

United Nations  
**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records



**FOURTH COMMITTEE, 2023rd  
MEETING**

Wednesday, 13 December 1972,  
at 3.20p.m.

NEW YORK

*Chairman:* Mr. Zdeněk ČERNÍK  
(Czechoslovakia).

**AGENDA ITEM 22**

**Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Territories not covered under other agenda items) (concluded)\*** (A/8723/Add.6 (part II), A/C.4/L.1029/Rev.1)

**QUESTION OF ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA, ST. LUCIA AND ST. VINCENT: CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (concluded)** (A/C.4/L.1029/Rev.1)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the text of the revised draft resolution concerning the question of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent (A/C.4/L.1029/Rev.1).

2. Mr. REFADI (Libyan Arab Republic) thanked the sponsors of the draft for having accepted the suggestion made by him at the 2021st meeting.

3. The CHAIRMAN put draft resolution A/C.4/L.1029/Rev.1 to the vote.

*At the request of the representative of Trinidad and Tobago, a recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Against:* None.

\*Resumed from the 2021st meeting.

*Abstaining:* Belgium, France, United States of America.

*Draft resolution A/C.4/L.1029/Rev.1 was adopted by 72 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.<sup>1</sup>*

**REPORT OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE**

4. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had thus concluded its consideration of agenda item 22. Since the report would be along the lines previously established, he suggested that, if there were no objections, the Committee authorize its Rapporteur to submit the report direct to the General Assembly.

*It was so decided.<sup>2</sup>*

**AGENDA ITEM 64**

**Question of Namibia (continued)** (A/8723/Add.2, A/8724, A/8841 and Corr.1, A/8934, A/C.4/L.1028, A/C.4/L.1030, A/C.4/L.1031)

**GENERAL DEBATE (concluded) AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)\*\*** A/C.4/L.1028, A/C.4/L.1030, A/C.4/L.1031)

5. Mr. IBRAHIM (Sudan) expressed the gratification of his delegation and that of Africa at large for the firm action taken recently by the Government of Australia in closing down the Ian Smith information office in that country. That act reflected the seriousness with which the new Australian Government viewed its commitment to the United Nations, the Charter and the cause of justice and peace. He thanked the people and the Government of Australia of that gesture and hoped that the United States would emulate that example by closing the only other such office, the one in Washington.

6. It was regrettable that in the United Nations certain Powers were applying a double standard and that there existed, as described by the Ambassador of France in his statement at the 1639th meeting of the Security Council at Addis Ababa, a gap between what some Members were ready to say and what they were ready to do. Indeed, some Members of the United Nations cried out for forceful measures against what to them was only a form of terrorism and lamented the inaction of the Organization when it did not comply with their suggestions; they also denounced the use of violence

\*\* Resumed from the 2021st meeting.

<sup>1</sup> See para. 23 below.

<sup>2</sup> The report was submitted to the General Assembly as document A/8955.

by the United Nations, as if the Organization had not resorted to violence in the past. Yet when they were confronted with terrorism in its most organized, legalized and institutionalized form, such as the repressive régime in South Africa, they pleaded for patience and understanding and continued to tolerate and support those racists who differed little from Hitler and his henchmen. A community of interests strengthened their alliance and brought them together to frustrate the efforts of the United Nations. In that connexion, he recalled that it was precisely the inaction of the League of Nations in Africa, due to such community of interests, which had encouraged the aggressor to be more aggressive and arrogant, with the results which were well known.

7. He also wished to point out that some mandatory Powers could very well fail their sacred trust in order to satisfy their own nationalistic goals and could cause irreparable damage. The Mandate in Palestine was such an example: the mandatory Power had betrayed the birthright of the indigenous people which had been entrusted to it. That was what the South African colonial régime had been doing and what it intended to continue doing by extending the system of *apartheid* to the international Territory of Namibia, by confining the indigenous people to the most barren areas, by controlling the movements of the African population by rigorous laws, by shifting people in order to satisfy the needs of mining, industry, agriculture and other interests and by inflicting all types of suffering and torture on the population.

