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Chairman: Mr. George J. TOMEH (Syria).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued) (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. III)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ALWAN (Iraq) said that there was no item on the Fourth Committee's agenda of more vital importance and greater urgency than the question of Southern Rhodesia.
2. Immediately upon the unilateral declaration of independence by the racist régime, Iraq had severed all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and imposed a complete embargo on the export of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia; that action had been communicated at the time to the Secretary-General in a note verbale dated 29 December 1965.^{1/}
3. Two years after the rebellion, the white settlers were still defying world opinion. The delegation of Iraq considered that the responsibility for that impasse rested with the United Kingdom. It was the United Kingdom which had sponsored "colonialism by settlement" in Southern Rhodesia; and the same kind of colonialism had been encouraged in Palestine, where also the United Kingdom, the administering Power, had implanted settlers at the expense of the indigenous population. The United Kingdom had abandoned the people of Southern Rhodesia to the tyranny of a racist minority. The formula of sanctions had proved ineffective in remedying the situation. For that reason the Special Committee had on 9 June

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966, document S/7056.

1967 adopted a resolution (A/6700/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 609) in which it reaffirmed, in operative paragraph 6, that "the only effective and speedy way of bringing down the rebellion in the Territory is through the use of force by the administering Power". In his statement of 4 October (1683rd meeting), however, the United Kingdom representative, although he had branded the minority régime as illegal, had added that the United Kingdom did not believe in violence as a means of achieving political ends. That contention seemed unworthy of the serious consideration of any member of the Committee, particularly the Asian and African representatives, who knew that the continents of Africa and Asia had been and still were the battleground of colonial wars waged by the United Kingdom and the other colonial Western European countries. The United Kingdom had even used violence against legally established Governments. How, for example, would the United Kingdom representative account for his country's armed intervention in 1956, in collusion with another racist régime, against a legally constituted Government which was a Member of the United Nations?

4. In the words of the President of Zambia addressed to the Special Committee at Kitwe on 6 June 1967 (see A/6700/Rev.1, Chap. II, paras. 202-237), Zambia had never been unrealistic and pessimistic, as had been charged, in arguing that only force could solve the Rhodesian question. It had rejected a realism which meant compromising moral principles; moreover, neither realism nor optimism had restored the rights of the 4 million human beings in Southern Rhodesia. Zambia, Mr. Kaunda had added, found it surprising that the United Kingdom, which showed such caution with regard to rebel white settlers, had no hesitation in sending in troops to kill Arabs in Aden.

5. The delegation of Iraq wished to take the opportunity to pay tribute to the President and the people of Zambia, who were suffering moral and material damage as a result of the Southern Rhodesian rebellion. In material terms alone, the need to find remedies for the indirect effects of sanctions had already cost Zambia \$90 million by the beginning of 1967.

6. Iraq fully subscribed to the resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its eighth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 27 February to 4 March 1967 (*ibid.*, chap. III, para. 320), and pledged its support for all decisions taken by any organ of the United Nations to put an end to the racist régime in Rhodesia.

7. Mr. RATAFIKA (Madagascar) said that the Government and people of Madagascar were alarmed at the

continuance of the situation created two years ago by Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. The usurping régime in that country was still disregarding the decisions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

8. What was most regrettable was the fact that certain States which were important trade partners of Southern Rhodesia were not complying with the terms of Security Council resolution 232 (1966), which called for the imposition of selective mandatory sanctions against the rebel régime. In point of fact, the States in question had considerably increased their trade with Southern Rhodesia, and one of them had even become its second most important trade partner after South Africa.

9. A few days ago the United Kingdom representative had once again stated that Mr. Smith's régime was illegal and that the United Kingdom Government undertook to settle the situation honourably. In fact, however, the situation had deteriorated since the meeting of 2-4 December 1966 on board the destroyer Tiger.

