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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(for the period 1 June-4 December 1989)

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report ~~on the~~ United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments ~~from 1 June to 4 December~~ 1989 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary-General's mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions concerning Cyprus. Most recently, in its resolution 634 (1989) ~~of~~ 9 June 1989, the Security Council called upon all the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with UNFICYP on the basis of the present mandate and requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good **offices**, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution **by 30 November** 1989. The submission of the report had to be delayed in order to be able to take into account ~~my~~ separate meetings of 29 November and **4 December** 1989 with the leaders of the two sides in Cyprus,

I. MANDATE AND **COMPOSITION** OF UNFICYP

2. The function of UNFICYP was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) in the following **terms**:

"In the interest **of** preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. "

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the **Greek** Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, **most** recently in its resolution 634 (1989). In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number **of** resolutions, **some** of which **have affected** the functioning of UNFICYP and, in **some** cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire (see S/14275, **para.** 7, note).

3. The **table** below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 30 November 1989:

Military personnel

Austria	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	Infantry battalion, UNAB	393	
	Military police	<u>10</u>	410
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	8	
	HQ CANCON	17	
	Royal Canadian Regiment	526	
	Signal aquadron	12	
	Military police	<u>12</u>	575
Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Infantry battalion, DANCON 52	323	
	Military police	<u>13</u>	342
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police	3	7
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military police	2	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police	3	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	23	
	HQ BRITCON	6	
	Force scout car squadron, B Squadron, 13/18 Royal Hussars	109	
	4th Royal Tank Regiment	320	
	Support regiment (<i>engineers,</i> <i>signals, army aviation flight,</i> <i>transport, medical centre,</i> <i>ordnance, workshops)</i>	275	
	Military police	<u>9</u>	<u>742</u>

2 091**Civilian police**

Australia		20	
Sweden		<u>15</u>	<u>35</u>
Total UNFICYP			<u>2 126</u>

4. One member of UNFICYP died as a result of a traffic accident. Since its inception, the Force has suffered 147 fatalities.

5. Mr. Oscar **Camilión** continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus. The Force remained under the command of Major-General Clive Milner.

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II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

6. UNFICYP maintained liaison and co-operation at all levels with the two sides in order to carry out its tasks effectively. The Force had freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military areas. Regarding movement in the northern part, the guidelines established in 1983 (see S/15812, para. 14), and subsequently improved, continued to be applied. UNFICYP continued its efforts to improve its freedom of movement in the northern part of the island and the guidelines are currently under review.

III. FUNCTIONS OF UNFICYP

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo

7. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

8. UNFICYP kept the United Nations buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of 146 observation posts, 54 of which were permanently manned. In addition, mobile and standing patrols were employed, especially in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices were used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

9. British Army engineers maintained the UNFICYP patrol and communications track, which runs the length of the buffer zone and is used for the surveillance of the cease-fire lines, the monitoring of agricultural activities, the resupply of observation posts and rapid reaction to any incidents.

10. During the period under review, the number of cease-fire violations remained at a low level. In Nicosia, the unmanning of positions implemented in May 1989 (S/20663, para. 14) had a positive effect and the number of incidents was the lowest since 1974. UNFICYP pursued its efforts to extend the unmanning to other positions.

11. A serious situation, however, arose in July as a result of a demonstration by Greek Cypriots in Nicosia. The details are as follows:

(a) in the evening of 19 July, some 1,000 Greek Cypriot demonstrators, mostly women, forced their way into the United Nations buffer zone in the Ayios Kasaianos area of Nicosia. The demonstrators broke through a wire barrier maintained by UNFICYP and destroyed an UNFICYP observation post. They then broke through the line formed by UNFICYP soldiers and entered a former school complex where UNFICYP reinforcements regrouped to prevent them from proceeding further. A short while later, Cypriot police and security forces elements forced their way into the area and apprehended 111 persons, 101 of them women;

