

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDREDTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 19 March 1985, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. A.R. Taylhardat

(Venezuela)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. BELAID

Mr. H. RABEHI

Argentina:

Mr. J. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. Ph. NIEUWENHUYS

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. V. BOJILOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U HLA MYINT

Canada:

Mr. J.A. BEESLEY

Mr. A. DESPRES

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG

Ms. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. LIU ZHONGREN

Mr. SHI JICHENG

Mr. SHI JINKUN

Mr. LIN CHENG

Mr. YE RUAN

Mr. PAN JUSHENG

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA

Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGI

Mr. M. BADR

Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE

Mr. H. RENIE

Mr. G. MONTASSIER

Mr. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. L. MUELLER

Mr. W. KRUTZSCH

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. W-E. VON DEM HAGEN

Mr. M. GERDTS

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER

Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI

Mr. HARYO MATARAM

Ms. R. TANZIL

Mr. R.I. JENIE

Mr. I. DAMANIK

Mr. A.H. AKBAR

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. F. PIAGGESI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Mr. M. CELIO

Mr. R. DI CARLO

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA  
Mr. M. SATO  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI  
Mr. I. AKIYAMA

Kenya:

Mr. P.N. MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Ms. S. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART  
Mr. S-O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN  
Mr. J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. J. RYCHLAK  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. L-E. WINGREN  
Mrs. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. A.M. SHMATOV  
Mr. A.A. GORGILADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS  
Mr. D.M. SHANNON  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWTIZ  
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY  
Mr. L. BELGARD  
Mr. H.W. DAVIDSON  
Mr. D. DORN  
Mr. B. MORTON  
Mr. D. STEPHENS  
Mr. R. SCOTT  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. K. WHITE  
Mr. R. GOUGH  
Mr. J. TIERNEY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT  
Mr. O. GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 300th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today takes up consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any matter related to the work of the Conference.

The list of speakers for today includes the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Argentina, the United States of America and Poland.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, in connection with the start of discussion at our Conference on the question of the prevention of nuclear war, the Soviet delegation would like to express a number of considerations on the subject. We fully share the opinion of those who, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, consider the prevention of nuclear war to be the number one task of the present day.

Today, however, we shall not go into the question of the consequences which nuclear war would bring in its train. As we understand it, today even those who oppose the working out of specific measures to prevent nuclear war recognize-- at least in words -- that there will be no victors in such a war and that the vanquished will be all mankind, which will simply disappear from the face of the Earth. Our position on this subject has been repeatedly expounded in the statements of Soviet leaders; in our documents, including the letter of 12 February 1985 addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in connection with resolution 39/148 P; and in statements at the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and at this Conference. It has found concentrated expression in the Declarations adopted in the United Nations on our initiative concerning the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe and the condemnation of nuclear war.

We have already had repeated opportunities to express our view that the adoption by the United States of new programmes for the accumulation and qualitative improvement of nuclear armaments, the expansion of the geographical limits to their deployment and the transfer of the arms race to outer space sharply increases the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war.

We are convinced that, as Mr. M.S. Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, recently emphasized, "the only reasonable way out of the situation is an agreement between the contending forces to bring about an immediate cessation of the arms race-- primarily the nuclear arms race -- on Earth and not to permit it in space. An agreement on an honest and equal basis, without attempts to outmanoeuvre the other side and dictate one's own terms to it. An agreement which will help everyone to move towards the desired goal-- the complete destruction of nuclear weapons and their prohibition for ever; towards complete elimination of the threat of nuclear war".

(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

We would like to devote our statement today to an analysis of the situation which has arisen in the Conference on Disarmament on the question of the prevention of nuclear war. We regard that situation as inadmissible: more, as doing serious damage to the authority of the multilateral body for disarmament negotiations. We resolutely reject and condemn the position of that small group of States which, not for the first year, is preventing the Conference on far-fetched pretexts from taking up its duties as the multilateral body for negotiations on this most important and highest-priority question of contemporary world politics.

What are the arguments advanced by those opposed to working out specific measures to prevent nuclear war?

First of all we are told that the question of preventing war is allegedly not yet ripe for negotiation. We categorically object to such an assertion, which runs counter to mankind's yearning to save itself from nuclear catastrophe. We advise the gentlemen who maintain this point of view to open the windows of their offices and look into the street, where millions, hundreds of millions of people in all the countries of the world are calling for the adoption of measures designed to prevent war. We advise those gentlemen to read the petitions, the appeals of various social, scientific and other organizations addressed both to our Conference and to their Governments. The position of those opposed to working out specific measures to prevent nuclear war diverges radically from the aspiration of the peoples of countries throughout the world. We would like to declare this frankly and openly.

We are told further that the Conference on Disarmament is allegedly not the appropriate place in which to examine this question. We can by no means agree with this either. It stands to reason that the Soviet-American negotiations on a range of questions concerning nuclear and space armaments are of first-rank significance which is perhaps difficult to over-estimate. The Soviet Government has repeatedly emphasized the vast importance it attaches to those negotiations.

It is impossible, however, not to see that the problem of preventing nuclear war is common to all mankind: a universal problem. We do not consider that there are chosen States which can conduct negotiations on this question and States-- indeed, an overwhelming majority of them-- which must, as it were, stand aside from those negotiations.

Nuclear war threatens the fate and life of all peoples and States; therefore all peoples and States can and should contribute their mite to the task of devising measures to prevent nuclear war. In this connection I would like to ask the gentlemen who oppose the examination at our Conference of the question of preventing nuclear war to tell us the address, to name us the organ which, in their opinion, would allow a wide circle of States to make their contribution to the solution of a cardinal problem of mankind. A significant majority of delegations at the Conference on Disarmament are empowered by their Governments to conduct here, in this body, and now-- not in some indefinite future-- negotiations aimed at preventing nuclear war. These delegations have mandates from their peoples-- peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of mankind. On what basis, then, does a small group of States impede the working out of specific measures on this question?

(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

Thirdly, an assertion is often heard at the Conference to the effect that there are, so to speak, no foundations for the conduct of negotiations, no proposals on the subject. Such assertions are as remote from the truth as Heaven is from Earth. It is sufficient to acquaint oneself with the documents of the Conference in order to arrive at the contrary conclusion. There are, for instance, the documents of the socialist countries, CD/355 and CD/484, enumerating specific -- I repeat, specific -- measures on which a large group of States, representing one of the most important political alliances of the contemporary world and at the same time a significant proportion of the territory and population of the globe, propose the conduct of negotiations.

There are also specific proposals by a group of non-aligned and neutral countries (CD/341). The measures referred to in the appeal launched by the Heads of six States on five continents in May 1984 (CD/502) and in the Delhi Declaration by the same countries dated 28 January 1985 (CD/549) are steps in the same direction. Lastly, the delegations of a number of Western countries have submitted their own proposals: I refer to the documents of Belgium (CD/380) and the Federal Republic of Germany (CD/357).

I would like specifically to point out that the document of Belgium contains -- and I quote -- "a list -- purely illustrative, and not exhaustive -- of measures which could form the subject of negotiations in this connection" and a proposal that "The Committee on Disarmament should be made responsible for carrying out, within a framework to be determined by it, the necessary work leading to the elaboration of an international agreement or several international agreements on these matters". And nevertheless, it is precisely the group of Western countries -- not, it is true, in a very friendly chorus -- that opposes not only negotiations but even the establishment of a special subsidiary body on this question with any terms of reference whatsoever.

The delegations of certain Western countries say that the proposals of the Group of Socialist Countries and of the Group of 21 are unacceptable to them and that therefore there is nothing to negotiate about. I also observe that, to us also, many considerations and proposals put forward by the Western countries look ineffective and irrelevant.

Now, however, we would not wish to go into the substance of the proposals submitted either by the East or by the West. We know that they differ in many ways. Now we should like to inquire of the Western delegations which oppose the pursuit of practical work in a subsidiary organ on the prevention of nuclear war: what negotiations could they mention, from the centuries-old history of diplomacy, that began with the presentation of identical or concurrent views by the parties? In such situations it would probably be unnecessary even to hold negotiations; it would be merely a matter of affixing signatures to the identical views.

We are told that in order to begin negotiations it is necessary to agree on their subject. In our view, however, such agreement already exists in the form of the consent of all to the inclusion in the agenda of the Conference -- the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum -- of an item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". This is indeed the subject for negotiations: what it is specifically necessary to do in order not to allow nuclear war to be unleashed. No further concrete definition is needed for the start of negotiations; all remaining questions, including the concordance and definition of



(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

specific measures which would contribute to the prevention of nuclear war, can be successfully settled in the course of the negotiations themselves on the basis of mutual endeavours to reach agreement. The Conference was established for the very purpose of comparing different approaches and different views, of conducting negotiations on them, of striving to narrow existing differences of view and of working out mutually acceptable agreements. So why then are the delegations of the Western countries obstructing that normal process, customary diplomatic practice, which has justified itself over a period of many centuries?