8. But despite all that, the people of Namibia had clearly expressed their desire for freedom and were ready to fight to attain it. They were not alone in their struggle; they had the support of all independent Africa and all freedom-loving peoples throughout the world. If the United Nations did not fulfil its obligation towards the people of Namibia, then they would be justified in resorting to whatever means available to them in order to expel the usurper.

9. He introduced draft resolution A/C.4/L.1030 to the Committee on behalf of its sponsors, who now included also the delegations of the Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo, Indonesia, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Upper Volta and Zaire. The principal points of the resolution on the question of Namibia, adopted by the General Assembly the year before, had been maintained in the draft. In addition, the sponsors had attempted to incorporate in the text certain new elements, bearing in mind the relevant recommendations submitted by the United Nations Council for Namibia and the views expressed by the Namibians. He stressed the fifth, sixth, eighth and thirteenth preambular paragraphs and noted that the solidarity of the international community with the people of Namibia had been clearly manifested in the results of the Namibia International Conference held that year under the auspices of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). In the seventeenth preambular paragraph the sponsors had recorded their satisfaction at the success of that Conference.

10. In the operative part the sponsors had affirmed in no uncertain terms that the only acceptable solution was the accession of the Territory to independence as a unified entity. They had categorically rejected the continuation regroupings, displacements and transferring of Namibians as classic policies of colonial domination, and thus, in paragraph 5, condemned the Government of South Africa for its continued efforts to destroy the unity of the people and the territorial integrity of Namibia. In paragraph 9, the relevant recommendations of the United Nations Council for Namibia were reflected and in paragraph 10 (a) the sponsors had expressed the need to refrain from any action which might confer a semblance of legitimacy upon South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

11. In paragraph 12, which related to the enlargement of the membership of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the sponsors were grateful to the Secretary-General for the consultations he had undertaken in that regard and, in view of those consultations, they were confident that the President of the Assembly would soon be able to proceed with his nominations in that regard.

12. Paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the draft resolution merited special attention from the Committee. The sponsors hoped that the draft resolution would receive wide acceptance.

13. Mr. OGOLA (Uganda) supported draft resolution A/C.4/L.1030 introduced by the representative of the Sudan. He then underscored the terrible situation prevailing in southern Africa, where slavery, the subversion of human dignity, the exploitation of man through insatiable greed, the denial of freedom and the systematic destruction of the African population were a daily reality. Namibia, a United Nations Territory, was desperately fighting for its existence in the face of the attempts by the South African régime to annex it. The draft resolution expressed once again the firm determination of the United Nations to prevent that annexation.

14. All the reports on Namibia indicated that South Africa was increasing its exploitation of the economic, natural and human resources of the Territory in order to leave it bare when the time for independence arrived. The unwillingness of South Africa to abide by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the advisory opinion of 21 June 1971 of the International Court of Justice, had serious implications for world peace. Those resolutions and the advisory opinion had declared beyond any doubt that the presence of the Government of South Africa in Namibia was illegal.

15. It was clear that South Africa's hopes of remaining in Namibia were increasing rather than decreasing and that the method by which it hoped to succeed was one of deceit and fraud. The South African Prime Minister obviously refused to understand that the mandate conferred by the Security Council on the Secretary-General was to assist in achieving the aim of self-determination and independence for Namibia. In South Africa's view, experience in self-government

was an essential condition for the exercise of self-determination and could best be achieved on a regional basis. However, the attainment of such experience was not the responsibility of South Africa and the only duty South Africa had with regard to Namibia was to leave the Territory. South Africa had ruled Namibia for 50 years and, under Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV), its task had been to prepare the Territory for independence during that period. Having failed to do so in the last 50 years, it lacked the *bona fide* character to be entrusted with the job now.

