

74. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Council agreed to convene such a meeting of interested delegations at Rome from 16 to 20 September 1974 to consider certain specific proposals for possible consideration by the World Food Conference and to report thereon to the third session of the Preparatory Committee (*ibid.*, para. 20).

*It was so decided.*

*The Council took note of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the World Food Conference on its second session (E/5533).*

75. The PRESIDENT thanked the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and the Secretary-General of the

World Food Conference for their statements and participation in the discussion.

76. Mr. CAVAGLIERI (Italy) extended a cordial welcome, on behalf of his country, to all participants in the World Food Conference. His country was happy to act as host to the Conference, which was a demonstration of international solidarity and co-operation.

77. Mr. MAREI (Secretary-General, World Food Conference) said that he had been convinced by the discussion that not only developing but also developed countries shared the secretariat's approach to the world food problem.

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*

## 1917th meeting

Monday, 22 July 1974, at 3.10 p.m.

*President:* Mr. A. KARHILO (Finland)

E/SR.1917

### AGENDA ITEM 4

#### Programme of action on the establishment of a new international economic order (E/5555; E/L.1608)

1. Mr. ALGAARD (Chairman, *Ad hoc* Committee on the Special Programme) reminded the Council that under the terms of section X (Special Programme) paragraph 6, of the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, adopted by the General Assembly at its sixth special session in its resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, the *Ad hoc* Committee on the Special Programme had been requested to make recommendations, *inter alia*, on the scope, machinery and modes of operation of the Special Fund. Unfortunately, the *Ad hoc* Committee had found itself unable to submit specific recommendations. However, its report (E/5555) reflected the basic views expressed on the subject, and it would be useful if the Council could comment on them.

2. Another task of the *Ad hoc* Committee had been to monitor the various bilateral and multilateral measures intended to assist the most gravely affected countries, pending commencement of the operation of the Special Fund. On that question, the *Ad hoc* Committee had been in close contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Emergency Operation who would give more detailed information on the subject.

3. The *Ad hoc* Committee had also been called to prepare, on the basis of information provided by the countries concerned and by appropriate agencies of the United Nations system, a broad assessment of the needs of the most seriously affected countries. That assessment had already been undertaken in collaboration with the World Bank and various international institutions.

4. The *Ad hoc* Committee would resume its work in the first week of September 1974 and hoped that by that time the Council would have put forward some suggestions; he also expected that a meeting of potential donor countries would have been held and that the latter would have been able to clarify their position with regard to the Special Fund.

5. He regretted that a large number of Member States did not appear to have appreciated the urgency of the situation. He wished to stress that the survival of millions of human beings depended on the United Nations, which was passing through the most serious crisis in its existence. It was for the Economic and Social Council to ensure that the Organization met the challenge, for the sake both of the countries affected and of its own reputation.

6. Mr. PREBISCH (Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Emergency Operation)<sup>1</sup> stressed that the Emergency Operation had got off to a slow start if one considered the date which had been fixed for receiving contributions or announcements of contributions, and of the desperate plight of the poorest developing countries, which had worsened still further after the increase in oil prices. Nevertheless the operation had begun to take shape; as the Secretary-General had recently stated, on the assumption that the pre-conditions envisaged by certain contributors, notably as regards adequate participation by others, were realized, it appeared that pledges or expectations of bilateral and multilateral contributions already indicated by Governments would amount to over \$1,000 million – the equivalent of more than one-third of

<sup>1</sup> The complete text of the statement made by the special representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Emergency Operation was circulated as document E/L.1610.

the estimated cost of the emergency assistance required over the next 12 months by the most seriously affected countries. That figure did not include a large number of bilateral contributions which were being made, mainly by oil-exporting countries; it remained to be decided whether such contributions, which related to the Emergency Operation but also contained an element of economic development, could be included in the global calculations.

7. The Secretary-General had convened a meeting of possible contributors on 15 June 1974, in order to speed up the rate of flow of contributions; that meeting, which was of a preparatory nature, had not resulted in definitive decisions, and the Secretary-General proposed to convene another meeting, at ministerial level, in September 1974, at which it was hoped that specific solutions would be arrived at. A note had been sent to the most seriously affected countries asking them for the information required to determine their most pressing needs. That difficult task had been undertaken immediately on the basis of information already available, with the assistance, at the technical level, of institutions such as IBRD, IMF, UNCTAD, UNDP and FAO. In spite of the difficulty of the undertaking, he proposed to submit in the near future a provisional list of countries, on the understanding that it might subsequently be modified.

