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Chairman: Mr. Carlet R. AUGUSTE (Haiti).

AGENDA ITEM 101

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects (continued) (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2, L.121, L.122 and Add.1):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/5915 and Add.1, A/5916 and Add.1, A/5972, A/6026);
- (b) The authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations (A/5966/Rev.2)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the delegations of Finland, Mauritania and Uganda had asked to be included among the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.122.

2. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan) pointed out that the Committee had heard many statements on the matter before it, including those of the permanent members of the Security Council, whose agreement was essential. It was clear from those statements that draft resolution A/SPC/L.121 was unacceptable to many Member States, including some permanent members of the Security Council. It must be borne in mind that the big Powers continued to enjoy certain exclusive rights set out in the Charter. In 1962, when the United Nations had tried to take a stand which was not acceptable to the Soviet Union and France, the very existence of the Organization had been threatened. At that time, the General Assembly had had before it an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,^{1/} and an attempt had been made to have the Assembly accept that opinion as having the force of law. On realistic grounds, the Jordanian delegation had opposed that move, saying that the Court's advisory opinion should not be used as a means of imposing a majority decision on Member States which did not accept that opinion. His delegation had foreseen that the countries comprising the minority

might find themselves deprived of their votes under Article 19 of the Charter, and had emphasized that, in order to function effectively, the United Nations must reflect the realities of the world. That meant that the United Nations must not be the exclusive preserve of any one group of States; its actions must take into account all the conflicting interests and ideologies to be found among its Members; that was the price of universality. Jordan had therefore submitted an amendment^{2/} providing that the General Assembly should merely take note of the advisory opinion. Unfortunately, that amendment had been opposed by the United States and many other delegations, and had not been adopted. Article 19 had thus been invoked, as anticipated, at the nineteenth session, and the result was common knowledge.

3. The Committee was now facing a similar problem. The Jordanian delegation believed that the authority of the United Nations might be gravely impaired if the Assembly were to adopt a resolution which could not be implemented. The Organization was still essentially an institution based on co-operation and negotiation; it was not a world government. In those circumstances, any attempt to undertake a peace-keeping operation would be unrealistic unless it had the consent of the permanent members of the Security Council. While it was easy to obtain a majority opinion, that apparent success might be followed by a stalemate. In any issue involving a right guaranteed by the Charter, that right could not be subject to modification by a majority vote, for that would be tantamount to rewriting the Charter by means of majority votes. What was needed was negotiations aimed at reaching practical solutions which could be carried out, not the scoring of debating points.

4. The financial aspect of peace-keeping was related to the solution adopted by the competent United Nations organ; on the other hand, a solution without financial means to implement it was meaningless. Those were two sides of the same coin, and the question was where to draw the line between the authority of the Security Council and that of the General Assembly. The functions of those two bodies were certainly distinct. The Assembly's competence was restricted when action was required under Chapter VII of the Charter. As for the Council, to the extent that it was primarily responsible for peace and security it was the organ qualified to take mandatory decisions. Nevertheless, the question remained whether the Assembly could act when the Security Council failed to do so and, if so, in what eventuality it might do so. Those were fundamental questions which must be answered.

^{1/} Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p.151.

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 64, document A/5380, para. 6.

5. In the light of the conflicting views expressed in the Committee, his delegation believed that the item should be referred back to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, in the hope that it would be able to prepare a report for the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. After twenty years of existence, the United Nations needed new methods, and there was pressing need for a change. The responsibilities of the Organization were becoming increasingly heavy. It must not be overlooked, on the other hand, that a solution was meaningless unless finances were available to carry it out, and that the permanent members of the Security Council had an important part to play in the matter.

6. After studying draft resolution A/SPC/L.121, his delegation continued to feel that many aspects of the problem needed more consideration. Paragraph 4 (a) (iii), in particular, raised points which required clarification. The question arose as to what would happen if one of the permanent members of the Security Council committed an act of aggression, as had in fact happened. Would it suffice for that member to abstain from voting on the contemplated operation to be dispensed from any share in the expenses of that operation?

7. The debate initiated in connexion with the proposals originally submitted by Ireland had given the members of the Committee an opportunity to express their views, and that would guide the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations in its deliberations. That Committee was in a better position than the Special Political Committee to arrive at a practical and workable solution.

