



Chairman: Mr. Max H. WERSHOF (Canada).

AGENDA ITEM 76

Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly (continued): *

(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (continued) (A/7931, A/C.5/1313 and Add.1)**

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the Committee to the note by the Secretary-General (A/7931) and invited it to elect four persons to fill vacancies occurring in the membership of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions as a result of the expiration, on 31 December 1970, of the terms of office of Mr. Corrêa, Mr. Riad, Mr. Sanu and Mr. Serbanescu. As shown in documents A/C.5/1313 and Add.1, five persons had been proposed for appointment. Subject to rule 157 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, members of the Fifth Committee were free to vote for whomever they wished, whether or not their names had been formally proposed for appointment.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Semichi (Algeria) and Mr. Ashwin (Australia) acted as tellers.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

Number of ballot papers:	90
Invalid ballots:	0
Number of valid ballots:	90
Abstentions:	0
Number of members voting:	90
Required majority:	46

Number of votes obtained:

Mr. Mselle	86
Mr. Khalil	84
Mr. Tardos	69
Mr. Corrêa	52
Mr. Faura	48
Three other persons	4

Having obtained the highest number of votes above the required majority, Mr. Paulo Lopes Corrêa (Brazil), Mr. Ahmed Tewfik Khalil (United Arab Republic), Mr. C. S. M. Mselle (United Republic of Tanzania) and Mr. József Tardos (Hungary) were

recommended by the Committee for appointment as members of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for a three-year term beginning on 1 January 1971.

2. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the results of the voting should be reported directly to the General Assembly by the Rapporteur.

3. Miss FORCIGNANO (Italy) said that by his note (A/7931, para. 4), the Secretary-General had informed members of the Committee that he had received a letter from Mr. Bannier, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, in which Mr. Bannier had tendered his resignation from the Advisory Committee, to be effective on 31 December 1970. The Secretary-General had also drawn attention to the fact that it would be necessary for the General Assembly to appoint a person to serve for the unexpired portion of Mr. Bannier's term of office, namely, until 31 December 1972. The Italian Government had informed the Secretary-General, by letter dated 23 September 1970, and all Permanent Missions to the United Nations, by Note No. 4832 of 22 September 1970, that it had decided to submit the candidature of Mr. Mario Majoli to fill the vacancy arising as a result of Mr. Bannier's resignation. In the circumstances, the Italian delegation would have expected a document informing members of Mr. Majoli's candidature to have been circulated by the Secretariat together with document A/C.5/1313. It was the duty of the Fifth Committee to complete elections for membership of the Advisory Committee, and to elect, as soon as possible, a person to fill Mr. Bannier's seat as a member of the Advisory Committee.

4. The CHAIRMAN said that he would consult the representative of the Secretary-General in order to ascertain what steps should be taken to issue the document to which the Italian representative had referred.

AGENDA ITEM 77

Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions (continued) (A/8011 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/C.5/XXV/CRP.2)

5. Mr. DENEKE (Ethiopia) said that the report of the Committee on Contributions (A/8011 and Corr.1) showed that in carrying out its functions the Committee had taken account of opinions expressed by Member States at previous sessions of the General Assembly. In drawing up the scale of assessments, the Committee had based itself on national accounts data for the years

* Resumed from the 1372nd meeting.

** Resumed from the 1358th meeting.

1966 to 1968, on surveys made by the regional economic commissions, and on statistical reports submitted by technical co-operation programmes. Reference to paragraph 21 of the Committee's report showed that the number of countries with *per capita* income above \$1,000 had increased from seventeen to twenty-four and that the number of countries with *per capita* income below \$300 had declined from seventy-six to seventy-one. In view of that upward trend, it was to be hoped that the Committee would continue its endeavours to determine the real economic position of Member States. It was to be hoped, too, that the gap between countries with *per capita* income above \$1,000 and countries with *per capita* income over \$500 would be narrowed in the very near future, thus alleviating the strain imposed on developing countries. His delegation endorsed the Committee's recommendation that the Secretary-General be authorized to continue arrangements, for the period 1971-1973, for the payment of part of Member States' contributions in currencies other than United States dollars, and hoped that payment would be accepted in as wide a range of currencies as possible.

