



**OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

**TWENTY-NINTH SESSION**

# **SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE**

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**SUMMARY RECORDS OF MEETINGS**

**18 SEPTEMBER-6 DECEMBER 1974**

**UNITED NATIONS**



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## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The *Official Records of the General Assembly* for a given session consist of records of meetings, annexes to those records, supplements, the *List of Delegations* and the *Check List of Documents*. Information on other documents is given in the *Check List* and in the relevant annex fascicles.

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Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine
WHO	World Health Organization

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## AGENDA

[*Note.* The items are listed in the order in which they appeared in the letter dated 21 September 1974 (A/SPC/168) from the President of the General Assembly to the Chairman of the Special Political Committee. The number of the item on the agenda of the General Assembly is indicated in brackets.]

The General Assembly, at its 2236th plenary meeting, held on 21 September 1974, decided to allocate the following items on the agenda of the twenty-ninth session to the Special Political Committee for consideration and report:

1. Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa [37]:
  - (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
  - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
2. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [38]:
  - (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
  - (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
  - (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
  - (d) Report of the Secretary-General.
3. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations [39].
4. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories [40].
5. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [41].

The General Assembly, at its 2237th plenary meeting, also held on 21 September 1974, decided to consider item 110 (Question of Cyprus) directly in plenary meetings with the understanding that it would, when considering the item, invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to take the floor in the Committee in order to express their views, and that it would assume its consideration of the item taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY**  
**TWENTY-NINTH SESSION**

---

**SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE**

**Summary records of the 904th to 947th meetings,  
held at Headquarters, New York, from 18 September to 6 December 1974**

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**904th meeting**

Wednesday, 18 September 1974, at 4.10 p.m.

*Temporary Chairman:* Mr. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA (Algeria).

A/SPC/SR.904

*Election of the Chairman*

1. Mr. SZARKA (Hungary) nominated Mr. Per Lind (Sweden) as Chairman.
2. In the absence of further nominations and in accordance with rule 103 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the TEMPORARY ACTING CHAIRMAN declared Mr. Per Lind (Sweden) elected Chairman by acclamation.

*Mr. Per Lind (Sweden) was elected Chairman by acclamation.*

*The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.*

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**905th meeting**

Monday, 23 September 1974, at 3.30 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.905

*Statement by the Chairman*

1. The CHAIRMAN, after expressing his gratitude to the members of the Committee for having elected him to the post of Chairman, said that he considered his election both an honour for himself and a tribute to his country, Sweden, which during its long and active participation in the work of the United Nations was represented on the General Committee with its election—for the first time—to the chairmanship of one of the Main Committees. He also

thanked Mr. Szarka of Hungary for having nominated him for the post of Chairman. He would endeavour to justify the confidence placed in him and to meet the standard of fairness and impartiality set by his predecessors. He introduced Mr. Guyer and Mr. Urquhart, Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs, who would alternate as representatives of the Secretary-General in the Committee, and Mr. Hemdl, the Secretary of the Committee, and his staff. Finally, on behalf of the members of the Committee, he welcomed the representatives of the

three States recently admitted to the United Nations, namely Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau.

### *Election of the Vice-Chairmen*

2. The CHAIRMAN reminded members of the new provisions of rule 103 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly concerning the election of Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees and invited the members of the Committee to submit nominations.

3. Mr. JACHEK (Czechoslovakia) congratulated the Chairman on his election and expressed pleasure at the presence of the representative of Guinea-Bissau in the Committee. Speaking on behalf of the socialist States, he nominated Mr. Gueorgui Ghelev (Bulgaria) for the post of Vice-Chairman.

4. Mr. SINGH (Nepal), after warmly congratulating the Chairman on his election and welcoming the representatives of Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau, nominated Mr. José Luis Martínez (Venezuela) for the post of Vice-Chairman.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that, since only two nominations had been received for the two posts of Vice-Chairman, it would be unnecessary, under the provisions of rule 103 of the rules of procedure, to conduct a secret ballot.

*It was so decided.*

*Mr. Ghelev (Bulgaria) and Mr. Martínez (Venezuela) were elected Vice-Chairmen by acclamation.*

### *Election of the Rapporteur*

6. Mr. MIGLIUOLO (Italy) associated himself with the congratulations to the Chairman and, after welcoming the representatives of Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau, nominated Mr. Hassan Abduldjalil (Indonesia) for the post of Rapporteur.

7. The CHAIRMAN said that, since there were no other nominations, he would take it that the Committee wished to waive the requirement of a secret ballot.

*It was so decided.*

*Mr. Abduldjalil (Indonesia) was elected Rapporteur by acclamation.*

8. The CHAIRMAN congratulated Mr. Abduldjalil on his election and congratulated the members of the Committee on having elected him.

9. Mr. GHELEV (Bulgaria), after thanking the representative of Czechoslovakia for having nominated him and the members of the Committee for having elected him, said that he saw his election as a recognition of Bulgaria's contribution to the work of the United Nations in promoting peace and social development. He congratulated the Chairman on his election and warmly welcomed the representatives of Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau.

10. Mr. MARTINEZ (Venezuela) congratulated the Chairman on his election and expressed his thanks to the representative of Nepal for having nominated him and to the Committee for having elected him.

11. Mr. ABDULDJALIL (Indonesia) congratulated the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen on their election. Speaking on behalf of his delegation and on his own behalf, he expressed appreciation for the honour which had been done to Indonesia by his election as Rapporteur and said that he would endeavour to justify the confidence placed in him.

### *Organization of work*

12. The CHAIRMAN said that he wished first of all to appeal to the members of the Committee to try not to request additional documentation or duplicate copies of documents already distributed. He recalled that the General Assembly had for years been endeavouring to limit documentation and pointed out that the note submitted by the Secretary-General at the twenty-seventh session on publications and documentation of the United Nations<sup>1</sup> contained a summary of the approved policies. Secondly, he reminded the Committee that the normal hours were from 10.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. for morning meetings and from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. for afternoon meetings. He therefore urged all members of the Committee to be punctual and requested their co-operation in ensuring that meetings did not run late unless it was possible to give the Secretariat sufficient notice to enable it to arrange for the substitution of conference staff.

13. The officers of the Committee would be grateful if those representatives wishing to exercise their right of reply would so inform the Secretary of the Committee beforehand. Furthermore, once the list of speakers had been closed, the order of speakers could be changed only if two delegations wished to exchange places on the list; otherwise, if a representative was not prepared to speak at the time assigned to him, his name would be placed at the end of the list.

14. With regard to the summary records of the debates of the Committee, he reminded members that the procedure to be followed in submitting corrections was printed on the cover page of the records. At its 2236th plenary meeting the General Assembly had once again approved the recommendation of the General Committee (see A/9750) that the Special Political Committee should be authorized to request transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings, or portions thereof; he trusted that members of the Committee would not abuse that privilege and reminded them that, for budgetary reasons, that procedure should be used instead of requesting the reproduction of statements *in extenso*.

