

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/3698
11 October 1957

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Twelfth session
Agenda item 44

SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF
THE UNITED NATIONS

Report of the Fifth Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Jaime de PINIES (Spain)

1. At a series of meetings held between 30 September and 9 October 1957 (599th to 604th meetings), the Fifth Committee considered, under agenda item 44, the following two questions:
 - (a) The assessment of the States admitted to membership in the United Nations at the eleventh session of the General Assembly [namely, (in the order of admission) Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Japan and Ghana];
 - (b) The scale of assessments for Members' contributions to the United Nations budget for the financial year 1958.
2. These questions had been carried over from the eleventh session by decision of the General Assembly taken on 27 February 1957 on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee. The circumstances which led to that decision are described in documents A/3549 (paras. 15-21 and 36-48)^{1/} and A/C.5/708.

Initial phase of discussion

3. At the opening of the discussion in the Fifth Committee, the Chairman pointed out that consideration of the questions outstanding from the eleventh session was intended to provide the basis upon which the Committee on Contributions might proceed at its October session. It would therefore be preferable to deal at that

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 46.

preliminary stage rather with the principles inherent in the two questions than with particular elements of the scale of assessments.

4. The representative of the United States of America submitted a draft resolution (A/C.5/L.458)^{2/} which provided, in the operative paragraphs, that the General Assembly should decide as follows:

(a) In principle, the maximum contribution of any Member State to the ordinary expenses of the United Nations should not exceed 30 per cent of the total;

(b) The percentage contributions fixed by the Committee on Contributions for Japan, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia for 1956 and 1957, and for Ghana and the Federation of Malaya for 1957 should constitute miscellaneous income of the United Nations;

(c) The Committee on Contributions should take the following steps in preparing the scales of assessment for 1958 and subsequent years:

- (1) The percentage contributions fixed by the Committee on Contributions for Ghana, Japan, the Federation of Malaya,^{3/} Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia for 1958 should be incorporated into the 100 per cent scale for 1958. This incorporation should be accomplished by applying the total amount of the percentage contributions of those six Member States to: (a) a reduction in the percentage contribution of the highest contributor - but in no event to a reduction below 30 per cent; and (b) to consequential reductions in the rate of contribution of those Member States affected by the application of the per capita ceiling principle. Such reductions should not affect the assessment percentage of other Member States in the 1958 scale;
- (2) In establishing scales of assessments for subsequent years, the Committee on Contributions should complete the reduction of the contribution of the highest contributor to 30 per cent by the application thereto, to the extent necessary, of contribution percentages fixed for additional Member States which may be admitted, and by the application thereto of any increases in the percentage

^{2/} As amended by document A/C.5/L.459.

^{3/} Admitted to membership on 17 September 1957.

contributions of Member States which may be found necessary by the Committee on Contributions because of increases in relative national income. The percentage contributions of Member States should not be increased for years subsequent to 1958 because of the provisions of this resolution, that is, solely for the purpose of reducing the percentage contribution of the highest contributor to 30 per cent.

5. The considerations which the United States representative advanced in favour of his proposal are summarized below:

(a) The General Assembly decided in 1946 to apportion the regular expenses of the United Nations among the Members broadly according to capacity to pay. By using the word "broadly" the Assembly recognized that capacity to pay should not be the sole criterion in fixing the scale of assessments. Thus, in December 1946, the initial assessment of the United States was set at 39.89 per cent - a figure far below its actual relative capacity. By that decision the Assembly established that, in addition to capacity to pay, the size of the membership of the United Nations and the sovereign equality of its Members were factors of importance in determining a maximum rate of contribution.

(b) In 1948, when the Organization comprised fifty-eight Members, the General Assembly accepted the principle of a ceiling to be fixed on the contribution rate of the Member State bearing the highest assessment and concurrently recognized that in normal times no one Member should contribute more than one-third of the ordinary expenses of the United Nations. The application, however, of that principle was deferred until the financial year 1954, by which time the number of Members had risen to sixty.