The allusions voiced by the one delegation last year to the effect that practical work on this item is undesirable because it will be unduly "polemical" in character are artificial, in our opinion, and cannot justify the position of those who are obstructing the start of such practical work. On the contrary, the establishment of an ad hoc committee would create the conditions for serious, thoughtful discussion on all aspects of the problem of preventing nuclear war and for a peaceful search for mutually acceptable solutions.

Lastly, one of the favourite devices for frustrating businesslike negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war is the attempt to place an "equals" sign between war in general and nuclear war. The Soviet Union is a resolute opponent of all wars. The Soviet State -- I would like to remind those present in this chamber -- was born with the slogan of immediate cessation of an imperialist war, and left that war. The first decree of the Soviet State was the Decree on Peace. We are against war, but we nevertheless see differences between the wars of the past -- wars using conventional weapons -- and nuclear war.

In the first place nuclear war, as distinct from wars using conventional armaments, cannot be a means of implementing policy because it will inevitably lead to the destruction of him who unleashes it. In other words, if the result of conventional wars is, as a rule, the victory of one, and the defeat of the other, of the sides taking part in them, in a nuclear war there will be no victor and the loser will be the whole of mankind.

In the second place, nuclear war cannot be restricted to any one region or territory of the two opposing sides; all the States of the world will suffer its consequences. Nuclear war is a catastrophe on a world-wide scale, which will place in doubt the possibility of the continued existence of life on Earth.

In the third place, the consequences of nuclear war -- ecological, genetic, climatic, biological and so forth -- are different in principle from the consequences of war using conventional types of weapons.

Conventional and nuclear war, therefore, are phenomena of different orders. Consequently, tying the prevention of nuclear war to the settlement of other questions means creating artificial obstacles to the settlement of this first-rank question.

And now the last point. The delegations of Western countries are "magnanimously" agreeing now to examine questions of preventing nuclear war at informal meetings, in the course of some sort of consultations. They are even promising to express some sort of ideas about some sort of lines along which it would be possible to discuss those questions somewhere in a lobby in the background of the Conference on Disarmament. We shall not consent to that approach. The Conference was established for negotiations, and we demand the holding of negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war, negotiations with the aim of working out specific measures in accordance with the mechanism of negotiation prescribed by the rules of procedure of the Conference.

(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

This year, by all indications, the position of the Western countries on the question of preventing nuclear war is becoming even more rigid. Whereas last year they expressed readiness to establish a subsidiary body, now--- as the consultations held have shown--- the group of Western countries object in principle to that step. We would like to address to the group of Western countries through you, Mr. President, the question: has such a metamorphosis really taken place in their position? We would like to hope that that is not so, and that that group will not impede the conduct of negotiations with the aim of working out, in a subsidiary organ with appropriate terms of reference, specific measures to prevent nuclear war.

In conclusion we would also like to speak of the following matter. We often hear in this chamber, at various consultations and simply in the course of friendly chats between representatives at the Conference, expressions of regret that the authority and role of the Conference on Disarmament are steadily declining and declining. And this is really the case. To us, the Soviet delegation, and to the delegations of many other countries such a situation is very disturbing. But who is responsible for this? Is it not those who, for many years now, have stubbornly striven to turn the Conference into a debating club, and who obstruct the conduct of negotiations on a wide range of items of the Conference agenda? Is it not those, finally, who are depriving the Conference of the opportunity to respond to the demand of, essentially, the whole of mankind that it should immediately sit down at the table for negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war and, sparing neither time nor effort, bring them to a successful conclusion?

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): I should like at the outset to convey to our Soviet colleagues the feelings of deep sorrow and the sincere condolences of the Bulgarian delegation on the death of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko.

In my statement today I should like to speak on item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Preventing the militarization of outer space is nowadays a task of primary importance. Its accomplishment is central to the efforts of the international community to reduce the danger of war, in particular nuclear war. The outcome of these efforts will determine, to a great extent, the prospects of achieving meaningful agreements in other areas of arms control.

Strategic stability in the world today depends on our chances of success in the endeavour to spare outer space from becoming a new, and potentially most dangerous, arena of the arms race. It is incumbent upon all of us actively to work in order to reverse, before it is too late, the tendencies leading to the militarization of outer space.

The international community is not beginning the struggle for peace in outer space from scratch. Thanks to the vision and the efforts of those who have believed, and still believe, in preventive disarmament measures, the 1960s and the 1970s have witnessed the foundation of the international legal basis for guaranteeing the peaceful use of outer space.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Of undeniable importance in this respect are:

The 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water;

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies;

The 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems; and

The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

These are significant achievements in the efforts to limit the military uses of outer space.

Nevertheless, the task of completely excluding outer space from the sphere of the arms race remains unaccomplished. Its importance has sharply grown in the light of the latest developments resulting from the revival of some old hopes of using outer space for the achievement of military superiority. These acts call into question the possibility of undertaking further steps in the field of arms control in outer space. Similarly, serious concern has arisen that the relevant disarmament agreements would probably come into real danger.

Ongoing military programmes and preparations to acquire the capacity of waging "Star Wars" have brought about considerable concern world-wide. The so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" has become the subject of intensive discussions in the broadest political and scientific circles, for it constitutes an unprecedented challenge to the aspirations for peace of all peoples.

The "Strategic Defence Initiative" is officially presented as a futuristic programme to build a ballistic missile defence, with some of its elements based in space, which would reputedly render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". This initiative is widely perceived, however, as the latest attempt to impose upon the international community yet another dangerous militaristic concept, whose possible realization is fraught with innumerable risks for the future of all mankind. The real motivation of this "Star Wars" project seems, once again, to be that endless search to achieve strategic superiority by the United States over the Soviet Union, which would in practice be also the military superiority of NATO over the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The "defensive" terminology used to conceal the nature of this programme cannot hide the truth. And the truth is that, should the United States "Strategic Defence Initiative" be implemented, it would undermine the very foundations of international stability, peace and security. Similarly, it would adversely affect the efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and to develop further the international legal régime in the field of disarmament.

The majority of the international community remains unconvinced that the United States "Strategic Defence Initiative" is just scientific research, with no serious military and political implications.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The United States Congress has been asked to approve 3.7 billion dollars this year, after 1.4 billion last year, for "research" on what is envisaged as a three-tier anti-ballistic missile system. This is almost a threefold increase only for one year. Thirty billion dollars are planned for this purpose for the period of the next five years. Spending such huge sums has always been a serious indication that research activities are intended to enter, at some point, the stage of testing, production and deployment of the newly-created weapons.

Besides, a Joint Outer Space Command of the United States Armed Forces has already been set up. A command centre is under construction with a view to carrying out military operations in outer space.

Fred C. Ikle, United States Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy, stated that the "Strategic Defence Initiative" was not an optional programme, at the margin of the defence efforts, but that it was central to United States military planning well into the next century. The officer in charge of this programme, Lieutenant-General James A. Abrahamson, announced that the implementation of the project was going at such a fast pace that the first tests of space weapons with the use of the Shuttle type spaceships were envisaged as early as in 1987, two years ahead of the planned schedule.

In the large press-coverage of this issue last week, it was clearly stated that "Research under way at United States Government and military contractors' laboratories leaves no doubt that the "Star Wars" concept is far more than fantasy, or at least more than the political gambit that some have suggested it is."

Serious concern has been caused by the fact that the United States space-based anti-missile programme, which is advertised as a non-nuclear strategic defense, could serve several major offensive functions, which reveal its intended purpose.

Leading experts in this field have drawn our attention to the fact that this reputedly defensive system can be used as:

- (a) A defensive adjunct to an offensive nuclear attack-- a shield allowing nuclear-armed missiles to be launched in a first strike while the defense is held in reserve to cope with a retaliatory response;
- (b) A weapon to destroy enemy space satellites which have become an increasingly important part of the military strategic systems;
- (c) A means to unleash lightning-fast offensive strikes from space against relatively "soft" ground targets, such as planes, oil tankers, power plants, etc., causing instantaneous fires and damage that could "take an industrialized country back to an 18th-century level in 30 minutes"; and
- (d) A tool which after being further improved could be used to destroy the concrete and steel silos that protect strategic missiles underground, thus becoming itself a first-strike weapon.

