



CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Agenda items 64, 65 and 102:	
Question of Namibia (<i>continued</i>)	
Question of Territories under Portuguese administration (<i>continued</i>)	
Question of Southern Rhodesia (<i>continued</i>)	
General debate (<i>continued</i>)	81

Chairman: Mr. Théodore IDZUMBUIR
(Democratic Republic of the Congo).

AGENDA ITEMS 64, 65 AND 102

Question of Namibia (*continued*)
(A/7623/Add.2 and Corr.1)

Question of Territories under Portuguese administration
(*continued*) (A/7623/Add.3, A/7694)

Question of Southern Rhodesia (*continued*)
(A/7623/Add.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. BENITES (Ecuador) considered it was a fortunate coincidence that the Fourth Committee was being directed by a representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo during its debate on the questions of Namibia, Territories under Portuguese administration and Southern Rhodesia. The Democratic Republic of the Congo was at the top of the pincer movement which, starting from South Africa, extended through Namibia and Angola on one side, and through Rhodesia and Mozambique on the other. It was aimed at encircling the heroic peoples of the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself, which were so generously supporting the cause of the freedom of the peoples oppressed by the régime which had formed an alliance in southern Africa. The members of that unholy alliance—South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal—were following the same policy of white racism and were trying to foist a foreign culture on the indigenous inhabitants of the colonial Territories. The ultimate goal of the *apartheid* doctrine practised by South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was to destroy African culture in order to assert the white minority's economic and political domination. For its part, Portugal disguised *apartheid* in its colonies with the hypocritical doctrine of a separate culture for Africans and Whites. From the political point of view, the common denominator of the alliance was that all its member régimes

were illegal. In South Africa, a white minority was usurping the African majority's right to self-determination; Rhodesia had unilaterally proclaimed a fictitious constitution and Portugal alleged that its colonies were overseas provinces which formed part of the metropolis.

2. His Government's position on the question of Southern Rhodesia was clear and precise. During the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, his delegation had pointed out that Southern Rhodesia's so-called Constitution of 1961 bore no resemblance to the constitutions of democratic States since it was based on a strict racist policy. That Constitution, with hardly any changes, was introduced by force in 1965—which constituted a revolt against the British Crown—and ratified in February 1966 by the Constitutional Ratification Bill.

3. He also reaffirmed the statement he made in 1962 that his Government could not accept constitutional changes in Southern Rhodesia unless they were accompanied by express recognition of the right of the majority to self-determination.¹ Further, by its resolutions 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 and 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, the Security Council had imposed sanctions against Ian Smith's régime and, in compliance with those decisions, Ecuador had passed in 1966 a law prohibiting relations with Southern Rhodesia, invalidating passports issued by its authorities and denying transit to its ships and aircraft. In addition to the political revolt, the Ian Smith régime had violated the human rights of the Zimbabwe people and had launched a furious repressive campaign against them and their leaders. Moreover, despite the sanctions imposed by the Security Council, the economy of the Territory did not seem to have suffered. According to the statements made by the so-called Rhodesian Minister of External Affairs, there had been a 7 per cent increase in industrial production over 1967, a 5 per cent increase in mining and 3.6 per cent increase in the total value of exports. Consequently, the Security Council must seriously consider the results of the sanctions and condemn those who had disregarded its decisions.

4. Turning to the question of Namibia, he drew attention to a letter from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs² which attempted to prove that, by virtue of the Mandate of the League of Nations, South Africa had a right to administer the Territory. It should be borne in mind that the Territory had been a German protectorate, and not a colony, until, as a result of the First World War, the United Kingdom transferred it to the Union of South Africa; its

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, vol. III, 1114th meeting, para. 45.
² See document S/9463, annex I.

Mandate was confirmed by the League of Nations in December 1920. However, neither the philosophy of the Covenant of the League of Nations nor its actual provisions gave grounds for thinking that the creation of mandates constituted authorization for the annexation of mandated Territories. The Mandate agreement entrusting the Territory to the Union of South Africa was clear; Article 2 conferred only administrative and legislative powers over South West Africa and the above-mentioned letter from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the country had fulfilled its duty to provide information on its administration. When the League of Nations ceased to represent the international community, the United Nations assumed trusteeship of the Territories which did not have their own government. At the beginning, the Union of South Africa recognized the authority of the United Nations regarding the administration of the Mandate over the Territory.