8. During the visits which he had paid to OECD and EEC, as well as to a certain number of oil-exporting countries, he had been at pains to draw the attention of possible donors to the distinction that should be made between the Emergency Operation and the Special Fund which was to be set up when the work of the *Ad hoc* Committee on the Special Programme had been completed. He found that several countries, having rendered substantial assistance, felt that there was no call to participate in the Special Programme. But it was necessary to obtain information from them about the bilateral operations which they had already carried out in order to determine in each individual case what assistance was still required.

9. The Secretary-General had earnestly requested countries to pay their contributions as soon as possible or, if a contribution had been pledged subject to certain conditions, to make an advance which would enable him to undertake the operations for which he was responsible without delay.

10. During his conversations, he had encountered certain obstacles which were, however, now receding. The developed countries had pointed out that the oil-exporting countries now had very large resources to invest, while for their part the oil-exporting countries thought that it would be only right for the developed countries, which had benefited for a long time from the low prices of primary commodities from the developing countries, to come to the latter's aid. Without wishing to enter into that kind of discussion, which was out of place at a time when the need for aid was so urgent, he would observe that it was natural that the oil-exporting countries should wish to devote part of their new resources to raising the living standards of their own populations, which was still very low; as for the unsatisfactory prices obtained by the developing countries for their primary products, the United Nations had repeat-

edly drawn attention to that point. Events had given the lie to the generally-accepted theory that market forces determined the most appropriate price level and the most rational distribution of productive resources. It was obvious that market forces had been powerless to avert the serious problems engendered by technology. In the case of oil, they had brought a deterioration in the terms of trade between oil and manufactures. The low prices of oil, by encouraging consumption and waste and by favouring forms of technology calculated to increase that waste had aggravated the inequality in bargaining power between producer and consumer countries. That had happened not only in the case of oil but with all primary products, particularly tropical products. If it was desired to establish the new international economic order advocated by the General Assembly in the Declaration adopted at its sixth special session in resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, there must be an improvement in the terms of trade and recognition of the fact that the prices of primary commodities from developing countries had started at too low a level, mainly because those exploiting them had at their disposal an abundance of low-paid labour. The aim should be not merely to prevent a deterioration in the terms of trade but, through a rational policy, to bring about a gradual rise in the level of prices of primary commodities in order to strike a balance more favourable to the developing countries than that resulting from the play of market forces.

11. The food shortage from which the developing countries were suffering arose fundamentally from the fact that the developing countries had insufficient resources to introduce expensive and complicated techniques which would make it possible for them to increase soil productivity. That was one aspect of the problem of development in the third world countries. Those countries, lacking the capital needed to accelerate development and solve their problems, were forced to follow a policy of playing for time in the hope that those problems would be solved by the spontaneous impact of economic forces. If it was really desired to establish a new economic world order, it was essential to find, with the agreement of all, a solution which would enable those countries to build up capital, which they needed all the more owing to the rapid growth of their populations. It was right to point out, however, that many developing countries did not always make the necessary effort; all too often they diverted their potential for capital formation to consumption, in imitation of the consumption characteristics of the large industrial centres which ran counter to the basic demands of development in third world countries. It had often been said that development had been characterized by a growing disparity between the industrial centres and the developing countries. In his view, it would be even more correct to say that the patterns of consumption of the large centres were rapidly gaining ground in the developing countries, thus internationalizing the consumer society. Whereas the difference between consumption by the upper social levels in the developing countries and consumption in the large industrial centres was steadily diminishing, the disparity was steadily increasing between consumption by those upper levels in the developing countries and that of the great masses of people on the periphery of development, which the World Bank had estimated at 40 per cent of the

population of the world – a figure which in any case was valid for Latin America. Consequently, and in order to solve the primary commodity problem, it was necessary to tackle the problems of those masses whose income was extremely low because it had not been possible for them to be absorbed by modern technology, precisely owing to the low rate of capital formation already mentioned.