As unrealistic as it may seem, the hope to create a fool-proof anti-missile system could, unfortunately, engender in some military-minded people a dangerous illusion that a nuclear attack could be launched with impunity. This may induce such people to consider nuclear war rationally thinkable, which would make nuclear war itself more probable.

As pointed out by the eminent United States scientists Hans A. Bethe (a Nobel Prize Winner), Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried and Henry W. Kendall: "Even if

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

space-based ballistic missile defense did not have a cataclysmic birth, the successful deployment of such a defense would create a highly unstable strategic balance. It is difficult to imagine a system more likely to induce catastrophe than one that requires critical decisions by the second, is itself untested and fragile, and is threatening to the other side's retaliatory capability".

The assertion that the envisaged United States anti-missile system is non-nuclear and defensive is devoid of any foundation. This system is designed directly to serve and supplement the strategic nuclear offensive forces. Various components of this system are based on the use of nuclear explosions for their energy supply. Moreover, parallel with the creation of a nuclear shield there continues the implementation of the programmes for the deployment of nuclear weapons with a first-strike capability, such as the MX ballistic missile, the Pershing-II missiles in Western Europe, the B-1 and "Stealth" bombers, the TridentII submarine missiles, etc.

The question naturally arises as to why it is necessary for the United States to introduce these nuclear systems, if its real intention is to switch to a non-nuclear strategy that is defence-oriented.

As to the contention that the "Strategic Defence Initiative" would eventually render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete", it is becoming more and more clear that the purported aim is to make Soviet nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete", while leaving the United States offensive nuclear arsenal virtually untouched, and even strengthening it.

The implementation of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" will deal a destructive blow to the efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament. It is widely expected that the establishment of a strategic defense system would open the way to an unlimited build-up of offensive nuclear forces.

McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith pointed out in their recent publication entitled: "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control", that: "There is simply no escape from the reality that Star Wars offers not the promise of greater safety, but the certainty of a large-scale expansion of both offensive and defensive systems on both sides. We are not here examining the dismayed reaction of our allies in Europe, but it is precisely this prospect that they foresee, in addition to the special worries created by their recognition that the Star Wars program as it stands has nothing in it for them. Star Wars, in sum, is a prescription not for ending or limiting the threat of nuclear weapons, but for a competition unlimited in expense, duration and danger".

The logic of these words is merciless. When one side creates a "nuclear shield" and deploys first-strike nuclear weapons, then the other side would be compelled to undertake all the necessary steps to counter the implicit threat to its own security, including through the expansion of its strategic nuclear forces. With reference to this aspect, Senator Edward Kennedy rightly pointed out last January that it was not necessary to be a Newton to understand that the first law of the nuclear-arms race requires that each action by one of the sides breeds a counter-action by the other.

Should the "Strategic Defence Initiative" be carried out it would not only undermine but break apart the existing elements of the international régime of non-militarization of outer space.

A direct threat would be made to the 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, prohibiting the development, testing and deployment of systems or components of anti-missile space-based defence, as well as the deployment of anti-missile defence systems covering the entire territories of

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

the States Parties. The conclusion of this Treaty of unlimited duration marked an important step in strengthening strategic stability, which led to the achievement of the SALT 2 agreements. The violation of the ABM Treaty, which the United States "Strategic Defence Initiative" objectively aims at, would lead to a sharp destabilization of the strategic environment, prejudicing the prospects for further agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament.

The 1963 Moscow PTB Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in outer space would also be in jeopardy. Carrying out such tests is envisaged as a means of energy supply for the X-ray laser components of the ABM system presently developed in the United States.

The new negotiations initiated last week in Geneva between the USSR and the United States on the whole complex of questions concerning outer space and nuclear weapons -- both strategic and intermediate-range -- are a hopeful gleam that the issues on which depends the security of all nations can be efficiently settled. These negotiations open up a new, perhaps a last, opportunity to prevent a dangerous militarization of outer space, and to create an environment conducive to making significant steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

In the Joint United States-Soviet Statement of 8 January this year, it was stated that "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability". Success at these negotiations seems to be contingent upon the adherence by both sides to its agreed subject and objective. Only a strict observance of all elements of the Joint Statement may advance the negotiations with a view to achieving "the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere".

My delegation and, I suspect, many others, are impressed by the constructive and comprehensive approach of the USSR to the non-militarization of outer space. The Soviet Union's readiness to radically solve this problem permeates its 1981 and 1983 draft treaties and its initiative submitted to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly entitled, "Using Outer Space Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes for the Benefit of Mankind".

Another expression of this constructive position has been given in the speech of 11 March by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Gorbachev.

The Conference on Disarmament is entrusted with the important task of working out agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. We believe that all delegations are duty bound to co-operate in embarking upon serious practical actions.

The best ground for proceeding in this respect is to set up an ad hoc committee on item 5, as stipulated in General Assembly resolution 39/59, which 150 States voted in favour of, with none against. The urgent need to adopt measures on the non-militarization of outer space is more than evident. In our opinion, the Conference should make every possible effort to resolve the procedural problem by the end of March, and initiate substantive work under this item.

We believe that this is possible if each of the three Groups makes its own contribution with a view to reaching a compromise that would pave the way for the Conference to fulfil its responsibility as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, my delegation salutes in you the representative of Venezuela, a country that has been the beacon of democracy in Latin America for many decades and has distinguished itself by the vigorous pursuit of justice, human rights and peace in the region.

My Government has insisted that the voice of my delegation be heard during the 1st plenary meeting of our Conference during this annual session that is devoted to agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". My Government, however, is not the only one to attach priority importance to the prevention of war, in particular a war involving nuclear weapons. There is a shared determination among all delegations in this room to this effect. Agenda item 3 is, indeed, a focal point of our collective endeavour. Disarmament and arms control cannot only mean the reduction or elimination of certain types of military hardware. The behavioural component is equally important. We must make sure that those weapons, and most particularly nuclear weapons, which States believe they must retain for their security are not used, and that war is henceforth excluded as a means of realizing political aims. The topic of prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, stresses both aspects of our task, the necessity to effect drastic cuts of weaponry, in the hope of the total elimination of certain categories of weapons, and the establishment of rules of State behaviour with the perspective of shaping an evermore peaceful world. The consideration of the agenda item takes on added significance at a time when the bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers are underway. It becomes even more evident that it is incumbent upon the Conference to contribute its share to a multilateral framework for the prevention of nuclear war and all armed conflict.

In its statement of 7 February, my delegation observed that an immediate task for the Conference would be to find an appropriate procedural format in which the prevention of war and the elaboration of possible appropriate and practical measures to that end could be considered; my delegation equally argued that it would be necessary to agree at an early point on a substantive programme of work under agenda item 3, sufficiently comprehensive to allow all perspectives and proposals to be thoroughly considered.

Working Paper CD/578, which I have the honour to introduce today and which is available to delegations, attempts to make a contribution to both objectives. I should make clear that at this juncture the Working Paper reflects the perspective of my own delegation. We hope, however, that it will receive broad support. In view of the difficulties which the choice of a precise organizational format for agenda item 3 has so far encountered, the Working Paper refrains from making hard-and-fast suggestions but, instead, spells out the prerequisites for any argumentative and purposeful consideration of the agenda item. It does so by establishing a list of criteria which the future procedural format ought to meet. The Working Paper equally contains a draft work programme under agenda item 3 in the form of a structured list of items to be taken up. This list does not reflect rigid positions, but merely undertakes to englobe earlier attempts to prepare our substantive work under the agenda item. My delegation has conscientiously included as many proposals and concepts from other delegations and groups as possible. The list, however, remains open for any reasonable modification and amendment. The test of its usefulness would, of course, be the degree of consensus that could be achieved both on the list and on the substantive examination of their individual subitems.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The Working Paper, in effect, poses a critical query: when and how can this Conference finally get down to substantive and future oriented work on agenda item 3, in the sense of a thorough, rational examination of all views and proposals in the most operational and solution-oriented manner?

The starting positions held by most delegations and groups are clear. They have been spelt out on many occasions. We must now begin to discuss and to provide the argumentative underpinnings of our views; we must cease merely to promulgate them. All views, including the most seductive but also the most controversial, must be put to the same rigorous and professional test: the test of reason. No delegation or group of delegations should get away with often glib, arbitrary and superficial recipes for the prevention of nuclear war, only because somebody had prescribed them before or because they had been the subject matter of such and such Conference or resolution. The objective in a Conference built on consensus is clear. We must undertake a search for problem solutions that are commonly acceptable and fulfil the security requirements of all. It must be obvious to all delegations that unity of views in disarmament -- and thereby results -- can only be achieved if the security of all States is enhanced.

