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**Chairman:** Mr. FAKHREDDINE Mohamed  
(Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued) (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. NABWERA (Kenya), noting that almost a year had elapsed since the unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia, said his delegation hoped that the Committee would be able to recommend positive and practical steps to be taken by the United Nations, in concert with the United Kingdom Government, in order to put an end to the illegal régime.

2. It was important, however, before all else, to examine why the measures so far taken by the United Kingdom Government had failed. In the first place, the United Kingdom Prime Minister had made a grave error when he had stated publicly that force could never be used against Ian Smith and his colleagues if they illegally declared Southern Rhodesia independent, even though at the time the United Kingdom Government had maintained that a unilateral declaration of independence would be a treasonable act. Secondly, once the use of force had been ruled out, effective economic sanctions should have been imposed immediately; the United Kingdom Government had always announced economic measures well in advance and had thus given the Smith régime time to prepare to withstand them. Thirdly, sanctions had not proved effective because South Africa and Portugal had not been forced to comply; a considerable amount of oil had been flowing into Southern Rhodesia from Mozambique, and from South Africa by rail through

Botswana which the United Kingdom could well have stopped. His delegation seriously wondered whether the United Kingdom had any real intention of putting an end to the Smith régime or whether the steps so far taken had been simply tailored to suit the political situation in the United Kingdom and to prepare world public opinion to accept the fact that the so-called independence of Southern Rhodesia had come to stay. He would appreciate a categorical statement from the United Kingdom representative on that point.

3. At the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers held in London in September 1966, a unanimous decision had been reached that there would be no independence for Southern Rhodesia until majority rule had been achieved. That was one reason why his own country's delegation had agreed to sign the communiqué, but subsequently it had been disturbed to learn from the *London Observer* of 25 September 1966 that, during the current negotiations at Salisbury, arrangements were being made for independence to be granted before majority rule. The *London Times* of 14 October 1966 had reported that the United Kingdom Government was now thinking of the interim period for direct rule by the United Kingdom in terms of minutes and hours and that it would then invite Ian Smith to form a Government of independent Rhodesia. If that information was not correct, he would be happy if the United Kingdom representative would deny it.

4. The communiqué issued by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference had never been intended to bind the United Nations to the decisions taken in London. The Commonwealth countries were only twenty-two in number and could not expect to be able to impose their views on the 121 Members of the United Nations; his delegation would like to dissociate itself from any such assumption. The communiqué consisted of two parts. The first part, the most important section of which was the agreement by the United Kingdom Government that independence would not be granted before majority rule, had been unanimously accepted by all the participating Governments. The second part merely recorded the views of the majority, on the one hand, and of the minority, including the United Kingdom, on the other. That formula had been necessary in order to avoid a deadlock. Hence, as far as his country's delegation was concerned, it took note of the views expressed by the minority but was not bound to support them. It was important to understand that clearly. In the opinion of his delegation, the Committee could, if it so wished, take note of the communiqué, but it could not be expected to do more than that.

5. A decision concerning Southern Rhodesia should be made at the current session of the General

Assembly. Supporters of the illegal régime had put forward all sorts of excuses in order to avoid taking effective action against it. The issue could no longer be shelved. The Committee was faced with the choice of either recommending practical ways for putting an end to the illegal régime, and thus remaining on the side of democracy and human decency, or of avoiding a decision, and thus becoming indirect supporters of that régime. The United Kingdom had had time enough to devise methods of dealing with the problem, and the United Nations must ensure that it would not evade its responsibility.

6. His delegation proposed, first, that a resolution should be adopted by the Committee and transmitted to the General Assembly, asking the Security Council to meet immediately and impose mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42, of the United Nations Charter; and, second, that the United Nations should be prepared to offer assistance to Zambia, whose economy would necessarily be affected by the application of sanctions. Those measures were the absolute minimum required to put an end to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. If the United Kingdom Government really meant what it so frequently declared in public, it should not be afraid to accept measures which offered the only sure way to restore constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia. His own country would never accept any government in that Territory which was not elected on the basis of one man, one vote.

