

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/7200 (Part II)*
7 November 1968

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Twenty-third session
Agenda items 23 and 69

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

(covering its work during 1968)

Rapporteur: Mr. Abdul Samad GHÄUS (Afghanistan)

CHAPTERS III-V

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* This document contains chapters III-V of the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly. Chapters I (the general introduction) and II will be issued subsequently under the symbol A/7200 (Part I). Other chapters of the report will be issued as addenda.

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CHAPTER III

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

I. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. At its 594th meeting, on 1 April 1968, the Special Committee, by approving the thirty-fourth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.454/Rev.1), decided, inter alia, to take up as a separate item the "Implementation of the Declaration by the specialized agencies and international institutions associated with the United Nations".
2. By the same decision, the Special Committee, with a view to facilitating its consideration of the item, invited the Secretary-General to request the international organizations concerned to furnish, not later than June 1968, information relating to steps taken and/or envisaged by them in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII) of 14 December 1967.
- 3 The Special Committee considered this item at its 617th, 643rd and 644th meetings, between 3 July and 18 October.
4. During its consideration of the item at its 643rd and 644th meetings, the Special Committee had before it a report submitted by the Secretary-General in response to the invitation mentioned in paragraph 2 above (see annex).
5. In its consideration of the item, the Special Committee was guided by the relevant provisions of resolution 2311 (XXII), particularly operative paragraph 8 thereof, by which the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to examine this question and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session. The Special Committee also took into account other resolutions of the General Assembly, particularly resolution 2326 (XXII) of 16 December 1967, by operative paragraph 7 of which the General Assembly expressed "its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the help they have so far given, and requests them to increase their economic, social and humanitarian assistance to the refugees from Territories under colonial domination".
6. At its 617th meeting, the Chairman of the Special Committee made a statement (A/AC.109/SR.617) in connexion with developments concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII).
7. Following statements at the same meeting by the representatives of the United States of America, Venezuela, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Iran and Australia (A/AC.109/SR.617), the Special Committee decided to endorse the statement made by the Chairman and to approve the suggestion contained in the last paragraph thereof, on the understanding that reservations expressed by certain delegations would be

reflected in the record of the meeting. The statement of the Chairman is reproduced in section II A below.

8. At the 643rd meeting, the Special Committee, following a statement by its Chairman (A/AC.109/SR.643), decided without objection to authorize him to present to it for consideration at its next meeting a statement from the Chair regarding the item.

9. At the 644th meeting, the Chairman made a statement in accordance with the decision mentioned in paragraph 8 above (A/AC.109/SR.644). At the same meeting, statements were made by the representatives of Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Madagascar, the United Kingdom, Australia, Mali, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Italy, Yugoslavia, Finland, Sierra Leone, Poland, India, Syria and Bulgaria, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/SR.644).

10. The Chairman then submitted a revision to sub-paragraph 6 of paragraph 9 of his statement, by which the phrase "subject to any decisions which it might take following its consideration of the relevant item," was inserted between the words "General Assembly" and the words "to request the Secretary-General".

11. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the statement by the Chairman, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the record of the meeting. The text of the statement by the Chairman is reproduced in section II B below.

II. DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A. Statement of the Chairman endorsed by the Special Committee at its 617th Meeting on 3 July 1968

12. At its twenty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2311 (XXII) of 14 December 1967 concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations, operative paragraphs 6 and 8 of which read as follows:

"6. Requests the Economic and Social Council to consider, in consultation with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, appropriate measures for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies in implementing the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

...

"8. Requests the Special Committee to examine this question and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session".

13. In accordance with the request addressed to it in operative paragraph 8 above, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, at its 594th meeting, on 1 April 1968, decided to include in its agenda an item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration by the specialized agencies and international institutions associated with the United Nations". Further, in order to facilitate its consideration of this item, the Special Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General to request international organizations concerned to furnish not later than June 1968 information relating to the steps taken and/or envisaged by them in the implementation of this resolution. I understand that the Secretary-General expects to submit a report in response to this invitation in the near future.

14. On 14 June 1968, the Acting President of the Economic and Social Council held preliminary consultations with the Chairman of the Special Committee in pursuance of operative paragraph 6 of resolution 2311 (XXII).

15. During these consultations, reference was made to the information furnished by the specialized agencies and other international institutions in response to various requests addressed to them in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session and by the Special Committee during 1966.^{1/}

^{1/} A/6700 (Part I), section VIII, and annex III; A/6700/Add.3/Corr.1; A/6825.

16. It was noted that this information had been before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly during its consideration, at the twenty-second session, of the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations". In the same context, and at the invitation of the Fourth Committee, statements containing additional information had been made in that Committee by the representatives of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (A/C.4/SR.1744).

17. Following its consideration of the item, and taking into account the above-mentioned information, the General Assembly, in paragraph 2 of its resolution 2311 (XXII), had expressed "its appreciation to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and to the specialized agencies which have co-operated with the United Nations in seeking to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly".

18. The Chairman recalled that in addition to the recommendations made in other operative paragraphs of that resolution associated with the United Nations, the General Assembly had, in a number of other resolutions adopted at the same session, addressed various requests to those bodies.

19. In order to facilitate the consideration by the Council in accordance with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII), of appropriate measures for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies in implementing the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Chairman suggested that the heads of the specialized agencies should be invited to participate fully in the discussion of the item at the Council's forty-fifth session and in particular to provide the Council with the most recent information concerning their policies and the present and future activities in that regard. He also suggested that the agencies should be invited at the same time to advance such suggestions as they might consider appropriate concerning the measures to be taken for the co-ordination of these policies and activities.

20. Following an exchange of views, the President of the Council expressed general agreement with the suggestions made by the Chairman of the Special Committee and undertook to transmit them to the Council.

21. In the light of the discussion in the Economic and Social Council at its forthcoming session in Geneva and of the information furnished by the specialized agencies, it was suggested that it would be desirable for further consultations to take place, as appropriate, between the President of the Council and the Chairman of the Special Committee, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII). It would be necessary for the proposed consultations to be held during the Council's consideration of the item at its forthcoming session in Geneva. If the Committee agrees to this suggestion, it may be necessary for the Chairman or a member of the bureau designated by him to proceed to Geneva for these consultations.

B. Statement of the Chairman adopted by the Special Committee
at its 644th Meeting on 18 October 1968

22. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 643rd meeting, I should like to make the following statement concerning the implementation of the Declaration by the specialized agencies and international institutions associated with the United Nations:

23. At its twenty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2311 (XXII) of 14 December 1967 concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations, operative paragraphs 6 and 8 of which read as follows:

"6. Requests the Economic and Social Council to consider in consultation with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, appropriate measures for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies in implementing the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

...

"8. Requests the Special Committee to examine this question and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session."

24. Members will recall that in order to facilitate its consideration of this item the Special Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General to request the international organizations concerned to furnish information relating to the steps taken and/or envisaged by them in implementation of the above-mentioned resolution. The Secretary-General has accordingly submitted a report which is contained in document A/AC.109/304 (see annex to the present chapter).

25. Members are also aware that during June 1968 preliminary consultations pursuant to operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII) took place with myself as Chairman and the Acting President of the Economic and Social Council. I submitted an oral report on these consultations to the Special Committee at its 617th meeting, on 3 July 1968. In this connexion I should like to make reference to the following extracts from that report:

"In order to facilitate the consideration by the Council in accordance with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII), of appropriate measures for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies in implementing the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Chairman suggested that the heads of the specialized agencies should be invited to participate fully in the discussion of the item at the Council's forty-fifth session and in particular to provide the Council with the most recent information concerning their policies and the present and future activities in that regard. He also suggested that the agencies should be invited at the same time to advance such suggestions as they might consider appropriate concerning the measures to be taken for the co-ordination of these policies and activities.

"Following an exchange of views, the President of the Council expressed general agreement with the suggestions made by the Chairman of the Special Committee and undertook to transmit them to the Council."

26. In taking note of my report on these consultations the Special Committee agreed at its 617th meeting, on 3 July that further consultations would be desirable between the President of the Council and myself during the Council's consideration of the item at its session to be held at Geneva during July/August this year. However, for reasons beyond my control it was not possible for these consultations to take place.

27. As indicated in the report before the Committee (see annex), the Secretary-General has had discussions with the executive heads of the agencies and institutions concerned through the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII). Further discussions on this matter took place at the joint meetings of the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination and the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination which were held at Bucharest between 3 and 5 July 1968. During these discussions a number of the agencies and institutions concerned outlined their policies and the action already taken by them in implementation of the above-mentioned resolution. A report on these discussions is contained in paragraphs 23-44 of the report of the Chairmen of the joint meetings of these two bodies which is contained in document E/4557. The Committee will wish to note in particular the statement made in paragraph 44 of that report by the President of the ECOSOC at the conclusion of these meetings which reads as follows:

"...It was evident that the agencies were ready to apply such resolutions as their governing bodies might adopt on this matter. The implementation of some of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly might take some time and require continuing attention. He felt certain that the co-ordination requested by the General Assembly would be realized so that all United Nations bodies could present a common front."

28. Furthermore, the Economic and Social Council considered the item at its forty-fifth session held at Geneva during July/August 1968, in the course of which the representatives of the specialized agencies furnished information concerning their policies and activities in regard to General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII). In view of the need to obtain further information, the Council decided to postpone a decision on the question until its resumed forty-fifth session, due to be held shortly.

29. In this connexion, I would draw particular attention to the following extract from the report submitted by ECOSOC to the General Assembly: 2/

"774. During the debate in the Council,^{3/} a number of delegations drew attention to the need for more intensive activity on the part of the specialized agencies, aimed at the implementation of the Declaration. It was stated that the agencies fell into three categories, those successfully assisting, those making sincere efforts but facing difficulties,

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/7203), paragraphs 774 and 776.

3/ E/SR.1552, 1553, 1555, 1558, 1559.

and those having concluded that action by them aimed at the implementation of the Declaration was incompatible with their statutes. In contrast to the views expressed by representatives of agencies, some delegations thought there was no inconsistency between paragraphs 3 and 4 of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII), where a distinction was made between peoples struggling for their independence and governing authorities in colonial territories. It was suggested that the agencies should increase their assistance to refugees, particularly in training, strengthen their programmes in colonial territories and cease assistance to minority and racist régimes. It was also suggested that certain Powers used hypocritical arguments based on the technical character of the specialized agencies to cover up their activities, and that the implementation of the Declaration could no longer be considered a political issue.

"776. Representatives of the specialized agencies indicated the status of the matter before their governing organs. In one agency, for example, the assembly had taken action in 1968; in others the matter would be taken up at the inter-governmental level later in the year. Agency representatives pointed out that diseases and crop pests did not respect frontiers and that it would be impossible for the agencies to work without the co-operation of governing authorities. Relations between the agencies and Southern Rhodesia were minimal; such contact as existed was established through the United Kingdom. According to one agency's legal position, endorsed by its executive directors, it was not free to comply with the Assembly's request to deny assistance to certain régimes: despite that, it had given assurances of its earnest desire to co-operate with the United Nations. In response to requests for details of its lending policy, it was stated that the relationship of the agency with individual countries was confidential and that any departure from that relationship would impair the agency's ability to operate effectively."

30. Taking into account the information and the developments which I have outlined above, it seems to be the general feeling of the members of the Committee that the Special Committee:

(1) Note the information contained in the report of the Secretary-General (see annex), as well as the information furnished to ECOSOC at its forty-fifth session by the specialized agencies and other international institutions concerned on their policies and their activities in implementation of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII).

(2) Reiterate its conviction that the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations should extend their full co-operation to the United Nations for achieving the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(3) Express its appreciation to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and to the specialized agencies and the international institutions which have co-operated with the United Nations in the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

(4) Recommend that the specialized agencies and international institutions concerned should take urgent and effective measures to assist peoples struggling

for liberation from colonial rule and in particular to extend within the scope of their respective activities all necessary aid to the colonial peoples of Southern Rhodesia and Territories under Portuguese administration and to work out in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national liberation movements concrete programmes to this end.

(5) Recommend that the specialized agencies and international institutions should take all the necessary steps to withhold any assistance to the Governments of South Africa and Portugal until they renounce their present policies of racial discrimination and colonial domination, as well as to the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

(6) Recognize that the implementation of some of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly might require careful and continuing attention and for that reason recommend to the General Assembly, subject to any other decisions which it might take following its consideration of the relevant items, to request the Secretary-General urgently to obtain and transmit to the Special Committee for its consideration concrete suggestions from the specialized agencies and international institutions concerned as to the best ways and means of achieving the full speedy and effective implementation of the relevant resolutions.

(7) Urgently request all States, directly and through action in the specialized agencies and institutions of which they are members to facilitate, through the relevant governing bodies and other appropriate means the full speedy and effective implementation of the relevant resolutions.

(8) Authorize the Chairman of the Special Committee to continue his consultations with the President of ECOSOC during the forthcoming resumed forty-fifth session of that body taking into full consideration the above-mentioned provisions.

(9) Express the hope that in view of the importance of this question, the representatives of the specialized agencies will actively participate in the consideration of the relevant items by the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at its current session.

(10) Decide to continue its own consideration of the question during 1969 subject to any directives the General Assembly might wish to give at its current session.

ANNEX*

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

Report of the Secretary-General

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE
TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

Report of the Secretary-General

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 594th meeting on 1 April 1968, the Special Committee, by adopting the thirty-fourth report of its Working Group (A/AC.109/L.454/Rev.1), decided to include in its agenda an item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations" and to consider it separately. In taking this decision, the Special Committee was guided by the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII) of 14 December 1967 relating to the implementation of the Declaration by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations. The operative paragraphs of that resolution read as follows:

"1. Recognizes that the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the international institutions associated with the United Nations should extend their full co-operation to the United Nations in achieving the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"2. Expresses its appreciation to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and to the specialized agencies which have co-operated with the United Nations in seeking to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

"3. Recommends the specialized agencies and international institutions concerned to take urgent and effective measures to assist the peoples struggling for their liberation from colonial rule, and in particular to extend, within the scope of their respective activities, all necessary aid to the oppressed peoples of Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination and to work out, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, and through it with the national liberation movements, concrete programmes to this end;

"4. Also recommends the specialized agencies and international institutions not to grant any assistance to South Africa and Portugal until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination;

"5. Requests all States, directly and through action in the specialized agencies and international institutions of which they are members, to facilitate the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

"6. Requests the Economic and Social Council to consider, in consultation with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

Countries and Peoples, appropriate measures for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies in implementing the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

"7. Requests the Secretary-General to assist the specialized agencies and the international institutions concerned in working out appropriate measures to implement the relevant resolutions and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

"8. Requests the Special Committee to examine this question and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session."

2. In order to facilitate its consideration of the item, the Special Committee further decided to invite the Secretary-General to request the international organizations concerned to furnish not later than June 1968 information relating to the steps taken and/or envisaged by them in implementation of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII).

3. In response to the invitation referred to in paragraph 2 above, the Secretary-General wishes to report that by a letter dated 30 April 1968, he brought the decision of the Special Committee to the attention of the under-mentioned specialized agencies and international institutions associated with the United Nations and requested them to furnish at an early date the desired information in order to enable him to report to the Committee: International Labour Organisation (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Universal Postal Union (UPU), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Organization of American States (OAS), League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

4. In the above-mentioned letter the Secretary-General also recalled that by an earlier letter dated 31 January 1968 he had transmitted to them for their attention the text of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII).

5. The substantive portions of the replies received by the Secretary-General from the international organizations concerned in response to his letter of 30 April 1968 as well as to his earlier letter transmitting the General Assembly resolution are reproduced below.

6. In submitting to the Special Committee the information contained in those replies, the Secretary-General wishes also to refer to the following developments relating to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII).

7. In accordance with operative paragraph 7 of the General Assembly resolution, the Secretary-General has held discussions with the executive heads of the agencies and institutions concerned, through the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, on the implementation of the relevant resolutions.

8. Further, discussions concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII) took place at the joint meetings of the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination and the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination which were held at Bucharest between 3 and 5 July 1968. a/

9. Finally, following the preliminary consultations which were held on 14 June 1968 between the President of the Economic and Social Council and the Chairman of the Special Committee in accordance with operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII), and which were the subject of an oral report by the Chairman to the Committee at its 617th meeting on 3 July 1968, the Council considered during its forty-fifth session, held at Geneva, an item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations". b/ During the Council's consideration of the item, the representatives of the specialized agencies furnished information concerning their policies and activities in regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII). In view of the need to obtain further information, the Council decided to postpone a decision on the question until it resumed its forty-fifth session.

a/ A summary of these discussions is contained in the report of the chairmen of these two bodies (E/4557, paras. 23-44).

b/ The proceedings of the Economic and Social Council on this item are set out in the relevant summary records (E/SR.1522, 1553, 1555 and 1558-9) and are also covered in its report to the General Assembly (Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/7203)).

REPLIES RECEIVED FROM THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

[Original: English]
1 April 1968

With regard to assistance to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration, and to those suffering as a result of military operations, FAO's policy has been consistently to provide help to the extent possible. For instance, the Director-General has sanctioned grants of World Food Programme emergency food aid to Tanzania and Zambia for needy refugees from Mozambique. FAO has also participated in discussions with the United Nations about a scheme for special training for such refugees, and we have assured the United Nations of our full co-operation.

As far as withholding assistance from Portugal is concerned, we give no form of assistance to that country under our regular programmes, or under any other programme or trust fund (including United Nations Development Programme projects). In practice, therefore, we have complied with the resolution.

As South Africa is no longer a member of FAO, the question of withholding assistance from that country does not arise.

I intend to bring the General Assembly's resolutions to the attention of the FAO Council at its next session, to be held in October 1968.

[Original: English]
28 June 1968

The broad lines of FAO assistance to Non-Self-Governing Territories were covered in Mr. Boerma's letter to the Secretary-General [see above]. In addition, technical assistance has been given under UNDP to the following Territories: Bahamas, Bermuda, British Honduras, the Cayman Islands, Grenada, the Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands.

With regard to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration, I attach herewith a note on FAO/WFP assistance in this regard [see below].

Assistance given to Mozambique refugees in Tanzania

Emergency Operation 817 and Project No. 256

In October 1964 the Director-General of FAO approved emergency food aid to the Government of Tanzania for the feeding of refugees who had fled there from Mozambique. The Government of Tanzania subsequently asked for WFP food aid for a

"Development scheme preparatory to the permanent settlement of refugees" and the Executive Director of WFP approved development project No. 256 - Tanzania on 13 January 1966, for the provision of food to 6,000 Mozambique refugees in the Rutamba area at a total WFP cost of \$672,000. However, due to an almost continuous influx of refugees in the area, food aid was extended on 26 September 1966 to an additional 4,000 refugees (and to 600 Congolese refugees) under an expanded project No. 256 at a total WFP cost of \$208,000.

Emergency Operation 844 and Project No. 441

A further group of Mozambique refugees started to move across the border into Tanzania and the Director-General of FAO, in December 1966, approved food aid for six months to 6,000 refugees in the Muhukuru area under emergency operation 844 at a total WFP cost of \$312,500. This emergency operation was approved on the understanding that the Government of Tanzania would subsequently submit a request to WFP for a development project for the permanent settlement of these refugees. For various reasons, the Government of Tanzania could not submit this request and consequently asked WFP to extend emergency operation 844. Therefore, in October 1967, a second phase was approved for a further six months of food aid to 9,000 refugees at a total WFP cost of \$197,500. The 9,000 refugees included the 6,000 initial refugees plus 3,000 refugees who had in the meantime crossed the border into Tanzania. Project No. 441 was a regular development project which followed emergency assistance provided under emergency operation 844. WFP aid was requested to enable the refugees to become self-supporting in food during their initial period of settlement. This "Refugee settlement Scheme (Muhukuru)" was approved in November 1967 by the Executive Director of WFP at a total WFP cost of \$600,000.

Assistance given to Mozambique and Angolan refugees in Zambia

Zambia Project No. 205

Originally this project, which was approved by the Executive Director in October 1967 at a total cost to WFP of \$132,700, aimed at providing assistance to 1,200 refugees, from South and South West Africa, Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia, who had crossed the border into Zambia following the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In December 1965 there was a sudden influx of about 5,000 refugees from Mozambique. The Government of Zambia agreed to grant shelter to these people and made arrangements for the resettlement of about 2,000 of them on a 2,000-acre site at Nyimba.

During the spring of 1966 about 1,800 refugees from Angola entered Zambia and were granted asylum. The Government made available initially 1,500 acres of land at Lwatembo. During September/October 1966 a further 1,450 refugees from Angola were also settled at Lwatembo followed by an additional 600 in January/February 1967.

An additional 450 Angolan refugees were also settled at Mayukayukwa.

Extension I. The Executive Director of WFP approved the extension requested by the Government to provide food for these Angolan and Mozambique refugees in November 1966 at a total cost to WFP of \$364,200 and for a duration of eighteen months. It was anticipated that the refugees would become self-supporting by the end of the period of extension, i.e., June 1968.

Extension II. Owing to difficulties in obtaining necessary land and to insufficient crop returns, the Government requested a second expansion of the project; which was approved in March 1968 at a total WFP cost of \$180,500, to provide food aid to the refugees for one year, i.e., July 1968-June 1969, after which it is expected that the refugees will be self-supporting.

Emergency Operation Zambia 860

In mid-December 1967, owing to civil disturbances in Angola, 500 refugees sought asylum in Zambia. The Director-General of FAO approved in March 1968 food aid for the 500 Angolan refugees for a period of six and a half months at a total WFP cost of \$14,000.

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

[Original: English]
4 March 1968

I wish to inform you that the text of this resolution will be brought to the attention of the Executive Board of UNESCO at its seventy-eighth session, which will open on 20 May.

[Original: English]
2 July 1968

I have now pleasure in informing you that the Executive Board examined an item entitled "Recent decisions of the Organizations of the United Nations system of interest to UNESCO" which included inter alia the text of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII). As a result of its discussions the Board adopted resolution 7.1 which I am sending you herewith. Please note paragraph 4 by which the Board "draws the attention of the General Conference and of the Director-General to the necessity within its sphere of competence, of intensifying UNESCO's action intended to assist peoples struggling to free themselves from colonial rule and to liquidate all vestiges of colonialism". I therefore expect that, at its fifteenth session (15 October-21 November 1968) the General Conference will examine General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII) and give me specific guidance concerning its implementation.

Relations with international organizations

Recent decisions of the organizations of the United Nations system of interest to UNESCO (78 EX/13 and Add. and 78 EX/37 part III)

"The Executive Board,

- "1. Having examined documents 78 EX/13 and Add.,
- "2. Notes the recent decisions of interest to UNESCO taken by the organizations of the United Nations system since its 77th session;
- "3. Welcomes the opportunity which these resolutions give for UNESCO to strengthen those activities which lie within its competence in the fields of economic and social development;
- "4. Draws the attention of the General Conference and of the Director-General to the necessity within its sphere of competence, of intensifying UNESCO's action intended to assist peoples struggling to free themselves from colonial rule and to liquidate all vestiges of colonialism;
- "5. Welcomes the 'Memorandum of Understanding on Guidelines for Co-operation and Co-ordination of Activities between UNESCO and United Nations Industrial Development Organization signed in Geneva on 4 April 1968' by the Director-General and the Executive Director of UNIDO, and invites the Director-General to pursue his consultations with the Executive

Director of UNIDO, along these guidelines with a view to presenting to a future session of the Board for its approval an agreement between UNESCO and UNIDO."

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

/Original: English/
1 March 1968

This resolution was noted by the Executive Board and will be brought to the attention of the Twenty-first World Health Assembly.

I shall not fail to keep you informed of developments in WHO, and shall be writing to you again on this question in due course.

/Original: English/
11 June 1968

Three resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session were taken into account by the World Health Assembly in its resolution WHA21.34 entitled "Implementation of Resolution WHA19.31". As you may remember, resolution WHA19.31, of which I enclose a copy /see "A" below/ was adopted in May 1966 and suspended the right of Portugal to participate in the Regional Committee for Africa and regional activities, and to receive technical assistance from the Organization. At the request of the Twentieth World Health Assembly, the implementation of this resolution was referred in 1967 to three Regional Committees concerned for further consideration. The response of the Regional Committees for Africa, Europe and the Western Pacific is given in the document which was considered by the Twenty-first World Health Assembly, document A21/AFL/3 /see "B" below/. I enclose also, for your convenience, copies of resolution WHA21.34 /see "E" below/ as well as the third report of the Committee on Administration, Finance and Legal Matters (A/21/21) /see "D" below/.

I have pleasure in enclosing also my report on co-ordination with other organizations, the United Nations, the specialized agencies and the IAEA, (A21/P&B/8) /see "C" below/ which refers, on page 13, to the appeals or requests with the United Nations General Assembly has addressed to specialized agencies with regard to the implementation of the Declaration and reproduces in full, in annex G, the text of resolution 2311 (XXII).

At its eighteenth plenary session held on 24 May, the World Health Assembly adopted without debate resolution WHA21.50 noting this report. For your convenience, I enclose copies of the resolution /see "F" below/.

A. Resolution WHA19.31 adopted at the thirteenth plenary meeting
of the World Health Assembly on 18 May 1966

(Resolution AFR/RC15/R2 adopted by the Regional Committee
for Africa at its fifteenth session on 9 September 1965)

"The Nineteenth World Health Assembly,

"Having regard to Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Constitution;

"Having regard to the provisions established by the Second World Health Assembly in resolution WHA2.103 concerning the representation in the regional committees of Member States which have not their seat of government within the region, and in particular Article 2, paragraphs (a) and (b) of these provisions;

"Considering resolution AFR/RC15/R2 adopted by the Regional Committee for Africa at its fifteenth session on 9 September 1965;

"Considering the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Security Council in regard to African Territories under Portuguese administration, and in particular the position taken by the Security Council in its resolution 180 (1963) of 31 July 1963 by declaring the system of government applied by Portugal in Africa to be contrary to the principles of the Charter, a resolution mentioned in resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965 of the General Assembly;

"Considering that Portugal no longer fulfils, under the terms of Articles 2 and 47 of the Constitution and of resolution WHA2.103, the conditions required to represent on the Regional Committee the Territories it administers in Africa;

"Considering furthermore that by adopting a passive attitude the World Health Organization would be an accessory to Portugal in refusing to comply with the decisions of the United Nations,

"1. SUSPENDS the right of Portugal to participate in the Regional Committee for Africa and in regional activities until the Government of that country has furnished proof of its willingness to conform to the injunctions of the United Nations;

"2. SUSPENDS, pursuant to Article 7 of the Constitution, technical assistance to Portugal in application of point 9 of the operative part of resolution 2107 (XX) of the General Assembly; and

"3. REQUESTS the Director-General to report to the Twentieth World Health Assembly on the measures which have been taken in application of the decisions of this resolution."

B. Responses of Regional Committees to implementation of resolution WHA19.31

(Document A21/AFL/3 dated 27 March 1968)

"In its resolution WHA20.38,^{c/} the Twentieth World Health Assembly noted the report of the Director-General^{d/} on the implementation of resolution WHA19.31 and decided to refer the matter to the Regional Committees concerned for further consideration.

"The question was considered by the Regional Committees for Africa, Europe and the Western Pacific at their sessions in 1967. These Regional Committees adopted respectively resolutions AFR/RC17/R2, EUR/RC17/R9 and WPR/RC18/R2, the texts of which are appended to this document (annexes 1, 2 and 3).^{/see below/}. The reports of the Regional Committees contained the following passages on this subject:

Regional Committee for Africa - Report on the seventeenth session:

"... Attention was directed to the belief by at least one representative that the Director-General had felt a certain hesitation in accepting the absolute suspension of all assistance to the populations in the Portuguese Territories since application of such policy might pose problems on occasions when emergencies arise and for which there was obvious need for humanitarian assistance. It was also suggested that the Committee may wish to defer its decision pending consideration of the conclusions reached by the Regional Committees for Europe and the Western Pacific. In the final analysis, however, it was decided that the African States must fulfil the commitments entered into two years previously. As a result, resolution AFR/RC17/R2 was adopted."

Regional Committee for Europe - Report on the seventeenth session:

"... In discussing the implementation of resolution WHA19.31 (WHA20.38) concerning the suspension of technical assistance to Portugal, the Committee set up a sub-committee which was unable to draft a formula acceptable to all its members. After discussion, two draft resolutions were voted upon, one proposed by Algeria, Poland and Yugoslavia and the other by Belgium. The Committee adopted the latter (resolution EUR/RC17/R9)."

Regional Committee for the Western Pacific - Report on the eighteenth session:

"... The Committee noted that the measures taken under this resolution, which referred to the suspension of technical assistance to Portugal and its overseas territories, had been the subject of a report by the Director-General to the World Health Assembly. As a result of discussions which had taken place during the Assembly, the matter had been referred to the Regional Committees concerned for further consideration. Two

c/ WHO: Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions. 9th ed., pages 302-3.

d/ Official Records of the World Health Organization, 160, annex 14, pp. 99-100.

Portuguese territories in the region, Macao and Timor, were affected by the resolution.

"During the discussion of this item, it was pointed out by the representative of the Philippines that one of the functions of WHO was to stimulate and advance work to control and eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases. Unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health and control of diseases was a common danger and the extension to all peoples of the benefits of medical and related knowledge was essential to the fullest attainment of health. It would be difficult for WHO to act on the problems of communicable diseases if the necessary relations with the countries concerned were not maintained.

"The Committee adopted a resolution recommending that the policy of granting technical assistance to a Member State or to overseas territories under its administration be reviewed, in so far as this policy imposed restrictions limiting the extension of the Organization's campaigns against communicable diseases of world-wide or regional importance or circumscribing programmes for the training of indigenous health personnel of the overseas territories concerned (see resolution WPR/RC18.R2)."

Annex I

(Document AFR/RC17/R2)

"The Regional Committee [for Africa]:

"Having considered resolution WHA20.38 relating to the implementation of resolution WHA19.31 adopted by the Nineteenth World Health Assembly,

"1. REITERATES its unreserved support for its resolution AFR/RC15/R2 adopted on 9 September 1965 at its fifteenth session in Lusaka and for resolution WHA19.31 [see "A" above] adopted on 5 May 1966 by the Nineteenth World Health Assembly in Geneva;

"2. DISAPPROVES of all assistance that might result from any interpretation whatsoever of paragraph 2 of resolution WHA19.31, in the conviction that it will in no way benefit, under present circumstances, the real African populations, oppressed by Portuguese colonialism and racial discrimination;

"3. URGES the Member States of the Region, in accordance with resolution AFR/RC15/R2, to do all in their power to protect and promote the right to health of the populations of the Portuguese colonies in Africa struggling for national liberation; and

"4. INVITES the Regional Director to transmit this resolution to the Director-General and to request him to bring it to the attention of the Twenty-first World Health Assembly."

Annex 2

(Document EUR/RC17/R9)

"The Regional Committee /for Europe/,

"Noting resolution WHA20.38 of the Twentieth World Health Assembly by which it decided to refer the question of implementing resolution WHA19.31 /see "A" above/ to the Regional Committees concerned for further consideration;

"Considering that the object of seminars, conferences and other meetings of a technical character is to pool the knowledge and experience of the participants and thereby to further the application of knowledge;

"Considering that the benefit of attendance at such meetings accrues to the participants as a group and not as representatives of individual countries;

"Considering therefore that any limitations on the implementation of the Organization's programme should be applied only in the light of preceding considerations,

"IS OF THE OPINION that funds should be restored for Portuguese nationals to attend seminars, conferences and other technical meetings in the European Region."

Annex 3

(Document WPR/RC18.R2)

"The Regional Committee /for the Western Pacific/,

"Noting resolution WHA20.38 of the Twentieth World Health Assembly,

"Considering that one of the functions of the World Health Organization is to stimulate and advance work to control and eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases,

"Considering that it is declared in the Preamble to the Constitution of the Organization that unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health and control of diseases is a common danger and that the extension to all peoples of the benefits of medical, psychological and related knowledge is essential to the fullest attainment of health,

"RECOMMENDS that the policy of granting technical assistance to a Member State or to overseas territories under its administration be reviewed in so far as this policy imposes restrictions limiting the extension of the Organization's campaigns against communicable diseases of world-wide or regional importance or circumscribing programmes for the training of indigenous health personnel of the overseas territories concerned."

C. Co-ordination with other organizations, the United Nations,
the specialized agencies and the IAEA

(Document A21/P&B/8, dated 30 April 1968)

Introduction

"The present document follows similar reports on decisions of the United Nations, specialized agencies and IAEA affecting the programme of WHO which have been submitted to the Health Assembly each year. The format and presentation, however, have been changed in compliance with resolution WHA20.52 which, in operative paragraph 4:

"Requests the Director-General, while presenting resolutions of the United Nations, specialized agencies and IAEA to the World Health Assembly, to propose steps to be undertaken by the Organization for successful implementation of those aspects of the resolutions which are of importance for national and international health programmes, indicating the possible costs of these measures to WHO'."

...
"4.7 Colonial countries and peoples and apartheid

"4.7.1 The Director-General has reported to the Executive Board and the World Health Assembly the appeals or requests which the United Nations General Assembly has addressed to specialized agencies with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to related questions. The United Nations organs concerned with these questions have been kept informed of the relevant actions taken by governing bodies of WHO. The actions taken before the twenty-second session of the General Assembly have been summarized by the United Nations Secretariat in a document entitled Implementation of General Assembly's resolutions 2151 (XXI), 2184 (XXI), 2189 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) and pertinent resolutions of the Special Committee: Requests addressed to Specialized Agencies and International Institutions. e/

"4.7.2 At its twenty-second session in the autumn of 1967, the United Nations addressed appeals or requests to specialized agencies in resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, the question of Territories under Portuguese Administration, the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations.

"4.7.3 Representatives of the Organization attended the deliberations of the General Assembly on these questions and gave information on the action taken by the directing organs of WHO. The paragraphs of these five resolutions which are addressed to specialized agencies are annexed."

e/ See A/6700 (Part I), chapter I, annex III.

D. Third report of the Committee on Administration,
Finance and Legal Matters

(Document A/21/21 dated 21 May 1968)

"During its eleventh meeting, held on 21 May 1968, the Committee on Administration, Finance and Legal Matters decided to recommend to the Twenty-first World Health Assembly the adoption of the attached resolution relating to the following agenda item:

"3.5 - Implementation of resolution WHA19.31" (see "A" above).