My delegation and other Western delegations have repeatedly, and most recently at the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, put forward views on security. Now comes the opportunity to argue, to explain and to provide the rationale behind such views. But my delegation, jointly with others, will conduct the examination under agenda item 3 in a spirit of common purpose and in a search for consensus, both in the strict interpretation of the letter and spirit of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We will listen carefully, but we also want to be listened to. We strive for a rich, rewarding dialogue, joining in the search for a common strategy for the prevention of war in the nuclear age. It is the hope of my delegation that the present Working Paper will make a contribution towards this end.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): This year the world will commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the onset of the nuclear age. In 1945, a terrible instrument of mass destruction appeared on the face of the Earth, and it has been with us ever since, in constantly growing numbers and destructive potential. For the first time in history, the extermination of all life on the planet became a real possibility.

For more than four decades, mankind has had to live with the knowledge that its future is uncertain and that quite suddenly and unexpectedly a hecatomb may be unleashed which will put an end to centuries of civilization and, in the best of cases, condemn the survivors to an unpredictable fate.



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

When signing the Delhi Declaration on 28 January this year, the President of the Republic of Argentina eloquently referred to the dark shadow looming over mankind today. He said:

"We have lost the right to life. Nobody demanded that we should hand it over; and we never renounced it of our own free will. But almost without our realizing it, it was torn from us by the nuclear arms race between the super-Powers.

"All the rights and freedoms of peoples and of nations, all the material and spiritual goods which, in all their variety, they possess, have a single foundation: the right to life. This is so essential an attribute that it has never been denied by any civilization or culture. Nevertheless, today we have lost it: in a few minutes a small group of persons can destroy what every human being on this planet possesses -- beginning with his life and the lives of his family -- as well as everything that every nation has built up over centuries, without hearing our voice, regardless of our will and without our even knowing it. It is even possible that shortly it will not even be a group of people but a couple of machines which will automatically put an end to mankind."

The situation we are facing is vividly described in those words, whose logical consequence is that mankind has one, and only one, overriding task before it: to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war.

The prevention of nuclear war, agenda item 3 of this Conference, has been the sole unavoidable task, I should say ever since the first atomic bomb was exploded. It was regrettable, one might even say tragic, that this impressive event occurred when the Charter of the United Nations had already been signed barely six weeks earlier. The extent to which countries would have been prepared to sacrifice their sovereignty if they had acted under the impact of the hair-raising prospects then opened up will always be one of the great unanswerable questions in history. In any event, that did not happen. It remained for the people and the society of the second half of the twentieth century to find the formulas and avenues capable of making a twenty-first century possible.

This is not the occasion on which to recall all the efforts made to that end. They have been many and various, bilateral and multilateral. Yet the clear objectives of the early years have been gradually becoming blurred, I think, and the paths have grown separate. Towards the end of the 1940s, an opportunity was lost which was never to arise again. It should not be forgotten that the Baruch Plan envisaged that all activities for the peaceful use of atomic power would be conducted under the control of an international authority, that the production of nuclear weapons would cease and that they would no longer be included in national arsenals.

Shortly afterwards, it should also be remembered, Mr. Gromyko, who was ambassador at that time, proposed a draft convention under which the States parties would undertake not to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances, to prohibit the production and stockpiling of such weapons and to destroy existing stocks.

As we all know, the opportunity slipped by without anything being achieved. International efforts did not cease, however, but became less ambitious and fragmented into a number of paths. Efforts were made to avert the outbreak of

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

nuclear war by error, lack of communication or accident. Efforts were also directed towards the non-use of force in international relations or strengthening methods of peaceful settlement of disputes. Attempts were made to provide assurances for non-nuclear weapon countries on the part of the nuclear-weapon countries. A nuclear weapon-free zone was established, and the creation of others is being promoted. Confidence-building measures are being fostered, and a partial nuclear test ban treaty was signed, while efforts are being made in main to achieve a complete ban. Bilateral disarmament agreements were signed, and it is hoped to achieve a freeze of nuclear arsenals or a ban on the production of fissionable material. And this list is by no means an exhaustive one.

Some of these efforts have been successful, the remainder not. Broadly speaking, there has been little or no progress, and in some cases even regression, as in the case of a nuclear-weapon-test ban.

It may be said, however, that even when the outlook was more favourable, the avenues chosen, valid in themselves, are not conducive to the final elimination of the danger of a nuclear hecatomb. Whatever the individual merits of any of these approaches, there can be no denying the fact that they only signify or seek to achieve a reduction or attenuation of the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. They by no means render it impossible. Worse still, the goal remains remote, and sometimes appears to be growing more and more distant and even becoming unattainable.

From the standpoint of the prevention of nuclear war, partial or collateral measures are ineffective or transitory. It may be possible, for example, to remove three SS-20 for every Pershing-II, or vice versa, and this will be considered a great step forward; but will the situation really have changed? Will not new missiles soon replace those which have been banned or limited? Do not new instruments of war appear every day, such as the nuclear delivery vehicles which fly at low altitude, much lower than aircraft, violating the sovereign airspace of States and creating direct and indirect risks of all kinds? The Under-Secretary for Political Affairs of Finland, Dr. Törnudd, referred to this problem a few days ago.

In saying this, I do not wish in any way to underestimate the value or importance of the efforts being made, although obviously they are not all of equal value. Concrete results in these efforts will always be positive and welcome. We must be clearly aware, however, that even so, the supreme objective, the prevention of nuclear war, will not have been attained.

To prevent means to avoid, to block, to forestall, and this will never be ensured as long as nuclear weapons continue to be included in the arsenals of each Power.

As long as these instruments of mass destruction exist, the risk of an attack, even if accidental or involuntary, remains, just as the possibility of retaliation logically remains.

If we really want to achieve the complete and effective prevention of nuclear war, there is only one path capable of guaranteeing that we obtain this objective: the prohibition -- to use the current terminology for chemical weapons -- of the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, stationing and use of nuclear weapons.

The fact that this is in our opinion the only way in which really to avert the outbreak of nuclear war does not mean that it is easy, near to hand or even possible, at least in the immediate future. To mention it even seems a token of naivety or self-delusion.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

We must not forget, nevertheless, that once this objective was possible, as I recalled a moment ago. We must bear in mind that the prohibition of nuclear weapons remains the steadfast objective of the great majority of the international community. We must not fail to appreciate that in the bilateral communiqué of 8 January 1985, and for the first time in this context, the general and complete elimination of nuclear weapons is recognized as a valid objective.

The desirability of the disappearance of nuclear weapons or of their becoming obsolete is frequently referred to today. I must point out in this connection, as our colleague the Ambassador of Peru did a few days ago, that if this is the real objective, the most direct and least expensive path is the negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the verification of which would be no more difficult than in the case of others which might possibly be envisaged. In addition, the available and rapid means of rendering nuclear weapons obsolete is obviously a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon testing. Both these paths are open, and have been for many years.

The years pass by, and the world continues to live in a state of insecurity, uncertainty and instability that is unbearable, without the least promise of any solution. The question which must be asked is how long can mankind sit back and tolerate a situation which the Delhi Declaration describes in the following terms:

"Almost imperceptibly, over the last four decades, every nation and every human being has lost ultimate control over their own life and death. For all of us, it is a small group of men and machines in cities far away who can decide our fate. Every day we remain alive is a day of grace as if mankind as a whole were a prisoner in the death cell awaiting the uncertain moment of execution. And like every innocent defendant, we refuse to believe that the execution will ever take place."

It is fair to ask whether the nuclear-weapon countries really need those weapons in order to live in security, or at least the relative security which can be achieved in this world. In the final analysis, would they not genuinely be safer if there were no nuclear weapons capable of **attacking** them from thousands of kilometres away? Do not conventional defence systems have the same power of deterrence and defence? Is it not true that the Soviet Union and the United States are invulnerable in conventional terms?

The possibility of nuclear retaliation has always been justified as the only means for Western Europe to overcome the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. Even admitting that this superiority exists, does this necessarily have to be the case? Are nuclear weapons the only alternative? Does the West not have sufficient human and material resources -- if it is prepared to pay the price -- to put up a credible conventional deterrent against any opponent?

The risks of nuclear war will last inevitably as long as some States base their security on the possible use of atomic weapons. Nuclear deterrence and the prevention of nuclear war are, I believe, contradictory, incompatible concepts. Until those States forego this means of defence, which they claim is necessary to defend themselves, any attempt to eliminate the tremendous danger which is of such concern to use will remain vain. What is odd or paradoxical in all this is that the "self-defence" invoked involves not only the possible obliteration of the enemy but also, plainly and simply, self-destruction and, as a by-product, the devastation of the rest of mankind. Henry Kissinger seems to be right in saying, in a recently published article, that while nuclear arsenals have grown and nuclear war has become

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

a synonym of mutual annihilation, the West has refused to face up to the psychological impossibility of continuing to count on general nuclear war as a plausible strategy.

