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Chairman: Mr. Emilio ARENALES CATALAN
 (Guatemala).

AGENDA ITEM 25

**Admission of new Members to the United Nations (A/
 3662, A/SPC/L.15 and Add.1 and 2, A/SPC/L.16 and
 Add.1 and 2, A/SPC/L.17) (continued)**

1. Mr. MOD (Hungary) noted with regret that while all delegations paid lip service to the principle of universality, some of them violated the principle in practice, notably in regard to the People's Republic of China and the Mongolian People's Republic.

2. The admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations had been recommended in 1955 by a majority of the General Assembly, including some States which now sought to prevent its admission. The Mongolian People's Republic met all the requirements for admission. Its Government pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence, as was proved by its constantly widening diplomatic, commercial and cultural contacts. In a cablegram dated 1 September 1957 (S/3873) the Foreign Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic had declared his Government's readiness to assume and fulfil all the obligations arising out of the Charter of the United Nations. Apart from that undertaking, any unbiased person who studied the Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic, in particular chapter X dealing with the fundamental rights and duties of citizens, would see that its Government had been guided in its foreign and domestic policy by the spirit of the Charter.

3. In its domestic policy the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic had always concentrated on raising the standard of living and improving the cultural level of the people. For example, at the time when the Republic was established there had been only twelve primary schools, one secondary school and one teacher-training school. At present there were 349 primary schools, fifty-two seven-year schools and thirty-one ten-year schools, with a total enrolment of 91,000 pupils, who received their education free of charge. In addition there were fifteen technical schools with 5,000 students, five schools for advanced studies with an enrolment of 3,200 students, and one university with more than 1,800 students. In view of such statistics it was clear that the delegations which wilfully opposed the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic committed an injustice not only against its people but against the United Nations.

4. The two thirteen-Power draft resolutions (A/SPC/

L.15 and Add.1 and 2, A/SPC/L.16 and Add.1 and 2) were conceived in a spirit of intentional discrimination and violation of the principle of universality. Those who supported the drafts and at the same time invoked the principle of universality should realize that by trying to restrict representation in the United Nations to one part of a temporarily divided country they were not defending that principle but violating it. Moreover, their discrimination was motivated by a specific political objective, namely, to prevent countries which were building socialism from being admitted as Members of the United Nations. Such a position not only violated the principle of universality but was contrary to the Charter.

5. With reference to the Republic of Korea, previous speakers had mentioned General Assembly resolution 918 (X), paragraph 2, which clearly expressed the view of the Assembly that applications of countries about which a problem of unification arose were a separate problem. The United Nations had repeatedly declared that its objective in Korea was the reunification of the country by peaceful and democratic means. So far all attempts by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to expand relations between the two States in Korea and thereby promote reunification had been frustrated by South Korea, which maintained a warlike atmosphere. It was obvious that the admission of only one of the two States would be fatal to reunification and, as the representative of Morocco had said, (45th meeting) would perpetuate the division of the country. If Korea was to be admitted, the only solution in existing circumstances was the simultaneous admission of both States.

6. The situation was different in regard to Viet-Nam. Article 7 of the 1954 Geneva agreements provided for general elections in 1956. The authorities of South Viet-Nam, relying on the support of certain great Powers, had prevented the application of that article and had violated other provisions of the agreements. The admission of South Viet-Nam would constitute direct encouragement to the authorities there to continue their present policy. The United Nations must not provoke the violation of international agreements. On the contrary, its task was to secure the application of the Geneva agreements, some of whose signatories, he regretted to note, were represented among the delegations sponsoring the draft resolution in favour of the admission of Viet-Nam (A/SPC/L.16 and Add.1 and 2).

7. Mr. GAJEWSKI (Poland) observed that one of the notable successes of the United Nations had been the admission in recent years of twenty-two new Members. That success had been due to the fact that at the tenth session of the General Assembly realism and the desire for co-operation had triumphed over the inflexible attitudes of the past, and an impartial respect for the principles of the Charter had prevailed over the dis-

criminary policy toward certain States because of their political and economic system, while, in the case of divided countries, concern for their reunification had taken precedence over other political considerations. The results had been a much more equitable representation in the United Nations of all parts of the world, a fact which only emphasized the absurdity of the absence of the People's Republic of China from the Organization.

