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Chairman: Mr. Charles T. O. KING (Liberia).

AGENDA ITEM 61

Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of "apartheid" of the Government of the Union of South Africa (A/4147 and Add.1, A/SPC/L.37) (concluded)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he would put the thirty-six Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.37) to the vote paragraph by paragraph, as had been decided at the previous meeting. A roll-call vote had been asked for on the second paragraph of the preamble, on operative paragraph 2 and on the draft resolution as a whole.

2. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first paragraph of the preamble.

The paragraph was adopted by 51 votes to 3, with 7 abstentions.

3. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the second paragraph of the preamble.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Brazil, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The paragraph was adopted by 67 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

4. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the third paragraph of the preamble.

The paragraph was adopted by 66 votes to 1, with 6 abstentions.

5. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the fourth paragraph of the preamble.

The paragraph was adopted by 66 votes to 3, with 6 abstentions.

6. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote operative paragraph 1.

The paragraph was adopted by 72 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

7. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote operative paragraph 2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Liberia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon.

Against: Portugal.

Abstaining: Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, France, Hungary.

The paragraph was adopted by 61 votes to 1, with 14 abstentions.

8. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote operative paragraph 3.

The paragraph was adopted by 63 votes to 3, with 9 abstentions.

9. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote operative paragraph 4.

The paragraph was adopted by 66 votes to 3, with 6 abstentions.

10. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution as a whole.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Italy, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel.

Against: Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France.

Abstaining: Netherlands, Spain, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Dominican Republic, Finland.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 67 votes to 3, with 7 abstentions.

11. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he had voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole but had abstained on operative paragraph 2 because in it the General Assembly addressed itself to all Member States. The Committee had been dealing only with the question of the policy of racial discrimination being applied in the Union of South Africa, and the paragraph might give the erroneous impression that all Member States were applying such policies. In the opinion of the USSR delegation, that paragraph was superfluous. Operative paragraph 3, on the other hand, properly reflected the opinion of the General Assembly.

AGENDA ITEM 27

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

- (a) Report of the Director of the Agency (A/4213);
- (b) Proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees: document submitted by the Secretary-General (A/4121)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. John H. Davis, Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, took a place at the Committee table.

12. The SECRETARY-GENERAL recalled that he had undertaken at the thirteenth session (.25th meeting) to make such proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to the Palestine refugees as he might consider helpful or necessary to put before the General Assembly. His proposals were contained in the document now before the Committee (A/4121).

13. As he indicated in the second paragraph of the introduction to his report, after a careful examination of the problem his recommendation was that the Agency should be continued pending what the General Assembly had called the "reintegration of the refugees into the

economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement".

14. Recalling the terms of his report, he said that he "strongly and unreservedly" recommended the continuation of UNRWA "for all the time and to all the extent necessary".

15. The Committee was now called upon to take a decision on that recommendation.

16. The members of the Committee would, of course, have noted the political, psychological and economic arguments upon which his recommendation was based. There would hardly be any great difference of opinion as to the validity of those arguments, but opinions would probably differ regarding their relative significance and the emphasis which should be given to the various aspects of the question. However, he was not asking the General Assembly to pass judgement on the reasons why UNRWA should be continued, but to reach a decision on its continuance for such reasons as each Government or delegation might consider decisive. In the circumstances, there was no reason for him to explain his own reactions to the various arguments brought forth in public discussions which had preceded the current debate, or even to try to correct the misunderstandings which, somewhat to his surprise, had been apparent in those discussions.

17. He wished to make it clear that when he recommended the "indefinite" continuance of UNRWA, it obviously meant that he was not, any more than anybody else, in a position to say for how long such assistance would actually be needed. He sincerely hoped that the time would be short.

18. In the proposals which he was placing before the Assembly, he indicated various possibilities for improvements in the present arrangements for UNRWA's work. Those suggestions were naturally on a different level from the recommendation for the continuance of UNRWA. They were indications of certain objectives which, if endorsed by the General Assembly, might guide the Director of UNRWA in his negotiations with the host Governments.

19. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his personal conviction that for political, humanitarian, psychological and economic reasons the General Assembly should decide on the continuance of United Nations assistance to the Palestine refugees, through UNRWA, for all the time and to all the extent necessary.

20. Mr. DAVIS (Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) thought that in view of the expiry of the Agency's mandate on 30 June 1960 it would be useful for him to single out certain aspects of the Agency's past activities. Although its funds had been limited, the Agency had nevertheless been able to provide a considerable amount of relief. It had been able to hold malnutrition among the refugees to a minimum, to provide improved shelter, avoid epidemics, and provide schooling for refugee children approximating to that prevailing in the host countries. Those combined services had been provided at an average cost of \$33 per person per year, which was evidence of the efficiency of UNRWA's performance. When the question of UNRWA's future was examined, those activities should, as in the past, receive most attention. In addition, the presence of the Agency and other United Nations bodies in the Middle East had contributed appreciably toward the

general stability of the area. The Agency had been able to maintain its services without interruption even during periods of tension.

21. On the other hand, the Agency had been unsuccessful in its second task: the rehabilitation of the refugees. The excess of births over deaths more than offset the number of persons rehabilitated and increased the total number of UNRWA's dependants. The reasons for the Agency's failure in that direction was that neither the refugees nor the host Governments had been able to accept that part of its mandate. They felt that a grave injustice had been perpetrated on the Arab world by the events which had culminated in rendering more than a million Palestinians homeless and destitute. The Arab spokesman had opposed all rehabilitation projects on the grounds that their implementation would constitute a surrender of the basic right—the choice between repatriation and compensation—recognized in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III). Although the Assembly had repeatedly stressed the fact that the implementation of the proposed rehabilitation projects would not prejudice that right, the opposition persisted and must be taken into account in any effort to solve the problem. In view of the Agency's lack of success in that field, its future role in that regard should be carefully appraised. Unless a satisfactory formula could be devised, there would seem to be little merit in continuing to assign the task of rehabilitating the refugees to UNRWA.

