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Chairman: Miss Angie BROOKS (Liberia).

AGENDA ITEM 49

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/5126 and Corr.1 and Add.1; A/C.4/516 and Add.1-6, A/C.4/550, A/C.4/551; A/C.4/L.740/Rev.1, A/C.4/L.741 and Corr.1) (*continued*)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.4/L.740/REV.1, A/C.4/L.741 AND CORR.1) (*continued*)

1. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) said that, as a sponsor of joint draft resolution A/C.4/L.740, he wished to clarify some points in the text.

2. There had been some criticism of the tenth preambular paragraph. However, the sponsors had merely quoted verbatim from letters sent by the two Governments concerned, without adding any expression of personal opinion. Again, in the twelfth preambular paragraph, they had merely quoted from official United Nations documents.

3. The sponsors had now revised operative paragraph 3, and the new version would be introduced by the Chairman of the African-Asian group. The group had borne in mind two facts: first, that Rwanda and Burundi had stated that after 1 July the presence of Belgian troops would be their responsibility as sovereign States, and, second, that they had asked the United Nations for guarantees against the presence of Belgian troops. That paragraph had accordingly been very difficult to draft, and the sponsors therefore confined themselves to stating that the Belgian troops in process of evacuation would be confined within their barracks. If Rwanda and Burundi subsequently requested assistance from Belgium or any other country, they would do so on their own responsibility. Until such time as they were independent, however, it was the duty of the United Nations to stipulate that no Belgian troops should be there after 1 July.

4. As to the role conferred on the Secretary-General under the draft resolution, the Ghanaian delegation had every confidence in the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium but feared that settlers on the spot might create disturbances. Experience in the Congo showed that the Belgian Government could not be sure of keeping its own nationals under control. That made the presence of the United Nations essential.

5. In submitting the joint draft resolution, the sponsors had shown their confidence in Rwanda, Burundi and Belgium. He therefore appealed to Belgium not to press for a vote on its draft resolution (A/C.4/L.741 and Corr.1). The joint draft was more comprehensive than the Belgian proposal and its sponsors had endeavoured to define clearly the responsibilities of the United Nations. If the Belgian representative pressed his proposal, the sponsors of the joint draft resolution would request priority for their text.

6. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) said that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution had concentrated on the question of withdrawing the Belgian forces. Since Belgium had stated that it could not evacuate its troops before 1 July, insistence on that point would have served no purpose.

7. In operative paragraph 3 of that draft resolution there had been a disparity between the French and English texts; the former said "au ler juillet 1952" and the latter "by 1 July 1962". The sponsors had accordingly decided to present a revised version (A/C.4/L.740/Rev.1), in which the English text of that passage would read: "evacuate its forces still remaining in Rwanda and Burundi and that, as of 1 July 1962, the Belgian troops ...".

8. Mr. BINDZI (Cameroun) said that the revised French text should read: "retire et évacue ses forces encore stationnées au Rwanda et au Burundi, qu'à partir du ler juillet 1962 ...".

9. Mr. YOST (United States of America) said that his delegation supported the Belgian draft resolution (A/C.4/L.741 and Corr.1), which dealt succinctly with all the essential matters. It was his delegation's understanding that Belgium would be willing to accept amendments; it hoped that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.4/L.740/Rev.1) would be equally accommodating. Since the latter proposal had been drafted exclusively by the African-Asian group, it would be natural and proper if it likewise would be subject to amendment in order to take into account the views of other groups and delegations.

10. His delegation was particularly pleased with the attention which the joint draft resolution paid to economic problems, and in that regard it wished to emphasize the absolutely vital importance of Belgian technical and economic aid during the next few critical months. No other country had yet offered Rwanda and Burundi a comparable amount of aid; moreover, even if the United Nations and other peoples wishing to assist the two new countries took prompt action, weeks or months would pass before new technicians could be recruited and sent there.