The assumption that the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons guarantees peace and ensures that they will never be used -- as was asserted in a statement in their defence made at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament -- is an enormous fallacy, in which just one mistake -- and there are many who could commit it, on either side -- would make the dreaded nightmare a reality. Just one single mistake will be enough, because there will be no time for a second.

What I have said above is an inescapable reality. As long as nuclear arms exist and as long as some people see their use as legitimate and justified, efforts to prevent nuclear war will be so many half-way steps, fruitless attempts to obtain the impossible, substitutes which will avoid fundamentals, if not mere exercises in self-deception which will even be counter productive.

A clear example of the latter is the desire to sink the problem of the prevention of nuclear war in the wider problem of prevention of war in general. The latter is a praiseworthy objective which mankind has pursued since its earliest days and which it should continue to try to achieve, but it ignores the urgency and specificity of the other objective which should undeniably have priority.

It is utterly impossible to confuse the two problems or to believe that there are only differences of degree or of scale between them. A few words spoken by Vice-Admiral John Marshall Lee, at the colloquium organized on this subject by the Bellerive Group in December 1983, clearly and soundly summarize the difference in nature of what is at stake. The difference between nuclear war and conventional war, Admiral Lee said, is so great that we would do better to put different names to the two, in other words, not use the same word, "war", in the two cases. The prevention of nuclear war must therefore be recognized as a separate and supreme objective for all nations and peoples of the world. Of course, we also wish to prevent conventional wars. And we have other profoundly important causes: personal, national and universal ones. But the prevention of nuclear war is in itself in a separate category. For if we use the word "vital" literally, the prevention of nuclear war is the only vital, genuinely vital, interest of States. If we fail to prevent nuclear war, all other objectives and causes will become utterly insignificant. Peace, total peace, is a splendid objective. Nuclear peace is an absolute practical necessity, he said.

I am quite aware that it is not difficult, especially with regard to subjects which have been so much discussed like this one, to find quotations to support any statement. But it is undeniably easier, much easier, to find them when trying to describe the sinister nature of nuclear weapons. It is much more difficult, on the other hand, when seeking to praise their alleged virtues. In such cases, we usually find that those who extol their benefits are directly or indirectly officials of the Governments brandishing them, and it is an odd but very significant fact that those same people frequently swell the ranks of their opponents when they leave public office and can express their genuine feelings. The distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria made this point a few days ago when quoting the words of Lord Zuckerman.

The Conference on Disarmament included item 3 in its agenda in 1983 in response to a request from the General Assembly in resolution 37/78 I. It was the hope of my delegation and of many others which co-sponsored or voted for the resolution that this topic, the overriding issue of our time, would receive the priority, serious and substantive consideration it deserves within this body.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

This has regrettably not been the case. We have been given virtually academic exercises which, whatever their interest, are not in keeping with the terms of reference and specific function of this Conference, and provide no other prospect than an unending debate on wide-ranging problems which it takes a very special outlook to consider as falling within the agenda item "prevention of nuclear war". The Group of 21, which deeply desires that a real beginning should be made on an unavoidable task, has therefore displayed great flexibility, which led to the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee contained in document CD/515.

The outcome was negative, as we all know, and there is no reason to suppose -- although I hope I may be mistaken -- that this year the picture will be any different. As on so many other issues, including those which have been so much discussed and are so ripe as agenda item 1, we find ourselves faced with an insurmountable obstacle.

We cannot, however, resign ourselves to frustration or inactivity. It is the fate of everyone that is at stake. In resolution 39/148 P, the General Assembly once again renews its request to the Conference on Disarmament to deal actively with the question of the prevention of nuclear war, but at the same time invites Governments to submit their views on the best way of expediting action on the question, and requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the subject.

We are eager to learn the contents of the answers which Governments send in reply to the Secretary-General, as well as the report requested from the Secretary-General. It is to be hoped that the study of these documents will give rise to new avenues and procedures for advancing along the road towards the prevention of nuclear war. Among these possible avenues, as the Government of Argentina pointed out in its reply, there is the possibility of establishing, as an organ of the General Assembly, an ad hoc committee on the prevention of nuclear war. If set up, it might serve as a fruitful forum for the discussion and continuing analysis of the existing situation in this field, capable of promoting and sponsoring the adoption of appropriate and practical measures which the General Assembly is calling for and which are essential for the future of mankind.

In any event, we have an inescapable duty to pursue and step up our efforts to bring about the real prevention of nuclear war.

I began this statement by quoting a few words spoken by the President of the Republic of Argentina when signing the Delhi Declaration. I think it is perhaps appropriate to end with another quotation from the same speaker on the same occasion:

"There are people who think that there will be no nuclear holocaust because there has not been one so far. They are wrong. If the ideas which have prevailed so far in the nuclear arms race continue to be applied, the holocaust will inevitably occur sooner or later.

"There are those who have resigned themselves and accept the holocaust as inevitable. They too are wrong. Nuclear war is not a biological fact from which we cannot escape, but a political fact which we can and must prevent.

"It is essential to put an end to this awful threat. It is essential that we recover our right to life. Everywhere and at all times, peoples and nations must demand that it be returned to us. We do not have the strength to make this happen, but we do have the right, and voices, to demand it."

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): In my remarks today, I want to address an item added to our agenda relatively recently, but which is of considerable importance to my delegation, as it is to all of the States represented here. The Conference on Disarmament has had under consideration the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space for only four years. Work on this issue in this and other forums has attracted the attention of the world community because of the role that the boundless environment of outer space increasingly plays in our daily affairs.

One cannot overestimate the benefits to the world that have resulted from the peaceful uses of outer space, which began some thirty years ago, and have multiplied to the point that instantaneous, global telecommunications made possible by artificial earth satellites are almost taken for granted. We also tend to forget how recently we have developed the ability to monitor the world's weather system in near-real time, to track the progress of major storm systems, to provide early warning to citizens, and to aircraft and to ships on the high seas. Most of us have probably seen the striking photographs which remote sensing satellites send back to Earth. These assist in locating natural resources, and in averting natural catastrophe from erosion or land misuse.

At the same time, we must very frankly acknowledge the fact that, in parallel with the great benefits from the peaceful uses of outer space that I have mentioned, and the myriad of other such uses far too numerous to describe here, outer space has long occupied an important role in the military activities of States and alliances of States. This role has included communications, navigation and monitoring the activities of military forces on the Earth's surface. Early warning against the possibility of large-scale attack by nuclear forces is another military activity of fundamental importance.

I think it is fair to say that all of the States represented in this chamber have a stake not only in the peaceful uses of outer space, but in the military uses as well. All of us, I believe, can agree that the monitoring by satellite of a number of international agreements in the arms control area, such as the bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, is an important application of space technology that directly serves international security and stability. Co-operative measures, such as the "hot-line" agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, also rely on the use of space -- in this case to provide the communications links.

All of us can recognize as well that outer space has been the location of military activities related to the testing of weapons, and, in at least one instance, the Soviet ASAT weapon system, the operational environment of an existing system for the destruction of satellites. Moreover, every time an intercontinental ballistic missile is tested, from the first such test by the Soviet Union in 1957, the trajectory of the missile's flight passes through outer space. The fact of operational ballistic missile forces possessed by a number of States is, of course, directly relevant to the security of every nation.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

It is evident that the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is not a simple matter. It has many aspects, and all of them need to be considered. One such aspect of considerable importance is a development that many delegations here have already welcomed. That is the convening of bilateral negotiations between my country and the Soviet Union on 12 March here in Geneva, having the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth. A number of interventions in the Conference have stressed the special responsibilities of the two major Powers, due to the extent of their involvement in outer space, and have urged them to give special attention to the arms control issues that involvement implies. Indeed, this is exactly what we hope will take place in these bilateral negotiations. One of the three negotiating groups in which the bilateral negotiations will take place will address defence and space weapons.

However, to say that two Powers presently have the greatest involvement in outer space does not mean that other States do not also have a presence and a role in that environment. Everyone recognizes that States and consortia including China, France, Japan, India, and the European Space Agency, have launched their own satellites into outer space. Many other States have made use of launching facilities of those States or consortia which offer them and similarly now have satellites operating in orbit. Thus, there is unquestionably a multilateral dimension to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, and the Conference on Disarmament needs to address this question in depth.