6. Mr. ALWAN (Iraq) said that it was gratifying to learn that the Committee on Contributions had decided to exercise wider discretion in assessing the contributions of developing countries, and that, as a result, the assessments of countries with a *per capita* income below \$300 had not been increased. The Committee had provided a detailed explanation of the procedures it had followed in drawing up the scale of assessments, and most delegations appeared to be satisfied with the scale.

7. His delegation had noted with satisfaction that, in reviewing the scale, the Committee had concentrated on the question of the ability of Member States to secure foreign currency. It was of the opinion, however, that the Organization's needs for currencies other than United States dollars should first be met through the contributions of developing countries and had therefore agreed to co-sponsor the proposal on the subject introduced by the representative of the United Arab Republic at the previous meeting. In response to the Secretary-General's letter FI 311(1) of 9 January 1970, his Government had already paid its contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations. However, it had been surprised to learn, from the same letter, that the currency of a new developed country had, for the first time, been added to the list of non-United States currencies in which it was estimated that substantial amounts of expenditures would be incurred by the United Nations in 1970. So far as his delegation was aware, the country in question did not act as host to a specialized agency or regional economic commission. It would be interesting to learn why that particular currency had been added to the list for the first time in 1970, the amounts of expenditure incurred in that particular currency and the reasons for the expenditure.

8. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to document A/C.5/XXV/CRP.2 containing a paragraph concerning the ability of Member States to secure foreign currency,

which a number of delegations had proposed for inclusion in the Committee's report. The United Arab Republic should be included among the delegations listed.

9. Mr. TURNER (Controller) said that the inclusion of the paragraph in question in the Committee's report as a general policy guideline on which there was a consensus would create no difficulty for the Secretary-General. It did, in fact, reflect recent policy and practice.

10. Replying to the representative of Iraq, he said that, in accepting national currencies other than United States dollars, the Secretariat was guided by expenditure incurred in such currencies under the regular budget. Priority was given to the countries concerned, but that was without prejudice to the right of any Government to make payments in currencies other than United States dollars to the extent that they were needed. The Secretariat could not accept currencies for which there was no need. In the previous two years, expenditure equivalent to \$1 million had been incurred in the currency to which he assumed the representative of Iraq had been referring.

11. Mr. ALWAN (Iraq) asked whether the decision to accept payment in the currency in question had been referred to the Committee on Contributions. If so, what had been its reaction and for what purpose had the currency been used?

12. Mr. TURNER (Controller) replying to the representative of Iraq, said that the currency had been used primarily for activities relating to the operations of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and, to some additional, limited extent, to the operations of other organizations such as UNDP and UNRWA. A pooling system existed whereby currencies were made available to other organizations within the United Nations system as required. The decision to accept the particular currency in question had been referred to the Committee on Contributions, which had taken note of it.

13. Mr. ALWAN (Iraq) asked whether the Secretariat could supply his delegation with a breakdown, by item, of the expenditure incurred in the currency in question.

14. Mr. TURNER (Controller), replying to the representative of Iraq, said that the Secretariat would supply the fullest possible information.

15. Mr. BANERJEE (India), reverting to the earlier remarks of the Controller, said that it could be taken for granted that the paragraph contained in document A/C.5/XXV/CRP.2 did reflect a consensus and a decision by the Committee.

16. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to the inclusion of the paragraph in its report.

It was so decided.

17. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that he felt constrained to sound a very serious warning that, unless some drastic action was taken to make the United Nations solvent it would languish and disintegrate within two or three years. The Committee on Contributions must face that fact squarely.

18. The developing countries should not harbour thoughts of decreasing their contributions for they were the cheapest possible premium they could pay for the maintenance of peace. In connexion with the artificial ceiling which had been imposed on the United States contribution, he pointed out that the host country derived very considerable intangible benefits from the visits of statesmen to the United Nations in that it was thereby spared the need to send representatives on special missions around the globe. The assessment of the Soviet Union had been reduced because that of Japan had been increased, yet the USSR had a larger population and an area almost twice as great as that of the United States. The major contributors should not skimp on their contributions. Indeed, why should they not earmark a small percentage of 1 per cent of their defence budgets for the United Nations? Even though the Arab States had suffered many tribulations as a result of the errors of the United Nations, their contributions, however large they might be, were a cheap investment. It was high time that more voices were raised in the Committee on Contributions to urge consideration of ways to save the United Nations financially, because it was the best hope for peace.

19. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the draft resolution submitted by the Committee on Contributions in its report A/8011 and Corr.1, para. 53).

20. Mr. MARTINEZ (Venezuela) commended the Committee on Contributions on its excellent report. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the Committee. Referring to the matter dealt with in paragraph 19 of the report, he said that his delegation considered that when the operation of the *per capita* income factor was reviewed, the present ceiling of \$1,000 should be raised to \$1,500.

21. Mr. VAZQUEZ (Uruguay) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution because, in particular, it considered that in establishing the 1971-1973 scale of assessments, the Committee on Contributions had made considerable progress in the slow process of establishing a just scale. It was for the General Assembly itself to consider the establishment of new criteria or the amendment of existing criteria in order to correct whatever imbalances persisted.

The draft resolution in paragraph 53 of the report of the Committee on Contributions (see A/8011, Corr.1, para. 53) was adopted by 86 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

22. Mr. SERBANESCU (Romania), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution following the favourable consensus on the request to revise the contribution

of Romania. He expressed gratitude to those delegations which had supported his request for a review of his country's rate of assessment in view of the natural disasters which it had suffered.

23. Mr. NAITO (Japan) recalled that his delegation, at the 1373rd meeting, had already stated its position on the scale of assessments for 1971, 1972 and 1973. It was not entirely convinced of the equity of that scale and, with particular regard to the assessment of Libya and its own rate, he felt that the Committee on Contributions had not always succeeded in its attempts to avoid drastic changes in the scale. His delegation had therefore been obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

AGENDA ITEM 80

Implementation of the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies (continued) * (A/7968, A/7989 and Add.1, A/7999 and Add.1, A/8033, A/8128, A/8139, A/C.5/1299, A/C.5/1304 and Corr.1, A/C.5/L.1043):

- (a) **Report of the Secretary-General (continued) * (A/7999 and Add.1);**
- (b) **Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (continued) * (A/8139)**

Report on the activities of the Joint Inspection Unit during the period 1 July 1969-30 June 1970 (continued) * (A/8128, A/C.5/1299, A/C.5/1304 and Corr.1, A/C.5/L.1043)

24. Mr. SILVEIRADA MOTA (Brazil) said that in connexion with the agenda item under discussion, the General Assembly was required to decide whether the Joint Inspection Unit should be continued beyond its experimental period of four years. His delegation felt that it should refrain from commenting on the reports already submitted by the Unit; at the present juncture, the task of the Fifth Committee was not to appraise the intrinsic merits of those reports but to assess the activities of the Unit in terms of its contribution to the United Nations system. Nevertheless, his delegation would say that, having perused the reports so far produced, it would prefer the Unit to concentrate more on actual inspection of management and financial procedures and to make specific comments and recommendations on them, rather than to discuss general ideas or deal with management and financial procedures in too broad a manner.

25. In an endeavour to form an opinion on the accomplishments of the Unit, his delegation had studied the Secretary-General's report on the activities of the Joint Inspection Unit during the period from 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970 (A/C.5/1304 and Corr.1) and the relevant comments of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/8128), together with the report on the activities of the Unit from January

* Resumed from the 1369th meeting.

1968 to June 1969,¹ and the Advisory Committee's related comments.² Unfortunately, those reports did not provide sufficient information on which to base an opinion. The elements of evaluation provided did not go beyond somewhat general statements and the Secretary-General, the Joint Inspection Unit and the Advisory Committee left unanswered several questions which must be answered if the Fifth Committee was to make a proper assessment of the performance of the Joint Inspection Unit.

26. In the first place, no precise indication was given of the effectiveness of the Unit's recommendations in attaining the purposes for which it had been established, namely, in promoting efficiency and the better use of funds. Moreover, so far the Unit's reports had not been received very well and an effort should be made to ascertain whether poor receptivity was attributable only to a resistance to change or to other reasons as well. In that connexion, his delegation agreed that organizations should supply more information on action taken to implement the Unit's recommendations or on the reasons for the absence or deferment of such action. It was not enough to express appreciation for recommendations, no matter how thought-provoking they might be; what was essential was to determine whether the recommendations resulted in greater efficiency and a more economical use of resources.