16. The expression "on a regional basis" as used by South Africa meant the policy of Bantustans and Balkanization. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.1030 denounced that policy in clear terms and insisted that South Africa must not be allowed to dismember Namibia, which must attain its independence as a unitary State.

17. The draft resolution also denounced the economic activities of South Africa and its Western trading partners in Namibia. Those activities, which were carried out in total disregard of the wishes of the indigenous population, created a situation of intolerable alienation for the people of Namibia. It was true that in the course of the past year strikes by the Ovambo workers had to a certain extent paralysed the machinery of exploitation of the local population. He commended the gallant people of Namibia and in the name of the people and Government of Uganda assured them of full support.

18. It was necessary also to take account of the situation in the Territory after those strikes since the South African régime had hastened to recover the initiative in labour-employer relationships. Both the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (S/10832)<sup>3</sup> and the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia (A/8724) assigned relatively little importance to the impact of the strikes and the outcome of the subsequent negotiations carried out between the South African officials and strike leaders. Although the officials claimed to have reached some understanding with regard to a new labour system, that "understanding" left much to be desired.

19. He quoted several of the reasons why the United Nations Council for Namibia considered that the new system was quite inadequate; the Council felt that the terms of the agreement were completely unsatisfactory by modern labour standards. For that reason, acceptance of the agreement by the majority of the workers was doubtful and the labour situation remained unsettled.

20. His delegation strongly supported two points in draft resolution A/C.4/L.1030: the imperative need for the United Nations Council for Namibia to establish its authority in the Territory and the idea that the Namibian people should actively participate in the work of the Council.

<sup>3</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1972, document S/10832.

21. The draft resolution was reasonable and realistic since it took into account the political, economic and social needs of the people of Namibia.

22. Mr. Abdoulaye DIALLO (Niger) stated that he fully supported draft resolution A/C.4/L.1030.

23. Mr. VÁSQUEZ (Colombia), Mr. BABELA (Congo), Mr. LÓPEZ SCHÜMMER (Spain), Mr. ANOLIN (Philippines), Mr. ORANTES LUNA (Guatemala), Miss BENNATON (Honduras), Mr. SIDIK (Indonesia), Mr. Mohammad DAOUD (Iraq), Mr. OULD HACHEME (Mauritania), Mr. UPRETI (Nepal), Mr. Abdoulaye DIALLO (Niger), Mr. ISHAN (Nigeria), Mr. KHAN (Pakistan), Mr. VLASCEANU (Romania), Mr. CHUTHASMIT (Thailand) and Mr. AQUEREBURU (Togo) stated that they had been absent when the Committee had voted on draft resolution A/C.4/L.1029/Rev.1 relating to agenda item 22, but would have voted in favour of it had they been present.

24. Mr. KOUAMÉ (Ivory Coast), speaking on a point of order, asked the Chairman to ensure that at the remaining meetings no votes should be taken at the beginning of the meeting.

25. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the President of the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Fifth Committee had asked that a vote should be taken as soon as possible on draft resolution A/C.4/L.1028, concerning the United Nations Fund for Namibia.

26. Mr. NEKLESSA (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) inquired whether there were any further speakers on the matter, since it would seem more appropriate to end the general debate before going on to vote.

27. The CHAIRMAN said that if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Committee agreed with that suggestion.

*It was so decided.*

28. Mr. BOUCHOUK (Algeria) said that the previous week's debate in the Security Council on the question of Namibia, after the publication of the report by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on his mission to the Territory (see S/10832,<sup>3</sup> annex II), had been fruitful in so far as it had clearly demonstrated that the South African Government was pursuing an anachronistic policy in insisting on maintaining its domination over the Territory. Unfortunately, the Council had adopted a resolution which did not respond to the international community's desire that energetic measures should be taken to oblige the South African Government immediately to withdraw from Namibia.

29. In the light of the advisory opinion of 21 June 1971 of the International Court of Justice, the South African presence in Namibia must be considered as an act of aggression; the Security Council was accord-

ingly the only body empowered to take the necessary measures.