15. He announced that, in accordance with the recommendation contained in annex V of the rules of procedure, he intended to close the list of speakers on each item before one third of the meetings allocated to that item had been held. At the same time, he urged members of the Committee to submit draft resolutions as early as possible so that delegations could take them into account when making statements.

<sup>1</sup> A/INF/136/Rev.1.



16. He drew the Committee's attention to a letter from the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/SPC/167) requesting that the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania should be invited to participate as observers in the Committee's debates on agenda item 37, concerning the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. The Special Committee had also recommended that the General Assembly should make the necessary financial provision and had asked that that recommendation should be considered urgently so that the representatives of the two liberation movements could be present at the beginning of the debate on that item. Accordingly, he intended to hold a meeting in the near future to consider the question and had asked the Secretariat to prepare the document on the financial implications.

17. He further reminded the Committee that the list of items allocated to it, which were the same ones that the Committee had considered in previous years, was contained in the letter dated 21 September 1974 from the President of the General Assembly (A/SPC/168). However, at the current session, in connexion with item 110, concerning the question of Cyprus, the General Assembly had decided that during consideration of that item in plenary meeting the Assembly would invite the Special Political Committee to meet in order to give the representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to express their views before the Committee.

18. With regard to the order in which the items allocated to the Committee would be considered, he said that he would keep in touch with the various regional groups and would endeavour to ascertain their wishes. He would also

make suggestions based on the practice followed in previous years.

19. Mr. HERNDL (Secretary of the Committee) informed the Committee that the Special Committee on *Apartheid* was expected to adopt its report at the end of the current week; consequently, the Committee would probably have the documents relating to item 37 in all languages, by the following week. The report of the Secretary-General (A/9740) on item 38, concerning the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, was also available, and the remainder of the documentation relating to that item, including the report of the Commissioner-General, which was in preparation, was expected to be distributed during the second half of October. With regard to item 39, the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations was also in preparation, but for the moment he was unable to say precisely when it would be possible to distribute it.

20. Referring to item 40, concerning the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, and item 41, concerning the effects of atomic radiation, he said that both the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation were to meet from 14 to 18 October and their reports should therefore be available towards the end of October.

21. The CHAIRMAN said he hoped that the information on the documentation would facilitate consultations on the order in which items should be considered. He concluded by thanking the members of the Committee for the kind words they had addressed to him.

*The meeting rose at 4.20 p.m.*

## 906th meeting

Thursday, 26 September 1974, at 10.55 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.906

### AGENDA ITEM 37

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)** (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the letter dated 20 September 1974 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/SPC/167 and Corr.1). The consultations he had held with the representatives of the various regional groups and other interested delegations with a view to arriving at a generally acceptable

decision had appeared to indicate wide agreement that the Committee should, at the current early stage, take up the request by the Chairman of the Special Committee. He believed that the Committee might, without taking a vote, agree to the following statement:

"The Special Political Committee has been seized with a request from the Special Committee on *Apartheid* to invite the representatives of two liberation movements associated with the work of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, that is, the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, to participate in the Special Political Committee's debate on 'policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa' in the capacity of observers and recommends that the General Assembly make the necessary financial

provision to enable the representatives to do so. This request is contained in a letter dated 20 September 1974 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* to the Chairman of the Special Political Committee (A/SPC/167 and Corr.1).

"The Special Political Committee was further asked to consider this request urgently so that the representatives of the two liberation movements could be present at the beginning of the debate on the item in question.

"In this connexion, the Special Political Committee has received a statement submitted by the Secretary-General (A/SPC/L.299) in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly concerning the administrative and financial implications of the request contained in document A/SPC/167 and Corr.1.

"Taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the relevant precedents set in other Committees of the General Assembly in recent years, the Special Political Committee decides to recommend to the General Assembly that it accede to the request of the Special Political Committee on *Apartheid*, as contained in document A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, and to report to the General Assembly accordingly, as a matter of urgency."

2. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee, without taking a vote, agreed to the statement.

*It was so decided.*

3. Mr. RENS (Belgium) said that his delegation wished to explain its position on the implications of the decision taken by the Committee. The decision to give observer status to certain organizations might be interpreted as recognition of them by the Committee. Moreover, the participation of some movements in preference to others might seem to indicate their recognition as the exclusive representatives of the population of South Africa.

4. His delegation could not accept such an interpretation. Belgium could not recognize those movements as the exclusive spokesmen of the South African population. It viewed their representatives merely as individuals who were in a position to clarify the Committee's discussions and contribute to its work. In that spirit and with that reservation, his delegation had not opposed the decision to invite them to participate in the Committee's debates on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa.

5. Mr. HANSEN (Federal Republic of Germany) said that, as was well known, his Government strongly condemned both the policy of *apartheid* pursued by the Government of South Africa and racial discrimination. It therefore welcomed the idea of giving the non-white part of the South African population an opportunity to participate in the Committee's deliberations. However, his Government was of the opinion that the admission of representatives of the two organizations as observers did not imply recognition of them or affect the representation of South Africa in the United Nations.

6. Mr. DE LATAILLADE (France) said that his delegation wished to explain its position following the adoption by consensus of the recommendation put forward by the Chairman. France's total rejection of *apartheid* had been reaffirmed within the United Nations on numerous occasions. His delegation therefore considered that the presence of the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania could contribute very usefully to the discussion on the item in view of those individuals' knowledge of the situation in South Africa. However, his Government recognized the Government of South Africa, and his delegation's acceptance of the consensus should not be construed as meaning that the presence of the representatives of the liberation movements implied recognition of those movements. His delegation also felt that in embarking upon that course the Committee was establishing a potentially dangerous precedent.

7. Mr. DAUNT (United Kingdom) said that his delegation supported the decision taken by the Committee to invite the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania to participate in its deliberations. He wished, however, to make his Government's position clear. His Government recognized the Government of South Africa, and there could be no question of recognizing the two organizations as the representatives of South Africa.

8. Mr. VAN DER KLAUW (Netherlands) said that his delegation welcomed the decision taken by the Committee. It felt that the two organizations in question could make a useful contribution to the discussion on *apartheid*. However, his Government interpreted the term "liberation movements" as meaning movements against *apartheid*.

9. Mr. BARAKAT AHMAD (India) said that his delegation was gratified by the decision taken by the Committee and the spirit of co-operation shown by the preceding speakers. However, he wished to remove a misunderstanding which might have arisen from some of their remarks. The use of the word "exclusive" might create the impression that a minority of the population of South Africa had been excluded by the representation of the two movements in question. He did not believe that that was the case, since those movements represented the overwhelming majority of the population. He found the reference to "the non-white part of the population" very unfortunate; that segment constituted the greatest part of the population of South Africa.

10. His delegation wished to propose that the relevant publications on *apartheid* issued by the Unit on *Apartheid* and the specialized agencies, as well as by liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and anti-*apartheid* movements, should be made available in the conference room before the debate on the item began.