8. He could only regret the extent to which the atmosphere of the tenth session was absent from the present discussion. His delegation agreed with the view expressed by many speakers that it was necessary to correct past injustices towards certain States and to continue to strive for universality. An injustice had been committed against the Mongolian People's Republic which, eleven years after its original application for admission, ^{1/} was still excluded from the United Nations. His delegation was convinced that that country fully satisfied the requirements of the Charter for admission. It was a peace-loving State which maintained diplomatic relations with many countries. The very friendly relations between it and his own country had been recently demonstrated anew by an exchange of visits of Premiers. Not only was the Mongolian People's Republic able and willing to carry out the provisions of the Charter: it even based its activities and its relations with other countries on the principles of the Charter.

9. Those facts were now denied. In order to realize the partisan nature of such denials it was enough to recall that the General Assembly at its tenth session had categorically approved the credentials of the Mongolian People's Republic by recommending, by a very large majority, its admission to the United Nations.

10. As to the two draft resolutions concerning Viet-Nam and Korea, there was a serious question whether, by forcing the admission of only one part of those countries, the General Assembly would not be committing a new injustice, this time against the Viet-Nameese and Korean peoples. No delegation had denied that the fundamental problem of those peoples was that of reunification. His delegation, which represented a country that had been divided among three Powers for more than a century, had listened with interest to the statement of the representative of Ireland at the previous meeting, pleading for the right of peoples to unity. If that premise was accepted, he failed to see why the General Assembly should look for solutions which were contrary to international legal instruments and to the vital interests of the peoples concerned and, indeed, contrary to the interests of political stabilization in an area where many controversial problems remained to be solved.

11. The special interest of his delegation in a solution of the question of reunification was intensified by reason of Poland's responsibilities as a member of the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Viet-Nam and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. The Geneva agreements of 21 July 1954 laid down the principle that Viet-Nam was one country, that the existing division was purely provisional and that everything should be done to bring

about its reunification. The achievement of that objective was not only a matter of supreme importance for the Viet-Nameese people; it was also important for the neighbours of Viet-Nam and for the strengthening of peace and stability in the Far East.

12. In view of those considerations his delegation could only oppose the draft resolution on the admission of Viet-Nam (A/SPC/L.16 and Add.1 and 2). Its adoption would only perpetuate the provisional division of Viet-Nam and would encourage the elements inside and outside Viet-Nam which were striving to nullify the Geneva agreements. Further, it would constitute a flagrant discrimination against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. His delegation believed that Viet-Nam should be admitted to the United Nations, but only as a unified State. In taking that position it was acting in conformity with the Geneva agreements, with the aspirations of the whole Viet-Nameese people and with the desire expressed by all nations represented at the 1955 Bandung Conference, which had stressed the necessity of admitting a united Viet-Nam to the United Nations.

13. Similar humanitarian, legal and political considerations were responsible for his delegation's view that the reunification of Korea was a most essential and urgent problem. Moreover, the United Nations had assumed specific obligations with respect to the reunification of that country. No political considerations could obscure the fact that there were two States in Korea existing side by side. In the circumstances, the United Nations could best promote the reunification of Korea by encouraging the progressive rapprochement of the two States. That meant applying strictly all the military clauses of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, promoting the continuous development of co-operation in the technical, economic and cultural fields and calling for a political conference to establish a basis for the final settlement of the Korean question, a proposal which had again been made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

14. His delegation could not support the draft resolution on the admission of the Republic of Korea (A/SPC/L.15 and Add.1 and 2), which appeared to be prompted by very different considerations. It felt that the question of the admission of Korea should be envisaged from the viewpoint of a united Korea. However, in view of existing conditions and of the desire on the part of some delegations to see South Korea admitted, his delegation would be prepared to support the simultaneous admission of both Korean States in the hope that their co-operation as Members of the United Nations might help to hasten the reunification of Korea. Finally, his delegation would support the draft resolution submitted by India and Indonesia (A/SPC/L.17), although it would have welcomed a reference in it to General Assembly resolution 918 (X), which constituted a most felicitous expression of the basic principle to which all delegations were apparently so attached, namely, the principle embodied in the Charter of the universality of the United Nations.

15. Mr. FORSYTH (Australia), after recalling the breaking of the long deadlock on the question of the admission of new Members in December 1955 which had led to an increase of 36 per cent in the membership of the United Nations over the past two years, thought it regrettable that it had been necessary at the present session to bring up again the question of

^{1/} See Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 4, document S/95.

the admission of the Republics of Viet-Nam and Korea. At its last session the General Assembly by a majority of 40 votes to 8 had declared itself in favour of the applications of both countries, (resolution 1017 (XI)) thereby confirming a position it had taken in respect of Korea as early as 1949 (resolution 296 G (IV)) and in respect of Viet-Nam as early as 1952 (resolution 620 C (VII)). When the applications were recently reconsidered by the Security Council, ^{2/} only the negative vote of the Soviet Union had prevented Viet-Nam and Korea from taking their rightful place in the United Nations. His Government would like to see the General Assembly again register an impressive vote in favour of the admission of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam. The recommendations of the General Assembly could not forever be ignored by the Soviet Union.