11. His delegation consequently regretted certain provisions of that draft resolution which seemed likely to alarm the Belgians in Rwanda and Burundi. In its opinion too much importance was being attached to the presence of the Belgian troops, for it was difficult

to see what danger 450 Belgian soldiers could present for Rwanda and Burundi in comparison with the risk of panic and chaos. In the light of those considerations, his delegation would be happy to support the joint draft resolution if it could be amended in the following respects.

12. Firstly, the fifth preambular paragraph should be omitted or modified, because not only one, but several, of the objectives set forth in operative paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1743 (XVI) had failed of achievement, some of the objectives being mutually contradictory. There was therefore no point in singling out only one of the objectives in question.

13. Secondly, the tenth preambular paragraph should be omitted or revised, for if the resolution was to venture on to the difficult ground of summarizing the views expressed, it should do so with scrupulous objectivity. It was true that the Government of Rwanda had declared in its letter of 14 April (A/5126/Add.1, annex XXXVII) that termination of the Trusteeship Agreement would make illegal the presence of Belgian troops on the territory of the Republic, but it was equally true that the representatives of the Government of Rwanda who had participated in the Committee's proceedings had clearly stated that their Government desired to enjoy its sovereign right, after independence, to negotiate whatever bilateral or multilateral arrangements it deemed necessary in that connexion. There were already a great many inter-governmental arrangements in existence concerning the presence in the territory of one State, of military technicians or military forces of another State. There was nothing illegal or incompatible with national sovereignty about such arrangements.

14. Thirdly, the twelfth preambular paragraph should be omitted or revised. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium had in fact said at the 1313th meeting that, under the hypothesis that the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi should request the immediate departure of Belgian troops, those troops would no longer have any role to play and would remain in barracks until they could be evacuated. However, he had never said that, if either Government should request a temporary retention of certain Belgian forces, those forces would have no role to play. The twelfth preambular paragraph, therefore, did not accurately reflect the statements made to the Committee.

15. Fourthly, although a welcome change had just been made in the first part of operative paragraph 3, the fact remained that in the second part of that paragraph the sponsors, while paying lip service to the sovereign rights of Rwanda and Burundi, nevertheless curtailed those rights by calling for the withdrawal of Belgian forces at a fixed date after independence, whatever the wishes of the two Governments after independence might prove to be.

16. If the sponsors of the joint draft resolution feared that Belgian forces would not withdraw promptly after being requested to do so by the sovereign Government of Rwanda or of Burundi, they could amend operative paragraph 3 to provide that the troops would be withdrawn from the territory of either State within one month after the Government of that State had so requested.

17. If the joint draft resolution could be amended in the manner he had described, it should be able to be adopted almost unanimously.

Mr. Houaiss (Brazil), Rapporteur, took the Chair.

18. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia) said that the complexity of the matter under consideration derived from the fact that Belgium was not confident that Rwanda and Burundi were capable of preserving law and order. It was regrettable that Belgium had insisted on retaining troops which it should have evacuated just before independence. As the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi had voiced their desire to be independent, they could not have failed to appreciate the consequences of their action, nor could they have failed to prepare themselves for independence in the course of their efforts to obtain it, for they had not received it as a gift. They had made it known that they wanted no more Belgian troops in their territory. To those who said that the situation was not clear, he could reply that the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi had never objected to the terms of operative paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1743 (XVI).

19. After independence the situation might deteriorate in certain respects. That, however, was a possibility that had to be accepted by placing confidence in the manifold resources of the two countries. His own country had gone through difficult hours during the early stages of its independence but had succeeded in overcoming them. His delegation had complete confidence in Rwanda and Burundi, and that was, in a way, the main difference between its position and that of the Belgian delegation.

20. The text agreed upon by the members of the African-Asian group was far from perfect, and, in particular, his delegation was not very satisfied with the second part of operative paragraph 3, which might serve as a legal basis for the maintenance of the Belgian troops. However, the joint draft resolution represented an acceptable compromise. As for the draft resolution submitted by Belgium, he asked the Belgian delegation not to press for a vote upon it.