11. His delegation trusted that the Committee's decision would be conveyed to the liberation movements as early as possible so as to give their representatives sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements for their journey.

12. The CHAIRMAN said that he wished to assure the representatives of India that his remarks had been noted by the Secretariat.

13. Mr. SEIGNORET (Trinidad and Tobago) observed, in connexion with the statement by the Indian representative, that there were also whites in South Africa who opposed *apartheid*. He wished to stress that point in view of the statement by the Netherlands representative.

14. The CHAIRMAN said that the Rapporteur would submit a report<sup>1</sup> to the General Assembly on the decision taken by the Committee as soon as possible.

<sup>1</sup> Subsequently circulated as document A/9774.

### *Organization of work*

15. The CHAIRMAN said that he had prepared an informal tentative schedule of the order in which the items allocated to the Committee might be taken up.<sup>2</sup> The schedule also took into account the decision by the General Assembly in connexion with item 110, the question of Cyprus. He would welcome any suggestions which members of the Committee wished to make with regard to the organization of work.

*The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.*

<sup>2</sup> *Idem*, A/SPC/L.300.

## 907th meeting

Tuesday, 1 October 1974, at 5.25 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.907

### *Organization of work*

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the members of the Committee to document A/SPC/L.300, which set out the suggestions of the officers of the Committee concerning the order in which the items allocated to the Committee might be considered. He had the impression, after consulting with the members of the Committee, that the provisional time-table he had suggested would meet with general agreement. However, he had to point out that the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* would not be available until Monday, 7 October, and thus the Committee would not be able to begin its consideration of item 37 until then.

2. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey) said that he did not wish to refer to the order in which the various items were to be taken up but to the manner in which the Committee would consider item 110, the question of Cyprus, and he was therefore not sure whether he should speak at the current meeting.

3. The CHAIRMAN said that it was quite all right for the representative of Turkey to refer to the manner in which item 110 was to be considered.

4. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey) thought it his duty to point out that, in accordance with the decision taken by the General Assembly at its 2237th plenary meeting, the debate on the question of Cyprus might take several meetings. He therefore hoped that the words "as well as any meeting which the Committee will have to schedule in connexion with the General Assembly's decision on item 110", which appeared in the penultimate paragraph of document A/SPC/L.300, meant that the Committee would be able to devote more than one meeting to the item. The main purpose of the debate was to enable the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community to take part in the consideration of the question of Cyprus since, basically,

that question concerned an intercommunal dispute and it therefore seemed logical and fair that an equal opportunity should be given to both communities.

5. In his view, it was irrelevant whether the item was considered by the Special Political Committee or by the General Assembly in plenary meeting, provided that the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community could participate in the debate. It must be pointed out that the great majority of the Members of the Organization, including the non-aligned countries, had always favoured the participation of the representatives of the Cypriot peoples in any debate on the Cyprus question. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia had said in the General Assembly (2244th plenary meeting), it was of primary importance that the representatives of both national communities should take part in the search for a just and lasting solution. In fact, the General Assembly had recognized that point when it had taken the decision concerning item 110.

6. Consequently, it was important that the representatives of the two communities of Cyprus should make statements only in the meetings of the Special Political Committee on the item—for which the Chairman had suggested two weeks should be allocated—for otherwise, every time that the debates of the General Assembly in plenary called for the intervention of the Turkish Cypriot representatives, his delegation would request a meeting of the Special Political Committee and an appropriate report on it.

7. He hoped that account would be taken of his comments, in order that the Committee's work might be completed in an orderly manner and reflect the true political situation.

8. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would begin its work on Monday, 7 October, with item 37. Subse-



quently it would take up items 38, 41, 40 and 39. The order in which the items were taken up might then be changed if circumstances so required. Similarly, the necessary changes would have to be made whenever the General Assembly invited the Special Political Committee to meet in accordance with the decision it had taken at the 2237th plenary meeting concerning item 110.

9. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) said that traditionally the Committee had begun its work with item 37 and he believed everyone agreed that that procedure should be followed. As to the rest of the items, he suggested that the Committee should defer its decision until it took up items 38 and 40; it would thus be possible to avoid duplication of work, since the General Assembly had to consider the question of Palestine in plenary meetings and many members of the Committee would have to take part in that debate.

10. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) congratulated the Chairman on his election and observed that the General Assembly had decided to take up the question of Cyprus directly in plenary meetings and that during consideration of the item it would invite the Special Political Committee to meet in order to give the representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to state their views; it would then resume its consideration of the item taking into account the Committee's report. For the moment, however, it was not possible to foretell when the Assembly would ask the Committee to meet or what its instructions would be. He therefore thought that the comments of the representative of Turkey were inopportune, since it was not possible to discuss the substance of the item in the Special Political Committee.

11. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey), replying to the representative of Cyprus, said that in the view of the General Assembly the question of Cyprus was an intercommunal dispute and the Assembly had decided that the item could not be considered unless the view of the Turkish Cypriots, who were not represented in the United Nations, were known. Thus, since the representation of Cyprus in the United Nations represented only one of the two Cypriot communities, the Turkish Cypriot community must be given the opportunity to state its views. Apparently, the Special Political Committee would be the forum in which the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community would be heard and the General Assembly would not be able to take up the item until the Committee had reported to it.

12. The CHAIRMAN said he had thought that the proposed time-table would be approved by all the members of the Committee, but after hearing the representative of Lebanon, he thought it would be better for the Committee to begin its consideration of item 37 on Monday, 7 October, and that, if possible, the officers of the Committee should put forward at that meeting another tentative

time-table in which the comments of the representative of Lebanon would be duly taken into account, together with other factors such as the availability of documents.

13. Mr. VAN DER KLAUW (Netherlands) supported the Chairman's suggestion, but thought there was no reason for the officers of the Committee to rush to submit another time-table; they could do so at a later stage.

14. The CHAIRMAN said that the new time-table would not necessarily be submitted during the following week but during the period devoted to consideration of item 37, which was expected to take about 20 meetings.

15. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates) congratulated the officers of the Committee on their election and said he wished to stress the importance of the comments of the representatives of Lebanon on items 38 and 40. Neither of those items, and in particular item 38, should be taken up by the Committee until the General Assembly had completed its consideration of them in plenary meeting.

16. Mr. KI (Upper Volta) congratulated the officers of the Committee on their election and said he was concerned about two aspects of the consideration of item 37. First, the Committee had decided to hear the representatives of two South African liberation movements; he would like to know the date on which those representatives would be able to attend; in his view, it should be at the beginning of the debate on the item. Secondly, he wondered whether there would be sufficient time to study the relevant documents before the following meeting.

17. The CHAIRMAN said that, with respect to the first question of the representative of the Upper Volta, the General Assembly would consider in plenary meeting on the following day the invitation to the representatives of the two liberation movements and that until then no plans could be made.

