

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 818th
MEETINGThursday, 19 October 1972,
at 3.30 p.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Hady TOURÉ (Guinea).

AGENDA ITEM 38

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (*continued*) (A/8666 and Corr.1, A/8670, A/8689, A/8703, paras. 501-519):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8722 and Add.1, A/8770);
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/8822)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. SEKONE (Upper Volta) said that, on reading the comprehensive report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8722 and Add.1), his delegation had first of all had a feeling of failure because the 10 resolutions which the Special Political Committee had prepared at the twenty-sixth session and which had been adopted by the General Assembly had produced no significant results. In fact the situation for Africans, Coloureds and Indians in South Africa continued to deteriorate and its main economic partners still supported South Africa. On the other hand, his delegation was still optimistic because it could not believe that the United Nations would capitulate before the authorities of Pretoria. A society based on racial discrimination and arbitrary legislation was not viable and was necessarily a threat to peace. The evils of the régime, including elements of genocide, were evident throughout the Special Committee's report.

2. While the white minority controlled 87 per cent of the territory, including all the developed areas, the Africans, who constituted 70 per cent of the population, had to be content with 13 per cent of the territory—the unproductive lands of the Bantustans.

3. The South African Government's efforts to explain away the crime of *apartheid* convinced no one. It was in fact doing everything to consolidate the system through a rule of terror without which *apartheid* could not exist. By using the harshest measures to combat the inevitable resistance to such a system, the South African Government had made it impossible for the people to work peacefully to change it. The United Nations had recognized the legitimacy of the South African peoples' struggle to regain their fundamental human rights. The anti-*apartheid* organizations in South Africa and elsewhere should be encouraged. Although the evil could not be effectively fought with resolutions,

the United Nations, and in particular the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, had been instrumental in drawing the attention of the world public to the situation. International action could not be directed towards helping the oppressed peoples of South Africa to adapt themselves to the system; on the contrary, its aim should be to ensure that all the peoples of South Africa enjoyed the same freedom.

4. He recalled that South Africa's objectives had been clearly stated by Mr. Verwoerd in 1963 when he had said that the Government's intention that South Africa should remain white meant that the whites must not be merely guides and leaders but have absolute power.

5. Some Western Powers, conscious only of their own interests, apparently favoured the presence of a Western civilization in South Africa. Yet those were the very Powers which should be working to make Africa forget the slave-trade, colonial rule and the way they had obtained cheap raw materials because of the pitiful conditions of African workers.

6. Since non-white South Africans had not the right to vote, they could only combat white domination through armed struggle. To counter that resistance, the racist minority, encouraged by the members of NATO, was amassing vast quantities of arms. Three permanent members of the Security Council—France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America—had sought ways to enable South Africa to obtain arms and licences to manufacture them, in contravention of Security Council resolution 282 (1970). That arms flow was a danger to peace and a threat to the sovereignty of neighbouring States, which were supplying the resistance movements in South Africa with legitimate aid. The United Nations could not take that situation lightly.

7. The extension of *apartheid* and the Bantustan system to Namibia, even though the United Nations had withdrawn its administration from South Africa, showed the South African Government's intention to extend the *apartheid* system. The international community should act rapidly and effectively to counter that threat. It should increase its efforts to isolate South Africa politically and economically by persuading South Africa's economic partners to change their policy. His delegation appealed to all the States listed in annex II to the report of the Special Committee to search their consciences because their economic gains were based on the suffering of a whole people. South Africa's claims that the arms supplied to it were for external

defence and not intended to be used against the opponents of *apartheid* were unfounded. Those arms encouraged it in its arrogant defiance of the United Nations, they endangered the sovereignty of neighbouring States, and they also encouraged Portuguese colonialism. The Security Council should therefore make the arms embargo and economic sanctions mandatory.

8. The international campaign against *apartheid* should be intensified. The failure of South Africa's so-called policy of dialogue showed that *apartheid* was indefensible. The decision of the international tennis authorities to readmit South Africa to participate in the Davis Cup tournament and to include it in the South American zone was to be deplored. He hoped that the countries in that area, which had always co-operated with the African States, would take adequate steps to reverse that decision, and he was pleased to note that Argentina had already adopted a positive attitude in the matter.