5. After referring to the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its early sessions, he said that in its resolution 338 (IV) of 6 December 1949 the General Assembly requested the International Court of Justice to deliver an advisory opinion on the international status of South West Africa and the obligations of the Union of South Africa arising therefrom. The background to that resolution had been the Union of South Africa's decision to refrain from transmitting further information on the Territory and the enactment of the South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act, 1949, designed to establish a political association between the Union of South Africa and South West Africa. In its advisory opinion, the Court stated that the Union of South Africa continued to be bound by the international obligations conferred on it by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, by the Mandate over the Territory and by the obligation to submit the petitions made by its inhabitants; it stated that South Africa was not empowered unilaterally to alter the international status of South West Africa and in order to do so would have to secure the consent of the United Nations. By resolution 449 (V) of 13 December 1950, the General Assembly accepted the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and established a Committee to confer with the Government of South Africa concerning the procedural measures necessary for implementing the Court's advisory opinion.

6. The argument put forward by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs was a futile dialectic attempt to avoid complying with Security Council resolution 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, which called upon the Government of South Africa to withdraw its administration from the Territory immediately and in any case before 4 October 1969. Since that date had already passed, the Security Council should adopt the necessary measures. Furthermore, since the policy of *apartheid* had been extended to Namibia, the South African Government was guilty of a crime against humanity which was just as serious as those committed by the Nazis. It was implementing in Namibia plans for "homelands", modelled on the Bantustans, a new kind of colony based more on biological than on social and human concepts. The Bantustans were settlements which represented the purest form of human exploitation and were more akin to a flock of animals or a beehive than to a free human community.

7. When the question of Angola had been brought before the Security Council in 1961, he had explained his Government's attitude—which remained unchanged—that the Territories under Portuguese administration were colonies under the régime of the League of Nations. When Portugal converted them into overseas provinces at a time when the United Nations Charter was already in force, it had committed an illegal act, since the indigenous population should have been consulted through a free plebiscite and the acceptance of the conversion by the United Nations was required. Thus, Portugal was bound to lead the Territories under its administration to full autonomy and its staunch refusal to do so justified the national liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). Ecuador had come into existence as a result of an armed national liberation movement and it was only logical that it should feel sympathy for the peoples which were today fighting for their independence in the same way.

8. He realized that Portugal, economically the least-developed country in Europe, was only able to wage a colonial war on separate fronts because of the unholy alliance of the colonialists in southern Africa and those who sympathized with them. Nevertheless, the people's fighting powers remained strong; he recalled with feeling the valiant spirit of the national liberation movement, which he personally had been able to witness in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania.

9. His country would fully support any measure which favoured the self-determination of the African countries under racist domination and which enabled them to achieve full self-government, the right to freedom and the guarantee of their human dignity. Lastly, echoing the words of the Chairman of the Committee in 1967, he expressed the hope that the diplomacy of persuasion might still lead to positive results.

10. Mr. ABDEL-WAHAB (United Arab Republic) said that once more the General Assembly was meeting at a time when over 30 million inhabitants of southern Africa were suffering from colonial wars and the occupation and annexation of their territory. However, although his country sometimes doubted the effectiveness of the United Nations, it had not lost its faith in the Organization or its determination to stand by the principles of the Charter.

11. The situation in southern Africa had continued to deteriorate rapidly during the past year and the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, which represented the collective international will, had been met with defiance from the régimes dominating the scene in that part of the world, which were led by South Africa and supported by its Western associates, including the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. All the illegal actions taking place in southern Africa were designed to perpetuate the domination of the African majority by the white minority, a policy based on the fiction of racial supremacy.

12. No one should be deceived by the justifications of those who were evading their responsibilities and violating their Charter obligations, whether they criticized the Security Council like the representative of the Tel Aviv

régime, or contended, like the Pretoria régime, that the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly were illegal and unrealistic, or asserted, like the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the measures adopted should be practical and within the Organization's capacities. Whenever a resolution was adopted, it must be implemented, respected and complied with.