18. As to the time available for study of the documents relating to item 37, he explained that the afternoon meeting on Monday, 7 October, would be devoted solely to the introductory statement by the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and, possibly, to the introduction of the relevant report by the Rapporteur.

19. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to begin its programme of work with item 37 and to postpone any decision about its consideration of the other items until the Chairman submitted his new proposal on the time-table.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.*

## 908th meeting

Monday, 7 October 1974, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.908

### AGENDA ITEM 37

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)\* (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at its 906th meeting the Committee had decided to recommend that the General Assembly should accede to the request of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* that the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania should be invited to participate as observers in the Committee's debate on the item. It had also recommended that the General Assembly make the necessary financial provision to enable them to do so. The Rapporteur had submitted a report (A/9774) to the General Assembly, which had approved it at its 2254th plenary meeting. In that connexion, he drew the Committee's attention to the text of a letter addressed to him as Chairman of the Special Political Committee by the representative of South Africa (A/SPC/169).

2. Mr. MBOUMOUA (Secretary-General, Organization of African Unity), speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, paid a tribute to the Chairman, whose country, together with the other countries of Scandinavia, played a leading role in rendering assistance to oppressed and exploited peoples.

3. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) retained its confidence in the United Nations despite the latter's internal contradictions, its lack of enforcement power and the influence of the Powers that applied the maxim "He who pays the piper calls the tune". The United Nations was the best forum from which international opinion and the conscience of the world could be alerted when the natural and inalienable rights of man were threatened. It was because of that faith in the moral strength of the United Nations that OAU had made its Charter complementary to the Charter of the United Nations and had signed an agreement on co-operation with the United Nations. It wanted that co-operation to be positive, and it had therefore decided to co-ordinate its action with that of the United Nations, especially with regard to the struggle for the elimination of *apartheid*.

4. OAU was convinced that any attitude that amounted to a violation of the principles and resolutions of the United Nations could only harm the Organization's essential moral

authority. It could not understand how those who shared OAU's conviction as to the usefulness of the United Nations could tolerate South Africa's arrogant attitude. When the African countries contested the right of South Africa to take part in the Organization's activities, they did so to safeguard the moral authority of the United Nations system. Membership in any organization entailed the obligation to respect its principles. When a member violated the rules, there was no alternative but to expel him, unless the organization wished to bring about its own downfall. The countries of Africa deplored the inconsistency of those States that did not wish to face up to their responsibilities in the matter and were thus sapping the moral strength of the United Nations. The recent decision (see General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX)) to call upon the Security Council to take up the problem of South Africa's credentials was a step towards creating an awareness in the international community of the defiance by one of the States Members of the United Nations of the universally accepted principles embodied in the Charter.

5. OAU denounced the attitude of complaisance and complicity. The aggressiveness and arrogance of the Pretoria régime could not exist without the complicity it enjoyed. The co-operation with South Africa by a majority of the Western Powers as an inexhaustible source of moral support to that country. The unconditional support which it received from the United States of America and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) proved that those countries were not really opposed to the policy of *apartheid*. Declarations of intent were useless if accompanied by support of the régime. Nor could the countries concerned save their conscience by invoking certain legal principles. For what was the value of a legal principle when the goals which it should protect were denied. African countries and the international community as a whole knew that the true motive of the countries in question was to protect their short-term economic interests. Countries like the United States argued that they had a democratic government and a liberal economic system in which companies had freedom of action. Did that mean that American democracy had changed since the imposition of the economic blockade against Cuba? Why could the action taken against Cuba not be taken now against South Africa? The solution to the problem of *apartheid* in South Africa rested with the Western Powers; the problem would never be solved, except by the victory of the freedom fighters, unless the Western Powers took positive action against South Africa. Until then there would be no peace or security in southern Africa.

6. To regard the problem of *apartheid* as a simple problem of human rights was, in the view of the African States, an incorrect or at least an incomplete approach. It was a problem of national liberation. History had already shown that the problems of liberation were solved by the victory

\* Resumed from the 906th meeting.

of the freedom fighters. OAU would continue to denounce the Machiavellian attitude of the Western Powers and would intensify its assistance to the liberation movements, whose armed struggle was the only alternative method of making the Pretoria racists and their accomplices listen to reason. The lesson of history was that justice and liberty would triumph.

7. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) said that a majority of delegations would agree with the Secretary-General of OAU when he said that the effort to challenge the credentials of the South African delegation was designed to safeguard the moral authority of the United Nations and that right, justice and liberty would triumph in the end.

8. Speaking as Rapporteur of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, he said that the advent of three new independent States—Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau—gave the international community reason to hope for a more concerted campaign against colonialism and *apartheid*. There was hardly a single resolution among those adopted by the General Assembly since the 1950s that did not allude to the policy of *apartheid*. That in itself testified to the concern with which the international community viewed that anachronism. Like the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* in 1973, he had been tempted to submit only a two-page report enumerating the long list of United Nations resolutions on *apartheid* and stating simply that most of them remained unimplemented. That was the truth of the situation, for South Africa continued to defy United Nations resolutions and still had allies that enabled it to do so. Nevertheless, there had been important developments in 1974 and a measure of progress in the international campaign against *apartheid*.

9. In resolution 3151 D (XXVIII), the General Assembly had requested the Special Committee on *Apartheid* to submit five special reports in addition to its annual report. Thus, the Special Committee had not been able to reduce its documentation. It hoped that the reports circulated so far (see A/9622, A/9780, A/9781) would assist the Special Political Committee in formulating a more positive plan of action to combat *apartheid* and that the day would soon come when it would finally dispose of the item and the Special Committee on *Apartheid* would no longer exist. Three of the special reports were still under consideration but would soon be available. He would introduce the reports when the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had approved them; he apologized for the unavoidable delay.

10. The annual report (A/9622) outlined the activities of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and the international community in implementing the programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. As of 4 October, 19 countries had become signatories to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, and Dahomey was, before the day was over, to become the twentieth signatory; three countries had ratified the Convention. During 1974, a number of countries had, in compliance with United Nations resolutions, taken concrete steps to discourage and/or prevent collaboration with South Africa. However, some countries still ignored the appeal of the Special Committee and maintained relations with South Africa.

11. During the year, the Special Committee had held a special session at Dublin, Rome, East Berlin and Geneva. It had been granted an audience by the Pope, who had reaffirmed the stand of the Church against racism and racial discrimination. The Special Committee had also held consultations with high government officials in Vienna and Budapest. It had met with the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, the Chief of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, now President, of Austria, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Italy, and a host of other public and private officials. It had also consulted with representatives of non-governmental organizations, liberation movements and anti-*apartheid* movements and with individual experts, thereby promoting public awareness of the problem of *apartheid*.

12. The Special Committee, through its Chairman or Vice-Chairmen, had continued to meet with high-level officials of Governments in order to impress upon them the need for the total isolation of the South African régime and full implementation of United Nations resolutions. The consultations had been most useful.