9. His delegation welcomed the holding of an international conference of trade unions on *apartheid* and hoped that the United Nations would ensure its success.

10. The suggestions made by the ex-Chairman of the Special Committee (809th meeting) to improve the efficacy of United Nations action against *apartheid* by co-ordinating the bodies concerned with that problem and to create a unified organ on southern Africa should be carefully considered.

11. His country, which had always implemented the resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity on *apartheid* and would continue to do so, was convinced that the policy of *apartheid* could be changed if all States Members of the United Nations were moved by a common political will. His delegation therefore welcomed the recommendations made in the report of the Special Committee and would support any draft resolutions submitted to that effect.

Mr. Zahawie (Iraq), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

12. Mr. KAHILUOTO (Finland) said that the elimination of *apartheid* and racial discrimination should be one of the most urgent aims of the United Nations. Every kind of racial discrimination and segregation offended the Finnish sense of justice, its concept of freedom and the law, and its faith in the equality and dignity of man. The report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* clearly showed the continued deterioration of the situation in South Africa. It was also most alarming that the policy of *apartheid* had been introduced in Namibia. In a note dated 4 October 1972, the Governments of the Nordic countries had expressed to the Secretary-General their detailed views on *apartheid* and racial discrimination.¹ He would therefore deal only with certain aspects of the problem to which his Government attached special importance.

13. The racial policies pursued by the Government of South Africa constituted a continuous danger not only to the peaceful development of that region but also to the world at large. No country, however far from the scene, could afford to ignore that danger. The United Nations must therefore not fail in its efforts to put an end to the system of *apartheid*, which called for the co-operation of all its Members. The Security Council resolutions on the arms embargo were of crucial significance but unfortunately they were not observed by all Member States. The embargo should be made effective and the resolutions fully implemented. Finland had consistently implemented them to the fullest extent. The overwhelming condemnation of *apartheid* evident from the debates and resolutions of the United Nations organs was of vital importance in forming and maintaining a world public opinion opposed to racial discrimination. It was important that continuous and reliable information should be available on the subject, as the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had emphasized. The United Nations and the specialized agencies could substantially influence basic attitudes in Member countries through the dissemination of factual information on racial discrimination in southern Africa. His delegation therefore wholeheartedly supported the proposal² to launch a decade for action to combat racism and racial discrimination which was currently being discussed in the Third Committee.

14. Finland had supported the international humanitarian actions taken to defend victims of *apartheid* through annual contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and its Government intended to raise its contribution for 1973 to \$60,000.

15. It considered the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa indispensable in offering to the peoples of the region some of the opportunities denied them, and it also intended to increase its financial support to that fund during the coming year. It had in addition given its first contribution of \$15,000 to the newly established United Nations Fund for Namibia, and it had recently contributed for the first time to the Assistance Fund for the Struggle Against Colonialism and *Apartheid* established by OAU.

16. In supporting the endeavours of the United Nations to increase the political pressure on the South African Government and to promote humanitarian work for the victims of *apartheid*, his delegation concurred with the views of the Secretary-General, as expressed in chapter VII of the introduction (A/8701/Add.1) to his report on the work of the Organization that the international community must mobilize effectively all the resources available to it.

17. The CHAIRMAN expressed appreciation of the Finnish Government's increased contribution to the humanitarian funds.

¹ See document E/CN.4/1093/Add.7 (mimeographed).

² Subsequently approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 2919 (XXVII), of 15 November 1972.

18. Mr. DI BERNARDO (Italy) said that the policy of *apartheid* represented an open violation of a fundamental principle of the United Nations Charter, that of the equality of all people. It seriously contravened the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and was rightly resented as an affront by the independent African States and by the overwhelming majority of other Member States. There was in fact a consensus on the subject that had rarely been achieved on other problems. It was therefore only appropriate that the Organization should be used to voice the concern of world public opinion. The problem was moral in essence. It was important that a large part of the work of the Special Political Committee should be devoted to the various aspects of *apartheid*, so that other United Nations bodies might be able to concentrate on the problem of racial discrimination in other parts of the world. In that connexion, the proposal of the ex-Chairman of the Special Committee to co-ordinate studies of the policies of *apartheid* was most valuable.