8. Miss KONIE (Zambia) said that only in a spirit of compromise would it be possible for the Committee to find any lasting solution to the problem before it.

9. The United Nations was nothing if it was unable to carry out its primary function: that of maintaining international peace and security. But the Organization was virtually impotent in the matter, as was shown by the example of Southern Rhodesia; it had had to content itself with economic sanctions which, as everyone knew, would be ineffective. To all intents and purposes, the United Nations at the moment was at a standstill.

10. What was needed, therefore, was a permanent settlement of the question of peace-keeping. Experience had shown that any lasting solution would have to be a negotiated one. It was for that reason that her delegation believed that the General Assembly should direct the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to continue its study of the whole subject.

11. Her delegation's understanding of the matter was that, while the Charter conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Assembly also bore its share of responsibility in that field, as was apparent from Articles 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 35 of the Charter. The Assembly should therefore take prompt action in cases where it was convinced that peace and security were in jeopardy because of a deadlock in the Security Council. Zambia also believed that the powers of the Council and the Assembly were complementary, and that that principle should

be elaborated in order to define the functions and powers of both those organs.

12. Her delegation agreed with most of the proposals introduced by Ireland, but it had some reservations, especially regarding the proposals for financing peace-keeping operations. It was surprising, indeed, that the permanent members of the Security Council alone were to be exempted from the obligation to contribute to the expenses of a given peace-keeping operation. Moreover, her delegation did not believe that *ad hoc* assessments or voluntary contributions could ensure the financing of peace-keeping operations; a permanent fund would be more satisfactory. The proposals originally submitted by the Irish delegation should be passed on to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations for further study.

13. After reserving her delegation's right to comment later on draft resolution A/SPC/L.121, she said that her delegation had been greatly heartened at the response to the Afro-Asian plan for voluntary contributions to restore the United Nations to solvency. It would like to appeal to all Member States to reconsider their stand and make a concerted effort to save the Organization from collapse.

14. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) recalled that, at the 1354th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Prime Minister of Iraq had defined peace-keeping operations as essentially actions designed to prevent armed confrontations before they endangered world peace and security. The Prime Minister had added that, while his delegation did not deny the utility of a discussion of those issues during the current session, it felt that the Assembly should avoid taking any final decision in order to give the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations an unfettered opportunity to study the problem in all its aspects.

15. All the attempts made so far to solve the difficulties arising out of the disagreements dividing the permanent members of the Security Council had failed, because they sought to impose the viewpoint of the majority on the minority. They had ignored the fact that the Charter deliberately provided for a mechanism designed to prevent the majority from thus imposing its will upon the minority. To meet the practical difficulties which the Organization had encountered, legal stratagems had been employed to overcome what was an essentially political problem. The effect had been just the contrary, since political conflicts were seldom susceptible of solution by legal means.

16. With the benefit of hindsight, it could be seen that the makeshift arrangements devised to initiate or maintain various peace-keeping operations had been doomed to failure precisely because they had ignored certain overriding political realities and sought to impose an interpretation of the Charter which was not acceptable to all the permanent members of the Security Council. When the inevitable crisis had finally occurred, it had struck the United Nations in its authority and in its ability to finance its activities. While the immediate threat had been eliminated by the compromise adopted on 1 September 1965 (1331st plenary meeting), the crisis was by no means over.

17. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had finished the first part of its work. Needless to say, the decision not to invoke Article 19 of the Charter in regard to the United Nations Operation in the Congo and the United Nations Emergency Force operations and to solve the financial difficulties through voluntary contributions would have far-reaching implications for the financing of current as well as future peace-keeping operations. With respect to UNEF, clearly a new method of financing was required if it was found necessary to continue the Force. As for future operations, the decision of 1 September 1965 meant that, until there was agreement on the legal and political aspects of the problem, financing would have to be through voluntary means.

18. His delegation was grateful to the Irish delegation for the proposals it had originally submitted (A/5966/Rev.2). In its opinion, however, it would complicate the Organization's task to single out the financial problem for solution without first reaching agreement on the legal and political aspects which were the crux of the matter. Secondly, since the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations would deal with all aspects of the problem, the General Assembly should not in any way prejudge the issue—which did not mean that the Special Political Committee's discussions would not be helpful. His delegation also considered that special provisions should be made for any victims of aggression, and that a procedure must be devised whereby any State guilty of aggression or of violating the Charter would bear the major share of the expenses of operations necessitated by its actions.