(b) The **Ayios Kassianos** school complex is **situated** in the **United Nations** buffer **zone**. **However**, the Turkish forces **claim** it to be **on** their side of the cease-fire line. Under working arrangements with UNPICY, the Turkish Cypriot security forces **have** patrolled the **school** grounds for **several years within specific** restrictions. This patrolling ceased altogether **as** part of the unmanning agreement implemented last May;

(c) In the afternoon of 21 July, **some** 300 Greek Cypriots gathered at the main entrance to the United Nations protected area in Nicosia, in **which the** United Nations headquarters is located, to **protest the** continuing **detention by** the Turkish Cypriot authorities of those apprehended at Ayios **Kassianos**. The **demonstrators**, whose number fluctuated between 200 and 2,000, blocked all **United Nations** traffic through **this entrance until 30 July**, when the Turkish Cypriot authorities released the last two detainees!

(d) The events described above created considerable tension **in the** island and intensive **efforts** were made, both at **United Nations Headquarters and at Nicosia**, to contain and resolve the situation. On 21 July, I expressed my concern at the events that had taken place and stressed that it was vital that all parties keep in mind the purpose of the United Nations buffer zone as well **as** their responsibility to ensure that **that area was not violated**. I also urged the Turkish Cypriot authorities to release without delay all those who **had been detained**. On 24 July, the President of the Security Council **announced that he had conveyed to the** representatives of all the parties, **on behalf of the members of the Council**, the Council's deep concern at the tense situation created by the incidents of 19 July. He also stressed the need strictly to **respect the United Nations buffer zone and** appealed for the immediate release of all persons still **detained**. He asked all concerned to show **maximum** restraint and to **take** urgent steps **that would bring about** a relaxation of tension and contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the **negotiations**.

12. During the period under review, there were three other **occasions** on which Greek Cypriot demonstrators entered the United Nations buffer zone.

(a) On 16 July, **some** 450 persons assembled at **Akaki**. About half of them entered the buffer zone and a few broke through the first cordon formed by UNFICYP but were intercepted by other United Nations soldiers **before** they could reach the Turkish **forces** line:

(b) On 22 July, approximately 400 persons assembled at Peristeroaa. About 150 entered the United Nations buffer zone where they were met by UNFICYP soldiers. A small group managed to evade the soldiers **and advanced toward** the Turkish forces line. In reaction, Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriot police deployed into the buffer zone **but**, on the demand of UNFICYP, they returned behind their line. The Force eventually collected the demonstrators and escorted them out of the buffer zone:

(c) On 15 October, **some** 3,000 persons assembled at Astromeritia. About 200 entered the United Nations buffer zone and **some** of them managed to **advance** within **200 metres** of the Turkish forces line before UNFICYP could intercept them and escort them out of the buffer zone.

13. The problem posed by demonstrators who violate the United Nations buffer zone has been the subject of numerous contacts at all levels between the United Nations and the Government of Cyprus (see also S/20310, para. 16, and S/20663, para. 11). In those contacts the United Nations made clear that it was obliged, under the UNFICYP mandate, to oppose activities in the buffer zone that were bound to provoke the other side and that entailed the risk of incidents. The United Nations pointed out that UNFICYP was neither mandated nor organiaed to assume responsibilities that fell within the competence of the civilian authorities. Accordingly, the United Nations expected the Government to give clear guidance to the population and to ensure that the police took effective measures to prevent demonstrators from entering the United Nations buffer zone.

14. On 15 November, Greek Cypriots held a number of demonstrations at Nicosia and other locations close to the United Nations buffer zone. The day before, President Vassiliou had made a public statement in which he stressed the Government's commitment to prevent clashes with UNFICYP, called upon demonstrators to stay away from places where incidents might take place and announced that the police was instructed to intervene, if necessary. The demonstrations of 15 November passed without incidents. Where necessary, the police intervened to keep demonstrators from entering the United Nations buffer zone. The Force Commander conveyed UNFICYP's appreciation for the co-operation of the authorities.