(c) The admission in 1955 of sixteen new Members, representing an increase in membership of more than 25 per cent, was an important new development. It was the position of the United States that, if the scale of assessments for the years 1956-1958 was equitable in December 1955, when the scale was approved by the General Assembly, the contributions of the sixteen new Members (amounting to a total of 6.36 per cent) should have been incorporated into the scale of assessments by means of a pro rata reduction in the contributions of all Member States: that procedure alone could have ensured

that the scale remained equitable. Instead, the General Assembly decided in 1956 to exclude the United States from the pro rata reduction granted to all other Member States with the exception of those assessed at the minimum. The effect of that decision was that, independently of the size of the membership, the ceiling of $33 \frac{1}{3}$ per cent became in fact a floor for the highest contributor. It was therefore essential, in the opinion of the United States delegation, that the latter point should be clarified, since it could hardly have been the intention of the General Assembly, when accepting the ceiling principle in 1948, to produce such a result, but rather to admit the possibility of reducing the assessment of the highest contributor below the figure of $33 \frac{1}{3}$ per cent.

(d) The United States was not seeking to reverse the General Assembly's decision of 1956. Its draft resolution had reference solely to the future and involved a modification in only one of the four basic principles governing the scale of assessments, namely, the principle of a ceiling on the contribution rate of the Member bearing the highest assessment.

(e) There were two tasks before the Fifth Committee: (i) to instruct the Committee on Contributions on the method of establishing a recommended scale of assessments for 1958, and in particular on the manner of incorporating into the 100 per cent scale the contributions (estimated at between 2.1 and 2.5 per cent) of the six Members admitted to the United Nations during the eleventh and twelfth sessions of the General Assembly; and (ii) to instruct the Committee on Contributions with regard to the principles which it should take into consideration when recommending at its 1958 session a scale of assessments for the three-year period 1959 to 1961.

(f) The United States proposal was designed to reduce in principle the ceiling from $33 \frac{1}{3}$ to 30 per cent, and to lay down a procedure whereby the full reduction would be made in several stages: in the first instance, the highest contributor, as well as Member States affected by the per capita principle, would benefit from the incorporation into the assessment scale of the contributions of the six new Member States; subsequently, the admission of other Members or increases in the national income of existing Members would serve to complete the proposed reduction of $3 \frac{1}{3}$ per cent.

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(g) The principal grounds on which the United States proposal rested were the following:

- (i) Since January 1954 the number of Members had risen by more than 35 per cent, from sixty to eighty-two. Broader representation of the peoples of the world should be accompanied by a broader sharing of responsibilities. In fact, however, the General Assembly had decided otherwise in December 1956 (resolution 1087 (XI)): while maintaining the assessment of the highest contributor at 33 1/3 per cent, the Assembly had apportioned the remaining 66 2/3 per cent of expenses among seventy-five Member States, as compared with the number of fifty-nine in preceding years. In an organization of equals, responsibility was not compatible with too heavy a reliance on any one Member, nor, as a corollary, did it seem just to ease the financial burden of all save the highest contributor;
- (ii) The contributions of the twenty-two Member States admitted to the United Nations since January 1954 would amount to a total of about 9 per cent, and account should be taken of that proportion in determining the maximum rate of contribution.

6. The representative of the Union of South Africa explained why his delegation could neither depart from the position it had taken at the eleventh session, nor in consequence give support to the United States proposal. The basic principles governing the scale of assessments being interdependent, a change in any one of those principles would upset the balance of the system, and might induce changes in some or all of the remaining principles with the object of redressing the balance. At present, national income formed the broad basis of the scale, subject to the adjustments specified in directives which the Committee on Contributions had previously received and which should be maintained, namely (a) an allowance for low per capita income; (b) a minimum percentage; (c) a maximum percentage; and (d) the per capita ceiling adjustment. Those four criteria included elements - the maximum percentage and per capita ceiling principles - that had no relation to capacity to pay. A reduction in the percentage of the highest contributor would entail a number of consequences: first, the assessments of Member States which benefit from the maximum percentage and per capita ceiling principles would be

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still further removed from their capacity to pay figure, which was and should remain a basic criterion of assessment; secondly, the burden of the reduction would be shifted to the lower-income group of Members, and specifically to those not assessed at fixed percentages; thirdly, in the event that the latter group sought and obtained relief through an increase in the already liberal allowance for low per capita income, the burden would fall on the middle-income group - such a contingency was not desirable since that group was bearing a disproportionate share of the assessments and, were it therefore to insist on relief, that end could be attained only by raising the minimum percentage or decreasing the allowance for low per capita income. Such a solution would presumably not be acceptable to the lower-income group of Member States.

