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*Chairman:* Mr. Eugeniusz KULAGA (Poland).

**AGENDA ITEM 35**

**Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/7742)**

1. Mr. BADAWI (United Arab Republic) introduced the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/7742). The Special Committee had been active in seeking to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it in paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2451 (XXIII). The Working Group established by the Special Committee had been working intensively in order to produce the model, currently referred to as model I, dealing with military-observer missions authorized or established by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to Council resolutions. Agreement had been achieved on the framework of model I which was divided into eight chapters summarized in the appendix to the report of the Working Group. During some 50 meetings held by the Working Group, constructive discussions had enabled the Working Group to complete five of the eight chapters constituting the schema of model I.

2. In order to preserve the unity of model I, the Working Group, with the approval of the Special Committee, had decided, since certain chapters were still under consideration, not to annex formally to the report the chapters already completed. They were chapters I, V, VI, VII and VIII of the schema in the appendix and Members of the United Nations could take cognizance of them.

3. For information on the incomplete chapters, he referred members of the Committee to paragraph 8 of the report. It stated that, despite the expressions of regret voiced at the meetings of the Special Committee that the Working Group had not been able to submit the complete draft of model I, it was generally recognized that the intricacy and the complexity of the questions involved not only justified but necessitated careful and patient approaches which would explain the slow progress.

4. In the light of those facts and also of the accomplishments of the Working Group during the past year, the

General Assembly might perhaps accept the recommendation made by the Special Committee in paragraph 10 of its report.

5. Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO (Mexico) said that, in adopting resolution 2451 (XXIII), the General Assembly had hoped to have before it at its twenty-fourth session a complete study on United Nations military observers established or authorized by the Security Council. Such a study was not included in the report before the Committee (A/7742), which registered merely important but limited progress. It was hardly surprising therefore that representatives of Member States were disappointed and that certain of them spoke of the theoretical character of the Special Committee's work or even asserted that, as the Special Committee had been unable to study the basic questions, it was time for the General Assembly to contemplate new ways of keeping alive the role assumed by the United Nations in the field of peace-keeping.

6. He considered that the work of the Special Committee had every chance of being successful. He recalled that the question of peace-keeping operations had caused the paralysis of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly. At the twentieth session, all Member States had agreed that Article 19 of the Charter referred only to expenses within the Organization's regular budget. However, it was essential to find other means of integrating peace-keeping operations within the constitutional framework of the United Nations and to keep open within the budget a section on highly useful expenditures. General Assembly resolution 2053 (XX) mentioned three aspects of the problem: the replenishment of United Nations resources exhausted by the operations undertaken in the Congo and the Middle East, the preparation of future operations and finally the financing of such operations.

7. The mandate given to the Special Committee was general and it even contained a *petitio principii*. There could be no agreement on paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of resolution 2053 (XX) without previous agreement on the nature of peace-keeping operations and on what they should be in the future. For two years the Special Committee had sought an ideal system of reference. Such a system was impossible to find for the Committee could not request a Member State to agree upon a distribution of the costs of future peace-keeping operations without defining those operations within the framework of the Charter. Similarly, it was impossible to ask a Member State to provide special forces, without determining what role they would play in future peace-keeping operations and what main organ of the United Nations would be responsible for supervising the accomplishment of the mission. It was on the basis of General Assembly resolution 2308 (XXII) that the Special Committee had embarked on a new course. The

Assembly had felt it appropriate to ask the Special Committee to devote its efforts to the preparation of a study on matters related to facilities, services and personnel which Member States might provide for future peace-keeping operations. For many long months the Special Committee had tried to carry out the mandate which had been entrusted to it by resolution 2308 (XXII). Finally, it had set up a Working Group comprising the four officers of the Committee and the four permanent members of the Security Council represented in the Special Committee.

8. The results achieved by the Working Group were modest although it had worked without respite. Nevertheless, the Working Group was the organ which was the most likely to attain the goals envisaged by the General Assembly. The Special Committee was dealing with the specific problems raised by peace-keeping and it could count on the close collaboration of the permanent members of the Security Council. That was essential since it was necessary to provide for military operations which excluded the forces of the permanent members of the Council. In the light of his experience, he had concluded that the way in which future peace-keeping operations were carried out must command unanimous agreement. Moreover, the Working Group had some very interesting features: it was not of negligible importance that its Chairman and Rapporteur were representatives of small Powers.