21. Mr. PARRY (Canada) said that his country welcomed the accession to independence of Rwanda and Burundi. It was undeniable, however, that those two countries would be faced with serious problems. They were among the least developed countries in the world, and the lack of specialists and trained personnel was seriously felt there. Furthermore, their security forces were few in number and inadequately equipped. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium had stated that his country would continue to provide assistance to the two countries and that it was prepared to do so without imposing conditions, fully respecting the sovereignty of Rwanda and of Burundi. As far as the Canadian delegation was aware, no offers comparable to that of Belgium had been made, and hence that country's aid was essential. However, foreign experts would stay in Rwanda and Burundi only if their safety could be ensured. The Committee's resolution should thus take into account the following factors.

22. Firstly, the Committee should take note of the fact that Belgium had indicated its readiness to assist the two countries and should recognize that Belgium alone could provide really substantial aid. Secondly, as regards ability to preserve law and order, it should be recalled that the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had recognized that the police forces and military forces of Rwanda and of Burundi existed only in embryo. A grave crisis would clearly result if the Belgian forces were to leave the two countries. Many delegations had failed to pay sufficient attention to that aspect of the report of the Commission for

Ruanda-Urundi. Thirdly, the United Nations should not have to carry out in Rwanda and in Burundi an operation comparable to that which had been conducted in the Congo. Finally, despite the attempts of certain delegations to distort their meaning, due attention should be paid to Belgium's assurances that the Belgian troops would not be kept in Rwanda and Burundi against the will of those countries.

23. His delegation found the Belgian delegation's draft resolution (A/C.4/L.741 and Corr.1) satisfactory. The joint draft resolution (A/C.4/L.740/Rev.1), on the other hand, had a number of weaknesses. The tenth and twelfth preambular paragraphs did not entirely reflect the true situation. However, the position of the Rwandese Government was extremely clear: it wished to preserve its freedom to act in its own best interests. The United Nations was therefore not entitled to prejudge that country's eventual attitude. Similar objections could be raised with regard to operative paragraph 3, which would, moreover, give to the departure of the Belgian troops the appearance of a hasty withdrawal. That, in turn, would be very dangerous as the impression thus created might cause a panic.

24. In his delegation's view, it was essential that Rwanda and Burundi, Belgium and the United Nations should act in a spirit of close co-operation.

25. Mrs. SKOTTSBERG-AHMAN (Sweden) thought that the Belgian draft resolution contained everything that was needed.

26. The joint draft resolution had many points in common with the Belgian draft, plus certain points which the Belgian draft lacked. However, her delegation felt that it was slightly unbalanced as it placed undue emphasis on the withdrawal of the Administering Authority's troops, a provision which had not been included in the resolutions adopted with respect to other Trust Territories. The reason for its inclusion was obviously the fear of recurrence of a situation such as had arisen in the Congo, but although the Administering Authority, the United Nations and the peoples directly involved were concerned at the difficulties confronting the two countries, and particularly Rwanda, it was to be hoped that no serious incident would occur and that the transition from Trusteeship to independence would take place smoothly.

27. The representatives of both Governments had stated that it would be possible to maintain order without any assistance. Her delegation was more than anxious to believe them. She approved the principle that the presence of foreign troops after independence would be illegal, but she also approved the principle that it should be left to the Governments to decide what they wished and what they needed. All those who had spoken and, in particular, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, had emphasized that nothing should be done which ran counter to the desires of the two Governments.

