

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 621st

MEETING

Monday, 24 August 1953, at 3 p.m.

Headquarters, New York

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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

The Korean question (A/2431, A/L.151/Rev.1, A/L.152/Rev.2, A/L.153, A/L.154/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.48, A/C.1/L.50) (*continued*)

[Item 16]*

1. Mr. PYUN (Republic of Korea) thanked the Committee for affording him an opportunity to speak on behalf of his Government, which was vitally interested in the subject under discussion.

2. He recalled that the representative of the United States of America had said in a newspaper statement that India could not participate in the forthcoming political conference. Under the terms of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431), which provided that the conference should be a two-belligerent-party affair, India, belonging to neither belligerent side, had no legal ground on which to base its participation. Mr. Lodge had further said that India, already Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, could not concurrently have a seat in the political conference, to which the findings of the Commission were to be referred, for it would look like a case in which a person was at once the judge and the jurymen.

3. Mr. Pyun said he would not, however, adduce arguments based on the terms of the Armistice Agreement, since his Government had consistently refused to accept the armistice terms. They had only consented not to obstruct the implementation of the armistice up to a certain time-limit, on condition that certain safeguards would be given against the possible dangers that might be brought to the Republic of Korea as a result of the armistice.

4. His Government was opposed to India's participation mainly on the ground that India had appeased the communist aggressors. While India had sent not one soldier to defend freedom, it had now willingly dispatched thousands of troops to guard anti-communist prisoners while the latter were to be subjected to communist indoctrination.

5. His people, Mr. Pyun stated, would have better understood the Indian efforts for a cease-fire if the enemy had been in a stronger military position. How-

ever, the reverse had been the fact. He asked what, then, had been the service of India? It had done all it could to hamstring the free world's action likely to lead to a clear victory when victory had been within its grasp, thus giving the enemy the breathing spell he so badly needed for rebuilding his force. With or without collusion with the enemy India had master-minded an arrangement for the exchange of prisoners of war which had been calculated to carry out the forced detention and forced repatriation of all the anti-communist prisoners, to which so much hypocritical aversion had been displayed.

6. The Koreans could understand if India refused to be in the militant vanguard against communist aggression for reasons of physical weakness and vulnerable geographical position. But they could not comprehend why India should have gone so far as to hinder the only free nation that could take effective action against world communist domination, and upon whose success in stopping that domination the future welfare of the Indian people ultimately depended. In the eyes of his people, India had not only been trafficking with the communists, but had been intriguing with them to make the free world look contemptible, thus eventually undermining the very foundations of the United Nations.

7. Mr. Pyun recalled that when Japan had occupied Manchuria and when Ethiopia had been invaded by Mussolini, the League of Nations, though it lacked the means to punish the aggressors, had never stooped to humour them. When the Soviet Union had invaded Finland, the League of Nations had expelled the aggressor. However, the League finally disintegrated because of its failure to meet the repeated challenge of the aggressors. When the communists launched their attack upon the Republic of Korea, the United Nations commendably and promptly adopted a resolution (S/1511) calling upon its Member nations to contribute militarily to collective security action. That had been a landmark never reached by the League on the path of progress toward collective security.

8. Mr. Pyun further recalled that on 7 October 1950 the General Assembly had adopted a resolution (376 (V)) calling for the unification of Korea. He

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

stated that that resolution had been so timed with the victorious advance of the United Nations forces beyond the 38th parallel that it had been understood by everybody that the United Nations meant to unify Korea by military means.

9. With the reversal caused by the invading Chinese communists, however, a wave of defeatism had seized many of the Member nations and had imposed upon the United Nations forces a stalemate along the 38th parallel when there had been a good chance to roll the invaders back to the historical national boundary. The Armistice Agreement came about as a culmination of the process of appeasement.

10. No time-limit, Mr. Pyun continued, was said to have been set to the armistice. Any action on the part of the Republic of Korea to break the armistice-perpetuated division of the country would be condemned as a violation of the armistice terms and dealt with as rigorously as if it were an act of aggression. The Chinese invaders would hold North Korea indefinitely as their prize for aggression. On the other hand, the Republic of Korea would be condemned for attempting single-handed what the United Nations and Korea had once jointly tried to do, namely, the reunification of Korea.