7. Mr. GOMA-NGANGA (Congo, Brazzaville) said that the case of Southern Rhodesia, where white settlers representing barely one twentieth of the population could seize power and the Security Council could not be prevailed upon to take a firm stand, was revealing the bankruptcy of the United Nations. It was now becoming clear even to the most naïve Africans that the liberation of their continent could be brought about only by the Africans themselves. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) must make up its mind to hasten the downfall of the Ian Smith régime, whatever the cost. The measures adopted at Addis Ababa must be enforced.

8. No confidence could be placed in the United Kingdom, which was anxious to preserve its wealth in Southern Rhodesia and would never move against its rebellious colony. Prior to each major international gathering, the United Kingdom launched an offensive to convince the world that it was concerned about the question. Thus, just before the sixth extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU at Addis Ababa in 1965, the United Kingdom Government had announced a series of measures such as an almost complete boycott of Southern Rhodesian exports, the freezing of Southern Rhodesian assets, the prohibition of financial transactions with Southern Rhodesia and so forth—measures which should have been taken from the moment of the unilateral declaration of independence. Similar tactics had been adopted on the eve of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. The communiqué of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, which had been quoted to the Committee by the United Kingdom representative (1606th meeting), was no more than a smoke-screen. The imperialist Powers, led by the United

Kingdom and the United States, still imagined that the Africans were like children and could easily be fooled, but they were making a grave mistake.

9. In spite of the economic sanctions in force, the British Petroleum Company was continuing to honour contracts signed with the Southern Rhodesian authorities for the supply of oil. The Beira-Umtali pipeline, owned by a United Kingdom company, continued to carry oil to Southern Rhodesia—not to mention the substantial assistance being received from the apartheid Republic of South Africa.

10. The plight of Zambia was another reason why it was imperative to crush the rebellion of the Salisbury authorities and eradicate United Kingdom colonialism in Southern Rhodesia as represented by the Ian Smith clique. Ian Smith, if allowed to continue in his madness, could, for example, plunge Zambia into chaos by shutting off its electrical supply, which came from the Kariba power station situated in the territory of Southern Rhodesia.

11. Meanwhile, the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States, continued to assist the usurpers at Salisbury either directly or through the agency of the South African bandits. The situation had reached the point where the only remaining possibility was armed intervention. The African people believed in peace, but they knew that speaking of peace was not enough to ensure it. In the name of "peace" and "freedom", United States soldiers were killing innocent people in Viet-Nam, and, in the name of "anti-communism", Africans were massacred by the Salisbury racists and their allies. Those who humiliated, oppressed and massacred other peoples could hardly claim to be the champions of peace. Peaceful coexistence could not mean freedom for some to impose their will on others by armed force. The Africans under colonial rule could not be asked to lay down their arms.

12. The NATO countries posed as good Samaritans offering disinterested assistance to the African peoples. It might be asked, however, why the Peace Corps was not fighting in the United States, alongside the American Negroes, and why it was not fighting in Angola, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to help free the African peoples from the fascist dictatorship of Salazar and from the criminal Pretoria and Salisbury régimes. It was likewise to be wondered why the United Kingdom insisted on confining itself to so-called economic sanctions against the Rhodesian outlaws, while it had no hesitation in using its military arsenal to exterminate the "rebels" in Aden.

13. When the main culprit was a permanent member of the Security Council, nothing could be achieved through the United Nations except the adoption of resolutions, and the cases of South Africa and Portugal showed the futility of mere resolutions. As Ian Smith was in the meantime consolidating his position, the Africans must attack him on two fronts.

14. First, if the United Nations did not succeed in compelling the United Kingdom to use force in Southern Rhodesia, the Africans themselves must intervene on the side of the Zimbabwe people. South Africa, the United Kingdom and doubtless other Western Powers would go to the aid of Ian Smith,

but at least the real enemies of Africa would then be unmasked.