28. Although apparently not intended to be so, the joint draft resolution was tendentious. While, as was stated in the tenth preambular paragraph, the Government of Burundi had actually said that from the date of the proclamation of independence it would not agree to the presence of foreign troops on its soil, the paragraph contained no trace of the Rwandese representative's statement that Rwanda intended to retain complete freedom of action and to decide only after independent on the legality or otherwise of the pres-

ence of foreign troops. Her delegation considered that an entirely legitimate attitude. It was impossible to tell what the decision of Rwanda would be, and it was necessary to avoid giving the impression that the United Nations was seeking to exert pressure on the Government of Rwanda. Operative paragraph 3 appeared further to increase such pressure. Although it referred to the sovereignty of the two countries, it did so only in an incidental manner at the end of a sentence.

29. She felt that emphasis should be placed on the freedom of choice of the two Governments and believed that the final date of withdrawal should depend on the Governments' requests. It was to be hoped that calm would prevail, but since the possibility of disturbances could not be ignored, the Governments should not be prevented from taking whatever measures they deemed necessary. That was desirable, moreover, in the interest of all Members of the United Nations, as the Organization was not at present in a position to replace the Belgian troops.

30. In the circumstances, her delegation could not support the joint draft resolution unless it was made more balanced.

31. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) thanked the Chairman and the other members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi and also the Secretariat for their very comprehensive report (A/5126 and Corr.1 and Add.1).

32. One week before the independence of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, the General Assembly was faced with a tragic situation because, instead of a single State, two States were to accede to independence. His delegation deplored that fact and hoped that the two countries would succeed in re-establishing political unity. However, he welcomed the Agreement on Economic Union between the two countries, signed at the Addis Ababa Conference, on 19 April 1962 (A/5126/Add.1, annex XVI) and hoped that it would prove a step towards a closer union.

33. What was even more tragic was the fact that, after forty years of Belgian administration, it was being emphasized that Ruanda-Urundi could not achieve independence without the presence of foreign troops. His delegation attached great importance to the question of the withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces and noted that there was a difference of opinion between the General Assembly and the Administering Authority. Any decision on the matter would therefore constitute a precedent which might either satisfy or disappoint the United Nations for a long time to come.

34. His delegation had listened carefully to the arguments advanced by the Belgian delegation and, in particular to the statement made by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the 1313th meeting, when he said that, after independence, the complete evacuation of the troops would take five weeks. The position of the United Nations had nevertheless been clearly stated in paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1743 (XVI) which provided that the withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces should be completed before independence. The sponsors of that resolution had intended that there should be no derogation from that principle. Hence, the Administering Authority's interpretation of the sponsors, which had been accepted by the General Assembly.

35. The Burundi Government had already decided that it did not wish to have foreign troops on its soil after independence, while the authorities of Rwanda had stated that the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement would make illegal the presence of Belgian troops on the territory of the Republic (A/5126/Add.1, annex XXXVII). The United Nations and Ruanda-Urundi therefore held the same view on the question—namely that, as from the date of independence, the presence of foreign troops would be incompatible with the sovereignty of the two countries. The Belgian authorities did not dispute that principle but claimed that, for technical reasons, the troops should remain a while longer in Ruanda-Urundi. One reason they gave in that regard was that the troops were needed for the protection of Belgian military material. He wondered whether the statement that those vehicles and arms would be transported to Belgium was really in conformity with the spirit of the Mandate and the Trusteeship, since Belgium had *inter alia* promised to continue to assist Ruanda-Urundi after independence. It would seem that a special arrangement might be made to leave that material at the disposal of the two Governments. No foreign force should remain on the territory of the two countries after independence, since that would conflict with their wishes; and his delegation hoped that the Belgian authorities would make every effort to respect the United Nations decision on the subject.

36. His delegation was also concerned about the situation of the Rwandese refugees, and regretted that operative paragraph 3 (a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1743 (XVI) concerning the reconciliation of the various political factions had not produced any results. He therefore appealed to all concerned to reconsider the question with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. Since the representatives of the Rwandese Government and the petitioners had stated that the services of all were needed to ensure that the programmes for the reconstruction and development of the country were carried out, he hoped that all Rwandese would work together for their country's common good. The initiative in that regard should come from within, and the President of the Legislative Assembly and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Rwanda had a vital role to play in the search for a solution which was essential for their people.