13. In annex I to its annual report, the Special Committee presented a comprehensive review of developments in South Africa during the preceding year. The results of the white elections, in which Vorster's Nationalist Party had gained a clear margin, indicated the determination of the white minority to pursue the policy of *apartheid* in spite of growing international opposition and the yearly appeal to South Africa by the United Nations to abandon its policies. That section of the report also focused on the enforcement of *apartheid*, and the implementation of the Bantustan policies, under which thousands of Africans had been removed and thousands of others arrested and prosecuted. It pointed out that a total of R702 million, or \$912.6 million, had been allocated for defense for 1974-1975, representing an increase of R229,078,000 over the previous year, and it expressed concern over reports of military collaboration between certain countries and South Africa.

14. The Special Committee was glad to state that, in spite of measures taken by the minority régime in South Africa to suppress opposition to *apartheid*, the resistance to it had intensified. Black African workers had continued to call for strikes for better wages and working conditions. In that connexion, the *Rand Daily Mail* of 10 September had reported a statement by the Minister of Labour that there had been 246 strikes involving African workers the previous year and 54 in the first six months of the current year. The Minister had stated that over the 18-month period the strikes in question had involved 75,000 workers and a loss in working time of over 3,900 hours. The student movements and many black organizations had persistently and courageously gone on strike in defiance of the régime, despite severe penalties for doing so.

15. The annual report also contained a number of conclusions and recommendations which the Special Committee considered important for the future activities of the United Nations in combating *apartheid* and racism. The Special Committee concluded that developments during the preceding year had led to the further isolation of the South African régime and signalled a new stage in the struggle of



the South African people and the efforts of the international community to eradicate *apartheid*. That conclusion had recently been reinforced by Bishop Lamont, a white Rhodesian churchman, who had denounced the white minority Government of Rhodesia before the Roman Catholic Synod of Bishops.

16. The Special Committee took cognizance of the heroic struggle of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination, the fall of the Fascist régime in Portugal and the emergence of a new Government which had embarked on a course of democratic transformations and had accepted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It could not but hail the new voice of Portugal in the United Nations and hoped that South Africa would begin at long last to see the writing on the wall. The Special Committee considered that the liberation of the Territories under Portuguese domination and the recognition by Portugal of the independence of those Territories had created a new situation in southern Africa that called for an intensive strategy and a programme of action designed to secure the total eradication of *apartheid* and to end the threat to peace in South Africa and southern Africa as a whole.

17. The leaders of the South African régime had repeatedly stated their belief that in order for them to prepare for peace, they must first prepare for war. In its annual report, the Special Committee recommended that the General Assembly and the Security Council should launch an urgent appeal to Governments and world public opinion for an immediate end to any form of military collaboration with South Africa. It called for special international campaigns to be launched in 1975, under United Nations auspices, for the intensification of the arms embargo against South Africa, the cessation of collaboration by banks and multinational companies with the South African régime, the cessation of emigration to South Africa, and the release of political prisoners in South Africa.

18. The Committee recommended that provision should be made for the continuation and intensification of consultations with Governments and with specialized agencies and other intergovernmental bodies and that it should maintain liaison with the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference of Trade Unions with a view to promoting maximum participation by the trade unions at the national and international levels in action against *apartheid*.

19. In its efforts to implement United Nations resolutions against *apartheid*, the Special Committee had undertaken, in accordance with a mandate from the General Assembly, high-level consultations with Governments, including some which continued to maintain relations with South Africa. It had also visited a number of countries to publicize United Nations efforts against *apartheid*. It considered those consultations to be a step in the right direction and would recommend their continuation. As requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 3151 D (XXVIII), the Special Committee had increased its co-operation with the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the other United Nations bodies concerned with southern Africa, OAU, trade union organizations, anti-*apartheid* movements and other non-governmental organizations. In its report, the Special

Committee assessed the extent of that co-operation and the role played by those organizations, during the year, in the concerted approach to the struggle against *apartheid*.

20. The Special Committee considered it would be desirable to organize a seminar in 1975 in a Western European capital to discuss the current situation in South Africa and the means of promoting public action against *apartheid*. Such a seminar would supplement the work carried out during the special session of the Special Committee in Europe and would pay close attention to analysing the role of South Africa in the whole of southern Africa and the economic interests and other forces which aided and abetted the South African régime in the pursuit of its policies.

21. The Special Committee also recommended that its name should be changed to United Nations Special Committee against *Apartheid*, since it considered that the change of the preposition "on" to "against" would more accurately reflect the work of the Special Committee and would remove any ambiguities. The Special Committee further recommended that its membership should be increased to include as many regional groups and Governments as possible.

22. The missions by delegations of the Special Committee to various Western and Eastern European countries and to New Zealand and Japan, and the special session in Europe, had proved useful in publicizing United Nations efforts to promote international action against *apartheid*. The Special Committee considered it essential that the United Nations should expand its efforts in the dissemination of information on *apartheid*, including the production of more films and audio-visual material and wider distribution of publications, in order to reach wider segments of the public in all countries.

23. In accordance with resolution 3151 (XXVIII), the Special Committee had prepared a special report entitled "Violations of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council by the South African régime" (A/9780). The report indicated that since the establishment of the United Nations successive South African Governments had repeatedly and flagrantly violated the provisions of the Charter, particularly those concerning human rights and non-discrimination. The régime had illegally occupied Namibia, in violation of numerous resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, and had tried to undermine the mandatory sanctions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter against the illegal Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia. It was ironic that an eminent South African, Field Marshal Smuts, then head of the South African delegation to the San Francisco Conference, had participated in writing the human rights provisions into the Charter and that the very principles Smuts had tried to promote had subsequently been defiled by the South African *apartheid* régime, headed by a man who had spent years in detention for pro-Nazi sentiments which he had never repudiated. The report also showed that South Africa had ignored or openly defied numerous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid* and for a peaceful solution based on the full application of human

rights and fundamental freedoms to the inhabitants of the country as a whole. Instead, the white minority régime had continued to imprison men and women of all races for upholding the very principles upon which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was based.

24. Another special report, entitled "Arbitrary laws and regulations enacted and applied by the South African régime to repress the legitimate struggle for freedom" (A/9781), summarized briefly some of the most notorious laws, such as the Suppression of Communism Act, the Terrorism Act, and the like. The severe penalties prescribed under those laws had been used by the South African régime to suppress the legitimate struggle of black Africans against *apartheid*. Thus, the white minority régime must bear full responsibility for the deteriorating situation in South Africa, which constituted a serious threat to peace and order within the country and to international peace and security.

25. He was gratified that his own delegation, which had occupied the Chair of the Credentials Committee, had played an important and decisive role in the vote to reject the credentials of the South African delegation and that subsequently, at the 2248th plenary meeting, the General Assembly had overwhelmingly rejected the credentials of the white minority Government of South Africa. By so doing, it had upheld its previous decision contained in General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII), in which it had declared that the South African régime had no right to represent the people of South Africa and that the liberation movements recognized by OAU were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people. Representatives of those movements were present in the Committee as observers. He looked forward to the day when they would sit as delegates. It was significant that the General Assembly, in resolution 3207 (XXIX), had called on the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa in the light of the constant violation by South Africa of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

26. The Special Committee hoped that the Special Political Committee would recommend further measures other than warnings and demands to bring an end to the policy of *apartheid* pursued by the white minority régime in South Africa.