7. The South African representative added that, while he realized that the United States proposal was not prompted by financial considerations, its financial implications for the other Member States could not be disregarded. He illustrated these by means of calculations showing the adverse effect of the proposed change on the assessments of States with a per capita income of some \$300 per annum, and pointed out that there would be an even heavier impact in the case of States with a per capita income above \$300 and not subject to the ceiling principle, whereas the largest contributor, with a per capita income six times as large and a national income constituting over 40 per cent of the total for all Member States would - on an assessment of 30 per cent - receive an allowance well in excess of 25 per cent. On those grounds the South African delegation was unable to support operative paragraphs (a) and (c) (1) of the draft resolution. As regards paragraph (b), the proposal to treat the contributions of six new Members as miscellaneous income seemed open to question, and particularly since four of those Members, having reached the second year of their membership, might be regarded as entitled to early incorporation in a 100 per cent scale. The correct method of apportioning the expenses of the Organization among the Members was through the incorporation of all Members in the scale. Finally, operative paragraph (c) (2) was unacceptable since, unlike the preceding paragraphs - the purpose of which was to utilize only the contributions of new Members in reduction of those of the highest contributor and Member States affected by the per capita ceiling principle - it contemplated

utilizing, to the extent necessary, the percentage increases of Member States at present paying variable contributions. It was the view of the South African delegation that, on the contrary, any increase in the percentage of Members within the latter group should be applied in reduction of the assessments of other Members within the same group which qualified for a decreased rate of contribution.

8. The interventions recorded in paragraphs 4 to 7 above broadly represented the two principal positions taken in the Fifth Committee on the question at issue. Accordingly, the remainder of the present report is largely confined to the additional points advanced in support of one or other of those positions, to the amendments offered to the draft resolution, and to a record of the voting. The views of the various delegations are set forth in the official records of the Fifth Committee, 599th to 604th meetings.

9. The representative of Spain proposed an amendment (A/C.5/L.460) to the draft resolution (A/C.5/L.458) in the form of the following addition to the second sentence of paragraph (c) (1):

"and (c) to any reductions in the contributions of other Member States which may be recommended by the Committee on Contributions as a result of its review, at its session commencing 15 October 1957, of appeals from recommendations made previously by that Committee."

10. The representative of Cuba considered that the United States proposal was in principle deserving of support. At the eleventh session virtually all Member States, with the exception of those at the ceiling and the floor, had been granted reductions in their assessments upon the admission of sixteen new Member States. It was, therefore, equitable that with the more recent admissions, the United States percentage contributions should be reduced. His delegation had reservations to enter only in respect of paragraph (c) (2) of the draft text, which was expressed in terms that were perhaps too restrictive for the Committee on Contributions. Furthermore, his delegation had some doubts regarding the phrase in lines 3 to 7 of this particular paragraph.

11. The representative of Argentina saw no valid reason for modifying the existing system. Capacity to pay should be maintained as the basic principle regulating the apportionment of expenses. The increase in the ordinary expenses of the

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United Nations, coupled with such special items as the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force, imposed a heavy burden on the lower-income group of countries; were the contributions of the new Members to be devoted solely to a reduction in the share of a very small number of States, the additional burden resulting from an extension of the Organization's activities would have to be borne by the remaining Members. Furthermore, since the international economic situation had become sufficiently stable by 1956 for the General Assembly to contemplate the full application of rule 161 of the rules of procedure and the approval of an assessment scale for three years, a complete revision of the standards governing that scale should only be envisaged for 1959 and following years. The Committee on Contributions should accordingly be requested merely to fix the contributions of the six new Member States and to revise the scale of assessments in accordance with the method followed at the previous session for incorporating into the scale the contributions of the sixteen Members admitted at the tenth session.