19. *Apartheid* was completely alien to the Italian people and to their culture, which was based on the values of humanism and on the universal principle of equality of all men. Italy had therefore voted in favour of the resolutions condemning that policy.

20. In view of the interrelation of psychological, historical and social factors in the problem, any change in that present situation could be brought about only through the gradual replacement of *apartheid* by a meaningful dialogue between the various communities. As emphasized in the Manifesto on Southern Africa, signed at Lusaka in 1969, that could only be the work of the peoples of South Africa themselves. The main duty of the United Nations was to help that process in every possible way. It must therefore remain faithful to its corner-stone, peace, since only peaceful methods could solve the problem. Since it was essentially a moral problem, the means to solve it must be effective on the moral plane. The full weight of the moral influence of the societies of Member States must be felt in South Africa. Although the instinctive reaction to the practice of racial discrimination was to punish those responsible by isolating them, every possible opportunity should be given to the people of South Africa to come into contact with liberal ideas and ways of life and thus to realize the strength of world condemnation and of world support for the rights and wishes of the African populations. The validity of such an approach was confirmed by the report of the Special Committee (A/8722 and Add.1) which made many suggestions for broadening and rendering more effective the programme to enlighten world public opinion, in particular opinion in South Africa. For instance, the report on the maltreatment and torture of prisoners in South Africa (A/8770) should be given the widest possible publicity in order to awaken South African public opinion to the dangers of the policy of *apartheid*. In particular, South African youth should be made aware of the constitutional, political and humanitarian problems that the arbitrary detention and maltreatment of political prisoners involved. The Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations had on several

occasions emphasized the need to bring South African students to breathe in the atmosphere of other countries' universities and open societies. The recent reactions of the South African students to certain aspects of the policy of *apartheid* showed that the idea of further relations with South African youth should be consistently pursued.

21. Most States Members of the United Nations seemed increasingly to advocate the adoption of economic sanctions, a course which raised various problems for the Organization. Italy had contributed to a study carried out in accordance with Security Council resolution 191 (1964) on the practicability and effects of sanctions, the results of which were given in the report of the Expert Committee established pursuant to that resolution.³ Sanctions and related measures were the prerogative of the Security Council and, to be implemented, they should be decided upon according to the rules laid down in the Charter of the United Nations and after the practical means to control their application had been ensured. Italy would certainly abide by any decision taken on that basis.

22. One of the limited measures which would be realistic and could contribute to make the pressure of the Organization and of world public opinion really felt in South Africa was the embargo on the sale of arms recommended by the Security Council and reaffirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2775 A (XXVI) and by the Security Council in its resolution 311 (1972), which Italy had supported and implemented.

23. Some speakers had put forward theories according to which NATO might be envisaging a military *entente* with South Africa. Not only had no factual basis been given to justify that allegation but the work of the Special Committee had provided good reasons for its rejection. While it had quoted statements referring to the alleged integration of South Africa into the NATO alliance, it had also reproduced the official denial of such statements.

24. Since the problem of *apartheid* was mainly moral and social in nature, the impact of United Nations action must be primarily a moral one. Only through decisions based on a broad and authentic unity of purpose could its message be conveyed to the Government and people of South Africa without giving them any excuse for equivocal interpretation. Italy continued to believe that the principles contained in the Lusaka Manifesto and in particular the appeals to South Africa to negotiate the necessary changes in its policy were still valid. In any event, that approach did not complicate or exclude any other steps. South Africa must be shown the way out of its present sterile search for domination through racial discrimination towards a responsible role of true leadership in Africa, for the benefit of the African population.

³ Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Special Supplement No. 2, documents S/6210 and Add.1.