30. He summarized the problem of Namibia since the adoption in 1966 of resolution 2145 (XXI), by which the General Assembly had decided to terminate the Mandate of South Africa over the Territory, until the submission to the Security Council in 1972 of the report by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. That report was inadequate, however, because it did not answer many specific questions which the representative of the Secretary-General should have clarified. One of his tasks was to obtain an unequivocal statement by the South African Government of its intentions concerning the self-determination and independence of Namibia, as well as a precise definition of the meaning which the Government gave to the concept of self-determination. The only information to be had from the report was that, for the South African Government, self-determination must apply within the context of Bantustans; in other words self-determination must be based on the division of the Namibian people.

31. The report also stated that the South African Government was prepared to establish an advisory council drawn from representatives of the various regions. It was clear, however, that there had been no change in the attitude of the South African Government with respect to Namibia; it was regrettable that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General should have stated in his report that, in his opinion, the principle of self-determination as formulated by the South African authorities was acceptable in principle.

32. If the South African Government wished to demonstrate its good faith, it must renounce its policy of Bantustans and grant independence to Namibia while preserving the unity of the Namibian people.

33. In a statement made in August 1972 after the publication of the first report by the Secretary-General on the question (S/10738),<sup>4</sup> the President of SWAPO had stated that the situation in Namibia had worsened since the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa and that the United Nations must take measures to put an end to the South African presence in Namibia.

34. All justice-loving States must launch a massive campaign against South Africa in view of the failure of the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and of South Africa's persistent defiance of the Organization; that defiance was partly encouraged by the obvious indifference of some States which were openly accomplices of South Africa.

35. The South African Government could not remain in Namibia without the help it received from its allies. The strengthening of that assistance was especially serious and its objective was to maintain Namibia under South African domination.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1972, document S/10738.

36. Furthermore, on the strategic level, South Africa and the Salisbury and Lisbon régimes had established a genuine coalition not only to repress the African peoples' struggle for liberation but also to install powerful foreign economic interests in order to consolidate their colonial policies.

37. Such a situation increasingly threatened international peace and security and it was the duty of all countries loving peace and justice to provide concrete assistance to the liberation movements in their struggle.

38. Finally, he congratulated the representatives of SWAPO on their active participation in the work of the Fourth Committee on the question (2015th and 2018th meetings), as well as Miss Barbara Rogers for her sober and detailed statement on the situation in Namibia (2014th and 2018th meetings).

39. Mr. Cissé (Mali) noted that, despite the great interest which the international community felt in the problem of Namibia, it had been considering the problem for 27 years and had still not been able to solve it. However, everything had a limit and it seemed that the time had come when the Organization's authority would be seriously impaired, if the situation did not change.

40. Unfortunately, the problem had always been hedged about by compromises which paid greater regard to the criminal interests of the racist authorities in Pretoria than to the legitimate rights of the people of Namibia. However, it demanded an urgent solution—in the first instance for legal reasons. By refusing to hand over the administration of the Territory to the United Nations, South Africa had opposed the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, and it would be called to account by the international community; the illegal occupation of Namibia constituted an act of aggression—neither more nor less—and in that connexion it should be remembered that Chapter VII of the Charter laid down appropriate measures for dealing with such situations. The second consideration was political in nature: South Africa had extended its inhuman policy of *apartheid* to Namibia, and success in saving Namibia from the clutches of South Africa would help to restrict the scope and the pernicious effects of that policy.

41. Moreover, the international community was under a moral obligation to deal with South Africa's insulting defiance of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

42. The climate of repression in Namibia was reflected in the "homelands" policy which South Africa had institutionalized in order to create economic cells of *apartheid* in the various ethnic groups and thus crush the national unity and identity of the people of Namibia. In the economic field, South Africa had virtually handed the Territory over to foreign companies, as the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia (A/8724) showed. The profits of the firms operating in Namibia were so great that pressure groups had been formed to maintain the *status quo*. In addition,

South Africa had undeniably extended the application of many of its laws to Namibia. The suppression of the strike by the Ovambo mine workers in 1971 and the expulsion of young intellectuals from their colleges merely rounded out the picture.