27. In conclusion, he paid a tribute to the Chairman for his exemplary leadership, patience and understanding. He thanked the Vice-Chairmen and members of the Special Committee, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Implementation and of the Sub-Committee on Information and Petitions, the Chief of the Africa Section, and the members of the Secretariat who had served the Committee for the co-operation they had extended to him as Rapporteur of the Special Committee. He also wished to express his appreciation to the Governments and people of Ireland, Italy, the German Democratic Republic, Austria and Japan, as well as the Holy See, for their warm hospitality and co-operation. He also thanked the Director-General and the Deputy Director-General of the ILO, the Directors of the United Nations Information Centres in Rome and Tokyo,

and their staffs, and the Office of Public Information for their assistance and co-operation.

28. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria), speaking as Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, said he believed that the time was ripe for a solution to be found to the problem of *apartheid* in South Africa if the United Nations and its Member States were able to rise to the occasion. Despite the cruel repression by the racist régime in South Africa, the black population had not reconciled itself to servitude, exploitation and dispossession, and there was evidence of new thinking even among some whites who saw the inevitability of change. Moreover, there was an increased awareness all over the world of the inhumanity of *apartheid* and a growing commitment on the part of Governments and organizations to assist the struggle for liberation in South Africa.

29. The Special Committee had been greatly encouraged by the recognition on the part of many Governments and organizations, and above all by the liberation movements, that in discharging its mandate it had made no small contribution to the promotion of the movement against *apartheid* over the preceding decade. One of its first acts had been to seek the co-operation of the South African régime. Those who fought against *apartheid* were not motivated by hatred for the white people who had settled in South Africa over the centuries, even though they had callously enjoyed material comforts earned by the blood, sweat and tears of the African people. Opponents of *apartheid* abhorred the race classification imposed by the South African régime and looked forward to a society based on human dignity, irrespective of race, colour or creed. The liberation movements of South Africa had reiterated on a number of occasions that South Africa belonged to all the people of that country, including the whites, so long as they did not claim the right to oppress and humiliate the black people. In that connexion, it was interesting to note that the Prime Minister of Mozambique, who until recently had been leading an armed struggle for the liberation of his people, had invited the whites who had fled that country to return to their homes. The welcome developments in the former Portuguese colonies had clearly shown that a peaceful solution to the situation in South Africa could be achieved by declaring an amnesty for political prisoners, extending freedom of expression to oppressed people and negotiating with the liberation movements on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

30. In 1964, a Group of Experts led by Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden and Lord Caradon of the United Kingdom had suggested such a course,<sup>1</sup> which had later been endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 191 (1964), and in 1969, in Lusaka, the African States had called for a peaceful solution in the Manifesto on Southern Africa.<sup>2</sup> However, the South African régime had spurned every move towards a peaceful settlement and had proceeded to terrorize the African population and impose Bantustans in

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964*, document S/5658, annex.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.



order to divide and dispossess them. The Vorster régime had been ruthless and vengeful in its treatment of the hundreds of political prisoners held in South Africa for a decade or more, cut off from the outside world and denied remission and parole, and, in resolution 3055 (XXVIII), the General Assembly had expressed its strong conviction that there could be no peaceful solution in South Africa without the release of those prisoners.

31. The South African régime had not heeded the lesson of Portugal. When the leaders of the new Portugal and the African liberation movements had been engaged in ending the colonial conflict, with the goodwill of the whole world, the white rulers in Pretoria had begun to rush their troops to the border. They had increased their military budget by over 40 per cent, hoping to get more arms from the black market or from some countries which seemed to place profit above their concern for human life in Africa.

32. Very recently, on 25 September, the South African police and their dogs had attacked peaceful rallies held in observance of FRELIMO Day at the University of the North at Turfloop and in Durban. They had raided the homes of many black trade union, student and other leaders all over the country and had even searched hospitals and arrested people who were receiving treatment for injuries inflicted by the police dogs.

33. The United Nations had a duty to take urgent and effective action to prevent the racist régime in South Africa from precipitating a disaster, and it must help all the people of South Africa to find a solution to the grave situation. The destiny of South Africa could not be left to the racists. The recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee were directed towards concerted action by all Governments, all organizations and all peoples in support of the struggle for freedom in South Africa.

34. He noted that the General Assembly had already taken two significant steps at its current session, first of all by rejecting the credentials of the delegation of the Pretoria régime and calling upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa, and secondly by inviting the representatives of the South African liberation movements to participate in the debate on *apartheid* in the Special Political Committee. The two decisions were complementary to each other and were a logical sequel to General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII). He wished to welcome the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, who had won recognition by the international community as the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people after a long and heroic struggle for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

35. He was, of course, aware of the doubts and reservations of some delegations with regard to the recent action taken by the United Nations. However, who could deny that the régime in Pretoria was unrepresentative of the people of South Africa? It could, at best, claim to speak for the white voters of South Africa, who had themselves been subjected to manipulation and pressures to enable the régime to stay in power.

36. Some people had mistakenly argued that the representatives of the Pretoria régime should be accommodated in the United Nations because of the principle of universality. However, universality could be achieved only by the elimination of colonialism and racism in southern Africa so that the millions of people under colonialist and racist domination could occupy their rightful place in the United Nations. The recent decisions of the General Assembly were the first steps towards ensuring the representation of all the people of South Africa, irrespective of race, colour or creed, thus contributing to the true universality of the United Nations.

37. During the preceding year, the Special Committee had concentrated on consultations with Governments, specialized agencies of the United Nations, anti-*apartheid* movements, trade unions and other non-governmental organizations in its efforts to promote concerted action against *apartheid*. It had emphasized that *apartheid* was not merely a local problem of the people of South Africa or of the African continent but a matter of direct concern to the United Nations and to the Governments and peoples of the world.

38. The special session held in Dublin, Rome, Berlin and Geneva had provided the Special Committee with an opportunity to hold extensive consultations with Governments and public organizations. He wished to express the Special Committee's appreciation to the Governments of Ireland, Italy and the German Democratic Republic, as well as to the many participants in the special session, for their co-operation and assistance.

39. In his capacity as Chairman of the Special Committee, he had led a series of missions for consultations with the Governments of Austria, France, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom and had found the consultations and exchanges of views most useful.

40. The Special Committee had visited a number of countries which were the main trading partners of South Africa to discuss with them the possibility of concerted action. It had visited some countries which had already taken action against *apartheid* in order to convey its appreciation to them and benefit from their advice. It had thus initiated discussions which it hoped would lead to a wider consensus and more effective international action. He believed that those efforts must be continued.