16. It was in Korea that the United Nations had first proved that it had real possibilities as a factor in the gravest problems of peace and war. As the representative of Chile had said (44th meeting) the Republic of Korea was a symbol of United Nations resistance to aggression; and the perpetrators of that aggression were the very authorities in North Korea who were now asking to be treated as equally worthy of United Nations membership. Certain representatives had alleged that South Korea was being converted into a military camp. On the contrary, it was in North Korea that military strength had been steadily built up in the past few years. In the circumstances, the Unified Command had had no alternative but to replace obsolete material in order to restore a military balance and make it possible to defend the Republic of Korea if necessary. His Government's knowledge of conditions in Korea was not merely academic. Australian troops had fought there under the United Nations Command. As a member of the various United Nations commissions in Korea, Australia could testify that the Republic of Korea was a State qualified to be a Member of the United Nations.

17. Australia's knowledge of the Republic of Viet-Nam likewise stemmed from direct contact. For the past five years Australia had been continuously represented in that country and had observed with sympathy and satisfaction its increasing strength after its emergence from the turmoil of war and civil strife. Under the leadership of Ngo Dinh-Diem the Republic of Viet-Nam had in three years emerged from conditions of warfare, disorder and uncertainty to an honoured place in the community of free nations in South-East Asia. At that very moment it was receiving international recognition in the fact that the annual meeting of the eighteen Colombo Plan nations was being held at Saigon. The Republic of Viet-Nam was recognized by more than forty countries and it participated widely in the work of the specialized agencies. Internally, Viet-Nam had made remarkable progress. Elections had been held and a popularly elected government was in office. Not the least striking feature had been the assimilation of more than 1 million refugees who had fled from communist North Viet-Nam. By contrast, no free elections had been held in the North. An indication of the attitude of the people towards the régime there was the exodus of more than 5 per cent of the population in spite of restrictions on their movements.

18. The Soviet representative had argued (44th meeting) that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had obstructed the reunification of the country in violation of the 1954 Geneva agreements. The Geneva agreements stipulated that there should be discussions on free elections with a view to the reunification of the country. President Ngo Dinh-Diem had repeatedly emphasized that he was in favour of free, nation-wide elections but that the conditions for free elections did not exist in the area under communist control. All the evidence available to the Australian Government confirmed that view. The obstacle to the reunification of Viet-Nam was the absence of liberty in the North, and without liberty the real will of the people could not be ascertained.

19. It was a tragic fact that political geography divided the Korean and Viet-Nameese peoples, but that was not a valid reason for denying either nation its rightful representation in the United Nations. After the exposure in Hungary of the true nature of communist rule and the methods by which peoples were held in subjection, could it be believed that North Korea and North Viet-Nam were free and independent countries, or peace-loving States within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter? Acceptance of the argument that unification should be put before membership in the United Nations would mean in practice that the people of Korea and Viet-Nam would be denied their place in the Organization until they consented to being brought under the communist régimes of the North, which would thereby be given a veto over the representation of the Korean and Viet-Nameese nations in the Organization.

20. It had also been argued that the admission of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam would prevent unification. If anything, the alternative of admission of all four areas somewhat illogically suggested by the members of the Soviet bloc would perpetuate division.

21. Charges had been made that a policy of discrimination was being pursued in the question of the admission of new Members. There was a sense in which the United Nations Charter required the General Assembly to discriminate. By establishing certain criteria requiring the Members of the General Assembly to judge whether applicants were qualified, the Charter required them to be discriminating in deciding whether or not to accept or reject a particular application. The Assembly should not be intimidated by a word which in some contexts had an ugly sound.

22. As a co-sponsor of the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions Australia urged their adoption. The possibility that the will of the Assembly would again be frustrated by the veto was no reason for not making its will clear. It was important that the people of Korea and Viet-Nam should know that the Assembly was firm in its view that they should be represented by governments which were qualified under the terms of the Charter. It was important that a vote should be taken on each of the specific proposals for the admission of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam in order that the Governments and peoples of those countries might realize what attitudes were taken, and by whom, towards their aspirations for membership in the United Nations. The Australian delegation welcomed the opportunity to register its position and believed that the majority of delegations shared that desire. It did not wish to see some procedural device adopted which would deprive the peoples of Korea and Viet-

^{2/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Twelfth Year, 789th and 790th meetings.