12. He would stress the seriousness of the problem posed by the backward masses which had not been absorbed by modern technology. That problem had both an international and a domestic side. At the present moment, there was an opportunity to attack it through a series of convergent measures.

13. The oil-producing countries now had enormous resources; the figures were common knowledge. On the other hand the major consumer countries were suffering from large deficits which had to be corrected by bringing back the profits of the oil-producing countries. Without such "recycling" there would be a risk of recession in the world economy, a risk which should be avoided in the interests of everyone and above all of the developing countries, which would be the first to suffer from depression.

14. But however useful such recycling might be in the immediate future, a more radical solution would require that some of the oil resources should go direct to the developing countries. In that connexion, he recalled the theory of a well-known economist of the developed world, of which he had read in a newspaper article a few days previously. According to that theory, the imbalance of payments in the industrial centres could easily be solved; all that was required was to recycle to those centres the profits of the oil-producing countries through a series of short-term operations, long-term investments, bank issues, etc. In that and similar articles there was not the slightest reference to the developing countries. Nevertheless the capital accumulating in the oil-producing countries could play an important role if instead of returning in greater part to the developed countries it was directed to the developing countries. That would make it possible to solve three problems at once: firstly, the development of the peripheral countries would be accelerated; secondly, the injection of new resources into the developing countries would enable them to import more capital goods from the industrial centres, which would help to solve the latter's balance-of-payments problems; thirdly, the oil-producing countries would find in the developing countries a vast field for productive investment which would enable them to make good the probable diminution of earnings from oil. Such use of oil resources to promote development was, in his view, of supreme importance. If the earnings of the oil-producing countries reverted to the industrial centres, the existing state of affairs would remain unchanged. The peripheral developing countries would continue to suffer from insufficient capital formation.

15. Despite the General Assembly's recommendation in resolution 3176 (XXVIII), the percentage of resources transferred to the developing countries had attained neither 1 per cent of GNP nor even 0.7 per cent of GNP in official assistance. There had been a setback in that respect. It might be possible to remedy the situation if oil revenues

were mobilized in part in favour of the developing countries, not as a philanthropic gesture but on the basis of mutual interest. The industrial centres themselves would benefit because of the resultant increase in the developing countries' imports of their capital goods. That effort would have to be accompanied by undertakings on the part of the developing countries to mobilize their internal resources more intensively; for the international effort had to be accompanied by a domestic counterpart. From that point of view he envisaged three types of convergent measures: a progressive directing of oil resources investment into the developing countries; an adequate contribution, larger than in the past, from the industrial centres; and a greater mobilization of the domestic resources of the developing countries. Those steps would help to solve one of the basic problems confronting the developing countries, namely that of capital formation.

16. Another major problem confronting the developing countries was that of their balance of payments. Most of those countries had suffered from a persistent deficit during the past 25 years. One of the reasons for that state of affairs was that trade between the developing countries themselves had not been sufficiently stimulated. It was doubtful whether the imbalance of trade from which many peripheral countries suffered could be corrected by increasing the prices of the commodities they exported to the industrial centres. The investment of oil revenues could play an appreciable role in helping to establish industries which, while not neglecting exports to the industrial centres, would serve to sustain reciprocal trade among developing countries.

17. It had been predicted in certain quarters that the rate of growth of the industrial centres would decline in coming years; without wishing to make any predictions on the subject, he was of opinion that the developing countries could not anticipate any action on the part of the industrial centres that would enable them to remedy the persistent disequilibrium in their balance of payments. They should count rather on trade among themselves; an effort had already been made in that direction by the creation of markets, mutual concessions, etc., but that effort was insufficient. The investment of oil revenues could play a tremendous role in helping the poorest countries to enter the circuit of reciprocal trade. It was necessary not only to create a favourable commercial setting for reciprocal trade, and to encourage investments to stimulate such trade, but also to establish an appropriate system of payments. Such an effort had to be made, whether in the framework of free trade areas or under common market agreements within sub-regional or regional groups, etc. A certain amount of doctrinaire resistance had been encountered, however, particularly in Latin America.