25. Mrs. GAVRILOVA (Bulgaria) thought it regrettable that the situation in southern Africa had not improved over the past year. Despite the efforts of the African peoples and the United Nations, tension had become even more acute, in contrast to the recent relaxation of tension in several other parts of the world. Many national, regional and international bodies and organizations were assisting in the struggle against *apartheid*. The United Nations was continuing its efforts to that end. In addition to the Organization's innumerable resolutions on the elimination of racial discrimination and the fact that the Security Council had held for the first time a series of meetings in Africa itself, the Secretary-General had taken a number of steps aimed at ensuring the implementation of the relevant United Nations decisions.

26. Unfortunately those efforts had not yet met with success. As could be seen from the detailed reports of the Special Committee (A/8722 and Add.1, A/8770), the Vorster régime persisted in its policy of racial discrimination and genocide, strengthening its reign of terror and illegally maintaining the people of Namibia in a state of slavery. It continued to strengthen its administrative and legislative machinery in order to legalize its minority rule.

27. The Special Committee's reports contained some very revealing facts concerning the assistance given by the Western imperialist partners to the South African Government, enabling it to continue unfettered its exploitation of the country's vast resources. Those imperialist States and the racist régime itself knew that such exploitation was possible only through the use of brute force.

28. The imperialist States had no interest in eliminating *apartheid* or in overthrowing colonial rule in southern Africa, a region that was still under their power. They were socially, politically and ethnically linked with Vorster's régime, which in turn fully responded to their aims, namely the desire to extend their influence over other countries in southern Africa in order to hamper the process of national liberation.

29. The Special Committee's report (A/8722 and Add.1) clearly showed the development of the arms industry in South Africa with the aid of capital invested by the imperialist States. It revealed the illegal supply of arms to the South African régime, and gave details on the supply of arms by South Africa to the racist régimes of other African countries, particularly Southern Rhodesia. South Africa was becoming more and more a centre for the suppression of the African liberation struggle.

30. For the imperialist States members of NATO, the supply of arms to South Africa was not only a question of making a profit while at the same time achieving their colonial and political designs; it was also a part of their over-all aggressive plan for establishing strategic bases in various parts of the world.

31. That was why the struggle of the African peoples

was a struggle against not only the racists but also the powerful imperialist war machine. Hence the policy of *apartheid* was a threat not only to the Coloured population of the country but also to all peace-loving peoples. The policy of *apartheid* had therefore justifiably been described in United Nations documents as a crime against humanity.

32. That was why peace-loving peoples appealed to the United Nations to do its utmost to eradicate the South African racist régime and to assist the African peoples in becoming the true masters of their own land and fate. World public opinion attributed the biggest share of the blame for the delay in decolonization to the imperialist partners of the racists in Africa.

33. The delegation of Bulgaria fully supported all the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee, and would be ready to support any corresponding draft resolutions. Bulgaria strictly conformed with all United Nations resolutions and decisions aimed at isolating the racist régimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and maintained no relations of any kind with them. Within the limits of its capability, it gave assistance to the victims of *apartheid* and colonialism in Africa, and in accordance with its socialist outlook and principles of international solidarity, would give its moral and material assistance to the peoples of that continent.

34. Mr. FOUNGUI (Congo) said that the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8722 and Add.1) was a document of considerable political importance that threw much light on the monstrous evils of *apartheid*.

35. Just because of their colour, black people were dispossessed of their land and lived in a state of misery, deprived of their right to education, health, justice and free speech. With complete equanimity, the South African racists massacred and tortured blacks to death every day. In fact the black people served only to enrich the whites.

36. What was at stake in South Africa was not simply the fate of Africans but the fate of all mankind. Instead of advancing, one part of humanity had sadly taken a step backwards. What purpose had been served by the Nuremberg trials, if the racist doctrine espoused by Hitler was being propagated anew?

37. He wished to recall certain ideas that had led to that doctrine. The well-known nineteenth-century writer Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau had propounded the same erroneous theories in his work *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*, which had had a direct influence on Hitler. Other writers, such as the Reverends V. Junod and W. H. Bentley, claimed that civilization had hitherto been the sole prerogative of the white races and that the black races would never produce an Einstein, a Stravinsky or a Gershwin. Such ideas had of course been refuted. Yet why was it that Africans found themselves once again face to face with such a virulent form of racism? Why was it that the majority of those

States that had drafted the Charter of the United Nations and held the Nuremberg trials were the first to uphold such an inhuman system?