37. As chapter VI of the report of the United Nations Commission (A/5126 and Corr.1), like the reports of previous missions, indicated, Ruanda-Urundi faced serious economic and social problems. His delegation therefore supported the view expressed in paragraph 376 of that report.

38. The attainment by Ruanda-Urundi of independence in peace and tranquillity would do credit both to the Administering Authority and to the United Nations. The Organization's prestige would be enhanced and his delegation hoped that, through the efforts of all, failure would be avoided. In conclusion, he expressed his best wishes for the future of Ruanda-Urundi and hoped that the two new States would soon become Members of the United Nations.

39. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled once again that the Committee's main objective, before it took a decision on the question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi, should be the good of the peoples concerned. Those peoples were perfectly justified in demanding independence for 1 July 1962, and he unreservedly approved the action

of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution in retaining that date in their text.

40. The struggle engaged in by all colonized countries against colonialism clearly showed that the presence of foreign troops on their territories would be incompatible with full and complete independence, and the sponsors of the joint draft resolution were therefore right in wishing the General Assembly to adopt measures of major importance in that regard. Those measures naturally encountered strenuous opposition from all the colonialist bloc, and the United States, the United Kingdom and France, Western Powers which were friends of Belgium, had rushed to the latter's aid. The colonial Powers sought to make the General Assembly take a decision which would be tantamount to a reversal of the position it had taken in resolution 1743 (XVI). According to that resolution, it was clear that Belgium was obliged to withdraw all of its military forces before 1 July 1962.

41. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sought to prove the impossible when he had tried to show that the General Assembly had taken no such decision, and in order to do so he had not hesitated to employ the most brazen manoeuvres. What had betrayed him, however, was that he had not even been satisfied with the period of one month which the sponsors of the joint draft resolution had in operative paragraph 3 accorded for the evacuation of the Belgian troops. It was therefore clear that he was attempting to keep the troops in the Territory for a much longer time.

42. In regard to the wording of the joint draft resolution, the Soviet Union was prepared to vote for the beginning of operative paragraph 3—up to the words "by 1 July 1962"—as originally worded. Although he had not yet seen in writing the amended version of the beginning of that paragraph, he did not believe that he would be able to vote for it in the form submitted by the representative of Liberia. That representative had called his amendment a drafting change designed to correct a discrepancy between the English and French versions. So far as he could see, however, the amendment affected the substance and not merely the form of all four official versions in English, French, Spanish and Russian (there being, to his knowledge, no Chinese text). It omitted from the draft the principle that Belgium was obliged to withdraw its forces by 1 July 1962. That was the principle embodied in General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI). If that date were omitted from the new resolution, it would be tantamount to reversing the General Assembly's previous decision and to excusing Belgium for having disregarded it. Even if that principle were still mentioned in the preamble, it would lose much of its force unless it was repeated in the operative part.

43. The difference of principle was in fact immense, because the decision taken by the General Assembly in resolution 1743 (XVI), and reiterated in the new draft resolution, would enable any Member State—in the event that on 1 July 1962 Belgium refused to withdraw its forces, in defiance of the Assembly's decision and the wishes of the two local Governments—to affirm, as of 2 July, the existence of a threat to international peace and security and to request a meeting of the Security Council. In view of the political importance of that decision by the Assembly, it was essential that it should be repeated in the new resolution. If therefore the sponsors of the draft maintained their amendment, the Soviet Union would take up upon itself

to submit an amendment calling for the restoration of the original wording.