19. As regards the planning, directing and controlling of peace-keeping operations, his delegation believed that the Secretary-General should be given a central role, subject to the supervision of the competent organs of the United Nations. No other authority had comparable practical experience to that of the Secretary-General in such matters, and the United Nations must make full use of the unique possibilities offered by his high office.

20. The Charter was somewhat vague on the subject of the authorization of peace-keeping operations. The fact was that the type of peace-keeping operations which had become common had not been exactly foreseen. No one disputed that the Security Council had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and that it had exclusive responsibility for enforcement actions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. Similarly, there was no disagreement that the Assembly, subject to the provisions of Article 12, had the right to make recommendations to Member States individually or collectively in respect of disputes or situations that might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The problem was whether such recommendations could extend to the dispatching of armed forces or even observers to trouble spots.

21. If the Committee were to indulge in abstract legalisms, it would have to admit that neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly was empowered to initiate peace-keeping operations, since there was no explicit provision in the Charter that

was applicable to such operations. His delegation was not entirely convinced of the validity of the theory of the "residual" powers of the General Assembly. According to that theory, the word "action", in Article 11 of the Charter, referred only to the enforcement measures specified in Chapter VII and, since peace-keeping operations did not impose any obligation on States to contribute troops, for example, and could only be undertaken with the express approval of the States concerned, they were not covered by the limitation placed on the authority of the General Assembly in Article 11. That theory was not easily tenable from the purely legal standpoint. But that did not necessarily mean that the United Nations should ignore the valuable experience it had gained in mounting peace-keeping operations. The problem was to find that delicate political and legal balance which would permit the Organization to continue on its course. The difficulties were not insoluble; there were many examples of rigid political positions being set aside as a result of changing circumstances and developments. The provisions of the Charter could certainly not be twisted to suit the convenience of the moment, but the Charter was a flexible and dynamic document and was, moreover, completely adaptable. Those who did not believe so were in fact condemning the Organization to stagnation and ultimate destruction.

22. The case of the non-self-governing territories was an example of how one interpretation of the Charter had gradually given way to a more rational view. At one time the administering Powers had opposed any liberal interpretation of Chapter XI of the Charter and insisted that colonial problems were their exclusive concern. But the trend of history had compelled them and the United Nations to take a different view, and the Organization had thus been enabled to play a progressively more active role, culminating in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)). Similarly, there was no doubt that the United Nations would one day assume a far greater role in the vital matter of peace-keeping than had been possible in the past.

23. It was advisable, however, to proceed with caution. At the end of the nineteenth session, the Assembly had decided to continue the work of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations. At the current session, the only action required was to reaffirm the decision of 1 September 1965 and renew the terms of reference given to that Committee in resolution 2006 (XIX), without in any way prejudging the direction which that Committee's work should take. In addition, the records of the Special Political Committee's discussions should be referred to it.

24. In the light of the foregoing remarks, his delegation would vote in favour of resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1.

25. Mr. TOIV (Mongolia) said that his Government's position in regard to peace-keeping operations had been stated in its reply (A/6026, annex II) to the Secretary-General's letter of 23 June 1965 concerning guiding principles for future peace-keeping operations. His Government had expressed the conviction that all peace-keeping operations would be successful

only if the fundamental provisions of the Charter were strictly observed. As the bitter experience of the League of Nations had shown, it was essential that a very clear distinction should be drawn between the functions of the General Assembly and those of the Security Council. That was why the provisions of the Charter which made that distinction must be followed, particularly in the case of operations involving the use of armed force.

26. The role assigned to the Security Council was fully consistent with its functions. Articles 24, 25, 39, 41 and 42 of the Charter contained extremely clear provisions as to the measures that could be taken by the Council and the Assembly respectively whenever a situation endangered international peace. Articles 24 and 25, for instance, gave the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Under Article 43, special agreements had to be concluded between the Security Council and Member States when armed forces necessary for the maintenance of peace were to be made available to the Security Council. The Charter also provided for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee, whose role in relation to the Security Council was clearly defined. Under the Charter, therefore, the Security Council alone was entitled to take decisions relating to the use and financing of United Nations armed forces.