38. The fact was that without the extensive aid provided by members of NATO the South African racist régime could not exist. Those States should listen to reason, for already many peoples of independent Africa were becoming increasingly aware of the dangers of *apartheid*—peoples who knew that the cause of Africa was a just one and that they could count on the active support of many millions of people all over the world, including the peoples of NATO countries, who should be distinguished from their reactionary Governments.

39. The Special Committee's report contained important concrete proposals for improving methods in the struggle against *apartheid*. His delegation believed that, following the general debate on the item, members should seek the total isolation of South Africa. The Special Committee's nine-point programme (see A/8722, para. 26) should be studied by all. His delegation, for its part, would support any just proposal and would make its position known at the appropriate stage. His delegation therefore appealed to all peace-loving countries to redouble their efforts in the campaign against *apartheid*. It also appealed to the Governments and peoples of Africa to redouble their vigilance in order to prevent *apartheid* from gaining ground.

40. He wished to pay particular tribute to Mr. Farah of Somalia for his years of service to the Special Committee on *Apartheid*. His delegation would give Mr. Farah's proposals close study and would make its position known at a later stage. It was time for the international community to take concrete measures to create a better world, where that which had befallen the Jews and the blacks of the colonies, and which ill-fated peoples everywhere still had to endure, would never happen again.

41. Mr. KUSUMASMORO (Indonesia) paid a tribute to Mr. Farah of Somalia, the former Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, for his years of dedicated service. The suggestions made by Mr. Farah in his statement at the 809th meeting were most valuable.

42. The Special Committee on *Apartheid* was to be commended on its efforts to attend the conferences of various governmental and non-governmental bodies concerned with *apartheid*, such as the International Conference on Namibia and the meeting of the Commission on Racism of the World Peace Council, both held at Brussels in May 1972. The Special Committee's attendance at such meetings reinforced the faith of members of the various organizations concerned that the United Nations was dedicated to eliminating racism. In that connexion, world public opinion was a potent force that could be mobilized in the struggle against racism and could be used to influence Governments to adopt policies that could put an end to *apartheid*.

43. The Sub-Committee on Information of the Special Committee was to be commended on its great initiative

in disseminating information on the evils of *apartheid*. There was need, however, for a greater effort among the different agencies of the United Nations and other governmental and non-governmental organizations to publicize as widely as possible all the heinous aspects of *apartheid*. The Secretariat's Office of Public Information and Unit on *Apartheid* should increase their publications and make them available in languages other than English. Greater emphasis should be placed on the dissemination of information on *apartheid* through radio and television programmes, and Member States and independent radio and television stations should be requested to allocate specific broadcasting time to United Nations programmes on *apartheid*.

44. The past year had not been entirely without progress. The resolution adopted by the Workers' Group at the ILO Labour Conference at Geneva on 24 June 1972 (*ibid.*, para. 150), calling, *inter alia*, for an international trade union conference on *apartheid*, was a hopeful sign in an otherwise disappointing situation. Such a conference would enable the trade union movement to develop a co-ordinated plan of action against racial discrimination, and Indonesia looked forward to the Special Committee's active participation in that proposed conference.

45. Despite the numerous United Nations resolutions on *apartheid*, that policy continued to grow stronger. There must be concerted action to implement those resolutions. Nations must abandon the fiction that there was a qualitative difference between arms supplied to South Africa for defence and arms which could be used for oppression. Furthermore, under Security Council resolution 282 (1970), the military build-up in South Africa had been termed a potential threat to international peace and security.

46. Military and economic collaboration with the South African racist régime would only be at the expense of the immediate victims of *apartheid*. The true interests of nations lay in encouraging the development of social justice for all the peoples.

47. The United Nations and other bodies concerned must redouble their efforts to bring *apartheid* to an end. Indonesia, which had made a modest contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, intended to continue its contributions during the coming years and called upon all nations which had not yet done so to contribute in order to assist the victims of *apartheid*.