18. The stimulation of reciprocal trade required a certain dynamism; the countries or groups of countries with resources at their disposal should make every effort to direct their requests for imports increasingly at other developing countries of the sub-region or region, or even at such countries in other parts of the world. If the oil-producing countries were to procure a growing share of their imports from developing countries, that would have an important multiplier effect on reciprocal trade; if a

developing country increased its export to an oil-producing country, the resultant introduction of a system of payments would have advantages for other developing countries, thus creating an ever-widening circuit – which must, however, be kept open. Such systems of payment, and the payments union which would be the ultimate objective, called for a firm foundation of convertibility. It was difficult for the developing countries to establish such a foundation, but if they could be helped by bringing oil resources into play, a foundation of convertibility could be established for any currency of account and a system of reciprocal trade would thus be backed by a monetary stimulus. In that perspective there was now an opportunity, unprecedented in the history of the industrialization of the developing countries, of establishing a favourable framework for development.

19. Analysing, in the light of Latin American experience, the role of multinational corporations in stimulating world trade, he said that the corporations, by reason of their organization, technology and capability, were in the best position to profit from the trading facilities established to stimulate reciprocal trade. Recent studies had provided interesting information on the advantages and disadvantages of the activities of multinational corporations to peripheral States. He referred in that connexion to the inferiority, not only technical but financial, of those countries *vis-à-vis* the corporations. If the developing countries had at their disposal resources that were independent of the multinational corporations – notably resources derived from oil – they would be in a better position to negotiate with the latter. They could thus secure better conditions of association with the multinational corporations, or more simply form their own multinational corporations.

20. The observations he had made showed that the present crisis afforded great opportunities for solving the structural problems which impeded the acceleration of the rate of development of the peripheral countries. There was a Chinese proverb to the effect that great crises entailed huge risks, but also brought great opportunities. It was now possible to create the new order, the concept of which had, after many years of discussion, been enshrined in a historic United Nations resolution.

21. When the Secretary-General had asked him to become his Special Representative for the United Nations Emergency Operation, he had accepted with gratitude towards the United Nations and with a desire to help to solve the urgent problems confronting the countries worst hit by the present economic crisis. Those countries, representing a large proportion of the world's population, should have the benefit of mankind's solidarity. That would be in the interest of the world as a whole, since the world economy was now highly vulnerable: if the economies of the poorest countries were to collapse, a chain reaction might result. In those circumstances, the United Nations had a great role to play; population problems, environmental and commodity problems, and problems of the utilization of natural resources and of the transfer of technology arose at the world level and required its presence. No other body could assume such responsibilities. For that purpose, however, the structure of the United Nations system had to be reformed. In the countries he had visited in Latin America and elsewhere,

there was a lack of integration between the functions of economic analysis performed by the United Nations and practical action, particularly in technical assistance matters. The United Nations system must adjust its structure to achieve relevance to problems which had acquired a significance they had not possessed at its inception. The General Assembly had been wise to adopt resolution 3172 (XXVIII) providing for a special session devoted to development and to those problems; the United Nations system should reform its structures so that it could mount a vigorous attack on the great problems confronting it and give real meaning to the new international economic order.

22. Mr. MACKENZIE (United Kingdom) said that he had two suggestions to make with regard to the Emergency Operation for assistance to the countries hardest hit by the crisis. First, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General should issue as early as possible a list of the countries which all parties had agreed to recognize as fulfilling the necessary conditions for receiving emergency assistance; secondly, the conditions under which pledges of funds could be considered as contributions to the Emergency Operation should be defined.

23. Mr. PÉREZ GUERRERO (Venezuela) said that the steps to be taken to meet the present economic crisis were of two kinds. First, there were the urgent problems faced by many countries as a result of the latest series of economic events, added to pre-existing factors. Secondly, there was the problem of the world economic structure, which had been the subject of the Declaration and of the Programme of Action adopted by the General Assembly at its sixth special session. It was encouraging to note that, so short a time after the Secretary-General's meeting in New York with actual and prospective contributors, an emergency programme was already being prepared. He stressed that the question was not one of forcing countries with greater liquidities, or the oil-producing countries, to bear the entire financial burden of assistance, but a question of sharing the responsibility among all countries standing in a favourable position in the concert of nations. His delegation was certain that other oil-producing countries would, like Venezuela, rise to their responsibilities. Some had already given proof of that spirit by responding favourably to the Secretary-General's appeal for contributions towards emergency assistance to the developing countries most seriously affected by the crisis, as recorded in the Secretary-General's note on the subject (E/L.1608).