9. The Working Group was responsible for the choice of model I. The mandate given to the Special Committee had involved a basic question: would the observers continue to work in a political vacuum? For some time the future of the work of the Special Committee had been in doubt. Then, the Secretary-General had been requested to prepare a background document on observers which, if it had not been distributed as a document of the General Assembly, could be obtained from the Secretariat. The data obtained from statements in the Security Council gave an indication of the nature and operation of observers. Furthermore, the information derived from the experience of past operations was important.

10. Once the necessary documentation had been assembled, the Working Group had a choice between two alternatives: it could either summarize the data obtained from the preliminary documentation in order to establish guidelines applicable to future operations, or it could take the preliminary documentation as the starting point for drawing up a constitutional and definitive model for peace-keeping operations. If it had chosen the first alternative, it would have carried out the letter of the mandate given in General Assembly resolution 2451 (XXIII), but the Assembly would have received a useless report. The decision taken by the Working Group to draw up a model was perhaps one of the most fruitful which the Organization had taken in 1969. While it might defer the application of a resolution, it nevertheless made it possible to carry out more faithfully the real mandate given by the General Assembly. It was only now that the Special Committee was seeking to determine the constitutional bases for peace-keeping operations and contemplating the self-limitation of the powers of the permanent members of the Security Council; it was only thus that future peace-keeping operations could be planned. The Working Group had been

unable to complete model I. However, it was surprising that it had done so much for, one year previously, it would not have been thought possible for the Special Committee to make progress in a study on the establishment, direction and control of peace-keeping operations, that it would be able to examine precise texts on their composition and their command, and that it would propose legal arrangements governing the agreement between the host country and Member States providing personnel and material. The success of that study justified the efforts which the General Assembly and the Special Committee had devoted to peace-keeping operations.

11. The Special Committee's report (A/7742) had given rise to two criticisms. It had been said that model I dealt with military observers and not with militarily constituted bodies; and that military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to Council resolutions had been studied and not military observers established or authorized by any one of the main United Nations organs. The Special Committee had chosen a very precise topic because model I could serve as the basis for a more detailed study of peace-keeping operations. It was based on a hypothesis on which there was complete agreement, with a view to establishing subsequently principles whose meaning was not in doubt. Once model I was finished, the General Assembly would have precise solutions for all kinds of eventualities which occurred during peace-keeping operations and which so far had been tackled pragmatically. Some delegations felt that the model should be studied by the Security Council, to which the General Assembly should transmit it. Once it had been approved by those two organs, it would constitute the first element of that constitutional law of the United Nations which was beginning to be drawn up.

12. The second criticism of model I was that the Working Group had been concerned with a type of operations which had so far caused no friction. There was a fundamental difference between the execution of operations based on solid constitutional principles and the kind of operations executed so far, which could hardly be said to be completely in accordance with the provisions of the Charter since they were based upon vague principles and had caused the serious difficulties of which everyone was aware. The objective of the Special Committee's terms of reference was that in future the execution of peace-keeping operations should conform to universally accepted standards. It was therefore working along the right lines and the General Assembly must decide whether it was to continue. Once the difficulties of establishing model I had been overcome, the establishment of model II should make rapid progress. The discussions could be very useful if Member States showed a desire to extend the scope of the subject in order to include the large-scale operations referred to in paragraph 12 of the report of the Working Group (A/7742, annex).

13. The Committee was no doubt concerned about the financing of the peace-keeping operations, because the crisis which had led to the establishment of the Special Committee had been financial in origin. The problems inherent in each model would be solved on a case-by-case basis. It was natural, however, that the General Assembly should be concerned with the past deficit.

14. The Secretary-General's statement at the 1299th meeting of the Fifth Committee<sup>1</sup> showed that the once temporary financial difficulties had become chronic. The General Assembly's intention in establishing the Special Committee had been to improve the Organization's difficult financial situation. That first mandate was still part of its terms of reference. The approach of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations might make it possible to consolidate the financial situation of the Organization because Member States, and in particular the industrialized countries, might make voluntary contributions before the commemorative meeting in October.

15. He hoped that his statement would enable the Committee to obtain an over-all idea of the present state of the Special Committee's work. He felt able to recommend that the Committee should allow the Special Committee to continue its discussions.