12. Both at the 599th and subsequent meetings of the Fifth Committee, numerous delegations emphasized that the question at issue was chiefly one of principle, since the generosity which the United States of America had shown in connexion with the extra-budgetary programmes of the United Nations and other voluntary programmes of assistance was established beyond the possibility of doubt.

13. At the 600th meeting, the representative of the United States introduced a revised text (A/C.5/L.461) which:

- (a) Incorporated the amendment proposed by Spain (A/C.5/L.460) (see para. 9 above);
- (b) Substituted the following text for operative paragraph (c) (2) of the initial draft resolution (A/C.5/L.458):

"In recommending scales of assessment for years subsequent to 1958, the Committee on Contributions shall recommend such steps as it considers necessary and appropriate to complete the reduction of the maximum assessment of the highest contributor to 30 per cent. It shall give particular consideration to making use of the contributions of new Members to complete this reduction."

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17. This view was endorsed by certain other delegations which pointed out that capacity to pay should continue to be measured by national income, appropriately adjusted in the case of Member States with a low per capita income. On that basis, the United States assessment should be set at between 40 and 45 per cent and, if an exception to the general rule had been made in its favour through the lowering of the ceiling to 33 1/3 per cent, the admission of new Members did not in itself justify a further exception in the form of a decrease to 30 per cent, or modify in any way an existing capacity to pay. Any Member State assessed at a rate lower than its capacity to pay would warrant was in fact receiving a rebate at the expense of other States. It could not therefore legitimately claim any part of the relief which the admission of new Members represented; instead, that relief should be granted to the low-income and middle-income groups. The United States assessment should not be changed until an improvement in the economic position of other countries warranted a lower ceiling consistent with the principle of capacity to pay. The task before the Committee on Contributions was to revise the scale of assessments in the light of the latest estimates of national income. As regards the six Members admitted at the eleventh and twelfth sessions, their contributions should be used in reduction of those of other Members with the exception of States which benefited from the ceiling, floor and per capita provisions.

18. Delegations supporting the revised draft resolution (A/C.5/L.461) considered its provisions to be reasonable, logical and fair. The existing basic principles for determining the scale of assessments were sound principles, but that fact in no way implied that the ceiling of 33 1/3 per cent had been fixed in perpetuity. It was the right of the General Assembly at any time to revise the scale and, while every Member should be called upon for its fair share of the expenses, requests for a lowering of percentage assessments deserved to be carefully heeded. Although due account should be taken of each Member's capacity to pay, and of any peculiar difficulties that it faced, the percentage contribution to the United Nations budget should not be equated with national income. Regard should be had to the substantial contributions made by the United States to various international programmes and to the fact that in the past it had borne an even larger share of United Nations expenses. In addition, the economic situation of certain other

14. The United States representative explained that, as regards point (a) above, his delegation appreciated that the Committee on Contributions would not undertake at its October session a comprehensive review of the scale of assessments, but would limit itself to considering appeals by various Member States from previous recommendations of the Committee. It was therefore equitable that any reductions which the Committee recommended should be made by applying a part of the contributions of the six new Member States, without raising the assessments of other Members. Where point (b) above was concerned, the United States delegation recognized that, as suggested by the representative of Cuba and others, its original text was perhaps too rigid. Paragraph (c) (2) in its amended form (A/C.5/L.461) would afford to the Committee on Contributions full discretion in recommending a procedure whereby the assessment of the highest contributor might be reduced to 30 per cent in future years: the proposed discretion should cover both the timing and the extent of the reduction, which could be effected either by applying the contributions of new Member States or by raising the assessments of other States as and when increases occurred in their national income.

15. The representative of Iraq proposed the deletion of the last preambular paragraph of the revised draft resolution, which was, he submitted, superfluous: the instructions to be given to the Committee on Contributions were of a general character, and that Committee should be allowed sufficient latitude in making recommendations to the General Assembly. The delegation of Iraq would be pleased to vote in favour of the draft resolution on the understanding that its adoption would not constitute a precedent for other international organizations. Each case should be considered strictly on its merits.