15. Secondly, there must be a campaign against the pound sterling, which had rightly been called the United Kingdom's Achilles' heel. Paradoxically, the United Kingdom was more vulnerable economically than Southern Rhodesia. The African States must be ready to break diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and refuse to pay for imports in sterling. If necessary, the African countries could also prohibit all exports to the United Kingdom. The prices of primary products would thus inevitably rise; the pound sterling would collapse; and, at a cost of no more than three months of patience on the part of the Africans, a solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia would very soon be found—especially if the oil-exporting countries of the Arab world also joined in.

16. The time had come to adopt such practical measures in order to bring freedom to the Africans of Southern Rhodesia.

17. Mr. ALJBOURI (Iraq) recalled the statement made at the 1440th plenary meeting of the General Assembly by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs that it was far from certain whether selective mandatory sanctions were sufficient to deal with the problem of the illegal régime of the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia, and that the Iraqi delegation fully supported the African States in their demand that force should be used to put an end to that régime.

18. The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Organization of African Unity and other bodies had condemned the illegal seizure of power by the white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and had placed the responsibility for that situation squarely on the shoulders of the United Kingdom Government. Under the pretext that Southern Rhodesia had enjoyed self-government since 1923, the United Kingdom had shirked its responsibility as the administering Power and abandoned the majority of the population to the mercy of the ruthless white minority.

19. The United Nations had never accepted that argument, and in resolution 1747 (XVI) the General Assembly had affirmed that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations. Many Governments considered that if the United Kingdom had used force after the unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965, the rebellion would have collapsed within a short time. That Government had, however, refused to take any firm action and had insisted on the application of economic sanctions, which had proved to be ineffective.

20. In a recent article, President Kaunda of Zambia had said that the sanctions had failed because they had been based on two incorrect assumptions. In the first place, it had been thought that an international system of sanctions could be applied against Southern Rhodesia and that although South Africa and Portugal would not participate, they would at least remain

neutral. Actually, however, those two countries had helped to nullify the effect of the sanctions by providing massive aid to Southern Rhodesia. In the second place, it was believed that the Europeans whom the sanctions affected would join in the opposition to Smith and force him to sue for a settlement. Those people had, however, merely left Southern Rhodesia and had resettled in South Africa where they had become prominent in aid-to-Rhodesia committees. Moreover, the oil embargo called for by the Security Council in its resolution 217 (1965) had failed, owing to the fact that Southern Rhodesia received large amounts of petroleum daily from South Africa and Portuguese Territories.

21. As the administering Power had failed to deal with that dangerous situation, whose continuance constituted a threat to international peace and security, it was incumbent on the United Nations to initiate action. His delegation considered that sanctions should be mandatory and should be binding on all States. If the Security Council decided that the Rhodesian situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, it was empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter to call upon Member States to take any action it decided upon, including military operations. In the case of the administering Power, there was of course no need for such authorization from the Security Council. Time was running short, and the United Nations must act quickly. Justice enjoined all Members to insist on majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe.

22. Mr. FATTAL (Syria) expressed concern that, despite developments in the field of decolonization elsewhere, there had been no progress towards a solution of the urgent question of Southern Rhodesia.

23. His delegation considered that the developing countries, because of their rich experience in national liberation strategies and tactics, bore primary responsibility for leading the United Nations in its struggle for the liberation of Southern Rhodesia. In the view of those countries, counsels of moderation towards colonialism and requests that the colonialists should be given a further opportunity of putting an end to their own privileged situation could only perpetuate colonialism by enabling it to consolidate itself at a time when it was crumbling. A colonial Power would only abdicate its privileges when it was faced with overwhelming force. History showed that colonialist expansion derived its strength from oppressive exploitation and from the fragmentation of countries. The only way to eliminate colonialism was through coercive measures and not by policies based on moral principles.