E. Resolution WHA21.34 adopted at the seventeenth plenary meeting
on 23 May 1968

Implementation of resolution WHA19.31

"The Twenty-first World Health Assembly,

"Having considered the report (A/21/AFL/3) of the Director-General on the implementation of resolution WHA19.31;

"Bearing in mind resolutions WHA19.31 and WHA20.38 adopted by the Nineteenth World Health Assembly and the Twentieth World Health Assembly respectively;

"Noting resolution AFR/RC17/R2 adopted by the Regional Committee for Africa at its seventeenth session, resolution EUR/RC17/R9 adopted by the Regional Committee for Europe at its seventeenth session and resolution WPR/RC18.R2 adopted by the Regional Committee for the Western Pacific at its eighteenth session; and

"Having regard to resolutions 2270 (XXII), 2311 (XXII) and 2326 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its twenty-second session;

"DECIDES that, in applying paragraph 2 of resolution WHA19.31, the Director-General should take into consideration the need:

"(a) not to envisage in WHO programmes any assistance for Portugal until that country renounces the policy of colonial domination,

"(b) to provide, if necessary, in co-operation with other appropriate organizations through special programmes, for health assistance to the refugees and nationals of countries under colonial domination, particularly in regard to the control of communicable diseases and the professional training of qualified national personnel,

"(c) to ensure, within the limits of his competence, the implementation of this resolution and to report periodically to the Regional Committees concerned and to the World Health Assembly on the measures taken to put this into effect."

F. Resolution WHA21.50 adopted at the eighteenth plenary meeting
on 24 May 1968

Co-ordination with other organizations, the United Nations, the
specialized agencies and the IAEA

(Programme matters)

"The twenty-first World Health Assembly

"Having considered the Director-General's report on Co-ordination with other organizations, the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and the IAEA (A21/P&B/18),

"1. NOTES the report of the Director-General; and

"2. THANKS UNICEF for its valued and continuing support for programmes designed to improve the health of women and children."

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION

/Original: English/
3 October 1968

Neither Portugal nor South Africa is a member of IMCO but they respectively adhere to certain conventions of which IMCO is the depositary. No previous opportunity has arisen to place this matter before the IMCO Council but it will be considered by the Council at the session opening 25 November 1968.

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

/Original: English/
20 February 1968

This resolution has already been notified to the Executive Directors.

/Original: English/
10 May 1968

... The resolution does not call for any action that we could take within the sphere of our activities. As Mr. Woods indicated, in his letter of 20 February 1968, see above the resolution was brought to the attention of the Executive Directors. We do not envisage any further action in this regard.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

/Original: English/
10 May 1968

... I would inform you that General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII) was brought to the attention of the Board of Executive Directors of the Fund on 12 January 1968.

We note that operative paragraph 5 of the resolution is addressed to States' members of specialized agencies.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

/Original: English/
18 April 1968

I refer to the resolutions 2270, 2307, 2311 and 2326 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the course of its twenty-second session.

On 8 April, at the twenty-first meeting of its sixty-third session, the Council of ICAO examined those resolutions, particularly the paragraphs to which you had drawn attention, and decided on the following:

(a) Resolution 2270 (XXII) (question of Territories under Portuguese administration) and resolution 2311 (XXII) (implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations):

(i) To reaffirm the willingness of ICAO to render assistance to the refugees from the territories of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia in the form established at the sixtieth session of the Council (my letter E 2/27 of 21 March 1967);

(ii) To note that ICAO has not in the past rendered, nor is presently rendering assistance to Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

(b) Resolution 2307 (XXII), on the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa:

To reaffirm the Council decision (my letter E 2/1.6 of 21 March 1967) that ICAO is ready to co-operate with you and the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid in the accomplishment of the tasks assigned under this resolution.

(c) Resolution 2326 (XXII) (implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples):

To extend its action in (a) (i) above to cover refugees from other territories under colonial domination, as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2326 (XXII).

UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION

[Original: French]
28 February 1968

I have noted the above-mentioned resolution, particularly operative paragraph 7. I shall, as appropriate, bring this resolution to the attention of the Executive Council of the Universal Postal Union at its next session.

[Original: French]
21 June 1968

Resolution 2311 (XXII) of the United Nations General Assembly was circulated to the Executive Council at the session held at Berne from 15 to 24 May 1968. It was reproduced together with resolutions 2270 (XXII), 2307 (XXII), 2324 (XXII) and 2326 (XXII).

The Council took note of the resolution at its opening meeting on 15 May 1968. The complete text of these resolutions will be reproduced in the documents of the Executive Council, which are usually circulated to the postal administrations of all the member countries of the Union.

INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION

[Original: English]
1 March 1968

The text of this resolution will be drawn to the attention of our Administrative Council, the twenty-third session of which is due to open on 11 May next.

[Original: English]
6 June 1968

As I mentioned in my letter of 1 March, I drew the attention of our Administrative Council during its twenty-third session to this resolution. The Council considered that, under the terms of the International Telecommunication Convention, it is difficult for the ITU to enter into relationship with liberation movements within countries which are members of the Union.

It considered, however, that every attempt should be made to implement resolutions of the General Assembly, and requested me to submit a report to its next session in May 1969 on any measures it had been possible to take.

WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION

[Original: English]
16 May 1968

This resolution will be brought to the attention of the twentieth session of the Executive Committee of WMO which meets in Geneva from 30 May to 14 June 1968.

I shall not fail to inform you of the decision of the Executive Committee as soon as possible after the session.

[Original: English]
27 June 1968

The Executive Committee of WMO at its twentieth session (1968) reviewed the recommendations addressed by the United Nations to the Organization and adopted a resolution on this subject. In accordance with the directives contained in the resolution, I have pleasure in enclosing herewith copies.... [see below]

With regard to resolution 19 (EC-XX) I would invite your particular attention to the decision taken in respect of General Assembly resolutions 2311 (XXII) ("Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations"), resolution 2270 (XXII) ("Question of Territories under Portuguese administration") and resolution 2326 (XXII) ("Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples").

In considering these resolutions, the Committee was informed that no assistance of any kind (financial, technical or in the form of equipment) had been given by WMO to the countries referred to in these resolutions. In its consideration of other resolutions, the Committee requested the Secretary-General to continue to make every effort for developing programmes in the field of training giving particular attention to the training of refugees. The Committee did not find any other specific measures which could be taken at this time by the Organization but requested me to report to the Committee when further action by the Organization is required.

I trust that the information contained in this letter and its attachments will demonstrate that the WMO is giving thorough consideration to all resolutions of the United Nations addressed to it and that the Organization is anxious to take all necessary action in this connexion, within its terms of reference.

Resolution 19 (EC-XX)

Recommendations addressed by the United Nations to the Organization

"THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,

"HAVING CONSIDERED the report of the Secretary-General on those resolutions of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and of the forty-second and forty-third session of the Economic and Social Council which were referred to the World Meteorological Organization or are of interest to the Organization,

....

"ENDORSES the action already taken by the Secretary-General on the United Nations resolutions adopted by the twenty-second session of the General Assembly and the forty-second and forty-third sessions of the Economic and Social Council;

"DECIDES:

"(1) That measures be taken on these resolutions as indicated in the annex to the present resolution;

"(2) That no action seems necessary on the resolutions not mentioned in the annex;

"REQUESTS the Secretary-General:

"(1) To implement the measures indicated in the annex as far as the budgetary provisions and staff resources available permit;

"(2) To inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the decisions taken."

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

[Original: English]
28 June 1968

I would inform you that allocations totalling \$372,000 were included in the UNHCR Programme for 1968 to assist refugees from Portuguese territories. Similar allocations will be included in the 1969 Programme which will be submitted for approval to the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme at its nineteenth session in October 1968.

A copy of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII) has been duly passed to the League of Red Cross Societies.

UNHCR assistance to refugees

The operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII) concerned assistance to the peoples of Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration. This resolution recalls previous resolutions on this subject under which the High Commissioner for Refugees is also requested to provide and increase economic, social and humanitarian assistance to refugees from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

While the High Commissioner has no competence to provide humanitarian assistance within the countries of Territories mentioned above, he has been, and is, in a position, by virtue of his mandate, to assist refugees who are outside the Territories under Portuguese administration. Persons from Southern Rhodesia, however, do not come under the competence of the High Commissioner.

The High Commissioner has been able to provide humanitarian assistance in co-operation with the Governments concerned, to refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The refugees in question came from Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea.

The attached table shows the numbers of refugees in these countries as at 30 June 1968 as well as the allocations of funds made available by the High Commissioner in 1968 and those proposed for 1969. Up to and including 1967, the High Commissioner has made available for assistance to Angolan refugees \$482,000, for Mozambiquans \$1 million and for those from Portuguese Guinea \$517,000.

The assistance provided consists mainly of helping the Governments concerned to settle these refugees in agriculture. The Governments provide the land free of charge and contribute towards the cost of goods and services. The remainder of the funds required for successful settlement on the land, such as agricultural equipment, seeds, household goods for the refugees, medical and primary education facilities and part of the infra-structure of a settlement are provided by and through the High Commissioner. Since the refugees have to be nourished before they are self-supporting through food from their own cultivation, they are provided with food rations which are mainly contributed by the World Food Programme. The High Commissioner finances the inland transportation, storage and handling of this food.

In view of the limited financial resources available for the UNHCR current material assistance programme, whose financial target averages \$4 to \$5 million annually, the High Commissioner has to rely to a large extent on the voluntary contributions he may be able to obtain from as many sources as possible within the international community, if he is to increase his assistance to refugees from the countries mentioned above.

Annex

Number of refugees from Territories under Portuguese Administration as of 30 June 1968 f/

UNHCR allocations in 1968

UNHCR proposed allocations in 1969

(In round figures)

<u>Territory of origin</u>	<u>Country of asylum</u>	<u>Number of refugees</u>	<u>1968 allocations (\$US)</u>	<u>Proposed 1969 allocations (\$US)</u>
Angola	Dem. Rep. of Congo	350,000 ^{a/}	50,000	275,000
	Zambia	11,400	134,000	260,000
Portuguese Guinea	Senegal	61,500	115,000	100,000
Mozambique	Tanzania	27,000	392,000	175,000
	Zambia	5,150	52,000	12,000
TOTAL		453,000	743,000	822,000

^{a/} Conservative UNHCR estimate.

^{f/} See also the note prepared by the United Nations Secretariat on refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration (A/6700/Add.3, annex VII).

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

[Original: English]
28 August 1968

The text of resolution 2311 (XXII), together with the texts of other resolutions of the last session of the General Assembly that made reference to international organizations or agencies, had been included in a memorandum prepared by the General Secretariat at the request of the General Committee of the Council. The Committee on Juridical-Political Matters of the Council studied that memorandum and, in its report dated 4 April 1968, concluded that it was unnecessary for the Council to take any action with regard to it. The Council took note of the Juridical-Political Committee's report at its meeting on 24 April 1968.

LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

[Original: English]
27 February 1968

I wish to inform you that the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States is considering means for the implementation of the above-mentioned resolution, in accordance with the viewpoint of the Arab League.

[Original: English]
20 June 1968

... I have the honour to inform you that the Arab States - in general - have taken the necessary measures to implement the foregoing resolution, and that the Arab African States, in their capacity as members of the Organization of African Unity, have also adopted the appropriate steps for its implementation.

In this connexion, Arab States - members of the League of Arab States - would appreciate it if the principles embodied in the aforesaid resolution could be applied to the people of Oman, who are one of the peoples striving to gain their freedom, on the basis of the following points:

1. Allocation of scholarships for the Omani citizens in a bid to ameliorate their cultural standard and furnish technicians and cultured citizens.
2. Granting the Omani citizens - via the League of Arab States - technical aid in the fields of vocational and technical training. This aid can be supplied through the United Nations Development Programme.
3. United Nations Economic and Social Council Social Committees may sponsor a social survey - in full co-operation with the League of Arab States - for the natives of Oman.
4. Securing appropriate health services - through the International Red Cross - for the Omani strugglers.

5. Specialized agencies of the United Nations Economic and Social Council - through full co-operation with the Arab League - may conduct proper studies and researches for the economic development in Oman.

6. Protection of human rights in Oman and extending every possible assistance to the Omani people in their struggle to attain freedom and self-determination, in conformity with United Nations resolutions.

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

[Original: French]
27 February 1968

I am grateful for the appreciable help you are giving us and I hope that we shall continue to co-operate as closely as in the past in the great struggle to free the African territories which are still the victims of foreign domination.

[Original: French]
17 May 1968

The Organization of African Unity is following closely and with great interest the work of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In particular, I would recall that the secretariat of the OAU has been represented at the Committee's meetings in Africa and has even contributed to the Committee's work whenever it was invited to do so. I am sure that the Special Committee will easily identify these contributions in the records of the meetings held at Addis Ababa and Dar-es-Salaam.

Furthermore, the secretariat has instructed its representative in New York, Ambassador Moctar Thiam, to follow all the work of the Special Committee in New York. Mr. Moctar Thiam can, at the appropriate time, describe orally the measures which the OAU has taken or proposes to take in order to implement General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII).

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, at its fourth ordinary session, held at Kinshasa in September 1967, adopted the following resolutions:

- CM/Res.101 on Territories under Portuguese domination
- CM/Res.103 on the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa
- CM/Res.104 on the problem of refugees
- CM/Res.108 on Southern Rhodesia
- CM/Res.109 on South West Africa
- CM/Res.102 on apartheid and racial discrimination.

All these resolutions had previously been adopted by the Council of Ministers at its ninth ordinary session held at Kinshasa in September 1967.

Furthermore, the Council of Ministers, at its tenth ordinary session held at Addis Ababa in February 1968, adopted the following resolutions:

- CM/Res.135 on Rhodesia
- CM/Res.136 on the Co-ordinating Committee for the liberation of Africa
- CM/Res.137 on Territories under Portuguese domination
- CM/Res.138 on South West Africans tried and sentenced in South Africa
- CM/Res.139 on South West Africa
- CM/Res.140 on South African participation in the Olympic Games
- CM/Res.141 on the problem of refugees
- CM/Res.142 on apartheid and racial discrimination
- CM/Res.144 on the question of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti)

These resolutions are very explicit and express the political, diplomatic and material support which Africa is willing to provide to further any action contributing to the liberation of the African territories under colonial domination. Furthermore, since the most recent Council of Ministers, a Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees has been established in the OAU secretariat. Among other things, this Bureau is responsible for promoting the resettlement of refugees (particularly those coming from territories under colonial domination), finding them employment and collecting all information on educational, training and employment opportunities for refugees in Africa.

I hope that this information, together with any additional information that Mr. Thiam may be able to provide, will make it clear to the Special Committee that our Organization takes an exceptional interest in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2311 (XXII).

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS BY COLONIAL POWERS IN TERRITORIES UNDER THEIR ADMINISTRATION WHICH MIGHT BE IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

I. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. At its 594th meeting, on 1 April 1968, the Special Committee, by approving the thirty-fourth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.454/Rev.1), decided, inter alia, to take up as a separate item military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in the Territories under their administration which might be impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to refer it to Sub-Committee I for consideration and report.

2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, particularly resolution 2326 (XXII) of 16 December 1967, by operative paragraph 4 of which the General Assembly approved the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1968, including the study of military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration which might be impeding the implementation of the Declaration.

3. At the 637th meeting, on 23 September, the Chairman of Sub-Committee I, in a statement to the Special Committee (A/AC.109/SR.637), introduced the report of that Sub-Committee on this item (see annex to the present chapter). The Sub-Committee's report included eleven working papers prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Sub-Committee, which contained information on military activities and arrangements in a number of Territories, as well as extracts from petitioners' statements concerning this question.

4. The Special Committee considered the report of the Sub-Committee at its 638th, 640th and 641st meetings, between 26 September and 3 October, during which the following delegations made statements: at the 638th meeting, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ethiopia and the United States of America (A/AC.109/SR.638); at the 640th meeting, Madagascar, the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Syria, Australia, Mali and Poland and the Chairman (A/AC.109/SR.640); and, at the 641st meeting, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria, Australia, Afghanistan, Venezuela, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Italy and the United Republic of Tanzania and the Chairman (A/AC.109/SR.641).

5. At the 641st meeting, the representative of Italy proposed that the debate on the item be adjourned until after the twenty-third session of the General Assembly (A/AC.109/SR.641). The Special Committee, by a roll-call vote of 13 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions, rejected the Italian proposal. The result of the voting was as follows:

In favour: Australia, Honduras, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Finland, Ivory Coast, Madagascar.

6. The Special Committee then voted on the report of Sub-Committee I, as follows:

(a) Sub-paragraph 27 (f) of the report was adopted by 10 votes to 4, with 9 abstentions (see section II, paragraph (19)(f) below);

(b) The report of Sub-Committee I as a whole was adopted by 16 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions.

7. At the same meeting, statements in explanation of vote were made by the representatives of Madagascar, the Ivory Coast, Finland, Iran, the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/SR.641).

8. The conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee are set out in section II below.

II. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee at its 641st meeting on 3 October 1968

CONCLUSIONS

(1) Having studied the military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration, the Special Committee found conclusive evidence that such activities and arrangements, far from benefiting the colonial peoples concerned, constituted one of the most serious impediments to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and in several cases posed a grave and ever-increasing threat to international peace and security.

(2) After examining the situation in more than twenty colonial Territories, the Special Committee found that the problem presented itself in two distinct aspects which are examined separately below.

(3) In the first place, in Territories which possess rich economic resources and sizable populations, military force has traditionally gone hand-in-hand with economic exploitation, these being two features of the colonial system; in each Territory the colonial Power has created a network of forts, or military strong points, for the purpose of subjugating the people and providing protection for the foreign economic interests which are exploiting the Territory's resources. Later, these same military forces have been used to suppress the emergent national liberation movements.

(4) Today, in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and Territories in Africa under Portuguese control, the colonial régimes are engaged in ever-increasing military activities aimed at denying by force the legitimate aspirations of the people to freedom and independence. In Namibia, the Government of South Africa continues to defy the authority of the United Nations and has intensified its military preparations in order to maintain its illegal presence in the Territory. Among the preparations noted by the Special Committee was the introduction in Namibia in 1967 of compulsory military service for all medically fit white male citizens between seventeen and sixty-five years of age, the expansion of the police force and the construction of new airfields, including a military air base reported to have been built at Mpacha, in the Caprivi Strip, in 1965. In addition, the South African authorities are said to have conducted missile experiments at Tsoumet, in Namibia and South Africa is reported to be expending large sums on the development of guided missiles and to be establishing its own aircraft industry.

(5) In Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the Portuguese authorities are waging a war of colonial repression on an ever-increasing scale against the liberation movements in an endeavour to deny the peoples of those Territories their freedom and thereby to prevent the attainment of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). According to the information available to the Special Committee, Portugal has deployed an army of between 120,000 and 150,000 troops in the Territories under its control and has constructed a network of over 400 airfields in Angola and nearly 300 airfields in Mozambique from which it carries out military operations against the liberation movements. Armed with the latest weapons and equipment, much of which originated, according to statements by leaders of the liberation movements, in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO countries, Portuguese armed forces have devastated large areas and in northern Mozambique alone have forced over 400,000 people to leave their villages in pursuance of a scorched earth policy.

(6) The information available to the Special Committee shows that Portugal is intensifying its war of repression in these Territories. This is apparent from the continuing increase in Portugal's military expenditures which in 1968 amounted to \$US280 million, corresponding to half of Portugal's annual budget, approximately two thirds of this sum being attributed to expenditure on "extraordinary overseas forces" and from the introduction in 1967 of stringent legislation relating to compulsory military service in Portugal and in the African Territories. On the basis of data available to it, the Special Committee has come to the conclusion that one of the main reasons that Portugal has intensified military activities and arrangements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, is the close military co-operation between Portugal and its NATO military allies. It is within the framework of this bloc that the military contingents of Portugal, which it uses in its devastating war against the peoples of the above-mentioned Territories, are trained. The Special Committee concludes further that Portugal, one of the most backward countries in Europe, could not carry out such a prolonged and extensive war in Africa if it were not receiving economic, financial and military assistance from its NATO allies.

(7) In Southern Rhodesia, the illegal racist minority régime is likewise increasing its military activities against African nationalists and is reported to have succeeded in obtaining supplies of weapons and military equipment despite the embargo imposed by the Security Council in November 1965.

(8) The information available to the Special Committee further shows that there is increasing co-operation between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia who have formed a military entente and whose representatives meet regularly to exchange information and to draw up joint plans for military activities against the liberation movements in Africa. A recent example of this co-operation was the sending by South Africa of reinforcements to Southern Rhodesia to assist the illegal régime in military operations against African freedom fighters.

(9) The Special Committee views these developments with the greatest concern. It cannot fail to point out that the continuing escalation of armed repression in the above Territories, the intensification of military preparation and the collusion between South Africa, Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia have created a grave and ever-increasing threat to the security of neighbouring independent States and to international peace and security in general.

(10) The Special Committee considers, moreover, that those States which continue to permit the supply of arms and military equipment to the members of the entente, including those who continue to furnish military assistance to Portugal within and outside the context of NATO, encourage South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia to conduct military operations against African patriots and bear a grave responsibility for the consequences of their failure to heed the repeated appeals of the United Nations.

(11) The second aspect of the problem is found in the smaller colonial Territories, where the military activities of the colonial Powers also pose a serious danger. As developments in international relations have shown, foreign military bases are a major instrument of neo-colonialist policy and a basic source of tension throughout the world. As part of their global strategy, the colonial Powers and their allies have come to rely on the maintenance of military bases and staging points in many countries, including colonial Territories, for supporting far-reaching military operations. In this connexion, as recent events have shown, the colonial Powers and their allies are attaching increasing strategic importance to the small colonial Territories, especially islands, and the trend is towards expanding these bases and constructing additional ones, rather than eliminating them.

(12) In the Pacific Ocean, one of the largest United States bases is on Guam which contains an important naval base at Apra Harbour, a naval air station at Agana and the Anderson Air Force Base which is used by the United States Strategic Air Command as a staging point for bombing missions over South-East Asia. In addition, according to information available to the Special Committee, the Territory is used as a base for Polaris submarines patrolling in Asian waters. Altogether, some 28,500 servicemen and their dependants are attached to these bases, compared with a Guamanian civilian population of 50,000. As a result, according to the administering Power itself, the economy is mainly "military-oriented" and supported primarily by wages earned in the military establishments. The Special Committee also notes that Guamanians are subject to conscription into the armed forces of the United States.

(13) The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is also being used by the administering Power for military staging and supply purposes and much of the land has been alienated for such use. A number of military installations already exist

in the Territory and, according to information available to the Special Committee, there is reason to believe that the administering Power intends to establish a military headquarters, air and naval bases and facilities for stockpiling nuclear weapons on the islands of Saipan and Tinian and for utilizing the island of Rota for military training and other activities. Similar plans for expanding existing facilities in Eastern Samoa are also reported. Elsewhere in the South Pacific, Australia has included the Trust Territory of New Guinea in its over-all military plans and has established a separate military district for Papua and New Guinea. Since 1963, Australia has increased its expenditure for military purposes in the Territory and, among other things, has constructed some 237 airfields and landing strips. In 1965, the Australian Government initiated a \$A40 million three-year construction programme, providing for the building of five army barracks and training camps in Papua and New Guinea, the construction of a marine base at Port Moresby and a naval base on the Island of Manus. The Special Committee notes that the latter has already been used for SEATO naval exercises.

(14) The situation in other parts of the world is not significantly different. In the Caribbean, naval and air bases exist in Bermuda, the United States Virgin Islands and the Bahamas, and there are smaller research and satellite tracking stations on other islands such as Grand Turk and Antigua. In Bermuda, the United States Government has an air force and a naval base which together occupy one tenth of the island and which are held under a ninety-nine year lease beginning in 1941. The island also contains a British naval station and is used by the Royal Canadian Air Force and Navy in accordance with an agreement signed in September 1964. In the Bahamas, the largest military base is on Andros Island and is used jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom for testing underwater weapons.

(15) In the Indian Ocean, the United Kingdom has since 1965 entertained plans for the establishment of a military staging post in the "British Indian Ocean Territory" which includes islands belonging to the Seychelles. In 1967, the United Kingdom Government entered into an agreement with the Government of the United States for the joint financing and use of such military staging areas and other facilities as might be constructed, the agreement to remain in force for an initial period of fifty years and be renewable for a further period of twenty years. As the United Kingdom representative pointed out, his Government had repeatedly stated that it had no plans to establish military bases on the islands.

(16) In the case of Gibraltar, the strategic value of the Territory is a principal reason for its continued colonial status. A major British military and naval base controlling entry to the Mediterranean, it was substantially expanded during the First and Second World Wars and now contains a naval base and dockyard, a subterranean fortress and an air force station. Since 1949 it has become a NATO base being part of the Iberian Atlantic Command, subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). As such, it has been used for naval exercises by warships of various nationalities belonging to NATO. Apart from tourism and small processing industries, the economy of Gibraltar depends on the base, about half of the workers in the Territory being employed either in the naval dockyards or in services connected with other military installations.

(17) From the above information, the Special Committee concludes that strategic military considerations are an important factor in prolonging colonial rule in

many parts of the world. Far from dismantling their military bases in colonial Territories in response to appeals by the United Nations and the non-aligned nations, the colonial Powers and their allies are increasing military activities and arrangements as well as expanding existing bases and building new ones. Not only is this an important factor impeding the process of decolonization, but it inevitably leads to interference with the economic development of the Territories concerned both through the extensive alienation of land for military purposes and by drawing the population away from productive activities, as in the case of Guam and Gibraltar where the bases play a dominant role in the local economy.

(18) The Special Committee considers that the military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration and the use of military bases in colonial Territories for military operations against a third party or for the suppression of independence movements in any part of the world, are contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter and an abuse by the administering Powers of their moral responsibilities towards the peoples under their administration.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(19) In the light of the above conclusions reached during its study of the item, the Special Committee:

(a) Affirms that on the whole military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration constitute a serious impediment to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

(b) Strongly condemns as a crime against humanity, and as a serious threat to international peace and security, the wanton use of military force by colonial Powers to suppress the legitimate aspirations of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence; and, in particular, vehemently condemns the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia for the continuing intensification of their co-ordinated military aggression against the liberation movements and peoples in Territories under their domination.

(c) Condemns further the formation in southern Africa of a military entente between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia aimed at suppressing by armed force the inalienable right of the oppressed people of the area to self-determination and independence; and calls upon all States to withhold all support and assistance, including the supply of arms and military equipment, to this entente whose existence and activities run counter to the interests of international peace and security.

(d) Expresses its grave concern regarding the increasing use by the colonial Powers and their allies of colonial and Trust Territories for the purpose of establishing strategic military bases and staging areas which constitute not only a source of international tension but also a serious impediment to the implementation of the Declaration by making the political future of the Territories concerned dependent on the long-term strategic interests of the colonial Powers.

(e) Deplores the large-scale alienation of land for military installations and the utilization of local economic and manpower resources for the servicing of such bases which hinders the economic development of the Territories and is therefore contrary to the interests of the people.

(f) Condemns the use of military bases in colonial Territories, especially in Guam and the Trust Territories, against third parties, as contrary to the spirit of the Charter and a threat to international peace and security.

(g) Requests all States having responsibility for the administration of colonial and Trust Territories, to comply unconditionally with the provisions of operative paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, operative paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, and operative paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2326 (XXII) of 16 December 1967, whereby the General Assembly requested all colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones.

(h) Further requests the colonial Powers to cease forthwith alienating land belonging to the people of the Territories for the construction of military bases and installations and to return such land already alienated to its rightful owners, and also to desist from utilizing the economic resources and manpower of the Territories for the furtherance of military activities against the legitimate interests of the colonial peoples.

ANNEX*

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I

MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS BY COLONIAL POWERS IN
TERRITORIES UNDER THEIR ADMINISTRATION WHICH MIGHT BE
IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE
GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

Rapporteur: Mr. Rafic JOUEJATI (Syria)

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A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

1. At its 488th meeting, on 20 February 1967, the Special Committee, in the light of General Assembly resolution 2326 (XXII), decided to undertake a study of military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in the Territories under their administration which might be impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Committee also decided to refer this item to Sub-Committee I for consideration.

2. The Sub-Committee began its consideration of this item in 1967, at its 45th and 46th meetings, held on 6 and 27 September. Owing, however, to the refusal of certain administering Powers to provide it with information on military activities and arrangements in the Territories under their administration and in view of the lack of time and information available to it, the Sub-Committee decided to continue its consideration of the item at its next session.

3. The Sub-Committee accordingly resumed its consideration of the item at its 54th to 57th meetings held between 25 June and 3 September 1968.

4. The Sub-Committee had before it eleven working papers prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Sub-Committee. Eight of these working papers (see appendices I to VIII below) contained information available to the Secretariat concerning military activities and arrangements in the following Territories: Namibia, Gibraltar, Territories under Portuguese administration, Seychelles and St. Helena, Southern Rhodesia, Papua and New Guinea, Guam, Bahamas, Bermuda, Turks and Caicos Islands, Antigua and the United States Virgin Islands. The three remaining working papers contained pertinent extracts from statements made by petitioners at meetings of the Special Committee in 1965-1967 (see appendices IX to XI below).

5. In addition, the Sub-Committee had available to it supplementary information concerning Gibraltar provided by the Mission of Spain to the United Nations and concerning the Territories in Africa under Spanish administration provided by the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations.

6. In formulating conclusions and recommendations on the question under consideration, the Sub-Committee also took into account additional relevant information provided by its members. The Sub-Committee wishes to draw attention to the fact that the colonial Powers refused to co-operate with the Sub-Committee on the question of working out concrete measures aimed at the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX), 2189 (XXI) and 2326 (XXII) requesting the dismantling of military bases and installations in colonial territories and refraining from establishing new ones.

B. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

7. Having considered the question and having studied the documentation and other information available to it, the Sub-Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations at its 57th meeting on 3 September 1968.

8. The delegation of Chile expressed a general reservation on the consideration of this question by the Special Committee. It pointed out that, while Chile

supported the principle, it did not consider that the Special Committee was the organ best suited to study military activities. It stated that it had participated nevertheless in the debate, imbued with a spirit of co-operation with the Committee in its fight to eradicate colonialism. Many paragraphs of the report did not fully reflect the position of Chile and it had been compelled to reserve its position on some of them. Other paragraphs, however, reflected what had been stated by the Chilean delegation on numerous occasions. The report was not entirely satisfactory but it represented an effort which could contribute to the Fourth Committee's task of implementing the principles set forth in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

C. CONCLUSIONS

9. Having studied the military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration, the Sub-Committee found conclusive evidence that such activities and arrangements, far from benefiting the colonial peoples concerned, constituted one of the most serious impediments to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and in several cases posed a grave and ever increasing threat to international peace and security.

10. After examining the situation in more than twenty colonial Territories, the Sub-Committee found that the problem presented itself in two distinct aspects which are examined separately below.

11. In the first place, in Territories which possess rich economic resources and sizeable populations, military force has traditionally gone hand in hand with economic exploitation, these being two features of the colonial system; in each Territory the colonial Power has created a network of forts, or military strong points, for the purpose of subjugating the people and providing protection for the foreign economic interests which are exploiting the Territory's resources. Later, these same military forces have been used to suppress the emergent national liberation movements.

12. Today, in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and Territories in Africa under Portuguese control, the colonial régimes are engaged in ever increasing military activities aimed at denying by force the legitimate aspirations of the people to freedom and independence. In Namibia, the Government of South Africa continues to defy the authority of the United Nations and has intensified its military preparations in order to maintain its illegal presence in the Territory. Among the preparations noted by the Sub-Committee was the introduction in Namibia in 1967 of compulsory military service for all medically fit white male citizens between seventeen and sixty-five years of age, the expansion of the police force and the construction of new airfields, including a military air base reported to have been built at Mpacha, in the Caprivi Strip, in 1965. In addition, the South African authorities are said to have conducted missile experiments at Tsoumet, in Namibia and South Africa is reported to be expending large sums on the development of guided missiles and to be establishing its own aircraft industry.

13. In Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the Portuguese authorities are waging a war of colonial repression on an ever increasing scale against the liberation movements in an endeavour to deny the peoples of those

Territories their freedom and thereby to prevent the attainment of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). According to the information available to the Sub-Committee, Portugal has deployed an army of between 120,000 and 150,000 troops in the Territories under its control and has constructed a network of over 400 airfields in Angola and nearly 300 airfields in Mozambique from which it carries out military operations against the liberation movements. Armed with the latest weapons and equipment, much of which originated, according to statements by leaders of the liberation movements, in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO countries, Portuguese armed forces have devastated large areas and in northern Mozambique alone have forced over 400,000 people to leave their villages in pursuance of a scorched earth policy.

14. The information available to the Sub-Committee shows that Portugal is intensifying its war of repression in these Territories. This is apparent from the continuing increase in Portugal's military expenditures which in 1968 amounted to \$US280 million, corresponding to half of Portugal's annual budget, approximately two thirds of this sum being attributed to expenditure on "extraordinary overseas forces" and from the introduction in 1967 of stringent legislation relating to compulsory military service in Portugal and in the African Territories. On the basis of data available to it, the Sub-Committee has come to the conclusion that one of the main reasons that Portugal has intensified military activities and arrangements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, is the close military co-operation between Portugal and its NATO military allies. It is within the framework of this bloc that the military contingents of Portugal, which it uses in its devastating war against the peoples of the above-mentioned Territories, are trained. The Sub-Committee concludes further that Portugal, one of the most backward countries in Europe, could not carry out such a prolonged and extensive war in Africa if it were not receiving economic, financial and military assistance from its NATO allies.

15. In Southern Rhodesia, the illegal racist minority régime is likewise increasing its military activities against African nationalists and is reported to have succeeded in obtaining supplies of weapons and military equipment despite the embargo imposed by the Security Council in November 1965.

16. The information available to the Sub-Committee further shows that there is increasing co-operation between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia who have formed a military entente and whose representatives meet regularly to exchange information and to draw up joint plans for military activities against the liberation movements in Africa. A recent example of this co-operation was the sending by South Africa of reinforcements to Southern Rhodesia to assist the illegal régime in military operations against African freedom fighters.

17. The Sub-Committee views these developments with the greatest concern. It cannot fail to point out that the continuing escalation of armed repression in the above Territories, the intensification of military preparation and the collusion between South Africa, Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia have created a grave and ever increasing threat to the security of neighbouring independent States and to international peace and security in general.

