



## ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

FORTY-SEVENTH SESSION

OFFICIAL RECORDS

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at 3 p.m.

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President: Mr. SCHEYVEN (Belgium).

## AGENDA ITEM 2

General discussion of international economic and social policy (E/4638, E/4674, E/4679, E/4687 and Add.1 to 3, E/4688, E/4695, E/4701; E/CN.11/878; E/CN.12/825 and Add.1; E/CN.14/435; E/ECE/741) (*continued*)

1. Mr. EKLUND (Director-General, International Atomic Energy Agency) recalled the interest of the developing countries in nuclear energy and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which provided for the granting of assistance for nuclear energy development.

2. In the booklet attached to its reports (E/4650 and Add.1), IAEA pointed out that nuclear power was already being introduced by some of the more industrialized among the developing countries but that, for want of a solution to certain technical problems, the developing countries would lag further and further behind, using more expensive power sources and remaining overwhelmingly dependent on conventional fuels. There were, in contrast to nuclear power, other applications of nuclear energy which were already helping many developing countries. For instance, nuclear energy applications had helped to promote the "green revolution" in Asia, in which IAEA and FAO, working through the FAO/IAEA Joint Division, had played a part. In a Central American Special Fund project, control of the Mediterranean fruit fly (*ceratitis capitata*) by the radiation-induced sterile male technique had eradicated 90 per cent of the fly population in the test area.

3. The benefits of nuclear techniques were not confined to agriculture, but extended to medicine, biology, industry and hydrology. Hence it was to be regretted that, although the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology had recommended that increased resources should be devoted to the FAO/IAEA Joint Division, it had not made any proposals as to where those resources might be found.

4. The booklet also pointed out that developing countries should begin systematic prospecting to meet the demand for uranium. A vigorous campaign in those countries might result in discoveries of economic importance.

5. The report concluded that IAEA was an effective tool for international co-operation which could handle a considerably larger assistance programme with little or no increase in the size of its staff. The chief brake on its work was shortage of resources, especially for technical assistance. Although the target set for voluntary contributions had remained at the \$2 million level since 1962, it had never been possible to reach more than 70 per cent of that sum. As a result, at the present time IAEA could meet only one-quarter of the value of the technically sound requests which it received, compared with some 90 per cent ten years before. The technical assistance programme was used to initiate new projects which could subsequently be taken over by UNDP. Thus the programme could have a multiplier effect out of proportion to its actual size.

6. It was worth mentioning in that connexion that each of the existing nuclear power projects in developing countries was being or had been financed bilaterally. International sources of capital had not yet played a role.

7. With regard to recent developments in IAEA, the Board of Governors had set up a committee to review its own composition and was informing the General Conference that it intended to propose an amendment for a modest expansion in the size of the Board. A similar committee had helped the Board to study IAEA's role in connexion with the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, and the Board of Governors had concluded that IAEA had the competence needed to be the responsible international organization in the field. The first priority was to promote a much fuller and wider exchange of information about nuclear explosive technology. Lastly, the Board had prepared a report showing the terms on which special fissionable materials were already available through IAEA and suggesting ways of improving the supply situation.

8. With regard to co-ordination, IAEA's experience was that multilateral co-ordination through ACC, the Economic and Social Council and so on was most effective in dealing with strictly administrative matters, but that problems of programme co-ordination were usually most easily resolved by direct contacts between the agencies concerned. Some examples were the aforementioned FAO/IAEA Joint Division, the agreement between UNESCO and IAEA for joint financing and operation of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, the arrangements between WHO and IAEA concerning

some established isotope applications, and the long-standing joint programme with WMO.

9. ACC should address itself to the major problems of co-ordination or common action, and the Geneva component of the ACC secretariat might be strengthened accordingly. The ACC secretariat might also benefit from having scientific representation on its staff.

10. With regard to high-level scientific and technical advice on the programmes of the United Nations family, it would be wise to avoid a decision which would commit the Council before it had made a thorough study of the matter. Any solution should take full advantage of the scientific and technical expertise that already existed in the secretariats of the agencies themselves. It was to be hoped that the Council would find it useful to instruct ACC to study the problem.

11. IAEA's work in the matter of safeguards was becoming increasingly important, and its secretariat was taking steps to simplify and to bring down the costs of safeguards. A division had been set up to concentrate on research in that field.

12. IAEA had entered a new era since the non-nuclear weapon States had made it clear that they expected certain modifications both in its programmes and in its methods of work to enable it to play the various roles foreseen in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that respect, it bore repeating to recall that the most intractable problem remained the inadequacy of resources for technical co-operation and other direct field assistance.