27. Unfortunately, those special rights of the Security Council had often been violated by the imperialist States, especially the United States; for instance, that country had made use of the United Nations flag in Korea, as had also been done in the Congo.

28. In order to prevent the United Nations from becoming an instrument in the service of a group of States that held a majority of votes in the Security Council, the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Council should be strictly observed. That principle was an insuperable obstacle to those who, in violation of the Charter, sought to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries and to impose resolutions legalizing the use of force against sovereign States. Accordingly, any attempt to substitute the General Assembly for the Security Council was manifestly an attempt to undermine the basic principles of the United Nations.

29. The General Assembly had a right to consider all questions relating to the maintenance of peace and to make recommendations, but it did not possess, under the Charter, the power to take decisions regarding the practical action required for that purpose. Any question calling for specific action by the United Nations had to be referred to the Security Council and came within the exclusive competence of that organ. That was the purport of Article 11 of the Charter. Granting to the General Assembly functions similar to those of the Council, particularly in the field of peace-keeping, and bypassing the latter organ, was not the way to strengthen the authority or increase the effectiveness of the United Nations. Again, arguments based on General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950 would not help to solve the Organization's problems. Furthermore that resolution could have no legal effect whatsoever. His delegation therefore could not support

the Irish delegation's proposal, for it would lead the United Nations into a repetition of its past mistakes by depriving it of any possibility of taking effective measures to maintain international peace and security.

30. The question of financing the cost of maintaining United Nations armed forces fell exclusively within the purview of the Security Council. There could be no question of joint action by the General Assembly and the Security Council in that sphere. In dividing the cost of military operations among the Member States, the United Nations should apply the principle of the sovereign equality of those States and take the economic capacity of each country into account. However, his delegation considered that the expenses incurred through such operations should be met in different ways according to the requirements of the case: by dividing the cost among the Members of the United Nations, or by calling for voluntary contributions only from the States involved. The decision on the financing of all military operations should be based on the principle of the responsibility of the aggressor State.

31. In his delegation's view the Special Committee, although it had not yet completed its work, had made very useful progress in carrying out its task under General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX). Its mandate should be extended so that it might formulate fundamental principles to govern future peace-keeping operations and submit recommendations on the subject to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

32. His delegation wished to emphasize once again that the examination of the question of peace-keeping operations should be guided by the need to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of world peace and security. His country's loyalty to the principles of the Charter had been affirmed in many statements, including the communiqué which it had issued with the Soviet Union on 19 April 1965; the two countries stated, *inter alia*, that, if the effectiveness of the United Nations as an instrument for international co-operation and peace-keeping was to be ensured, the Western Powers must refrain from using it for selfish ends to the detriment of the interests of other Member States. The Mongolian People's Republic, for its part, was ready to do everything in its power to help the United Nations to become a true centre for co-operation among all States.

33. Mr. NEKROUF (Morocco) observed that the institutional and financial crisis which had shaken the United Nations the previous year had been solved only through the wisdom and political flexibility shown by the Members of the United Nations. The comprehensive review of the question of peace-keeping operations should be tackled in the same spirit.

34. In that connexion, he welcomed the excellent work done by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations. Nevertheless, the reports containing the summary records of the Special Committee's meetings (A/5915/Add.1, annex I and A/5916/Add.1) exhibited two negative features: first, the statements showed how vaguely the Charter was worded and how diverse were the interpretations placed on it by Member

States; secondly, the confrontation of views had led to a hardening of two extreme attitudes which were unlikely to facilitate co-operation between the two vital organs of the United Nations, the General Assembly and the Security Council.

35. On the other hand, the report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly (A/5915/Add.1, annex II) put forward general observations and conclusions from which it derived ten broad guide-lines, within the terms of the Charter, which could apply to future peace-keeping operations. His Government had studied those guide-lines with interest and, in its note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, had summed up its position on the matter as follows:

"In the opinion of the Moroccan Government, the Security Council retains primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but the General Assembly, which includes all the States Members of the Organization, does not on that account forfeit the powers conferred on it by the relevant provisions of the Charter.