18. The Sub-Committee considers, moreover, that those States which continue to permit the supply of arms and military equipment to the members of the entente, including those who continue to furnish military assistance to Portugal within and outside the context of NATO, encourage South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia to conduct military operations against African patriots and bear a grave responsibility for the consequences of their failure to heed the repeated appeals of the United Nations.

19. The second aspect of the problem is found in the smaller colonial Territories, where the military activities of the colonial Powers also pose a serious danger. As developments in international relations have shown, foreign military bases are a major instrument of neo-colonialist policy and a basic source of tension throughout the world. As part of their global strategy, the colonial Powers and their allies have come to rely on the maintenance of military bases and staging points in many countries, including colonial Territories, for supporting far-reaching military operations. In this connexion, as recent events have shown, the colonial Powers and their allies are attaching increasing strategic importance to the small colonial Territories, especially islands, and the trend is towards expanding these bases and constructing additional ones, rather than eliminating them.

20. In the Pacific Ocean, one of the largest United States bases is on Guam which contains an important naval base at Apra Harbour, a naval air station at Agana and the Anderson Air Force Base which is used by the United States Strategic Air Command as a staging point for bombing missions over South-East Asia. In addition, according to information available to the Sub-Committee, the Territory is used as a base for Polaris submarines patrolling in Asian waters. Altogether, some 28,500 servicemen and their dependants are attached to these bases, compared with a Guamanian civilian population of 50,000. As a result, according to the administering Power itself, the economy is mainly "military-oriented" and supported primarily by wages earned in the military establishments. The Sub-Committee also notes that Guamanians are subject to conscription into the armed forces of the United States.

21. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is also being used by the administering Power for military staging and supply purposes and much of the land has been alienated for such use. A number of military installations already exist in the Territory and, according to information available to the Sub-Committee, there is reason to believe that the administering Power intends to establish a military headquarters, air and naval bases and facilities for stockpiling nuclear weapons on the islands of Saipan and Tinian and for utilizing the island of Rota for military training and other activities. Similar plans for expanding existing facilities in Eastern Samoa are also reported. Elsewhere in the South Pacific, Australia has included the Trust Territory of New Guinea in its over-all military plans and has established a separate military district for Papua and New Guinea. Since 1963, Australia has increased its expenditure for military purposes in the Territory and, among other things, has constructed some 237 airfields and landing strips. In 1965, the Australian Government initiated a \$A40 million three-year construction programme, providing for the building of five army barracks and training camps in Papua and New Guinea, the construction of a marine base at Port Moresby and a naval base on the Island of Manus. The Sub-Committee notes that the latter has already been used for SEATO naval exercises.

22. The situation in other parts of the world is not significantly different. In the Caribbean, naval and air bases exist in Bermuda, the United States Virgin Islands and the Bahamas, and there are smaller research and satellite tracking stations on other islands such as Grand Turk and Antigua. In Bermuda, the United States Government has an air force and a naval base which together occupy one tenth of the island and which are held under a ninety-nine year lease beginning in 1941. The island also contains a British naval station and is used by the Royal Canadian Air Force and Navy in accordance with an agreement signed in September 1964. In the Bahamas, the largest military base is on Andros Island and is used jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom for testing underwater weapons.

23. In the Indian Ocean, the United Kingdom has since 1965 entertained plans for the establishment of a military staging post in the "British Indian Ocean Territory" which includes islands belonging to the Seychelles. In 1967, the United Kingdom Government entered into an agreement with the Government of the United States for the joint financing and use of such military staging areas and other facilities as might be constructed, the agreement to remain in force for an initial period of fifty years and be renewable for a further period of twenty years. As the United Kingdom representative pointed out, his Government had repeatedly stated that it had no plans to establish military bases on the islands.

24. In the case of Gibraltar, the strategic value of the Territory is a principal reason for its continued colonial status. A major British military and naval base controlling entry to the Mediterranean, it was substantially expanded during the First and Second World Wars and now contains a naval base and dockyard, a subterranean fortress and an air force station. Since 1949 it has become a NATO base being part of the Iberian Atlantic Command, subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). As such, it has been used for naval exercises by warships of various nationalities belonging to NATO. Apart from tourism and small processing industries, the economy of Gibraltar depends on the base, about half of the workers in the Territory being employed either in the naval dockyards or in services connected with other military installations.

25. From the above information, the Sub-Committee concludes that strategic military considerations are an important factor in prolonging colonial rule in many parts of the world. Far from dismantling their military bases in colonial Territories in response to appeals by the United Nations and the non-aligned nations, the colonial Powers and their allies are increasing military activities and arrangements as well as expanding existing bases and building new ones. Not only is this an important factor impeding the process of decolonization, but it inevitably leads to interference with the economic development of the Territories concerned both through the extensive alienation of land for military purposes and by drawing the population away from productive activities, as in the case of Guam and Gibraltar where the bases play a dominant role in the local economy.

26. The Special Committee considers that the military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration and the use of military bases in colonial Territories for military operations against a third party or for the suppression of independence movements in any part of the world, are contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter and an abuse by the administering Powers of their moral responsibilities towards the peoples under their administration.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

27. In the light of the above conclusions reached during its study of the item, the Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should:

(a) Affirm that on the whole military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration constitute a serious impediment to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

(b) Strongly condemn as a crime against humanity, and as a serious threat to international peace and security, the wanton use of military force by colonial Powers to suppress the legitimate aspirations of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence; and, in particular, vehemently condemn the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia for the continuing intensification of their co-ordinated military aggression against the liberation movements and peoples in Territories under their domination.

(c) Condemn further the formation in southern Africa of a military entente between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia aimed at suppressing by armed force the inalienable right of the oppressed people of the area to self-determination and independence; and call upon all States to withhold all support and assistance, including the supply of arms and military equipment, to this entente whose existence and activities run counter to the interests of international peace and security.

(d) Express its grave concern regarding the increasing use by the colonial Powers and their allies of colonial and Trust Territories for the purpose of establishing strategic military bases and staging areas which constitute not only a source of international tension but also a serious impediment to the implementation of the Declaration by making the political future of the Territories concerned dependent on the long-term strategic interests of the colonial Powers.

(e) Deplore the large-scale alienation of land for military installations and the utilization of local economic and manpower resources for the servicing of such bases which hinders the economic development of the Territories and is therefore contrary to the interests of the people.

(f) Condemn the use of military bases in colonial Territories, especially in Guam and the Trust Territories, against third parties, as contrary to the spirit of the Charter and a threat to international peace and security.

(g) Request all States having responsibility for the administration of colonial and Trust Territories, to comply unconditionally with the provisions of operative paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, operative paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, and operative paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2326 (XXII) of 16 December 1967, whereby the General Assembly requested all colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial territories and to refrain from establishing new ones.

(h) Further request the colonial Powers to cease forthwith alienating land belonging to the people of the Territories for the construction of military bases and installations and to return such land already alienated to its rightful owners, and also to desist from utilizing the economic resources and manpower of the Territories for the furtherance of military activities against the legitimate interests of the colonial peoples.

APPENDIX I

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN NAMIBIA

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat for
the members of Sub-Committee I at their request

Military and police forces

1. Under the terms of the South West Africa Constitution Act (Act No. 42 of 1925, as amended) control over defence and police matters rests with the Government of South Africa. The military and police forces in the Territory therefore form an integral part of the South African military and police establishment. a/ The military forces are organized for both external and internal security purposes and in the latter capacity serve to complement and supplement the police force. In the event of war or other emergency, the police force may be employed to assist in the defence of South Africa and Namibia.
2. The South African armed forces consist of a comparatively small Permanent Force (which includes the standing army, navy and air force) numbering 17,276 men in 1967, supplemented by a much larger Citizens Force and commando units made up of volunteers and draftees who serve part-time. As noted below (paragraph 12 below) all medically fit white male citizens from the age of seventeen are liable for service with one or other of these part-time military forces unless they are members of reservists of the Permanent Force, the Police or Prison Service.
3. Units of the South African Permanent Force (including army, air force and naval units) are stationed at various places within Namibia, but information is not available concerning their strength, which presumably changes from time to time. According to the information transmitted by South Africa to the International Court of Justice, the military establishment at Windhoek consists of a permanent administrative staff (which in 1964 consisted of three officers and seven other ranks of the Permanent Force) and the following part-time units: The Windhoek Regiment, a Citizens Force regiment composed at that time of twenty officers and 221 other ranks, commando units and school cadet corps.
4. The Windhoek Regiment forms part of the Armoured Corps of the South African Citizens Force and presumably has equipment similar to other units of the Armoured Corps (which include armoured cars and Sherman and Centurion tanks). Since the introduction of compulsory military training for all medically fit male citizens and the extension of the period of military service in 1967 (see paragraph 12 below) it is probable that the reserve strength of the regiment has increased. According to the information supplied to the Court, recruits underwent nine months' training in South Africa during their first year, followed by three-week training periods at the military camp at Windhoek during the succeeding three years and shorter periods thereafter. Members of the Citizens Force can be called upon for service if needed at any time during a ten-year period. Otherwise, except for the

a/ Because of this integration there is little separate data concerning Namibia. Additional information concerning the strength of South Africa's defence and police forces can be made available to members of the Sub-Committee if they so wish.

training periods, recruits are free to pursue their civilian activities. Cadet detachments at schools for white children in the Territory receive elementary training in drilling and target practice with small-calibre rifles.

5. The commando units are comprised of volunteers who have not previously belonged to the Permanent Force, the Citizens Force or their reserves, and also of white citizens serving their period of compulsory service (see paragraph 12 below). They are trained in the use of weapons and combat operations and may be called for service at any time. Each member is issued with a rifle and each unit is issued with three light machine-guns and three sub-machine carbines for target practice. They serve a sixty-day training period during their first year and receive nineteen days of training during each subsequent year.

6. Under the South African Defence Act (Act No. 44 of 1957, as amended), which is also applicable to the Territory, non-white persons are normally excluded from military training.

7. At Walvis Bay, there exists one of the South African military training camps where upwards of 1,000 men are in training, and an area is set aside for exercises by the South African Defence Force. Information published by the South African Government indicates that in this area three periods of small arms and artillery practice were carried out in late 1967 and early 1968, covering about six, thirteen and eight weeks respectively.

8. In a White Paper on defence for the period 1965-1967, tabled in the South African House of Assembly on 5 June 1967, the Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. Botha, stated that the operational readiness of the South African Defence Force had increased considerably in this period. The numerical strength and efficiency of the Force had been enhanced, the quality and availability of equipment improved, strategic supplies stockpiled, and a firm foundation towards self-sufficiency in regard to essential supplies established. He also stated that to maintain a defence force on the desired level of preparedness, necessitated a continuous process of renewal by means of planning, training, readjustment, research and provisioning. This process had already been projected far into the future.

9. According to information published by the South African Government in March 1967, the total strength of the South African police force in Namibia was 688 (compared with 690 on 30 June 1966) consisting of 432 whites, 217 Africans and 39 coloureds. White recruits must be between 16 and 45 years of age, with a minimum of ten year's schooling; non-white recruits must be between 18 and 35 years of age, with at least eight years' schooling.

10. Local government authorities in urban areas also have their own municipal police forces. Available official information indicates that African municipal policemen numbered eighty-five in 1963.

11. The South African police operates a radio communication system between various mobile and other stations in South Africa and Namibia.

New legislation

12. The South African Defence Amendment Act (Act No. 85 of 1967). The South African Defence Amendment Act, enacted in 1967, abolished the ballot system and introduced a system of compulsory military service for all medically fit white male

citizens between 17 and 65 years of age, except those joining the Permanent Force, the Police or the Prisons Service. This provision also applies to white male immigrants under 25 years of age who have been in South Africa for not less than five years, unless they declare that they do not intend to become citizens.

13. The Minister of Defence may determine each year the number of the new recruits to be allocated to the Citizens Force and to the commandos. Members of the Citizens Force must be liable to nine periods of service over ten years; the first for a maximum of one year, the next three for up to twenty-six days and the last five for up to twelve days. Members of the commandos must be liable to service for sixteen years, for a maximum of sixty days in the first year and nineteen days in any subsequent years.

14. The Amendment Act prohibits, even in peacetime, the publication of information concerning the movements or disposition of the South African Defence Force or any force of a country which is allied to the Republic, or of any South African or allied warships and military aircraft without official authorization. (Under the original Act, the publication of such information was prohibited only "in time of war".) It also prohibits the publication of any statement, comment or rumour relating to any activity or any member of the South African Defence Force or any force of a foreign country, calculated to prejudice or embarrass the Government in its foreign relations or to alarm or depress members of the public, except where the publication thereof has been authorized by the Minister or under his authority.

15. The South African Police Amendment Act (Act No. 74 of 1967). This act amends the original act (Act No. 7 of 1958, which is in force in Namibia) by authorizing the expansion of the South African Police Force to include the Police Reserve of Officers, the Reserve Police Force and temporary members. Another amendment provides that "whenever there are not in any locality sufficient ordinary members of the Police Force available to perform police duties or any particular police duty therein, or to convey any person in lawful custody from such locality to any other place, the Minister of Police or, if authorized thereto by the Minister either generally or in any particular case, any commissioned officer, magistrate, additional magistrate, assistant magistrate, Bantu affairs commissioner, additional Bantu affairs commissioner or assistant Bantu affairs commissioner in that locality may appoint as temporary members to act as such, so many fit and proper persons as may be necessary for the performance of any such duty as aforesaid".

Military equipment and facilities

16. On 22 February 1967, South Africa's Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. Botha, announced in Stellenbosch that steps had been taken for the installation of a Decca navigational system capable of determining the position of vessels at sea to within twenty-five yards. The system would involve an expenditure of 6 million rands and would cover the South African coast from Namibia to Natal. On 13 April, it was reported in the South African Press that the system would have five chains covering the coast from Angola to Mozambique and out to sea for more than 240 miles.

17. Speaking in the South African House of Assembly on 10 May, the Minister of Defence said that "the Defence Force and another body are developing a new defence weapon which promises to be a great success". He added that the Council on Scientific and Industrial Research and the Defence Force had also been doing

research for a number of years on rockets and guided missiles, which were "absolutely essential for South Africa". Noting that the budget allocations for research had "increased from 29,000 rands a few years ago to 10 million rands this year", he expressed the view that:

"With such weapons - along with our radar network which is directed at our northern borders, and the Decca navigation system, which is being introduced along our coastline so as to enhance our safety, along with the additional striking power of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, with the added submarines - South Africa's safety will be in good hands, and we can become a very important ally to the Free World ...".

18. During the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania informed the First Committee at its 1555th meeting on 18 December 1967 that recently South Africa had greatly accelerated its nuclear development with assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany. He said that the closest co-operation existed between the two countries in the production not only of bomb-grade plutonium and nuclear bombs but also of the means of delivery. Construction and research and development work on ballistic missiles had been undertaken near Pretoria since 1965. In addition, South Africa had conducted tests in experimental rocketry and other weapons. The base from which such work was carried on was Tsoumet, Namibia.

19. In reply, the representative of South Africa stated that nuclear research was carried out at the Pelindaba Centre near Pretoria. Its reactor, the fuel used and the fissionable material produced were subject to the safeguards and inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The latter was completely satisfied that all activities of the Centre were devoted exclusively to research for peaceful purposes. With regard to the research station at Tsoumet, he said that it was concerned with ionospheric research in connexion with the international programme of the International Quiet Sun Year.

20. The year 1967 saw the beginning of a South African aircraft industry. It was reported in the South African Press in April that later in the year Afic Holdings (Pty.) Limited would begin manufacture under licence of an Italian light aircraft, Afic RSA 200, an all-metal, single engine, four-seater airplane with a cruising speed of 160 miles an hour. A spokesman for the company said that the plane was intended as an answer to the possibility of the application of sanctions against South Africa.

21. It was reported in September that a new Hovercraft factory at Kuysua in South Africa would start production by November. The engine would, at first, be imported but the company aimed at complete local manufacture. The Managing Director of Hover Air South Africa (Pty.) Limited, which was affiliated to a British firm, said that the craft had commercial value and military importance.

22. On 24 November, the Prime Minister of South Africa opened the Atlas Aircraft Corporation factory at Kempton Park, Johannesburg. The factory was largely concerned with the manufacture of the Impala military jet trainer, a twin-seater with a cruising speed of over 500 miles per hour, and formed the nucleus of what was intended to be an expanding aircraft industry. Press reports indicated that the opening of the Atlas factory meant that henceforth aircraft production in

South Africa would no longer consist merely of the assembly of engines and components imported from Britain and Italy. The entire aircraft could now be made in South Africa - right from the rivets binding its fuselage to the powerful Bristol-Siddeley motor, the Impala's power plant.

23. Since its aircraft industry began to advance into the manufacturing stage only in late 1967, South Africa continued to depend largely on foreign countries for military aircraft. In February 1967, it was reported in the South African Press that if current negotiations between Pretoria and Paris were successful, France would supply South Africa with between £40 million and £50 million worth of Transall tactical and strategic military aircraft, made by Nord Aviation in co-operation with three companies in the Federal Republic of Germany. In May, South Africa was reported to have submitted a large order at the Paris Air Show. In July, the first of the sixteen Sud-Aviation SA 321 Super Frelon helicopters bought from France for short-range troop and equipment transport arrived in South Africa. During the year, the South African Government was reportedly interested in obtaining other types of aircraft made in Canada, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

24. Efforts have been made to promote the development of the shipbuilding industry in South Africa. Mr. Cornelis Verholme, Chairman of Verholme United Shipyards of the Netherlands, was reported to have stated during a visit to South Africa in November 1967 that he had plans for a shipyard at Rietvlei, near Cape Town; it would eventually cost 75 million rands and would be capable of building ships up to 300,000 tons dead weight. He pointed out that the proposed yard, even in the early stages of development, would be capable of constructing submarines and other ships for the South African Navy.

25. Meanwhile, although since November 1964 it has been unable to obtain naval vessels from the United Kingdom, the South African Government has done so from certain other foreign sources. A 24,000-ton oil tanker purchased from Denmark was officially renamed at Durban on 10 August 1967. In January 1968, work was reportedly about to start at Nantes in France on the three Daphne-type, deep-diving submarines ordered by South Africa in 1967; they were expected to be completed before the end of 1968. Each submarine, costing about 8 million rands, would carry twelve torpedoes and need a complement of six officers and thirty-nine men to be trained in France.

Airports and harbours serving Namibia

26. Aircraft of South African Airways connect Namibia with the Republic and Europe. Viscount aircraft make five direct return flights every week between Windhoek and Johannesburg, and four between Windhoek and Cape Town. There are also Skycoach services, and twice-weekly flights between Keetmanshoop and Kimberley via Upington. Once a week, the Boeing 707 jetliner from Johannesburg to Europe touches down at Windhoek. Internal air services are provided by South West Airways.

27. The Territorial Administration has committed 5.55 million rands to airfield construction, the most important being the J.G. Strydom aerodrome (2.4 million rands) at Windhoek and a much enlarged airfield at Grootfontein. Other new airfields have been under construction in various centres in the "white" area as well as at Ondangua (Ovamboland), Ruacana (the site of the proposed Kunene hydroelectric scheme) and Runtu (Okavango) in the northern Native reserves.

28. There are two airfields in the Caprivi Strip, a Native reserve bordering Angola, Zambia, Southern Rhodesia and Botswana. One, the Katima Mulilo airfield, which was built by WENELA, a South African labour recruiting organization, has a 6,000-foot runway. The other, a jet airfield constructed by South Africa in 1965 at Mpacha, ten miles south of the border with Zambia, is said to have a two-mile-long runway.

29. The Mpacha airfield has been described by several persons, including the President of Zambia, as a military base, a charge denied by the South African Government. In October and November 1965, the President of Zambia, as well as the representative of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Zambia (A/AC.109/PET.434), stated that there were fighter planes on the airfield. Furthermore, there are reports that the South African Police has used this airfield to cope with the "terrorist" infiltration into the white-ruled areas of Southern Africa. On 23 November 1967, for instance, the Southern Rhodesian "Ministry of Information" said in a statement that: "A South African police helicopter operating from the Caprivi Strip crashed near Kazungula, on the Southern Rhodesian side of the Zambezi River. The helicopter was flying along the course of the Zambesi River. Members of the crew sustained minor injuries". Kazungula is situated at the point where the borders of Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, Namibia and Botswana meet.

30. Namibia is served by two harbours. Lüderitz, the only harbour in the Territory proper, was in 1967 so shallow (11 feet) that loading and unloading had to be carried out by means of lighters. Even the larger fishing vessels were said to experience difficulty in using the port. It was reported however that the harbour would be dredged to a depth of 20 feet.

31. Walvis Bay, which forms an enclave in Namibia and is in fact a part of the Cape of Good Hope administered by the Territory, has a deep water harbour equipped with 4,600 feet of quays, 29 harbour cranes and over 111,000 square feet of floor space in storage sheds. The port is adequate for the present needs, but is being enlarged to keep pace with future demands.

32. As stated in paragraph 39 below, the public was warned not to enter the area in and around Walvis Bay during the exercise scheduled to be carried out by the South African Navy on 27 and 28 November 1967.

Anti-"terrorist" measures

33. Information concerning guerrilla fighting in the Territory which started during 1966 and the subsequent arrest, trial and conviction of Namibians for alleged "terrorist activities" as well as the action taken by the United Nations bodies directly concerned in regard to the trial of these persons is contained in documents A/6700/Add.2, chapter IV and A/AC.109/L.460.

34. In a speech at Germinstown on 10 November 1967, South Africa's Deputy Minister of Police, Mr. S.L. Muller, described the activities of the liberation movements operating in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola which, he said, had only one common goal, the elimination of white authority in southern Africa. He said that although in Angola and Mozambique there was open warfare, the organized campaign against South Africa had achieved very little beyond causing a certain amount of discomfort.

35. In his opening address to the South African Parliament on 2 February 1968, the Acting State President, Mr. J.F. Naude, said that special measures against "terrorists" had been so successful that they could now be relaxed to some extent, though the Government would remain watchful. In accordance with the Government's policy to fight onslaughts by "terrorists" whenever possible, police units had been sent to Southern Rhodesia. These steps and the police action in Ovamboland, Namibia, had had the desired effect.

36. However, the South African Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. Botha, differed with the view on "terrorism" expressed by the Acting State President, when the question was raised during the budget debate in the House of Assembly on 3 April. The Minister said that what was being experienced today was that as Communist Powers gained increased influence in the neighbourhood of the Red Sea and in certain African States, there would be increasing attempts to infiltrate "terrorists" into southern Africa in an effort to paralyse southern Africa. This must eventually lead to guerrilla warfare, which in turn would lead to conventional warfare.

37. The Minister added that: "this threat is no longer one with which the Defence Force of South Africa can deal. It is a threat with which the whole State and all the people of South Africa as a whole must deal, because these threats have to be met on various fronts ... What I wish to say today is that it will be as well for those who incite 'terrorism' and guerrilla warfare against South Africa, to realize that provocation can later lead to hard retaliation for the sake of self-respect and peace".

Military co-operation with other countries

38. Relations with the United Kingdom. In 1966, the United Kingdom Government decided, for economic reasons to withdraw the single naval frigate stationed in South Africa, as well as the Commander-in-Chief in the South Atlantic, from Simonstown, South Africa. In January 1967, the representatives of the two Governments met and agreed on certain changes in the Simonstown Agreement of 1955 in the light of that decision. In the following month, the South African Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. Botha, announced that it had been agreed that South Africa's naval chief would assume responsibility for the defence of the Cape sea route in the event of war. (Under the 1955 agreement, the British Royal Navy commander at Simonstown would have assumed over-all command of the navies of both countries in time of war.) The United Kingdom Commander-in-Chief would leave and would be replaced by a senior naval officer, who would maintain liaison in Cape Town. The Minister expressed the hope that the United Kingdom and its Western allies would "provide tangible evidence of their appreciation of our willingness to make a greater international contribution towards the defence of the Cape sea routes, at least when it comes to the provision of equipment for our Navy".

39. The South African Government has since made many unsuccessful attempts to induce the United Kingdom Government to abandon adherence to the arms embargo imposed since November 1964 and supply it with military equipment (mainly naval vessels and aircraft) reportedly worth more than £150 million. On 18 November 1967, for instance, the Prime Minister of South Africa declared that the United Kingdom could no longer afford the "luxury" of refusing to supply armaments to the Republic.

40. The declaration followed an announcement by the Ministry of Defence (in the Government Gazette of the Republic of South Africa dated 17 November 1967) that a

practice shoot landwards from SAS President Steyn would take place on 27 and 28 November. The Ministry warned the public that it would be dangerous to enter the area stretching from a point half a mile south of the mouth of the Swakop River in Namibia to a point eleven miles south of the Walvis Bay, and air space up to 20,000 feet immediately above during the exercise.

41. Relations with Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. There have been various reports in recent years to the effect that Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia are developing closer co-operation on defence matters. In a comment on this question made at the National Press Club in Washington on 8 November 1967, the Foreign Minister of Portugal stated that his country neither had nor contemplated a military pact with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The three Governments had many common problems which could be solved only by co-operation and continuing discussion of these problems was indeed taking place among them but he stressed that there was no necessity for co-operation of a military nature.

42. On 12 March 1968, The Times (London) devoted an entire article to a report by a team of journalists on the results of an inquiry which they had undertaken into reports of steps being taken secretly by Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to forge a tripartite alliance. The inquiry suggested, inter alia, that senior officers of the Portuguese, South African and Southern Rhodesian armies, air forces and police had been meeting regularly for many months, if not years. The meetings, it was stated, were usually in Salisbury, Pretoria, Lourenço Marques and, occasionally, Luanda. The most visible effect was that military aircraft from one country were allowed freely to overfly and land in the territory of another. But more important was the exchange of intelligence. A guerrilla wanted by one country could be notified to the other two; if arrested, he would be handed over.

43. The latest statement on this question was made by the South Africa Minister of Defence on 3 April 1968 in the House of Assembly. He denied the existence of any agreements with neighbouring States which had to contend with the same threat from "terrorists" and guerrillas as that with which South Africa was confronted. He added that: "Agreements are not necessary between friends, and friends who are threatened have no need to sign an agreement to meet a threat".

44. Information concerning South African assistance to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia in combating the activities of guerrillas is contained in the working paper relating to that Territory. b/

b/ A/7200/Add.1, annex, paras. 42-46.

APPENDIX II

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the members of
Sub-Committee I at their request

Organization of military installations

1. Under the Portuguese Constitution, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Macau and Timor are described as part of "the Territory of Portugal" and are designated Overseas Provinces. According to article 136 "this unity between the Overseas Provinces and Metropolitan Portugal involves, in particular, the obligation to contribute in an adequate manner to the presentation of the integrity and defence of the whole Nation and the aims of national policy as defined in the common interest, by the bodies in which sovereignty resides".
2. It is in this context that the Portuguese Government includes the overseas Territories in the over-all Portuguese military organization and expects them to contribute to Portugal's military budget. As to actual division, while continental Portugal is organized into four military regions and the Madeira and Azores Islands each constitute a military command, Angola and Mozambique each constitute a military region, and the other five Territories each constitute a military command. Information published in 1966 shows that Angola is further subdivided into the northern, eastern, central and southern territorial commands. At present Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Macau and Timor all have military governors; in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the governor is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. During the period of intensive fighting in Angola, this was also the case, although at present the Territory has a separate commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Many of the district governors in Angola are, however, military officers.
3. In 1957 land-based naval commands were established in these Territories, the one in Angola also encompassing São Tomé and Príncipe. These naval commands were responsible to the Navy General Staff for military purposes but co-operated with the Governor-General on matters affecting policy and administration. The original legislation provided that until warships could be stationed in Angola and Mozambique, at least two ships from Portugal would visit these Territories each year with a view to training the territorial command.
4. In 1958, other naval commands with regional responsibility were established for the smaller overseas Territories. Since July 1967 naval commands have been reorganized; those based on land are divided into four categories with responsibilities for ocean areas, naval regions, naval territorial regions based in the overseas Territories, and naval establishments in certain ports. There are six commands of naval regions, including one for Portugal with headquarters at Lisbon, one for the Azores with headquarters at Ponta Delgada, and one each for

Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde. The previously established naval territorial commands for Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Macau and Timor are retained and an additional one is established for Madeira.

5. The Portuguese Air Force is organized as a separate pattern. There are three air regional commands with headquarters in Lisbon, Luanda and Lourenço Marques. Angola is the Second Regional Air Command. There are a number of military airfields in both Angola and Mozambique, and the airports in São Tomé and Príncipe and Cape Verde are both used as strategic stop-overs between Portugal and Angola and Mozambique. In Angola, there are over 400 airfields and landing strips, 27 of which can take the largest aircraft needed to travel within the Territory. In Mozambique there are nearly 300 airfields of which 20 are of the second category. As reported previously, a/ the network of airfields in Mozambique was completed in 1964-1965 to facilitate troop movements and the airfield at Beira was enlarged to accommodate heavy transport planes.

Military expenditure

6. A rather complicated situation exists as regards military expenditure in the Territories under Portuguese administration. Each Territory has its own armed forces budget (orçamento privativo das forças ultramarinas no território) and Portugal's own budget also includes, under the heading of national defence, an allocation for special forces in the overseas Territories (forças extraordinárias do Ultramar). Although the budgets are separate, the Territories are responsible for contributing from their own revenue to Portugal's military expenditure under a decree of 1959 (42,559, 3 October) and to the "Overseas Military Defence Fund"; Portugal in turn has a reciprocal responsibility for "the complement of expenses in connexion with national defence" in the Territories, as provided under article 61 of the Overseas Organic Law of 1963.

7. As a general rule, therefore, the territorial military budgets are financed as follows from: (a) the territorial contributions under the 1959 decree; (b) complementary funds from Portugal; and (c) any other source of receipts as may be authorized. In 1967, for example, Angola's military budget was being financed from (a) its own contributions under the 1959 decree mentioned above; (b) 10 per cent of the receipts from autonomous services as specially provided for under a decree of 1962 (decree 44,342, 12 May); (c) receipts from the "extraordinary defence tax" as provided under a decree of 1964 (decree 46,112, 29 December); and (d) receipts from the "Overseas Military Defence Fund". It may be pointed out that in Angola, the autonomous services include those of ports and harbours, post and telegraph, national Press, roads, electricity and the Settlement Board. In Mozambique, where ports and harbours have a large revenue, a similar provision was enacted in 1964 to raise money for the armed forces (decree 45,605, 9 March), and this source was expected to provide almost one third of the Territory's military budget for 1967, which amounted to almost 840 million escudos.

8. As reported elsewhere, b/ it is difficult to obtain an accurate figure for Portugal's annual total military expenditures because of the separation between what are considered to be "extraordinary" military expenditures

a/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annex No. 8 (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter V, para. 78.

b/ A/7200/Add.3, chapter VIII, annex I, paras. 30-36.

and other allocations for military purposes which come under the administrative budgets of separate departments. Moreover, in order to present a balanced budget, estimated revenues and expenditures are usually considerably lower than actually anticipated and the real situation can only be known after the accounts are approved, which is usually two years later.

9. Since 1961 the most important item in the "Extraordinary Budget" has been the allocation for the "Extraordinary Overseas Forces". The following data in table 1, extracted from the government budget estimates show, that from 1961-1965 the initial budgetary allocations were usually set so low that they had to be doubled during the year. From 1966 onwards, the original budgetary estimates have been higher and supplementary allocations have become smaller.

Table 1

Portugal's budgetary allocations for the "Extraordinary Overseas Forces"
in 1961-1968
 (million escudos)

	Budgetary allocations			Total as per cent of GNP at market price
	<u>Initial allocation</u>	<u>Supplementary</u>	<u>Total</u>	
1961	950	1,500	2,450	...
1962	1,500	1,796	3,296	4.1
1963	1,750	1,666.2	3,416.2	3.9
1964	1,750	1,851.4	3,601.4	3.8
1965	2,000	2,188 ^{a/}	4,188 ^{a/}	4.1
1966	2,500	1,870	4,370	...
1967	3,500	1,754	5,245	...
1968	4,000

a/ As revised in the 1967 budget.

Source: Portugal. Diário do Governo, 1961-1967.

10. Apart from the allocation for the "Extraordinary Overseas Forces," extraordinary military expenditure includes specially authorized allocations, as for instance for the purchase of ships for the navy expansion programme and the contribution of bases, military hospitals, etc. For 1968, total extraordinary military allocations amount to 5,607 million escudos of which 4,000 million escudos is for the "Extraordinary Overseas Forces", 772 million escudos for the naval expansion programme, and 500 million escudos for air base construction.

11. According to the summary of the 1968 budget, total military allocations for the year amount to 8,259 million excudos, of which 5,615.5 million escudos is for common expenditure, 1,282 million escudos for the army, 873.6 million escudos for the navy and 487.8 million escudos for the air force. As will be

seen from table 2, since 1962 the "Extraordinary Overseas Forces" have absorbed an average of two thirds of the total military allocations. It may also be noted that in 1968, since military allocations represent about 50 per cent of the total ordinary budget, for every two escudos spent on government services, one escudo will have to be spent for military purposes. In contrast only some 3,000 escudos have been allocated for the implementation of the Development Plan in 1963. (See A/7200/Add.3, chapter VIII, annex, para. 33, table 2).

Table 2
Portugal's military budget 1962-1967 (million escudos)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Extraordinary Overseas Forces</u> (1)	<u>Total military allocations</u> (2)	<u>Total ordinary budget</u> (3)
1962	3,296.0	5,696.0 ^{a/}	8,238.7
1963	3,416.2	5,844.7 ^{a/}	9,034.9
1964	3,601.4	6,548.1 ^{a/}	9,596.2
1965	4,188.0	7,259.2 ^{a/}	10,712.1
1966	4,370.0	6,280.0	11,026.5
1967	5,254.0	7,854.0	12,605.4
1968	4,000.0 ^{b/}	8,259.0	16,915.7

a/ Actual expenditure.

b/ Initial allocation (see paragraph 7 for explanation).

Sources: Columns (1) and (3) - Portugal. Orcamento Geral do Estado (Decree No. 48,164) in Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 298, 26 December 1967.

1962-67 Column (2) - 1962-1965: Portugal. Projet de Loi d'Autorisation des Recettes et des Dépenses pour 1966, p. 227, table No. 14 and Ibid, 1967, p. 243, table No. 10, 1966-1967; Portugal. Rapport sur le Budget Général de l'Etat pour 1967, p. 75.