13. It had been said that certain Powers were not complying with the resolutions of the United Nations because they were unrealistic, and that the situation was deteriorating in southern Africa precisely because of the adoption of those resolutions; but he thought that the real explanation was, as the Secretary-General had stated in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization (see A/7601/Add.1, para. 3), that there was no political will to solve those problems on the part of those in a position to make such a contribution.

14. Did the Charter say that force should be used to deprive the peoples of their right to self-determination and independence, that régimes which refused to comply with the Security Council resolutions should be rewarded by financial, military and political assistance and that victims of colonialism should be branded as terrorists? Or did it, on the contrary, say that Member States which did not comply with the decisions of the Security Council should be subject to punitive action?

15. Was it unrealistic to call for sanctions against Portugal for its violation of the principles of the Charter, and against South Africa for its refusal to comply with the mandatory decisions of the Security Council, or to ask the United Kingdom to take all effective measures, including police action, to protect the people of Zimbabwe, in accordance with its Charter obligations as the administering Power? If the Charter was not applicable to those questions, was that because the people involved were not white or because the principles of the Charter were contrary to military and economic interests? The truth was that the Powers which had the capacity to act within and outside the United Nations were the same Powers which obstructed action to put an end to the tragic situation in southern Africa; they were the Powers which refused to impose sanctions against South Africa although they knew that it was assisting the Ian Smith régime; they were the Powers which were supplying arms and economic aid to Portugal and South Africa, thus enabling the latter to strengthen its occupation of Namibia. Those actions were in direct violation of the Charter and it was ironical that countries which had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security should also bear the primary responsibility for disturbing the peace and security in southern Africa.

16. In Southern Rhodesia, the people of Zimbabwe were living under the rule of one of the ugliest forms of racism and were subject to repressive measures comparable to those of nazism. Although the Territory of Southern Rhodesia had been under the colonial rule of the United Kingdom for more than seventy years, the United Kingdom Government maintained that it was not to blame for the fact that Southern Rhodesia had for forty years had its own forces, under the command of the local authorities. That

same Government had also said that to light the torch of war in southern Africa would have terrible consequences, without any guarantee that the results would be swifter than those obtainable by the resolute application of sanctions. But who handed over the power and the control of the military forces to the racist minority, in defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly? And was it not true that the minority, aided by the South African forces of aggression, had already started the war in Southern Rhodesia? Did the United Kingdom Government seriously believe that sanctions would produce the desired result as long as South Africa continued to be the main trading partner of Southern Rhodesia, and as long as certain Powers were aiding Ian Smith through their assistance to South Africa? The survival of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia was conclusive evidence that sanctions had failed; that failure, combined with the failure of the negotiations, proved that the only way of preventing the survival of the régime was to resort to police action.

17. The United Arab Republic wanted peace and prosperity for all the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia, both black and white, and if the United Kingdom Government and its allies shared that wish, they should prove it by withdrawing their trade and consular missions for Southern Rhodesia, by adopting the same methods which they had used unjustly in other colonies, by assisting the liberation movements and by imposing sanctions against South Africa to ensure the success of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

18. In 1968 many people had hoped that the new Government in Portugal might reconsider its policy and recognize the rights of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence; and that hope had been reflected in General Assembly resolution 2395 (XXIII) of 29 November 1968. Regrettably, the new Portuguese Government had intensified the colonial war and the statements of its officials were not encouraging. The Portuguese Minister of Defence had said (see A/7623/Add.3, annex I, para. 21) that it would be necessary to continue fighting until peace was achieved through a Portuguese victory. The Prime Minister, Mr. Caetano, had said (*ibid.*, para. 12) that his country could not leave to an uncertain fate "those values which, under the Portuguese flag, have transformed barbarian lands into promising territories". But how could people who were defending their land and their dignity be called barbarians?

19. Settlement schemes had been started in Angola and Mozambique, as a result of which thousands of Africans had been evicted from their land. Portugal's allies were continuing to provide it with economic and military assistance and the modern weapons which Portugal was using were conclusive evidence of the support it was receiving from the Western Powers, which not only enabled it to continue its occupation of the African Territories but had also encouraged it to defy the United Nations.