11. It must be apparent to everybody that the only way for both the United Nations and the free world to survive was to reverse the process of appeasement which the past actions of India had typified. That reversal must begin with the political conference. If the conference should prove another sequel of appeasement, Mr. Pyun declared, the hope of the free world would be at an end. And, unfortunately, nothing would more manifestly presage the continuance of appeasement in the political conference than the participation of India.

12. The Republic of Korea desired to take part in the political conference with the sincere hope of reaching a just solution of the Korean problem, which would be impossible if appeasement continued. Therefore, his delegation wished to make it clear that the Republic of Korea found it next to impossible to collaborate with India on the same side.

13. There were many indications, Mr. Pyun observed, that India was inclined to outlaw the Republic of Korea as an aggressor, if the latter were to attempt the unification of the country by force, though the Republic had every right to recover its lost territory. India seemed to derive that moral rectitude from the principle of non-violence. From the knowledge of how India had been behaving in Kashmir, the Korean delegation gravely doubted whether India would live up to that high moral standard if India found itself in circumstances similar to those in which Korea had found itself.

14. The CHAIRMAN, on a point of order, asked the representative of Korea to limit his remarks to the composition of the political conference.

15. Mr. PYUN (Republic of Korea) went on to express his delegation's preference for an across-the-table conference rather than for a round-table conference. The reason was obvious. In dealing with communists, past experience had shown that it was highly dangerous to have more than two sides, for the

intermediate side or sides seldom failed to serve the communist ends.

16. The Korean delegation wished to have it on record that it stood firm for the practicable and reasonable principle of limiting the membership of the conference to the belligerent parties to the war in Korea. The coming political conference would finally decide whether Korea would go to the communist empire or remain in the free world. Mr. Pyun asked if it was unnatural of them to feel that they should have at their side in the fateful conference only those who had sent them military aid. That did not mean that the Korean people regarded the other nations who had failed to send fighting units to Korea as unfriendly. That only meant that they could not find more faithful friends than those who had testified to their friendship for Korea in characters of blood, toil and agony. In that connexion, he recalled that certain nations had acted in a manner as if they had betrayed the very cause for which their own sons had laid down their lives in Korea.

17. Mr. Pyun wished to reserve the opinion of his delegation as to which of the sixteen nations should participate in the political conference. He felt the number of participants should be limited to an essential minimum, if the conference was to have a chance of success.

18. As regards the participation of the Soviet Union, the Korean delegation was of the opinion that since it had been the Soviet Union that had both master-minded and supported the Korean invasion, it was only proper that it should come in on the communist side, not otherwise. As the representative of the United Kingdom had so thoroughly exposed (616th meeting) the USSR draft resolution, Mr. Pyun did not feel he needed to do anything more to pull it apart.

19. Mr. Pyun stated in conclusion that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States, as well as the sixteen-Power Declaration (A/2431, part I) were defence arrangements designed to counterbalance the military pacts between the North Korean communist puppet régime and communist China and between the latter and the Soviet Union. If they did not contemplate aggression, the Soviet Union and its satellites could be quite indifferent. The violent concern over them showed that they had not given up intentions of aggression. The idea of neutralizing or demilitarizing Korea, an idea so busily propagated, whatever might be its source, dovetailed into the communist idea of creating a military vacuum in the Republic of Korea. In the opinion of the Korean delegation, that was to be carefully guarded against.

20. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) observed that when the Committee had been discussing proposals relating to the armistice, it had been faced with the negative position of the USSR, which seemed as if it were designed to ensure the failure of any proposal that endeavoured to work out a satisfactory formula. At that time, the representative of Peru had stated that there was a duty to struggle against any effort to prevent the Organization from fulfilling its duty, and that the fulfilling of duty at times had unsuspected results. Those words, which had not been based on a prophetic vision but on an intense desire for peace,

had found a happy fulfilment. A political change, an unfavourable economic situation in the Soviet countries, had created favourable circumstances for the acceptance of the Indian proposal and an armistice had been signed.