1968 Diário do Governo, Series I, 26 December 1967, table XXXIII.

12. However, on the basis of past experience it is expected that actual military expenditure in 1968 will probably exceed 10,000 million escudos or approximately \$US350 million. This brings Portugal's military expenditure close to \$US 1 million a day, money which, except for the war, could be spent on economic development and improved social services.

13. As table 3 below shows, the territorial military budgets have also risen sharply in recent years, especially those of Angola and Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea. In the period 1963-1968 Angola's military budget more than doubled and that for Mozambique has increased by over 90 per cent. Both these Territories have had to bear these heavy military expenditures from their own revenues supplemented by special taxes. In Guinea, called Portuguese

Guinea, military expenditure has also almost doubled over this period, but as in the other smaller Territories, most of the additional funds have come from Portugal.

Table 3

Military budgets of the Overseas Territories, 1963-1967
(millicn escudos)

<u>Territory</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Angola	456.6	481.4	554.8	626.0	782.0	951.3
Mozambique	472.1	495.5	573.7	724.4	838.4	910.3
Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea	48.6	65.3	68.0	67.4	88.4	92.8
Cape Verde	12.7	12.5	13.8	15.0	19.7	25.2
São Tomé and Príncipe	9.8	9.1	8.8	10.3	10.5	10.4
Macau and dependencies	25.6	19.6	23.2	22.5	28.1	0.9
Timor and dependencies	<u>33.8</u>	<u>27.7</u>	<u>27.8</u>	<u>28.3</u>	<u>33.3</u>	<u>33.4</u>
Total	1,059.2	1,111.1	1,275.1	1,493.9	1,800.4	2,024.3

Source: Portugal. Diário do Governo, Series I.

14. The distribution of the military allocations between the three armed services (table 4) gives some indication of the role each service plays in the Territories. It is therefore significant that for 1968 the army allocation in Angola is to rise by 25 per cent over 1967; that in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the largest allocation is for the air force; and that in Cape Verde, where a new naval command is being established, the allocation for the navy is being doubled.

Armed forces

15. in 1964 Portugal was estimated to have had 47,000 men in the armed forces. These included 25,000 in the army, 15,000 in the navy and 7,000 in the air force. In addition, there were substantial numbers of men under arms in the Overseas Territories, in which the effectives of the army consisted of 12 battalions of caçadores (light infantry troops), 14 independent companies of caçadores, 1 battalion of motorized cavalry, 6 independent squadrons of motorized cavalry, 3 companies of military police, 2 battalions of engineers, one signal company and several quartermaster units. Although these figures have no doubt more than doubled since then, they are presented to show the pattern of organization of the army. The army also supplies a division of about 18,000 men to NATO in Europe.

16. Portugal considers itself to be at war in its overseas Territories.^{c/} A large number of troops from Portugal are now serving in the overseas Territories, engaged

^{c/} In October 1963 the overseas armed forces were placed under war-time discipline, and war-time penalties, including the death penalty, now apply to offences committed by the armed forces in the Territories (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, paragraph 75).

Military budgets of the overseas Territories for 1967-1968
(distribution between the three armed services and share of
costs between the Territories and Portugal)
(million escudos)

Year and Territory	Army	Air Force	Navy	Total	Total	
					Of which territorial revenue	Complement paid by Portugal
Angola						
1967	533.0	180.0	69.0	782.0	782.0	-
1968	678.9	200.5	71.9	951.3	951.3	-
Mozambique						
1967	609.4	166.0	63.0	838.4	838.4	-
1968	667.3	180.0	63.0	910.3	910.3	-
Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea						
1967	30.1	32.2	26.1	88.4	12.1	76.3
1968	30.5	35.3	27.0	92.8	12.2	80.6
Cape Verde						
1967	15.0	1.4	3.3	19.7	4.3	15.4
1968	16.1	1.5	7.6	25.2	4.5	20.7
São Tomé and Príncipe						
1967	7.4	0.8	2.3	10.5	5.5	5.0
1968	7.0	1.1	2.3	10.4	5.1	5.3
Macau and dependencies						
1967	26.9	-	1.2	28.1	28.1	-
1968	...	-	0.9	0.9	0.9	-
Timor and dependencies						
1967	31.5	-	1.8	33.3	5.1	28.2
1968	31.6	-	1.8	33.4	5.1	28.3
Total						
1967	1,253.3	380.4	166.7	1,800.4	1,675.5	124.9
1968	1,431.4	418.4	174.5	2,024.3	1,889.4	134.9

Source: Portugal. Diário do Governo, Series I, 1967 and 1968.

in military operations against liberation movements. According to newspaper reports, there are probably some 120,000 to 150,000 troops in the overseas Territories: 40,000 to 60,000 in Angola, 40,000 to 60,000 in Mozambique, and some 25,000 to 30,000 in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea. These include army, air force and navy personnel. According to one official source, in 1966 there were some 60,000 troops in Angola, d/ including an army of about 55,000 men and officers, a navy of 1,000 to 2,000, and an air force of 3,000 to 4,000. Similar information is not available for Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea.

17. As already reported, a new military service law is being introduced to meet the growing needs of the armed forces. In addition to introducing voluntary military service for both men and women, the new law broadens the concept of military service to include duties that may be assigned by the armed forces. Men are subject to recruitment into the armed services on the first day of the year of their eighteenth birthday and their military service obligation ceases on 31 December of the year of their forty-fifth birthday. In time of peace, men will be drafted into the armed forces only when they reach twenty-one years of age. However, under new regulations introduced in November 1967 (Decree Law 48,024, 4 November), persons over sixteen who are liable for military service may not leave the country without special permission.

18. Although the new law provides that "the normal period" of active military service is for two years, including a period of training and a period of service with the armed forces, this period may be prolonged "as circumstances may require". In practice, service in the air force and navy has always been for longer periods (thirty-six months in the air force and forty-eight months in the navy). Currently, all units serve an additional two years overseas irrespective of their prior length of training service.

19. Before the previous military service law, it was estimated that some 36,000 men entered military service in Portugal each year, and there were about half a million reservists available. Since the upper age of military obligation is forty-five years, it was estimated in 1964 that a further 300,000 would be available for home defence and other similar duties, and up to 800,000 men could probably be mobilized without seriously affecting the running of the nation's economy.

20. It is not known to what extent the new military law increases the number of recruits available annually. Since the new law applies to all Portuguese citizens, all the local inhabitants in the overseas Territories are equally subject to recruitment. In practice, as reported for Angola, only those Africans "who are expected to be loyal" are selected after registration for service in the armed forces, almost all units of which have European officers. (In 1964 the Portuguese Army was reported to have about 3,000 regular officers.) The majority of Africans in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, are incorporated in the traditional militia (see paras. 28 to 33 below).

21. Since the start of military operations in the African Territories a new commando company has been created and a special commando training centre (Centro de Instrução de Comandos (CIC)) was set up in Luanda in 1965. Apart from training,

d/ The representative of GRAE told the Special Committee in 1967 that there were 85,000 Portuguese troops in Angola (A/6700/Add.3, chapter V, para. 542).

the CIC is also responsible for planning, co-ordinating, carrying out and supporting operational activities as may be assigned to it. The CIC organization has its own command and includes among others a service unit, a training unit, a commando unit and a psychological action unit. This latter is responsible for training and supervising commandos in psychological warfare.

22. Commandos are selected from volunteers from any branch of the armed services and on average one out of a hundred applicants is accepted for training. According to newspaper reports commandos are being used in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea.

Equipment

23. Portugal manufactures most of its own light equipment and light and heavy artillery as well as mortars, grenades, mines and ammunition of all kinds, a Sten-type gun and a nine milimetre pistol. According to an official Portuguese source, e/ although Portugal is self-sufficient as regards a great deal of the material used by the army, it has to rely on foreign sources for its naval and air material. In 1964, the majority of the Portuguese soldiers were reported as armed with an older Mauser rifle as compared with the more modern weapons issued to the Portuguese division attached to NATO. At that time the Mauser rifle was being replaced with the G3 automatic rifle developed in the Federal Republic of Germany and manufactured in Lisbon at the rate of 160 per day. This automatic G3 rifle was said to be "an ideal weapon" for African fighting and it was being issued to Portuguese troops with a bayonet. In 1964, Portugal's artillery was reported to be mainly of British and German types such as the British 8.8 centimetre and 14¹ centimetre field guns and 9.4 centimetre anti-aircraft guns and German 10.5 centimetre and 15 centimetre guns as well as Bofors 4 centimetre guns. There is no information on the use of these in the African Territories.

24. Since 1964, at which time its navy comprised 96 vessels, including 3 destroyers, 11 frigates, 3 submarines and 1 corvette, Portugal has begun to expand its fleet as part of its long-term overseas defence programme. Emphasis is to be given to ships for coastal defence and protection of maritime routes between Portugal and the overseas Territories. In 1964, it concluded an agreement with France for a long-term loan of \$US125 million to be used for the construction of 20 naval vessels, 2 escort ships and 7 submarines (See A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, paragraph 82). Eleven ships are now under construction: 4 escort destroyers and 4 submarines (to be paid for entirely by Portugal) are being built in France and another 3 escort destroyers are being built in Portugal with United States aid under a bilateral agreement. In December 1966, the Government authorized the purchase of six new corvettes for which 580 million escudos have been allocated to be spent over the period 1966-1974. In December 1967, the Government placed an order for four patrol boats of about 250 tons each. These are to be built in Portugal and delivered in 1970 for use in the overseas Territories.

25. The Portuguese Navy also includes two destroyer escorts on loan from the United States since 1953 (Act of 5 August 1953 - 67 Stat 363) and since extended under United States Public Law 90-224 of the 90th Congress HR 6167 of 26 December 1967.

26. Apart from additions to its fleet, Portugal has also increased considerably the number of small craft of various types for use on lakes and rivers by military forces in the overseas Territories. Since 1961 new ships launched at the Mondago shipyards include eleven patrol launches (lanchas de fiscalização), forty-one landing craft of various types including some of over 500 tons for military cars, and one navy patrol ship.

e/ Statement by the former Secretary of State for the Air, Brigadier General Kaulza de Arriaga (See A/6700/Add.3, chapter V, paragraph 24).

27. In 1964 Portugal's air force comprised some 7,000 men and officers and 350 aircraft. These included 50 HAA F-86F fighters; 50 F-84G fighters; 12 P-2V Neptune ASW patrols; various transport planes including 15 Nord 2502 transports, Junker J-52 transports, C-47, C-54, and DC-6 transports. In addition there were various smaller craft including Dornier Liaison planes, trainers and Alouette helicopters. In 1966, Portugal was reported to have acquired 40 Fiat G-91 tactical fighters from the Federal Republic of Germany, and by April 1967 it was reported in a Portuguese paper that the Portuguese air force had more than 700 planes, including F-104G planes built in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is not known to what extent these aircraft are used in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, but various Portuguese sources have reported the use of the air force in transport, reconnaissance patrols, and when necessary, bombing missions. In 1965 the Diário de Noticias, for instance, carried a series of articles entitled "Three fronts in three months", in which descriptions were given of the Luanda air force base, the helicopter force which is responsible for reconnaissance in forest areas, and of parachute troops who are air-lifted to the areas of activity. f/ In 1967, the Portuguese air force was reported to have twelve Fiat jets in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea.

Para-military and internal security forces in the overseas Territories

28. In addition to the regular armed forces, there are various para-military and internal security forces in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea. In each of the three Territories there is a traditional militia which is a military corps (corpo militar de segunda linha) composed of Africans living in traditional societies (vizinhos das regedorias). The traditional militia is under the direct command of the local administrative authority and through him, responsible to the Governor or Governor-General of the Territory. In case of war or emergency, the militia may be placed under the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps as necessary where such an organization exists.

29. According to the law, all male individuals living in a regedoria, who are 18 years of age and over and who meet the requirements for military service automatically belong to the traditional militia. Active service in the militia units is determined by their respective commands, but there appears to be no specific duration for active service. It is the duty of the militia units to collaborate actively with their respective commands in the defence of the regedorias against incursions of armed bands and attempts to change the public order; to contribute to the regedoria police; and to contribute through the social co-operation corps in carrying out work of exclusive interest to the regedoria.

30. In recent years these militia units in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, have been specially armed and trained and organized into protection forces (forças de quadricula) and "intervention" forces which are used with the volunteer corps and the regular army in active warfare.

f/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6300/Rev.1), chapter V, para. 99.

31. Angola and Mozambique each has a Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps. The Volunteer Corps was first created in Angola following the uprising in 1961 and was composed of Portuguese citizens resident in the Territory. In both Territories the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps now has a permanent staff of military leaders and organized units throughout the Territory which is divided into "civil defence zones" corresponding to the administrative districts. In Angola, where it is commonly referred to as the OPVDC (Organizaco Provincial de Voluntrios e Defesa Civil) it serves as an auxiliary to the regular armed forces. It has an autonomous budget which in 1965 amounted to 58.5 million escudos, the greater part being for salaries and allowances of the permanent staff. Like the militia, the OPVDC in Angola is also divided into "self-defence" units comprising the local population, public servants and employees of private enterprises, and an intervention force made up of volunteers, whose task is to destroy "bands of guerrillas". Participation by public servants and employees of private firms in the Territory in the "self-defence" units has been made compulsory.

32. Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, also each has a Public Security Police force which has recently been enlarged. In Angola, it was last reported to be around 10,000 men.

33. In a new development, in 1967, Portugal was reported to have armed some of the local population in the north of Mozambique and in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea. (See A/7200/Add.3, chapter VIII, annexes II and III).

Portuguese military policy concerning the overseas Territories

34. Portuguese armed forces serving in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, are considered by Portugal to be on "missions of sovereignty", which is intended to keep the African Territories as part of the Portuguese nation. The armed forces have three specific responsibilities. These are: the defence of territorial borders, the maintenance of internal security, and psycho-social action. Details of these activities are contained in previous reports of the Special Committee and information on recent military activities is contained in A/7200/Add.3, chapter VIII, annexes.

35. Since 1961 when fighting first broke out in Angola, Portugal has strengthened its military forces and military installations in all the overseas Territories and more particularly in Angola and Mozambique. Maintaining that the activities of the liberation movements are instigated from outside the Territories, in February 1965 Premier Salazar made it clear that Portugal rejects a "political solution" and considers that "continued military effort" is the only way to achieve "order in the Territories and peaceful progress of the inhabitants". g/ In 1966, as reported elsewhere (A/67CO/Add.3, chapter V, paragraphs 17 ff.) various Portuguese spokesmen have emphasized that Portugal is prepared to face a long-term war. This, for instance, was the main theme of a speech made in October 1966 by Brigadier General Kaulza de Arriaga, former Secretary

g/ Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chapter V, para. 16.

of State for Air. The future of the Portuguese nation depended, he said, on a policy of unity and the exercise of full Portuguese sovereignty over all the Territories comprising the nation. Measures required "to strengthen the national structure" involved, in order of priority: in the short term, improved inter-territorial communications; in the medium term, economic development; and in the long term, national population growth, settlement of Angola and Mozambique, raising the level of development of both Europeans and Africans (elevação do grau de evolução das populações brancas e negras) and a special effort in the field of research. In terms of strategy, Portugal's position in the western world could remain significant only if it was based on a participation of military installations and bases which kept pace with general developments.

36. In Africa, the Brigadier-General continued, Portugal had to face the fact that the war against it would continue, with varying intensity, for an indefinite period. This was a prolonged war which demanded great economy in its conduct and operation. Thus Portugal's strategy in Africa must be developed along the following lines: externally on the diplomatic, psychological, economic and military fronts; internally it must counter "subversion" and be prepared for traditional large scale military actions; and finally it must obtain wherever possible the necessary war materials. In the overseas Territories military forces needed to be supplemented by highly mobile air-borne striking forces. This required a better supply of aircraft and better intelligence work.

37. As part of Portugal's long-term military preparation in Africa, land and air communications between Portugal and Angola and Mozambique are being improved and the territorial military establishments have been strengthened with increased staffs. In 1966, for instance, larger staffs were created for the naval command in Angola and the air force commands of Angola and Mozambique and a new parachute troop unit (batalhão) was established with Cape Verde and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, as its base area. In early 1967 the staffs of the maritime defence of Cape Verde and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, were also increased.

38. Various military training centres are also being established in the two larger Territories. These include the commando training centre in Luanda which provides a three-month course of specialized training in commando techniques. In 1966, new training courses for army officers, pilots and parachute troops were instituted in Angola and there are two training centres in Mozambique. There are also special training courses for militia officers and civil defence officers.

Military co-operation of Portugal with other countries affecting the Territories under its administration

39. Portugal's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The question has often been raised since 1963 of the use by Portugal, in suppression of national liberation movements in the Portuguese Territories in Africa, of arms provided by its NATO allies. Petitioners from these Territories have reported to the Special Committee, both in written petitions and in oral hearings, on the military and other assistance Portugal is receiving from NATO and its members. In particular, representatives of the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, have told the Special Committee that they are convinced that without the help of its military allies, Portugal would not be able to continue the war on three fronts in Africa.

40. During the past five years the question of the supply of war materials to Portugal by members of NATO has been raised by many delegations in speeches in the Committee of Twenty-Four, the General Assembly and the Security Council. The main points made in these speeches are that NATO members are assisting Portugal in its war against the national liberation movements by: (a) making arms and armaments available to Portugal; (b) helping to train Portuguese troops; (c) providing assistance to Portugal for its domestic defence, thereby releasing Portuguese troops and equipment for service in Africa; and (d) providing economic and financial assistance which has helped Portugal to carry the burden of the cost of the war in Africa.

41. This same question has formed the substance of resolutions adopted by the three bodies mentioned above. The relevant operative paragraphs of the most recent of these resolutions are as follows:

- (i) Special Committee, resolution of 20 June 1967 (A/6700/Add.3, chapter V, para. 1024).

"6. Requests once again all States, particularly the military allies of Portugal in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to take the following measures:

(a) to desist forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which enables it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its domination;

(b) to take all necessary measures to prevent any sale or supply of weapons and military equipment to the Portuguese Government;

(c) to stop the sale or shipment to the Portuguese Government of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition;

(d) to take the necessary measures to put an end to the activities referred to in operative paragraph 3, above".

- (ii) General Assembly resolution 2270 (XXII) of 17 November 1967.

"8. Once again requests all States, particularly the military allies of Portugal in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to take the following measures:

(a) to desist forthwith from giving the Government of Portugal any assistance, including the training of Portuguese military personnel within or outside the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which encourages that Government to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its domination;

(b) to prevent any sale or supply of weapons and military equipment to the Government of Portugal;

(c) to stop the sale or shipment to the Government of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition;

(d) to put an end to the activities referred to in paragraph 6 above".

(iii) Security Council resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965.

"6. Requests all States to refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the people of the Territories under its administration; and to take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government for this purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories under Portuguese administration".

42. The replies of Member States on the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolutions are contained in documents S/5448, October-November 1963, and S/7385 and addenda, June-November 1966. Among the replies are those of the following ten NATO members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. In each case the reply states what measures the Government concerned has taken in response to the Security Council's resolutions.

43. In November 1965, during the discussion on the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Fourth Committee's attention was drawn to a report in the Daily Sketch that seven B-26 bombers had been secretly delivered to Portugal by the competent United States authorities. Other aircraft which were reported to have been used by the Portuguese military authorities in Africa include the United States manufactured Lockheed Harpoon, F84 and F86 aircraft (A/6300/Rev.1, chapter V, paras. 311-318), Italian FIATs said to have been assembled in the Federal Republic of Germany, and French manufactured Alouette helicopters (A/6300/Rev.1, chapter V, para. 488).

44. When the Special Committee visited Africa in 1967 it was shown various arms and armaments the liberation movements claimed to have captured from Portuguese troops. These, according to the petitioners' identification, included a Belgian FAL rifle bearing the mark of the Herstel arms factory, Italian grenades and a 400 Kg bomb of foreign make.

45. At the 1592nd meeting of the Fourth Committee (A/C.4/SR.1592, paras. 6-11), the representative of the United States explained that the seven B-26 aircraft had been delivered to Portugal under contract by private persons, illegally. Those concerned had been indicted in the Federal District Court for exporting aircraft without a licence. The contract in question had called for the supply of twenty aircraft, but the United States authorities had intervened in time to prevent the remaining thirteen aircraft from leaving the United States.

46. Commenting on the arms captured from Portuguese troops the United States representative stated, inter alia, that the implication that the United States Government was knowingly making arms available to Portugal for use in Africa was untrue. On the same occasion the representative of Italy stressed that Italy did not supply arms to Portugal (A/6700/Add.3, chapter V, paras. 645-651).

47. Information on Portugal's NATO division is contained in Military Review (Vol. XLIV, No. 8), August 1964:

"A special camp has been constructed for her NATO division, which numbers about 18,000 men, adjacent to a fine training ground at Saint Margarita in Portugal. The division is organized on the NATO pattern, and has three infantry regiments, each of about 3,000 men. There are three battalions to a regiment, each of about 840 men. In addition, there are artillery, tank, and engineer units, and the usual other support units. A great deal of care and attention has been lavished on this NATO formation. It has been kept more than fully up to strength despite the obvious temptation to use some of its units for overseas work in Africa."

...

"Equipment for the NATO division has been provided partly by the United States under NATO agreements. It consists of M47 tanks, 105-millimeter and 155-millimeter guns, trucks, jeeps, and engineer and technical machinery and vehicles. Mortars and small arms are also of NATO pattern, although many are non-Portuguese. Mortars, grenades, mines, and ammunition of all kinds are now manufactured in Portugal, and plans are in hand to assemble certain military trucks."

...

"Many of the regular officers have attended courses of instruction with, and done attachments to NATO forces, which have ensured that they maintain a broad outlook and are up to date in military developments and techniques. The officers on the NATO divisional staff rotate so that, eventually, most regular officers will have gained some staff experience. This means not only that casualties of trained staff officers are easily replaceable in war, but also that, should it be thought necessary, there are sufficient available to form another divisional staff. The entire staff has twice moved off to Germany on training (the division had to stay in Portugal for economic reasons) and has been highly complimented on its work there."

48. The original North Atlantic Treaty and relevant supplementary agreements covering Portugal's relationship within the NATO framework are available for reference in the Secretariat.

49. Co-operation with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. During 1967, Portugal's relations with South Africa were strengthened through a series of exchange visits of government officials, including the ministers for defence, and the signing of a new agreement on the development of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric scheme on the Zambezi River in Mozambique. The new agreement, together with that relating to the joint development of the Cunene River (A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, paras. 66-68), are considered by Portugal to be "the prelude to a closer and more perfect co-operation between Portugal and South Africa".

50. As the previous reports of the Special Committee show, these events are but further steps in Portugal's policy of consolidating its position in southern Africa, and of developing closer ties with South Africa. In 1967 Mr. Nogueira, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, added his support to the theme that the southern part of Africa constitutes a separate area, distinct from the rest of the continent because of its "multiracial" societies and where Portugal and South Africa not only had many interests and problems in common, but also shared "the same system of values" and were both equally determined to defend these values.

51. During 1967 there was a recrudescence of reports suggesting that Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had a secret defence agreement. The existence of such an agreement has been suggested since 1961 (see for instance A/AC.109/21) and has sometimes been referred to in the Press as the "Unholy Alliance" or the "Salisbury-Pretoria-Lisbon Axis". As a result of these reports, Portuguese and South African officials again specifically denied the existence of a defence agreement between their Governments; according to Prime Minister Vorster, no such agreements existed "because they were not necessary".

52. Information suggesting evidence of military co-operation between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, includes visits between civil and military personnel, joint military training exercises, free overflights by each other's aircraft, collaboration between police officials and the exchange of information (see A/7200/Add.3, chapter VIII, paras. 66-73). An article in The Times (London) of 12 March 1968 on these questions suggested that there are also regular and frequent meetings between officials in Salisbury, Pretoria and Lourenço Marques.

Relations with African States

53. Since 1961 almost all the African States with common territorial borders with Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, have addressed complaints to the Security Council concerning the violation by Portugal of their air space and national Territory. These include complaints by Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Senegal, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The complaints by Senegal in 1963 and in 1965 led to the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 178 (1963) of 24 April 1963 and 204 (1965) of 19 May 1965.

54. In 1966, the Security Council also considered complaints by the Democratic Republic of the Congo of Portuguese activities tending to overthrow the legitimate authorities of the Congo. As a result, on 14 October 1966 the Security Council adopted resolution 226 (1966) in which it urged the Government of Portugal, "in

view of its own statement, not to allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo".

55. In November 1967, the Security Council was seized of a further complaint of the Democratic Republic of the Congo concerning Portuguese activities tending to threaten the territorial integrity of the Congo. On this occasion, the discussion centred on the invasion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by mercenaries from Angola. Subsequently, the Security Council on 15 November 1967 adopted resolution 241 (1967), in which it, inter alia, condemned, in particular, the failure of Portugal, in violation of previous Security Council resolutions, to prevent the mercenaries from using the Territory of Angola under its administration as a base of operations for armed attacks against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and called on Portugal to put an end immediately to the provision to the mercenaries of any assistance whatsoever.

56. According to a recent report from Zambia, on 22 March 1968 Portuguese aircraft conducted a bombing raid on three Zambian villages in the Kalabo district, killing six persons and wounding twenty. Of the six persons killed, two were Zambians and four were Angolan refugees who had settled in Zambia.

APPENDIX III

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the members of Sub-Committee I at their request

1. As of 11 November 1965, the date of the unilateral declaration of independence, the Southern Rhodesian armed forces were constituted as described in the following paragraphs. a/

2. Army. The regular army, with 3,400 men on active duty, consisted of two infantry battalions, namely the all-white Rhodesian Light Infantry and the white-officered Rhodesian African Rifles, and the Special Air Service Squadron, a 150-man unit of parachute commandos. One of the two infantry battalions was reported to be equipped with Ferret armoured cars. There was an establishment for two brigades, each based on one of the regular infantry battalions, which could be brought up to strength by calling out reservists. In addition to the regular army described above, Southern Rhodesia had 8,400 white reservists constituted into eight territorial battalions, four of which were reported to be active and the others believed to be in various stages of readiness, and one field artillery regiment.

3. Air force. The Royal Rhodesian Air Force had a total active strength of 900 regulars with seventy-five aircraft constituted into the following squadrons:

- (a) 1 squadron Hunter day-fighter/ground attack
- (b) 1 squadron Vampire day-fighter/ground attack
- (c) 1 squadron Canberra light bombers
- (d) 1 squadron armed Provost reconnaissance
- (e) 1 squadron Dakota and DC-4M North Star transports
- (f) 1 squadron Alouette Mk.3 helicopters.

Separate information on air force reservists is not available but a report prepared for the Institute of Strategic Studies in London in April 1966 suggested that the majority of the ground personnel servicing the regular air force units were reservists or African civilians employed by the air force.

4. Police. Apart from the armed forces, Southern Rhodesia had a 6,400-strong police force known as the British South Africa Police which had military equipment such as armoured cars and was in many ways a para-military force capable of being

a/ For information on the armed forces at the time of the dissolution of the Central African Federation, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter III, para. 33.

used in support of the military for purposes of internal security. Of the regular strength mentioned above, 2,000 were white. The police reservists were reported to number 28,000, of whom 21,000 were white.

5. Since the imposition of sanctions on the illegal régime, a tight censorship has been imposed on further developments concerning the security forces. It is therefore not possible to bring the 1965 figures on the armed forces up to date. However, statements made by officials of the illegal régime would indicate that, although the structure and composition of the armed forces have remained essentially the same, there has been a substantial increase in the size of the military services. In May 1966, the régime announced compulsory registration for all Europeans, Asians and coloured males in the country between the ages of seventeen and sixty and doubled the period of peace-time military training which European, Asian and coloured youths undergo, from four and a half months to nine months. Within the last two years, training exercises for the territorial battalions have also been increased and made more intensive. In July 1967, the régime announced that two of the territorial battalions would be deployed in operational areas with the regular army instead of going on the normal training. They would assist the regular army in patrolling the Zambezi Valley in search of armed African nationalists.

6. Figures on current account expenditure of Southern Rhodesia for the years 1964/1965 to 1967/1968 as provided for in its annual budget show a gradual but significant increase in appropriations for the army and police, as illustrated below:

Current Account Expenditure From 1964/65 To 1967/68
(pounds)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total current expenditure (approx.)</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Increase</u>
1964/65	70,723,139	3,019,080		2,916,550		5,174,000	
1965/66	73,751,076	3,105,700	+ 86,620	2,905,346	- 11,204	5,451,000	+277,000
1966/67	74,494,159	3,870,801	+660,901	2,614,101	-384,045	6,108,200	+323,360
1967/68	81,378,100	4,295,268	+340,967	2,797,184	+ 92,583	6,394,380	+154,380

7. The figures quoted above show that since the illegal declaration of independence, the annual expenditure on the army and police has been increased by £1 million and £750,000 respectively, whereas the air force vote has decreased by £300,000.

8. Equipment used by the army is mostly British, dating back before the unilateral declaration of independence. In the air force, the majority of the combat planes are also British in origin, but also date back to before the unilateral declaration of independence. Since the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom Government has imposed an embargo on all supplies of arms and military equipment to Southern Rhodesia. Subsequent to the action taken by the United Kingdom

Government, the Security Council, by its resolutions 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 also imposed a total embargo on the supply of arms and military equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to Southern Rhodesia. The illegal régime, however, has not run short of supply of arms and military equipment. On the contrary, it has stated that, despite sanctions, it has been able to import adequate supplies of arms and ammunition, aircraft, vehicles and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition. The régime has not revealed its current sources of supply for arms and military equipment and there is no information on countries of origin for such supplies. b/

9. The headquarters of the army is located in Salisbury at the Kentucky military barracks which houses the white Rhodesian Light Infantry, and one of the wings of the air force. Army headquarters in Salisbury also operate schools for the police and military, providing separate training for white and African soldiers, as well as police. Close to the African Police Training School, there is also the King George VI military barracks which houses African soldiers. Three of the five armouries of the army are located within twenty miles of Salisbury, at Norton, Burrowdale and Inkomo, the last being the headquarters of the Rhodesian African Rifles. White officers of the Rhodesian African Rifles and a section of the white Rhodesian Light Infantry live within the neighbourhood of the Llewellyn barracks in Bulawayo which houses a large contingent of the Rhodesian African Rifles. A section of the air force is located five miles from the Llewellyn barracks at Mbizo air force base. Llewellyn barracks has one armoury. There is an army camp with landing facilities, between Gokwe and the south bank of the Kariba Lake. Camping and training facilities are also available in areas near the northern Zambezi Valley and near the borders of Botswana and Mozambique. The headquarters of the air force is at Thornhill, about eight miles from Gwelo. Most of the air force jets are based in Thornhill, which also has a training school for pilots. The same area has a section which accommodates soldiers of the Rhodesian African Rifles.

10. Statements by the Smith régime on clashes with nationalists, reportedly coming from across the border, show that there is now a heavy concentration of troops in the Chirundu Valley near the Zambia border, at Kariba and at Victoria Falls. The Zambezi River is patrolled by boats manned by the armed forces of the Smith régime. According to press reports, the approaches to the power station of the Kariba Dam which is on the Southern Rhodesian side of the border with Zambia, have also been mined by the armed forces of the Smith régime. c/ According to official reports, the armed forces are now fully equipped to meet any threat of "external aggression or internal subversion". Within the last two years, emphasis has been placed on counter-insurgency in training at all levels and on "the defence phase of limited war".

b/ For additional information concerning the supply of arms, ammunition and military equipment to the illegal régime, see paragraphs 100-106 of the Secretariat working paper on Southern Rhodesia (see A/7200/Add.1, chapter VI, annex).

c/ For an account of the fighting between the armed forces and African nationalists, see documents A/6700/Add.1, chapter III, paragraphs 39 to 49, and 55 to 63; and A/7200/Add.1, chapter VIII, paragraphs 34 to 41.

11. Commenting on the striking capabilities of the air force, Air Vice Marshall Hawkins, the commanding officer of the "Royal Rhodesian Air Force", has stated that apart from South Africa, the Rhodesian Air Force was the strongest and best balanced force within 3,500 miles. The Air Force had the weapons and the bombs which it required. The Rhodesian Air Force jet bombers were the country's strike effort. This meant that "anyone with evil intentions towards the country would have to think twice before attacking it". It also meant that if "anyone was misguided enough to launch a fairly large land-based assault against the country it could withstand those forces and give support to the army and other security forces in repelling such an attack". He said that the Air Force was well equipped and capable of capturing and wiping out small groups of "terrorists". In the event of an attack, it would, with transport aircraft and helicopters, get ground forces to any point, in some cases within minutes.

12. On 26 August 1967, it was reported in the Press that South African soldiers and police had reinforced the Southern Rhodesian armed forces fighting against African nationalists near the Zambian border. The South African forces consisted of a detachment of police who were in action against the African nationalist forces operating in the Wankie area. A number of officers and men of the South African army who had been training with patrols of the Rhodesian security forces in the Zambezi Valley also took part in the operations in that area.

13. On 25 August the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, speaking at Nelspruit, said that South Africa would deal with "terrorists" on the same basis as if the country was at war. South Africa had no defence agreements with Rhodesia and Portugal and none were necessary; the countries were good friends and were aware of their duties to each other. South Africa would not only ensure its own peace and security but also that of the whole of southern Africa.

14. On 8 September 1967, it was reported that the South African Government had officially informed the United Kingdom Government that the South African Police were helping the Smith régime in the fight against terrorists. Speaking at Brakpan the same day, the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, stated that members of the South African Police Force with the approval of the Smith régime were active in Southern Rhodesia to fight against "terrorists" who had originally come from South Africa and were on their way back to South Africa to commit acts of terrorism. He emphasized that only the members of the police force were involved in the operation and that the South African Government would act in any country where it was asked to act by the government of that country.

15. On the same day, Mr. Ian Smith stated at a press conference in Salisbury that the South African Police would remain in Rhodesia for as long as it was felt there was a need. He welcomed this assistance which showed that the close co-operation with South Africa was not only continuing but improving and that both countries were determined to work together.

16. On 23 November 1967, it was reported that a South African police helicopter operating from the Caprivi Strip had crashed on the Southern Rhodesian side of the Zambezi River near Kazungula. It will be recalled that there are two airfields in the Caprivi Strip, one of which, Mpacha, has been described as a military airfield (see appendix I above, para. 29).