16. Mr. CREMIN (Ireland) said that the utility of peace-keeping operations, which was the primary purpose of the United Nations in accordance with Article 1 of the Charter, had been abundantly demonstrated over more than 20 years. In 1965, when the Assembly had established the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, whose terms of reference were contained in General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX), it had intended to work out, for future operations, a more satisfactory system than that used in the past; one of the reasons for that decision was known, however, to be the problem of financing those operations, which had arisen at that time from the fact that not all countries had contributed to the cost of certain operations. That situation had been mentioned in the preamble to resolution 2006 (XIX) and operative paragraph 3 asked the Special Committee to consider ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organization; that was in fact its basic mandate.

17. Now, almost five years after the establishment of the Special Committee, the question of peace-keeping was one of the six principal subjects highlighted in the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations.<sup>2</sup> The General Assembly, in the second preambular paragraph of resolution 2499 (XXIV), had stressed the need for positive steps in peace-keeping. Some speakers had made strong appeals in that connexion in the Assembly during the current session, in particular Mr. Yost of the United States on 23 October 1969 (1788th plenary meeting) and Mr. Thompson of Guyana on 30 October 1969 (1796th plenary meeting).

18. Unfortunately, the Special Committee did not seem to have made enough progress in carrying out its mandate; its report (A/7742) showed that it had been unable to complete three of the eight chapters of its report on model I, including the chapter entitled "Financial arrangements". As his delegation had said in the Committee (636th meeting, para. 33) during the twenty-third session of the Assembly difficulties encountered by military observer missions was not one of the principle reasons for the establishment of the Special Committee and they did not

even come strictly within the scope of the study. It was therefore discouraging that the Special Committee had not been able to complete its task on an issue which, from past experience, appeared relatively simple. He had hoped that, as requested in paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2451 (XXIII), the Committee would have had before it at the current session a comprehensive report on model I and progress reports on other models.

19. The Special Committee's report (A/7742, para. 9) showed that very little progress had been made with regard to model II; it was to be expected that that model, which concerned "peace-keeping operations on a larger scale", would present much greater difficulties than model I. Moreover, in paragraph 6 of the Special Committee's previous report<sup>3</sup> reference had been made to documentation which the Secretary-General was to provide on model II; as that documentation would probably be more substantial than that provided for model I and might be somewhat controversial, it was to be feared that the preparation of the report on model II would be slow. Consequently, it was probable that by the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, a complete report would only be available on model I, although a more reliable system for peace-keeping operations—in particular with regard to financing, which had been the principle reason for establishing the Special Committee—was urgently required.

20. In that connexion, Mr. Araujo Castro, the representative of Brazil, had said at the 1795th plenary meeting of the General Assembly that the maintenance costs of the United Nations were minor in comparison with the risks the world would run if the Organization were to disappear. The pertinence of that observation was illustrated by the data given in annex X of Working File No. 1: the total cost of all United Nations military observer missions between 1947 and 1968 had amounted to less than \$60 million—less than half the cost of a nuclear submarine. Yet that expenditure had made it possible to control situations which could have gravely affected world peace. It was ridiculously low in comparison with world expenditure on armaments which, as the Secretary-General had said in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the organization,<sup>4</sup> now stood at almost \$200,000 million per year.

21. His delegation, with other delegations, had put forward specific proposals with regard to financing; it urged that the Special Committee should recommend those proposals to the General Assembly for adoption as an interim measure, pending agreement on definitive measures. Because of the divergence of views between Governments, the search for a perfect system might take some time; in the meantime, the United Nations would only have an inadequate system to meet new situations. It was to be feared that the better might prove to be the enemy of the good.

22. His delegation strongly urged the Special Committee, in the spirit of General Assembly resolution 2499 (XXIV) on its twenty-fifth anniversary, to make a determined effort in the following few months to complete its report on model I and in particular the chapter on financial arrange-

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 74, document A/C.5/1233.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, agenda item 25, document A/7690, para. 34.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-third Session, Annexes*, agenda item 32, document A/7396.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 40.

ments. That could have particularly encouraging symbolic importance as the United Nations was preparing to celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary.