"The ideas put forward regarding the method of financing peace-keeping operations seem to the Moroccan Government, moreover, to represent a reasonable approach to the solution of this complex problem.

"In short, the Moroccan Government ... believes that the principles thus set out reflect a praiseworthy effort to take genuinely into account the different points of view expressed on this matter and that the proposals made in the report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly can provide the basis for a harmonious and balanced solution of the institutional and financial crisis of the United Nations." (A/6026, annex II.)

36. The Charter was perfectly clear. Article 10 provided that: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council." Article 11 explained in detail what that provision meant, and Article 14 provided that "Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin." Furthermore, Article 15 provided that "The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council", and Article 17 provided that it "shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization" and apportion the expenses of the Organization among the Members. It was thus quite clear that the General Assembly retained the first right to examine any situation and to make recommendations on the action to be taken, in so far as a particular question was not before the Security Council at the same time.

37. The drafters of the Charter had been very prudent to confer on the Security Council, under Article 24, "primary", and not exclusive, responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. If the Security Council failed to act or acted

against the wishes of the Members of the United Nations, the General Assembly had no choice but to take up its responsibilities in the matter of peace-keeping in order to ensure the survival of the Organization and the pursuit of its objectives.

38. The General Assembly, which had been watching the failures of the Security Council for the twenty years of its existence, had good reason to recommend now that a study should be made on a possible recasting of the Charter with the essential aim of making the Council an effective instrument capable of rapid action in accordance with the wishes of the 112 Member States which were not permanent members of the Security Council.

39. His delegation had already advanced the view that, after the membership of the Security Council had been increased, the office of permanent member of the Council should be defined and some restrictions should perhaps be imposed on the veto.

40. His delegation considered that the Special Political Committee, on recommending to the General Assembly that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations should be kept in being, might also request that Committee to study the possibility of recasting of the Charter along the lines he had indicated. Even if there was general agreement on an interpretation of the Charter, the wording was still vague and open to contradictory constructions which might give rise to disputes.

41. Admittedly such a study would involve real difficulties and would have to be a long-term project. Meanwhile the United Nations was under an obligation to take more limited decisions in order to meet any eventuality. With that prospect in view, his delegation therefore welcomed the Irish representative's initiative in submitting a draft resolution on the authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations. While the proposed voting procedure and cost apportionment system left room for improvement in some respects, the adoption of the draft resolution, in the absence of any other procedure, would enable the United Nations to palliate the effects of any weaknesses on the part of the Security Council.

42. Morocco, which had been making voluntary contributions to the United Nations Emergency Force since 1957, was ready to extend its active co-operation and firm support to any harmonious and balanced solution which would enable the United Nations effectively to assume its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

43. Mr. BEAULIEU (Canada) introduced the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.122), whose sponsors had since been joined by Finland, Iceland, Mauritania and Uganda.

44. His delegation attached great importance to the question of peace-keeping operations, and Canada's views had been clearly expressed in its representative's statement to the Special Political Committee on 19 November 1965 (461st meeting). Canada considered it necessary that the authorization, control and financing of peace-keeping operations should be placed on a firmer footing and that the apportionment of financing among Member States should be based on the essential principle of equity.

45. In common with the other sponsors of the draft resolution, his delegation considered that, whatever provisional or long-term arrangements might be made for the authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations, there were two pressing questions to be settled as a matter of priority: first, the mandate of the Special Committee should be extended so that it could complete its comprehensive review of the question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects; secondly, efforts should be made to secure voluntary contributions, in the spirit of the consensus reached on 1 September 1965 (1331st plenary meeting) and in response to the Secretary-General's appeal to the Governments of all Member States. The sponsors of the draft resolution were convinced that those two items would meet with the almost unanimous consent of Member States. Moreover, the fact that both points were mentioned in the same resolution and that a proposal was made at the same time that the Special Committee should elect its own bureau would enable the General Assembly to demonstrate its willingness to continue the review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations. It would be useful for the Assembly, in its turn, to call upon all Member States to make voluntary contributions.