24. The reality of colonialism was even more complicated in the case of Southern Rhodesia, where there were two adversaries. On the one hand, there was the administering Power, the United Kingdom, and on the other hand, an oppressive racist minority régime, a by-product of United Kingdom colonialism. It was true that the former had condemned the rebellion, but that condemnation had deceived no one into believing that the United Kingdom had been motivated by a concern for the welfare of the majority. If that had been so, action to prevent the injustices perpetrated against the Rhodesian people would have

been taken by the United Kingdom at a time when the country had still been under its control. The half-hearted efforts of the United Kingdom to persuade the illegal régime to end its rebellion were merely a disguised attempt to preserve the economic privileges of international monopolies and the political influence that the Western imperialist States still enjoyed in that part of Africa.

25. With regard to the second adversary, the Syrian delegation believed that although it was the legal and moral responsibility of the United Kingdom to quell the rebellion, only direct forceful action by the developing nations, and in particular the African peoples with the support of the peace-loving nations, could bring to an end the injustices which were being committed against the African population of the Territory. That unjust situation could be dealt with only by revolutionary means.

26. Southern Rhodesia did not, moreover, represent the first instance in modern times where a small minority supported by an administering Power had taken over an entire country and subjugated its people; that had happened, for example, in the Middle East when the people of Palestine had been expelled by an invading minority.

27. The Syrian delegation would support any international move designed to compel the United Kingdom Government to take any action provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter—including the use of force—to bring down the Ian Smith régime. In Syria's view, mandatory economic sanctions should be required of all countries, and the principle of one man, one vote should be introduced in Southern Rhodesia as soon as the Smith régime had been overthrown.

28. Mr. RAMANI (Malaysia) said that one of the most important events since the Committee had discussed the question of Southern Rhodesia at the twentieth session and since the General Assembly had adopted resolutions 2022 (XX) and 2024 (XX) had been the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers held in London in September 1966. As his Government had signed the communiqué issued by that Conference, he would take that document as a starting point in examining the progress made.

29. It was understandable that the United Kingdom representative, at the Committee's 1606th meeting, should have read out the communiqué, in order to have it on the record, but he had surely not meant to imply that the Commonwealth had said the last word on the subject and that what had satisfied the members of the Commonwealth should satisfy the members of the United Nations. Different points of view had been stated in the communiqué, and what had in fact been decided must remain a matter of individual interpretation.

30. Two basic facts had been accepted without question by the United Kingdom Government, namely, that Southern Rhodesia was a British colony under the 1961 Constitution and therefore British territory, and second, that the unilateral declaration of independence was illegal and constituted a rebellion which must be put down. Primarily, therefore, it was a United Kingdom problem, but the United Kingdom was

answerable to the world community for its stewardship over the peoples of the Territory, the 4 million Africans as well as the 200,000 Whites. The United Kingdom, on its own initiative, had brought the matter to the Security Council the previous year<sup>1/</sup> and had obtained the Council's endorsement of an embargo on oil and petroleum products. As had been foreseen, however, Southern Rhodesia had obtained oil through South Africa and the Portuguese Territories, and although the United Kingdom was insisting that the oil embargo and other economic sanctions were crippling the Rhodesian economy, the illegal régime in the Territory claimed that the economy had never been stronger.

31. The communiqué issued by the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers had been analysed in detail by the United Kingdom representative at the Committee's 1606th meeting. The essential obligations undertaken by the United Kingdom Government were that it would apply the necessary mixture of persuasion and pressure to ensure that the illegal régime restored all authority to the Governor; that the Governor would then appoint a legal and widely representative government; that it would negotiate with that interim government in order to achieve a constitutional settlement acceptable to the people as a whole; and that if the illegal régime did not accept those arrangements, the United Kingdom would apply to the Security Council for mandatory sanctions to be imposed against the Territory. Steps which should now be taken by the United Kingdom were, first, that the broad conclusions reached by the Commonwealth countries should be made acceptable to the Committee and, second, that the Committee should be informed of what positive steps the United Kingdom had taken to publicize its intentions in Southern Rhodesia, as it had undertaken to do, and what approaches it had made to the illegal régime and with what result.

32. At the Committee's 1606th meeting, when the representative of Trinidad and Tobago had referred to a time limit of one month as having been given to the Smith régime, the United Kingdom representative had stated that the only time limit agreed upon had been the end of 1966. According, however, to a New York Times dispatch from London dated that same day, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had reiterated his country's intention to request the Security Council, "by about the end of November", to impose mandatory sanctions, if no settlement had been reached.