24. The initiative of bringing together prospective contributors at the ministerial level should be encouraged. Venezuela would participate in such a meeting since an opportunity would thus be afforded of finding a solution satisfactory to the countries that attached conditions to their prospective contributions to the emergency programme; those contributions would have to be made sufficiently flexible to be really effective.

25. He regretted that the report of the *Ad hoc* Committee on the Special Programme was so sketchy and hoped that its next report would be more detailed. In his opinion, the Emergency Operation should not entail an increase in the bureaucratic machinery of the United Nations; the international or regional financial institutions could help the



United Nations to carry out the task involved in the establishment and functioning of an emergency programme.

26. Mr. BARCELÓ (Mexico) agreed that action must be taken at two levels: firstly by emergency measures in the 30 or 40 most seriously affected countries, and then by seeking a solution to problems deriving from the economic and social structure, throughout the world and in the developing countries in particular. In that context, the World Population Conference and the World Food Conference to be held during the year should concentrate on solving the problems not only of the current emergency but the problems which would arise in the longer term. In his opinion the whole United Nations machinery, beginning with the Economic and Social Council itself, should engage in a search for guidelines and patterns of action. Indeed it was the duty of the Council and of all other United Nations bodies to adapt themselves to the needs of the hour.

27. Mr. FERGUSON (United States of America) said that he wished to make his delegation's position clear on the subject of emergency operations on the one hand and a new international economic order on the other. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General had said that the present crisis involved a series of problems arising from deep-rooted causes and from imbalances in the international economic order. The United States of America acknowledged the existence of those imbalances and of certain injustices but with regard to the countries most seriously affected by the crisis it made a definitive distinction between problems requiring immediate short-term assistance and long-term development problems. It rejected the theory under which the adoption of a new international economic order as defined by the General Assembly at its sixth special session, with all its attendant premises and hypotheses, was a necessary pre-condition for the solution of the urgent problem facing some 35 most seriously affected countries. Those reservations had already been expressed in the United States Government's reply to the Secretary-General.

28. Nevertheless the United States was prepared to participate in the Emergency Operation and his Government would very shortly announce, as soon as the result of the present year's harvests were known, the nature of its participation. That support, however, should not be taken to imply approval of the Programme of Action: the United States had already declared that it would not contribute to the Special Fund envisaged in section X of the Programme of Action. But it supported fully the emergency assistance programme, in the belief that those countries which had the resources available to do so should come to the help of those hardest hit by the crisis.

29. It was not a question of deciding there and then whether the increase in oil prices had been provoked or whether it had come about spontaneously. Another error to be avoided, in his delegation's view, was the over-simplified distinction made between developed and developing countries. There were in reality countries which were at different stages of development. Similarly, the distinction between consumer and producer countries was an artificial one. The United States, for instance, was probably the largest consumer country and at the same time the largest

producer, not of manufactured goods, but of primary commodities. It imported manufactured articles, and therefore faced the same problems and the same difficulties as the producers of primary commodities and importers of manufactured articles.

30. Mr. DUMAS (France) reminded the Council, on behalf of the nine members of EEC, that the Community had announced its intention of participating in the special emergency operations, and had indicated the substantial amount and the conditions of its participation in its reply to the Secretary-General (E/L.1608). The Community and its members, individually and collectively, were following the development of the situation with interest and would study carefully the suggestions made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

31. Mr. LAGERFELT (Sweden) said that the present crisis had seriously affected a number of developing countries; according to several estimates, those countries would need from \$3,000 to \$4,000 million of additional resources over a period of 12 months.

32. The Special Programme adopted by the General Assembly at its sixth special session had been most timely. It was now incumbent on the whole United Nations system on the one hand, and the industrialized and potential donor countries on the other, to make strenuous efforts to implement that programme and, as a first step, to meet short-term needs. Sweden itself had channelled assistance in the most flexible and speedy manner possible to the most seriously affected countries; his Government had decided to increase by some \$20 million its bilateral aid to a certain number of those countries and had made that sum freely available to cover their import requirements. Other countries had been enabled to redirect their input of Swedish assistance in order to augment their import capacity.