46. His delegation appreciated the concern of certain delegations regarding the need to specify the questions to which the Special Committee should give its attention under its renewed mandate. Although questions such as those raised in draft resolution A/SPC/L.121 should be studied by the Special Committee, it would be inappropriate to go into such detail in a resolution extending the mandate of that Committee; disagreement might arise over the wording or over the selection of questions to be studied separately. Since the Special Committee's task was to carry out "a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects", it would be difficult to construe it as excluding any matter related to that question. It might be thought that, when the Special Committee was reconvened, it would begin by drawing up a programme of work based on an established order of priorities. It would also continue to use the guide-lines laid down by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly in paragraph 52 of their report (A/5915/Add.1, annex II).

47. The statements made so far revealed two different approaches in the Special Political Committee. Some considered that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations should be given an opportunity to complete its work and make a detailed study of all proposals related to peace-keeping before the General Assembly took any further decision regarding the manner in which future peace-keeping operations should be authorized and financed. Others thought that an interim arrangement was needed to enable the General Assembly to undertake such unforeseen peace-keeping operations as might be required in the near future.

48. His delegation reserved its position on the substance of the proposal made in operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121. It had carefully studied each of the two approaches on its

merits and, in view of the present diversity of opinion, thought it would be wiser not to try to conclude at the present session any detailed agreements, even of a temporary nature, on the arrangements which should govern United Nations action in financing future peace-keeping operations.

49. Mr. PANYARACHUN (Thailand) said that, in his opinion, peace-keeping operations were an extremely important and highly controversial issue. The difficulties it had generated had paralysed the work of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session, and the compromise ultimately arrived at was merely a provisional measure which did not go to the crux of the problem.

50. The Thai delegation, which was a member of the Special Committee, had been glad to note that its members, and subsequently the members of the General Assembly, had agreed that the financial difficulties of the United Nations should be solved by means of voluntary contributions from Member States and, in particular, from the highly developed countries. At the nineteenth session Thailand had been one of the first countries to state that those Member States which did not agree with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the question of contributions to peace-keeping operations should make voluntary contributions to the United Nations in order to help in restoring its financial situation. In the course of the general debate at the current session (1353rd plenary meeting), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand had made a further appeal to those countries, and his delegation wished to express its appreciation to those Governments which had made or pledged voluntary contributions to the Organization in response to the Secretary-General's appeal.

51. The Thai Government had always faithfully discharged its financial obligations for United Nations activities as assessed by the General Assembly. Moreover within its limited means, it had contributed voluntarily to certain peace-keeping operations, and it hoped that in the near future the highly developed countries would enable the United Nations to overcome its financial difficulties.

52. At the end of the General Assembly's nineteenth session his delegation had approved a proposal by the President, to the effect that the Special Committee established under resolution 2006 (XIX) should be permitted to complete its work. The most urgent task of the Special Political Committee was to recommend the renewal of the Special Committee's mandate. It was to be hoped that that Committee would resume its meetings immediately after the Assembly's twentieth session.

53. With regard to the authorization and financing of peace-keeping operations, his delegation wished to point out that the Security Council had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and that, in that context, it acted as an agent of all the Member States, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization. In the event that the Security Council was unable to carry out its responsibility in the matter, the General Assembly had the residual authority to recommend the authorization of United

Nations peace-keeping operations. It was the duty of the Member States to see to it that the performance of that task was not delayed by the unco-operative attitude of any one State. The authority to apportion the expenses of peace-keeping operations among the Members of the United Nations rested with the General Assembly, and such expenses were the collective financial responsibility of all the Members. The special interests and responsibilities of certain Powers and the capacity to pay of other countries should, however, be taken into consideration.

54. Those were the views which guided his delegation: they were in agreement with the guide-lines laid down in paragraph 52 of the report of the Secretary-General and President of the General Assembly (A/5915/Add.1, annex II).

55. His delegation warmly welcomed the Irish proposal (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2) and expressed its gratitude to the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland. It attached special importance to the statements of principle made in the preamble. With regard to the operative part, his delegation would have no difficulty in accepting the amendments to the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, as enunciated. It also understood the sponsors' motives in proposing that the permanent members of the Security Council should be called upon to vote first. If a peace-keeping operation was to be undertaken by the United Nations, it should be assured of a reliable financing system and should not be on a hand-to-mouth basis. In addition it was essential to ensure that such operations were carried through to a successful conclusion. Other Member States, before voting on the authorization of an operation, should therefore be aware of the degree of support for it among the major Powers.