27. Another point to be elucidated was whether the subjects reported on by the Unit might not have been studied by another organ concerned with control, investigation and co-ordination. In that connexion, it would be helpful to bear in mind the report of the Secretary-General (A/7938), which described all the bodies and organs established in the United Nations family of organizations for the purpose of administrative and budgetary control, investigation and co-ordination. That document showed that there were already very many such organs and that over \$4,600,000 had been spent on them in 1969. It was permissible to wonder whether all those organs were equally indispensable and whether they were not to some extent duplicating each other's work. In 1969, the Advisory Committee had expressed concern³ at the overlapping of activities of organs having investigatory functions in the field of administration and the Joint Inspection Unit, in paragraph 3 of its second report (A/C.5/1304 and Corr.1, annex), stated that there had been a progressive development of consultations between the Unit and United Nations bodies whose activities were closely related to those of the Unit, such as the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Panel of External Auditors of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The very fact that an effort had to be made to avoid duplication in the work of those bodies seemed to suggest that there was overlapping.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 81, document A/C.5/1241.

² *Ibid.*, document A/7728.

³ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 8* (and erratum), para. 80.

28. His delegation doubted the need for so many organs to deal with co-ordination, control and inspection and would be unable to reach a definitive conclusion on the continuation of the Joint Inspection Unit until it had weighed comprehensive information on the performance of the Unit in effectively promoting a more rational use of resources, the real need for the Unit, and the relationship between results obtained and costs incurred. For the time being, his delegation did not object to the Advisory Committee's suggestion (A/8128, para. 9) that the Unit should be continued, on an experimental basis, for a period of two years beyond 31 December 1971. It was to be hoped that, if the General Assembly endorsed that suggestion, the extension would provide an opportunity for a thorough review of the Unit's activities and for the submission of information on the basis of which a serious evaluation could be made.

29. Mr. NAUDY (France) introduced a draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1043)—which five other countries had co-sponsored—which restated the relevant recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee (A/8128), which his delegation supported. Operative paragraph 2 was based on the premise that it would be appropriate for the Joint Inspection Unit to be in the same position with regard to all organizations within the United Nations system. Operative paragraph 3 implied that, one year before the expiration of its new term, consideration would be given to whether it should be continued and, if so, whether its terms of reference should be amended or otherwise clarified. His delegation believed that the Unit should be given every chance to demonstrate its effectiveness and should continue to function as long as possible under conditions of its own creation. Consequently, its terms of reference and conditions of work would be reviewed only at the General Assembly's twenty-seventh session. Given the labyrinthine nature of the United Nations system, the initial progress of a body like the Joint Inspection Unit would inevitably be slow. His delegation believed that the Unit was working in the right direction and that its programme of activities was well-chosen. The Unit should be allowed to function long enough so that the decision as to its future could be an informed decision.

30. Mr. MSELLE (United Republic of Tanzania) observed that the work done by the Joint Inspection Unit merited appreciation, but the Unit had not yet had sufficient time to prove itself. It did not have a large staff and could hardly be expected to make sweeping recommendations so soon after its establishment; it would obviously need some time to settle down to work, especially in a system of the size and complexity of the United Nations family. He accordingly felt that it would be premature at the present stage for the fifth Committee to decide not to continue its mandate.

31. He would have thought that the problem of receptivity of the Unit's reports, mentioned in paragraph 33 of the Unit's second report, rested more with the legislative organs than with the Joint Inspection Unit itself. The fourth column of the table at the end of the Secretary-General's report (A/C.5/1304 and Corr.1)

showed many significant blanks. The inspectors could hardly be blamed when no action was taken by a body which had considered one of their reports: the body concerned should either state why it had rejected the report or should accept it and take the action indicated.

32. With regard to the question of the co-ordination of the work programme of the inspectors, his delegation was heartened by the efforts made by the Joint Inspection Unit to avoid duplication by refraining from investigating areas already under study by other groups, and hoped that legislative organs which wanted studies to be undertaken would first determine whether the work could be done by the Unit before they established a new investigating body.