Nam of the reassurance and encouragement which a positive vote on specific proposals would give them.

23. Miss ROESAD (Indonesia) said that her delegation had always approached the question of the admission of new Members from the viewpoint of universality, which it considered to be part of the fundamental philosophy of the United Nations. It had hoped that the unity of view achieved in 1955 would prevail whenever the question of the admission of new Members arose, and it regretted to note that so soon again the question appeared to be rendered insoluble by the adoption of adamant positions and *a priori* judgements which could not, in the last analysis, benefit those who were most directly concerned. Applicants should have the assurance that they would be admitted to the United Nations if their existence as States was clearly established and they had declared themselves peace-loving and able and willing to carry out the obligations specified in the Charter. For that reason, her delegation favoured the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic, whose existence as a State was fully established and with which her Government entertained diplomatic relations.

24. As to Korea, her delegation considered unification by democratic and peaceful means a prerequisite for its admission. The admission of only a part of the country would not accelerate but would probably retard unification, and unification was certainly the desire of the Korean people as a whole.

25. In the case of Viet-Nam, her delegation would abide by the decision of the Viet-Nameese themselves. The 1955 Bandung Conference, attended by representatives of the Governments of both South and North Viet-Nam, had declared itself in favour of the admission of a unified Viet-Nam. Accordingly, her delegation could not support the admission of only a part of the country.

26. Obviously the admission of new Members could not be effected without the agreement of the Security Council and particularly its permanent members. In her view, the possibility of achieving agreement would be enhanced if all the proposals and records of the present session of the General Assembly relating to the admission of new Members were transmitted to the Security Council for consideration.

27. It was in order to avoid a vicious circle that her delegation had joined with that of India in sponsoring the draft resolution in document A/SPC/L.17, and she hoped that it would receive the Committee's endorsement.

28. Mr. MALILE (Albania) said that his Government had always supported any effort to increase the membership of the United Nations and to strengthen the Organization. Most of the twenty-two recently admitted Member States would have been admitted much earlier if the United States had not discriminated against them on account of their political systems. It was as a result of that policy that the great Chinese people was not represented in the United Nations and that the place which rightly belonged to its representatives was filled by the Chiang Kai-shek clique. It was time that the policy of discrimination was abandoned.

29. The Assembly had on several occasions considered the question of the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic, which had first applied for membership in 1946 and had made several subsequent appli-

cations, but was still unable to take its rightful place in the United Nations because of the hostile attitude of certain countries. There were no real grounds for opposing its admission and the discrimination practised against it violated the Charter.

30. A number of powerful States had recognized that the Mongolian People's Republic fulfilled the requirements for membership, and at the tenth session of the General Assembly the majority of delegations had supported its application for admission. It was a country with a very long and rich history, a sovereign State, both peace-loving and democratic. It had political, economic and cultural relations with a number of States in Europe and Asia, some with political and social systems which differed from its own. It was detrimental to the prestige of the United Nations to continue to refuse it admission.

31. During the previous year's debates it had become apparent that a number of delegations felt that the question of the admission of Korea and Viet-Nam should not be considered until those countries had been unified. In the same way, General Assembly resolution 918 (X) had requested the Security Council to consider "the pending applications for membership of all those eighteen countries about which no problem of unification arises". That still held good, and the first duty of the United Nations was to work for the unification of both those countries. While it was obvious that Korea and Viet-Nam were entitled to membership in the Organization, the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions ran counter to their interests.

32. Imperialist circles in the United States had always striven to turn South Korea and South Viet-Nam into military bases for their own aggressive purposes. They had instituted a tyrannical régime in South Korea which, like their well-known plan for a march northward, constituted a serious threat to peace. The Armistice Agreement had been a victory for the peace-loving peoples of the world and it had been expected that it would be implemented. Unfortunately, that had not been the case. The South Korean and United States authorities had not only made no attempt to carry out the terms of the Agreement but had done their utmost to violate them. The United States representative on the Military Armistice Commission had openly and unilaterally stated on 21 June 1957 that he was not prepared to carry out one of the most important conditions of the Armistice Agreement, namely, not to supply new types of weapons to the armed forces in Korea. The recent deliveries of arms to South Korea and the transfer of the headquarters of the United Nations Command from Tokyo to Seoul was a serious threat to peace in that part of the world.

33. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had, in contrast, always followed a peaceful policy designed to promote the unification of the country. It had scrupulously observed the Armistice Agreement and had made many proposals for the establishment of economic and cultural relations between the North and the South. It had, in fact, just made fresh proposals for the restoration of economic relations with South Korea, but they too had been turned down. It had reduced its armed forces and made specific proposals for the evacuation of foreign troops from Korea.

34. While his delegation was of the opinion that Korea should be admitted only after unification, in view of the existence at the present time of two separate States in

the country, it felt that if South Korea were admitted, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should also be admitted simultaneously.

35. In the case of Viet-Nam, the Geneva agreements had defined the steps by which unification was to be brought about. General elections under the supervision of the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Viet-Nam were to have been held in July 1956, but they had still to take place. The United States was deliberately disregarding the agreements and, in seeking to bring about the admission of South Viet-Nam to the United Nations, was making the unification of the country more difficult. Its purpose was to retain South Viet-Nam as a military base to be used against the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. That military base seriously threatened the peace of the area.

36. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam had, in the interests of the Viet-Nameese people, always scrupulously observed the terms of the Geneva agreements. It had at all times been willing to start negotiations with the authorities in South Viet-Nam for the unification of the country, and had in June 1957 approached those who had presided over the 1954 Geneva Conference with the request that they should, as a matter of urgency, take the necessary steps to ensure the implementation of the agreements and the unification of the country.

37. Some delegations had appealed to the Soviet Union to use its influence to bring about the unification of Korea and Viet-Nam. Their appeal should in fact be addressed to the United States.

38. Mr. NONG KIMNY (Cambodia) briefly reviewed the different points of view which had been expressed during the debate. Certain delegations believed that the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam qualified for membership; others felt that the admission of Korea and Viet-Nam should not be considered till unification had been achieved. Since opposing views were held by permanent members of the Security Council, a deadlock had been reached.

39. In the case of Korea, most Member States were of the opinion that the Republic of Korea fulfilled the requirements for membership but that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not qualified for membership under Article 4 of the Charter, since it had taken up arms against United Nations forces. While that argument was legally valid, it had to be recognized that there were two Koreas and two Viet-Nams. His delegation hoped that Korea would be unified. To achieve that end, there must be free and democratic elections under United Nations supervision.

40. So far as Viet-Nam was concerned, the 1954 Geneva agreements, while recognizing the division of the country as a temporary expedient, made provision for its unification. He would not pass judgement on the arguments advanced in favour of the implementation of those agreements; the attitude of governments was dictated by their own national interests. It was difficult to foresee the fate of the agreements.

41. It would not seem that the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions offered a solution which would prove acceptable to all the parties concerned, and hence his delegation would abstain from voting on them. The admission of Cambodia to membership in the United

Nations had been delayed for a considerable time, and it had been a disillusioning experience. The Security Council must assume responsibility for an equitable and just solution to the question of the admission of new Members to the United Nations.

42. Mr. AZIZ (Afghanistan) looked forward to the day when membership in the United Nations would be universal. His delegation had on many previous occasions stated its position on the question of the admission of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam. It would vote for the admission of partitioned countries after they had been unified. It did not feel that a country should remain divided against the wishes of its people, and the right of self-determination should be applied in all such cases.

43. His delegation would therefore abstain from voting on the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions, (A/SPC/L.15 and Add.1 and 2, A/SPC/L.16 and Add.1 and 2) but would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution submitted by India and Indonesia (A/SPC/L.17), which would serve as an incentive to the permanent members of the Security Council to increase their efforts to solve the problem of outstanding applications for membership.

44. Mr. KARUNATILLEKE (Ceylon) said that his delegation believed in universality of membership in the United Nations — a principle which appeared to be generally accepted, irrespective of the attitude which Member States adopted towards the question under discussion.

45. So far as Korea was concerned, the United Nations had a particular obligation towards South Korea, but the fact was that there were today two separate States in Korea, although they had a common culture, a common language and, until recently, a common territory.

46. The representative of Ireland had pointed out at the previous meeting that the solution to the problem of the unification of Korea probably lay with the Peking Government. Ceylon felt that the United Nations was making a grave error in preventing the Peking Government from taking its rightful place in the Organization. Taiwan was not China. If countries maintaining diplomatic relations with the Peking Government could be of any help in promoting the unification of Korea, his delegation would be happy to co-operate.

