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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

The Korean question (A/2431, A/L.151/Rev.1, A/L.152/Rev.1, A/L.153, A/L.154/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.48) (continued)

[Item 16]*

1. Mr. TSIANG (China) observed that all the Members of the United Nations were interested in the Korean question in one way or another, but that the interest of Korea itself was infinitely greater than theirs because its very existence was at stake. For that reason, the Republic of Korea, which was the only Korean Government recognized by the United Nations, was entitled to have its wishes duly considered—not that it should impose its will on the United Nations or wield a veto over the decisions of the First Committee, but because its wishes should carry at least as much weight as those of any other Member of the United Nations. It was unfortunate that the legitimate claims of the Republic of Korea had been discounted when it did not yet have an army. Happily, that attitude had been revised, but not yet sufficiently revised. Obviously, failure of the First Committee to give proper consideration to the legitimate claims of Korea would mean that its work would add to the confusion and render the task of the political conference more difficult.

2. Referring to the provisions of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1), he said that his delegation shared the general feeling of satisfaction that the conclusion of an armistice in Korea had brought. Nevertheless, it felt that the terms of the Armistice Agreement might have been better if certain delegations had not indulged in so much neutralism and wishful thinking. Of course, it was essential to produce an atmosphere conducive to peace, but the impression must be avoided that the political conference was the starting point for a long programme of appeasement which would result in a defeat for international peace and security.

3. The Chinese delegation welcomed the reaffirmation, in paragraph 2 of the fifteen-Power draft resolution, that the objective of the United Nations remained

the unification of an independent and democratic Korea. That paragraph was addressed to, *inter alia*, President Syngman Rhee. In that connexion, he pointed out that President Syngman Rhee certainly preferred peace to war. History would bear out that fact inasmuch as before the aggression against his country, he had proved his peaceful intentions by co-operating with the United Nations with a view to the unification of Korea. He was now continuing to promote the unification of his country by peaceful means, but felt that, if such means should prove ineffectual, other means should be used. Some governments believed that, in that event, it would be better to accept the division of Korea. There was therefore a basic difference of opinion. While every country valued the principle of national unity and was prepared to make sacrifices to establish or maintain its own, some were nevertheless indifferent to the national unity of the other States. That paradox, which was a recurrent historical phenomenon, had obviously not contributed to the development of international co-operation and had, on the contrary, led to foreign interventions. Every country remained free to determine to what extent it was prepared to help President Syngman Rhee to achieve his goal, but the least the United Nations could do was not to obstruct his efforts and not to compel him to accept the division of his country.

4. He supported the Armistice Agreement (A/2431) and consequently approved of its paragraph 60, which was quoted in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1). He was opposed to the consideration of any Chinese question or interest in the political conference on Korea.

5. Paragraph 5 (a) of the fifteen-Power draft resolution was certainly the most important provision. The Chinese delegation endorsed it because it considered that the criterion applied in selecting the participants in the political conference was a fair one; the Member States which had sent units of armed forces to Korea had thereby proved their interest in the Korean question and their devotion to the principles of the United Nations. Any departure from that criterion would necessitate a re-examination of the entire question of participation in the conference. The Chinese delega-

*Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

tion was accordingly in favour of the participation of Australia in the political conference on two grounds: first, on the basis of the criterion laid down in the said paragraph of the draft resolution, and then for the historical, geographical and economic reasons set forth by the representative of Australia (613th meeting). From those various points of view, the right of China to be represented in the conference was not less than that of any other country. Although China had not sent armed forces to Korea, it was not because it wished to shirk its responsibilities for the implementation of collective security. Besides, it had sent substantial quantities of food and medical supplies.

6. The Chinese delegation was not convinced of the soundness of the reasons given by certain Members in support of the participation of the USSR and India in the political conference. While it would obviously be unrealistic to plan a political conference without the participation of the USSR, the United Nations should nevertheless bear the moral factors in mind before taking its decisions. It could not very well overlook the fact that the USSR had not only supplied arms to the aggressor, but had shared the responsibility for the aggression. In the circumstances, it was not proper for the United Nations to propose that the USSR should take part in the political conference; the invitation should come from the other side. Nor could China support the draft resolution inviting India to participate in the conference inasmuch as the Republic of Korea had objected to India's participation. Moreover, the views of India would surely find expression through some of the participants mentioned in the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1). Regardless of the position taken as to the form of the political conference—whether it was a round-table or an "across-the-table" conference—it should be borne in mind that the communist delegations would be solidly united, while far less unity was to be expected on the United Nations side, as the debate had already indicated.