22. Again, the Agency had been unable to implement fully certain complementary programmes because in years when the over-all contributions had fallen short of its budget it had been able to meet only the most urgent needs. Thus the vocational training programme had had to be severely curtailed in 1957 and the funds available in 1958 had only been sufficient to permit 260 youths to complete their courses. The individual assistance programme to aid specially gifted refugees had been discontinued in 1957 for budgetary reasons; in 1959, however, it had been possible to allocate \$350,000 to it—enough to benefit about 1,000 persons. The Agency was now in a position to award about 100 university scholarships a year, and the beneficiaries, who were obtaining excellent results, would later play an important part in their respective fields. All those programmes, however, were very difficult to plan, for the Agency never knew until the end of the fiscal year how much money, if any, would be left after the most pressing needs had been met. The Agency intended to use for the expansion of vocational training any funds it received through the World Refugee Year campaign, and for that reason it hoped that that humanitarian endeavour would receive substantial support all over the world.

23. The estimated cost of UNRWA's operations in 1960 was \$38.9 million, including \$1.5 million for the expansion of vocational training and individual assistance. It might be asked whether such expenditure was justified; the answer would depend on the importance attached to the Agency's achievements and to the economic, social and political repercussions which would follow a withdrawal of international assistance of the type provided by UNRWA. Considered from that angle UNRWA's work was surely well worth what it cost. If its existence was not of itself sufficient to solve the refugee problem, it nevertheless helped to maintain a more favourable climate for its solution.

24. Under the circumstances it would be rash to predict how long it would take to reach a solution, and hence for how long UNRWA's services would be required. In any event it seemed certain that it would take a decade or longer. The fact must not be overlooked that at least 600,000 refugees, roughly two-thirds of the total, must cross a demarcation line or a national boundary, in one direction or another, to find chances of employment. Even there, suitable work did not exist but had to be created, and that would require both time and new investments. The Secretary-General had clearly set forth in document A/4121 the magnitude of the effort involved. In referring to that aspect of the problem he was assuming, like the Secretary-General, that the refugee would be able to choose for himself a place to live, on the basis of known alternatives; in other words he was assuming that paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), or provisions derived from it, would be implemented.

25. It might be asked whether certain of the functions of UNRWA might be eliminated, but the question was academic, since UNRWA could at present supply only the most essential services to refugees. The Agency could, however, entrust certain of its functions to the host Governments and pay them an annual subsidy for the work; the Secretary-General had already covered the subject fully in his report. The General Assembly would probably wish UNRWA to approach the subject by negotiation with the various countries concerned.

26. Certain operational problems made UNRWA's work more difficult than it need be. In order to operate effectively UNRWA would need a more dependable source of funds, particularly in the case of programmes of vocational training, scholarships and individual assistance. Those functions should occupy an appropriate place in the budget instead of being dependent on the variations in total receipts, which were consistently too small in any case. Another need was to rectify the ration rolls, particularly in Jordan where, according to the Agency's estimates, 150,000 ineligible persons were drawing rations. The situation naturally prevented UNRWA from placing certain legitimate claimants on the ration rolls, including 105,000 children born to refugee parents since 1951. Recent discussions, however, gave reason to believe that the rectification of the rolls would be accelerated in the future.

27. There was the further problem of about 317,000 persons, including frontier villagers, Bedouins and poor people in the Gaza zone, who were not registered with UNRWA or eligible for assistance but were often in a worse plight than the refugees assisted by UNRWA. According to interpretations given in the past, UNRWA's mandate did not extend to such persons. The host Government representatives on the Advisory Commission agreed with him that the question called for the earnest attention of the Committee.

28. As indicated in the annual report of the Director (A/4213, paras. 41–47, and annex H), the host Governments had not hitherto accorded the Agency the full privileges and immunities to which it was entitled as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations. There was, however, reason to believe that more rapid progress would be forthcoming in that respect.

29. In case his previous remarks gave the false impression that the host Governments had been generally unco-operative in working with UNRWA, he wished

to say that their co-operation had on the whole been good. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the host Governments had to bear heavier burdens on behalf of the refugees than was generally realized; they had provided land, water and police protection for the camps and were also contributing towards the education of refugee youth. In addition, they had to deal with the complex political and social problems arising from the presence of refugees within their borders. Other Governments and numerous voluntary organizations deserved most sincere gratitude for their assistance.

30. The relief given to refugees supplied only their most pressing needs and could not satisfy the aspirations of the adult mind or encourage creative talents. Hardship and disappointment were thus still the lot of the refugees, who had practically no possibility of

self-advancement. The most distressing situation was undoubtedly that of the 30,000 young people who reached maturity each year, for in the majority of cases there were no prospects for them.

31. For the reasons he had given, it was essential to extend UNRWA's mandate until such time as the forces which would shape the future of the Middle East made it possible to solve the problem of the Palestine refugees. It was to be hoped that the persons vested with the responsibility of directing those forces would exercise statesmanship by giving the refugees a sense that the wrong they had suffered had been redressed, and by putting to use the latent energies and talents of the refugees for the benefit of of themselves and of the whole Middle East.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.