13. Mr. BOERMA (Director-General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) said that one spur to progress was undoubtedly dissatisfaction with the *status quo*. The reason for the existence of the Economic and Social Council was man's dissatisfaction with the standard of living that the planet offered to the majority of its inhabitants. It was therefore healthy to find a certain degree of dissatisfaction with United Nations bodies and also within the United Nations family itself. However, change and improvement, essential to progress, must be built on sound foundations.

14. Two mistaken notions about co-ordination should be dispelled. The first was that it could be effected in terms of generalities without tackling technical problems. No effective co-ordination, however, was possible without a real understanding of the technical issues at stake. All the problems relating to economic and social development involved technical backgrounds which must be examined in detail before solutions could be proposed. The various bodies responsible for general co-ordination could not, in the normal way, treat specific subjects in detail, and would accomplish more if they confined themselves to policy guidance and did not try to achieve technical co-ordination. A good example of co-ordination was the recent dialogue between several executive heads of special-

ized agencies and the Preparatory Committee for the Second United Nations Development Decade. It had enabled them to explore in depth a question of general interest to several agencies and had been extremely useful. The idea underlying much of the Committee's work - the fixing of an over-all growth target for the decade and related sectoral targets in, for example, agriculture - went far towards the ideal of "creative co-ordination" by producing a sense of combined purpose.

15. The assumption that ACC was at fault in not reporting all the details of the inter-agency problems which arose was equally wrong. On the contrary, full disclosure of the various negotiating positions was often more likely to exacerbate difficulties than to lead to solutions, particularly since international differences of view frequently reflected similar divergencies between ministries in national Governments. If the FAO Council had pressed for details of the extensive and difficult negotiations which the Director-General of FAO had been conducting with the Executive Director of UNIDO, the Director-General of FAO would have had to state his views on the matter at a time when the two sides were still some way apart; the Executive Director of UNIDO would probably have been forced to act likewise, and in all probability no satisfactory agreement would have been concluded. Governments should trust the secretariats of the agencies and enable them to resolve differences of view by methods of "quiet diplomacy". Only when it proved impossible to reach agreement at secretariat level and an intolerable situation had arisen should Governments intervene and insist on a full disclosure of all the negotiations and perhaps set up special machinery for resolving the difficulty.

16. He hoped that ACC would evolve along the lines of the proposals outlined in its report (E/4668) to the Council and the other ideas now being discussed. It was working within terms of reference conferred upon it in 1946 and in some respects completely out of date, for instance in regard to its own membership. It was surely paradoxical that, while planning for the Second United Nations Development Decade, neither the Secretary-General of UNCTAD nor the Executive Director of UNIDO, with their major sectoral responsibilities, were, properly speaking, members of ACC at all and that they took part in its work only under the general umbrella of the United Nations. At a time when the interdependence of the economic and social sectors was becoming ever clearer and the pressing need for some sort of *aggiornamento* was becoming obvious, it was difficult to understand the reluctance with which some Governments were contemplating such a move.

17. At the present time the notion of constitutional independence was less important than that of functional decentralization. The programme which United Nations bodies were trying to put into effect was too big for centralization to pay off, and the visionaries who expected miracles of efficiency through the abolition of the specialized agencies or the incorporation of their pro-

grammes in a single budget were doomed to inevitable disappointment - but on managerial rather than on political grounds. FAO had neither more nor less independence than any of the other larger United Nations bodies, such as UNCTAD or UNIDO. In any event, what really mattered was not the constitutional position of a given body but the part it could play in an over-all programme of development. There was no alternative to the existing system of decentralized responsibility, and improvements should surely be attempted within that general framework.

18. The way in which FAO and other specialized agencies had handled development aid had been satisfactory, thanks in large part to their co-operation with UNDP. FAO was aware that it was doing better in project identification and formulation than in project implementation, and had called upon a reputable firm of management consultants to help it to improve its project implementation. It had assembled certain skills which were being used by IBRD, regional development banks, bilateral programmes, non-governmental organizations and industry. The experiment whereby the best elements of bilateral and multilateral aid were being combined was particularly interesting, and FAO was involved in it through formal agreements with the Governments of Denmark and Sweden and informal arrangements with several other countries.

19. Turning to some specific developments concerning FAO, he reminded the Council that he had referred, at the forty-fifth session (1532nd meeting), to his proposal that the executive secretaries of the United Nations regional economic commissions should also act as regional representatives of FAO, thus in effect merging the regional offices of FAO with the economic commissions. However, the consultations which had taken place subsequently had revealed a broad consensus that FAO should retain its own identity and presence in the regions and thus should not merge with the economic commissions. The authority of the regional representatives of FAO had accordingly been strengthened, so that they would in future be able to treat more directly and effectively with the executive secretaries of the regional economic commissions. He hoped to achieve his general aim of a regional programme closely integrated with that of the regional economic commissions.