7. He supported the programme for Korean relief referred to in paragraph 6 of the draft resolution. He was opposed, however, to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48), which did not give evidence of any serious effort to solve the problem.

8. It was to be hoped that the political conference would result in strengthening peace and security in the Far East and in the unification of Korea. Achievement of those objectives did not depend solely on the United Nations. But, whatever the outcome of the conference, it must not be allowed to be used to consolidate the forces of communist aggression in the Far East. The United Nations should at least provide moral assurance that it would not obstruct the efforts of the Far Eastern peoples to attain their independence and, at the same time, secure peace.

9. Mr. KYROU (Greece) associated himself with the remarks made by the Chairman at the 613th meeting on the resumption of the work of the session, hailed the armistice in Korea as a victory for the champions of collective security, expressed his gratitude to all those who had fought in Korea on behalf of the United Nations, and warmly commended the negotiators of the Unified Command for their skill and patience. It was to be hoped that the high price paid in blood and suffering would be an object lesson show-

ing that aggression did not pay and that the most effective defence against it lay in strengthening collective security. Unity in action had made the armistice possible. Unity would also make possible the establishment of an independent, unified and democratic Korea.

10. The fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) was a kind of springboard for the adoption of practical measures and for the creation of an atmosphere favourable to negotiations on Korea. It had been argued that the draft resolution was too exclusively inspired by the principle of two opposing sides. But the fact had to be faced that, until the Armistice was signed, two opposing sides had been at war and the Armistice Agreement had been signed by those two opposing sides.

11. Contrary to Mr. Vyshinsky's allegation (615th meeting), the statement made on 27 July 1953 (A/2431) by the representatives of the sixteen States Members of the United Nations whose armed forces have participated in the action in Korea, in which they affirmed their determination to carry out the terms of the armistice fully and faithfully, in no way endangered peace in the Far East; it would indeed be a welcome move for the other side also to make a statement expressing its determination to carry out the terms of the armistice in good faith.

12. In any case, the fact that there were two parties to the Armistice Agreement was inescapable. The best way to eliminate that "two-sidedness" was to spare no effort to make the political conference a success, so that the armistice might be converted into a lasting peace.

13. While, on the one hand, the USSR representative feigned to ignore the existence of the two sides, he tried, on the other, to perpetuate their existence even after the completion of the work of the conference by proposing in his draft resolution (A/C.1/L.48) that the decisions of the conference would be deemed to have been adopted if they had the consent of the parties which had signed the Armistice Agreement.

14. On the other hand, the purpose of the fifteen-Power draft resolution was to create an atmosphere conducive to the establishment of peace in the Far East. That atmosphere could be generated if the participants were guided by the spirit of moderation and generosity which had characterized the statement of the Prime Minister of India when he had said that his country did not wish to take part in the political conference if all the parties primarily concerned did not desire its participation.

15. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia) observed that with the cessation of hostilities and the easing of international tension the United Nations had won an important victory, particularly in view of the General Assembly's contribution to the settlement of the problem of the prisoners of war, which had been the last hurdle in the way of the conclusion of an armistice.

16. The present situation was generally consistent with the principles which Yugoslavia had advocated from the very start of the hostilities. The Yugoslav representative in the Security Council had proposed on 25 June 1950 (S/1500) and again on 27 June 1950 (S/1509) the immediate cessation of hostilities, together with an invitation to both sides to send representatives to Lake Success so as to make a peaceful

settlement of the conflict. Unfortunately, the proposals had not been adopted and the aggression had continued.

17. The United Nations should now find a solution to the political aspects of the Korean problem. Korea remained essentially a United Nations problem not only for technical and historical reasons, but chiefly because it was part of the problem of international peace and security, one of the basic concerns of the United Nations.