20. The reasons for that support had been revealed by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs who had stated in December 1968 that the military leaders of the Western nations now recognized the value of Portugal's overseas position for the defense of the Western world; there was, for instance, a United States military base in the Azores.

21. The co-operation between the illegal régime of Ian Smith and the Portuguese authorities had been further strengthened. There were, however, some encouraging factors: the freedom fighters had made tremendous progress and in several regions the Portuguese colonial forces were isolated in their posts and garrisons. Whatever economic or military assistance Portugal obtained from its allies could not change the fate of the aggressor, for the determination of the peoples to liberate their land was more powerful than all the armies of aggression.

22. In Namibia, the forces of occupation were continuing to suppress the people fighting for its freedom. In defiance of the authority of the United Nations, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs had said that his country intended to remain in Namibia and that its inhabitants wanted the South African occupation forces to remain there too.³ That statement was belied by the repressive measures and inhuman laws adopted by South Africa against the Namibians.

23. The occupation of the international Territory of Namibia would continue as long as the allies of South Africa went on providing assistance to the occupation forces. If South Africa's allies meant what they said, they would refrain from providing military and economic aid to South Africa and would assist the liberation movements.

24. All racist régimes, whatever their names, had similar objectives—the annihilation of the indigenous inhabitants and the usurpation of power by armed force in the name of a theory of racial superiority which might call itself *apartheid*, Zionism or separate development.

25. The present critical situation was the result of the aggression perpetrated against indigenous peoples, the refusal to allow them to enjoy their human rights and their own determination, on the other hand, to recover their freedom and dignity. There would be no peace until the United Nations took steps to ensure the implementation of its resolutions.

26. The most important factor in the situation in southern Africa was the attitude of the Republic of South Africa, which was occupying Namibia, which had sent forces to Southern Rhodesia to fight against the people of Zimbabwe, and which was helping the Smith régime and the Portuguese in their colonial wars. Other Powers, too, such as the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, were helping South Africa to consolidate its power in southern Africa.

27. The refusal of certain permanent members of the Security Council to apply the sanctions adopted by the Council showed that their policy was designed to prolong the tragic conditions in southern Africa. The supply of arms to South Africa showed that the policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was to maintain the racial régimes in southern Africa and suppress the liberation movement in that area.

28. If it wanted peace and justice to prevail, the United Nations should take steps to ensure that South Africa complied with the resolutions of the General Assembly and

the Security Council, and that Member States stopped providing military and economic assistance to the régimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia or to the Portuguese Government.

29. Mr. NAVA CARRILLO (Venezuela) said that, though the increasingly serious situation in Namibia was a flagrant violation of the right to self-determination and independence and to human rights in general, the Government of South Africa was continuing to ignore the decisions of the United Nations.

30. His delegation had already pointed out that in order to put an end to that unjust and inhuman situation, which constituted a threat to international peace and security, action must be taken by the Security Council. The Council must not shirk its task of enabling the United Nations to assume direct and effective responsibility for Namibia as soon as possible.

31. The history of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration showed that Portugal had stubbornly refused to recognize a liberation movement whose victory was inevitable. The struggle in those colonies was a result of the Portuguese Government's refusal to recognize the right to self-determination of the peoples of the Territories concerned, and of its policy of disregarding the appeals of those who called for a peaceful settlement and for the recognition and implementation of the principles and rights proclaimed by the United Nations.

32. The United Nations had considered several alternative solutions to the problem. The General Assembly in resolution 1807 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 had urged the Portuguese Government to cease all acts of repression in its colonies and to create the necessary conditions for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. The talks held with that Government in 1963 in pursuance of a Security Council resolution of 31 July 1963 (resolution 180 (1963)) had not had the desired effect because the Portuguese authorities' idea of self-determination differed considerably from that of the international community.

33. He stressed the positive results that had been achieved in bringing freedom and independence to the peoples under colonial rule, by combining national co-operation with United Nations encouragement. The Portuguese Government should not underestimate the value of a peaceful settlement of the problems which it had brought upon itself by its deliberate disregard of the wishes of the Territories under its administration. Either it must recognize and respect the claims of those peoples, or they, with the support of the majority of States, would end by imposing their own ideas.