21. The armistice represented a human triumph as well as a juridical victory. The significance of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the general trend followed by institutions of international law had been discussed at great length, and representatives had referred to a time when the prisoner of war had lost his personality. By an immense majority, the General Assembly had maintained the principle of the inviolability of the human person, and a formula had been found by which forced repatriation would not result (resolution 610 (VII)).

22. The armistice represented a further step towards final peace. Mr. Belaúnde said he wished to pay his delegation's tribute to all those factors which had led to the juridical triumph and the hope of peace. He paid homage to the United Nations, because in one form or another, all countries had answered the call. Those who could not give aid militarily had made economic contributions or had given their moral support. After paying tribute to the South Korean people and the other sixteen nations who had contributed armed forces, the Peruvian delegation would propose in the appropriate meeting of the General Assembly that the United Nations pay homage to those countries and their citizens.

23. Mr. Belaúnde observed that he was in complete agreement with the appraisal of the problem which had been made (620th meeting) by the representative of Brazil. The representatives were confronted both with a legal situation and a factual situation. From the strictly legal point of view, the United Nations would seem to have competence, by means of its regulatory powers, to lay down those principles under which juridical order should be established in Korea after the armistice and to provide for the punishment of the aggressor. That flowed out of the concept of collective security. Under the plan envisaged at San Francisco, when there was an aggression, peace should be re-established, regulated and imposed by the United Nations.

24. In fact, the United Nations faced a case of rebellion, because, if there had not been the intervention of the Soviet Union, the incident could have been speedily settled. The Soviet Union had disregarded the resolutions of the United Nations. Therein lay the genesis of all difficulties. The factual situation being so, the United Nations had no real possibility of regulating, in a unilateral manner, the Korean problem. The United Nations had had to negotiate an armistice and still had to negotiate a peace.

25. There existed a sort of dualism which was difficult to overcome. Because of the existence of this dualism, there were certain inconsistencies in the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1). On the one hand, it paid tribute to the jurisdiction of the United Nations, and, on the other hand, categorically declared that the Member States which supplied arms should participate in the conference. Mr. Belaúnde believed that the representatives should maintain the high jurisdiction of the United Nations, but should exercise the prudence which the facts required. The

fifteen-Power draft resolution, however, reaffirmed a very important United Nations principle, namely, that it was the objective of the United Nations to achieve by peaceful means a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and to restore fully international peace and security in the area.

26. There was, however, a viewpoint which conciliated the conflict between the juridical position of the United Nations possessing full jurisdiction in the Korean question and the fact that the peace was having to be negotiated. When the sixteen countries answered the appeal of the United Nations, they bore the mandate of the United Nations in restraining and punishing aggression under an obligation they had contracted under the Charter. They were, consequently, the nations most fitted to carry on the further mandate of creating a final peace out of the armistice. He believed the Assembly should tell those countries that they had its mandate and that they should discuss the peace on its behalf. That concept of the mandate did not prejudice anyone nor represent the exclusion of anyone. It did not represent the exclusion of the Soviet Union, which had the right to be represented in the conference on the side of one of the belligerents. The Soviet Union was the chief representative of the group that fought on the other side.

27. Mr. Belaúnde stated that peace and security in that area and in Asia were based on the peaceful unification of Korea and on its neutralization. A possible solution would be for the political conference to neutralize Korea, giving it international guarantees. If such a solution were adopted, the USSR and communist China could have no objection, since a unified Korea would be a neutralized State. Furthermore, no one could criticize the United Nations for such a solution, because it would be certain that neither the USSR nor communist China could use Korea as an instrument in extending its hegemony in Asia, the end sought for in launching the aggression.

28. He said that the full jurisdiction of the United Nations in collective security action and the necessity for the conference to solve the problem of unifying and neutralizing Korea were two principles which had to be borne in mind in considering the composition of the conference. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR did not serve that purpose. As had been pointed out, it would exclude countries which had a right to be present; some of them might be small, but they had made an enormous contribution to the punishment of the aggressor.

29. After stating his profound admiration for India, Mr. Belaúnde said that his delegation, in view of the painful realities of the situation, the need for prudence and the need for not jeopardizing the prospects of success of the Korean political conference, could not support the draft resolution which put forward the candidacy of India. His delegation's negative vote would simply represent the picture of a painful circumstance and would not in any way amount to a disagreement concerning the undeniable role which India was called upon to play in world affairs and particularly in the political affairs of Asia.