33. Although he agreed with the Nigerian representative that the inspectors should not overemphasize field visits, he also felt that they should undertake such missions when they were requested to do so by the executive heads of the specialized agencies.

34. The General Assembly should continue the Joint Inspection Unit for a further experimental period of two years, and should review the matter before the end of its twenty-seventh session in order to afford the specialized agencies ample time to take appropriate action after it had reached its decision.

35. Finally, he hoped that the Fifth Committee would adopt the draft resolution in document A/C.5/L.1043 unanimously.

36. Mr. LAWRENCE (United States of America) said that programme evaluation was a matter of concern to all Members States having an interest in the proper administration of the programmes of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The ready availability of pertinent, objective information about the results of programmes was vital to continued government support of those programmes. The Fifth Committee should be mindful of the need to strengthen the United Nations evaluation machinery. In particular, his delegation would suggest the possibility of setting up a central mechanism which would meet the need for effective, independent evaluation of the activities of the entire United Nations system. Originally, his delegation had thought that the Fifth Committee would consider programme budgeting, the assignment of priorities and the two-year budget cycle as well as evaluation, including the question of the Joint Inspection Unit, under agenda item 80. However, it had not objected when the Chairman had suggested that the question of the Joint Inspection Unit should be discussed separately from the Bertrand Report (see A/7822). Regardless of the sequence in which matters relating to evaluation, programme budgeting and priorities were discussed, they were component parts of the global problem of improving the management of the Organization's affairs. Later in the session, his delegation might suggest ways of dealing with that global problem.

37. His delegation was pleased with the progress the Joint Inspection Unit had made and agreed with the Secretary-General that the Unit's contribution to the

improved efficiency of the United Nations and its family of organizations had assumed significant proportions. It was also pleased that consultations had taken place among the Joint Inspection Unit, the Advisory Committee and the external auditors, and hoped that such co-operation would continue, thereby avoiding unnecessary duplication in the external examination and evaluation of operations of the United Nations system of organizations. It seemed, however, that the inspectors were concerned about the tendency on the part of the United Nations and other organizations to defer action on the reports of the Joint Inspection Unit. It was extremely important that the governing organs of the United Nations system should examine the Unit's reports as soon as possible after they were issued and ensure that appropriate action was taken on the recommendations they contained. In that connexion, his delegation urged that the executive heads should submit progress reports to the members of the governing organs informing them what action had been taken to implement the Unit's recommendations.

38. His delegation would endorse an extension of the Joint Inspection Unit for an additional number of years on the understanding that the role, responsibilities, terms of reference and perhaps other characteristics of the Unit might be altered during the twenty-sixth session by any decision which the General Assembly might take on the over-all problem of improving management and procedures.

39. Mr. VAN VLOTEN (Netherlands) said that his delegation endorsed the Advisory Committee's suggestion to continue the Joint Inspection Unit on an experimental basis for a further period of two years beyond 31 December 1971. It hoped that in the meantime a realistic review would be made of the Unit's work and mandate in order to enable the Unit to perform an even more useful function in the United Nations system. Emphasis should perhaps be placed on investigations of prevailing conditions rather than on general studies about possible future arrangements.

40. His delegation also endorsed the suggestion in paragraph 32 of the Unit's second report that relevant reports of the Unit should be examined by the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme. At least twice a year, a concise summary or table should be issued giving essential data on all activities of the Unit, in particular the status of reports and comments thereon.

41. Turning to the draft resolution before the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/L.1043), he suggested that at its current session the General Assembly might confine itself to announcing that it intended to take a formal decision at its twenty-sixth session on the continuation of the Unit for a further period of two years and on a review of the Unit's work and mandate. The resolution on the subject might bring that fact to the attention of all organs in the United Nations system so that when taking a final decision at its twenty-sixth session, the General Assembly would have had the benefit of any comments they might wish to make and would have secured their concurrence in its recommendations.