34. The problem of southern Rhodesia was another example of the ineffectiveness of the Organization, caused by the refusal of certain Member States to fulfil their responsibilities. He could not understand what was preventing those States from sincerely and effectively collaborating in the efforts to put an end to that situation.

35. In its resolution 2383 (XXIII) of 7 November 1968, the General Assembly had affirmed the responsibility of the

³ *Idem*.

United Kingdom for the continuing deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and had condemned the failure and the refusal of the United Kingdom to take effective measures to bring down the Smith régime, as well as the policies of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and all other Governments which continued to have political, economic, financial and other relations with Southern Rhodesia, thus enabling it to sustain itself.

36. After referring to Security Council resolutions 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, he said that in the second of those resolutions the Council had unequivocally affirmed the responsibility of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, for the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Now, more than a year later, it was clear that the United Kingdom had neither the capacity nor the means to take action, nor any effective political will to respond to the international community's appeal. The intermittent negotiations between the United Kingdom and the illegal Smith régime, although at first sight encouraging, were merely intellectual exercises that would not lead to an effective solution.

37. His delegation had recently stated in the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that, although the results of the sanctions adopted against the Southern Rhodesian régime were not known, it was possible to imagine how the régime's position was developing, since a "wait-and-see" policy did not in any way impede the advancement and consolidation of the white minority in the Territory. The most immediate and urgent concern should be to adopt genuinely effective measures to bring down the illegal racist minority régime of Ian Smith and enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to self-determination.

38. As had been pointed out in the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (A/7601/Add.1, para. 165) sanctions had not brought about the desired result. That was due not only to the refusal of certain countries to co-operate and apply the sanctions, but also to the fact that the sanctions were not comprehensive enough to produce the desired results. The Security Council should supplement them with measures that would ensure compliance by States which had refused to implement past decisions or any future decisions, and with measures that would take into account the decisions already adopted by the General Assembly.

39. As the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal régime of Ian Smith were acting in concert, it was essential, in taking the new measures which were urgently needed, to bear in mind the need for co-ordination in order to ensure some reasonable probability of success. The three Governments had joined hands in preventing the exercise of fundamental rights and in refusing to comply with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions of the Organization; they had even threatened the sovereignty and territorial integrity of some neighbouring African countries. In selecting specific measures for each situation, it was obviously essential therefore to consider additional measures of co-ordination.

40. His delegation reaffirmed its hope that the three problems could be settled by peaceful means and, judging

from the statements made in the Manifesto on Southern Africa adopted at Lusaka⁴ and the Addis Ababa declaration, it was sure that African statesmen shared the same concern and the same desire. His delegation was for the rule of law and the enjoyment of the benefits of peace and justice by all men, irrespective of the geographical region in which they lived.

41. Mr. RAOELINA (Madagascar) said that, in deciding to consider the three items of the agenda at the same time, the Committee had underscored the complexity and the increasing seriousness of the situation south of the Zambezi.

42. For centuries small groups of Europeans had been progressively invading Africa in pursuance of a policy of colonization—long since rejected—which aimed at destroying the original personality of Africa. Certain colonial Powers rejected assimilation and only wanted to exploit new wealth. Although scientists had already made it possible to journey to the moon, there were still white men in southern Africa who were refusing to allow Africans to exercise their inalienable right to achieve independence, affirm their personality and express themselves as human beings.

43. His delegation was convinced that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples should be applied universally, regardless of any differences of opinion or ideology, and that the administering Powers should abandon their outdated ideas.

44. With regard to Southern Rhodesia, he said that the situation was far from being settled in a manner acceptable to all. Despite the statement made in the Security Council condemning the Rhodesian referendum of 20 June 1969, and describing its results as invalid, the illegal Government of Ian Smith had persisted in its errors, disregarding the resolutions of the United Nations and defying public opinion.