23. Mr. YOST (United States of America), after stressing the primary importance among the tasks of the United Nations of the maintenance of international peace and security, welcomed the Soviet Union's proposal at the current session that a special item should be devoted to the strengthening of international security. However, in that respect, eloquent declarations were not enough; progress could only be made through painstaking negotiation. The subject before the Committee offered all Member States, and particularly the great Powers, an excellent opportunity to adopt realistic measures.

24. The Special Committee had so far made little headway in improving arrangements for the future or solving financial problems. Since the crisis provoked by the deep divergencies between Governments in 1964 to 1965, the capacity of the United Nations to undertake collective peace-keeping operations had been limited and its peace-keeping machinery remained rudimentary. Yet the Organization had scored notable peace-keeping successes, because the consensus had been more far-reaching in practice than in doctrine.

25. The United Nations peace-keeping operations were now being conducted on an *ad hoc* basis in Cyprus, the Middle East and Kashmir. Was it possible to move beyond that *ad hoc* system? It seemed the time had come to do so. The discussions that had recently taken place in the Special Committee indicated, as did its report (A/7742), that there existed a readiness to reach understanding which must be put to good effect. Evidently, the Special Committee had not made much progress on such difficult issues as financing and legal arrangements and the rules that should govern the establishment, direction and control of observer missions. Nevertheless, his delegation, which had participated actively in the discussions of the Working Group of the Special Committee, felt that they had been constructive; for its part, it was ready to work intensively to complete a set of realistic procedures for the conduct of observer missions and then to proceed to operations involving organized contingents, within a short time after the conclusion of the current session of the General Assembly.

26. He wished to set forth the United States view on what the over-all objective should be and to suggest certain key requirements for the successful launching and management of United Nations peace-keeping operations. In the view of his delegation, the main concern must be effectiveness and reliability in carrying out an operation once it had been duly authorized. The end result that was sought was not primarily clarification of the rules—though that was important—but a real improvement in the Organization's performance. In every field—authorization and administration, and arrangements for financing and manning—the procedures adopted must be both politically realistic and practical in the operational sense. "Realistic" meant that it was necessary to take into account the interests of all parties concerned, to be impartial in both intent and application, and through the Organization's action, to induce the co-operation of contending parties as well as

those providing manpower and funds. "Practical" meant that procedures must provide for political support to the authorizing body and for efficient and effective management. Moreover, such procedures must be flexible enough to be adaptable to circumstances.

27. The United States was not wed to any particular formula or set of proposals. It was certainly not rigid or doctrinaire about details. It was results that mattered—the peace-keeping capacity of the United Nations must be developed to the fullest and impediments to its action must be removed. In that spirit, he wished to set forth the ideas of his delegation on certain key requirements for effective peace-keeping. His delegation hoped that intensive and serious discussions could take place soon on those and other points. It would welcome the views of Member States, including those not represented in the Special Committee.

28. In the first place, it was essential to ensure a balance of responsibilities between United Nations bodies, particularly between the Security Council and the Secretary-General. It was agreed that the Security Council had the primary responsibility, with due regard for the residual authority to be exercised by the General Assembly when the Security Council was unable to act. The Special Committee was now focusing on operations authorized or established by the Security Council. In the view of his delegation, the Security Council should determine the key provisions of the mandate and exercise broad political supervision. Others advocated extending the authority of the Security Council to encompass operational decisions such as the size and composition of the force, naming the commander, determining financing. The key point on which discussions should focus was where to draw the line of operational responsibility so as to take account of both political and operational necessities. The United States felt that the Security Council had a legitimate interest in assuring political responsiveness, but effective management required that the executive authority of the Secretary-General should not be impaired and that he have adequate staff support to carry out his peace-keeping tasks.

29. In the second place, it was essential to stress the need for speedy action. In that regard, the United States delegation was in favour of proposals that had been advanced for the creation of a United Nations stand-by force of earmarked contingents available on very short notice. In the meantime, it was necessary to try to improve the present system. In any event, the United States was open to suggestions on the matter, including those made by the countries that had over the years provided the bulk of United Nations forces and operational facilities. Any design for improving the present system must be acceptable to those countries. In that regard, he wished to assure the Committee that the United States would continue to help provide logistical support when requested and to co-operate in joint measures to strengthen the present earmarking system.