18. It was also essential to determine clearly the specific role which the United Nations should play in the current phase of the Korean problem. The United Nations was a world organization in which universality was the principle. It acted on behalf of the community of nations as a whole and should therefore consider every problem from the universal point of view by placing itself above the particular interests of its component parts. The United Nations should therefore not be considered an armed camp pitted against another armed camp or a military alliance or political or ideological bloc opposed to another such alliance or bloc. Its objective in Korea should be the implementation of its Purposes and Principles in terms of the concrete realities of the Korean problem. While it was true that the conduct of the United Nations had not always been guided by that rule, that attitude had nevertheless prevailed at the first part of the seventh session of the General Assembly, thanks to India's efforts which led to the removal of the obstacle raised by the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war. That attitude should also prevail in the future and, while for practical reasons it was desirable that the restoration of peace in Korea should be considered in a restricted forum, such a course would not imply that the United Nations was divesting itself of its responsibilities in the matter. Hence, the political conference should not become a forum in which the two sides continued the war against each other, but should be an instrument of conciliation and co-operation. Only then could it be expected to pass from the preliminary phase of stabilizing the armistice and of creating a favourable atmosphere to the actual settlement of the Korean and then of the other Far Eastern problems.

19. The Yugoslav delegation would be guided by those considerations in determining its attitude on the question of the composition of the political conference.

20. Mr. ELIZALDE (Philippines) observed that after three years of effort to repel aggression the United Nations had achieved its objective and had discharged its immediate responsibility. The Philippines had taken part in the United Nations action to maintain international peace and security in accordance with its obligations under the charter.

21. It was clear that paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement (A/2431) provided the only possible basis for a discussion of the organization of the political conference. Its reference on three occasions to the terms "both sides" was significant. The intent of the negotiators at Panmunjom was therefore obvious. They had been the military commanders of both sides and could only commit the governments of the States concerned, in other words, those States whose forces had participated in the action in Korea. In principle, it was for those States to determine the composition of the political conference.

22. The fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/L.151/Rev.1) was based essentially on paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. The Agreement had been concluded with considerable difficulty and care should be taken not to depart from it by too broad an interpretation of the words "governments of the countries concerned on both sides". Otherwise, innumerable difficulties might arise. The fifteen-Power draft resolution adhered closely to paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, which was binding upon the sixteen Member States which had sent armed forces to Korea. Hence, they could not be expected to submit any proposal which would constitute a departure from the provisions of paragraph 60. The countries representing each side should be chosen respectively by the two sides and any recommendation for the inclusion of States other than those which had participated in the Korean hostilities would require the approval of both parties to the Armistice Agreement.

23. The General Assembly was certainly entitled, under Article 10 of the Charter, to recommend the participation of the USSR and India. However, in view of the fact that the USSR had sympathized with and materially assisted the aggressor, its participation would have to be the subject of a proposal from the other party to the Armistice Agreement. On the other hand, India's participation would be justified by its services in helping to bring about an armistice in Korea. Not only had India been a member of the United Nations Commission on Korea; it had also provided ambulances to the Unified Command. Under its auspices the United Nations had established relations with the other side and an agreement had been concluded with respect to the prisoners of war. Moreover, India had accepted the chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

24. It was the right and duty of the Philippines to participate in the conference, not only because it had participated in the action to repel aggression in Korea by providing relief and armed forces, but also because it had a primary interest in any peace settlement which affected the stability of the Far East.

25. The Philippines had joined fourteen other delegations in submitting a draft resolution (A/L.154/Rev.1) paying a tribute to those who had given their lives for Korean independence and the strengthening of the principles of the United Nations. Korea, the chief victim of the aggression, was entitled to the co-operation of the United Nations in its goal of unification and rehabilitation. The political conference should have to restore the atmosphere of trust which would make that co-operation possible.

26. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria), on a point of order, said that the representatives of sixteen Asian and African States—Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand and Yemen—had held an emergency meeting in view of the sudden worsening of the situation in Morocco and had asked him if the Chairman agreed to make a statement to the Committee on their behalf.

27. The CHAIRMAN said that under article 97 of the rules of procedure the Syrian representative's request was out of order since the Moroccan question was not on the Committee's agenda.

28. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) accepted the Chairman's ruling and said that a document on the matter would be distributed shortly to members of the Committee.

29. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the list of speakers should be closed at noon on Monday, 24 August 1953.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.