30. In conclusion, Mr. Belaúnde emphasized his conviction that they were all seeking means to obtain a real peace which would be characterized by co-opera-

tion. He hoped that the political conference would open the way to that goal, thereby enabling still further progress to be made during the next year.

31. Mr. TJONDRONEGORO (Indonesia) said that his delegation, which had warmly welcomed the signing of the Armistice Agreement, regarded that agreement as the first step—a major one—in the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem; it should lead to a better future for the peoples of that area and perhaps even to a more peaceful world in general. Though the danger of a resumption of hostilities, despite the obvious futility of such a course, had not been entirely eliminated, the effect of the cessation of hostilities should not be underestimated, as was demonstrated by the great happiness brought by the return of prisoners of war to their homes and families. Both parties to the agreement had expressed satisfaction even to the point of regarding it as a victory. It could indeed be regarded as a victory of common sense on both sides and as a victory in the struggle for peace which would serve as a fitting memorial to those who had given their lives.

32. Many difficult problems, however, remained. Difficulties were already being encountered in determining the mere composition of the political conference. Nevertheless, the journey towards peace was long, and they should concentrate on taking the right first step. The General Assembly must assure the basic climate of conciliation and co-operation without which it could not hope to secure the success of the impending conference. For that reason, his delegation had regretted the rejection of an invitation to the Chinese and North Korean Peoples' Republics to send representatives as observers to participate in the debate. They represented the "other side", whose co-operation was necessary for the setting up of the conference in accordance with article IV, paragraph 60, of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431), and the presence of their representatives would have avoided some of the problems raised in the four-Power draft resolution (A/L.152/Rev.2) and the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1). The Committee could also have gained some knowledge of the countries which that side intended to appoint to the conference. As it was, the necessity for further consultations remained before the conference could be convened. As it was necessary to make the best of the situation, however, his delegation had co-sponsored the draft resolution embodied in document A/C.1/L.50 as an expression of its earnest desire to facilitate the convening of the conference in the most beneficial and co-operative atmosphere possible.

33. Indeed, it would be far wiser for the General Assembly not to link itself with one side or represent only one of the parties to the Armistice Agreement. He believed that the Assembly should concern itself with the peaceful implementation of the Armistice Agreement by all concerned. The concept of two belligerent parties should not be carried over to the political conference, particularly since that would not be conducive to the harmonious atmosphere which all desired to create. The Armistice Agreement represented the conclusion of the military negotiations and set the stage for higher level political discussions of a broader nature. It also provided the opportunity to create a new atmosphere for further peaceful settlements still to be negotiated.

34. Since a political settlement for that area was of vital concern to more than the belligerent sides in the past military conflict, his delegation shared the view that the composition of the conference should be flexible. Of course, both sides should be represented, but the United Nations would be well advised to recommend the inclusion of non-belligerent or neutral governments as well, so as to promote co-operation and, if necessary, moderation in the conference.

35. Referring to the view that paragraph 5 (a) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution meant that only the belligerents in Korea had a right to representation at the political conference, he considered that the terms of that paragraph did not exclude the participation of non-belligerent nations and allowed for a broader interpretation of article IV, paragraph 60, of the Armistice Agreement. He noted that his interpretation was supported by the fact of there being two draft resolutions (A/L.152/Rev.2 and A/L.153) recommending respectively that the USSR and India participate in the political conference.

36. The USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48) also embodied a multilateral approach to the conference, although it seemed to fail in carrying through that flexible approach in the method suggested for the adoption of decisions. A further common denominator in the discussion, he considered, was the agreement that the number of participants in the conference should be limited. While he did not wish to challenge the right of those who had fought in Korea to be represented, paragraph 5 (a) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution laid undue stress on the sole right of the belligerents to participate in the conference. Noting that it was probable that practically all of the countries which had contributed armed forces in Korea would desire to participate, he expressed the view that there was a real need to limit participation of the belligerents of that side for the sake of a balanced atmosphere in the conference. The USSR draft resolution, on the other hand, provided a political balance between both sides, a course which his delegation regarded, along with the designation of neutral or non-belligerent nations as participants, as the practical and realistic means of attaining a good basic atmosphere for the conference. He added that any United Nations Member able to render important assistance to the conference should participate in it.