16. At the 601st meeting of the Fifth Committee, the representative of the Netherlands argued in favour of maintaining intact the four basic principles of assessment, including the ceiling principle. The admission of new Members meant that two-thirds of the contributions were derived from eighty-one States instead of fifty-nine, a fact which, so far from justifying a reduction in the assessment of the highest contributor, appeared to diminish the risk that by paying too large a proportion of the expenses any one State might exercise a preponderant influence. The increased membership had narrowed the gap between countries such as the United States which were assessed at below their capacity to pay and other Members.

Member States had improved. It would therefore be no more than fair to include the United States among the countries sharing in the benefits which the admission of new Members had yielded.

Intermediate phase of discussion

19. At its 602nd meeting the Fifth Committee had before it an amendment (A/C.5/L.462) to the United States draft resolution (A/C.5/L.461) proposed by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, as well as the Iraqi amendment to delete the sixth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution (see para. 15 above).

20. The five-Power amendment provided for:

(a) The deletion of the last two sentences of operative paragraph (c) (1) and the substitution of the following text:

"This incorporation shall be accomplished by applying the total amount of the percentage contributions of the six Member States named above to a pro rata reduction of the percentage contributions of all Members except those assessed at the minimum rate, taking into account the per capita ceiling principle and any reductions which may be required as a result of a review by the Committee on Contributions at its session commencing 15 October 1957, of appeals from recommendations made previously by that committee."

(b) The addition to operative paragraph (c) (2) of the following text:

"The percentage contribution of no Member State shall be increased solely for the purpose of reducing the percentage contribution of the highest contributor to 30 per cent."

21. The following arguments were advanced in favour of the amendment. It was to the general interest to find a formula that would meet some of the United States objections to the existing scale of assessments. The General Assembly had decided in 1946 that contributions should be based broadly on capacity to pay, but it had also recognized that that was not the sole applicable criterion. The United States assessment had been close to 40 per cent when its capacity to pay represented 60 per cent (in relation to the total membership), and had been reduced to $33 \frac{1}{3}$ per cent when that capacity had stood at between 45 and 50 per cent. Those who dissented from the United States proposal that the admission of twenty-two Members should be reflected in a decrease in its percentage contribution had expressed the view that capacity to pay was the main relevant factor, and that the other established principles,

such as the ceiling and the floor principles, did not warrant lowering the United States assessment at that time. But, against that view, it should be borne in mind that, apart from conforming with established principles, assessments should be fixed at a reasonable rate; no Member State should be asked to pay more than its fair share. Although the Fifth Committee was concerned at that stage solely with contributions to the regular budget, much of the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies was carried on through voluntary programmes, to which the United States was a generous contributor. It seemed reasonable therefore that, with the rise in the number of Members to eighty-two, the United States should not continue to pay one-third of the regular expenses, and that, instead, a ceiling of 30 per cent should be applied. Such a decision would not mark any considerable departure from the principle of contribution according to capacity to pay, and the United States would still be assessed at more than double the next highest rate. Furthermore, provision was made under the five-Power amendment for a gradual reduction of the highest assessment as the percentage rates of other Members decreased. The amendment, as a compromise proposal, might ensure that the decision to be taken by the Fifth Committee would receive a large measure of support: that was a desirable end, because the scale of assessments was vital to the smooth functioning of the United Nations and, were some Members to regard the scale as inequitable, discord might arise in spheres of United Nations activity in which harmony was essential.

22. The representative of the United States indicated that, in the interest of facilitating agreement, his delegation would be prepared to accept the Iraqi amendment - if formally proposed - to the sixth paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution (A/C.5/L.461). He added that the question had been raised why, if the United States assessment of 33 1/3 per cent had been satisfactory in 1954, it should be deemed desirable to reduce that rate upon the admission of twenty-two Member States. There were two reasons for such a reduction: first, it was sound policy that an organization should not rely too heavily on the contribution of a single member and, secondly, it was important for the successful operation of the United Nations that all Members should be fully conscious of their financial responsibility.

23. Although the first paragraph of the five-Power amendment (A/C.5/L.462) limited the reduction for 1958 to one-third of what the United States had proposed, his delegation was prepared, in the interest of general agreement, to accept that paragraph, and particularly since the proposed reduction posed problems for other Member States. It accepted also the second paragraph of the amendment, which stated in fact a principle that had been embodied in the original United States proposal (A/C.5/L.458). During the interval that would elapse before the reduction to 30 per cent could be achieved, the United States would be treated on an equal footing with other Members whenever decreases in assessments could be made. A reduction in its contribution would result only from the admission of new Member States or from increases in the national income of other States.