48. Mrs. GONZÁLEZ (Cuba) recalled that 27 years of efforts by the United Nations to pierce the armour of South Africa had brought only meagre results. Yet white South Africa, which had once withdrawn voluntarily into itself to amass wealth at the expense of the rightful owners of its lands, was now emerging, economically and militarily prepared, to demand acceptance by the international community. With that end in view, it had built up a public image which depicted it as a benevolent older sister who was willing to share her wealth with the less fortunate. In order to propagate

that myth on a continental scale, it had further cemented its ties with its satellite, Malawi, tightened its grip on the countries encircled within it, strengthened its economic, political and military alliance with Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese colonialism and redoubled its efforts to neutralize independent African States with economic blandishments and dialogue, threatening those which refused to yield, like Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania, with the use of force. Outside Africa, the Republic of South Africa was endeavouring to portray itself as a politically liberal and flexible country, laying special emphasis on its anti-communism.

49. However, no one was fooled by South Africa's masquerade. It was no coincidence that those who benefited by its generosity were its steadfast supporters, like Malawi, which had seen its zeal rewarded with the construction of a resplendent city, and the Portuguese colonies, in which South Africa, not content with its participation in the construction of the Cunene and Cabora Bassa dams, was endeavouring to establish new Bantustans. Thus, the true character of South African subimperialism was revealed. The waters of the Cunene and Zambesi rivers would not serve the indigenous inhabitants, but would be used to irrigate the settlements of European immigrants and to provide South Africa with electric power.

50. One would have hoped that the political and diplomatic offensive launched by the racist minority régime would not have received the approval and even the active co-operation of the members of NATO, and the United States of America in particular. That co-operation had not been confined to the dissemination of propaganda, but had been constantly extended into the military field in spite of the resolutions of the United Nations. That was demonstrated by the fact that in 1969 South Africa had imported more heavy weaponry than all the rest of Africa south of the Sahara. Repeated references had been made to discussions concerning a treaty similar to the North Atlantic Treaty covering the South Atlantic, which would include such countries as New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, Argentina and Brazil, in addition to South Africa. That treaty would apparently have as its economic counterpart a common market of the Southern Hemisphere. It should be noted in that connexion that the trade of Argentina and Brazil with South Africa accounted for more than 53 per cent of South Africa's trade with 22 Latin American countries.

51. The special relationship between South Africa and the United States of America, first established in the early 1960s, when the United States Government had rescued South Africa from a currency crisis, was now reflected in South Africa's hesitant but unmistakable drift towards the dollar area and in increasingly frequent joint ventures undertaken by the two countries. Infinitely more ominous were the military consequences of that fusion of interests. It was well known that South African regular and paramilitary forces were directly participating in anti-guerrilla and patrol operations in Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia, and that light planes and amphibian helicopters of the

type that the United States had sold to South Africa were being used to seek out guerrilla positions in the genocidal war in Viet-Nam. That matter was exhaustively discussed in *The Air War in Vietnam* by Frank Harvey. It was also known that South African helicopters and other aircraft had indiscriminately showered napalm and defoliants over certain areas of Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, in mid-1970, the Chairman of South Africa's Atomic Energy Board had announced that that country had developed a technique for producing enriched uranium, indicating that South Africa would be capable of manufacturing its own atomic weapons within the next five years. That had been made possible by United States technical assistance. Indeed, in 1965 a United States corporation had installed the first atomic reactor purchased by South Africa. Many of the scientists and engineers working there had been trained in the United States. It was interesting to note that all of the 1,000 people employed there were white.

52. The incredible political short-sightedness of the South African racist minority and United States imperialism had gone to pathetic extremes in their disregard for the irreversibility of history when, in 1970, the South African Government had sent a team of experts to Puerto Rico to carry out a detailed secret study on the political and economic ties between the United States and its Caribbean colony with a view to using them as a model in implementing *apartheid*.

53. The union of South African and United States interests could have no positive result. Two facts sufficed to confirm that statement: in 1970 South Africa had been the largest direct investor in Portugal, accounting for 35 per cent of total foreign investments for that year, and in December 1971 the current United States administration had announced the granting of an unprecedented credit of \$436 million to the Portuguese régime. President Caetano, despite his statement that the loan had not been solicited by Portugal, had offered a military base in return as a token of his "spirit of alliance and collaboration".