33. The report of the *Ad hoc* Committee on the Special Programme was a useful document, but his delegation had hoped for more specific recommendations to the Economic and Social Council. It was now urgent for the Council to consider the establishment of the Special Fund. It should therefore at the present session give its attention to such questions as how the governing body of the Fund was to be composed; how secretarial services should be supplied; how adequate funds could be secured; what countries should receive assistance from the Fund; what types of activities should be conducted; and whether those activities should be conducted through contracts with executing agencies or by machinery attached to the Fund itself.

34. As the Swedish representative had stated in the general debate (1904th meeting), the Swedish Government expected that Special Fund arrangements would be adopted in accordance with the principles laid down at the sixth special session of the General Assembly regarding the influence of developing countries in the decision-making process of multilateral financial institutions. That being its basic attitude, his Government would support proposals ensuring that the developing countries, whether recipients or donors, had a decisive voice in the governing body of the Fund.

35. Moreover his delegation was not convinced of the necessity to create new operational machinery for the Special Fund; it would be better to explore possible relationships with existing international organizations. As regards contributions to the Special Fund, his Government was prepared to act swiftly once a solution had been adopted which commanded wide support in the United Nations.

36. Mr. PREBISCH (Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Emergency Operation), answering the two points raised by the United Kingdom representative, said, first, that a preliminary list of countries would be distributed in a week's time. Secondly, a reporting system would be organized whereby bilateral or multilateral contributions made in the next 12 months

could be properly co-ordinated and combined. As part of that system, he and his colleagues would establish clear criteria for defining the type of contribution suitable for emergency operations. Some of the specialized agencies were also giving valuable help in that undertaking.

37. The PRESIDENT drew the Council's attention to paragraph 15 of the *Ad hoc* Committee's report, where it was suggested that the *Ad hoc* Committee should meet again early in September 1974, which called for a decision by the Council. The Council would perhaps wish to decide that the question be referred to the Economic Committee.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 5.5 p.m.*

## 1918th meeting

Wednesday, 31 July 1974, at 10.35 a.m.

*President:* Mr. A. KARHILO (Finland)

E/SR.1918

### *Organization of work*

1. The PRESIDENT reminded the Council that during the general debate a number of delegations had made substantive statements on the important issue of collective economic security, which the Council had intended to consider in plenary. Since one of the informal draft resolutions being discussed at the level of the Economic Committee dealt with that item, he proposed that it should be formally allocated to the Economic Committee for action.

*It was so decided.*

### *Human rights questions: Allegations regarding infringements of trade union rights (E/5565)*

2. The PRESIDENT drew the Council's attention to the note on allegations regarding infringements of trade union rights (E/5565), which had been submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions. In paragraph 5 of the note, the Secretary-General suggested that the Council should transmit the two communications from international trade union organizations relating to allegations of infringements of trade union rights in South Africa to the *Ad hoc* Working Group of Experts of the Commission on Human Rights and that the Working Group should be requested to include its findings on the matter in its report to the Council at the fifty-eighth session. He reminded the Council that a similar procedure had been adopted at its fifty-sixth session with regard to an identical issue. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Council wished to act accordingly.

*It was so decided.*

### AGENDA ITEM 9

#### World Food Conference (*concluded*)\* (E/5533; E/L.1609, E/L.1611/Rev.1; E/NGO/18)

3. The PRESIDENT invited the Council to revert to the question of the implementation of resolution 1836 (LVI) on emergency measures in regard to the supply of fertilizers and pesticides. In accordance with operative paragraph 1 of that resolution, the Council of FAO had considered at its sixty-third session the emergency plan of operations drawn up by the Director-General of FAO for increasing the supply of fertilizers to developing countries, including the establishment of a fertilizer pool. The relevant extracts of the report of that session were annexed to the letter of transmittal of the Director-General of FAO (E/L.1609).

4. Mr. CORDOVEZ (Secretary of the Council), presenting a preliminary oral report on the replies received by the Secretary-General in response to Council resolution 1836 (LVI), said that so far replies had been received from the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and United States.

5. The Government of Canada had indicated that, in recognition of the urgency of the situation, it had increased its planned assistance for the year 1974/75 by \$US 1 million, of which approximately one fifth would be devoted to the purchase of fertilizers, in addition to the

\* Resumed from the 1916th meeting.