APPENDIX IV

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN GIBRALTAR

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the
members of Sub-Committee I at their request

1. Gibraltar has served as a British military and naval base since its was taken over from Spain by an Anglo Dutch force in 1704 during the War of the Spanish Succession. It was formally ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Prior to 1704, the Rock had been an important fortress under Spanish rule since the second half of the fifteenth century when it was reconquered from the Moors.
2. In the nineteenth century, with the opening of the Suez Canal, Gibraltar's importance as a port of call and a strategic position controlling entry to the Mediterranean and the fast route to the East, was considerably enhanced. In 1893 work was begun to convert it into a large modern naval base.
3. In the First World War, Gibraltar proved a key point in the anti-submarine campaign of the Allies and an important base for the United States as well as the British navy. In the Second World War it was also used as an anti-submarine base. Patrols went out to keep the Strait clear and the bay was an important assembly point of convoys.
4. It was at this time, during the Second World War, that a subterranean fortress was developed inside the Rock, an airstrip was built and a Royal Air Force station was set up. As a result both sea and air cover were provided for the 30,000 Allied troops which had been gathered on Gibraltar for the North African landings. The operation was reportedly directed from a chamber deep in the heart of the Rock. It was reported that the tunnels in the Rock housed amongst other things gun emplacements, communications, workshops and an entire underground hospital.
5. During the two world wars, the Dockyard was fully engaged in the repair of British and Allied warships.
6. After the Second World War Gibraltar retained its strategic value as a base for the United Kingdom and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its situation was still regarded as favourable for anti-submarine operations in the eastern Atlantic and for the possible closure of the western end of the Mediterranean. It was also regarded as a vital centre for naval intelligence automatically provided by the Rock's unique location, from where it was possible to monitor and survey all the shipping passing through the Straits. It remained an important staging point since it possesses a deep water harbour covering an area of 440 acres.
7. In 1952 Gibraltar was described by a United Kingdom source as the only naval base in the area capable of maintaining and refuelling forces operating in support

of convoys on the United Kingdom-Cape route. It held considerable supplies of naval and aviation fuel which, it was stated, were so well protected that ships could be refuelled even if the dockyard were out of action. It was regarded as the ideal base for maritime air operations in the Atlantic and Western Mediterranean.

8. In September 1965, the NATO Military Committee, the senior military authority of the Organization, visited Gibraltar as part of its tour of the NATO installations in Europe and in a press release issued before his departure, General Ailleret, the President of the Committee, emphasized the continuing important role of Gibraltar in the Organization. Also in 1965, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Chief of the United Kingdom Defence Staff in an article on Britain's armed forces published in the NATO monthly bulletin "NATO Letter" stated, inter alia, "Our main bases in the Near and Middle East are Cyprus and Aden, and we maintain smaller garrisons in Gibraltar, Malta, Libya, at Bahrein in the Persian Gulf, and in Swaziland. All the naval forces deployed in the Mediterranean are assigned to NATO, as are the two maritime squadrons and the one photographic reconnaissance squadron stationed in Gibraltar and Malta."

9. In the Nato Handbook published by the NATO Information Service, Brussels, in November 1967, an outline of NATO military command structure described Gibraltar as being part of the Iberian Atlantic Command, one of the five commands subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic known as SACLANT. The Iberian Atlantic Command with headquarters in Lisbon had under it the Island Commander of Madeira and the Naval Commander of Gibraltar. Its principal role was said to be to protect the western approaches to the Mediterranean thus filling a strategic vacuum created in that area by the withdrawal of the French fleet.

10. According to the NATO Handbook, SACLANT's responsibilities were almost entirely operational. Unlike SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), SACLANT had no forces permanently attached to his command in peacetime. However, for training purposes and in the event of war, forces earmarked by the nations involved were assigned to his direction. Although these forces were predominantly naval, they also included ground forces and land based air forces.

11. According to reports, the recent reappraisal by the United Kingdom of its defence arrangements has resulted in a policy decision to base the British fleet in the United Kingdom and British dockyards. Following this decision, a Coastal Command Squadron used for anti-submarine operations and also the last of the RAF squadrons based at Gibraltar, have been withdrawn. Gibraltar continues, however, to be a staging post with master airfield facilities capable of being activated at short notice. Similar considerations apply to the naval dockyard. During the debate on Gibraltar in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in December 1967, it was pointed out by the representative of Spain that the Gibraltar airport was listed as a military airport by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and that its use by civilian aircraft was subject to permission by the United Kingdom Royal Air Force. During the same debate, Sir Joshua Hassan, the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, appearing as a petitioner before the Committee, when asked how much of the Territory was occupied by the military installations, mentioned the dockyard, barracks, a parade ground and the RAF airport.

12. From time to time reinforcement exercises have been held airlifting military personnel from the United Kingdom to Gibraltar. One such exercise that attracted attention in the Spanish Press was the airlift of 830 reservists, officers and men,

which was reported to have taken place in September 1967 at the time of the Gibraltar referendum. This airlift was also referred to by the representative of Spain during the debate on Gibraltar in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in December 1967.

13. At the same time, an Anglo-Dutch naval task force of thirteen ships called at Gibraltar as part of NATO manoeuvres. According to a Spanish spokesman a total of thirty-eight NATO naval units (including minesweepers, destroyers, cruisers, troop transports and an aircraft carrier) had been sighted in the port of Gibraltar or in the Bay of Algeciras during the period from 4-27 September 1967. This naval activity was widely publicized and criticized by Spanish sources as taking place just at the time that the people of Gibraltar were voting in a referendum on 10 September 1967. Reaction from a United Kingdom spokesman was that there were almost always United Kingdom warships in Gibraltar harbour and this was nothing unusual.

14. Later in January 1968, eighteen ships of the United States Sixth Fleet called at Gibraltar and there was a protest on the part of Spain against the use of Gibraltar as a port of call by ships of the United States Sixth Fleet. A United States Embassy official in Madrid was reported to have said that the visit of the ships was routine.

15. The number of United Kingdom military personnel stationed in Gibraltar was reported by an informed source in the United Kingdom to be about 1,000. Another source described the number as 4,000 including families. The figure of 1,000 was said to include 400 reinforcements flown in between 25 and 28 September 1967. These consisted of two companies of the Royal Warwickshire Fusiliers and detachments of Royal Engineers and Royal Signals. They were reinforcing the Worcestershire Regiment which was soon to be relieved by the Royal Ulster Rifles. The two companies of the Royal Warwickshire Fusiliers had been flown in on a six-month unaccompanied tour and were then to be relieved by the Royal Highland Fusiliers.

16. Apart from the military base, the local force in Gibraltar is the Gibraltar Regiment consisting of reservists who, when called up, would form an infantry battalion and a coast artillery battery. Gibraltar has a modified form of conscription by which Gibraltarians are called up for four months' training at the age of eighteen and then remain liable to attend annual camp in the active reserve of the Gibraltar Regiment until the age of twenty-eight. There is a small training cadre of about fifty regular officers and men, all locally recruited, with the exception of the regimental sergeant-major who is seconded from a United Kingdom regiment. These officers themselves have received training in military establishments in the United Kingdom. To assist them in running and training the reserve element, the regular cadre has a volunteer reserve of officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers who attend weekly evening drills and annual camp in much the same way as a territorial Army unit in the United Kingdom. In 1966, eighty-six men were called up for training.

17. There is also a locally recruited naval unit, the Headquarters Unit, Royal Naval Reserve, Gibraltar, HMS Calpe, which was formally commissioned in 1965 and took possession of premises in Her Majesty's Dockyard adapted for use as the unit's training centre. The planned strength of the unit is ten officers and ninety-six ratings. By the end of 1966, the unit had reached just over half strength and the process of selecting and training potential officers and senior ratings was reported to be well under way.

18. The importance of the base to the economy of Gibraltar, although substantial, was reported to be diminishing in favour of a reorientation towards tourism and small processing industries. When questioned on this subject in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in December 1967, Sir Joshua Hassan, the Chief Minister of Gibraltar appearing as a petitioner before the Committee, said that service spending which had formerly constituted 35 to 40 per cent of the total had now declined to about 28 to 30 per cent. Of the work force in the Territory comprising Gibraltarian, Spanish and Moroccan workers, it was estimated by a United Kingdom source that about half were employed in the dockyards and by public utilities.

APPENDIX V

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SEYCHELLES AND ST. HELENA

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the
members of Sub-Committee I at their request

I. SEYCHELLES

"British Indian Ocean Territory"

1. Under a United Kingdom Order in Council dated 8 November 1965, a/ three of the approximately 100 islands and atolls comprising the Seychelles were administratively detached from the Territory and, together with the Chagos Archipelago, formerly part of Mauritius, were set up as a separate administrative unit entitled the "British Indian Ocean Territory" under a Commissioner who is also the Governor of the Seychelles. The islands detached from the Seychelles are the Farquhar Islands, the Aldabra Group and the island of Desroches which in 1965 had a combined population of 384 persons. According to a written answer to a question in the United Kingdom House of Commons on 10 November 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies said, inter alia, that the new arrangement had been made with the agreement of the Governments of Mauritius and the Seychelles and that it was "intended that the islands will be available for the construction of defence facilities by the British and United States Governments, but no firm plans have yet been made by either Government."
2. It was later announced that, as agreed compensation for the loss of these islands, or atolls, the United Kingdom would pay the cost of constructing an international airport on Mahé, where the capital of the Seychelles, Victoria, is situated.
3. The purpose of the new arrangements was apparently to make available suitable islands which could be developed to serve as military staging areas if the United Kingdom withdrew from its existing bases east of Suez. This was indicated by Prime Minister Wilson at a meeting of the British Parliamentary Labour Party in June 1966 when he opposed a motion calling for a reduction in British military commitments in the region. He said that "if we believe in peace-keeping through the United Nations, and in making our contribution to it, we have to be there, or capable of getting there..... What we want to get away from, where we can, is the system of great bases in populated areas. What we need more is staging posts, such as those available to us in the Indian Ocean, with virtually no local population, but which will enable us speedily to get to where we are needed at minimum cost."
4. Later, in the statement on the defence estimates for 1967-1968, published on 16 February 1967, the United Kingdom Government said that it was examining possible

a/ British Indian Ocean Territory Order, 1965 (Statutory Instruments, 1965, No. 1920).

benefits from a new military staging airfield in the "British Indian Ocean Territory". During the discussion of the estimates in the United Kingdom House of Commons, Mr. Merlyn Rees, Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Royal Air Force) explained on 14 March that the Government was considering the possibility of establishing such an airfield on Aldabra but he revealed that this proposal had aroused concern in scientific circles, as Aldabra had a unique ecosystem. He said that the Government had assured the Royal Society that scientific considerations would be taken into account in coming to a decision on the airfield and that the Government would work closely with the Royal Society in conservation matters and, as far as it could, would provide facilities for ecological and other studies.

5. On 25 March 1967, it was reported that the United Kingdom Government was in the final stage of negotiating to purchase privately owned properties on the islands of Farquhar and Desroches.

6. On 25 April 1967, the United Kingdom Government published a command paper b/ containing an agreement between the British and United States Governments for their joint use of the "British Indian Ocean Territory" for defence purposes. The agreement took the form of notes exchanged between the Foreign Secretary and the United States Ambassador in London. The notes were dated 30 December 1966, when the agreement entered into force.

7. The agreement did not include any plan for the construction of facilities in the "Territory". It provided an administrative framework under which the Governments could consult together and apportion costs if facilities were provided. Each Government would have the use of any facility built by the other, and each would pay for its own site preparation. There was provision for shared financing of any jointly constructed facility.

8. The United Kingdom Government reserved the right to permit the use by third countries of British-financed defence facilities, but would, where appropriate, consult with the United States Government before granting such permission. Use by a third country of United States or jointly financed facilities would be subject to agreement between the two Governments.

9. Commercial aircraft would not be authorized to use military airfields in the "Territory". However, the United Kingdom Government would have the right to permit the use of such airfields in exceptional circumstances, following consultation with the authorities operating the airfields concerned, under such terms or conditions as might be defined by the two Governments.

10. The two Governments contemplated that the islands constituting the "Territory" would remain available to meet their possible defence needs for an indefinitely long period. Accordingly, after an initial period of fifty years the agreement would continue in force for a further period of twenty years unless, not more than two years before the end of the initial period, either Government would have given notice of termination to the other, in which case the agreement would terminate two years from the date of such notice.

b/ Treaty Series No. 15 (1967): Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Availability for Defence Purposes of the British Indian Ocean Territory, London, 30 December 1966, Cmd. 3231, HMSO 1967.

11. Following the publication of the agreement, it was reported on 1 May 1967 that a Royal Navy survey ship (HMS Vidal) carrying a joint team of the United States Navy and the United Kingdom Defence Ministry experts would set off in June 1967 to investigate the possibilities of using the "Territory" for defence purposes. The team, which would have two American and two British scientists attached to it, would also carry out ecological studies on Aldabra under the auspices of the Royal Society. The latter, in June, expressed opposition, on scientific grounds, to the plan of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence for establishing a military airfield on Aldabra, and called for the preservation of the ecology of the island. In rejecting this request, Mr. Denis Healey, the Secretary of State for Defence, said that no final decision on the airfield had been taken, but that if it was built, it would be on Aldabra and not elsewhere. Following the approval by Parliament on 27 July 1967 of a Defence White Paper in which the Government stated its intention to continue to study the possibility of building a military airfield in the "British Indian Ocean Territory", eight additional scientific institutions in the United Kingdom and the United States joined with the Royal Society in opposing its construction on Aldabra.

12. The scientists' objection to the use of Aldabra for an airfield was that, except for a portion of the atoll where a small fishing settlement had been established, most of the atoll had been undisturbed and would therefore afford a unique opportunity for scientists to study the atoll's ecosystem and the ways in which it had evolved over centuries, unaffected by any outside influences.

13. It was reported in the Press of the United Kingdom that the Defence Ministry believed that the airfield could be constructed without any serious disruption of the ecosystem since Aldabra, in fact, consists of three small islands close together and surrounding a lagoon sixteen miles in length. The Ministry planned to spend at least £20 million on the construction of the airfield. A 12,000-foot runway would have to be built on the eastern end and this area would be joined to the living quarters, offices and storage space at the Western Island by a road running along Middle Island, with swing bridges across each of the channels.

14. It was also reported that an anchorage would have to be created at the mouth of the main channel into the lagoon not only to ferry heavy supplies and fuel to the base when in operation, but to bring in the heavy equipment which would be needed for the initial construction work. Further a daily tide race through the channel would make it necessary to build a dam before there could be any question of a suitable anchorage.

15. According to the Defence Ministry's plan, the size of the base would correspond roughly to the one at Gan in the southern part of the Maldiv Islands, with a permanent garrison of 300 men and transit accommodation for many others. One of Aldabra's chief attractions, compared to various other atolls in the area, was that it had room for expansion. Mainly because of this and the high construction cost involved, the other atolls had not received serious on-site exploration by the Defence Ministry.

16. Mr. Merlyn Rees, Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Royal Air Force), stated in the United Kingdom House of Commons on 25 October 1967 that no decision had yet been taken whether to use Aldabra for defence purposes. He was replying to Mr. Tam Dalyell, a member from the Labour Party, who questioned the need for

a staging post or base on the island. Mr. Dalyell said that the construction of a base on the island would destroy the habitat, and that its uniqueness would go.

17. Mr. Rees also said that all the issues at stake would be carefully considered in reaching a decision. The Secretary of State for Defence had given an undertaking to the Royal Society that if the project were to go forward, the scientific bodies concerned would be fully and continuously consulted on the way in which it would be carried out.

18. Finally, Mr. Rees asserted that: "there is no question of the British Government being firm on Aldabra and other Governments wishing to go elsewhere. That could hardly be so as no decision has been made".

19. On 26 October 1967, the United Kingdom Government rejected suggestions that there could be any alternative island to Aldabra as a suitable staging post for the Royal Air Force in the western Indian Ocean. The suggestions were first made in the House of Commons by Mr. Dalyell, who said that the United States Government had proposed an alternative to the United Kingdom Government and was prepared to meet the difference in cost. However, United States officials denied this on that date. The Defence Ministry calculated that the base at Aldabra would cost about £20 million to build, whereas Mr. Dalyell claimed that the figure could easily reach £100 million. The only alternative island to have been considered was reported to be Wizard Island, situated about sixty miles east of Aldabra. The Defence Ministry believed that Wizard Island was too small for the runway and accommodation that would be needed, and that the total cost of making it into an adequate base would be about £40 million.

20. The Defence Ministry's construction plan for Aldabra was reported to have been modified since the return of a survey expedition to the atoll. There would be no need to build a dam in one of the channels being threatened by a tide race. Officials claimed that the new plan for a single jetty in another smaller channel would leave one of the main parts of the island untouched. One of the channels near the proposed runway site would have to be dredged to provide a deep water anchorage for large tankers, which would have to bring aviation fuel to Aldabra. There would also be a communications relay station, and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was interested in acquiring a site for its own relay station.

21. It was also reported that the question of hazards to flying posed by frigate birds was still being seriously studied. One complication was that the birds often migrated from Aldabra for three years at a time, so that any plan to exterminate them would not be concluded for three or four years, during which there would exist a serious hazard to pilots.

22. On 22 November 1967, the Prime Minister told the United Kingdom House of Commons that his Government was abandoning plans to turn Aldabra into a military staging post. He listed this as one of the cuts in defence spending following the devaluation of the pound. He also indicated that the whole idea of staging in "the British Indian Ocean Territory" was being dropped.

23. On 23 November, a spokesman for the United States Department of State said that the authorities had been informed by the United Kingdom Defence Ministry of the Government's decision affecting Aldabra. There would now be discussions with

the United Kingdom to determine future strategy and planning and no decision could be expected until these were concluded.

24. On the same day proposals were announced to make Aldabra a centre for internationally sponsored ecological studies over a period of from five to ten years, starting in 1969. The sponsors would be the Royal Society, the Smithsonian Institution and the United States National Academy of Science. As of 20 February 1968, it was reported in the Press that these proposals had not yet been approved and that the United Kingdom Government was "showing coolness" towards the scheme which might prejudice an eventual decision to proceed with the original defence plans.

25. According to a press report, c/ despite the United Kingdom's abandonment of its plan for Aldabra, the question of the establishment of British and United States military bases was among the issues raised during the elections to the Seychelles Peoples United Party (SFUP) which won three of the eight seats in the Legislative Council.

United States tracking and telemetry facilities on Mahé

26. An agreement between the United Kingdom and United States Governments for the establishment by the latter of tracking, telemetry and related facilities on the island of Mahé, in the Seychelles, is contained in notes exchanged between the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom and the United States Ambassador in London, dated 30 December 1966, the date on which the agreement came into force. The agreement, which is contained in a White Paper d/ published on 25 April 1967, states that the United Kingdom Government has indicated its willingness to accept, after consultation with the Government of Seychelles, the request of the United States Government to establish, operate and maintain, in the island of Mahé, a tracking and telemetry facility for orbital control and data acquisition in connexion with various United States space projects, facilities for meteorological and seismological research, and for communications facilities for such projects and research. The United Kingdom Government also indicated its willingness to make such arrangements as are necessary with the Government of Seychelles in connexion with the establishment, operation and maintenance of the said facilities. The costs of constructing, installing, equipping, operating and maintaining the facilities will be borne wholly by the United States Government. There are clauses regarding such matters as the provision of sites arising from the carrying out of the purposes of the agreement. Supplementary arrangements between the appropriate United States and British authorities may be made from time to time as required.

27. On the question of the duration of the agreement, the note of the United States Ambassador states that the facilities are expected to be required for use until 31 December 1988. The United Kingdom Government agrees to permit the facilities to be operated in accordance with the foregoing provisions until that date, and thereafter, at the request of the United States Government, for such additional

c/ Le Mauricien, 13 December 1967.

d/ Treaty Series No. 16 (1967): Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the United States Tracking and Telemetry Facilities in the Island of Mahé in the Seychelles, London, 30 December 1966
Cmd. 3232, HMSO, 1967.

period as may be agreed upon by the two Governments. It is also stipulated that should changed conditions alter the requirements of the United States Government for the facilities at any time prior to 31 December 1988, that Government will have the right to terminate the agreement after ninety days' advance notice in writing to the United Kingdom Government of its intention to do so.

28. The United States tracking station has been established on Mahé, with Pan American World Airways as the contractor at the station.

II. ST. HELENA

29. The island of St. Helena itself has not been used for military purposes. However, the Royal Navy at one time established a garrison on Ascension Island, a dependency of the Territory, to prevent the French from rescuing Napoleon from St. Helena. The Navy withdrew in 1922 and was replaced by British Cable and Wireless, Limited.

30. In 1942, an air base was built on Ascension by the Government of the United States under an arrangement with the Government of the United Kingdom. By further agreement between the two Governments, a United States tracking station was established in 1954. With the approval of the United Kingdom, Belgian paratroopers carried by United States aircraft used the airfield as a staging post on their way to the operation in Stanleyville, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in November 1964.

31. In more recent years, Ascension has become increasingly important as a communications centre, largely because of its position in the South Atlantic, midway between Africa and South America. In 1963, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) decided to set up a powerful relay transmitting station and the United Kingdom Ministry of Public Buildings and Works began work on the station (which started operating in 1966), a power house and a water distillation plant. To service the BBC's installations, the Ministry found it necessary to construct twenty miles of road, eight miles of water mains, twelve miles of electric power cables and a flexible pipeline to carry 1.5 million gallons of oil from a tanker which brings fuel oil to the station once a year.

32. There are four settlements (one American and three British) on Ascension, at one of which is located a village for more than 500 engineers employed by the BBC, their wives and children. There are also some 650 migrant labourers living on the island, including 150 West Indians and 500 St. Helenians.

APPENDIX VI

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN PAPUA AND THE TRUST TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the
members of Sub-Committee I at their request

General

1. Under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of New Guinea, the Government of Australia is responsible, inter alia, for the defence of the Territory (article 4). The agreement also provides that the Administering Authority "may take all measures in the Territory which it considers desirable to provide for the defence of the Territory and for maintenance of international peace and security" (article 7).
2. The Defence Act of the Commonwealth of Australia (1903-1967) extends to all Australian Territories including Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea (section 5 A (1)). Those parts of the act dealing with obligations to serve in the armed forces of the Commonwealth do not apply to "the native inhabitants of any Territory governed by the Commonwealth under a Trusteeship Agreement" (section 5 A (2)).
3. In accordance with the powers conferred by the Defence Act on the Governor-General of Australia to designate military districts (section 8 (a)), the Territory of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea have been constituted as a military district.

Army

4. The headquarters of the army in the Territories are at Murray Barracks at Port Moresby. The permanent force in the Territories is the Pacific Islands Regiment which is made up largely of Australian officers, with indigenous servicemen in other ranks. Since 1963, indigenous servicemen have been attending officers' training school in Victoria, Australia. The number of indigenous officers in the regiment is not available.
5. The headquarters of the First Battalion of the Pacific Islands Regiment is at Taurama Barracks near Port Moresby. In 1965 it was brought up to full strength and in the same year the Second Battalion was raised and stationed at Moem Barracks near Wewak. During 1966-67 plans were in hand for raising the Third Battalion and stationing it at Igam Barracks near Lae. According to a press report, the three battalions will number 3,500 troops when they reach full strength.
6. There is also a part-time volunteer formation known as the Papua and New Guinea Volunteer Rifles. Its headquarters are at Murray Barracks, Port Moresby, and it has units in most of the towns of the Territory.

7. In 1965, a three-year military construction programme to cost over \$A40 million was begun in the Territories. Of this total, \$A37 million was to be spent on army installations.
8. A report issued by the Commonwealth Public Works Department for the year 1966-67 indicated that there were five main army projects in the Territories, namely Murray Barracks, Taurama Barracks, Goldie River Training Depot (these three are near Port Moresby), Moem Barracks (Wewak) and Igam Barracks (Lae). The report stated that each of these projects could be regarded as a self-contained town. Goldie River Training Depot, for example, would occupy a 7,700-acre site and would contain barracks blocks, kitchens and mess halls, trade training and military instruction wings and an assembly hall. A school and a chapel would be provided later. Igam Barracks which would occupy a 704 acre site, would contain similar facilities as well as residences for Europeans and quarters for married indigenous enlisted men.
9. Another army project, a marine base complex costing \$A1.9 million, was completed in Port Moresby in January 1968. It was reported that it is to be used by the Papua-New Guinea Transport Squadron, the Australian's Army's Small Ships Unit and by the Royal Australian Navy. The complex includes a main wharf, two "dolphins" or temporary extensions to the main wharf, a transit shed and workshop. There is also a large slipway and cradle, a ramp for large landing craft, and two small ship berths.
10. According to the report of the Public Works Department, the labour force for these projects comprised 500 Europeans and 2,700 skilled and unskilled indigenous workers. The report also stated that nearly all building materials, except concrete aggregate and timber, had to be shipped from Australia and Japan.
11. In April 1968, the Australian Army was reportedly planning to acquire a 500 acre property in the Keravat area on the north coast of New Britain's Gazelle Peninsula to establish its first training ground on the island. The report states that the land is being bought by the administration. The army commander in the Territory said that the land was needed as a coastal training area and firing range.

Australian Navy and Air Force

12. Units of the Australian Navy visit Territory ports on exercises, courtesy visits and for coastal surveying. Units of the Royal Australian Air Force also cover Papua and New Guinea.
13. In 1948 the large naval and air base which had been built on Manus Island at Seeadler Harbour by the United States during the Second World War was dismantled and returned to Australia. The Australian Army maintained a small detachment and a few facilities at Manus until 1960 when the station was turned over to the navy.
14. Seeadler Harbour has been made the headquarters for the embryonic Papua and New Guinea navy; small units of the Royal Australian Navy are also stationed there. Press reports state that the latter keeps stock and maintenance facilities there that could in the case of emergency supply and repair a considerable fleet. Seeadler Harbour has also been used for SEATO naval exercises.

15. More than \$A3 million is being spent on the expansion of facilities at Manus as part of the three-year \$A40 million military construction programme referred to above. The projects at Manus include the provision of five patrol boats, the overhaul of the naval base, the conversion of several airstrips up to military standards, housing projects and a high frequency communications network.

16. In April 1967 it was reported that the Australian Navy had about 100 Australian and 250 Papua and New Guinea personnel at Manus.

17. In January 1968, the first of the five patrol boats arrived at Manus. It was reported that the five patrol boats would operate in New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Torres Straits waters and would be used to train Papuan and New Guinean sailors.

APPENDIX VII

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN GUAM

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the
members of Sub-Committee I at their request

1. The Territory of Guam is thirty miles long, has a total land area of 212 square miles and varies from about four to eight miles in width. The Territory was ceded to the United States of America by the Treaty of Paris in 1898, following the Spanish-American War. The island was governed by the United States Naval Department until 1950, except for the period during the Second World War when it was occupied by the Japanese from 10 December 1941 to 21 July 1944. Since 1950, the Territory has been administered by a civil Government under the Organic Act of Guam, 1950, as amended.
2. The Territory continues to be an important United States naval and air force base in the Western Pacific. The United States Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard maintain establishments on the island. The major military establishments are the United States naval base at Apra Harbor, Agana Naval Air Station and the Anderson Air Force Base.
3. In 1963, military authorities announced plans for the establishment during the year of Polaris submarine base at the naval base at Apra Harbor, and for the spending of over \$70 million during the next few years.
4. Early in 1966, Anderson Air Force Base became the staging point from which B-52 bombers from the United States Strategic Air Command began to bomb targets in Viet-Nam. In 1967, a press report stated that these planes were taking off from Guam daily for the five-hour flight to the coast of South-East Asia.
5. The administering Power reports that in 1967 there were some 38,500 servicemen and dependants attached to the bases maintained by the navy and the air force. The civilian population numbered about 50,000. In addition to military personnel, a large number of civilians are employed at military establishments, although the exact number is not known. The administering Power further reports that although the Territory has a vigorous and growing business community and high hopes from the tourist industry, the economy is still mainly "military-oriented", and supported primarily by wages earned in the military establishments.
6. Information is not available concerning the extent of naval facilities and installations at the naval base at Guam or the number of ships and submarines based there.
7. Bombers of the Strategic Air Command based in Guam have been estimated in press reports to number from fifty to sixty. Information is not available concerning other military and aircraft facilities and installations at the Anderson Air Force Base or the Agana Naval Air Station.
8. The United States Selective Service System on Guam has been in operation for more than fifteen years. The administering Power reports that the primary mission of

the system is the procurement of manpower for the United States armed forces. During 1967 the local boards, which are responsible for the registration, classification, selection, and delivery of registrants for induction, delivered 211 registrants to the armed forces examining and entrance station for induction. Of the number forwarded, 191 were inducted. In the previous year, 203 out of 222 registrants were inducted.

9. According to the administering Power, other functions of the local boards are to: (a) assist the recruiting services of the armed forces, both regular and reserve; (b) channel men by means of deferments to colleges, universities, and to approved apprentice training programmes so that there will be an adequate number of trained personnel in all fields; (c) maintain a current inventory of manpower resources by means of registration classification; and (d) report to the reserve components concerning the availability of standby reserve. The local boards are authorized to determine the availability of members of the standby reserve of the armed forces under section 672 (a) of title 10 of the United States Code, as amended, in time of war or national emergency declared by the United States Congress, or whenever otherwise authorized by law.

10. Since January 1952, a total of 1,853 have been inducted into the army, navy and the marine corps. According to the report of availability and summary of classification for Guam the total living registrants numbered 11,168 as of 30 June 1967.

11. During the hearings on the bill providing for an elected Governor of Guam those testifying before the House Sub-Committee on Territorial and Insular Affairs, including the Governor of Guam, said that a very large number of Guamanians were serving in Viet-Nam and many had laid down their lives. According to the latest reports, twenty-six residents of Guam had died in combat in Viet-Nam.

12. By operative paragraph 5 of its resolution No. 187 (1-S) adopted on 7 April 1967, the Ninth Guam Legislature stated, inter alia, as follows:

"That the community of Guam has per capita lost more of its men in the Viet-Nam Conflict than any other American community, and this fact is a source of great pride to the people of Guam, whose young men have volunteered in large numbers to join the American Armed Services, hardly the action of a colonial people, but instead the expression of patriotic Americans desiring to help defend not their colonial master but their own country ...".

APPENDIX VIII

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN BAHAMAS, BERMUDA, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS, ANTIGUA AND UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the
members of Sub-Committee I at their request

A. THE BAHAMAS

1. The first United States military base was established in the Territory during the Second World War. At that time, when the shortage of small naval craft to combat enemy submarines became acute, fifty United States destroyers were handed over to the British Government in exchange for the lease to the United States of naval and air bases in the British West Indies, including Bermuda, the Bahamas, St. Lucia and Antigua.
2. Negotiations were begun in London at the end of 1940 and an agreement ^{a/} was signed on 27 March 1941. The leases were for a period of ninety-nine years and gave the United States Government extensive rights of occupation within the leased areas, and jurisdiction in respect of cases arising in the various Territories outside such areas wherein United States military or naval personnel were involved. Certain privileges, such as exemption from taxation and customs duties, were extended to the United States military personnel occupying the bases.
3. After the Second World War, United States proving grounds for guided missiles and other facilities were established in the Bahamas. The administering Power reported in 1951 that work was proceeding on sites for the down-range stations of the Joint Long Range Proving Ground for guided missiles. In addition, sub-stations were being established on Grand Bahama, Eleuthera, Mayaguana and San Salvador Islands.
4. At present there is a United States military installation on the island of San Salvador, which is used for tracking missiles launched from Cape Kennedy, 350 miles to the northwest. On 16 January 1967, it was announced that the United States Government was building a \$6.5 million tracking station on Grand Bahama Island at the missile base at Gold Rock Creek.
5. The largest military base in the Bahamas is the Atlantic Underwater Test and Evaluation Centre (AUTEC) at the Andros Island. This joint United Kingdom/United States project was established under the provisions of an agreement signed

^{a/} Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America relating to the bases leased to the United States of America, London, 27 March 1941, HMSC (Cmd 6259).

on 11 October 1963 between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America, b/ and was formally opened on 14 April 1966.

6. The 420-acre base complex, with about 400 navy and civilian personnel, consists of three ranges: a weapons range, an acoustic range and a sonar range. This is the final testing ground for all new detection systems. Most of the work done at AUTEK will be directed towards anti-submarine research. There are also a number of down-range tracking stations extending some 95 miles from the AUTEK base. Such stations are located at Cargo Creek, Big Wood Key, Golding Key, Deep Creek and High Point Key.

7. The United States, which began torpedo tests at AUTEK in November 1966, had conducted about fifty tests by July 1967. Some torpedoes have been dropped from a radio-controlled helicopter; others have been launched by rockets.

8. The first British torpedo exercises reportedly were scheduled to start early 1968. It was reported in February 1968 that the first Royal Navy ship to operate at the AUTEK anti-submarine warfare test range would be Britain's first nuclear submarine to launch a Polaris missile, HMS Resolution. The submarine was expected to sail for Andros during the second week of March 1968 and to spend two or three days using the AUTEK facilities.

9. On 26 February 1967, the \$130 million AUTEK base was commissioned into service by United States Vice President, Mr. H.H. Humphrey, who was reported to have said, inter alia, that the advanced deep-water testing range would add to the nation's power by expanding United States offensive and defensive undersea capability.

10. United States civilian and military spokesmen are reported to consider that the Bahama Islands are of importance in the defence pattern of the Western Hemisphere in general, and the Caribbean in particular. Thus, on 19 January 1967, Mr. Turner B. Shelton, the United States Consul-General in the Bahamas, speaking on the subject of the United States-Bahamas relations, was reported to have stressed "the importance of the Bahamas in the defence pattern on the Western Hemisphere" and stated that the safety of the Bahamas and that of the United States of America "is made more secure by the experiments that are carried on at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Centre".

11. On 27 January 1967, Vice-Admiral Bernard A. Clarey, Commander of the United States Second Fleet and Commander of NATO's Striking Fleet in the Atlantic arrived in Nassau on board his fleet flagship, the heavy cruiser, USS Newport News. Speaking at a press conference, he was reported to have stressed the strategic importance of the islands - "stretching as they do from close to our coast and the entrance of the Caribbean area over to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands". "The very geography of the islands", he continued, "is extremely important to NATO and very important to the United States in their concern for protection in the Caribbean, if this ever becomes necessary"; he also said that the deep water surrounding the islands provides favourable research and development conditions

b/ Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America for the establishment in the Bahama Islands of an Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Centre, Washington, 11 October 1963, HMSO (Cmd 2170).

for the United States Navy. Vice Admiral Clarey also pointed out that in times of trouble the navy had on hand an amphibious force which was deployed in the Caribbean. "This force could be called on for our immediate use.... It was available at the time of the Dominican Republic's fracas a couple of years ago," he added.