47. The representative of Australia had suggested that unification might mean waiting until the day when South Korea adopted the political and economic system practised in North Korea. Those opposing the admission of South Korea to the United Nations might argue that once admitted it would try to impose its own political and economic system on North Korea. Neither those who recommended the admission of South Korea nor those who wished for the simultaneous admission of South and North Korea were seeing the issue in its entirety. Mr. Syngman Rhee had more than once declared that the only way of unifying Korea was through the use of force and that he was prepared to act. The delegation of Ceylon therefore saw danger in the admission of South Korea, but it was equally against the simultaneous admission of the two parts of Korea, because it felt that the division of the country must be regarded as temporary.

48. In view of the existence of the Geneva agreements,

the case of Viet-Nam was somewhat different. A real effort should be made to secure the implementation of the agreements.

49. If in the long run it proved impossible to achieve the unification of either Korea or Viet-Nam, or both countries, then the question of the admission of both parts of each might have to be considered. Since his delegation hoped to see unification achieved, it would abstain from voting on the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions but would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by India and Indonesia.

50. Mr. MOSCOSO (Ecuador) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions as being in accordance with the principles which his delegation had always upheld in the United Nations. It believed in the principle of universality and felt that the application of each individual State for membership should be judged on its merits, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

51. The delegation of Ecuador felt that the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam should already be Members of the United Nations, and regretted that the abuse of the veto by one member of the Security Council which engaged in discrimination against States whose political structure was not to its liking, had so far prevented their applications from being approved. The arguments against their admission were invalid and self-contradictory. It had first been argued that Korea and Viet-Nam should be unified before the question of their admission could be considered; then that there were two separate States in each country and, therefore, that both parts of each country should be admitted simultaneously; and, finally, that simultaneous admission of the two parts of each country would encourage future unification.

52. It should not be forgotten that United Nations forces had defended Korea against armed aggression from abroad and had assisted it in safeguarding its independence. To use that as an argument against its admission not only failed to make sense but would constitute a very dangerous precedent. It would be encouraging aggression.

53. To admit both parts of the two divided countries simultaneously would be tantamount to ratifying an unjust *de facto* situation which arose out of the use of force. It would give legal sanction to the aggressor. Clearly, the legal sanctioning of the dismemberment of a country could not lead to its reunification. The only proper way to achieve reunification was to recognize the sovereign integrity of the people and to admit them to the United Nations, so that reunification could subsequently be achieved with the help of the means for peaceful settlement available in the United Nations and with the co-operation of other nations.

54. His delegation reserved the right to speak, at the appropriate time, on the draft resolution submitted by India and Indonesia (A/SPC/L.17).

55. Mr. AZNAR (Spain) agreed with the representative of Colombia that the question of the admission of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam to membership in the United Nations should be considered by the Committee not as a political issue but on purely legal grounds, and that differences should be resolved in accordance with legal precepts alone.

56. In the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions, the

co-sponsors asked for a vote in favour of the declaration that the General Assembly found both Viet-Nam and the Republic of Korea qualified for membership in the United Nations, and that therefore both States should be admitted to membership. There was no doubt that both States had been found qualified for membership by the General Assembly. Nor were any qualifications for membership required other than those laid down in the Charter. He therefore failed to understand how it was possible to vote against the preambulatory paragraphs, or even to abstain from voting on them; and once it was recognized that both States were fully qualified for membership it was surely not possible to accept that premise and reject the logical conclusion contained in the operative paragraph that they should be admitted to membership.

57. Certain delegations appeared to feel that qualifications additional to those laid down in the Charter were required. While expressing a lack of sympathy for, or positive dislike of, the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions, they stated that if the two parts of each country were admitted simultaneously they would vote in favour of the admission of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam. In linking the admission of the two parts of each country they were admitting that the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam qualified for membership. Since it was admitted that the two States were entitled to membership, it would be in the interests of justice to admit them and then take up the remaining outstanding cases. They too should be considered on their merits.

58. His country had the greatest sympathy with the concept of national unity, but the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions in no way militated against the restoration of national unity, nor did they affect the right of other applicant States to membership. The two problems should be considered separately, although politics tended to confuse them; the Committee should be guided by legal precepts.

59. Mr. ABDESSELAM (Tunisia) said that his delegation would confine its remarks to the draft resolutions which had actually been submitted to the Committee. It did not consider that it was well enough informed on the subject of the Mongolian People's Republic to give an opinion in regard to its application for admission.