30. In the third place, there was the question of financing. The present *ad hoc* and voluntary system was inequitable and unreliable. The financing of operations must as far as possible be a collective responsibility. Proposals for the establishment of a scale of contributions must be examined

in an open and constructive spirit and the creation of a United Nations peace fund to supplement the financing of certain operations might also be envisaged.

31. Turning to the work of the Special Committee, he expressed appreciation for the efforts of its Chairman, Mr. Cuevas Cancino. The United States delegation regretted that the Special Committee had again presented an incomplete report. None the less, the renewal of its mandate was more necessary than ever. In connexion with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Organization, significant progress could be made if agreement could be reached on guidelines for models I and II. It would thus be possible to codify agreed procedures and clarify the political and operational conditions in which United Nations forces could operate.

32. Turning from the question of peace-keeping to the question of peace-making, he stressed that the primary requirement was the readiness of the parties concerned to use whatever processes were available to them. At the current session of the Assembly, during the discussion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, he had suggested (1788th plenary meeting) that the panel for inquiry and conciliation should resume its work; a regularly constituted panel of experts of that nature might advise the Secretary-General on ways in which United Nations special representatives might be used to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes. Various proposals for arbitration and fact-finding machinery should also be examined.

33. If he had stressed that aspect, it was because he felt that the ultimate aim of the United Nations was to prevent States from resorting to violence by inducing them to apply peaceful methods. In that light, the existence of machinery was not so important as the political will of States. When nations had learned that they had more to gain from compromise than from violence, the United Nations would be able fully to perform its role as the instrument of the common will for peace.

34. Mr. BEAULNE (Canada) said that the Special Committee had not entirely succeeded in carrying out its mission. Because of the great complexity of the problems facing it, it had not drawn up a comprehensive programme concerning the United Nations military observers established or authorized by the Security Council. The Working Group of the Special Committee had become fully aware only after it had started work of all the implications of the differing views on aspects of peace-keeping which, at first sight, had not appeared to raise any problems. However, the preliminary work had also brought to light the means of overcoming the difficulties.

35. For the information of the smaller countries, he outlined the work carried out thus far, and acknowledged the positive attitude of the permanent members of the Security Council which had enabled the Working Group to go ahead. The Working Group had been able to take up positive proposals for the first time in March 1969. The decision to examine the question of peace-keeping in systematic stages entailed the selection of a limited subject; thus model I had been defined in such a way as to exploit the common ground for limited agreement that existed between Member States on that issue. By definition, consideration of other models of peace-keeping operations

had been ruled out and no precedent had been established in that respect.

36. In view of that limited field of action, Governments had hesitated to consider any fresh trend which could have had widespread repercussions. However, certain constitutional points, to which model I had given rise for example, had no less importance because they occurred in a limited context. It was possible that they could be solved only by examining peace-keeping operations on a larger scale. Thus far, some of the solutions to the problems found in model I would have involved measures which had not seemed justified in the case of operations on a smaller scale. Part E of chapter II of model I (Direction and control) posed difficult questions relating to the various functions of the United Nations organs which would have to be cleared up, as the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union had pointed out in their statements. It sufficed to refer to the development of peace-keeping operations in the United Nations itself to appreciate the implications of that question, which it had been found necessary to broach with caution. Furthermore, the limited field of application of model I had enabled the Working Group to deal with less controversial subjects with greater confidence and to put forward elements for a solution. That had been the case with chapters I and V to VIII on which it had reached provisional agreement. However, as the Working Group had agreed to examine model I as a whole, it was obvious that any final agreement on one of the parts must depend on agreement on the whole; for that reason, the Special Committee had not officially circulated the draft chapters in their present state.

37. His delegation believed that peace-keeping could not be isolated from the sphere of politics since it touched upon the national interests of all the Governments of the States participating in peace-keeping operations as well as the host countries, whether observers or military personnel were involved. It was therefore not surprising that the three chapters on which the Working Group had not yet taken a stand were those concerning establishment, direction and control (chapter II); legal arrangements (chapter III) and financial arrangements (chapter IV). However, those questions were inseparably linked and any new agreement on parts of one question would entail agreements on parts of another.

38. Without explaining in detail the position of the other delegations, he thought the main points of disagreement on chapter II related to the respective functions of the Security Council which delegated authority and of the Secretary-General who acted on behalf of the Council. The same difficulties arose on all the points dealt with in the chapter, namely the earmarking of national personnel, the participation of Member States, and the appointment of the chief of the military-observer mission and staff officers. That same question arose in chapters III and IV, but it was still more complicated in the context of the financial arrangements, as the General Assembly's responsibility then became an important factor.