15. During the period under review, there were 14 overflights of the United Nations buffer zone by civilian aircraft coming from the south and 6 by civilian aircraft coming from the north. In addition, National Guard aircraft overflew the buffer zone three times and Turkish forces aircraft six times. Civilian aircraft of other nationalities accounted for nine further overflights. The overflights were investigated by UNFICYP and protested as appropriate.

16. Near Famagusta, fishing and pleasure craft from the southern part of the island occasionally crossed the maritime security line, which was established by UNFICYP as a practical measure for security purposes (see S/17657, pars. 19). UNFICYP reported each crossing of the line to the Cyprus police to secure their assistance in preventing serious incidents. In June, also to prevent incidents, the Turkish forces placed four marker buoys north of the line.

17. Both sides expressed concern on several occasions about the strength and development of the military forces on the other side. UNFICYP remained concerned about the level of forces in Cyprus and monitored those forces by overt means to the best of its ability.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

18. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP facilitated economic and other civilian activities in the areas between and adjacent to the cease-fire lines. In particular it facilitated farming, and sizeable tracts of land were opened for this purpose.

19. UNFICYP used its good **offices**, as necessary, in regard to the supply of electricity and **water from** one part of the island to the **other**. During the summer months, water shortages **occurred in many parts of** the island and both sides co-operated in solving this problem. Two inter-communal water projects were begun in November, the desilting of the **dam** at Marathasa and the replacement **of** a pipeline carrying water to Lefka **for** irrigation. UNFICYP facilitated the implementation of these project', and both aides are co-operating fully in carrying them out.

20. UNFICYP facilitated *normal* contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by making available the facilities of the **former** Ledra Palace Hotel located in the buffer zone. Meetings and seminars were organiaed by the United Nations Development Progranune (**UNDP**) and the **Office of** the United Nations High Commissioner **for** Refugees (**UNHCR**) on projects involving both communities. In addition, various Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot organizations and groups, including the leaders **of** political parties from both sides, have made increasing use **of** these facilities to meet each other.

21. The UNFICYP civilian police (UNCIVPOL) maintained close co-operation and liaison with the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot police on matters having inter-communal aspects. It also contributed to the maintenance of law and order in the buffer *zone* and assisted in the humanitarian activities of the Force, including escorting persons transferring from one side to the other.

22. UNFICYP discharged its humanitarian functions **for** the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of **the** island, almost all of them in the Karpass peninsula, who now number 611. UNFICYP distributed 403 tons **of** foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government and the Cyprus Red Cross Society. It also distributed social welfare and pension benefits to them UNFICY? personnel interviewed, in private, Greek Cypriots who applied for permanent transfer **to** the southern part **of** the island, in order to verify that the transfer was voluntary. Two such transfers took place during the reporting period. UNFICYP also facilitated 725 temporary visits by Greek Cypriots to the southern part **of** the island. The Greek Cypriot primary school at Rizokarpaso now has 26 pupils and the one at Ayia **Trias** has 10. UNFICYP assisted again in arranging visits of children attending school in the south to their families in the Karpass **for** the summer holidays.

23. UNFICYP periodically visited Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island. It helped them to maintain contact with their relatives in the northern part and arranged 17 reunions, involving 76 persons. UNFICYP distributed pensions to Turkish Cypriots in the northern part of the island who were formerly employed by the Government of Cyprus.

24. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island is now 276. UNFICYP delivered **to** them 238 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government and assisted in arranging frequent contacts between Maronites living on different sides of the cease-fire lines.

25. UNFICYP provided emergency medical servicea, including medical evacuation, to members of both communities. It escorted Turkish Cypriots to hospitals in the southern part of the island and regularly delivered medicines to the Turkish Cypriot community. It also carried out the arrangements for the delivery of mail and Red Cross messages across the lines.