60. The Tunisian delegation believed that membership in the United Nations should be as universal as possible. It was in that spirit that it had welcomed the recent admission of Ghana and the Federation of Malaya. However, the admission of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam to the United Nations might well perpetuate a division which the United Nations should seek to terminate. His delegation would therefore abstain from voting on the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions. It would vote in favour of the joint resolution submitted by India and Indonesia which, by enabling the Security Council to re-examine all applications for admission, might provide a solution to the present deadlock.

61. Mr. ABUBAKR OSMAN (Sudan) said that his delegation was consistent in its adherence to the principle of universality and would support the admission of any free country which fulfilled the requirements of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter. As a newly independent country, Sudan appreciated the role played by Korea and Viet-Nam in their struggle for

liberation. The Sudanese delegation hoped that they would soon join the United Nations as free and unified countries. However, it did not regard the procedure proposed in the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions as the best means of achieving that end. The admission of only one part of Korea and Viet-Nam would broaden the gap between North and South in each case and destroy all hope of their eventual unification. The 1955 Bandung Conference and the 1954 Geneva Conference had both adopted decisions calling for the unification of Viet-Nam. In accordance with the view that unification should precede admission, which was implicit in General Assembly resolution 918 (X), the Sudanese delegation would abstain from voting on the two Thirteen-Power draft resolutions. It would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by India and Indonesia as presenting better prospects of solving the question of the admission of new Members.

62. Mr. MALOLES (Philippines), exercising his right of reply in connexion with the Romanian representative's comment at the previous meeting that the application of Outer Mongolia had been accepted by the General Assembly in 1955 and had since been vetoed by the United States, said that the application of the Mongolian People's Republic had been considered at the 756th meeting of the Security Council and had been rejected by a vote of 4 in favour, 2 against and 5 abstentions, including the United States. In explaining their votes, a number of members of the Security Council had expressed their doubts as to the capacity of Outer Mongolia to discharge the obligations of membership in the United Nations. Those remarks went far to support the Philippine view that Outer Mongolia had yet to show that it fulfilled the requirements of the Charter.

63. The point had also been made that according to the Geneva agreements the boundary dividing South Viet-Nam from North Viet-Nam was purely temporary. The United Nations had held the question of applications from countries with problems of unification in abeyance for so long that any further delay was impossible. The unification of those countries could be achieved through free open elections by secret ballot under the auspices and supervision of the United Nations. Such safeguards would ensure that the popular will was not frustrated. The Philippine delegation had already said at the previous meeting that it would support any draft resolution to the effect that such elections should be held, subject to the provision of appropriate safeguards.

64. He could not agree that the applications of North and South Korea and North and South Viet-Nam should be taken together and again referred to the Security Council, as the draft resolution submitted by India and Indonesia seemed to propose. It would be a very questionable procedure to combine the applications of two countries which the Assembly had declared to be qualified for membership with the applications of other countries which had not been so recognized. Each application must be considered on its own merits. He repeated the views of the eminent French jurist, Professor Giraud, in connexion with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,^{3/} that a Member State could not make its consent to the admission of an applicant State contingent upon conditions not

explicitly provided in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter, nor could the admission of one State be made subject to the admission of other States to the United Nations. Those views ruled out the possibility of any "package deal".

65. Mr. BOGDAN (Romania) said he had been struck by the Philippine representative's omission of any reference to General Assembly resolution 918 (X). The Romanian delegation had laid great stress on that resolution in its statement at the previous meeting because it had had very important and successful results in the question of the admission of new Members. Moreover, that resolution was undoubtedly in favour of admitting the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations. The phrase "all those eighteen countries about which no problem of unification arises" included the Mongolian People's Republic. In fact, the USSR had proposed an amendment to that resolution whereby the eighteen countries would be listed by name, but other delegations had argued that it was superfluous and that the names of the countries could be taken for granted. The USSR had withdrawn its amendment on that understanding. In the debate on the resolution, there had been many specific references to the Mongolian People's Republic as a qualified applicant. At the 704th meeting of the Security Council, immediately after the decision by the General Assembly, there had been 8 votes in favour of the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic, 2 abstentions, including the United States, and only one vote — that of the Kuomintang representative — against. The Mongolian People's Republic had not changed its character. In 1946 the United States had been in favour of admission; in 1955 it had abstained from voting, and in 1957, at the 790th meeting of the Security Council, it had actually voted against. Its attitude was obviously motivated by political considerations.