54. There was little need for words, as the situation spoke for itself. Her delegation once again reaffirmed its conviction that the will of the oppressed peoples struggling to win back their rights would prevail.

55. Mr. THOMPSON-FLORES (Brazil), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that there was absolutely no substance to the allegations made by the representative of Cuba regarding a military alliance between his country and South Africa. More than two years before, his Government had denied categorically that it was considering or had ever considered entering into such an alliance.⁴ He stressed that no other country had more reason to oppose *apartheid* than Brazil, which constituted one of the world's best examples of a truly harmonious multiracial society. For its part, his Government had always respected the decisions and reso-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1970, document S/9914.

lutions of the Security Council concerning sanctions and would continue to do so.

56. Mr. CARSALES (Argentina), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said he wished to reply to certain statements made by the representative of Cuba. First, since his country had no connexion whatever with NATO, he was not in a position to speak of any plans of that organization. As to the allegation that his country was somehow to be included in an alliance or pact involving South Africa, he recalled that rumours to that effect had first been circulated as much as six or eight years earlier and had proved to be entirely without foundation. Unfortunately, nothing seemed to have a greater capacity for survival than baseless rumours, and there was little point in denying them repeatedly. At the twenty-fourth session (656th meeting) his country's delegation in the Special Political Committee had stated categorically that his Government had never had any intention to enter into any military arrangement with South Africa. Just two years before (700th meeting), he himself had repeated that denial and had hoped that he would not have to do so again. He stressed that not a single fact had ever been adduced to substantiate the rumours in question. He could only repeat once more that his Government had absolutely no intention to enter into an alliance with South Africa. Turning to the question of trade between his country and South Africa, he stressed that the volume of such trade was extremely small and indeed almost insignificant in the context of his country's total volume of trade.

57. Mrs. GONZÁLEZ (Cuba) said that she welcomed the statements by the representatives of Argentina and Brazil to the effect that their Governments did not intend to establish any military relations with South Africa. However, according to a paper issued by the Unit on *Apartheid* in February 1972 concerning South Africa's trade with Latin America, extensive discussions had been held between South African and Argentine trade officials concerning the expansion of commercial exchanges between their countries, and a member of an Argentine trade mission which had visited South Africa late in 1970 had stated that the potential existed for a tenfold increase in the volume of trade between those countries. Her delegation disputed the thesis that trade relations did not strengthen political relations. She expressed the hope that trade relations between South Africa and the countries of Latin America would cease to exist.

58. Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) said that his country's almost insignificant trade with South Africa could not in any sense be construed as economic support of the South African Government.

Hearing of Mr. P. L. Gqobose, representative of the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa)

59. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Committee had decided at its 815th meeting to hear a statement by the representative of the Pan-Africanist Congress

of Azania (South Africa), and invited Mr. Gqobose to take a place at the Committee table.

60. Mr. GQOBOSE (Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa)) stressed that the policy of the ruling white minority in South Africa regarded all dark-skinned people as inferior and therefore not worthy of human dignity and respect. That policy was the root cause of his country's tragedy, which might one day take on global dimensions. *Apartheid* was a unique, extreme and abominable form of racism, for it was based solely on skin colour.

61. The part of South Africa's territory—13 per cent of the total—occupied by 18 million Africans represented the most barren and unproductive areas, while the part—87 per cent—occupied by 3 million whites was fertile and rich in mineral deposits. Consequently, Africans suffered from ignorance, poverty and disease, earning an average monthly wage of £9, in comparison with £160 for whites. As a result, each year over 1 million African children died of malnutrition and other preventable diseases, in addition to more than 70,000 persons of all ages who died of tuberculosis. Those figures did not include the 10 million Africans who lived in the so-called Bantustans and on white-owned farms, where no statistics of any sort were kept.