10. In conformity with the decisions taken at Kinshasa recently by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its fourth ordinary session, Madagascar would give every support to the search for effective means of bringing the minority racist régime in Salisbury to its senses. Since selective economic sanctions could not bring about that goal, what means were there of restoring constitutional legality in Southern Rhodesia? As a matter of foreign policy, Madagascar was opposed to the threat or use of force; but in the special case of Southern Rhodesia, in which no peaceful settlement had proved possible over a period of two years, the Malagasy delegation felt that force was the only solution and was therefore necessary. The Malagasy delegation had already argued that case at the Dar es Salaam meetings of the Special Committee, and had been one of the sponsors of the draft resolution adopted almost unanimously by the Committee on 20 June 1967 (*ibid.*, chap II, para. 744). It wished to repeat that if the use of force was found necessary it would rest with the United Kingdom alone to take action, since it alone bore responsibility for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia, and since in any event it had no hesitation in using force in other parts of the world, including other Crown colonies.

11. The United Kingdom should carry out all its responsibilities as administering Power and should grant Southern Rhodesia independence only after the establishment of a system of majority government legally constituted following general elections held on the basis of the principle "one man, one vote".

12. Mr. MELLBIN (Denmark) said he would first restate the position of the Government of Denmark on the question of decolonization as it had been outlined by Mr. Jens Otto Krag, the Prime Minister of Denmark. At the opening of the Danish Parliament on 3 October 1967, Mr. Krag had said that the Danish Government would continue to support the endeavours of the United Nations with a view to the liquidation of the remaining colonial situations, and that it would participate actively in the attempts to find a solution to the problems of the southern parts of Africa in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the peoples concerned.

13. As to the specific case of Rhodesia, nearly all the countries represented in the Committee were agreed on the goal to be achieved, but there were differences of opinion on how to achieve it. Mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter had been imposed with the adoption, on 16 December 1966, of Security Council resolution 232 (1966); but Mr. Smith and his régime were still in power, and some had drawn the conclusion that more drastic measures should be resorted to. The Danish delegation agreed that further economic measures could be envisaged, but stressed the need for caution, for if such measures proved impossible to carry through they could erode the very basis upon which United Nations action against the Salisbury régime was founded.

14. As to the use of force, even those members of the Committee who advocated it would no doubt agree that all peaceful methods prescribed by the Charter must first be tried out, and that sufficient time must be allowed for them to produce the intended effect. It seemed that so far the selective mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council were not being applied by some Governments, and it seemed as if legislation and practices in certain other countries were not effective enough to prevent individuals and firms from violating the sanctions. He drew attention in that context to the Secretary-General's note of 13 January 1967 requesting all Member States to supply, on a monthly basis, information about imports to and exports from Southern Rhodesia of the commodities listed in operative paragraph 2 of Council resolution 232 (1966). The monthly publication by the Secretary-General of the statistical information thus obtained would make it easier to stop the loop-holes in the implementation of sanctions.

15. The very fact that the sanctions were not all-embracing and that they were not being fully carried out proved that further steps could be taken within the terms of the Charter to bring the illegal Salisbury régime to an end by peaceful means. The application of economic sanctions demanded great determination and patience. The Salisbury régime must on no account be allowed to believe that the international community would give up. If that was allowed to happen, it would probably spell the complete failure of the instrument of sanctions and irreparable damage could be caused to the United Nations and its possibilities of enforcing its resolutions by peaceful means.

16. Mr. George Brown, the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, had recently stated during the general debate, at the 1567th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, that his country would continue to pursue the policy of economic sanctions and to carry out its obligations under the Security Council resolutions. Because of the importance and volume of British trade with Southern Rhodesia prior to the unilateral declaration of independence, the determination of Britain in that respect was gratifying; it might possibly be interpreted as an indication that if an extension of the economic sanctions was called for it would be supported by the United Kingdom. Denmark, for one, would support a move in the Security Council to extend and tighten up the sanctions against Rhodesia.

17. Meanwhile, the Committee should address itself to other alarming problems arising in Southern Rhodesia, such as the institutionalization of apartheid and the fate of a large number of political prisoners, among them the two nationalist leaders, Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole. His delegation would support a demand by the Fourth Committee for measures to end those situations.

18. In the last analysis, the question of Southern Rhodesia was a challenge to United Nations effectiveness. By displaying a sufficient degree of determination, patience, perseverance and, above all, unity, the United Nations would demonstrate to the world that peaceful solutions could be found for problems beyond the scope of the present debate.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.