44. With regard to the end of operative paragraph 3 of the joint draft resolution, the Soviet Union delegation would be unable to vote in favour of its adoption. Those clauses in effect authorized the maintenance of Belgian troops in the two countries after independence, in violation of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI). It was of little consequence that the Belgian troops had originally come to the Territory in accordance with the provision of the Trusteeship Agreement signed in 1946. If their presence was in conflict with the clearly expressed will of the local peoples and Governments, it constituted a pure and simple act of aggression. In those circumstances, only two considerations were relevant: that foreign troops were present on the territory of an independent country, and that their presence was contrary to the wishes of the country concerned. For the same reasons, the Soviet Union would be unable to vote for the twelfth paragraph of the preamble.

45. Operative paragraph 4 was contrary to the Charter. Since the presence of foreign troops on the territory of an independent State was an act of aggression, the Secretary-General could not be authorized to comply with the provisions of operative paragraph 4 (a), except by a decision of the Security Council. The same applied to operative paragraph 4 (e): to assist in the training of the internal security forces of the two countries was tantamount to granting them military assistance, which likewise was possible only by virtue of a decision of the Security Council. The General Assembly had no competence in the matter.

46. Although he found nothing to criticize in operative paragraphs 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9, he had some objection to paragraph 5: apart from the fact that the Soviet Union did not recognize the legality of General Assembly resolution 1735 (XVI), which gave the Secretary-General powers wider than those he possessed under the Charter, it did not see how that resolution was applicable to the present case and why it was necessary to deviate from the normal practices governing the granting of technical assistance. Paragraphs 4 (c), 6 and 7 clearly indicated what the proper procedure in the matter was.

47. When it came to the vote, therefore, the Soviet Union would request that the twelfth preambular paragraph, the beginning of operative paragraph 3 (if the sponsors maintained the new wording), the end of that paragraph and operative paragraphs 3 (a) and (e) and 5 should be put to the vote separately. It would vote against those parts of the draft.

48. With regard to the draft resolution submitted by Belgium (A/C.4/L.741 and Corr.1), he thought the French representative was incorrect in considering that that draft represented a minimum programme which could perhaps be combined with the maximum programme proposed in the joint draft resolution A/C.4/L.740/Rev.1. The former draft was inconsistent with the General Assembly's task and merely revealed a passionate desire to retain Belgian troops in the Territory. The Soviet Union would vote against that draft.

49. Mr. KIANG (China) pointed out to the previous speaker that it was not correct to say that nobody used the Chinese text, for he himself was using it.

50. Mr. COLLIER (Sierra Leone) endorsed the joint draft resolution, of which his delegation was happy

to be one of the sponsors and which seemed to him to offer the best solution to a delicate problem. The delegation of Sierra Leone was fully aware of the Fourth Committee's responsibility deriving from the fact, recognized by all, that after independence the maintenance of law and order was likely to raise serious difficulties. It was impossible to forget the lessons of the Congo, and that was why the joint draft resolution contained details concerning the measures to be taken after independence. The delegation of Sierra Leone did not share the United Kingdom representative's admiration for Belgian colonialism, or his optimism concerning the events that would follow independence, if the Belgian troops were to stay on. He therefore supported the request made by the representative of Liberia that the joint draft resolution be given priority.

51. The joint draft resolution covered all the points in the Belgian draft resolution, but went further and referred to the status of the Belgian troops on foreign soil after 1 July, by repeating the statements made by both Governments in that connexion. He was surprised at the opposition of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to that approach, the more so since the latter had stated that his Government was ready to comply with the wishes of the two Governments in that respect after independence. The delegation of Sierra Leone did not question the solemn assurances given by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, but considered it logical that operative paragraph 3 of the joint draft resolution should insist on the evacuation of the Belgian troops still remaining in Rwanda and Burundi by 1 July 1962, and should provide that as from that date onwards those troops would be confined within their barracks and that the evacuation must be completed by 1 August 1962, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of Rwanda and Burundi.

52. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had maintained that that text distorted the wishes of the Government of Rwanda, but he wished to stress that the joint draft resolution was in no sense intended to deprive Rwanda of the right to negotiate in the matter of the presence of Belgian troops after independence. As the representative of Iraq had pointed out, after 1 July those troops would be making arrangements for their own evacuation and Rwanda would be entirely free to exercise its sovereign rights as it thought fit. The amendment to operative paragraph 3 suggested by the representative of Liberia should, moreover, meet the Belgian delegation's objections.

53. In that connexion, he reminded the representative of the Soviet Union that the interest of the peoples concerned must remain the primary consideration. The representative of the United Kingdom had complained that the African-Asian group had spent a long time in preparing the joint draft resolution and was attempting to impose it on the Fourth Committee. He (Mr. Collier) wished to state on that score that in the past numerous draft resolutions had emerged from the deliberations of other groups, particularly the group of Western European countries.

54. In closing, he wished to tender his best wishes to the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi, and expressed the hope that peace would again be preserved in that troubled part of Africa.

55. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) found himself unable to agree with the arguments put forward by the representative of the Soviet Union. It seemed preposterous for the Committee to allow its discussion

to be confined to the presence of 900 Belgian soldiers in the Territory. He did not consider that their presence represented a threat to the independence of the two countries, or of anyone else for that matter, and he did not even believe that the representative of the Soviet Union really thought so himself.

56. In his opinion, the Belgian draft resolution represented a basic minimum in which some of the provisions of the joint draft resolution could be incorporated. Most of the latter was acceptable to the Committee as a whole, as it was to the French delegation.

57. However, he wished to criticize the fifth preambular paragraph of the joint draft resolution as being based only on a controversial and disputed interpretation of operative paragraph 3 (e) of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI). It would have been more accurate, for instance, to say: "Taking into account the fact that all the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI), paragraph 3 (e), could not be fully carried out".

58. As it stood, the tenth preambular paragraph of the joint draft was inaccurately worded and prejudged the independence and sovereignty of the two Governments. Even if Burundi, after independence, continued to uphold the position that it had adopted before the Committee, it should be allowed the possibility of amending it. The position attributed to Rwanda was not quite in accordance with the facts. Perhaps the best solution would be simply to take into consideration in the tenth preambular paragraph the statements made by the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi respectively with regard to the presence of foreign troops on their soil after independence.

59. He would be unable to vote in favour of the twelfth preambular paragraph, but for reasons which differed from those given by the representative of the Soviet Union. Its wording was, to say the least, ungracious. The General Assembly had never referred to those problems in any previous resolution. Furthermore, if reference must be made to statements made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium in answering questions that had been put to him, such statements should not be truncated, as they took on a different shade of meaning outside of their context. Certain arrangements came within the normal competence of the Administering Authority, and the impression should not be given of attempting to impose them on it. In any event, no one had queried the solemn assurance given on that score by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium.

60. That remark also applied to operative paragraph 3. The paragraph could have been worded as follows: "Calls on Belgium and the two independent States of Rwanda and Burundi to settle immediately after 1 July the problem of the presence of Belgian military formations and, for that purpose, to make all arrangements that are mutually acceptable and consistent with the free exercise of their sovereign rights and taking into account the formal promise of Belgium to respect their wishes."

61. He had no objection to operative paragraph 4, but agreed with the representative of the Soviet Union about paragraph 5, on which he had the same observations of a legal nature to make. In addition, the amount of \$2 million was too little or not enough and the matter had not been gone into sufficiently. Moreover, the

sponsors of the draft resolution made no mention of the aid which Belgium had stated that it would continue to grant to the two countries. The provisions of paragraph 5 might commit the United Nations to dangerous procedures and, in view of certain precedents, caution should be exercised.

62. Operative paragraph 8 was quite unnecessary. It was either a mere repetition of the provision already contained in paragraph 4 (c), or else it was meant that Ruanda-Urundi should be kept on the agenda of the seventeenth session, as though the trusteeship was continuing, which was not compatible with the very principles of the United Nations. It would be inadmissible for the two independent Governments to be faced with the prospect of a political debate.