43. The various organs established by the Organization in connexion with the problem of Namibia had been ably carrying out their task. The United Nations Council for Namibia was steadily gaining strength and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and the United Nations Fund for Namibia were also active. In its resolution 319 (1972) the Security Council had approved the proposal of the Secretary-General to appoint a representative to assist him in the discharge of the mandate conferred upon him in its resolution 309 (1972), and it had recently considered the report of Mr. Escher (see S/10832,<sup>3</sup> annex II). Henceforth, the question of Namibia had to be viewed in the light of the statements and views of the inhabitants of the Territory, who had clearly conveyed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General their unanimous desire to attain self-determination and independence. In receiving the mission headed by Mr. Escher, the Government of South Africa should have stated unequivocally its position regarding withdrawal from Namibia and the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence in a united country. The statements of the South African Prime Minister had, however, been ambiguous and half-hearted. The weakness of Mr. Escher's report lay in the absence of records of the talks which the representative of the Secretary-General had had with the parties concerned.

44. The representative of the Secretary-General had seemingly failed to interpret correctly the provisions of Security Council resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972), nor did his report answer certain questions raised in the aide-mémoire presented to the Secretary-General by the Group of Three (see S/10832,<sup>3</sup> annex I). Accordingly, his delegation believed that, in extending the Secretary-General's mandate, account had to be taken of the defects of the report. Any envoy of the Secretary-General must be imbued with the spirit of the Organization's objectives. Moreover, it was apparent that the only way in which South Africa could be made to see reason was by resorting to the enforcement measures provided for in the Charter. The "contacts formula", which, in a spirit of co-operation, his country had not opposed, should not be employed as an argument for delaying other measures which the United Nations could take. That was how his country interpreted the intent of Security Council resolution 323 (1972).

45. With a view to safeguarding the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence, his delegation was ready at all times to co-operate with all States that cherished justice and peace.

46. Mr. PETRELLA (Argentina) said that his country's position on the subject was entirely consonant with the recommendations and decisions of the United Nations. Unfortunately, the situation in Namibia

throughout the past year presented an increasingly discouraging picture. Argentina believed that there were certain factors on which compromise was not possible, namely, independence and territorial unity. The strategy employed by the United Nations in order to attain those two fundamental objectives could surely be adjusted to the political situation and to the pressures—not to be underestimated—that helped to keep Namibia in its present state.

47. One of the most useful instruments in that regard was the United Nations Council for Namibia. It had pursued a sound policy in the past, and its effectiveness would be further enhanced if its membership was enlarged and made more representative. Similarly, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia would finally have to be appointed. In that way, medium-term and long-term measures could be planned for exerting pressure on behalf of the Territory, without neglecting the influence exercised over those States which had strong commercial interests in Namibia.

48. Clearly, none of those measures would produce immediate results. For that reason, he valued the important efforts being undertaken outside the United Nations, which had been reported by a petitioner. His country was in favour of studying and giving effect to many of those suggestions, which would not hamper the procedure initiated under Security Council resolution 309 (1972). To date, that resolution had not had very gratifying results, but it was premature to say that it had been a failure. Argentina did not agree with those who maintained that negotiations with the Government of South Africa gave the impression that that Government had a "valid interest" in the Territory—a conclusion that was true from neither a legal nor a political standpoint.

49. Again, the Secretary-General's negotiations had not been a waste of time. In no sense did they prevent the United Nations, if it so wished, from taking more effective steps. Similarly, it would be wrong to pay too much attention to what the South African press said or failed to say. Obviously, any information from that source was slanted, the sole aim being to sow dissension.