42. Mr. GONTHA (Indonesia) associated his delegation with those who had expressed their appreciation of the work done by the Joint Inspection Unit. However, his delegation would like to think that the situation must have progressed beyond mere promises, that the reforms suggested by the inspectors would be studied, as paragraph 33 of their report implied. With regard to the tendency towards deferment of action mentioned in that paragraph, his delegation welcomed the fact that there was now a better "receptivity" of Joint Inspection Unit reports by the United Nations and other organizations, but would have been even more gratified if that receptivity had generated commensurate action to implement the recommendations made in the reports. It could only be frustrating to the Unit if it continued to seek ways and means of improving the efficiency of the United Nations but was not periodically apprised of the practicability of its recommendations and the stage reached in their implementation. The areas of study and investigation to which the Joint Inspection Unit had accorded priority were also of serious concern to the developing countries inasmuch as they affected the success of their national development programmes. His delegation shared the Secretary-General's hope that the executive heads of the specialized agencies would inform the Unit which of its recommendations had been accepted and implemented, and which had been rejected or set aside for further study as that would greatly facilitate and stimulate its efforts. The executive heads should also be requested to report periodically to their governing bodies on the progress made in implementing those recommendations. He wondered whether the executive heads were making their comments on Joint Inspection Unit reports within three months, or, if action by their governing bodies was called for, within a year and whether the Fifth Committee should not also be informed of the measures which had been taken to implement the recommendations. Joint Inspection Unit reports should be given greater publicity and Governments, too, should be fully apprised of its recommendations and the results of their implementation, especially with regard to the improvement of co-ordination in the case of combined programmes since that affected the implementation of their national programmes.

43. He was surprised that the Joint Inspection Unit's recommendations did not normally go to the Governing Council of UNDP which, as the organ responsible for the over-all supervision of the use of UNDP resources and the execution of its projects, should be kept fully informed of the problems arising from its activities.

44. The machinery of the United Nations system should be fully attuned to the requirements of the Second United Nations Development Decade. The Joint Inspection Unit, whose members had been selected for their expertise and technical capabilities, could make a valuable contribution to that goal by exploring ways and means of implementing the coherent set of policy measures called for in section C of the international development strategy adopted recently by the General Assembly (resolution 2626 (XXV)). An effectively functioning United Nations

system, in which waste in material and human resources was reduced to the minimum, would be of tremendous assistance in the realization of national development programmes, which would, in turn, contribute to the implementation of international development programmes. Although the Joint Inspection Unit had come into being too late to help in the First Development Decade, it had been established in good time to provide expert advice and to utilize the experience of the past Decade in improving the results of the Second Decade.

45. His delegation felt that the Joint Inspection Unit's terms of reference and its collective independence should be strengthened. Finally, it supported the proposal in the draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1043) that the Unit should be extended for a period of two years beyond 31 December 1971.

46. Mr. ASHWIN (Australia) said that his delegation agreed with the comment made by the Polish representative (1369th meeting) that Joint Inspection Unit inspectors should go into the field to check on individual projects less often and should concentrate on major problems on which basic studies could be done at Headquarters. It doubted whether the Unit should proceed at the present stage with its studies on the organization and operation of United Nations development assistance; although the subject was important and the inspectors' procedure for on-site inspections seemed reasonable, he doubted whether the results so far achieved had justified the cost. Further studies in that area might perhaps be postponed pending rearrangements in the administrative structure of development assistance and pending completion by the Unit of other partially related studies.

47. On the other hand, however, his delegation had been impressed by the Unit's reports on the regional economic commissions and felt that it should continue its studies on decentralization, as outlined in paragraphs 17-21 of its second report.

48. His delegation also approved of the priority given to other areas of study and investigation referred to in that report, but hoped that the Unit would take care to ensure that its own studies were properly co-ordinated with those being undertaken by other United Nations bodies. It supported the proposal to continue the Unit on an experimental basis.

49. Mr. REFSHAL (Norway) felt that, on the basis of the reports from the Joint Inspection Unit and the comments made by the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee, the Fifth Committee should also now be in a position to assess the Unit's usefulness. His delegation, for its part, felt that of the good work done by the Unit, some could have significant impact whereas some was of peripheral interest. It was clear from paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2360 A (XXII) establishing the Joint Inspection Unit, that the Unit had been intended to be fully independent and to have broad powers; thus, the activities of the inspectors had been fully within the Unit's terms of reference. Yet the body of reports from the inspectors

had not had the expected impact, possibly because their work programme and the scope of their activities had been too wide-ranging in too limited a period of time. Their reports appeared to be somewhat scattered and at times peripheral; they might perhaps have done better during the initial period to have concentrated on a few central tasks. While the inspectors were certainly acting within their terms of reference in scrutinizing any problem, he felt they should devote the bulk of their time to problems which the United Nations and the participating agencies regarded as central and on which they needed immediate recommendations. His delegation noted with appreciation that the inspectors considered suggestions from the executive heads of the specialized agencies in preparing their work programmes and hoped that the Advisory Committee, which, of all representative bodies, was most conversant with the budgetary and administrative problems of the United Nations, would give the inspectors suggestions for their future work programme.