66. There had been no suggestion that the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter should not be respected. On the other hand, the Charter imposed no restrictions on the simultaneous admission of States. All cases should be discussed on their merits and the best procedure adopted. It was the abuse by some nations of the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter which had led to the proposal that certain States should be admitted simultaneously. The proposal had been made in order to avoid abuses and not to add new conditions to those laid down in the Charter.

67. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, recalled for the benefit of the Philippine representative and other representatives who opposed the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic on the pretext that not enough was known about it to satisfy them that it met the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter, that the Mongolian People's Republic was undoubtedly one of the eighteen countries whose applications had been favourably recommended to the Security Council in General Assembly resolution 918 (X). Some fifty-four Member States had thus expressed the view, by their votes on that resolution, that the Mongolian People's Republic was a State in the full meaning of the term and qualified for membership in the United Nations. At the 704th meeting of the Security Council, immediately after the adoption of resolution 918 (X), eight States had voted in favour of the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic, and only the illegal veto of the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique — illegal

^{3/} See *Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4)*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1948, p. 57.

in that he did not represent China - had prevented its admission. The considerations prompting those States which in 1955 had felt that the Mongolian People's Republic fulfilled the requirements of the Charter to change their position were not legal but strictly political.

68. It had been argued that the Charter should be the only guide in considering the applications of South Korea and South Viet-Nam. Article 4, paragraph 1, said that membership was open to peace-loving States which accepted the obligations contained in the Charter. One such obligation, laid down in the Preamble to the Charter, was respect for the obligations arising from treaties. However, the Government of South Viet-Nam had refused to comply with the 1954 Geneva agreements. It could not qualify for membership in the United Nations unless it complied with its treaty obligations.

69. Another of the basic principles of the Charter, laid down in Article 2, paragraph 4, was that all Members should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. Several representatives, including the representative of Ceylon at the present meeting, had referred to statements by Syngman Rhee, the leader of South Korea, expressing his intention of unifying the country by military means. That was obviously not in accordance with the requirement that Members of the United Nations must be peace-loving States.

70. The USSR had made no proposal for a so-called "package deal". It merely wanted the Charter to be applied without political discrimination of the kind that had been exercised against the Mongolian People's Republic. The social and political structure of the Mongolian People's Republic was not to the liking of certain States, which had accordingly brought pressure to bear in order to keep it out of the United Nations. He noted that at the 790th meeting of the Security Council the United Kingdom had abstained from voting on the application of the Mongolian People's Republic, although it had voted in favour of it in 1955. In 1955 the United States had abstained from voting on the application, but in 1957 it had vetoed it.

71. Mr. CROSTHWAITE (United Kingdom) could not understand why, if the representative of the USSR regarded Viet-Nam as so little qualified for membership in the United Nations, he should suggest that it be admitted provided that North Viet-Nam came in at the same time.

72. In connexion with the USSR point that the United Kingdom had been in favour of the application of Outer Mongolia in 1955, he noted that it had been made clear by the United Kingdom at the time that it was stretching its benevolence to the limit in regard to Outer Mongolia as well as to another applicant from the Soviet bloc. Subsequent events, especially in Hungary, had fully justified his Government's doubts about the relationship between the Government of the Soviet Union and certain of the countries whose applications were under consideration at that time.

73. Mr. WASHINGTON (United States of America) said that the United States had indeed voted against the admission of Outer Mongolia both in 1956 and in 1957, but the United States had never used its veto in the Security Council. In accordance with the Vandenberg resolution approved by the United States Senate in 1948, it felt that the veto should not be used on membership questions.

74. In connexion with Korea, the country had been plunged into war in 1950 by the aggression of the communist régime in North Korea, which had systematically blocked all efforts for reunification both before and since that time.

75. Mr. CHANG (China) objected to the use of the term "Chiang Kai-shek clique". The Government which he represented was the only legal government of China.

76. The CHAIRMAN asked all representatives to observe the rules of courtesy in their interventions. He also reminded representatives that the right of reply laid down in the rules of procedure must not be used in order to reopen the general debate.

Order of discussion of agenda items (A/SPC/17)

(continued)

77. The CHAIRMAN stated that he had received a letter dated 14 October 1957 from the President of the General Assembly, (A/SPC/17) informing him that at its 705th plenary meeting the General Assembly had decided to place an additional item entitled "Question of the composition of the General Committee of the General Assembly" on the agenda of the twelfth session and to allocate it to the Special Political Committee for consideration. At a later stage, the Committee would have to decide when it would take up the item.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.