63. In conclusion, he pointed out that there were no major differences between the two texts submitted to the Committee (A/C.4/L.740/Rev.1 and A/C.4/L.741 and Corr.1). It would be important for the future of Rwanda and Burundi that unanimous agreement should be reached on a joint text, and he therefore renewed his appeal for conciliation.

64. Mr. BINDZI (Cameroun), whose delegation was one of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution, appealed to Belgium to withdraw its draft resolution. The representative of Belgium had himself acknowledged that the African delegations had shown great understanding of his problems and had taken them into account. It was therefore relatively easy to find common ground for agreement. In addition, since certain provisions that were extremely important economically were not in the draft resolution submitted by Belgium, it would be simpler, instead of continuing to work on two drafts, to have a single text henceforth.

65. It was after several discussions that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution had changed the wording of operative paragraph 3. The change eliminated all differences between the English and French versions and thus avoided any apparent reconciliation of basically contradictory positions in an ambiguous text.

66. In reply to those who asked how a contingent of 450 men in the Territory after independence could be dangerous, he pointed out that the troops had been used to keep order and that the highest praise was due to them for that reason. However, if it was acknowledged that the troops had been able to keep order, it had to be admitted that they might also cause disturbances.

67. Some speakers had complained that the fifth preambular paragraph took into account only one of the provisions of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI). However, the other provisions, relating to the administrative and economic union and national reconciliation, were mentioned in other subparagraphs and paragraphs of the draft resolution. There had remained only the question of the retention of troops and it was only right that the matter should have been covered in one of the preambular paragraphs and one of the operative paragraphs.

68. Some members of the Committee thought that the tenth preambular paragraph was not sufficiently explicit and that, in that connexion, a mental reservation might even have been made. In point of fact, the paragraph repeated exactly what the representative of Rwanda had said; it would have been ill-advised of the sponsors of the draft resolution to supplement that statement, since it had not been possible during the

debate to obtain precise details from the Rwandese Government itself. There was quite obviously an importance nuance between illegality and the violation of legality but, where the statement of principles was concerned, all the possible reservations were never specified. There were exceptions to every rule, which was precisely what was stated in operative paragraph 3, which contained the words "without prejudice to the sovereign rights of Rwanda and Burundi".

69. It was true that the twelfth preambular paragraph did not reproduce exactly the statement of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs but the sponsors could perhaps easily amend their text to make it more accurate in that respect.

70. Many objections had been raised to operative paragraph 3. For example, the representative of France said that it would be better for provisions of that type to be laid down by Belgium and not by the United Nations. In addition, there had been several references to the honour of the officers. The representative of Iraq, at the 1325th meeting, had correctly described what the sponsors of the draft resolution had in mind: they would be satisfied if the Belgian troops were on the point of departure during the time they remained in the Territory after independence and if they did not interfere in the internal affairs of the country. There was no question of forbidding the soldiers to leave their barracks, provided that they

were not in uniform. Obviously Burundi and Rwanda, when they were independent, could settle the matter with Belgium as they thought fit.

71. He was surprised that some delegations objected to operative paragraph 5. If the delegations did not want the country to negotiate with Belgium under duress and did not want the Belgian troops to remain in the country, and since it was known that the country was in need and that the Secretary-General had at his disposal funds for emergencies, he failed to see where the problem lay. He, for his part, was convinced that, if the two countries appealed for aid directly to the delegations concerned, they would immediately be given credit. The United Nations, which was in a position to do so, should be allowed to guarantee the neutrality of the assistance.

72. Some delegations thought that the provisions of operative paragraph 8 would be tantamount to an extension of the Trusteeship Agreement. However, the problem had already arisen in the Congo, when that country had become independent. There could be no objection provided that the Secretary-General carried out specific functions that were within his competence and that had been vested in him by the General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.