50. His country would support all efforts on the part of the United Nations to resolve the question of Namibia.

51. Mr. WADUGODAPITIYA (Sri Lanka) said that Namibia's fate was unquestionably strange and perhaps without parallel. Formerly known as South West Africa, the Territory had been a German colony from 1892 until the League of Nations, after the First World War, had placed it under the Mandate of South Africa—a significant event because it had brought South Africa into the picture in a trusteeship role in response to the invitation of a world organization.

52. South Africa had administered the Territory until the demise of the League of Nations in 1943, submitting regular reports to that body. Soon after, the League had been replaced by the United Nations, which had



called on South Africa to continue to submit reports on its administration of South West Africa. South Africa had refused, and a new chapter had opened up in the history of Namibia. The Africans had reacted to South Africa's unilateral decision and, in a spirit of solidarity, had clearly and forcefully voiced their protest in the United Nations. That was how the Territory had received its new name of Namibia.

53. The United Nations had been considering the question of Namibia since 1946. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly had terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa (resolution 2145 (XXI)) and, at its fifth special session, had established the United Nations Council for South West Africa, setting it the task of administering the Territory until independence was attained (resolution 2248 (S-V)).

54. The General Assembly had subsequently adopted a number of resolutions on the matter, and in 1968, after the unsuccessful attempt by Liberia and Ethiopia to bring the case before the International Court of Justice, the United Nations had decided to grant Namibia independence by June 1968, establishing a body which was supposedly to be responsible for administering the Territory. South Africa, on the other hand, had consistently refused to recognize United Nations authority over Namibia and had taken steps to place the latter under the South African governmental system.

55. Finally, on 21 June 1971 the International Court of Justice had handed down its advisory opinion on the question, which had been rejected by South Africa. The opinion of the Court confirmed the correctness of the United Nations decisions regarding Namibia. Unfortunately, the many resolutions adopted had had little effect on South Africa. Perhaps the only ray of hope came from the resolution adopted by the Security Council at Addis Ababa (309 (1972)) and from the missions undertaken by the Secretary-General and, subsequently, his Special Representative in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him. On 20 July 1972, the Prime Minister of South Africa had said that he was prepared to co-operate with the United Nations on the question of independence for Namibia, although he had not made it clear in what way he would do so. The contacts with South Africa had not yielded results so far but the renewal of the Secretary-General's mandate was perhaps a good augury for an early solution of the problem.

56. It was clear that economic and military factors were posing significant obstacles to the attainment of independence by Namibia and that, coupled with the fact that South Africa was in physical control of the Territory, created a situation which enabled that country to ignore the resolutions of the United Nations and the opinions of the International Court of Justice with impunity.

57. His country had always complied with the United Nations resolutions on Namibia, and its position in that regard was well known. As a contribution to solving the problem, the Government of Sri Lanka had

decided to recognize the travel and identity documents issued to Namibians.

58. The situation in Namibia was an anachronism in the modern world, and Sri Lanka was confident that it would soon be remedied. The international community as a whole was responsible for the continuation of that situation.

59. The CHAIRMAN said that at the end of paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1028 the year should be 1973 and not 1972. After announcing that the delegation of Uganda had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution, he invited the Committee to vote on it. He drew the Committee's attention to the administrative and financial implications of the draft resolution, set out by the Secretary-General in document A/C.4/L.1031.

60. Mr. ASHWIN (Australia), speaking in explanation of vote, announced that his Government would contribute 10,000 Australian dollars to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, 5,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and 5,000 to the United Nations Fund for Namibia. In announcing the contribution, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs had noted that that was the first time that Australia had contributed to those funds, which had been established to assist the educational development of the people of southern Africa, and that he personally had long felt that Australia should assist the people of southern Africa by playing an active role in United Nations activities designed to achieve that objective.