50. Since some of the deliberative organs of the United Nations had dealt with the reports of the inspectors at a very leisurely pace and since the inspectors were far from completing their work programme, his delegation considered that the Advisory Committee's suggestion to continue the Unit on an experimental basis for a further period of two years beyond 3 December 1971 was a sensible way of getting full return from the initial investment. By the end of that period, the Fifth Committee would be in a better position to assess whether the Unit had been a useful one-time operation or whether the results it had achieved justified its establishment as a permanent institution.

51. Mr. STOBY (Guyana) felt that the Joint Inspection Unit had been an interesting but not entirely successful experiment; it had produced some good reports but some mediocre ones too. It was true that the Unit had gone beyond the inspection function strictly speaking—not necessarily a bad thing because of its stimulating effect—but when reviewing its role in the light of four years of experience, the Fifth Committee would have to decide whether the value of a body engaged in such wide-ranging activities might not be prejudiced by its potentialities for overlapping with other bodies.

52. In his view, in order to help the Fifth Committee to play its co-ordinating role in the system, the Joint Inspection Unit report should have included comments by the specialized agencies on its performance. He understood that the reason why the Unit had moved slowly was the complexity of the system it was studying, but thought that its pace would not have been quite so slow, nor the quality of its reports quite so uneven, if it had included more expertise. The Fifth Committee should draw the attention of intergovernmental organs to the importance of giving adequate consideration to the reports; careful consideration did not, of course, necessarily imply approval.

53. With a view to eliminating unnecessary overlapping, the Joint Inspection Unit should define its work programme every year purely for purposes of infor-

mation, not approval. For example, the inclusion of personnel questions in the Unit's work programme would surely bring it into conflict with the Administrative Management Service as regards the manpower utilization and deployment surveys being carried out by the latter, a problem which could perhaps be resolved through consultations, and the Unit's intended review of the organizational procedures of the General Assembly would surely overlap with the study to be prepared by the Special Committee on the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organization of the General Assembly set up for the purpose by the Assembly (resolution 2632 (XXV)). In his view, the Joint Inspection Unit should give priority to requests for reports from intergovernmental bodies, particularly the General Assembly. While he welcomed the close consultation between the Joint Inspection Unit and the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, described in paragraph 4 of the Joint Inspection Unit's second report, he felt that such consultations should not be carried too far lest they jeopardize the Unit's independence. From paragraph 3 of the report, it seemed that the Unit was merely trying to keep in touch with the surveys on the deployment and utilization of staff currently being undertaken by the Administrative Management Service, even though when the surveys were initiated the Fifth Committee had been concerned to ensure that they would be conducted with the help of an outside body, and the Secretary-General had said that the Unit would give its advice in that regard. In his view, the Unit should be informed of every stage of the surveys. He also hoped that the Unit's report on ECLA, together with the comments of the Advisory Committee, would be issued shortly. In his view, the Joint Inspection Unit should in future be represented at meetings of the Fifth Committee so that its representative could answer questions on its work and give members a better idea of its activities.

54. Mr. STARK (Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management) assured the representative of Guyana that there would be no overlapping between the manpower utilization and development surveys and the Joint Inspection Unit's personnel studies as a result of consultations between the Unit and the Administrative Management Service and because the Office of Personnel had been specifically excluded from the surveys.

55. It was true that, partly as a result of a suggestion by the Fifth Committee, the Secretary-General had considered associating the Joint Inspection Unit as far as possible with the Administrative Management Service surveys. In practice, however, the Unit had decided not to participate in the surveys, although exchanges of views were held between the two bodies and the material available to the surveyors was also made available to the inspectors when they needed it for their work.

56. The comments of the Secretary-General on the ECLA report would be issued in due course.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.