My delegation has joined with other Western delegations in proposing, as a compromise, that the Conference decide to establish an ad hoc committee, to identify, in the first instance, through a thorough and substantive examination, issues relevant to our agenda item. The Committee would take into account all existing agreements, and also take into account existing proposals and future initiatives.

In his statement of 12 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, addressed the question of an ad hoc committee. He suggested that the Committee undertake the task, complementary to work in the bilateral negotiations, of a comprehensive examination of existing multilateral agreements.

We recognize, Mr. President, the useful consultations which, under your guidance, have been continuing on the question of establishing a subsidiary body, and we hope that these consultations will soon bear fruit so that the Conference can get down to work within the framework of an ad hoc committee.

As long ago as 1982 my delegation spoke in a plenary meeting of the Conference on the important role played by present commitments in arms control agreements in ensuring international peace and stability. These agreements include the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; and the

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

1972 bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. My delegation will have considerably more to say on agreements such as these, within the context of the work of the ad hoc committee. At this point, let me simply note that the present network of international agreements respecting the outer space environment already provides exceptionally important, legally binding limitations on military activities in that arena, and my Government considers compliance with those obligations to be of the greatest importance.

Let me turn now to a related issue which has been very much in the forefront of public attention over the past several months, a subject which was raised by the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, in March of 1983, and which is known as the Strategic Defence Initiative. I think it important to address this issue here today because so much has been said that is either misleading or plainly wrong. We need to consider the Strategic Defence Initiative on the basis of fact, not fantasy.

The essential idea in the Strategic Defence Initiative is this: suppose that research could demonstrate the feasibility of constructing a defensive system that could render far less potent, or even harmless, the threat posed by nuclear-armed ballistic missiles? Would it not be better, in this event, to agree to restructure the basis of strategic stability, from one relying ultimately on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons to one relying on a defensive system that posed no such threat? Would this not be a more stable system of international security, of deterrence of war, than the present one? And would it not contribute toward the objective -- an objective that we all fully share -- of the total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere?

We should ask ourselves: why not open the floodgates of creativity for ideas to increase the chances that nuclear weapons will never be used, to ensure that a nuclear war -- which can never be won -- will never be fought? These are objectives to which all members of this Conference have committed themselves for many years: the search for international security, the attempt to bring ideas and diplomacy to bear on the most crucial problem of our age. I hope, then, that States represented here will not leap to criticize, but rather will consider carefully what my Government has in fact proposed. After all, if members of this body have attacked the theories of mutual terror or mutual assured destruction as inadequate or even immoral, is it responsible now for them to insist that defensive systems cannot and should not be devised that would lead to an escape from these theories and toward nuclear disarmament? Is it not defeatist a priori to deny that technology can serve stabilizing and not only first-strike scenarios?

In his statement on 12 March, the distinguished Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Richard Luce, succinctly described the basis of the programme of research on which my Government has embarked. He cited four points as agreed between the



(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, and President Reagan. I believe these points bear being described again:

First, the objective of the Strategic Defence Initiative is not to create a situation in which the United States or the West would somehow achieve superiority. Rather, the objective is to seek a situation of balance, taking into account developments by the Soviet Union.

Second, any deployment of weapons related to the Strategic Defence Initiative would, in view of our obligations under existing treaties, in particular the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, have to be a matter for negotiations.

Third, the objective of the Strategic Defence Initiative is to enhance the deterrence of war, not to increase the prospects of conflict.

Fourth, we seek, in our negotiations, to strengthen international security and to bring about reductions in the levels of offensive nuclear weapons on both sides.

With regard to these four points, I want to stress that the United States has taken, and continues to take seriously, its obligations under existing arms-control agreements. Consistent with this position, the United States has not conducted and has no intention of conducting any of the research under the Strategic Defence Initiative in a manner inconsistent with its treaty obligations, particularly its obligations under the ABM Treaty. In fact, as numerous statements by officials of the United States Government have made clear, one of the objectives of our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union is precisely to stop and reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty.

I think it is salient to note, in this connection, that the obligations assumed by the parties to the ABM Treaty do not include limitations on research. Research is not prohibited by this agreement, and, in fact, the United States has engaged in a limited research programme on technologies related to defence against ballistic missiles for many years, extending back to the entry into force of the Treaty and before.

This, of course, is also the case with the other party to the Treaty. However, our assessment is that the activities of the Soviet Union in the area of defensive technologies have been considerably greater than our own. Indeed, we estimate that over the last two decades their commitment of resources to strategic defence has been roughly comparable -- I repeat roughly comparable -- to the very high levels of their expenditures on offensive forces and has been many times higher than United States expenditures on defensive systems. Moreover, the Soviet Union continues to deploy a system of anti-ballistic missile defences, while the United States has not done so for nearly a decade.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The Soviet Union has also engaged in a programme to upgrade the capabilities of their ABM system. The investment of the Soviet Union in advanced technologies related to missile defence has also been considerable, for example, in the area of directed energy systems such as high-energy lasers.

Naturally, in the Soviet Union such programmes are not the subject of parliamentary or public debate. Who in the USSR raised doubts about the Soviet space initiative? We have no way of knowing. We here all know well that Soviet weapons become the subject of debate -- outside the Soviet Union -- after they have been deployed. In the West, we discuss weapons long before we decide to produce them.

As explained in document CD/561, introduced by my delegation on 12 February, my Government has concluded that the large phased-array radar under construction by the Soviet Union in Siberia at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of its obligations under the ABM Treaty. Moreover, other Soviet development activity and deployments of "air defence" surface-to-air interceptors with potential capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles raise more questions regarding Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty. In short, those who would complain about the actions of my Government with regard to research on defensive technologies would do well to direct their attention, their analysis, their questions, and their complaints elsewhere.

As a simple matter of prudence, my Government's investigations into strategic defensive technologies are needed to ensure that it is in a position to balance the developments by the Soviet Union to which I have referred. Such research constitutes an essential "hedge" against a developing potential by the Soviet Union to "break out" suddenly from the constraints imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It serves, as well, as a response to the erosion of the strategic balance caused by the continuing build-up by the Soviet Union of offensive arms. The United States cannot afford to allow a unilateral advantage to the Soviet Union that might open the door to a potential first strike. The activities of the Soviet Union must and will be taken into account so as to correct and stabilize the military balance. The United States will, of course, raise this issue in the bilateral negotiations and in other diplomatic channels.

On 5 March, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, made a statement to this body on the same agenda item to which I am speaking today. I welcome his reference to important co-operative efforts in the peaceful uses of outer space, not the least of which is the SARSAT-COSPAS rescue system, which my country has joined with the Soviet Union, Canada and France in developing and operating. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Bulgaria have now also joined this system. These efforts are heartening evidence of how States can work together to advance the international framework of co-operation. The scientific missions to explore Venus and Halley's Comet on its close approach to the sun next year are other fascinating and profitable ventures in international co-operation.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Therefore, it was with some concern that I listened to other parts of Ambassador Issraelyan's statement, in particular his characterization of threats to international security supposedly arising from "vast space militarization programmes" recently adopted by the United States, including the Strategic Defence Initiative and the United States development programme for an anti-satellite weapon system. This characterization of the present situation can only be described as bizarre.

It was not the United States that first tested intercontinental ballistic missiles transiting through outer space. It was not the United States that developed a fractional orbital bombardment system using nuclear warheads -- a system with no Western counterpart. It is not the United States that for over a decade has deployed and continued to test an operational anti-satellite weapon system. It is not the United States that maintains and is improving an operational anti-ballistic missile system. It is not the United States that has constructed a radar in violation of the obligations of the ABM Treaty. In sum, it is not the United States whose military development, testing and procurement have given a basis for fears that sudden abandonment of the ABM Treaty may be envisioned and plans for a first strike might be in preparation.

As stressed in document CD/561, non-compliance with arms control agreements now in force is a matter of crucial importance to my Government. But non-compliance is equally important to the world community. For whatever insistent calls may be issued here and there for sweeping new disarmament measures, often without regard to their verifiability, each of us here knows full well that arms control without confidence in strict compliance by all parties is a contradiction in terms. Such arms control does not add to world stability and security. It directly undermines these goals. Accordingly, the Conference on Disarmament surely has a vital stake in upholding the integrity of arms control agreements currently in force.

Let me generalize now on the actions of the Soviet Union that I have cited in the field of strategic offense and defense. As a whole, they have created a definite current imbalance and they threaten future strategic stability. But the Soviet Government did not raise the alarm over the "militarization" of space when it undertook its vast strategic buildup. Only now, when there is concern that this arsenal could be rendered less potent, or even harmless, is the militarization of space decried by some. This is understandable -- transparent, but understandable.