62. There were over 500 laws on South Africa's statute books which applied only to non-whites. Under those laws African men, women and children were searched without warrants in their homes and terrorized and assaulted in the early hours of the morning between 2 and 6 a.m. The police were empowered to molest Africans in every aspect of their daily lives. Some of those laws, like the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, the Bantu Pass Law, No. 67 of 1952, the Bantu Administration Act, No. 38 of 1927, and the Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, were specifically designed to destroy family life. Husbands, wives and children were forcibly separated under such legislation and sent to distant areas of the country.

63. Under *apartheid* legislation, communities comprising thousands of families were transported to distant areas without provision for water, sanitation, health facilities, transport or educational and recreational facilities and where there was no way to obtain food. Thousands of people representing such categories as former political prisoners, victims of racist legislation and police brutality, the aged, invalids and people suffering from employment disabilities who had received no compensation were removed to so-called resettlement projects, which in fact were nothing more than concentration camps. They subsisted there on government grants of £2.50 paid every two months. Those who escaped beyond the barbed wire encircling the camps were guilty of an offence. Journalists and reporters were not permitted to enter those concentration camps or any other area reserved for Africans, including the so-called Bantustans.

64. The Bureau for State Security was a vast espionage network which employed police informers to spy on

the people of South Africa. Members of the same family were induced to spy on one another, and one could be sentenced to long terms of imprisonment merely for criticizing *apartheid* within the privacy of one's home. Every aspect of African society was infiltrated by police informers, and the result was a generalized feeling of mistrust and insecurity. The Bureau for State Security also operated an international intelligence network which spied on all South Africans abroad, as well as on other people whom the racist régime believed to be working against it.

65. The more than 500 racist laws in force in South Africa accounted for a tremendous number of arrests, convictions, incidents of torture and executions. Every year between 76 and 119 persons were executed in South Africa, and over 1 million Africans were arrested and sentenced to gaol. The average non-white South African adult had been in and out of gaol some four or five times each year.

66. Those conditions, which the oppressed people of South Africa experienced every day and night of their lives, constituted a gross violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Racist South Africa was not merely a police State, for its unprecedented savagery was an abomination beyond all civilized standards. The white minority régime deliberately and systematically destroyed the human dignity which the international community was endeavouring to protect. The situation he described was one which he, like all victims of racism in South Africa, had experienced since childhood. One of the most degrading aspects of racial discrimination experienced by every African adult was the Bantu Pass Law, No. 67 of 1952, which required the African population to carry a pass at all times, regardless of their profession or state of health. Failure to do so was an offence punishable by imprisonment.

67. The economic and military support that the white racist minority received from the NATO Powers was well known. Its grave consequences were clearly reflected in the devastating effects of racism among the masses of the African population. Although the members of NATO were the first to protest against alleged

terrorism on the part of the oppressed people of the world, their active support of racism in South Africa made them the greatest terrorists of all time. Under the conditions perpetuated by their support, children died 30 minutes after birth because their mothers suffered from starvation.

68. It was to the credit of OAU that the contemptible so-called dialogue initiated by the white racists had failed. The only dialogue which could succeed was one conducted with the recognized leaders of the African people inside South Africa itself, who were currently either in gaol or detention. The racial problem in South Africa was a creation of the white racists themselves, and it was they who must solve it. They would receive no assistance in that regard from the leaders of African States. The South African liberation movement, as represented by the African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress and the Unity Movement, had been struggling against racism for many years. The non-violent means it had initially adopted had failed to change the prevailing conditions. Since the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, it had embraced armed struggle as the only means of changing the situation. Faced with the combined might of the allies of racism in South Africa, it did not underestimate the odds, and it expected a long and extremely brutal struggle, but under the leadership of the liberation movement, the masses of the African population were sure to win in the end. With the support of OAU and revolutionary peoples throughout the world, they were confident of winning their freedom, despite the military assistance provided to South Africa by the members of NATO.

69. He appealed to the international community for more determined efforts to isolate the racist régime in South Africa with a view to making it an outcast among nations. The liberation movement requested no military support from the United Nations, for no nation had ever been liberated by others, and South Africa was no exception. True freedom would come to South Africa through the sacrifices of its own people, however long and arduous the struggle.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.