B. BERMUDA

Activities by the United States

12. The United States has maintained naval and air force bases in Bermuda since 1941. These bases are known as Kindley Air Force Base and King's Point Naval Base. Provision was made for these installations in the agreement between the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom of March 1941 referred to in paragraph 2 above. The agreement provided, as in the case of the Bahamas, and on the same terms, that in exchange for leasing the bases the British Government would receive naval and military equipment and personnel. The exact location and boundaries of the bases, the necessary coast and anti-aircraft defences, the location of military garrisons, stores and other necessary facilities were determined by mutual agreement. The United States agreed not to use the leased property for any other purpose or to have rights over any natural resources located on or under it.
13. Use of the airfields for civilian purposes was expressly prohibited. By a supplementary Agreement of 24 February 1948, however, Kindley Air Force Field, among others, was opened to civil aircraft. c/ In accordance with the agreement, all technical facilities including air traffic control, meteorological forecasting, radio navigation aids and certain communications are provided by the United States.
14. At present, Kindley Air Force Field and Kings Point Naval Base, occupy a total area of 2.97 square miles, or about one-tenth the surface of the island.
15. Military units known to be stationed at Kindley Air Force Field are currently the 55th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, 15th Weather Squadron, 1934th Communications Squadron, Navy Units and an Army Unit. As of 21 September 1967, the total number of personnel at Kindley Base, military and civilian, was 1,996.
16. On 16 February 1968, General Howell M. Estes, Commander of Military Airlift Command (MAC), was reported to have said that plans were being made to increase the number of military personnel at Kindley Air Force Base.
17. On 4 April 1967, Captain Vance Dawkins, the United States Naval Base Commander, was reported to have told the members of the Hamilton Rotary Club that the United States Navy "needs Bermuda" and that "there has never been a day when there was a thought of pulling out of Bermuda". Captain Dawkins described the

c/ United Nations Treaty Series, 1950, No. 951.

naval operations base particularly as "a base for anti-submarine strategy" and as "a seaplane base". Captain Dawkins stated that it was only four years ago that the navy realized "that seaplanes have been superseded by land-based planes" and the navy's aircraft began operating out of Kindley. "As far as the future is concerned we are down to the operational level that meets the conditions, recognizing the Viet-Nam situation; I do not see a lessening of the requirements at any time", he added.

18. On 21 November 1967, Col. Horace A. Stevenson, Kindley Air Force Base. Commander, was reported to have said, inter alia, in connexion with rumours resulting from cutbacks in personnel at the Base, that Kindley Air Force Base and the United States Air Force would be in Bermuda "for many years to come".

Activities by the United Kingdom

19. Except between 1902 and 1913, Bermuda has been the headquarters of a British fleet since 1797, following the discovery of a passage through the reefs to a deep-water anchorage, and the realization of the strategic importance of the islands.

20. In 1956, the United Kingdom Government decided to withdraw the Commander-in-Chief of the American and West Indies Station from Bermuda. Thereafter, Bermuda became the headquarters of the West Indies Station under the command of a commodore with the title of Senior Naval Officer, West Indies.

21. The Station's force at present consists of the single frigate, HMS Leopard. The responsibilities of the station include the United Kingdom colonies in the Caribbean area.

22. Admiral Sir John Bush, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy's Western Fleet, during a four-day inspection tour of local installations in March 1968, expressed his hope that he would be able to send a flag ship, eight frigates and possibly a submarine or two to the area next spring. The basic purpose was to exercise larger groups of ships together. He hoped to repeat this operation each year.

23. Admiral Bush was also reported to have conferred during his visit with Mr. Stuart Roberts, the British Government representative in the Eastern Caribbean Territories about defence matters in the Caribbean area.

24. Admiral Bush's inspection tour in Bermuda coincided with the visit to the Colony by NATO Standing Force Fleet which reportedly was going to take part in a programme of exercises in conjunction with United States vessels in the Caribbean area.

25. Referring to the NATO fleet, Admiral Bush was reported as saying that the force was a sort of "policeman on the beat", a force which could deal, on NATO's behalf with any small troubles which developed.

Activities by Canada

26. On 11 September 1964, an exchange of notes between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada on arrangements regarding the status of Canadian forces in Bermuda took place in London. d/ According to Article II (Visiting Force) of the Exchange of Notes, "The Governments of the United Kingdom and Bermuda consent to the presence in Bermuda of the Canadian visiting force consisting of such elements as are set out in the Schedule hereto".

27.

Schedule

Arrangements regarding the status of Canadian forces in Bermuda

<u>Service</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Maximum number of personnel</u>
RCN	Radio Station located at Daniel's Head	50
All services	Administrative and Liaison personnel	As required, and in numbers acceptable to the authorities of Bermuda
RCN	HMC Ships and aircraft visiting Bermuda for the period of each visit	As required, and in numbers acceptable to the authorities of Bermuda
RCAF	Aircraft visiting Bermuda for the period of each visit	As required, and in numbers acceptable to the authorities of Bermuda

28. The agreement provided for making arrangements by the Government of Canada with authorities of the United Kingdom or the United States for the occupancy or use of accommodation, material, or services of the United States or United Kingdom forces in Bermuda.

29. It was reported that on 19 May 1967, Canada's Deputy Defence Minister visited the Canadian forces station at Daniel's Head. It was also reported that a two-day inspection of the Royal Canadian Navy's secret radio installations at Daniel's Head, Somerset, was made in August 1967 by an inspection team headed by Rear Admiral Robert W. Murdoch.

30. In November 1967, it was reported that about 170 men of the Royal Canadian Air Force were in Bermuda, at Kindley Air Force Base, taking part in anti-submarine warfare training exercises.

d/ Exchange of Notes between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Canada on Arrangements regarding the Status of Canadian Forces in Bermuda, London, 11 September 1964, HMSO (Cmd. 2477).

31. On 3 January 1968 a spokesman for the Royal Canadian Navy announced that an aircraft carrier, three destroyers and two submarines would be in Bermuda while taking part in exercises in the area at the end of January. Reportedly some 2,000 men would be on board the ships. The exercises would also involve the Royal Canadian Air Force, and several aircraft would be based at Kindley Base.

C. TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS

32. During the Second World War an anti-aircraft battery was stationed at Grand Turk. A temporary air base was established on South Caicos by the United States in 1944, and an airstrip constructed.

33. It is understood that the post-war military installation in the Territory was established in accordance with the provisions of an agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of 15 January 1952 concerning the extension of the Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground by additional sites in the Turks and Caicos Islands.

34. On 27 November 1956 an agreement for the establishment of an oceanographic research station in the Turks and Caicos Islands was reached between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1959, agreement was reached between the same two Governments concerning the establishment and operation of a tracking station on the Island of Grand Turk. The agreement was contained in an Exchange of Notes dated 16 March and 16 April 1959.

35. In June 1961, as a result of an agreement between the Government of The Federation of the West Indies and the Government of the United States of America concerning United States defence areas in The Federation of the West Indies, e/ the provisions of the above-mentioned agreements (including any amendments, modifications and extensions thereof) ceased to have any force or effect.

36. The agreement of 1961 provided, inter alia, for United States defence areas on Grand Turk.

37. At present, according to the administering Power, there are two United States military establishments on Grand Turk - the United States Air Force Guided Missile Base and the United States Naval Facility. There is also the United States Coast Guard Station on South Caicos.

38. The administering Power reports that there are between 200 and 300 United States servicemen and civilians stationed in Grand Turk. In 1966, a total of eighty-two islanders were employed in the bases, sixty-eight at the United States Air Force Guided Missile Base and fourteen at the United States Naval Facility.

e/ Agreement between the Government of The Federation in the West Indies and the Government of the United States of America concerning United States Defence Areas in the Federation of the West Indies, June 1961, HMSO (Cmd. 1369).

D. ANTIGUA

39. According to reports, there is a NASA tracking station, a United States naval base and an air force base in the Territory; another NASA station is being built.

E. UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS

40. There is a United States submarine base in St. Thomas. The base covers an area of 197 acres.

APPENDIX IX

NAMIBIA: EXTRACTS FROM PETITIONERS' STATEMENTS IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1965, 1966 AND 1967

Mr. Sam Nujoma, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), said that:

"... in violation of the Mandate, South Africa had established military bases in Windhoek, Walvis Bay and Katira Mulilo. In addition, several landing strips had been built in the area. White settlers from the age of 17 to 60 had been trained in the use of automatic weapons. Both the military build-up and white mobilization were aimed at the massacre and suppression of the African people." (A/AC.109/SR.344, 27 May 1965).

Mr. Vusumuyi Make, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), said that:

"...large-scale military installations were being constructed at Windhoek, Walvis Bay, which would take about five years to complete. Once that base was ready for use, the South African regime might agree to hand over South West Africa a/ and try to police it from Windhoek, Walvis Bay. Extensive air force installations were being built at the Caprivi Strip, as well as a series of landing strips, and those bases constituted a threat not only to South West Africa but to neighbouring territories as well. Once they were completed it would be extremely difficult for refugees to flee from South West Africa. ...

"The United Kingdom, despite Mr. Wilson's declaration, was still supplying Buccaneer jet bombers to South Africa. The role of the Federal Republic of Germany was even more dangerous. In collaboration with that country, South Africa was now known to be experimenting with poison gases. In November 1963, Professor le Roux, Vice President of the Council for Industrial and Scientific Research, had stated that South Africa was developing poison gases. A Reuters report of 7 November 1963 had quoted him as saying 'We appreciate that these poisons are capable of being delivered in vast quantities by aircraft and long-range missiles, and they can have a destructive effect similar to that of a nuclear bomb of twenty megatons.' The German team working on the project was led by Gunther Pruss, who had held a leading position in the poison gases department of the Nazi Wehrmacht." (A/AC.109/SR.344, 27 May 1965).

Mr. Nujoma, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), said that:

"... The Africans were ready to fight against South Africa, which was backed by Members of the United Nations, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium, Portugal, as well as the Federal Republic of Germany (which had sent experts to train South African soldiers in desert fighting at the military camp at Walvis Bay).

a/ On 12 June 1968, the General Assembly decided to change the name of the Territory to "Namibia" (see resolution 2372 (XXII), operative paragraph 1).

"... There was clear evidence of an unholy alliance between Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith. The Salazar police in Angola and the South African police collaborated in the arrest and deportation of political prisoners seeking asylum. There was similar collaboration between the Smith Government and the South African Government whereby many freedom fighters had been arrested in Southern Rhodesia and sent back to South Africa. There was evidence of a military pact between the Salazar and Smith Governments to defend Southern Zambesi from the independent Africans in the north.

"About 13 per cent of the white population in South West Africa was German. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was keenly interested in South West Africa and had supplied experts to train South Africans in desert fighting and guerrilla warfare."
(A/AC.109/SR.345, 28 May 1965).

Mr. Make, Pan African Congress (PAC), said that:

"... there was ample evidence that arms were being supplied to South Africa for use within the country and in South West Africa. According to government figures the defence budget for 1964-65 amounted to £105 million. The United Kingdom had been supplying arms until recently, and although the present Prime Minister had announced that supplies would stop, he had also stated that he would complete the supplies already contracted for, which included jet bombers. Furthermore, experts had been sent by the United Kingdom armaments industry to help South Africa to establish its own chemical and explosive industries. A new rifle had been produced, the R.1, which was superior to the one previously supplied by Belgium. Under an agreement signed in 1962 France had supplied large quantities of arms, and a South African company had been set up which was now making tanks of the Panhard A and L armoured car type used successfully by France in Algeria. During the Algerian war South Africa had sent men to train in anti-guerrilla warfare. Help from the Federal Republic of Germany included the setting up of arms and aircraft factories and experiments with poisoned gases ...

"As part of its military activities, South Africa was now building nuclear reactors in its own country and in South West Africa.

"... although not a NATO member, South Africa had received large quantities of arms from NATO and NATO countries. South Africa had set itself up as a bulwark against communism and was therefore regarded as an important link in the NATO defence system. There was evidence that arms were being supplied by the United States of America, despite official assurances to the contrary. Military supplies, which had included three submarines costing £30 million, were also being received from the United Kingdom Government, under certain secret clauses of the Simonstown Agreement referred to by the United Kingdom Prime Minister.

"... there was clear evidence of collusion between the unholy alliance of three and the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. South Africa, Portugal and South West Africa were known to exchange supplies of arms. Their police co-operated and there was an agreement for the return of fugitive prisoners." (A/AC.109/SR.345, 28 May 1965).

Mr. Tabata, Unity Movement of South Africa, said that: "

"the author of the book entitled Panzer Battles, a former member of Hitler's military staff who had been sent to South Africa in 1950 on a special mission, had revealed that 2,000 Nazi officers had been given asylum in South Africa after 1945 and that many of them were being used as military instructors." (A/AC.109/SR.347, 28 May 1965).

Mr. Kuhangua, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), stated that:

"... with the support of the Western Powers, the apartheid regime of South Africa had set up an immense military machine in South and South West Africa. The South African Minister of Defence had begun to recruit scientists for his rocket programme; he had stated that his Government would attempt to purchase rockets abroad, but would like to build its own missiles in case of an international embargo. According to press reports, South Africa was experimenting with missiles and poisoned gases capable of mass destruction. Not only southern Africa but the whole of the continent was threatened.

"... the greatest danger to South West Africa lay in the Federal Republic of Germany's decision to establish a rocket station in the country. He appealed to the Committee to call upon the Federal Republic to dismantle its rocket station immediately." (A/AC.109/SR.349, 1 June 1965.)

Mr. Shipanga, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), said that:

"... scientists from the United States and other western countries had been in South Africa in 1961 when the Verwoerd regime had built an atomic station near Cape Town. Now foreign scientists could be found in South West Africa. As travel was restricted, the Territory was highly suitable for secret undertakings. The research station in the Namib Desert, which was still claimed to conduct purely scientific research, was a threat to all the peoples of Africa...

"... In 1963 he had himself witnessed convoys of Portuguese troops crossing from Angola into South West Africa. In addition, Portuguese troops had called in at Walvis Bay on their way to Mozambique and had carried out exercises with their South African colleagues...

"... In 1962, a secret agreement had been concluded between South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany under which large numbers of ex-Nazis had taken refuge in the Territory.

"... the United Kingdom was continuing arms deliveries to South Africa, in the form of bombers, on the grounds that existing contracts had to be honoured. The United States involvement was harder to document; when a Belgium munitions factory was set up in South Africa, for instance, it was difficult to determine how far United States capital was involved. Nevertheless, that country's complicity could not reasonably be doubted... while many of the details remained obscure, there could be no doubt that the foreign monopolies were actively involved in the construction of military bases." (A/AC.109/SR.349, 1 June 1965).

"... research stations were springing up in remote parts of his country. But whether the gas was produced in South Africa or in South West Africa, there could be no doubt but that the intention was to use it against his people. The South African Government was taking extraordinary security precautions to ensure that no information leaked out, either about the so-called research or the missile stations. Obviously, those developments were part of the military build-up, and there was even talk of South Africa developing its own atomic bomb, with the help of West German scientists. (A/AC.109/SR.350, 2 June 1965).

Mr. Appolus, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), stated it was known from a reliable source that development work on poison gases had been started in an establishment near Johannesburg about three years previously, with West German collaboration. Information had also come in recently about the establishment of a missile tracking station in South West Africa. Owing to the security measures enforced, it was hard to get details and SWAPO had requested the United Nations Secretary-General to investigate the matter. No reply had as yet been received. (A/AC.109/SR.350, 2 June 1965).

Mr. Ngcobo, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa, stated that

"... the United Kingdom and United States Governments were protecting Verwoerd, and had consistently flouted the United Nations resolutions on South Africa. The United States had declared an embargo on arms to that country, but side-stepped it by supplying men and materials for producing arms on the spot. As had been stressed by previous petitioners, rocket and missile bases were under construction in South and South West Africa with the help of United States, United Kingdom and German scientists, and poison gases were being developed in South Africa with the aid of Nazi scientists. British military academies still trained South Africa's military men. It had been said that the United Kingdom would continue to honour previous contracts, but for each contract so honoured, thousands of Africans were exposed to extermination. Men laid off after the abandonment of the TSR.2 project were now going to South Africa to work on the maintenance of military aircraft. It also appeared that some squadrons of the United States Air Force were being taught Afrikaans." (A/AC.109/SR.358, 8 June 1965).

Mr. Nyaose, Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa, said that

"... the people and workers of South Africa and South West Africa had pinned their hopes on military intervention by the United Nations when South Africa had moved armed forces into Walvis Bay. But the only result had been wordy condemnation of the move and, since that time, the whole area had been militarized, as reported by SWAPO... The gravest threat of war was overhanging the African continent as a result of the aggressive plans of the imperialist Powers to use southern Africa as a battlefield in their war against the socialist countries.

"It was unfortunate that the final decision on military intervention by the United Nations would have to be made by the Security Council, where the power of veto still remained precisely in the hands of those countries that had been accused before the Committee. That those countries were still

rejecting a trade embargo on South Africa, still providing technicians and immigrants to build up its military power, and still maintaining the investments that were being used to perpetuate the social and economic exploitation of the African working masses, was no matter for surprise." (A/AC.109/SR.359, 8 June 1965).

Mr. Kuhangua, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), stated that

"... despite SWAPO's protest against the apartheid regime's military build-up in South West Africa and despite the Committee's appeal to keep the country free from military bases, it had been reported in the local newspaper, the Nationalist of 4 June 1965, that South Africa was building an air base in the Caprivi Strip near the Zambian border.

"President Kaunda had stated that Zambia would not be intimidated by South Africa's plan to build an £8 million air base in the Caprivi Strip. Heavy equipment worth £2 million had been moved into the area - the Zambian President had continued - some of it through Zambian territory. The President had further stated that the South African project was nothing else but warmongering and constituted a threat to world peace." (A/AC.109/SR.360, 9 June 1965).

Mr. Ngokong, African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, said that

"... the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Japan formed an unholy and more powerful alliance than the unholy alliance of Verwoerd, Salazar and Smith; they were sabotaging efforts to end Verwoerd's apartheid in South Africa and South West Africa, Salazar's fascism in Mozambique and Angola and Smith's oppression in Rhodesia.

"... aircraft supplied to South Africa included fighter, interceptor, bomber and patrol, transport, trainer and support aircraft and helicopters, whose names indicated their origin. He named some ten military air bases and some six air bases for citizen forces. With the Caprivi Strip in South West Africa, air bases would extend to the borders of Zambia. Strategic airfields for operative purposes were being constructed in various parts of the country; defence material and fuel were being stored at strategic points for issue to troops, aircraft and vehicles, on mobilization.

"... Commenting on the visit to South Africa by General Lauris Norstad, former supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe, the Johannesburg Sunday Express of 21 March 1965 had described the visit as further evidence of support for South Africa by overseas investors... The same paper, in its 4 April 1965 issue, had referred to a twelve-day business visit during which the former NATO Commander had held talks with South Africa's Minister of Defence and other top Defence Force officials; and had quoted his comment to journalists on South Africa: 'It's a dynamic positive country. You must accept overseas criticism as a form of flattery'. South West Africa, being represented in the Parliament at Cape Town under the South African Constitution, was in the same military situation as South Africa itself, and South Africa was conducting military exercises in the Caprivi Strip.

"The vested interests in South West Africa held by South African capitalists and their United Kingdom collaborators were proof that in South West Africa, too, military force would be used to subjugate the indigenous people.

"... press reports in May that a Jewish doctor in Capetown, Dr. Kaplinsky, was to go to the Federal Republic of Germany later in the year to give evidence before a Nazi war crimes court had been followed by a spate of threatening telephone calls to the doctor. The reports had led to speculation on how many former Nazis were secretly living in South Africa. An article in the issue of Ons Land dated 23 April 1965 had said that the possibility could not be excluded that Martin Bormann was living in South Africa under an assumed name: the former Prime Minister Malan and Verwoerd had both been very sympathetic to the Nazis and had strongly favoured neutrality and a separate peace treaty with Nazi Germany; it would be understandable if some of the war criminals had turned to South Africa, especially after Malan became Prime Minister in 1948. Any secret ex-Nazi population would undoubtedly have been encouraged by Otto "Scarface" Skorzeny, former Nazi SS Commander and rescuer of Mussolini from an Appenine prison. According to reports in the Johannesburg Sunday Chronicle, the Cape Times and other newspapers, Skorzeny had been to South Africa on a public mission to promote trade between South Africa and Spain. He had visited Parliament on 23 April with Senator L. T. Weichardt, leader of the South African Grey Shirts, who had been interned by the Smuts Government during the war; the latter had stated that the visit was connected with the Spanish pavilion at the Rand Easter show.

"The Rand Daily Mail of 31 March 1965 had quoted a statement by Prince Hubert zu Lowenstein, during a recent tour of South Africa as a government representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, that he had been disturbed at the activities of German white radical groups making pilgrimages to South Africa; he had described them as neo-Nazis, touring South Africa making speeches on the supremacy of the white man. They were finding willing audiences at the numerous German clubs to be found in South African cities. According to the Sunday Express, the Commissioner-General of Transkei had received a group of neo-Nazis whose leader, Heinrich Hertle, editor of an extremist West German paper called Die Deutsche Wochenzeitung; had said that the group were all supporters of apartheid. Hertle had been attached by zu Lowenstein in the South African Press for Nazi propaganda at a German club near Durban.

"The Sunday Times had reported that Nazi marching songs and talk of reviving the Hitler spirit could be heard nightly in the German club at Pretoria - where there was a large colony of Germans who had fled their country at the end of the war. There were over 2,000 former Nazi army and SS officers in South Africa, many of whom, according to the Press, were now instructors in the South African army or holding high positions in the government munitions department or in the munitions industry.

"The speaker also gave the names of and biographical information on other ex-Nazis, including two who were now holding leading positions in atomic energy and poison gas research respectively, and a former Goebbels propaganda man who had published an anti-semitic pamphlet in South Africa."

"... there had been no decrease in the flow of former Nazis to South Africa... after Prince zu Lowenstein's statement 800 more Nazis had come into South Africa. There was a direct link between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the South African regime."
(A/AC.109/SR.363, 10 June 1965).

Mr. Kerina, National Unity Democratic Organization of Namib (NUDO) stated that South Africa possessed the largest and best equipped military machine in Africa. Its alliances with the United Kingdom, Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany further enhanced its capacity for internal suppression. The defence budget had increased fivefold since 1959. South Africa was a military state, mobilized for internal and international war. Its existence was a serious threat to the entire African continent.

South West Africa was only nominally separated from South Africa, which had always intended to absorb it into South Africa as a fifth province. In defiance of the Mandate, South Africa had established numerous military bases in South West Africa, and was at present engaged in constructing emergency military airfields, equipped to handle jet fighters. (A/AC.109/SR.367, 15 June 1965).

Mr. Smith, speaking on behalf of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC), said that

"... The South African Government was building an air base in the Caprivi Strip in South West Africa. If such military developments remained unchecked, the whole of southern Africa would one day be locked in a mortal struggle for which both the United Nations and those Powers which had supplied South Africa with the necessary equipment and technical information would be responsible. Despite the fact that, according to the terms of its Mandate, South Africa had undertaken not to build military or naval bases on South West African territory, it had nevertheless proceeded to do so."
(A/AC.109/SR.435, 7 June 1966).

Mr. Nujoma, speaking on behalf of the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), said that

"... In violation of the Mandate under which the racist regime of South Africa administered South West Africa, military bases had been established in the country, the largest of them at Walvis Bay, the country's main seaport. There was a military training camp at Windhoek, the capital, and a huge air base had recently been constructed at Singalamwe in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, only fifteen miles from the Zambia-Namibia border. Equipment valued at £25 million including guns and heavy artillery was said to have been brought to the Caprivi air base from South Africa via Southern Rhodesia. According to his information, large tanks, such as those that had been used during the Second World War, were massed there and Southern Rhodesian jet fighters were stationed at the air base. It was also reported that construction of the air base had been carried out by Lewis Construction, a Southern Rhodesian company. Police stations attached to the South African Army had been erected throughout Namibia, and White housewives were being trained in the use of automatic weapons."

...

"... Although the nations of the world had joined forces to oppose German fascism during the Second World War, practical, moral and material support, including armaments, were being supplied to the fascist regime of South Africa to help it to carry out its declared racial discrimination and apartheid policy, and to perpetuate White supremacy and exploitation of the Africans in a most inhuman manner. The Nairobi Sunday Nation of 8 May 1966 reported Rhodesia's Hunter jet fighters and Canberra bombers had been using South Africa's Caprivi Strip airfield, that Rhodesian Air Force jets had been using Lourenço Marques as a refuelling point, and that Rhodesia had negotiated an air pact with Portugal and South Africa to give them the advantage in case of any direct armed intervention. According to the article, military liaison between Rhodesia, South Africa and Mozambique had been established along the 700-mile Zambian border shared by the three countries. That report indicated the existence of a military pact between the regimes of Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith in order to maintain White supremacy and to continue the suppression and exploitation of the African masses in southern Africa. The military build-up and the stockpiling of war material in Namibia by those regimes was a threat to the peace and security not only of the people of Namibia and Africa, but of the whole world."

"... His organization also wished to place on record its strongest rejection of the unilateral action taken by the regimes of Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa to use Namibia as a dumping area for war material, and demanded that the United Nations or some other competent international body undertake an on-the-spot investigation to discover exactly what kind of armaments had been installed. He said that poison gases were being developed in South Africa; he had no information in that connexion regarding South West Africa, but his people feared that one day, when they rose up against the regime, poison gas would be used against them."

"... On 7 April 1965, the newspaper Le Monde had reported that on his arrival in Johannesburg, Mr. Raymond Schmittlein, Vice-President of the French National Assembly and Chairman of the France/South Africa parliamentary group, had stated that France would continue to sell arms to South Africa and would improve its trade and cultural relations with that country. The Tanzania Standard of 14 May 1966 reported the purchase by South Africa of sixteen French Super-Frelon helicopters for an estimated £10 million. It had further been reported by the South African pro-Government newspaper, Die Vaderland, that the French Government had promised to supply the apartheid Government of Dr. Verwoerd with submarines by 1970."

The New York Times of 25 March 1966 had reported:

"While the main thrust of Portugal's military activities lies in Africa in what Professor Salazar termed a successful campaign against terrorists, her European defence ties are now entirely on a bilateral basis with Germany, France and Spain. The forthcoming visit here by German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder may lead to the expansion of the arrangements under which a German jet air base with accompanying facilities is being built at Beja in southern Portugal. In exchange for these facilities, Germany is

to provide Portugal with jet combat aircraft for the African operations. France, which sells Portugal Alouette helicopters used in Africa and is building frigates for her, has been granted a missile tracking station on the Azores. This week, Portugal's Defence Minister and army Chief of Staff visited France.

"... His organization called upon the Governments of those countries to stop the supply of arms and ammunition to the South African racist regime, because it believed that suppression of a people by others constituted a constant threat to the peace and security of the world." (A/AC.109/SR.417, 23 May 1966).

Mr. Mifima, South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), said that

"... South Africa had also set up large military bases throughout the country; among those already completed was the air base at Mpacha in the Caprivi Strip, fifteen miles from the Zambian border, which was guarded by South African soldiers. The military bases and installations had been built not only for internal security but also for provocative and aggressive use against the newly independent African States, particularly Zambia, in the event of confrontations between the African forces and those of imperialism. However, military bases and installations could not prevent people from fighting for freedom. Since the war of liberation had broken out, the South African police and soldiers had been patrolling Zambia's borders with South West Africa and Angola, using helicopters, military police cars and police dogs.

"... A new camp had been completed in the Caprivi Strip for about 150 soldiers and policemen who constantly patrolled the Zambian border to check on the movements of freedom fighters." (A/AC.109/SR.524, 7 June 1967).

Mr. Letlaka, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), said that

"... The increasing financial involvement of the Federal Republic of Germany in South Africa and South West Africa was well known. The threat of the resurgence of fascism in the Federal Republic of Germany was also clearly to be seen in South West Africa, and, of course, in South Africa. There were many German experts in South Africa and South West Africa, including the Caprivi Strip, among them many military experts. The threat of that base to independent Africa, and especially independent Zambia, need hardly be stressed. The Federal Republic of Germany had also helped South Africa in building the huge military and naval base at Walvis Bay, in the mandated Territory of South West Africa, which had been made part of South Africa and was under the complete control of the South African Navy. There, too, German instructors were active under the supervision of a well-known Nazi sympathizer.

"South Africa's apartheid Government, as part of the 'free world', received financial support and strategic materials from it. The crimes against the Africans in South Africa and South West Africa were committed in the name of the profits made by the investors from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Japan. Those countries derived profits from the sufferings of the African people of South Africa and South West Africa. They were partners in oppression and exploitation, and the props on which the oppressive regime of Vorster rested.

"...Asked whether he could provide information concerning the supply of arms by NATO countries and Israel to put down the struggle in South West Africa, the petitioner replied that although it was known that there were weapons of Israeli origin in South and South West Africa, it was difficult to furnish precise figures. There was a tremendous flow of capital from South Africa to Israel, and South African volunteers had recently gone there." (A/AC.109/SR.524, 7 June 1967).

Mr. Kuhangua, speaking on behalf of the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), said that

"... The large companies were mercilessly pillaging the natural resources of the area and plundering its indigenous inhabitants in direct violation of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 30 November 1963. They were active in both South Africa and South West Africa, aided by certain Members of the United Nations, and contemptuously ignoring General Assembly resolutions. They had helped South Africa to strengthen its military potential and had turned it into a nuclear Power in order to reap profits ranging from 25 to 45 per cent by the brutal suppression and exploitation of the indigenous population." (A/AC.109/SR.535, 15 June 1967).

APPENDIX X

TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION: EXTRACTS FROM PETITIONERS' STATEMENTS IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1965, 1966 AND 1967

Mr. Sakupwanya, speaking on behalf of the Preparatory Committee of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee, said that:

"... It was hard to escape the conclusion that a well-planned genocide operation was being conducted by the Portugese colonial regime on the innocent and unarmed Africans of Mozambique with the aid of the NATO Powers. Thanks to that aid, Portugal had been able during the past five years to construct eight new military bases and to maintain some 40,000 troops." (A/AC.109/SR.345, 28 May 1965)

Mr. Kapilongo, speaking on behalf of Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (UPA), said that:

"... The arms used by the Portugese soldiers were supplied by NATO. For example, Portuguese aircraft had recently dropped plastic bombs supplied to Portugal by NATO." (A/AC.109/SR.346, 28 May 1965)

Mr. De Melo, speaking on behalf of Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), said that:

"... Mr. Salazar had just concluded a military pact with Mr. Ian Smith.... At present the Portuguese forces totalled some 60,000 men. Portugal's accomplices were the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium, all of which wanted to profit from wealth so easily acquired.... In a recent speech in the Portuguese National Assembly, a member of the Portuguese Army had boasted of receiving money from NATO." (A/AC.109/SR.346, 28 May 1965)

Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), said that:

"... One of the greatest contributions the Special Committee could make would be to persuade the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Belgium to stop giving economic and military support to Portugal." (A/AC.109/SR.350, 2 June 1965)

"... As a poor country Portugal could not afford to wage war on three fronts without the assistance of its NATO allies. Weapons manufactured in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and France had been found inside Mozambique. Between 1951 and 1961 the United States had contributed half a billion dollars to Portugal in the

form of weapons. There was nothing to indicate that such aid had since ceased. The Federal Republic of Germany not only sold weapons to Portugal but had established a military base in Portugal where training was given to the armed forces of the NATO Powers. The Federal Republic of Germany had recently purchased sixty war planes from Canada to supply to Portugal and had increased its economic aid to that country.... France had concluded an agreement with Portugal to establish a base in the Azores, in return for which it would build 120 ships of various kinds for Portugal. A Portuguese officer who had deserted had informed the nationalist movement that the Portuguese forces in Mozambique were equipped with United States helicopters, French jet planes, United Kingdom frigates and weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany." (A/AC.109/SR.351, 2 June 1965)

"... According to official statements, a military alliance existed between the South African and Portuguese Governments, in accordance with which the South African chief of armed forces made six-monthly visits to Mozambique to inspect military bases and confer with Portuguese army chiefs. Such conferences usually ended with statements of support for the South African Government and its military forces in Mozambique and Angola. Portugal also sent army officers to South Africa to discuss joint defence and other matters." (A/AC.109/SR.352, 3 June 1965)

"... His organization had no assurances that any of the three Powers, namely the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, had ever received a written guarantee from Portugal that arms would not be used in Angola and Mozambique. The United States Government had evaded that question when representatives of FRELIMO had raised it in the United Nations in 1963. Nor was there any plain statement by NATO that the Portuguese provinces in Africa were in fact excluded from the so-called 'national territory' of Portugal; i.e., from the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. That again was a matter the Committee should investigate. All the assurances cited were but a play on words which would delude no one save those desirous of being deceived and that certainly did not include the people of Mozambique on the Special Committee. His concern was that nothing was being done to elicit a firm answer from NATO and from Portugal's allies on these points.

"But even assuming that those uncertainties were resolved positively, the fact still remained that Portugal was receiving such substantial material aid from NATO Powers that it was freed from the necessity to provide for the defence of its European territory and the funds thus released were available for the purchase of arms to continue the struggle in Africa. The Federal Republic of Germany had made it plain that, outside NATO, anything was allowable. And it was noteworthy that that country was establishing military bases of its own in Portugal for so-called training purposes - an explanation which would be accepted only by the simple-minded.... Only an effective total embargo on the supply of arms to Portugal, imposed by all States Members of NATO, would prevent the Portuguese fascist regime from continuing its repression in Africa.

"... According to available information, four airstrips had been built in Northern Mozambique immediately adjacent to Tanzania: Portugal was trying to make the rest of the world believe that the fighting in Mozambique was instigated from outside, specifically by Tanzania. Military jet aircraft

kept a constant watch on the Mozambique-Tanzania border and violated Tranzanian airspace.... It was known that assistance was being received from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and that there were exchanges of military officers and technicians between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia.... With regard to South Africa, armed forces were present in Mozambique as technicians and army chiefs visited Mozambique regularly and made pronouncements of support for Portugal in its policy of white supremacy there.

"... He confirmed that United States technicians had helped in the construction of the base at Beira.... Many of the NATO countries, in particular, the Federal Republic of Germany, were training Portuguese army officers in all military matters, on the professed understanding that they would not be used in Africa...