37. The argument that a balanced representation of both sides was unnecessary in view of the procedure for the adoption of decisions set forth in paragraph 5 (a) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) overlooked the important fact that the terms of that paragraph did not guarantee a just and harmonious political atmosphere. It was not enough to guarantee equality in the adoption of decisions: both parties must have some reasonable assurance that they would not find themselves always and inevitably in the minority when differences arose. The duty of the neutral countries in such a conference would be to promote reconciliation and, when necessary, moderation.

38. The Indonesian delegation would therefore vote in favour of the participation of India at the conference. A realistic approach must certainly recognize the vital role which India could still play in the efforts to reach a peaceful settlement in Korea. The exclusion

of such a great Asian nation would mean a failure on the part of the General Assembly to view the problem in its proper context. He did not think that the representative of South Korea had given the Committee wise counsel in that respect. In conclusion, he stated that his delegation was in favour of participation of the USSR, but reserved his right to refer to the USSR and fifteen-Power draft resolutions at a later stage.

39. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his Government and people had warmly welcomed the conclusion of an armistice. The past three years had witnessed a valiant struggle by the Korean people for freedom and independence. It was now evident to everyone that the attempts to impose the Syngman Rhee régime on the Korean people had failed completely.

40. Reviewing the proposals submitted so far to the Committee, he concluded that they were based on one of two principles: one, that the political conference should be a round-table one and the other that it should be a conference composed of two sides. The main exponent of the latter view was the representative of the United States of America, who had taken exception to the participation in the conference of neutral States and who had given a faulty interpretation of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. That paragraph stated that the political conference would be composed of representatives appointed by the two sides, and its wording did not support the view that the conference should be attended only by countries which had supplied armed forces in the Korean conflict. As for the argument that the discussion must be limited to the terms of the Armistice Agreement, Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter empowered the General Assembly to discuss any question within the scope of the Charter.

41. Mr. Kiselyov recalled that Mr. Lodge had stated (623rd meeting) that the United States would vote against Indian membership in the political conference, a statement which was in sharp contrast with the United States' position regarding India during the first part of the seventh session, when Mr. Acheson had bestowed great praise on the Indian delegation. Mr. Lodge's supporters, the representatives of Cuba (618th meeting) and Brazil (620th meeting) had also indicated that they would oppose Indian participation on the grounds that Syngman Rhee threatened to boycott the conference if India took part in it.

42. A peculiar situation would result from following the counsel of those representatives, since that would mean that the membership of the conference would depend on none other than the so-called President of South Korea.

43. The Committee had just heard the representative of the Syngman Rhee group make various slanderous statements concerning India and object to its participation in the political conference on the ground that it was a neutral. Such statements by the representative of a group which remained in power only by virtue of armed force did not provide any reason for eliminating India from the political conference. It was known that the same party had boycotted the Armistice Agreement, which had been welcomed by all the peoples of the World. In that connexion, Mr. Kiselyov cited various statements reportedly made by Syngman Rhee, which demonstrated that far-reaching plans for aggression were in preparation. Syngman Rhee had already acted, with the tolerance of the United States Command, to release prisoners of war who were to have been returned, in order to impress them into service in the South Korean Army. The Committee should recognize that the peoples of the world demanded an end to all such provocations and supported the peace-loving policy of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and of the People's Republic of China.

44. Mr. Kiselyov added that reference must also be made to the so-called Mutual Defense Treaty concluded between the Syngman Rhee group and the United States, which conclusively attested to the fact that the reactionary circles in the United States were far from reconciled to the failure of their aggressive venture in Korea and were preparing to reopen it in the future. That treaty amounted to placing a time bomb under the political conference.

45. The USSR draft resolution envisaged peaceful co-operation for a fair solution of the Korean question in accordance with the desire of the people of Korea and the peace-loving people of the world. It would make it possible to proceed from war to peace. In that connexion, Mr. Kiselyov said that he was in full agreement with the sentiments expressed by the Indonesian representative. The Byelorussian delegation would vote in favour of the USSR draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.