39. In general, his delegation felt that the majority of orthodox positions, including its own, had changed during the course of the Working Group's activities. For that reason, it was optimistic in regard to future prospects, while

stressing that all sides would have to modify their positions further in order to obtain a safe, practical and generally acceptable system of peace-keeping operations, even in the restricted sphere of model I. It was possible to discover new ways of reconciling national interests and international obligations. The studies of the Working Group had revealed that peace-keeping operations required the participation of several organs of the United Nations and it would perhaps be necessary to set up other bodies to perform functions which were at present assigned on an *ad hoc* basis or for which no one was responsible.

40. If the mandate of the Special Committee was extended, his delegation hoped to continue the examination of hitherto unresolved questions, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Cuevas Cancino. In that connexion, it counted upon the continued co-operation of the other members of the Working Group and other delegations who were actively concerned with peace-keeping. Despite possible setbacks, and although it was premature to speak of model II, which would deal with military strength, the possibility of useful work in that field should not be rejected. It was important to bear in mind both the principles contained in the Charter and the organic growth resulting from their application in conformity with the spirit of the Charter. Finally, the Canadian representative recommended that the Committee approve the report of the Special Committee (A/7742).

41. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) noted that the question of peace-keeping operations constituted an integral part of the Organization's main task, which was to secure peace and strengthen international security. The Soviet Union constantly advocated strengthening the role and authority of the Organization in international affairs and transforming the United Nations into an effective peace-keeping instrument. That position of the Soviet Union was in no way determined by conjunctural or transitory considerations, but was derived from its peaceful foreign policy, which had been initiated by the great Lenin. At the first international conference in which his country had participated—the Genoa Conference of 1922—the Soviet delegation, in pursuance of directives formulated by Lenin himself, had advocated universal peace and a general reduction of armaments. In its capacity as one of the founders of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council, and therefore sharing with other members of the Council the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Soviet Union was constantly striving for the development of co-operation between States, for the improvement of the international situation, and for agreement between States Members of the United Nations on the most effective ways and means of strengthening international peace and security.

42. His delegation believed that, if all Member States, whatever their social system, evinced a genuine concern for peace-keeping, it would then be possible to increase considerably the role of the United Nations in the solution of that problem and in the anticipation and prevention of military conflicts by peaceful means, such as negotiations, good offices, conciliation procedures, and other measures provided for in the Charter. However, his delegation did not exclude the possibility that in certain circumstances peaceful measures would not be sufficient and that, in

order to maintain or restore international peace, there would be no other alternative than to use force in the name of the United Nations. Action of that kind by the United Nations, using military contingents or military personnel, was provided for under the Charter in the general context of ensuring collective security. The United Nations must carry out peace-keeping operations entailing the use of armed force only when they were really essential and only if they were aimed at ensuring collective security, by serving the interests of all Member States and not only some of them. Failure to comply with that basic condition—and resort to operations of that kind in violation of the Charter—had, as was known, led to serious and even tragic consequences.

43. The ways of ensuring compliance with that requirement for United Nations peace-keeping operations were defined in the relevant provisions of the Charter. Under the Charter, the Security Council was the only organ entitled to take action to maintain or restore international peace and security and, consequently, the only organ entitled to take decisions on all questions relating to the formation of United Nations forces, the determination of their objectives, composition and strength, the leadership of the operations undertaken by them, the command structure, the length of time the forces should remain in the theatre of operations, and the financing of the expenditure involved. The Soviet Union had made every effort to give effect to that position since the Charter was drafted and had taken it as a basis for determining its attitude to every specific case of peace-keeping operations; now more than ever before, it remained faithful to that position of principle as strictly defined in the Charter. That position offered the only assurance that United Nations forces would not be used to serve the narrow, unilateral interests of certain States or groups of States to the prejudice of other States, thereby merely aggravating the situation rather than strengthening peace. That assurance was based on the need for agreement by the required majority of the members of the Security Council, including all its permanent members, on all important questions relating to the establishment, use and financing of United Nations forces.