"... Outside NATO, the United States was giving guerrilla warfare training in Latin America to Portuguese officers, some of whom were known to be now fighting in Mozambique and Guinea. The Federal Republic of Germany had provided training in the use of modern weapons supplied to Portugal." (A/AC.109/SR.354, 4 June 1965)

Mr. Simango, speaking on behalf of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), said that:

"... Two reports came from the Portuguese Press. The first confirmed official Portuguese statements on the valuable technical advice that Portugal was receiving from the United States of America in her colonial warfare and political oppression. The second concerned a 'study tour of air force military strategy' by Southern Rhodesian air force officers. The air force headquarters at Beira in Mozambique was being equipped as a strategic point in the system of air bases being constructed in Mozambique with the help of NATO countries." (A/AC.109/SR.354, 4 June 1965)

Mr. Cabral, General Secretary of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), said that:

"... The Portuguese presence was possible only because of the substantial aid, in arms and money, which the enemy was receiving from its NATO allies and from others, such as South Africa.

"... In 1959 there had been 600 Portuguese soldiers, i.e., one battalion, stationed in the country. There were now 20,000 men of the three armed services occupying the Territory. There were as many Portuguese soldiers in the country as there were in Angola, although Angola was thirty times the size of so-called Portuguese Guinea. Moreover, the number of special police, who were responsible for repression, and political police, who were in fact secret police, had been considerably increased.

"... Portugal did not manufacture arms but only explosives and, recently, machine pistols. The weapons used by the Portuguese troops came mainly from West Germany, the United States and Italy (for explosives). The aircraft used by the Portuguese were generally United States jet fighters and bombers. The Portuguese aviators' helmets, moreover, bore the

insignia of the United States Air Force. Weapons captured by the PAIGC fighters had been displayed at Conakry and Dakar.

"It was childish to say that Portugal received NATO arms but was forbidden to use them. Anyone who put a knife in a madman's hand need not be surprised if he used it. He was not asking Portugal's allies to stop providing it with arms, for that would be difficult for them. On the other hand, since they claimed to be opposed to Portugal's racist policy, those countries could give arms to the PAIGC. The delivery of arms, however, was not the only problem. Portugal was also receiving substantial economic and financial assistance. For example, Portuguese soldiers wounded in combat were given medical treatment in the Federal Republic of Germany. That was rather an odd thing for it might be asked whether the PAIGC was at war with the Federal Republic." (A/AC.109/SR.368, 16 June 1965)

"... His party had already on a number of occasions, in particular at the United Nations in 1962, reported the presence of Spanish soldiers in the Portuguese units. It had been claimed that they were volunteers, but that had proved to be incorrect, since the Spanish Government's control over its territory was too tight for leaks of that kind to be possible. Moreover, the PAIGC special services had reported the presence in so-called Portuguese Guinea of soldiers speaking a language which could be English. Certain armaments, in particular PV-2 aircraft, could not be used by the Portuguese, since they did not know how to handle them. There were non-Portuguese pilots in so-called Portuguese Guinea who were teaching Portuguese to fly those aircraft. Lastly, it was possible that Cubans working for Tshombe had gone to serve in the Portuguese forces.... The people of so called Portuguese Guinea made no distinction between the arms which Portugal used for external purposes and those which it used to exterminate the population. With the exception of the atomic bomb, all the arms allegedly intended for external purposes were used against the population. They included grenades, Munser rifles, Breda machine pistols, mortars, aircraft and napalm bombs, which were not manufactured by Portugal but certainly supplied by NATO." (A/AC.109/SR.369, 16 June 1965)

Mr. Chipenda, speaking on behalf of Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), stated that:

"... P-19 radios of United States make, G3 and FN weapons of Belgian make, UZI machine-guns of Israel make and other weapons manufactured in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as a large quantity of war matériel of various origins, had fallen into the hands of the MPLA fighters. It was estimated that there were 50,000 Portuguese forces in Angola including Africans."

"... The Portuguese colonialists had recently strengthened their repressive measures. They had stepped up their military training with the aid of their allies, already well known in Angola by the acts of banditry perpetrated against the local population. Press and radio continued to appeal to the settlers to take part in training, repeating the proverb: 'Forewarned is forearmed'. The training of civilian volunteer paratroopers, intended to protect the Portuguese settlers, had also been stepped up."

"... It seemed strange that a small country like Portugal could maintain so vast a colonial empire, where it was now fighting on three fronts. In fact, the situation was explained by the massive support which the imperialist countries of NATO were giving the Portuguese Government. As was known, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the United States were interested in exploiting the wealth of the Portuguese colonies, particularly Angola. The Portuguese colonial domination enabled them to continue and even intensify their policy of plundering the country's wealth."

"... The war matériel (aircraft, napalm bombs, tanks, weapons of all kinds, etc.) used by Portugal came from the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium. In part that assistance was provided through NATO, since Portugal as a member of NATO has a right to military assistance from that organization; in part it was provided under bilateral agreements between Portugal and its allies. Under cover of assistance to a member country of NATO, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany were thus providing large quantities of matériel to the Portuguese colonists."

"... The Federal Republic of Germany had recently given Portugal \$40 million. It had sent it sixty military aircraft. It supplied Portugal with large quantities of weapons. It had built a large military base in Portugal, where the instructors were German. It had built hospitals in Portuguese territory where the wounded of the Portuguese army were cared for, and also a large munitions factory near Lisbon whose technicians were German.... The Portuguese army received direct technical assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany. The Portuguese Government was able to send troops to Angola to the degree that the Federal Republic of Germany sent German troops to ensure the security of Portugal. The strength of the German forces was difficult to evaluate." (A/AC.109/SR.420, 25 May 1966)

Mr. D'Almeida, speaking on behalf of Mouvement Populaire de Liberation de l'Angola (MPLA) said that:

"He wished to draw the Special Committee's attention to the permanent danger of South African intervention in Angola. A military pact had been concluded between Verwoerd, Salazar and Ian Smith, all champions of fascism. The pact provided for direct intervention by the signatories in the event of revolutionary activity spreading. The Star of Johannesburg had stated in November 1964 that the defensive system of South Africa on the ground depended at present on the possibilities of local defence in Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia, and that Africa would certainly not remain inactive if one of those bastions were to be threatened. As if to illustrate the military pact between imperialist criminals, groups of armed police from South West Africa a/ had recently crossed the southern frontier of Angola and carried out massive arrests among the political and military personnel in the area. It was probable that those arrested had subsequently been massacred by the Verwoerd police." (A/AC.109/SR.453, 21 June 1966)

a/ On 12 June 1968, the General Assembly decided to change the name of the Territory to "Namibia" (see resolution 2372 (XXII), operative paragraph 1).

Mr. Ervedosa, a member of Frente Patriotica de Libertacao Nacional (FPLM), said that:

"... reconditioned Lockheed 'HARPOON' PV-2 tactical bombers from the 1960 NATO allocation, sold at a nominal price to the Portuguese Government, were permanently stationed in the Territory. There were also North American 'HARVARD' T-6 training aircraft, adapted for tactical support, Dornier DO-27 communications aircraft, with 37 M/M rocket launching systems, and Republic 'THUNDERJET' F-84 tactical support aircraft, which again were recently reconditioned aircraft from the NATO allocation sold at a nominal price to the Portuguese Government. Lockheed 'NEPTUNE' P2V-5 long-range patrol aircraft from the NATO allocation assigned to air base 6 at Montijo, Portugal, had been used for regular missions. The weapons had included containers of napalm, mainly of United States origin, and 20-pound, 100-pound, 500-pound and 750-pound high-power bombs, some originally supplied by NATO, some of local manufacture, and some supplied by the Republic of South Africa. The Portuguese air force also had depth charges (which had replaced napalm in attacks on the people in the jungle, since they were the only effective weapon in areas of dense vegetation), which were part of the NATO allocation and were stored at air base 6, at Montijo, Portugal."

"... In February 1962 two working meetings had been held, one at Salisbury and one at Luanda, between the headquarters staff of the Second Air Region and the Command of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force. Those meetings had led to the exchange of operational information, the planning of joint co-ordination arrangements and the study of methods of operational co-operation..."

"... At the first meeting of air staff officers at Salisbury, the General staff of the Royal Air Force had tried to obtain information on the type of weapons used and on existing means of co-ordination. Some fifty diagrams had been brought to Salisbury and the officers responsible for security services at the bases had been briefed on the defence systems of the bases, the type of weapons and the smallest details of the whole defence system.... There had been twelve twin-engined Lockheed 'HARPOON' PV-2 bombers at the air base and six at Luanda, and four of those aircraft had later been sent to Beira, in Mozambique. There had also been some twelve or fourteen Republic F-84 'THUNDERJETS' and about twenty North American T-6 aircraft, in addition to Lockheed P2V-5 'NEPTUNE' patrol aircraft."

"... Up to February 1963 some Portuguese army officers had received training in the United States under the NATO co-operation programme. However, Portugal was in a position to train its own air personnel for the purpose of repression. The Portuguese were present in Angola in sufficient numbers and did not need reinforcements from outside. Portugal did, however, receive considerable financial assistance from its allies which was far more valuable to it than assistance in manpower. As to air attacks the method had varied, according to the type of weapon used. In the case of some bombs there had been a compulsory safety altitude; for the depth charges, the altitude had been slightly lower; machine-gun attacks had been made at a fairly low altitude and for the dropping of napalm bombs the aircraft had skimmed two or three metres above the tallest obstacle." (A/AC.109/SR.450, 18 June 1966)

Mr. de Pádua, speaking as a member of the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN), stated that:

"... The weapons used by the parachutists and special troops which he had seen with his own eyes had formed part of the armaments of the Portuguese NATO division. Some of the napalm bombs had come from South Africa through NATO. According to some senior officers - as Manuel Alegre could confirm - Israel, acting as an intermediary for the Federal Republic of Germany in that instance, had supplied the Portuguese with USI sub-machine-guns. Bomb fragments found in the encampments of the fighting units bore inscriptions in English." (A/AC.109/SR.454, 21 June 1966)

Mr. Eduardo, speaking on behalf of the Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE), said that:

"... Day after day, dozens of innocent Angolans were being savagely cut down by Salazar's horde of killers with the help of United States sub-machine-guns and dollars, French and German bombers and tanks, Belgian rifles, and the material and political support of several other NATO countries. The experience of five years of resistance showed that, without help from those countries, Portuguese colonialism would long since have succumbed to the blows struck by the Angolan freedom fighters." (A/AC.109/SR.454, 25 June 1966)

Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and referring to the role being played by a number of Western European and North American Powers, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the question of colonialism, said that:

"... under the guise of participating in an alliance for the defence of democracy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and a few other Powers were supplying Portugal with some of the most deadly modern weapons and training her soldiers in the techniques of counter-guerrilla warfare." (A/AC.109/SR.418, 24 May 1966)

Mr. dos Santos, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that:

"... The army and the PIDE (political police) worked in close co-operation, in particular during military operations. The Portuguese troops received precise and official instructions: they had orders to massacre the population of the villages or to intern them by force in concentration camps built for the purpose near military and administrative posts. Peasants' houses were systematically burnt and crops and livestock were stolen or destroyed." (A/AC.109/SR.418, 24 May 1966)

Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that:

"The United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium were supplying weapons to Portugal either through NATO or through other channels. FRELIMO had been able to establish with certainty, and had a list of weapons captured from the Portuguese army with serial numbers to prove it, that the Portuguese army was in possession of weapons (rifles, automatic rifles and machine-guns) originating in Belgium, the

Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, the Portuguese forces had recently taken delivery of Italian aircraft built in the Federal Republic of Germany.... It could safely be assumed that all Portuguese senior staff officers had received special training at NATO, especially in view of the known concern of certain Western Powers at the extent of guerrilla warfare throughout the world." (A/AC.109/SR.418, 24 May 1966)

"... Although the official position of the NATO Powers was that they undertook no activity south of the Tropic of Cancer, there was evidence of indirect aid; according to the testimony of a Portuguese prisoner, there were Portuguese paratroops in Mozambique which had been equipped by NATO. The reason for their presence was unknown; but the Portuguese Government would certainly never admit publicly that they were there to fight. The prisoner had also said that the construction of air bases was continuing, and eight jet airplanes had been bought from the Federal Republic of Germany. It was evident that NATO aid alone enabled Portugal to foot its military bills."

"... There was military co-ordination among South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal with regard to their political policies for control of the African populations. Every six months Portuguese officers went to Salisbury for discussion, and a high-ranking officer paid regular visits to Mozambique." (A/AC.109/SR.419, 24 May 1966)

"... Recent estimates put the number of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique at approximately 50,000. That did not, however, take account of a further 7,500 men who, according to Portuguese information agencies, had arrived in the past month, nor of a further 6,000 who were known to have arrived in Mozambique only a few days previously. At that rate, the number of Portuguese soldiers could be expected to reach 75,000 by the end of 1966."

"... Every effort was being made by the Portuguese forces to guard all borders between Mozambique and neighbouring countries." (A/AC.109/SR.418, 24 May 1966)

"... The Portuguese Government had also been conscripting Africans, but many of them had deserted. Ninety-five per cent of them were mere youngsters unaware that they were going to a war. Whenever there was an armed clash they were threatened with execution if they did not fire on their own people. It was therefore difficult to assess the morale of the Portuguese, but as their army was adequately replenished and equipped it was probably fairly high. Nevertheless, how long Portugal could continue, despite support from its allies, was an open question. Since 1961, increasing proportions of its national budget had been devoted to military expenditure. At the same time, vast sums accrued from the companies operating in the colonies." (A/AC.109/SR.419, 24 May 1966).

Mr. Mbule, speaking on behalf of Uniao Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO), said that:

"... In 1961, after the uprising in Angola, fearing its repercussions in other Territories, especially Mozambique, Portugal had taken preventive measures by forming, in April, the PIDE. That organization was composed of

murderers, bandits and ex-criminals to whom Salazar had granted pardons on condition that they co-operate with his criminal policy. The Headquarters of PIDE was set up in Laurenço Marques and Beira. Many people, including Dr. Agostinho Illunga, Dinis Mondlane and Tomás Nyatumba, had been charged with high treason against the Government. In 1962 they had been sentenced to five years' imprisonment in Lisbon plus fifteen years' residence in Portugal and deprived of all political rights. Innumerable arrests were planned by the 'black' Portuguese and their network of informers and executed by the white man. PIDE was a terrorist organization modelled after the Gestapo. Some PIDE members succeeded in joining liberation movements for the purpose of betraying them. They tried to expel freedom fighters from the Party and even from the host country; they had gaols where nationalists were kept indefinitely; with the money they obtained from Portugal they enticed nationalist leaders to return to their homeland where they faced immediate arrest, as in case of Daniel Mahlayeye, Matias Mboa, Bomba Tembe, José Cavane and many others."

"... In Mozambique, the Portuguese forces consisted of divisions of the regular army, with artillery, engineers, and army medical corps, infantry, cavalry and an army service corps, a special army of hunters, a volunteer corps, an air force, a police force and a reserve force. All those forces were well equipped with modern weapons and unlimited supplies of ammunition. In the previous year they had numbered 45,000 men, but that figure had been increased to 60,000 last December." (A/AC.109/SR.436, 7 June 1966)

Mr. Amilcar Cabral, speaking on behalf of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), said that:

"... On the morning of 5 June, ten bombers and four jet aircraft had bombed a small village in Guinea where a meeting of active leaders had been held the previous day. The village had been completely destroyed, seven persons had been killed and fifteen seriously wounded. The aircraft had been American B-26's and Fiats manufactured in the Federal Republic of Germany. Portugal, which was an underdeveloped country ranking last among the European nations, did not manufacture aircraft. Why, then, were the Western countries helping to bomb the people of Guinea? He did not understand the contradictions in the attitude taken by the United States, which proclaimed itself the friend of Africa but continued to help Salazar, and the Portuguese criminals. The legitimate aspirations of the people of Guinea were in no way incompatible with those of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany."

"... The morale of the Portuguese troops was very low. They were taking part in the war because they did not know how to get out of it. Many soldiers deserted and turned up with the forces of the liberation army. More recently, one of the deserters had said that at least 60 per cent of the soldiers in his barracks were tired of the war and wanted only to see the end of it. In that atmosphere there were constant conflicts between soldiers and men. For at least a year and a half the Portuguese had been on the defensive. In fact, their only offensives were directed against the civilian population, whom they bombed relentlessly." (A/AC.109/SR.451, 20 June 1966)

"... It was clear that Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were taking practical steps to persecute, arrest and massacre the African. In Guinea, for example, Portugal, in agreement with South Africa, was building a large airport on an island, to replace the African airports from which South Africa was barred. The airport would also give Portugal a secure base from which to bomb the people of the Cape Verde Islands and Guinea."

"... Portugal was in fact using American arms, as a journalist had written in the Washington Post. The people had realized that Portugal was receiving aircraft, napalm bombs and automatic weapons from its NATO allies. The States members of NATO replied that they did not authorize Portugal to use those weapons. If, however, you gave a knife to a madman bent on killing, how could you expect him not to use it?"

"... As to the reported delivery of Italian FIAT aircraft by the Federal Republic of Germany to Portugal, that was because within the framework of the Common Market and the agreements between Italy and the Federal Republic, FIAT aircraft were being assembled in the Federal Republic of Germany. There were twenty of those aircraft operating in Guinea. Thus aircraft designed by Italian brains and built by German manpower were being delivered for use in the Territories under Portuguese domination to exterminate the people, whose sole desire was to build their country in peace, like the Italian people. Besides the aircraft and arms from the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, other arms had been found, such as machine-guns and grenades, for example, made in Italy and Belgium. Furthermore, it was almost certain that the helicopters being used in Guinea were French-manufactured Alouettes. Up to four months earlier the total strength of the Portuguese troops in the Territory had been about 20,000 men but, following the many losses it had suffered, Portugal had raised that figure to 25,000. He could not say whether there were any mercenaries among them. With respect to aviation, there were technicians at Bissau hidden in a villa some distance from the town who were probably not Portuguese, for they did not look Portuguese and did not speak that language. He did not know what their nationality was but he supposed they were South Africans. It was quite likely that the countries which were supplying planes to Portugal were also sending it technicians to look after them. The Portuguese had on several occasions violated the air space of Guinea and Senegal, and both countries had brought complaints of the violation of their frontiers before the Security Council. Such violations were a common occurrence." (A/AC.109/SR.452, 20 June 1966)

"... PAIGC was at present making efforts to spread the idea of liberty among the Portuguese soldiers, so that they might appreciate the liberation movement and ultimately defect and enlist in its ranks, and it had already achieved some results. In fact, a good many of the Portuguese troops were illiterate and understood nothing about the struggle they were forced to engage in. Portugal was trying to keep them in ignorance, to prevent them revolting. The Political Commissioner of the nationalist army had prepared leaflets for the Portuguese soldiers, to be planted on the route the soldiers were to take. The leaflets, however, never included any words of hatred of the Portuguese. Some leaflets had been planted in the north of the country encouraging the Portuguese soldiers to desert. One deserter, a twenty-year-old Portuguese, who had been in Guinea for ten months, when

asked whether he knew why he was fighting a war, had replied that the Portuguese officers told their troops they were to go and disperse the bandits. The deserter had said, moreover, that the exit of his barracks was guarded and that the supply of provisions was very bad. On being asked whether he thought the nationalists had any chance of winning the war, the soldier had replied in the affirmative, pointing out that the Portuguese did not know the terrain well and that that was why they always put their African recruits in forward positions." (A/AC.109/SR.451, 20 June 1966)

Mr. Medeiros, speaking on behalf of the Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP), said that:

"... Whereas in the past the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, owing to their geographical situation, had functioned as depots for slaves, the archipelago was now actually becoming, in view of the expansion of the struggles for liberation in Angola and Mozambique, a military base against the nationalist movements in those countries, as well as in São Tomé and Príncipe. The archipelago was gaining importance in the context of air communications between Portugal and its Territories, especially since the independent African countries had closed their harbours and airports to the Portuguese colonialists. The archipelago functioned as a supporting and supply base for aircraft flying from Lisbon to Angola and Mozambique. In addition, the struggle by the imperialist Powers for the reconquest of Africa made the archipelago a supporting base for any future punitive operations against neighbouring countries. For instance, the Bonn militarists and revanchists were toying with the idea of establishing a military base in the island of São Tomé. It was for that reason that the airport at São Tomé had been improved in the light of new military needs. As a result of the improvements, Angola and Mozambique were required to contribute 1.7 million escudos each, and São Tomé 600,000 escudos, to the operational budget of the airport, under the terms of Decree No. 45,745 of 1 June 1965." (A/AC.109/SR.454, 21 June 1966)

Mr. de Andrade, speaking on behalf of the Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP), said that:

"... Although the United States and other Western Powers had rejected allegations that they were providing assistance to Portugal through NATO, there was ample proof that help existed, in the form of military equipment and weapons captured by fighting members of the national movements.... It was well known that German instructors were being sent to Portugal under the co-operation arrangements between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany was also providing military, political and economic assistance to Portugal. The pact between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal showed that the fascist spirit which still prevailed in that country was in harmony with the fascist tendency of the Portuguese Government... He had no exact figures of loans and investments made by the Federal Republic of Germany." (A/AC.109/SR.450, 18 June 1966)

Mr. Holden Roberto, speaking on behalf of the Gouvernement revolutionnaire de L'Angola en Exil (GRAE), said that:

"... Despite the fact that the Portuguese periodically announced that it was ended and although 85,000 Portuguese troops were engaged in the tragic conflict, in reality, the armed struggle in Angola now six years

old, was still being waged and there was no longer any limit to the atrocities practised by the enemy. Napalm bombs continued to be dropped on civilians, poison gas was used and whole villages were burnt to ashes ... The region controlled by the Angolan National Liberation Army (ALNA) had an area of 250,000 square kilometres and a population of 400,000."

"... Since 1966 the military operations conducted by the forces of the Angolan National Liberation Army had inflicted the following losses on the enemy: 523 Portuguese soldiers killed, 37 tanks destroyed, 2 helicopters and 1 aircraft shot down, 44 lorries destroyed, a large quantity of arms seized and 2 Portuguese soldiers captured. From the economic standpoint, the plantations and crops of the Portuguese settlers, a principal source of finance for the colonial war, continued to suffer attack by the Angolan forces and were confiscated and restored to the people."

"... The colonial war was being intensified and military repression continued in Angola and other Portuguese colonies. The military forces in those Territories, most particularly in Angola, continued to be reinforced ... Following various frontier incidents with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea and Senegal, the Portuguese colonialists had recently cut the Dilolo-Lobito railway in order to strangle the Congolese and Zambian economies. It would be recalled that in 1963 the Portuguese had also threatened to block the channel at the mouth of the Congo by sinking three boats full of cement at Santo Antonio de Zaire. That would have rendered unusable the Democratic Republic of the Congo's only outlet to the sea and established a veritable blockade of the country. The situation resulting from Portugal's policy towards both the African people in its colonies and the neighbouring States thus seriously disturbed international peace and security."

"It was impossible to avoid the conclusion that Portugal, an under-developed country with extremely slender resources, could only carry on a war through the assistance it received from NATO, which was also the reason for its obstinacy regarding the implementation of United Nations resolutions. That was not only inconsistent with the so-called free world's principles but also with any desire to maintain peace. He was forced to point out, for the benefit of all the Western countries, the NATO Powers, and particularly the United States of America, that the Angolan people would never forgive the fact that all the means of destruction employed against them came from the arsenals of the West. There were those who hoped to persuade the Angolan people that the NATO weapons delivered to the fascist Portuguese were not intended for the oppression of African peoples. It might be argued that the Atlantic Treaty, which enabled Portugal to maintain any army of 85,000 in Angola, 40,000 in Mozambique and 30,000 in Guinea (Bissau), was not directed against those Territories and their peoples. Unhappily, while that might be true according to the terms of the Treaty, the facts indicated otherwise. NATO weapons were actually used in Africa solely against colonized peoples. The five million Angolans would never agree that it was by chance that Western arms were used against them. The assurances which they had demanded

must be reinforced by preventive measures. The Angolan people urged the United States of America to enforce the embargo on arms destined for Portugal, as provided for by Security Council resolution 218 (1965), and called on all concerned, including the Brazilian people whose Government had recently sent a naval squadron to visit Angola, to admit in their hearts that they were a party to the Angolan people's sufferings."

"... It was not true, as Portugal claimed, that Portuguese troops were fighting on one front only, in the far north. There were at present three separate fronts. First, there was the front in the far north. A second front had later been opened on the north-east Angola-Congo frontier, with the rear base at Kasongo-Lunda (Democratic Republic of the Congo). The third front, relatively recent, was in the south, with the rear base in Katanga. It was therefore clear that, contrary to the claims of those criticizing the national liberation struggle, the fighting was spreading and would continue to spread. The area controlled by the ALNA was, and would remain, free. As the opportunity arose, the ALNA intensified its struggle with all the means at its disposal. In the other areas, the leaders of the movement had organized a system of mass mobilization led by political activists, whose task was to explain the reason for the action undertaken to the population ... GRAE maintained both a military organization in Angola to assert its authority within the country and a system to enable refugees to escape. In each area there was a commander who was also in charge of the camp. He was assisted by an adjutant. There was also a political commissioner, an officer in charge of social services and population movements, and an information officer. The officer concerned with schools and hospitals worked in collaboration with the area commander ... Reports of the way in which the Portuguese authorities treated prisoners were extremely disturbing. Several escaped Angolan combatants reported that the Portuguese troops tortured their prisoners in an attempt to obtain information. They frequently killed them in cold blood. Prison conditions were inhuman. At GRAE headquarters, the members of the Committee could see women and men mutilated by the tortures inflicted on them. One escaped Angolan prisoner had returned to his brothers with his lips pierced and closed by a padlock."

"... Terrorist attacks were made from time to time in areas not under GRAE control and terrible repressions then followed. If those regions were accessible by land, the infantry intervened; otherwise, the Air Force conducted operations. The liberation movements were not of equal strength in all regions; but repression extended everywhere. It was mainly the forests that were bombed. It could be said that the territory as a whole was subjected to bombing, but the bombing was more intense in the areas under GRAE control. The refugees were forced to leave those areas, since they were destroyed and gutted by fire. When they could, they fled to the Congo."

"... In addition to the regular army of 85,000 men stationed in Angola, there was also a provincial civil defence organization. Weapons were distributed to everyone, including women. Further, in the Lunda area the British-run Angola Diamond Company had its own private army and employed foreign mercenaries. However, for the Portuguese, the most effective way of combating subversion and terrorism was to populate

heavily the areas inhabited by the whites, particularly with 'soldier-settlers'. The people received not only weapons but also directives. The prisoner in question had said that, in his area, the motto was: 'A black on the road is a dead man', meaning that he would be killed instantly.... He had been informed by prisoners that the head of the commandos was French and that soldiers not of Portuguese origin were also stationed in Angola."

"... The military budget was a heavy burden on a poor country like Portugal and was causing economic difficulties. Portugal, although a small Power, maintained over 150,000 soldiers in Africa. It was quite clear, however, that its Government did not have the resources to meet the needs of that army by itself. It was receiving assistance from NATO in the form of weapons, and even money. The United States had given \$20 million to the Portuguese Government for the improvement of its road network, but there was no doubt that the money had been diverted from its original purpose and used to finance the colonial war. Furthermore, Portugal had joined NATO and thus received arms, which were used to massacre those fighting in Angola. Arms had been provided by the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium."

"... Only two or three weeks previously the Angolan free forces had captured a machine-gun with markings showing that it had come from Israel. Some officers had confirmed that they had seen machine-guns of the same type in the hands of the Katangese mercenaries. The weapon in question had been a very old one. It was the only weapon found which had come from Israel.... He had heard of a man who had received eighteen months' military training as a parachutist in the Federal Republic of Germany, near Bonn. Funds were being supplied to Portugal, ostensibly to improve its infra-structure; in fact, however, those funds were being used for the purchase of arms and for the maintenance of the 150,000-man army stationed in Africa. Portugal's war needs were enormous, and it needed funds. Portugal was also receiving assistance from the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It was undeniable that Portugal was receiving assistance, since it was a poor, under-developed country and was only able to continue the repression because of the assistance it was receiving. He could state further that Portugal had received funds from the United States for the alleged purpose of improving its road and highway system."

"... An article entitled "The White Bastion in Southern Africa", which had been published in a semi-official Angolan newspaper, dealt with the co-operation between the NATO Powers and Portugal and the contacts existing between South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia. It clearly stated that the purpose of Portuguese activities in Africa was to defend the white man in southern Africa. It stated that nothing the Africans could do could destroy that fortress."

"... He had recently seen a poster encouraging Portuguese soldiers to settle in Angola, the Portuguese Government promising them plots of land in Angola after victory. The illustration showed the soldier-settler with a gun in his right hand and a machete in his left."
(A/AC.109/SR.513, 30 May 1967).

Mr. Lara Lucio, speaking on behalf of the Movimento Popular Para a Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), stated that:

"... For over six years the colonialist army, rendered powerless by the mobility and effectiveness of the Angolan armed forces, had been committing all kinds of violence against the civilian population. The continual bombing of suspected resistance areas, the poisoning of crops, the cold-blooded liquidation of anyone suspected of nationalism, the increasing debasement of the Angolan people and the frantic exploitation of their wealth - those were the main characteristics of a doomed policy desperately aimed at surviving the radical changes of the modern world."

"... Who was paying for Portugal's war in Africa? Portugal levied a 'defence tax' on companies whose profits exceeded 500,000 escudos, and the public debt now amounted to 32,000 million escudos (over \$1,000 million). However, it was foreign investors who were helping Portugal to meet its military expenses. They had been granted favourable terms in Angola by decree 46,312 of 28 April 1965 and now many financial groups - South African, West German, Spanish, Japanese, American, Dutch, Norwegian, British, Belgian, French, Italian, and Swedish - were competing for licenses to exploit the wealth of Angola put up for auction by the Portuguese Government. Instead of being used to raise the level of living of the Angolan people, the vast economic resources created by foreign investments in Angola served to strengthen Portugal's limited capacity to pay for the colonial war."

"... NATO in general and some of its members in particular were continuing to provide Portugal with the means to decimate the African peoples. It was not true that weapons were being supplied to Portugal on condition that they would not be used in wars against the Africans. MPLA had salvaged several kinds of weapons made in Germany, the United States, Belgium and Israel, but none made in Portugal except, of course, ammunition and certain types of grenade.... The Federal Republic of Germany had set up a military base in the Portuguese town of Beja, in exchange for very substantial financial and military assistance. The United States was also giving financial and military support in exchange for the facilities in the Azores; or that France was supplying Portugal with helicopters and warships."

"... Two months previously, an official Portuguese source had announced joint manoeuvres by Portuguese and Southern Rhodesian firemen along the frontier between Mozambique and Rhodesia. Nobody had any doubt about the kind of fire which those makeshift firemen were meant to put out. The military nature of the visit to Lisbon in April 1967 by the South African Minister of Defense, Pieter Botha, his Chief of General Staff and the Commandant-General of the South African Armed Forces also aroused justifiable concern."

"... On 12 December 1966, Le Monde had reported the Portuguese authorities' concern about the expansion of the war in Angola. According to that newspaper, an official Portuguese source had announced a considerable increase in the Portuguese forces in Angola. The same source had said that 50 per cent of the Portuguese troops in Africa were in Angola."

"... There were very clear signs of a decline in the morale of the enemy troops. The general mobilization decree promulgated by the Portuguese Government in 1966 had already created considerable anxiety among the Portuguese population and soldiers. Compulsory military service had been fixed at a minimum of three years but could last as long as four years. Young people who were physically unfit for military service were no longer given an exemption; anyone could be called up until the age of forty-five. In addition, women had been taken on as volunteers in the Portuguese army for the first time. Following on the decree establishing provincial branches of the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps, the general mobilization showed how concerned the Portuguese Government was. The violations of the frontiers of Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo also showed how much the military were on edge. The mutiny of Portuguese soldiers in some Angolan barracks, particularly at Huambo (Nova Lisboa) in December 1966, gave some idea of the disarray which, despite all appearances, reigned in the colonialists' ranks. Indeed, that disarray had been mentioned by Deputy Commander Cunha who, at a meeting of the Portuguese National Assembly in March 1967, had criticized the confusion which reigned in the various sectors of government activity. According to him, there was no co-ordination of Portuguese economic, political and military activities."

"... Portugal was not implementing the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), which requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories. Angola had become an enormous military base. Airfields were being set up everywhere for the latest military aircraft purchased by Portugal. More and more troops were being massed in Angola. The situation was becoming increasingly dangerous for the whole of southern Africa, in view of the explosive situation in South West Africa and Rhodesia.... The current military budget of Portugal had increased by 44 per cent, at the expense of public health, education and the small Portuguese taxpayers, who paid the indirect taxes levied on all imported goods in order to finance the war. Portugal was ruined. It had an enormous public debt, which showed the effort that Salazar's war in Angola represented for the Portuguese people."

"... Portugal received weapons from NATO but it also purchased weapons abroad. The Angolan resistance fighters had captured from the enemy weapons made in Israel. Israel had been asked for an explanation. Apparently the weapons had been sold on a kind of 'open market' for weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany, which had in turn sold them to Portugal. The weapons included a Belgian FAL rifle bearing the mark of the Herstal arms factory, Italian grenades, etc. Some of the countries supplying arms to Portugal said that their bilateral agreements with that country stipulated that the arms should not be used against the peoples under Portuguese domination. It was obvious that Portugal was violating those agreements. The Angolan resistance fighters had defused a foreign-made bomb weighing almost 400 kg dropped from an aircraft.... France was still taking orders for warships (especially submarines) and supplying Portugal with helicopters which the Portuguese Air Force used against the maquis."

"... The military agreements concluded between the Governments of Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany were a matter of common knowledge. The important air base at Beja, in southern Portugal, was being used as a base for German Starfighter aircraft, and German instructors were training Portuguese pilots there. The Starfighters had a very long range and were often used in Angola. The military agreements between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany even made provision for Portuguese wounded in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), who were transported to the Federal Republic for treatment in German hospitals. ... He thought the Portuguese forces were assisted by foreign experts. It was difficult to give proof, because the Angolans had not yet killed or captured any. Everyone knew, however, that certain foreign countries were giving Portugal military assistance. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany had given Portugal weapons and aircraft and German experts were training the Portuguese to use them. In addition, the Angolan partisans had reported that, during the fighting, they often heard shouts in a foreign language." (A/AC.109/SR.515, 31 May 1967).