33. Several United Kingdom specialists in African affairs had openly doubted the effectiveness of the United Kingdom Government's approach to the problem. The political correspondent of the London Observer had written on 2 October 1966 that the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had come to the conclusion that the principal obstacle to agreement was that the white Rhodesians had an exaggerated view of the liberalism of his Government's policy; the Secretary's concern was to persuade them that a return to legality did not mean a

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1965, document S/6896.

period of direct rule by the Governor or from Whitehall and, still less, the imminent imposition of African rule. In the same issue of the same newspaper, one of the most knowledgeable specialists on African affairs had reported from Salisbury that most people there believed that there was not the slightest sign of the rebel régime being willing to alter its intransigent position; he had commented on the flexibility to which Mr. Wilson's vital six principles had lent themselves and on the failure of oil sanctions.

34. The Charter did not make any distinction between voluntary and mandatory sanctions, and, indeed, it did not use the word sanctions at all. Article 41 referred to "measures ... to be employed to give effect to its [the Security Council's] decisions", and the word "sanctions" had apparently been invented as a form of shorthand for measures that were to be enforced. The phrase "voluntary sanctions" was not found in the Charter and was, moreover, a contradiction in terms. Sanctions, whether comprehensive or selective, meant economic enforcement measures to which all Members of the United Nations became automatically committed under Article 25 of the Charter and for which authority was specifically given in Article 41 of the Charter.

35. If the United Kingdom Government had decided that, in the event of failure to reach agreement, it would take the matter to the Security Council by about the end of November, then perhaps some indication could be given to Members at the present time of how matters had developed since the publication of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué.

36. Mr. AL-SHAHEEN (Kuwait) said that the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia had been denounced by world public opinion, the General Assembly and the Security Council. That régime, which was supposed to represent a white population of about 200,000, had imposed itself as arbiter of the destiny of over 4 million Africans. That manifestly unjust state of affairs had not begun with the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith in November 1965; it was merely the culmination of a long process which had been going on in that country for years.

37. Although the United Kingdom Government had known from the outset that there would be an illegal seizure of power by the Ian Smith régime, it had done nothing to prevent Mr. Smith from carrying out his designs. It had also sought to preclude the use of

force, claiming that economic and financial sanctions alone would bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks. The United Kingdom knew that economic sanctions could not be effective because of the substantial aid which the illegal régime received from the Governments of South Africa and Portugal, two countries which pursued similar policies and employed equally ruthless methods to suppress the indigenous populations. The United Kingdom Government could not absolve itself from responsibility for the plight of the people of Zimbabwe. Indeed, the half-hearted measures it had taken so far gave reason to wonder whether it was really determined to bring down the Smith régime.

38. The Government of Kuwait had fully complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 217 (1965). It had not recognized the illegal authority nor entertained any diplomatic or other relations with it. Air and sea transport had been suspended, and all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia had been broken off. The fact that the Kuwait National Petroleum Company had important investments in the Feruka refinery had not prevented the Council of Ministers of Kuwait from acting promptly and imposing an embargo on oil and petroleum products. The resulting financial loss was of little import by comparison with the sacrifices of the African people in their struggle for freedom.

39. As the international community considered the Smith régime immoral and illegal, and as the use of economic sanctions as a means of eliminating the authority of the usurpers had met with universal agreement, there seemed to be no reason why Governments should not take all appropriate measures, including the use of force as prescribed by the United Nations Charter, to bring down that minority régime.

40. He reaffirmed the belief of the Government and people of Kuwait that freedom and self-determination were the birthright of the people of Zimbabwe. Once the Smith régime was eliminated, it would be incumbent on the United Nations to take all necessary measures to enable the people of Zimbabwe to realize their aspirations to independence and full sovereignty. His Government therefore associated itself with efforts to be undertaken to eradicate the remnants of colonialism in the African continent.

*The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.*