We welcome the expression of resolute opposition by the Soviet Union to competition in nuclear or any other arms. This is entirely consistent with our own position. The United States has made clear that if our research into defensive systems indicates their feasibility, survivability and cost-effectiveness, the deployment of such systems will be the subject of discussion, consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty, and consistent

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

with the Treaty's provisions for amendment. As President Reagan recently described it, our long-term commitment is to "internationalize" missile defences if they can be made effective. It is, thus, without foundation to suppose that the United States, by its efforts, seeks to increase and not reduce prospects of a nuclear confrontation.

I have already pointed out that the United States intends to undertake its research activities in full compliance with its Treaty obligations. Ambassador Issraelyan has argued that it would be "too naive" to assume that a programme of research would not inevitably lead to deployment because of "inherent momentum" in military technology. I can only speak for my Government on this account: we see no such inherent momentum in any piece of equipment or technology, and we trust that there is no such mechanistic or "inherent" momentum in the military technologies for defensive weapons under research in the Soviet Union. We trust that Ambassador Issraelyan does not mean his remarks to be an announcement of future deployment of defensive systems in contravention of the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Outer Space Treaty, because of some inherent momentum in military technology.

I also take issue with Ambassador Issraelyan's claim that the United States programme to develop an anti-satellite weapon system is a particularly dangerous threat to international stability because of a potential dual-purpose role, as both an anti-satellite and an anti-nuclear missile warhead system. Rather, the United States programme is a measured response to deter Soviet use of their operational ASAT system and to provide a capability to counter Soviet satellites that, while not weapons themselves, can help target terrestrial forces of the United States and other nations. And the specious claim that Western deployments of intermediate-range weapons in Europe are deployments of "first-strike" nuclear systems merits no rebuttal except to say that the deployment by the Soviet Union of its SS-20 missiles with over 1,200 warheads is being met with a measured and much smaller response.

I share Ambassador Issraelyan's hopes for a completely successful outcome to the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union that began last week. I also echo the intention he voiced to be constructive in ensuring successful work in the Conference on Disarmament. That intention will be best served by avoidance of polemics.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that my delegation is heartened by the receptiveness being indicated by so many delegations to the compromise mandate proposed for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to undertake serious, practical work to consider arms control and disarmament measures applicable to outer space. The time to establish a Committee is surely now.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Since this is the first time that I take the floor under your Presidency, let me congratulate you both on assuming this important function and the effective way in which you are carrying it out, which testifies to your personal and professional qualities. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Lowitz, for his contribution to the Conference's work during his Presidency in February. In my statement today I also would like to dwell on item 5 of our agenda, prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Ever since the first man-made object reached the Earth's orbit the international community has been confronted with the question of how to limit outer space exploration to exclusively peaceful purposes. One of the earliest initiatives designed to foreclose military utilization of outer space was the Soviet proposal of 15 March 1958 to conclude an agreement banning the use of outer space for military purposes, the elimination of foreign military bases, and the establishment of a United Nations agency for international co-operation in the study of outer space. This proposal became a spring-board for subsequent initiatives, many of them embodied in various United Nations resolutions. Together with several reports of various international organizations and of scientific institutions all over the world, arguing the need for the prevention of militarization of outer space, they are the proof that many have seen the imminent danger and tried to prevent it. It is due to these efforts that an important Treaty on rules governing the activities of States in outer space was concluded in 1967. The Treaty served as a basis for a number of important conventions together creating an international legal régime regulating various activities in this new domain of human activity. The most important achievement of that period was a prohibition of deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

Though an important step forward, all the existing regulations did not, however, prevent the use of outer space for military purposes.

That is why the world community expects early progress in working out further international guarantees to safeguard space from an arms race. This attitude was best indicated by the overwhelming vote last year for General Assembly resolution 39/59, a single resolution dealing with prevention of an arms race in outer space adopted by 150 votes, with only one State choosing to abstain. The political importance of this event was amply commented by Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka in his statement of 5 March 1985, where he said: "It is impressive not because we are playing a simplistic numbers game but because it does reflect a wide international consensus on a crucial issue. In essence the resolution represents the undisputed universal commitment of the international community, speaking with one voice, to the basic principles underlying the prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, it has to be said openly that it would be too demanding or even unrealistic in this state of world affairs to expect an agreement prohibiting all kinds of military activities in space or all kinds of military utilization of space objects. Such an all-embracing agreement would require a much more propitious international climate and could be achieved together with comprehensive and far-reaching disarmament measures on Earth.

What seems to be now within our reach and, moreover, what seems to be a much more urgent task is the need to foreclose the imminent new stage of militarization of outer space, i.e., the introduction of weapons into the space environment and turning it into yet another future battlefield. An indication of how to tackle this truly vital question may be provided by the Soviet proposal of August 1981 to conclude an agreement on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space; as well as another Soviet initiative of March last year in which

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

a draft treaty was proposed on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. My delegation wholeheartedly supports these proposals and invites other delegations to give serious thought to them. Should the world community choose to neglect these and similar proposals, it would soon come very close to an ominous stage in which it would confront a rapid expansion of capabilities for future war activities, encompassing both Earth and outer space at a distance of several thousand kilometers away, activities carried out with help of semi- or fully- automated weapon systems, capable of attacking objects in orbit, and from orbit targets on Earth.

The alarmistic tone I am using is not accidental. It is a matter of fact that one of the leading Great Powers had undertaken an unprecedented scientific and technical research programme with a view to developing over several years to come a strategic system of weapons in order to make its territory an unpenetrable fortress while preserving its enormous offensive capability. The scale of effort connected with the realization of the United States Strategic Defence Initiative, measured in terms of the money allotted to it, is several times bigger than the famous Manhattan Project or the Moon landing programme, the two biggest research programmes ever undertaken by the United States. The budget allocated already to this strategic programme and planned for the next five years indicates clearly that it is going to be intensified year by year. While in 1986 it will cost over \$2.5 billion, in 1990 it will reach over \$8.5 billion, and during the next five years a total of not less than \$26 billion is to be spent.

The entire programme was launched under the guise of its impeccable morality, its purely defensive character, and its unquestionably beneficial nature for the strategic stability and disarmament, and we have heard arguments, even today, to that effect. The most deceitful of all these claims is that the realization of the SDI will enable the eradication of nuclear weapons or, at least, will render these weapons obsolete. The arguments forwarded so far in order to substantiate this claim are less than convincing. All of them are based on shaky grounds, whether political or scientific. No one knows what will be in forty or fifty years from now. There are, however, several consequences of the realization of the SDI which can now easily be foreseen or are already known, all of which are dangerous for the world's security.

The United States drive toward the creation of several categories of space weapons will have disastrous consequences for the world's political, military and economic stability. These are not merely hollow words: I would like to elucidate the grounds on which this statement is based.

The plan to create a "defensive shield" is being portrayed in the United States as a protective, non-provocative undertaking. It may be seen as such, however, only by a layman. To anyone who understands the intricacies of the strategic balance of today, it is obvious that when a State possessing a modern, that is highly accurate and reliable, offensive arsenal acquires a monopoly in a strong strategic defence, it gains a superiority and is able to use its nuclear forces first with small or no fear of a retaliatory strike.

It is said by the present United States Administration that it has no desire to achieve such a first-strike capability, that there are no sinister motives behind the Strategic Defence Initiative. However, careful students of the strategic developments over the last three decades cannot help disagreeing. After all, one can hardly deny that ever since the first American strategic bombers came into service the underlying logic of the subsequent developments has been to achieve

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

superiority over the Soviet Union, the ultimate goal being the achievement of a first-strike capability. The steps in these developments are well-known: first, diversifying the strategic forces from bombers to land-based intercontinental missiles, to submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and now to sea- and air-launched cruise missiles; second, providing these weapon systems with maximum accuracy and reliability thus enabling them to attack even the hardest military targets; third, multiplying the nuclear warheads on the strategic missiles by MIRV-ing them; fourth, deploying medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe, with range permitting them to strike the territory of the Soviet Union and with deep penetration capability enabling them to destroy targets of strategic importance, like ICBM fields or underground command centres; and fifth, establishing plans to develop mobile, thus less vulnerable and super-accurate, intercontinental missiles as well as the "stealth" strategic bombers. And after following all these steps comes the last and ultimate one-- the strategic "defensive shield", creating a chance of rendering the retaliatory Soviet strike in a potential nuclear conflict ineffective.

It is difficult to overstate the dangers ensuing from the prospect of achieving the first nuclear strike capability. The stability of strategic situation would be shattered; any serious international crisis invoke a danger of pre-emptive strike; there would be a permanent suspicion on the part of the opposing States.