45. He wondered what could be done to put an end to the situation, which constituted a threat to international peace and security. It had often been said that the United Kingdom—which his delegation continued to consider as the administering Power—did not want to negotiate with a rebel régime; but what then was one to say of the talks held on board the *Tiger* in 1966 and on the *Fearless* in 1968? Those negotiations had failed and had only served to consolidate the rebel Smith's position in regard to the United Kingdom. Despite the view that the minority régime could not be overthrown except by armed force, it was obvious that the United Kingdom would not modify its policy; and its representative in the Security Council had indeed said so in June 1969.⁵ Nevertheless, the colonial history of the United Kingdom showed that in similar situations it had not hesitated to resort to force, as for example in the case of Anguilla. Meanwhile, in Southern Rhodesia, arbitrary arrests were increasing and the inhuman methods of repression used by the régime of Ian Smith were arousing the indignation of the civilized world.

⁴ The text of the Manifesto was subsequently circulated as document A/7754.

⁵ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, 1479th meeting.*

46. He reiterated his Government's strong condemnation of all racial discrimination, and of the *apartheid* policy practised by the illegal régime, which was obstinately denying the Rhodesians their fundamental rights. In his opinion, there were three ways to settle the situation. First, the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) could recommend that States Members of the United Nations should apply economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia more effectively, and that there should be some possibility of controlling the application of sanctions by the great Powers and particularly by the private sector in the United Kingdom. Secondly, the United Kingdom could convene a conference to be attended both by representatives of the minority and by representatives of the people of Zimbabwe, such representation however to be arranged on a proportional basis. Thirdly, the conference so convened could work for the establishment of a coalition Government in which the majority would be fairly represented.

47. His delegation urged the United Nations to take concerted action in collaboration with the Committee, since the Smith régime was hoping that the Organization, tired of imposing ineffective sanctions, would give up the struggle.

48. With regard to Namibia, what was surprising was the consistent refusal of the Republic of South Africa to regard the United Nations as the legitimate successor of the League of Nations, its failure to accept the validity of the General Assembly decision and its continued consolidation of its rule in the Territory. South Africa persisted in refusing to comply with the resolutions of United Nations organs; at the same time it was extending its policy of *apartheid* to the Territory and promulgating the South West Africa Affairs Act, 1969, which was aimed at the annexation of Namibia as a fifth province of the Republic. Needless to say, the South African Government had not complied with Security Council resolution 269 (1969), which called upon it to withdraw its administration from the Territory immediately and in any case before 4 October 1969. His delegation agreed with the letter recently addressed by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the President of the Security Council⁶ following the South African Government's response concerning the implementation of that resolution and hoped that the Security Council would take effective steps to bring about the immediate withdrawal of the South African authorities and to enable the Namibian people to achieve independence.

49. Madagascar condemned the policy of Portugal, which, by reason of its presence in certain African Territories, claimed that those Territories were provinces of metropolitan Portugal, and it upheld the right of peoples of those Territories to self-determination. The moderate wording of General Assembly resolution 2395 (XXIII) of 25 November 1968 had been intended chiefly to dissuade Portugal from its policy and to let it know the feelings of Members of the United Nations regarding the fate of their brothers still under colonial domination. Such moderation should not be interpreted as weakness, for it simply reflected the desire of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) to

achieve independence without bloodshed. His delegation hoped that the new Portuguese Government would reconsider its colonial policy and open the way to peaceful and democratic negotiation. The fighters in the liberation movements were exercising their right to resist, which they regarded as a patriotic duty. Consequently, the persons detained in various camps in southern Africa should be accorded special treatment.

50. He expressed his appreciation to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for its moral and material assistance to African refugees.

51. In his delegation's view, the United Nations had a role of the first importance to play in the struggle against colonialism. If all General Assembly resolutions and Security Council decisions on colonial questions had been unequivocally accepted, the last remnants of colonialism would have disappeared already. A week earlier, the President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, on behalf of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), had informed the General Assembly (1780th plenary meeting) of the views expressed at the sixth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Addis Ababa from 6 to 10 September 1969, and had officially introduced the Manifesto on Southern Africa.⁷ His delegation reaffirmed its support for the principles set forth in the Manifesto, which in general reflected the policy long followed by his Government in connexion with the problem of decolonization, and hoped that the document would help the Committee in its efforts to eliminate the last vestiges of colonialism in southern Africa.

52. Mr. MARKER (Pakistan) pointed out that in the chapter dealing with Southern Rhodesia (see A/7623/Add.1, annex I, para. 11) of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, his country's name had been inadvertently omitted from the list of members of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968). He asked the Rapporteur of the Special Committee to bring the report up to date in that respect.