26. UNFICYP co-operated with UNHCR, as co-ordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance to needy displaced persons in Cyprus, and UNDP, in particular to facilitate projects involving both communities. UNHCR supported such projects concerning sewerage, medical care and rehabilitation of the handicapped. UNDP continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and pursued projects with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) for the control of newborn animal diseases, with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for the development of handicrafts and with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the prevention and control of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

27. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP for a further period of six months beyond 15 December 1989, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force and assuming continuation of its existing strength and responsibilities, is estimated at \$13.8 million, as detailed below:

UNFICYP COST ESTIMATES BY MAJOR CATEGORY OF EXPENSE

(In thousands of United States dollars)

I. Operational costs incurred by the United Nations

Movement of contingents	290
Operational expenses	1 602
Premises (maintenance, utilities, etc.)	710
Rations	683
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	2 965
Miscellaneous and contingencies	250
Total I	6 500

II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents

Pay, allowances and transport	6 730
Contingent-owned equipment	470
Death and disability	100
Total II	7 300
Grand total (I and II)	13 800

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The estimate does not reflect the full cost of the operation. It excludes, in particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by the troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb.

28. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force which is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. In this regard, only \$2.0 million has been contributed by Member States, against anticipated expenditures of some \$13.1 million for the mandate period that is about to end. As these contributions have never been sufficient to meet the cost of the Force, the reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries have been met only up to June 1980. Unless additional contributions are received, the accumulated deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be \$174.6 million for the periods from the inception of the Force to the end of the current mandate period.

V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

29. During the period under review, I pursued the mission of good offices entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council in resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975 and in subsequent resolutions, most recently in resolution 634 (1989).

30. In my last report to the Council, I summarized the developments since August 1988 when the leaders of the two sides in Cyprus had agreed to meet without any pre-conditions to attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem. Since August 1988 they have met for some 100 hours at the residence of my Special Representative in Nicosia and have met with me on a number of occasions jointly and separately at United Nations Headquarters.

31. I informed the Council that the two leaders had agreed to successive rounds of talks to explain their views and concerns about a wide range of key issues; to develop a range of options for each of the issues that make up the Cyprus problem; and, finally, to prepare a draft outline of an overall agreement in which the solutions to be achieved would be described. I noted then that they had agreed to the specific procedures to be followed. I stated that the preparation of the draft outline was still in progress and that I would meet with them during the last week in June to review the situation and to decide how to proceed.

32. I was most gratified that, in connection with the Council's meeting on 9 June 1989, the President issued a statement (S/20682) in which, on behalf of the members, he urged both parties to redouble their efforts, be flexible and lend the fullest support and co-operation to the efforts of my Special Representative towards achieving a negotiated, just and lasting settlement.

33. I met the two leaders on 28 and 29 June 1989 to consider the situation in the light of the discussions that had taken place at Nicosia in May and early June and to agree on the completion of the third round of talks. In my statement at our joint meeting of 29 June, I recalled the procedures which the two leaders had agreed upon with a view to preparing the outline of an overall agreement and summarized in some detail the ideas which my colleagues had discussed with them on

a non-committal basis in May and June. I said that I believed that those ideas offered a real possibility of bridging the positions of the two sides and made a just and lasting agreement possible. I asked both leaders to seize that opportunity and co-operate with me to complete the work under way. I said that I had asked my Special Representative to bring them together in direct talks to complete the preparation of the outline. I indicated that, in line with my mandate, I intended to continue to play an active role in bringing the two sides within effective negotiating range. Finally, I invited the two leaders to meet again with me in September 1989 to consider the completed outline and to launch the negotiation of an overall agreement. I was pleased that the two leaders, after listening to my assessment of the situation and my suggestions for proceeding, pledged their co-operation in completing that task and accepted my invitation to meet me again in September.