Mr. Matondo, speaking on behalf of the Parti Progressiste angolais (PPA) said that:

"... Portugal had taken up arms against the innocent and unarmed Angolan people. It was supported by NATO, which provided it with the means of fighting against the Angolan people. Angolans were being burned alive by the Portuguese, while others were kept in prisons where they died for lack of medical care. By NATO's wish, Portuguese military training camps had long been established in Angola." (A/AC.109/SR.516, 31 May 1967).

Mr. Mbidi, speaking on behalf of the Union nationale des travailleurs angolais (UNTA), said that:

"... On 29 May 1967 at 2 a.m., the Portuguese army had crossed the border and intruded into Congolese territory as far as the outskirts of Malele, killing one woman, one child and two men and leaving several wounded. The refugees in the area had gone to warn the detachment of some twenty GRAE soldiers stationed there. However, the soldiers had fled, leaving the people defenceless. The Portuguese army had inflicted many casualties. Several of the wounded had been cared for at the hospital at Kisantu, 100 kilometres from Kinshasa. The refugees and the inhabitants of Kimbona, Kimpindi, Mpete, Kiyamgila and Yoyo had abandoned their villages and fled for their lives...."

"The Portuguese Government had established a reign of terror in Angola. It perpetuated its domination with the assistance of its NATO allies, including the United States of America, which had sent into Angola hundreds of thousands of tons of arms, some of which had been manufactured in Israel, and hundreds of military aircraft. The United States had also sent men to officer the Portuguese forces. Some of the large Portuguese companies established in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were also financing the military action in Angola...."

"The United States, United Kingdom and German imperialists, who had made common cause with those who wished to supplant the Portuguese colonialists in Africa, like Israel, were using a handful of Angolan exiles to arrange the kidnapping and murder of patriotic Angolan fighters...."

"He could show an article stating that Portuguese officers were being sent abroad for training in now to wage 'a Viet-Nam type of war'. In 1964, there had been fifty-four United States officers in Angola." (A/AC.109/SR.517, 1 June 1967).

Mr. Pinto-Bull, speaking on behalf of the Front de lutte pour l'indépendance nationale de la Guinée dite portugaise (FLING) said that:

"... It cost Portugal very little to maintain its presence in Guinea (Bissau). Its troops had abandoned the bush and occupied only the important centres, where they were subjected to no serious disturbances. It should, however, be noted that boredom and inaction weighed heavily upon the Portuguese troops, particularly those who were doing their military service. Several deserters had confirmed that the war was not popular with the people and in fact benefited only the career soldiers...."

"FLING called on the Western countries to accept and apply the embargo on arms destined for Portugal, in accordance with Security Council resolution 218 (1965). The assistance which the NATO countries were giving Portugal encouraged the latter to continue flouting United Nations resolutions and violating the Charter, its principles and the right of peoples freely to choose their own future." (A/AC.109/SR.518, 1 June 1967).

Mr. Chata, speaking on behalf of UNIAO Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), said that:

"... Since 1965, Salazar's defence budget had increased steadily and, in 1967, had amounted to £81 million, mainly for its aggressive policies overseas and over half the sum was intended for Angola. With that money it was hiring white lunatics and criminals from South Africa and Rhodesia, armed with weapons from the NATO countries and Israel, to help suppress the African masses in Angola. Defenceless villagers were bombed, their houses smashed by bazookas and hand grenades, and their property stolen or destroyed. Fields were bombed and crops completely ruined. As a result, many thousands of families had been made homeless and forced to live in the bush or flee to Zambia and the Congo. The homeless had no clothes, food or medicine. Those who fled the country were bombed, if spotted before they reached their destination and those who escaped death by bombs but fell into Portuguese hands were shot dead in public to frighten the masses...."

"The Angolan masses would never flinch before NATO-supplied guns or bombs and their march to freedom would continue." (A/AC.109/SR.524, 7 June 1967).

Mr. Neto, speaking on behalf of the Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), said that:

"... The Salazar Government was demanding an extraordinary effort from the Portuguese people in order to continue the war in Angola. As a result of the opening of the south-eastern front, the colonialists had been compelled to increase their total military strength from 50,000 in 1965 to 80,000 in 1967. The period of compulsory military service had been extended from two to four years. All settlers and officials of the colonial administration had to join the colonial civil defence militia. Young people between eighteen and twenty years of age were prohibited from emigrating. Portugal hoped by those means to make certain of having enough soldiers to continue the war in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

"... At the last session the General Assembly and the present session of the Special Committee, the question of the military assistance received by Portugal from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Israel and France, not to mention Rhodesia and South Africa, had been raised repeatedly. An appeal had been made to those countries to halt their aid to the Salazar Government. He hoped that that appeal would be heeded."

"... For some time past the Federal Republic of Germany had been giving Portugal substantial aid in various ways. First of all, there was military aid. Portugal was forced to keep a considerable number of troops in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). At the outset, Portugal had had an army of about 120,000 men. At the present time, it was obliged to spread its troops throughout the Territories fighting to escape its control. It accordingly needed reinforcements, and that was where the Federal Republic of Germany had intervened. In 1965, the Federal Republic of Germany had established a military base at Beja in Portugal. There German advisers and other foreigners were training fliers to handle Portuguese Starfighter aircraft, the supplier of which was not known. The Federal Republic of Germany had sent 17,000 soldiers to Portugal to replace Portuguese troops which were being used to suppress the liberation struggle of the colonized peoples....

"... It also supplied that country with weapons and even, through Brazil, with aircraft."

"... Until about 1955 repressive activities had been directed by the colonial administrators and heads of posts and in the towns by the police. In 1955, PIDE had been established - a political police force which was similar to the one functioning in Portugal but which operated with even greater cruelty in Angola. At the present time, repressive activities were conducted by the administration, PIDE and the militia, a para-military organization composed of men and women settlers mobilized for civil defence. All Portuguese and Angolan officials were required to belong to the militia." (A/AC.109/SR.526, 8 June 1967)

Mr. Gumane, speaking on behalf of Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO), said that:

"... Since 22 October 1965 the barbaric Portuguese régime had intensified its war of genocide in the districts of Tete, Manica e Sofala and Zambezia

arresting, torturing and killing people and burning the villages. Since then over 3,500 innocent and defenceless Africans had been killed by the Portuguese colonial troops, and many thousands were languishing in concentration camps in all parts of Mozambique. As a result, many Mozambicans had fled to Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi to take up refuge in those friendly African countries....

"With the aid received from the NATO Powers and especially the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of Portugal had been able during the past six years to construct twelve new military bases as well as maintain a force of about 46,000 troops in Mozambique. Flying box-cars laden with Portuguese soldiers landed frequently at Lourenço Marques and Beira. Apart from the existing military air bases, civil airfields were being used by the Portuguese air force. Others, some with runways long enough to take jet aircraft and troop carriers, had been and were still being hastily built in the wild inland terrain throughout the country, with the use of African forced labour working from dawn to dusk under the ever-present threat of death. Some 200 bush airstrips had been laid out in the territory, ready for landing troops and other security forces. All troops were armed with the latest automatic rifles, mortars, heavy and light machine-guns and other forms of military equipment supplied to Portugal by its NATO allies. Portuguese farmers working in cottage communities in rural areas could freely buy sub-machine-guns or rifles and revolvers at their local stores and ammunition, too, was readily available to white settlers. In view of Portugal's colonial policy, the aid being supplied to Portugal, mainly by NATO Powers, could only increase its determination further to enslave and exterminate the Africans.

"In carrying out its oppressive policies, the colonial Government of Portugal was also backed up by the fascist Government of South Africa and the white minority rebel Government of Rhodesia, led by Ian Smith, which were also bent on the further enslavement of the African people, their principal aim being to suppress the liberation movements of Africa and entrench colonialism and imperialism. Through agreements between the three colonial Governments, Mozambicans living in South Africa and Rhodesia were being kidnapped by the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) with the assistance of Vorster and Smith....

"The twelve military bases were also used by South African and Southern Rhodesian forces and the South African Government had recently sent in troops to be trained in guerrilla fighting. The air bases were primarily used by the South African and Southern Rhodesian air forces, which also used the civil air base at Lourenço Marques when training nearby. He had also heard from Portuguese deserters that, about a month previously, South African and Southern Rhodesian forces had been in action against the combatants in the Tete district. The bases could certainly also be used by the NATO Powers, because Mozambique was considered a Portuguese province and all the NATO allies had the right to overfly and use bases in each other's territory.... Soldiers from the Federal Republic of Germany had been sent to Portugal and some were being used in Mozambique as technicians. It had been reported

that Spain also was sending technicians. Ian Smith was in contact with the Portuguese Government and South Africa....

"There had been many deaths after the Tete uprising when the villagers had been rounded up by troops. Some had been shot when crossing the Zambesi river and others kept for days in a concentration camp without food. Many members of political parties had been shot and their leaders taken in military aircraft to the Lourenço Marques concentration camp. In February 1966, thirty-five people had been shot, their bodies thrown into a pit and burnt. People were dying daily in the forests and mountains from untended bullet wounds; many refugees arrived in Zambia wounded, including a boy of fourteen who had to have a bullet removed from his leg on arrival. Men, women and children were all shot indiscriminately and the treatment of prisoners in the concentration camps was no different from that in the German camps during the Second World War; it might, if anything, be worse." (A/AC.109/SR.526, 8 June 1967)

Mr. Matsihe, speaking on behalf of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), said that:

"... Portugal had recently instituted a military tribunal to try a number of Mozambican patriots accused of being members of the FRELIMO at the Portuguese army headquarters in Mozambique, under the chairmanship of Colonel Almor Baptista, assisted by an all-white jury of senior Portuguese army officers. The accused had not been prisoners of war, but thirteen Mozambican patriots accused of being members of FRELIMO. Their only crime had been that they were members of a nationalist movement."

"... In 1966, a group of Portuguese soldiers had arrested the Paramount Chief of the district of Maniamba, in Niassa Province, and had accused him of being a member of FRELIMO and of harbouring guerrillas. In an attempt to extract the information they wanted, they had beaten and tortured him, to no avail. They had then buried him alive up to the neck and had threatened to let him die of suffocation if he did not speak, but even that had not frightened him into giving any useful information. Hours later, however, he had begun to weaken, and fearing that his end was near he had decided to talk. The Portuguese soldiers had dug him out and with his last breath he had confessed that he was a member of FRELIMO because he was convinced that it would liberate Mozambique. He had told his torturers that they could do what they liked with him, but it would not alter the fact that Mozambique would be free, for the people would fight until the Portuguese left the land. With those words, he had collapsed and died." (A/AC.109/SR.532, 13 June 1967)

Mr. Mutaca, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that:

"... In Cabo Delgado and Niassa Districts, commercial activities had had to be drastically curtailed when the armed struggle had begun. The Portuguese colonial army would not allow any commercial relations between freedom fighters and Portuguese or Asian traders. Consequently, whenever the armed struggle had begun in any province or district, the Portuguese authorities had ordered the closure of business establishments except for those directly serving the military." (A/AC.109/SR.532, 13 June 1967)

Mr. Mondlane and other petitioners, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that:

"... The people in the liberated areas were in great need of social services of all kinds, including medical services. When the Portuguese army had been forced to retreat, the official health services, administrative services, schools and missionary institutions had been withdrawn. Immediately after the beginning of the armed struggle in some areas, the Portuguese administrative centres and mission stations had been turned into garrisons for the Portuguese army, and any medical services which had remained had been reserved for wounded soldiers....

"The Portuguese troops and police dropped objects resembling bombs, intending to frighten the people and make them surrender but, in fact, they merely encouraged them to go into the forests and join the freedom fighters....

"The Portuguese army sometimes occupied large farms and mission stations. Where the administrative organization under the control of the freedom fighters worked successfully in the free zones, the Portuguese army was very careful not to interfere....

"It was significant that, in 1964, the Portuguese Government had been forced, for the first time, to appoint a soldier as Governor-General. It had already done so in Angola in 1961 and in Guinea (Bissau) in 1963. In no case had any such military Governor-General remained in office for more than two years. In any country, the budget was the most sensitive indicator. The Portuguese budget for 1967 provided for a 25 per cent increase over 1966 for the administration of the overseas 'provinces'. Of a budget of £252 million, £98 million had been earmarked for the colonial wars. The 120,000 men of the Portuguese armed forces in the Territories under Portuguese administration were to cost £43,750,000 in 1967, as against £31 million in 1966....

"In the southern half of the country, people were constantly being harassed by the police and the army. It was estimated that some 10,000 people had been arrested or had disappeared, thirteen of whom had been brought before the courts....

"The Portuguese had made every attempt to annihilate FRELIMO members and had been prepared to destroy whole villages in order to be certain of wiping out FRELIMO leaders whom they knew to be among the general population. The police were ubiquitous in those areas. No meetings of more than five people were permitted....

"Portugal was steadily expanding military establishments in Mozambique in response to the increased activities of the liberation movement. Every three months or so, the Portuguese Government had to vote a supplementary appropriation to meet the rising cost of the war. About a year ago, the number of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique had been about 16,000; now it was approximately 65,000, although the Portuguese Government admitted to only 45,000. But besides the army, there were some 15,000 police; and there was also a so-called volunteer corps consisting of practically all adult

white settlers and any Africans who could be persuaded or coerced to join them. Recently, the term of service of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique had been increased from two to three or four years, depending on the needs of the situation.

"There were about 1,000 detainees in prisons or concentration camps in Mozambique. The number was not larger because, when freedom fighters were captured by the Portuguese, they were mostly killed outright. There were two types of concentration camps: regular concentration camps in areas dominated by the Portuguese, and so-called 'protected villages' in areas where the liberation movement was active. Those were villages surrounded by barbed-wire and minefields, the inhabitants of which were guarded by soldiers and escorted by them to work in the fields. The villages had practically no assistance from outside; there were no schools or medical services and villagers were not allowed to leave the villages. Most of the crops grown were used to supply the Portuguese army. In southern Mozambique there was a notorious concentration camp at Babana in which some seventy-five leaders of the liberation movement were imprisoned....

"Portugal was too weak to carry on a war in its colonies without outside support. As a member of the European community, it encouraged countries to send journalists and politicians on so-called fact-finding missions; they subsequently wrote articles and made speeches giving a biased view of the conditions there. The NATO Powers had pointed out that aid provided under the NATO system should not be used south of the Tropic of Cancer. That might technically be correct; Portugal might not be using equipment supplied by NATO in Africa, but the fact that it was able to use it in its own country freed Portuguese equipment for use elsewhere. It also received indirect aid from banks, and European-owned companies based in Portugal were manufacturing weapons which could be freely used. The NATO countries said that weapons should be examined to check the serial numbers, so that a protest could, if necessary, be made to Portugal, but that was almost impossible in guerrilla warfare. Arms might also be manufactured by another country under a NATO patent. There was, in any case, no restriction on the use of NATO-trained personnel. Specialized training was being given in counter-guerrilla techniques and the Portuguese officers who completed those courses were immediately sent to serve in Africa. One of the Portuguese doctors working in the free zone's health services had originally been sent to Africa as a doctor in the Portuguese army. He had travelled on a mission to Lisbon on a NATO passport, had been transported in a NATO ship to London, and, once there, had decided against returning to Africa to fight against his brothers. The Ghana Mission in London had then helped him to return via Accra to Mozambique, where he had joined the liberation movement....

"Portugal's NATO allies were a great source of material support to it. Since NATO troops had been removed from France, a new naval base had been built in Portugal and had been inaugurated on 23 February 1967. United Kingdom, United States and Netherlands forces had attended the inaugural ceremonies. That was further evidence of Western approval of Portuguese policy in Africa...."

"... Eight bombers were delivered to the Portuguese by the United States Central Intelligence Agency early in 1966. The pilot, a United Kingdom national named John Hall, had been arrested in the United States and accused of flying military aircraft without the authorization of the United States Government. The action by the United States Court, however, had been independent of the Government because of the division of power between Congress and the Judiciary. Early in 1967, the pilot had been acquitted after he had explained that he had been working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Surprise at his acquittal had been expressed by many newspapers in various parts of the world....

"There were between 15,000 and 16,000 soldiers who came for a minimum of two years and then returned to Portugal."

"... All their statements regarding military help to Portugal applied to the Federal Republic of Germany and not to the German Democratic Republic." (A/AC.109/SR.532, 13 June 1967)

APPENDIX XI

SOUTHERN RHODESIA: EXTRACTS FROM PETITIONER'S STATEMENTS IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1965, 1966 AND 1967

Mr. Shamuyarira, a petitioner from Southern Rhodesia, said that:

"... Among the steps taken by the Smith Government to promote its dream of a white Southern Africa were the encouragement of white immigration to Southern Rhodesia, joint army and police training exercises, the construction of a direct railway line between Salisbury and Pretoria, and the preparations to sign a defence pact with South Africa, Mozambique and Angola.... The nationalist movement had considered that the arms from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be transferred to the United Kingdom Government and had opposed their transfer to the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The Ghanaian representative had brought the matter up in the Security Council, but the United Kingdom Government had vetoed the resolution intended to prevent the transfer. The present United Kingdom Government had done little, if anything, to control the use of those armaments." (A/AC.109/SR.325, 19 April 1965)

Mr. Nyandoro, speaking on behalf of the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), said that:

"... The British attitude had been demonstrated by the statement of a Member of Parliament recently that it would be justifiable to send British troops to Rhodesia to protect the Kariba dam and power plant, but not prevent the entrenchment of the minority regime.... The country was virtually in a state of emergency and there was a dangerous atmosphere of tension. Government troops were deployed all over the country, and arms were being stored in European farms for quick access.... It was common knowledge that the Rhodesian Government was being provided with planes and military supplies by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal and South Africa and that the United Kingdom chose to ignore the fact that the Smith Government was negotiating military agreements with Portugal under the pretext of trade discussions." (A/AC.109/SR.340, 26 May 1965).

"... As for the political and military relations between the Southern Rhodesian Government and the Governments of South Africa and Portugal, the alliance between them was an open secret. It was known that the Government of Southern Rhodesia realized that a unilateral declaration of independence would be followed by economic chaos and had made arrangements with the South African Government to bring in South African troops, wearing the uniforms of the Southern Rhodesian Army, to help suppress any African uprising. The white minority would thus be free to continue in their management of the economy. It was useless for the United Kingdom Government to disclaim knowledge of such agreements for which it must be held directly

responsible. A general in the Southern Rhodesian Army had been promptly dismissed for stating that he would not support rebellion by Mr. Smith's Government, but the United Kingdom Government had done nothing...

"The United Kingdom was the largest contributor of assistance to the Southern Rhodesian Army. Not only did the United Kingdom Government underwrite any loans undertaken by Mr. Smith's Government, it also arranged for the latter to borrow money on the London market, which it was unable to do directly through intermediary companies. The Federal Republic of Germany was the next largest contributor, supplying not only arms but also pilots and experts in guerrilla warfare to help train the Southern Rhodesian Army. Portugal, too, was supplying arms; and there was every probability that NATO weapons were arriving in Southern Rhodesia through Mozambique." (A/AC.109/SR.341, 26 May 1965).

Mr. Mukono, speaking on behalf of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), said that:

"... Britain had apportioned the bulk of the army and air force to Southern Rhodesia at the break-up of the Federation. Britain continued to supply military equipment to the minority settler régime.... Arms were being supplied continuously by the United Kingdom. They were also supplied by Portugal, which was a member of NATO, by South Africa and by the United States of America.... He confirmed that the Federal Republic of Germany was not only supplying arms to Southern Rhodesia but had also sent experts in anti-guerrilla warfare. He himself had heard members of the white police boasting that their methods and tactics against the Africans were those used in South Africa and Nazi Germany. Eighteen specialists had arrived in April to train the Southern Rhodesian Army in Nazi tactics." (A/AC.109/SR.342, 27 May 1965)

Mr. Silundika, speaking on behalf of the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), said that:

"... Although the settlers were well armed and commanded a force of nearly 40,000 men, the Africans were determined not to accept anything less than the total surrender of their country and the total dissolution of the settler instruments of oppression.... It had been learnt that a Japanese company had recently sold tear-gas to the Smith régime for use against Africans and that Turkey had not only sold arms, but a Turkish guerrilla expert was training the settler forces in anti-guerrilla warfare." (A/AC.109/SR.423, 27 May 1966)

Mr. Chihota, speaking on behalf of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), said that:

"... The Rhodesian problem remained a threat to world peace. The battles being fought within the country, the involvement in British sanctions of such countries as Zambia, the threat of military invasion of Zambia and neighbouring territories by the settlers, the support provided by South Africa and Portugal to the settlers in Southern Rhodesia, were all factors contributing to the gravity of the situation and to the threat to peace in Africa and the world." (A/AC.109/SR.424, 30 May 1966)

Mr. Silundika, Secretary for Publicity and Information, Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), said that:

"... The régime had continued to expand its armed forces, on which it had spent in 1966 a total of £11 million - an increase of £5 million over 1965. In that connexion, the international conspiracy in support of the régime was very evident: military experts from the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey and Taiwan had been brought in to train the régime's armed forces in their war preparations against the African masses of Zimbabwe. The Rhodesian army was equipped largely with United Kingdom arms, for which spares continued to pour in. Under the alliance between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, there was an interchange of security officers for various operations. South African regular troops had been brought in to reinforce the régime's offensive line along the Zambezi border. Between 19 and 23 March 1967, 525 South African soldiers had entered Southern Rhodesia in civilian clothes and changed into uniform at Bulawayo before being sent to points on the Southern Rhodesian side of the border with Zambia. Of that number, 225 under Colonel Dries Kotzenberg were stationed near Chirundu, and the remaining 300, led by Daan Pretorius, were in the Zambezi Valley. In addition, five South African army officers had been seconded to the Southern Rhodesian armed forces during the first three weeks of April: Colonels J.A. du Plooy, H.F. van der Spuy and T.M.C. Diederichs, and Commanders M. Rupert and H.P. Brand. During the same period, 317 South African recruits had entered the Salisbury Police Training Depot for paramilitary training for the Southern Rhodesian fascist minority dictatorship."

"... The Southern Rhodesian problem could only be solved by force. The members were aware of the support being given to the Southern Rhodesian army by a number of countries, particularly those of the NATO bloc, to enable it to entrench the racist policy. Since force could only be eliminated by force, those countries able and willing to assist could help by making equipment available to carry on the armed fight. It should be understood that the people of Zambia were threatened not only by the crippling of their economy, but were also faced with bayonets from South Africa and Angola."

"... The Southern Rhodesian régime had inherited almost the entire military equipment of the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Most items were of United Kingdom make, though some had also been supplied by the United States. Since the unilateral declaration Southern Rhodesia had continued to receive arms through Portugal, whose supplies came from NATO countries, and through South Africa, assisted by the Federal Republic of Germany. Spares from the United Kingdom were still being received. Japan and Turkey had also furnished supplies, and the United Kingdom was continuing to do so through a factory in Brussels." (A/AC.109/SR.521, 5 June 1967)

Mr. Chitepo, speaking on behalf of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), said that:

"... This was not only a racist régime but a military one also. In addition to the regular white army of 25,000 men (including reserves) the whole civilian white population was undergoing military training. All white

men between eighteen and fifty-five years of age were liable to conscription. All white Rhodesians were armed, even the women. Every policeman had unrestricted powers to arrest on suspicion."

"... It was common knowledge that the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa were providing military assistance in the form of experts to Southern Rhodesia. According to information available to his organization, since the inception of armed resistance, Japan had been invited and had agreed to send experts in guerrilla warfare to help the rebels in Southern Rhodesia; it had also sent experts in steel and iron manufacture."
(A/AC.109/SR.523, 6 June 1967).

CHAPTER V

QUESTION OF SENDING VISITING MISSIONS TO TERRITORIES

I. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. At its 594th meeting, on 1 April 1968, the Special Committee, by approving the thirty-fourth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.454/Rev.1) decided, inter alia, to take up the question of sending visiting missions to Territories as a separate item. The Committee further decided that the item should be considered at its plenary meetings and, as appropriate, by Sub-Committees I, II and III. By the same decision, the Committee, with a view to facilitating its consideration of the item, authorized its Chairman to request the administering Powers concerned to furnish at an early date information concerning the steps envisaged by them in implementation of paragraph 18 of General Assembly resolution 2326 (XXII) of 16 December 1967.
2. The Special Committee considered this item at its 630th, 632nd, 633rd, 635th and 636th meetings, between 5 and 19 September 1968.
3. In its consideration of the item, the Special Committee was guided by operative paragraph 18 of the above-mentioned resolution, by which the General Assembly urged the administering Powers "to co-operate with the Special Committee by permitting access to the colonial Territories by visiting missions, in accordance with the decisions previously taken by the General Assembly and the Special Committee". The Special Committee also took into account other resolutions of the General Assembly, particularly resolution 2357 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, by operative paragraph 5 of which the General Assembly urged "the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance".
4. During its consideration of the item, the Special Committee had before it a report by its Chairman (see annex to the present chapter) submitted on 19 August in accordance with the decision referred to in paragraph 1 above. In that report were reproduced the substantive portions of the communications sent by the administering Powers in response to identical letters addressed to them by the Chairman requesting the information desired by the Special Committee.
5. Statements concerning the item were made by the representatives of India at the 630th meeting, on 5 September (A/AC.109/SR.630), and by the representatives of Iraq, Australia, Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Syria and the Ivory Coast and by the Chairman of the 632nd meeting, on 11 September (A/AC.109/SR.632).
6. At its 633rd meeting, on 13 September, the representatives of Iraq and the Ivory Coast introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.497), which was finally sponsored by the following members: Afghanistan, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia (A/AC.109/L.497/Rev.1).

7. At the same meeting, statements on the draft resolution were made by the representatives of Afghanistan, Mali, Iraq, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Ivory Coast, Tunisia and Bulgaria (A/AC.109/SR.633).
8. At the 635th meeting, on 18 September, the representative of Sierra Leone, on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution submitted the following revisions to the text of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.497): (a) Replace, in the third preambular paragraph, the words "tended to impede" by the word "impeded"; (b) Delete the fifth preambular paragraph, which read: "Noting that the administering Powers have stressed that the United Nations decisions concerning colonial Territories should be based on a fully informed and realistic appreciation of the situation in the Territories under their administration".
9. At its 636th meeting, on 19 September, the Special Committee adopted the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.497/Rev.1), by 18 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.
10. At the same meeting, statements in explanation of vote were made by the representatives of the United States of America, Finland, Australia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/AC.109/SR.636).
11. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/298) is reproduced in section II below.
12. On 25 September, copies of the resolution were transmitted to the Permanent Representatives of the administering Powers for the attention of their Governments.
13. In addition to the consideration of this item at plenary meetings of the Special Committee, as described above, Sub-Committees I, II and III, in considering the specific Territories referred to them, took into account the provisions of the General Assembly resolutions mentioned in paragraph 3 above concerning the question of sending visiting missions to Territories, as well as previous decisions of the Special Committee relating to the item.
14. Subsequently, the Special Committee in adopting the following reports of Sub-Committees I, II and III, endorsed a number of conclusions and recommendations, as indicated below, concerning the sending of visiting missions to specific Territories.

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Concerning</u>	<u>Relevant paragraph</u>
I	Establishment, Organization and Activities of the Special Committee	annex __, para. 4
XII	Seychelles and St. Helena	section II, para. 5 (g)
XVIII	Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands	section II, para. 10
XIX	Niue and Tokelau Islands	section II, para. 6
XX	New Hebrides	section II, para. 7
XXI	American Samoa and Guam	section II, para. 8
XXII	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	section II, para. 8
XXVI	Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent	section II, para. 8
XXVII	United States Virgin Islands	section II, para. 9
XXVIII	Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, Cayman Islands and Montserrat	section II A, para. 6; section II B, para. 7

II. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 636th meeting on 19 September 1968

The Special Committee,

Recalling that in its resolutions 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966 and 2326 (XXII) of 16 December 1967, as well as other pertinent resolutions, the General Assembly approved the sending of visiting missions to Territories and requested the administering Powers to co-operate in this regard by permitting such missions to visit the Territories under their administration,

Noting with deep regret that the responses of the administering Powers to these requests, as indicated in the report of the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (see annex) continue to be negative or qualified in character,

Convinced that the unco-operative attitudes of the administering Powers concerned towards the sending of visiting missions by the Special Committee have impeded the efforts of the Committee to assist in the full, speedy and effective implementation of the Declaration,

Bearing in mind that previous United Nations visiting missions have played a constructive role in assisting Territories to achieve speedy independence in conditions of peace and stability;

1. Reaffirms the vital importance of visiting missions as a means of securing adequate and first-hand information regarding political, economic and social conditions in Territories and as to the views, wishes and aspirations of the people;

2. Strongly urges the administering Powers to reconsider their attitudes towards the sending of visiting missions by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to permit access by such missions to Territories under their administration;

3. Requests its Chairman to enter into consultations with the administering Powers with regard to the implementation of paragraph 2 of the present resolution and to report thereon as appropriate to the Special Committee.

ANNEX*

QUESTION OF SENDING VISITING MISSIONS TO TERRITORIES

Report of the Chairman

1. At its 594th meeting, on 1 April 1968, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, by adopting the thirty-fourth report of the Working Group, decided, inter alia, to "authorize the Chairman to request the administering Powers concerned to furnish at an early date information concerning the steps envisaged by them in implementation of operative paragraph 18 of General Assembly resolution 2326 (XXII)", which reads as follows:

"18. Urges the administering Powers to co-operate with the Special Committee by permitting access to the colonial Territories by visiting missions, in accordance with decisions previously taken by the General Assembly and by the Special Committee."

2. Accordingly, the Chairman, on 18 April, addressed identical letters to the Permanent Representative of France, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America and to the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Portugal requesting at an early date the information desired by the Special Committee in order to enable him to report to the Committee without delay.

3. In these letters the Chairman recalled that in operative paragraph 4 of the above-mentioned resolution, the General Assembly approved the programme of work by the Special Committee during 1968, including the sending of visiting missions. The Chairman further recalled that the Committee's programme of work in this regard was set out as follows in its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session:

"328. In the section of this chapter concerning visiting missions and in the chapters of the present report relating to the small Territories, the Special Committee has set out recommendations with regard to the sending of visiting missions, to which it attaches special importance, and the establishment of a United Nations presence in connexion with the exercise by the peoples concerned of the right to self-determination. It is the intention of the Special Committee to pursue these recommendations during 1968 and to continue to seek the co-operation of the administering Powers in that endeavour. In particular the Committee proposes, subject to any decision the General Assembly might take in that regard, to despatch visiting missions to the Territories in the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas, and to certain of the Territories in Africa." a/

* Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/296.

a/ A/6700 (part I).

4. By a letter dated 3 May, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, in acknowledging the Chairman's letter, stated that it had been forwarded to his Government and that he would write to the Chairman when he received his Government's reply.

5. By a letter dated 6 May, the Foreign Minister of Portugal addressed a reply to the Chairman's letter, in which he stated, inter alia, as follows:

"As you are well aware, the Government of Portugal has formally reserved its position in regard to the above-mentioned resolution [General Assembly resolution 2326 (XXII)] as well as to resolution 1514 (XV) and to all the other recommendations of the General Assembly based on it. These include the recommendation setting up the Special Committee of Twenty-four, which the Government of Portugal, for reasons placed on record by its delegation, has never recognized as a body constituted on a legally valid basis. Consistent with this position, the Government of Portugal would be unable to co-operate with the Committee, even if there were, as far as Portugal is concerned, a case for extending to it the kind of co-operation which has been requested. No such case exists."

6. By a letter dated 24 May, the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations, addressed a reply to the Chairman's letter in which he stated, inter alia, as follows:

"I have been instructed to recall the terms of our response to a similar request made last year and to affirm that the views of the New Zealand Government remain as then stated.

"Last year we observed that it had been New Zealand's consistently held view that United Nations visiting missions may often have a constructive role to play in the development of non-self-governing territories and particularly in verifying, on behalf of the international community, acts of self-determination. It was noted, in this regard, that the people of Niue and the Tokelaus may well wish to exercise their right to self-determination in the relatively near future.

"The reply concluded with the expression of view that it might appear to be paying undue attention to two of the smallest territories on the non-self-governing list if a mission were to be sent exclusively to Niue and the Tokelaus. The New Zealand Government accordingly felt at that time and still feels that it would be appropriate for a United Nations mission to visit the Tokelaus and Niue at this stage only if such a visit were to form part of a more comprehensive tour of the area."

7. By a letter dated 24 July, the Acting Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed a reply to the Chairman's letter in which he stated, inter alia, as follows:

"I wish to inform you that the Australian Government has given consideration to your letter concerning the despatch of visiting missions of the Special Committee to dependent Territories, and has directed me to inform you that it does not consider that it would be desirable for missions from the Committee to visit Territories under its administration.

"In so doing I wish to note that Australia did not vote in support of General Assembly resolution 2326 (XXII) of which operative paragraph 18 is quoted in your letter, and to state that the Australian Government reserves its position about visiting missions of the Special Committee in general.

"The Australian Government also wishes to note that it has provided detailed information to the United Nations about the Territories under its administration in accordance with Articles 73 and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations and that these Territories are already the subject of examination and review by the General Assembly and its Committees and special committees. In addition, the Trust Territory of New Guinea, which forms an administrative union with the Territory of Papua, is the subject of regular examination and review by the Trusteeship Council, and periodic missions which the Council sends to the Territory. The recent thirty-fifth session of the Trusteeship Council received a report from a visiting mission which toured the Trust Territory earlier this year, and both the mission's report and the subsequent report of the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly are available to other members of the United Nations."

8. In a letter dated 30 July, the Acting Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, further to the letter to which reference is made in paragraph 4 above, stated, inter alia, as follows:

"I now have the honour to inform you, on instructions, that the United Kingdom Government's position with regard to visiting missions to Territories under its administration remains as stated in Sir Roger Jackling's letter of 26 May 1966, to the Chairman of the Special Committee. Sir Roger Jackling's letter was circulated as a document of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/171 of 14 June 1966)."

9. By a letter dated 5 August, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States addressed a reply to the Chairman's letter, in which he stated, inter alia, as follows:

"With reference to your letter of April 18, 1968, concerning visiting missions to United States Territories, I wish to inform you that the position of the United States Government remains as communicated to the Chairman of Sub-Committees II and III last year, in letters dated 6 April and 26 April 1967, respectively. The United States remains of the view that visiting missions to these Territories are not warranted at the present time. I am informed by the Department of State that if such missions were to be proposed for this year, the United States Government would in all likelihood not be in a position to accept."

10. Further reports by the Chairman on this question will as necessary be issued as addenda to the present document.