56. On the other hand, the decision to support a peace-keeping operation should be based on the actual situation and should not be contingent upon the positions taken by the permanent members of the Security Council. Delegations should consider the issue objectively and impartially.

57. His delegation also had some reservations about any financing system which departed from the principle of collective financial responsibility. In its view, the great Powers should not have the privilege of exercising a financial veto in that connexion. It hoped that the principle of collective financial responsibility would be maintained; however, if it should prove that amendments to that principle would facilitate agreement on the question, it would be possible to reconsider the matter.

58. Despite those few reservations, his delegation was convinced that the Irish proposal was a step in the right direction and that it had been most useful in stimulating discussion in the Committee.

59. Since some of the parties directly concerned were not ready to give a final judgement on the Irish proposal, his delegation felt that a little more time could be devoted to consideration of the matter. The Committee should take due note of the proposal and perhaps approve the general principles set forth in the preamble. The main consideration, however, was that the proposal should be referred to the Special Committee for urgent and detailed examination. In

that connexion his delegation welcomed the statement by the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland (482nd meeting) informing the Committee that the Irish delegation would not press for a vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2.

60. His delegation reserved its right to speak again on the two new draft resolutions (A/SPC/L.121 and A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1), which it had not yet had time to study thoroughly.

61. Mr. JUARBE Y JUARBE (Cuba) stressed the importance of the agenda item under consideration. It was not merely a question of defining peace-keeping operations and deciding how they should be authorized and financed, or of reducing the matter to a legal problem concerning the respective powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly; indeed, no such problem arose, for the functions of both those organs had been clearly defined in the Charter. The question involved many other, broader problems, and it could be said that there was no committee or even plenary meeting of the General Assembly whose agenda did not include one or two items connected with the item now before the Special Political Committee.

62. The Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly had stated in their report that most members were of the view that the question of future peace-keeping operations was extremely complex and would require more detailed analysis and study.

63. The fundamental causes of the problem could not be concealed by resorting to propaganda, nor could the situation be resolved by saying, as the United States representative had said (465th meeting), that it was intolerable that the interests of the majority who co-operated in an efficient peace-keeping system should be frustrated by the requirements of the few who refused to go along. It was necessary to define the majority in question. During the discussion the United States had tried to pose as the champion of the small States in the defence of peace and security. Unfortunately for that country, history—indeed, recent history—demonstrated the falsity of its pretensions. While the Committee was examining the question of strengthening the peace-keeping machinery, peace was being threatened and violated in many parts of the world. The aggressors of Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic and Cuba, the accomplices in colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea and the accomplices of the policies of apartheid in South Africa and of slavery in Southern Rhodesia were in no position to side with the small countries in order to claim that they represented the majority. It was not they who could guarantee the efficient functioning of peace-keeping machinery.

64. Paragraph 46 of the report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly stressed the need for strict compliance with the Charter if the United Nations was to be developed and strengthened so as to become a really effective instrument for the preservation and maintenance of international peace and security. The adoption of illegal measures such as the "Uniting for Peace" resolution would not ensure respect for the pro-

visions of the Charter. The Argentine representative had rightly stressed at the 462nd meeting that that resolution had constituted an excessive departure from the strict legal interpretation of the principles of the Charter and had thus sown the seeds of future discord, which had resulted in the paralysis of the Assembly's nineteenth session and the near collapse of the United Nations. It was true that the Charter granted the General Assembly the power to make recommendations, but it should not be forgotten that it conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It conferred on the Council, inter alia, exclusive power to authorize the financing of peace-keeping operations and to determine the methods to be used in such financing, as well as all powers relating to the composition, control and command of forces.

65. His delegation considered that the agenda item now before the Committee should be more thoroughly studied in another body and that the records of the Committee's discussions, together with other relevant documents, should be transmitted to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations when its mandate was extended by the General Assembly. The nineteen-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1) proposed that the item should be referred to the Special Committee.

66. His delegation reserved the right to speak on the matter again and would support any proposal consistent with the comments he had just made.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.