24. The representative of the United Kingdom considered that there was much to be said in favour of the arguments adduced by those representatives who had questioned the propriety of any change at the present juncture in the principles by which the scale of assessments was governed. His delegation was not in favour of appraising the assessment of any one Member State in isolation. Rates of contribution should be discussed in the widest context and not with reference to the particular situation of one, two or three Members: such a procedure in no way precluded the removal of possible anomalies in the existing scale of assessments. It was moreover difficult to disregard what had been said in the Committee about the additional burden which the United States proposal would impose on middle-income countries. It was important that the Fifth Committee should, if possible, reach unanimous agreement on the scale of assessments. Accordingly, further efforts should be made to reconcile divergent views among delegations and to work out a generally acceptable solution.

25. The representative of Ethiopia likewise maintained that the burden of the proposed reduction would necessarily be shifted to the middle-income group of contributors, including some or all of the new Members. He argued that the reduction of 3.3 per cent rested solely on one of the four basic principles of assessment and was to that extent of a somewhat arbitrary character. The reduction would ultimately have to be found in the 100 per cent scale.

26. Disquiet was voiced by the representatives of several Member States whose capacity to pay is limited. Countries that were industrially and financially less developed suffered disadvantages in that their economy was peculiarly subject to

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the fluctuations of world markets, and that the necessary stability must wait upon large-scale programmes of development. It was to be hoped that the Committee on Contributions would give due weight to this consideration, and that the highly industrialized countries would find it possible in the meanwhile to continue their large contributions to the work of the United Nations.

Final phase of discussion

27. To replace its former proposal, the United States submitted a revised proposal (A/C.5/L.463) which was discussed at the 603rd meeting of the Committee. This revised proposal consolidated in a single text all former proposals and amendments thereto which had been accepted by the sponsor. Thus, the preamble and operative paragraphs (a), (b), (c)(1) and (c)(4) were identical with the previous proposals as amended. The revised proposal, however, included additionally in its operative part two paragraphs, (c)(2) and (c)(3), reading as follows:

(c) "...

"(2) During the three-year period of the next scale of assessments, 1959-1961, further steps to reduce the share of the largest contributor shall be recommended by the Committee on Contributions when new Member States are admitted.

"(3) The Committee on Contributions shall thereafter recommend such additional steps as may be necessary and appropriate to complete the reduction."

28. The representative of Portugal proposed orally an amendment to paragraph (c)(4). In this connexion, he accepted a sub-amendment by the representative of Italy whereby the sub-paragraph would read "The percentage contribution of Member States shall not in any case be increased as a consequence of the present resolution". He believed that a revision on these lines would define more precisely the purpose in view as well as give an effective guarantee for the middle-income group of Members. Several delegations expressed their support for the Portuguese amendment, to which they attached particular importance. The amendment was accepted by the United States.

29. Members of the Committee paid tribute to the spirit of conciliation which the United States had shown in a desire to reach the largest possible measure of common agreement. Some members believed that the revised proposal went a long way to reach an equitable and just conclusion, and that it was worthy of the support of an evident majority of the Committee.

30. Other members expressed their concern at the uncertain future effect which might result from adoption of the proposal. They believed that it would be a more prudent course for the Fifth Committee not to take action on the proposal without the benefit of prior expert study such as might well be undertaken by the Committee on Contributions, which was technically competent to deal with these questions. If the Fifth Committee did not take the necessary steps to ensure such prior expert review, they stated that they would have to abstain or to vote against the proposal.

31. The inter-relationship of the principles on which the existing scale of contributions had been based was further underlined in the discussion at the 603rd meeting of the Committee. It was considered by some delegations that a modification of any one of these principles would affect the equilibrium of the present system, which had been carefully developed and controlled over a period of years. They stated in consequence that they could not give their support to any departure from the fundamental principle that the scale of assessments should be established on the broad basis of capacity to pay. Only if there was clear evidence that the application of the principle itself demanded a change would they consider it appropriate to reopen a question which had acquired constitutional significance when the General Assembly had fixed the maximum contribution at one-third of the total contributions and had deemed, in so doing, that the principle of broad capacity to pay could still be maintained in the scale.