53. The Pretoria and Salisbury régimes were relentlessly pursuing their oppressive policies of discrimination and *apartheid*. They had defied the efforts of the United Nations and their intransigence could only lead to violence and racial war.

54. The failure of the international community to take action was due mainly to the divorce between voting power in the General Assembly and effective response on the part of certain permanent members of the Security Council. Those in a position to influence and advise the racist régimes of southern Africa had not offered any rational solution to the problem, and the present deadlock only increased the colonial Powers' determination to resist the resolutions of the United Nations.

55. Southern Rhodesia, where the white minority had approved the proposals for a new constitution, was moving inexorably towards the declaration of a republic by the end

⁶ Document S/9471.

⁷ See foot-note 4.

of 1970; as one colonial Power disappeared, it was being replaced by an even more reprehensible one, since the so-called constitution was committed to the maintenance in perpetuity of the illegal racist minority régime.

56. The entire international community recognized the need to put an end to that régime and to guarantee the people of Zimbabwe the exercise of their right of self-determination, but it was confronted by an absolute negation of that objective. The present situation was characterized by the apathy of the administering Power, by the existence of an alliance between the neighbouring colonial countries which, with the help of Western economic interests, had nullified all efforts to find a viable solution, and by the consolidation of the racist régime.

57. In order to determine what further measures should be adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, it was necessary to examine the events of the past, which revealed six interrelated factors. Those factors, whose relative importance he would not attempt to specify, were the following: the lack of any definite allocation of responsibility for dealing with the problem of Southern Rhodesia; the United Kingdom Government's refusal to use force; the failure of economic sanctions; the cushioning effect of negotiations; the conspiracy of the neighbouring colonial Powers; and indirect subversion by foreign economic and military interests.

58. With regard to the first factor, the inconsistency of the United Kingdom in its role as the administering Power had complicated any consideration of the question. In some cases the United Kingdom had implied by its actions that the question of Southern Rhodesia was within its own internal jurisdiction, but at each critical moment it had brought the matter before the United Nations, thus recognizing the Organization's responsibility.

59. Directly related to the foregoing was the fact that the administering Power persistently refused to use force, thereby rejecting the only solution considered viable by the General Assembly. That refusal had enabled the Ian Smith régime to strengthen its position and, in view of such actions as the United Kingdom intervention in Anguilla, it gave grounds for the accusation that the United Kingdom was not acting impartially.

60. The economic sanctions had unquestionably failed to have any appreciable effect on the economy of Southern Rhodesia, chiefly because South Africa and Portugal had failed to comply with the decisions of the Security Council. Another contributing factor had been the large amount of clandestine trading through falsification of documents. Evasions of that kind had been so widespread that in 1968 and the first half of 1969 most of Southern Rhodesia's exports had been absorbed by Western European countries which claimed to be strictly implementing the economic sanctions. It must also be pointed out that certain Asian States appeared to have been unsuccessful in ensuring that their nationals strictly observed Security Council resolution 253 (1968), which Pakistan, for its part, was fully and unreservedly implementing.

61. It was deplorable, in his delegation's view, that while the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council

resolution 253 (1968) had been supervising the operation of the sanctions, the administering Power had at the same time attempted to find a solution through negotiations, despite the misgivings expressed by many African and Asian States that such efforts would be counter-productive. Even more disturbing were the United Kingdom's concessions on matters of principle. First it had demanded that the Southern Rhodesian régime should return to legality; later it had been prepared to tolerate the unilateral declaration of independence if the principle of majority rule was accepted, and now it appeared to have abandoned, or at least shelved, the fundamental element of the six principles it had defended earlier (see A/7623/Add.1, annex I, para. 71). The other two factors affecting the situation in Southern Rhodesia were the conspiracy of Southern Rhodesia's colonial neighbours and the subversion instigated by military, economic and other interests.