61. Mr. PIKET (Netherlands) said that he would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1028 because he accepted the underlying principle that the United Nations, in terminating South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and assuming direct responsibility for that Territory, had also incurred the obligation to prepare the people of Namibia for independence. Paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Fund for Namibia (A/8841 and Corr.1) noted that the results of the Secretary-General's appeals for voluntary contributions to the Fund for Namibia had been disappointing, since the Fund's financial resources at the end of September 1972 had amounted to only some \$80,000, including the allocation from the regular budget. In the light of that situation, the Secretary-General had had to defer implementation of long-term measures and limit the short-term commitments of the Fund. Furthermore, owing to the limited resources, the scope of assistance fell far short of the programme envisaged by the General Assembly when it had adopted resolution 2872 (XXVI) on the Fund. His delegation shared the Secretary-General's hope that now that the Fund had become operative, contributions would increase in such a way as to make it possible to achieve the desired goals. For its part, the Government of the Netherlands, subject to Parliamentary approval, had decided to contribute 50,000 guilders to the Fund for 1973.

62. Mr. LAFONT (France) said that his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1028,

but wished to express concern at the fact that the draft referred to other texts which his delegation had not accepted. He also had misgivings about the amendments which had been made to the text, since he feared that they might alter the spirit of a body whose objective was to carry on activities complementing those of the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa.

63. The fact that many Member States had failed to increase their contributions might be taken to indicate that they had not thought it necessary for the resources of the Fund to be augmented at the present time. It should also be noted that the financial information provided did not seem to be sufficiently clear.

64. His delegation would nevertheless vote in favour of the United Nations Fund for Namibia in order to indicate its sympathy for the fate of the Namibian people—a sympathy demonstrated by its contribution of \$100,000 during the current year to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, which the Fund complemented to a large extent. His country had thus become the second largest contributor to the Educational and Training Programme (see A/8850 and Add.1).

65. Mr. NEKLESSA (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his country would continue, as in the past, to provide assistance to the liberation movements of the colonial peoples.

66. He was opposed to the allocation of resources from the United Nations regular budget to a Fund which had been created on the understanding that it would be financed entirely by voluntary contributions. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that various provisions of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1028 established the principle of the voluntary nature of contributions to the Fund, his delegation, although it could not endorse paragraph 2 of the draft and regarded it as unwarranted and improper, would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

67. The CHAIRMAN put draft resolution A/C.4/L.1028 to the vote.

*At the request of the representative of Zambia, a recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab

Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

*Against:* Portugal.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 106 votes to 1, with no abstentions.*

68. Mr. ELLIOT (United Kingdom), noting that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, recalled that, as previously announced, his Government would make a contribution of not less than £50,000 to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, which the Fund for Namibia complemented to a large extent.

69. He pointed out that his delegation could not accept the premises on which some of the preambular paragraphs were based, for reasons stated on previous occasions; with regard to paragraph 6, he noted that, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report (A/8841 and Corr.1), the administration and supervision of the United Nations Fund for Namibia remained the Secretary-General's responsibility. He was certain that the Secretary-General, besides taking into account advice from the two bodies mentioned in paragraph 6, would draw upon the expertise and experience of the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa.

70. Mr. GRIGG (United States of America) said that he had voted in favour of the draft resolution but had reservations with regard to the transitional measures of financing provided for in paragraph 2. As his delegation had pointed out the previous year, it considered that such transitional measures could not be extended indefinitely for a fund which was to be based on voluntary contributions. Furthermore, his delegation did not approve of the increase to \$100,000 in the amount allocated from the regular budget of the United Nations, but did not oppose the resolution because of the United States support for the basic United Nations position on Namibia.

71. Mrs. PINT (Belgium) said that she had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1028 because she appreciated the spirit in which it had been drafted but that she nevertheless had reservations regarding paragraph 2. Her Government considered, as a matter of principle, that funds supported by voluntary contributions could be financed from the United Nations regular budget as a transitional measure only.

72. Mr. UPRETI (Nepal), speaking on behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1028, expressed heartfelt gratitude to Australia, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for their contributions to the Fund. He was certain that other States would also contribute and that they would assist the Secretary-General in the application of long-term measures for its financing.

*The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.*