32. In the course of discussion of the present item, a number of delegations made representations on their individual assessments, their views being summarized in the following summary records of the Fifth Committee:

<u>Delegation</u>	<u>Summary record</u>
Sudan	599th meeting
Spain	" "
Japan	" "
Ethiopia	602nd meeting
Romania	603rd meeting
Union of South Africa	604th meeting
El Salvador	" "

Decisions of the Committee

33. At its 604th meeting, the Committee proceeded to vote on the revised draft resolution proposed by the United States, with the amendment to paragraph (c) (4)

which had been proposed and accepted at the 603rd meeting. The voting on the operative part of the draft resolution was by paragraphs and the voting on paragraph (a) thereof by roll-call.

The result of the voting on paragraph (a) was as follows:

In favour: Albania, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nepal, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Libya, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Malaya, Mexico, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Paragraph (a) was adopted by 41 votes to 20, with 16 abstentions.

The result of the voting on the remainder of the operative portion of the draft resolution was as follows:

	<u>In favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstaining</u>
<u>Paragraph (b)</u>	58	2	15
<u>Paragraph (c) (1), first sentence</u>	62	0	12
<u>Paragraph (c) (1), second sentence</u>	47	10	18
<u>Paragraph (c) (2)</u>	42	20	12
<u>Paragraph (c) (3)</u>	42	19	16
<u>Paragraph (c) (4)</u>	52	2	18

The resolution as a whole was adopted by 43 votes to 17, with 17 abstentions.

Recommendation of the Fifth Committee

34. Accordingly, the Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

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SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE EXPENSES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 14 (I) of 13 February 1946, 238 (III) of 18 November 1948 and 665 (VII) of 5 December 1952, regarding the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations among its Members and the fixing of the maximum contribution of any one Member State,

Noting that, when the maximum contribution of any one Member State was fixed at 33.33 per cent effective 1 January 1954, the United Nations consisted of sixty Member States,

Noting further that, since 1 January 1954, twenty-two Member States have been admitted to the United Nations,

Recalling its resolution 1087 (XI) of 21 December 1956, whereby the percentage contributions of the first sixteen new Member States admitted since 1 January 1954 were incorporated into the regular scale of assessments for 1956 and 1957 and these were applied to reduce the percentage contributions of all Member States except that of the highest contributor and those of the Member States paying minimum assessments,

Noting that there are now six new Member States - Ghana, Japan, the Federation of Malaya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia - whose percentage contributions have not yet been fixed by the Committee on Contributions or incorporated into the 100 per cent scale of assessments,

Decides that:

1. In principle, the maximum contribution of any one Member State to the ordinary expenses of the United Nations shall not exceed 30 per cent of the total;
2. The percentage contributions fixed by the Committee on Contributions for Japan, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia for 1956 and 1957, and for Ghana and the Federation of Malaya for 1957, shall constitute miscellaneous income of the United Nations;
3. The Committee on Contributions shall take the following steps in preparing scales of assessment for 1958 and subsequent years:
 - (a) The percentage contributions fixed by the Committee on Contributions for Ghana, Japan, the Federation of Malaya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia for 1958 shall be incorporated into the 100 per cent scale for 1958. This incorporation shall be accomplished by applying the total amount of the percentage contributions of the six Member States named above to a pro rata reduction of the percentage

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contributions of all Members except those assessed at the minimum rate, taking into account the per capita ceiling principle and any reductions which may be required as a result of a review by the Committee on Contributions at its session commencing 15 October 1957, of appeals from recommendations made previously by that Committee;

(b) During the three-year period of the next scale of assessments, 1959-1961, further steps to reduce the share of the largest contributor shall be recommended by the Committee on Contributions when new Member States are admitted;

(c) The Committee on Contributions shall thereafter recommend such additional steps as may be necessary and appropriate to complete the reduction;

(d) The percentage contribution of Member States shall not in any case be increased as a consequence of the present resolution.