Should the development of a strategic defence system by one State become a fact of life it would not only give this State a strategic superiority but it would also inevitably cause a profound change in the military balance on the theatre and regional levels. The balance of forces on these levels would always be measured against the background of the ultimate power of the strategic first-strike capability possessed by one of the States. Moreover, systems able to knock out ballistic missiles and warheads in flight would be more than capable of destroying so easy a target as the opponent's satellites. At times of crisis or even limited conflict it would be plausible to expect these satellites to be destroyed, thus influencing not only the nuclear but also the conventional command and control capabilities of the prospective enemy. These and other actions could be expected to go unpunished, given the existence of the monopoly in strategic defence systems. Thus, the prospect of a nuclear war may become less worrisome and more tempting for a State enjoying the strategic superiority. In such a military setting, and taking into account the existing strong ideological and political controversies, it is not so far-fetched to assume that the danger of a nuclear war would increase, and this alone is a sufficient reason to be afraid of and to oppose the United States plans for the militarization of space.

It is more than natural to expect that a State possessing a nuclear arsenal would, if exposed to the prospect of eradication of its retaliatory capability, do its utmost to prevent such an outcome. As the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union, V. Issraelyan, stated in his statement of 7 March 1985:

"The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to competition in the build-up of any armaments including space weapons. It is all too obvious, however, that in face of a threat from outer space it will be forced to take actions to reliably guarantee its security. The choice is not ours, but we shall have to act to redress the strategic balance. The equilibrium will be redressed, but at the higher level of armaments".

And that is another reason for which the strategic military stability of today would be jeopardized by the realization of the United States military programme in space. It would mean simply the beginning of a new round in the strategic arms race, both in space and on Earth, the cost of which would be forbidding.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The net result of the new round in the strategic arms race provoked by the United States space programme will be on the one hand the deterioration of the world's security and, on the other, the deterioration of general economic conditions. Since the expenses connected with the realization of the early stages of the new United States plan are to reach an order of magnitude of scores of billions of dollars, and at the more advanced stages hundreds of billions, it does not require too much imagination to foresee the enormous drain those expenses will be on world economy. The most obvious victims of this diversion of financial, material and human resources into the military field will be the developing States.

Apart from the deterioration of over-all military stability, the space defence programme is bound to open up a "Pandora's box" of new, unpredictable technical possibilities permitting further, across-the-board sophistication of existing weapons and the creation of entirely new ones. Thus, the development of sensors for space surveillance, tracking, acquisition and kill assessment may equally well serve the guidance systems of future "fire and forget" missiles and other types of conventional and nuclear weapons. Efforts put into the research on the so-called directed energy weapons, like high energy lasers and particle beam weapons, may give birth to new categories of weapons to be deployed on Earth. A similar outcome is possible from the research into the so-called kinetic energy weapons, like the electromagnetic launcher known as a "rail-gun", or high velocity missiles. The new generation of computers and various communication links needed for the future management of the space defence system can also serve as the backbone of any modern weapon system to come. One could foresee the development of new protective materials, new deceptive and jamming systems, new propulsion systems to increase the manoeuvrability of various categories of weapons. The prospective space systems will need entirely new and powerful electrical sources, like small nuclear reactors, new charge batteries and capacitors. Several of the systems envisaged will require special coolants and various sophisticated construction materials. All this and other new technology will find an immediate application in any land-, air- or sea-based weapon system of today and tomorrow, intensifying the qualitative nuclear and conventional arms race.

In order to assess properly the scale and nature of the programme now put in motion one has to remember that the funds devoted to it are only a part of the military research and development budget of the United States, which doubled during the last five years to reaching about 35 billion dollars in 1985. All this research effort is now intensified and **focused** on space applications but nothing will prevent the new discoveries from being applied to mastering war-fighting in any other environment. It must be remembered that new discoveries in militarily applicable technology create the so-called follow-on imperative, that is, a quest for following the achievement in basic technology with actual weapons improvements which, in turn, give a boost to the development of counter-weapons, since it must be assumed that an adversary does something similar, and may be ahead. Thus, the new discoveries generate an accelerating spiral of research and development efforts, having no regard for any external political or military circumstances, although these circumstances may be invoked as justification of the efforts. Generally speaking, the military research and development undertaken by the United States, notably in connection with the **SDI** programme, is full of potential technical improvements which will negatively affect international security.

Still another major reason why the international community has to take a stand against the prospects of intensified militarization of outer space is that, if not stopped, it will jeopardize the structure of existing disarmament treaties and of various disarmament negotiations. The first victim of the programme may become the bilateral negotiations on space, strategic and medium-range weapons.



(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

It has been repeated several times in this very hall how great are the hopes all of us hold in connection with these talks. While welcoming them and wishing them success, we have to nevertheless point out that it would seem to be a fruitless undertaking if one of the negotiating parties carried out vigorous efforts entirely contrary to the aim of the negotiations. And because of the direct linkage between the three subjects negotiated, the failure in one of them would be tantamount to a collapse of all three. Equally devastating would most probably be the impact of such a failure for the prospects of overcoming the dangerous situation in Europe, where an increasing number of lethal weapons are amassed.

Notwithstanding the perils to the ongoing disarmament negotiations, the insistence on the realization of the Strategic Defence Initiative would most probably sound the death knell for several existing arms control treaties. The Treaty immediately endangered is the bilateral 1972 Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. Although the Treaty permits research, the scope and intensity of the research activity in connection with the United States defence initiative is too large to be deemed compatible with the spirit of the Treaty. Even more important is the fact that if the research undertaken is to provide an answer about the practicability of the whole idea, it will have to encompass testing of the prototype systems and this will already be in open contravention to the letter of the agreement. That this is a real possibility is indicated by the reports that the United States Administration is foreseeing a need for re-negotiation of the Treaty.

The proponents of the space "protective shield" claim that it will consist of a non-nuclear-weapon system. However, it is also reported that about 10 per cent of the funds devoted to the new space programme went into the area of nuclear weapons. Among various exotic weapon systems to be developed there is the idea of the so-called X-ray laser weapon, which is to receive its energy from a nuclear explosion. Substantial research is also devoted to other ways of channelling nuclear explosive energy into deadly beams. If proved true, these reports herald the prospect of abrogation of two important disarmament agreements, namely the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

All in all, it seems plausible to assume that the realization of the SDI would unavoidably create an international atmosphere foreclosing the chance to achieve tangible results in any disarmament forum existing today and would endanger the existence of the modest disarmament agreements in force, achieved with such effort.

The major argument readily arising against the system of space weapons is that it will, in all probability, have a clearly negative effect on the whole international co-operation in peaceful exploration of space. It can hardly be imagined that in view of growing military competition in space, in which any scientific development might have some military implications, it would be possible to plan and execute common international scientific and technical activities. The chances of less developed States, possessing no indigenous space technology, benefitting from international space co-operation for their development would shrink substantially. And the civilian space systems operated by other States able on their own to deploy them in orbit, would be continuously endangered by the space weapons deployed by a State which may have no regard for the rights and interests of others.

The considerations I have offered today on the issue of space weapon systems planned by the United States point to one single conclusion-- the prevention of an arms race in outer space is increasingly urgent. The urgency and gravity of the problem is unquestionable. We need therefore a quick decision on the

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

establishment of the appropriate organ of the Conference on Disarmament devoted entirely to this problem, namely, the Ad hoc Committee, with an appropriate mandate. But it would be difficult if not impossible without flexibility and readiness to compromise demonstrated by all the delegations. Thus we should search for a mutually acceptable solution, having in mind that the ultimate purpose of our efforts is a future agreement or agreements preventing an arms race in outer space. The work of such an organ would complement in an important way the negotiations carried out on a bilateral basis. The interaction created between the multilateral **and** bilateral efforts would be profitable for all the parties concerned and would permit a considerable improvement of the international climate.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

We have a rather long list of speakers for Thursday's meeting. You will recall that we have planned an informal meeting of the Conference. I have consulted with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Ambassador García Robles, and he has kindly informed me that he is willing to give up part of the time allocated for the Committee's meeting on Thursday afternoon. Even so, I think that we should try to make an effort to make full use of the time available on Thursday morning so as not to disrupt unnecessarily the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I believe that we should therefore consider the desirability of beginning our meeting on Thursday at 10.00 a.m. rather than the customary 10.30 a.m. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference so decides. Furthermore, if we could finish the list of speakers in the morning and all the work provided for in Thursday morning's agenda, there would be no need to use the time kindly offered us by Ambassador García Robles.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As there is no further business this morning, I intend to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 21 March, at 10.00 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.