44. It was regrettable that United Nations peace-keeping operations had in the past sometimes been carried out in disregard of the provisions of the Charter. It could serve no purpose to retrace past events, though a great deal could be said about cases where peace-keeping operations, nominally carried out in the name of the Organization as a whole, had in fact served the narrow interests of only some of its Members. In that connexion it was gratifying to note, however, that when systematic violations of the Charter had brought the Organization to the brink of a political and constitutional crisis, the majority of the Member States had shown an exalted sense of responsibility for the fate of the Organization, and had been unwilling to legalize violations of the Charter. That same sense of responsibility had enabled Member States to ensure that the discussion of the question of peace-keeping operations could progress beyond the stage of battles of words in the General Assembly and the various committees to constructive work based on the Charter, which was the only way of reaching mutual understanding and agreement. It was necessary to heed the lessons of the past in order to avoid any repetition of errors and to ensure success in the solution of the important political problem of peace-keeping operations.

45. His delegation drew two main conclusions from those lessons of the past: first, a peace-keeping operation could not be initiated or carried out when any group of Member States or any permanent member of the Security Council, in violation of the Charter, was excluded from participation in the solution of any substantive questions relating to those operations or from the control of their execution. Such a policy ran counter to the Charter and led to one-sidedness in the conduct of the operations, with dangerous consequences both for the State concerned and for the United Nations itself, as well as for the cause of international peace and security. Secondly, even when there was general agreement in principle with regard to a given peace-keeping operation, the absence of a clearly defined procedure for the approval, initiation or execution of those operations might give rise to political and practical problems and difficulties which, in his delegation's view, could be avoided by the timely formulation of definite principles for the execution of those operations in strict conformity with the Charter.

46. He was gratified to note that those two basic conclusions were apparently being given increasing weight in the work of the Committee of Thirty-three,<sup>5</sup> in which, for the first time in a long time, a certain area of agreement could be discerned, to the effect that the practical task of working out specific types of United Nations peace-keeping operations could now be undertaken. At the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, the Committee of Thirty-three had been able to inform the Assembly of the agreement reached on the formulation and outline of model I, "United Nations military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to Security Council resolutions". At the twenty-fourth session the Special Committee had been able to report more substantial progress. The fact that before September 1969 it had been able to present a complete outline of model I and the agreed text of five of the eight chapters of the model represented a new step forward, which would not have been possible earlier. His delegation, which was a member of the Committee of Thirty-three and its Working Group, was able to confirm that the Special Committee was carefully considering all the basic aspects of model I and the different variants of the actual text and that there had been a rapprochement of positions on quite a number of points in the three chapters on which agreement had not yet been reached. Moreover, intensive consultations were in progress in the Committee on the

possible title and framework of a model II. He agreed with the Irish representative that the work which had already been done and which would be done later with regard to model I would facilitate the formulation of model II.

47. With regard to the nature and the pace of the work of the Committee of Thirty-three on the specific problems of peace-keeping, his delegation believed that they bore witness to the serious and pragmatic approach of the participants to the matters under discussion and that any unduly hasty or ill-considered action would be dangerous.

48. In his statement at the current session of the General Assembly (1756th plenary meeting), Mr. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, had defined the Soviet Union's position regarding the efforts to find ways and means of making the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations more effective. He had said, *inter alia*, that in that important area, which for many years had been the scene of sharp political clashes provoked by the efforts of certain circles to undermine the United Nations Charter, the first signs of movement towards an understanding based on observance of the relevant provisions of the Charter had recently become discernible and that that development was to be encouraged. He had gone on to say that further progress in that field would meet the objective of strengthening international security and might well prove useful.

49. The Soviet proposals concerning the strengthening of international security<sup>6</sup> which were now before the First Committee provided that the General Assembly should invite the Committee of Thirty-three to intensify its efforts with a view to the earliest possible submission of its proposals to the General Assembly and to the Security Council.

50. It was necessary to work patiently and consistently in order, through serious discussions, to overcome, step by step, the remaining differences between the positions of States, while strictly respecting the Charter in deciding all questions relating to peace-keeping operations. He was glad to note that that pragmatic approach apparently was beginning to prevail in the consideration of the question of peace-keeping operations and bearing its first fruits, and he hoped that that approach would bring positive results.

*The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.*

<sup>5</sup> Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.

<sup>6</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 103, document A/7903, para. 7.