34. Shortly thereafter, they agreed that the direct talks would resume at Nicosia on 26 July 1989. Unfortunately, the incidents of 19 July prevented the talks from beginning on that date but the two leaders agreed in separate meetings with Mr. Camilión on 24 July that they would take place in the week of 31 July 1989.

35. From the latter part of June, H.E. Mr. Denktas began publicly to express his reservations about the process that had been followed during the third round of talks in May and June, stating that the procedure was flawed and that all discussions should take place in direct talks between the two leaders. In his meeting on 24 July with Mr. Camilion, he restated this position and expressed the view that the United Nations should not put anything before the two leaders at their next meeting, but added that if that was the intention he would wish to receive it in advance.

36. On 25 July, my Special Representative wrote to both leaders enclosing the ideas which had been discussed with them on a non-committal basis in May and early June and which I had summarized in my opening statement on 29 June. He stressed that those ideas were not presented as a proposal but merely to help them by providing food for thought and structure to their discussions. As I had urged in our meeting of 29 June, my Special Representative again underlined the importance of proceeding on a strictly confidential basis.

37. On 29 July, H.E. Mr. Denktas informed Mr. Camilion that it was not possible for him to participate in the talks the following week as he had agreed to do on 24 July because of the tensions resulting from the incidents of 19 July and because he had to seek guidance on the ideas from other Turkish Cypriot authorities.

38. Since then, I have concentrated my efforts to find a way to resume the talks on a meaningful basis. In addition to exchanges of correspondence with H.E. Mr. Denktas and the continuing efforts of my Special Representative, I met with President Vassiliou on 4 October and 29 November and with H.E. Mr. Denktas on 11 October and 4 December.

39. In my separate meetings with the two leaders in October, I stressed the need for a clear understanding of the approach to be followed to complete the outline as had been agreed on 29 June. I indicated my readiness to continue to assist the two

sides to achieve that goal, including by offering ideas on a non-committal basis when I believed that it could facilitate their discussions, I reiterated my belief that their task would be facilitated if they **took** into account all the ideas that had emerged during our current effort.

40. In our 4 October meeting, President Vassiliou expressed his readiness to resume direct **talks** to complete the outline as had been agreed to and taking **into** consideration all the ideas that had emerged so far.

41. In my 11 October meeting with H.E. Mr. **Denktas**, the latter made a number of suggestions **for** resuming the talks. He stressed the linkage between the negotiations and the political circumstances on which they must be based. He suggested that the two sides proceed by agreeing on the headings of an outline that would then be prepared through direct talks **and** that as part of the outline the two sides should agree on a joint declaration of intent that would define the new pattern of relationship between the two communities. H.E. Mr. **Denktas** stated that he would rely on **me** as to how the talks should proceed.

42. At the conclusion **of** the meeting, I announced that I would reflect on what H.E. Mr. **Denktas** had suggested, review the situation and present to the two leaders **my** views on how to resume the talks.

43. In the separate meetings on 29 November and 4 December, I stressed once **more** the importance **of** a commitment to resume the talks on a meaningful basis. Towards that end, I asked the two leaders to agree to the headings of the outline that had emerged during their talks and, when preparing the outline, to consider, inter alia, the many ideas that had been produced. I stated that, if both sides were willing to proceed in that way, I would invite them to a session of some two weeks' duration in February 1990 at a venue to be decided. In addition, I underlined the close relationship between the negotiating process and the overall atmosphere in which the negotiations took place. I urged the two leaders to promote in words and in deeds reconciliation and mutual trust **between** the two communities. In this connection, I suggested that a joint statement to that **effect** and goodwill measures could prove helpful.

44. President Vassiliou stated his willingness to proceed along the lines suggested. **As** regards a joint statement, he did not reject the preparation of such a statement at the appropriate time, adding that it should not detract from the agreed objective of arriving at an outline of an overall agreement. H.E. Mr. **Denktas** stressed the need first to agree on a joint declaration of intent on the relationship between **the** two communities and then to discuss the headings of an outline. Following the meetings, I instructed **my** Special Representative to pursue his contacts at Nicosia in order to prepare for the early continuation of the high-level talks.

45. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus held four sessions comprising 17 meetings of which 9 were attended by the three members and their assistants and 8 by the three members only. The Committee continued its discussions on reports submitted by both sides, and additional investigations were carried out in the field with the **p**articipation of the Third

Member and/or his assistants. The Committee also investigated new cases presented to it. In a press statement issued on 25 October, the Committee underlined "that it has to rely entirely on the files and documents transmitted to it by both sides but, finally, and above all, on the testimony of the witnesses interviewed, on their co-operation, and on their willingness and knowledge to give complete and precise information".

VI. OBSERVATIONS

46. In my last report to the Council, I had stated that the talks in which the two leaders had been engaged had progressed to the point where the contours of an overall agreement were discernible. I had expressed the hope to be able to report positive results to the Council. As the Council will have noted from the previous section of the present report, it is unfortunately not possible for me to report that we have achieved concrete results.

47. Nevertheless, I remain of the view that a basis for effective negotiations exists provided both leaders manifest the necessary goodwill and recognize that a viable solution must satisfy the legitimate interests of both communities. Each side needs to acknowledge issues considered essential by the other and be willing to negotiate reasonable solutions. The discussions since last year have clearly brought out all the issues that need to be covered in an agreement, and have produced ideas that should facilitate the negotiating process. It should therefore be possible for the two leaders to proceed expeditiously to complete their work on an outline as they had agreed to do on 29 June. As I stated above, following my recent meetings with the two leaders I was not able to announce the concurrence of both with my suggestions for resuming the talks. I hope that, after further discussions with my Special Representative, a way will be found whereby both leaders will soon be able to inform me of their willingness to continue the work agreed to on 29 June and to proceed as I suggested during my last meetings with them.

48. There can be no doubt that the negotiations and the overall atmosphere are closely interrelated. As I have often said, the success of negotiations depends, to a large extent, on the message that the two communities convey to each other. The recent relaxation in the crossing procedures by the Turkish Cypriot side and the growing number of contacts between groups on the two sides are positive developments which should be built on. The two leaders should make a determined effort to promote reconciliation. The adoption of goodwill measures, including the extension of the unarming arrangements, could prove useful in this regard. But we must keep in mind that, while negotiations are unlikely to succeed without an improved atmosphere, it is equally true that an improved atmosphere cannot endure if it is not accompanied by a clear commitment to meaningful negotiations.

49. As will be apparent from the present report, UNFICYP has continued to fulfil its functions in an exemplary manner, often under difficult conditions. The regrettable events of 19 July have underscored the importance for all concerned to respect the role and functions of UNFICYP. In this regard, I am pleased that the Government of Cyprus has in the recent past co-operated with UNFICYP in protecting the integrity of the buffer zone. It is clear that the presence of UNFICYP remains

indispensable. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this **matter** with the parties concerned, and I shall report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

50. I must again draw the attention of the Security Council to the worsening financial crisis facing UNFICYP. This is a situation which cannot but threaten the very existence of the Force. It is not fair that the troop-contributing Governments should have to bear so large a share of **UNFICYP's** cost. This is understandably **a matter** of growing concern to them as is evident from their letters to **me** on this subject. I would like to take this opportunity to express **my** appreciation to these Governments **for** their continued support, as well as to those that have made financial contributions. It remains **my** view that the best way to finance UNFICYP on **a more** equitable basis would be **for** the United Nations share of the costs of the **Force** to be financed **from** assessed contributions. I continue **to** hope that in due **course** the **members** of the Council will accept this overdue reform.

51. Finally, I would **like** to express **my** deep appreciation to **my** Special Representative, Mr. Oscar **Camilión**, to the **Force** Commander, Major-General Clive **Milner**, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP who **have** continued to discharge with great efficiency and devotion the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