62. The Zimbabwe people's problem was that they were not being permitted to exercise their inalienable right of self-determination and freedom. In order to create a peaceful, progressive and democratic society in Southern Rhodesia and to save southern Africa from racial war, the administering Power and the Western countries should comply in earnest with Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

63. He urged that the following steps should be taken in order to ensure the success of sanctions against southern Rhodesia: first, further extension of the mandatory sanctions under Security Council resolution 253 (1968) to include severance of economic relations and communications; second, the extension of sanctions to Portugal and South Africa in respect of the major commodities imported and exported by Southern Rhodesia; third, reiteration by the General Assembly of the United Kingdom's legal and moral responsibility to put an end to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, if necessary by force; fourth, implementation in full, by the United Kingdom, of paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968); and fifth, the strengthening of paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of that resolution by calling on all the twelve countries which maintained consular representation in Southern Rhodesia to withdraw such representation without delay. Such action would complement paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), which called upon all States not to recognize the illegal régime or maintain diplomatic or other relations with it.

64. He emphasized that no action recommended by the General Assembly or undertaken by the Security Council could relieve the United Kingdom of its obligation to put an end to the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia by all necessary means, without exception.

65. Turning to the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, he recalled that, when the matter had been discussed the previous year, his delegation, thinking that the Portuguese authorities would follow the example of other colonial Powers in granting independence to their former Territories, had maintained that any resolution, in order to be effective, should balance condemnation of Portuguese intransigence with constructive solutions.

66. Despite that moderate approach, the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration had deteriorated. The war of liberation had been intensified and military repression had increased, spreading beyond the frontiers into neighbouring territories. The Security Council, in resolution 268 (1969) of 28 July 1969, had been obliged to censure Portugal for violating the territorial integrity of Zambia.

67. Furthermore, the denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms had become increasingly rigid, justifying the charge that Portugal was firmly embarked on a course of racism and colonialism. The colonial alliance with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had been consolidated and had made Portugal an accessory to the criminal policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

68. Lastly, the colonial policy of transforming those Territories into an integral part of Portugal was continuing. The Portuguese authorities had in fact adopted measures to resettle the African peoples of the region in specified areas, to encourage European immigration, to recruit labour by force, to tax local inhabitants in order to finance the war effort, and to exploit the natural wealth of the region.

69. His delegation called upon Portugal to heed the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. It also called upon Portugal's allies in Europe and elsewhere to dissuade it from defying those resolutions. If peace was to be preserved in southern Africa, it was imperative that Portugal should implement those resolutions so that the Territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) could achieve independence.

70. Mr. SOW (Mali) said that, nearly twenty-five years after the creation of the United Nations and nine years after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the peoples of Namibia, the Territories under Portuguese administration and Southern Rhodesia were still unable to gain freedom.

71. The rebel régime of Salisbury, the Portuguese colonialists and the Pretoria racists continued to defy the United Nations and international opinion.

72. The time had come for the imperialist countries which were supporting those three régimes to discontinue their assistance. His delegation called upon all Member States to recognize the liberation movements and provide them with

material, military and all other forms of assistance. The diplomatic and constitutional support of States should be based on the decision of the actual peoples who were fighting for their freedom.

73. The imperialist Powers hypocritically supported resolutions condemning the racists, but in practice they assisted the latter. His delegation censured the United Kingdom, which in other circumstances had not hesitated to use force against non-white populations, for failing to act against the Salisbury régime and urged it to assist the Zimbabwe people.

74. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, speaking in the General Assembly on 2 October 1969 (1775th plenary meeting), had suggested that the United Nations should reconsider its approach to the problems of those colonial Territories. The long debates in the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the Fourth Committee, the requests for information and the hearing of petitioners had done nothing to hasten the peoples' achievement of independence. Some new machinery should be sought, under the auspices of either the Secretary-General or some competent body, to enable serious talks to be held between the true representatives of the liberation movements and the colonial Powers, with a view to determining the ways and means of bringing about self-determination. In that respect the Lusaka Manifesto might serve as a useful document for those who were recommended to adopt that new approach.

75. It was essential to avoid useless loss of life when that did not mean sacrificing the objective of liberation. He paid a tribute to the fight for liberation waged by the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau). His Government would assist them until final victory was won.

76. The CHAIRMAN said that the petitioner heard by the Committee at its 1828th meeting had provided a map of Mozambique; if there were no objections, he proposed that it be exhibited in the Committee room.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.