20. In reporting on co-operation with other agencies, pride of place should be given to the agreement reached with UNIDO resolving the difficulties due to conflicting mandates and harmonizing the activities of the two organizations in the best interests of the developing countries. Briefly, the agreement made a technical division of responsibilities between the two organizations and established an inter-secretariat machinery whose most important task would be to avoid all conflict or overlapping in the "grey area" where precise definition of responsibilities became difficult. The agreement had not been easy to reach, but he hoped it would be successfully applied in an atmosphere of reciprocal good will.

21. The arrangements laid down in the *aide-mémoire* signed in 1968 by FAO, UNESCO and ILO on agricultural education, science and training had been working satisfactorily in practice. With IBRD's increasing emphasis on agriculture, FAO was strengthening its relations with the Bank, particularly through the joint FAO/IBRD Co-operative Programme. Consultations were taking place with UNICEF to consider ways in which that body could increase its contributions to nutrition programmes.

22. Regarding WFP, he urged the Council to accept the target figure of \$300 million for WFP resources during the biennium 1971-1972 which had been recommended by the United Nations/FAO Inter-governmental Committee of the World Food Programme to the Economic and Social Council and the FAO Council. The target was realistic, especially considering the existing surpluses of dairy products and grains, which should be channelled increasingly through the World Food Programme. The size of the programme's largest projects was such that it would clearly make an important impact on the economic and social progress of some countries. The target figure of \$300 million had already been accepted by the FAO Council and, if the Economic and Social Council did likewise, it would be submitted to the General Assembly and the FAO Conference at the end of 1969.

23. Referring to country representation for FAO, he said that, by virtue of an agreement reached between UNDP and FAO in 1966, there were now twenty-eight FAO advisers to UNDP resident representatives. The posts were financed out of the UNDP administrative budget. He considered, and his view was shared by most member States, that FAO should have a team of at least fifty-five country representatives in the developing countries. Since a cost-sharing arrangement with UNDP appeared to be causing difficulties, he had prepared a plan for submission to the FAO Council for the establishment of fifty-five country representative offices to be financed out of the regular programme. That number would include the twenty-eight advisers already appointed and working on the spot, the two full-time country representatives hitherto financed under the UNDP Technical Assistance component, and the four deputy regional representatives in charge of the FAO sub-regional offices. Three-quarters of the cost was to be covered through the redeployment of resources within FAO itself, and the remaining quarter from additional funds.

24. The Programme and Finance Committees of FAO, while endorsing the principle of establishing fifty-five country offices, had invited the Director-General and the representative of UNDP to reopen negotiations with a view to reaching mutually acceptable cost-sharing arrangements. As a result, a new agreement had been reached, and had been approved by the FAO Council and the Governing Council of UNDP. It provided that the fifty-five posts would carry the title of Senior Agricultural Advisers/FAO Country Representatives. Twenty-eight of them would be financed by UNDP and the other twenty-seven by FAO. The functioning of that dual system

would be reviewed towards the end of 1970, but he could already say that it might have significant implications for the future. The system was based on the idea that, in order to make the efforts of the entire United Nations system on behalf of economic and social development more effective, it would be extremely valuable if the representatives of the various agencies and programmes in any given country were to act together as a sort of cabinet president over by the resident representative.

25. Of course, FAO was not seeking to induce other agencies to adopt the same idea, because the arrangements would certainly vary from one country to another. However, FAO regarded its own representation at the country level as an integral part of the over-all reorganization and an essential element for implementing a strategy on agricultural development. As Director-General of FAO, he envisaged a "cabinet" as an extension of ACC at the country level but with quite different purposes and functions, since it would be concerned only with development policy and programmes in a single country.

26. In its five areas of concentration, FAO was beginning to prepare its world, regional and country plans. Obviously the initiative for national action would come mainly from the Governments themselves. However, FAO for its part should, in consultation with the Governments, take a limited number of major initiatives at the world-wide or regional level in support of national efforts. The Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development was of the greatest importance in that context, for it should enable FAO to make a useful contribution towards the formulation of a global development strategy. It should provide the basic data required for setting sectoral targets for agriculture in the Second United Nations Development Decade. It had been drawn up at the request of the first World Food Congress held in Washington in 1963, and would be examined at the second World Food Congress that was to take place at The Hague in June 1970, to be attended by many persons participating in a private capacity.

27. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of FAO would fall in 1970 — a busy year for the organization, which, apart from the World Food Congress, would have to prepare for the World Conference on Agricultural Education and Training to be held in Copenhagen. There was also to be a new world census of agriculture, in which over seventy Member States had already announced their intention of participating.

28. World food production had risen on an average between 2 and 3 per cent during 1968, but very unevenly in the various regions. That year could be regarded as a normal year, since food production had kept abreast of population growth. However, according to FAO long-term estimates, the food requirements of the developing countries might be expected to rise at an average rate of 3.9 per cent a year until 1985. Consequently, what might be regarded as a normal year for food production was far from sufficient. After the improvement in 1967, the situation had not deteriorated to the alarming levels of 1965

and 1966; but battles were not won simply by keeping the enemy at bay. The world must understand that, if hunger and malnutrition were to be overcome, countries must be prepared to undertake with renewed zeal a long, arduous and extremely expensive struggle.

29. The United Nations system had been in existence for about one-quarter of a century, and it could now be said that the machinery had been established for tackling certain world problems which were becoming increasingly serious. The Second United Nations Development Decade offered a hope that building could really begin on the foundations laid during the past twenty-five years and more particularly during the first Development Decade.

30. Mr. GOAD (Secretary-General, Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization) said that among the outstanding achievements of IMCO during the past year had been the International Conference on Tonnage Measurement and the progress in the campaign against pollution of the sea.

31. Nearly fifty countries had attended the International Conference on Tonnage Measurement. The problem was singularly intractable and of more than academic interest, since port authorities based their dues on the tonnage of a ship and various international conventions also used it as indicative of the class into which a ship fell for safety purposes. The conference had succeeded in adopting an international convention providing for a universal system of tonnage measurement. The convention represented a compromise and would very probably come into force soon. It was the fifth international convention of which IMCO was the depositary and was yet another contribution to the development of a system of international rules for shipping.

32. The Council would be aware that the pollution of the sea resulting from the loss of the *Torrey Canyon* in March 1967 had resulted in urgent action by IMCO to prevent similar casualties and to reach international agreement on the measures to be taken in similar cases. The problem obviously did not affect the developed countries alone. Although there was reason to welcome the development of industry and commerce in countries which were not yet highly industrialized, the dangers inherent in that development should not be overlooked. In the fight against pollution from ships, IMCO had been a pioneer, and was looking forward to contributing fully to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment called for by General Assembly resolution 2398 (XXIII). To improve the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, which already contained a system of penalties, the Assembly of IMCO would have to approve certain amendments to prohibit, with a few exceptions, all discharge of oil from ships. Other amendments would authorize States parties to the Convention to report contraventions committed by ships to the States of the ships' registry and to require those States to inform all other parties to the Convention and IMCO of any action taken against such ships.

33. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, was also to be amended. The main amendments would require ships covered by the Convention to carry certain navigational equipment which had so far been carried voluntarily, and would establish a system of routing and separation of traffic at sea. Governments were encouraged to establish separation schemes in congested or converging areas along their coasts in order to reduce the risks of collision.

34. IMCO had also adopted measures to improve regional co-operation against pollution of the sea. On the legal side, two major questions had been brought to international attention by the loss of the *Torrey Canyon*: first, the right of the coastal State to take action to prevent, mitigate or eliminate damage resulting from the accidental discharge of oil and, secondly, civil liability and insurance connected with damage caused by oil pollution. The Legal Committee of IMCO, assisted by the International Maritime Committee, had prepared two sets of draft provisions for submission to an international legal conference on damage due to pollution, to be held in November 1969 under IMCO auspices.

35. It could therefore be asserted that the fight against pollution of the sea was an interesting example, in its own small way, of the kind of co-operation which was possible among sovereign States. IMCO, with a membership comprising almost all the maritime nations in the world, had offered to co-operate fully with the UNCTAD Committee on Shipping and with UNCITRAL.

36. With regard to the other activities of IMCO, he would simply remind the Council that his organization was concerned with container traffic and the simplification of international shipping documents.

37. The IMCO Council had decided to make known to all countries concerned the potential of IMCO for technical assistance in shipping. It had therefore decided to create additional posts for technical assistance, to be borne on the regular budget of IMCO in so far as their cost could not be met from UNDP allocations.

38. For IMCO the past year had been a year of reorganization. A working group had been asked to review the organization's objectives and methods of work. On the basis of its conclusions, the Council had decided that IMCO should expand its programme of work within its terms of reference and deal with all problems of maritime transport, particularly those concerning the developing countries.

39. Concluding, he expressed the hope that the Council would consider that IMCO had done as much as possible within its own field with its scanty resources. It intended to continue the work for which it was responsible at the lowest possible cost.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.