41. The Special Committee was concerned by evidence of continued and increasing collaboration with the South African régime by some States. The United Nations needed to do more to develop a world conscience and an alert public opinion to secure the full implementation of its resolutions. He had been surprised when the United Kingdom, despite a statement that it had undertaken a thorough review of its policy towards South Africa and the fact that it was committed to an arms embargo, had agreed to participate in joint exercises with the South African navy and air force. As indicated in paragraph 240 of its report (A/9622) the Special Committee had felt it essential to call for the abrogation of the Simonstown Agreement, which had become the justification for such exercises and other military contacts. The Committee was also disappointed

and distressed that the Government of France was continuing to supply sophisticated military equipment to South Africa on the grounds that it was for defensive purposes. What was defensive to the racists was offensive to the Committee and should be offensive to the world's conscience. South Africa regarded the link with France as a kind of alliance with a great Power and evidence of the impotence of the United Nations. The arms purchases encouraged the régime to threaten independent African States and the United Nations instead of seeking a peaceful and just solution. A French warship had also held joint naval exercises with South African warships. He appealed to France to reconsider its policy. The people of Africa had great respect for France and could not understand why that country found it necessary to supply arms to the South African racists, who were the enemies not only of the African people but also of freedom and human dignity. The Committee had been distressed to learn that the Chief of the General Staff of the South African defence force had visited Washington and held consultations at a very high level. It was also concerned about reports that NATO was studying secret contingency plans relating to South Africa and about information that some countries were using South African military facilities.

42. It was extraordinary that some countries justified military collaboration with the South African régime on the grounds that they were concerned with the defence of the Cape sea route, especially because of the passage of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe. Yet, the oil-producing States of the Persian Gulf and the Governments of Western Europe both maintained that they were against *apartheid*. The arms embargo against the South African régime and the ending of any form of military co-operation with it was the first and minimum step in action against *apartheid*. If countries wanted to avert a gruesome conflict in southern Africa, they must stop arming the racists.

43. The Special Committee had the right to expect co-operation from the permanent members of the Security Council in dealing with the problem of *apartheid* because it concerned the maintenance of peace and security. Yet, the South African régime continued to count confidently on some members to prevent effective action by the Council. He was sure that the right of veto had not been conceived of or accepted as an instrument to end the struggle against racism and to give comfort to a régime which had oppressed the great majority of the people of its country in defiance of the Charter and Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX), requesting the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa, provided a test and opportunity for the permanent members of the Council, especially those who had abstained in the vote in the General Assembly. He hoped that they would act with courage and integrity in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter.

44. The Special Committee on *Apartheid* had drawn special attention to the actions of some countries which had strengthened their relations with the South African régime in the preceding year. Despite the condemnation of its policies contained in resolution 3151 G (XXVIII), Israel

had strengthened its diplomatic, military, cultural and other links with the South African régime. It was ironic that, although Africans had given their lives in the war against the Nazi racists who had killed millions of Jews and African leaders had tried to promote a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, an alliance was emerging between Israel and the Nazis of South Africa. The Special Committee was also distressed by the growing relations between Iran and South Africa, and he hoped that Iran would heed its appeal to halt that collaboration. The Special Committee had also been concerned by reports on the links that South Africa had been able to forge with a number of Latin American countries. In reply to an expression of concern over reports that Brazil intended to exchange ambassadors with South Africa, Brazil had stated that all its legations had been discontinued or upgraded to embassies and that its action therefore had no political significance. He underscored the point that the South African régime was exploiting every means of breaking out of its isolation. He had trust in the Latin American countries and was confident that they were sincerely opposed to *apartheid* and racism. The United Nations must make a greater effort to inform the people of Latin America about *apartheid* in South Africa and about United Nations resolutions so that they would not be enticed by the manoeuvres of the South African régime. He hoped that the Special Committee would be able to send a mission to Latin America in the near future.

45. He had expressed the Special Committee's distress at certain developments in order to make an appeal to the States concerned to take appropriate action in the spirit of international solidarity. Criticism or condemnation was the province of the oppressed peoples of South Africa and of the peoples of the States concerned. However, the record was not entirely distressing. The Special Committee had been most heartened by the actions of many Governments which had implemented United Nations resolutions at some cost to themselves. It had been deeply moved to meet any people who had dedicated their lives and given their time and energy to the sacred cause of the liberation of the oppressed people of South Africa. He expressed his appreciation to the All India Lawn Tennis Federation, which had refused to play South Africa in the final round of the Davis Cup tennis competition, declaring that the principle of opposing *apartheid* was more important than a tennis championship. India's attitude was all the more commendable because it had never advertised its action as a sacrifice, even when it had had to forgo 5 per cent of its foreign trade under difficult economic conditions. Many other countries and organizations had resisted enticements to collaborate with the South African racists.

46. Collaboration with the South African régime continued because some Governments had taken the easy course of succumbing to pressures to continue trade and other relations with South Africa. He was confident that when people knew the truth about the situation in South Africa they would support the efforts of the United Nations and not let their nations profit from the oppression of the African people of South Africa. His faith in the people, even in the West, had been reinforced by the development of public opinion in some countries where *apartheid* had become a national issue as a result of dedicated efforts by youth, trade unions and churches. An appeal should be made to all Governments to co-operate

with the United Nations in informing their peoples about the inhumanity of *apartheid*, the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and the concern and commitment of the United Nations. He commended the very valuable work done by the Unit on *Apartheid* to disseminate information but pointed out that the resources devoted to that effort were very meagre, while the South African régime and its friends devoted millions of dollars to confusing world opinion. He hoped that Member States would consider making generous voluntary contributions to reinforce the efforts of the Unit on *Apartheid* and to support liberation and anti-*apartheid* movements in their information activities.

47. He hoped that his remarks would be taken in the friendly and constructive spirit in which they had been made. The problem of *apartheid* deserved the most serious consideration by the United Nations at the current crucial stage. He looked forward to thorough consultations by Member States belonging to all the regional groups with a view to arriving at proposals which would command unanimous support and could be effectively implemented.

48. Mr. LINDENBERG SETTE (Brazil) said he wished to clear up a false impression that might have been given by the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622). The report stated that by 27 September no reply had been received to a letter sent to the Brazilian Mission. The reply had in fact been sent on 11 July;<sup>3</sup> he had every reason to believe that it had been properly received by the Committee. He had that day delivered to the Chairman of the Special Committee a second letter to which he had annexed a copy of the first letter, from which the Chairman of the Special Committee had quoted in his statement. He hoped that when the Chairman of the Special Committee read the second letter he would see that his trust in the countries of Latin America, and in Brazil in particular, was not misplaced.

49. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) paid a tribute to the Chairman and to Sweden as well as to all Members of the United Nations whose vote had permitted the participation of the liberation movements in the Committee's deliberations. The rejection of the credentials of the representatives of the Pretoria régime by the Credentials Committee and the General Assembly and the invitation to the liberation movements to participate was a great leap forward in response to his delegation's

request of the previous year to expel the South African minority régime and leave South Africa's seat vacant until a non-racist government of all the people was able to contribute all its resources and talents to the development of mankind. There was, however, much room for improvement; he hoped that those Members which upheld justice would continue to strive to win all possible support for the liberation movements in their valiant efforts. He was aware that some countries were as fully dedicated to the continued subjugation of his people as he was to his people's struggle for freedom. Those countries were responsible for the ridicule directed against the United Nations throughout the world for its inability to take decisive and positive action when the provisions of its fundamental instruments were being violated. The United Nations was not a toothless bulldog; the forces of imperialism could summon all their resources when necessary, as, for example, in maintaining the division of Korea under the United Nations flag and in the United Nations efforts that had led to the death of Patrice Lumumba. It was foolhardy for those countries to believe that they could continue to impose their will upon the third world. There were many lessons to be learned from the great October war in which Arab and African efforts had been mobilized to repulse Zionist aggression. The final showdown was approaching when the Africans would be able to call upon all their resources. Despite the measures being taken by the South African régime, Africa was committed to the struggle of the South African people.

50. It would be unwise for the members of the Security Council to block just action against the white minority régime; they must reconcile themselves to the inevitability of his people's liberation. He poured scorn upon the spectacle of the minority régime bringing in political pygmies to confuse world opinion with a pseudo-multiracial delegation. That those pygmies had agreed to play the role they were playing was a clear indication of their political insignificance. While he agreed with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia who had stated in the General Assembly (2241st plenary meeting) that they were victims of circumstances, he pointed out that they were willing victims. He quoted from a Swedish newspaper interview with a South African patriot who had been thrown in prison for his part in the Sharpeville uprising and who had said that concessions were not enough and that only total overthrow would do. It was the duty of the international community to intensify its support for the struggle for South African liberation.

<sup>3</sup> Corrigendum to the report subsequently circulated as document A/9622/Corr.1.

*The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.*



## 909th meeting

Tuesday, 8 October 1974, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.909

### AGENDA ITEM 37

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/9580, A/9586-S/1123<sup>1</sup>, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. DA COSTA (Portugal) said that he wished first of all to pay a tribute to Sweden which held the chairmanship of the Committee at the current session; he had had occasion more than once during his period of exile to learn at first hand of the extent of Sweden's support for those who were struggling for Portuguese freedom.

2. Within five months after the liberation of Portugal, decisive and irrevocable steps had been taken to give independence to the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola, thus putting an end to the circumstances that associated Portugal in people's minds with South Africa and Rhodesia. Throughout his country's history, overseas expansion had assumed the form of colonialism. Nevertheless, the way in which the colonial wars in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique had been brought to an end showed the true sentiments of the Portuguese people. It was those sentiments that had inspired the Algiers<sup>1</sup> and Lusaka<sup>2</sup> agreements which reflected a desire for broad co-operation and the establishment of fraternal relations between the young independent nations and the former colonial Power.

3. The disastrous policies of the Fascist colonialist régime overthrown on 25 April 1974 had quite properly caused Portugal to be condemned for racial discrimination. His Government therefore welcomed the opportunity to express in the clearest possible terms its utter condemnation of the practice, policy and principle of *apartheid*. From the very outset, the movement of 25 April had laid the foundation for a democratic Portugal and had tackled the job of decolonization. It had already been demonstrated that the institutions then established were solid. A recent effort by reactionary forces to destroy what had already

been achieved had failed completely; the programmes of the armed forces movement would be faithfully carried out.

4. *Apartheid* was not only a crime; it was also a particularly insidious form of colonialism and one that, since it grew from within, was particularly difficult to stamp out. It was a political problem that could be resolved only by specific concerted action on the part of the entire international community. Such action would be a decisive move towards the establishment and consolidation of peace and security in Africa.

5. His Government's point of view on the subject of *apartheid* had been clearly expressed by Portugal's Minister for Foreign Affairs in the General Assembly (2239th plenary meeting); the new Portugal had already begun to translate its condemnation of *apartheid* into specific terms, as could be seen from article 15 of the Lusaka Agreement. Even more significantly, Portugal had brought a new style to the relationship between peoples which had been separated by war for so many years. The *de facto* cease-fire in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique was the first example of a colonial war that had ended in fraternization between the former adversaries.

6. His delegation condemned *apartheid* and was happy to be able to wipe out the shame of seeing the name of Portugal alongside that of countries in which hegemonic minorities persisted in trying to impose an inhuman and anachronistic racial discrimination.

7. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) said that his delegation welcomed the statement by the Portuguese representative, whose country had so recently been regarded as an enemy. He welcomed Portugal to the growing list of supporters of his organization's cause in Azania, and appealed to the Portuguese Government to extend decolonization to Angola with the same speed as it had done in the case of its other Territories. He had noted with pleasure the Portuguese representative's observation that what was needed was specific action. It was now incumbent on Portugal to sever all its links with South Africa; only then would its condemnation of *apartheid* be really meaningful.

8. In 1968, the Portuguese security services had handed over three Azanian patriots to the South African racist régime. It was the duty of the new Portuguese Government to demand that the South African Government return those individuals to the country in which they had sought refuge.

*The meeting rose at 3.50 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup> Agreements between Portugal and PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde), signed at Algiers on 26 August 1974.

<sup>2</sup> Agreement between Portugal and FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), signed at Lusaka on 7 September 1974.

# 910th meeting

Thursday, 10 October 1974, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.910

## AGENDA ITEM 37

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)** (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. LEBALLO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) said that he wished to congratulate the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on its report (A/9622 and Corr.1), which was excellent. The Special Committee had been created as a result of the impact made on the international community by the entry of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) into the Azanian national liberation struggle. In its first campaign, PAC, under the leadership of Mangaliso Sobukwe, had opposed the universally hated and condemned pass laws. Within hours the enemy had been so overwhelmed by the campaign's success that its Fascist police had brutally massacred scores of patriots at Sharpeville, Langa, Nyanga, Vanderbijl Park and other places. The masses of the people had refused to be intimidated by police brutality and had risen as one man behind PAC to paralyse industry with strikes, shaking the country's political foundations with mass demonstrations in city after city. World public opinion had been outraged by the South African régime's brutality and the world community's disgust had been reflected in speech after speech and resolution after resolution in the United Nations.

2. In 1963, under Prime Minister Vorster's personal direction, the South African police had escalated their terrorist campaign against the PAC underground and had arrested more than 10,000 of its suspected leaders and members in an effort to forestall a popular uprising. In that connexion, his organization wished to demand once again the immediate release of all political prisoners held by the South African *apartheid* régime. The régime must also free Mr. Sobukwe, who had been prevented from assuming his richly deserved role as head of a free Azanian nation, and thousands of other people from house arrest and detention in concentration camps in the Bantustans, camps which the sinister Vorster régime euphemistically called "transit camps". The régime must withdraw forthwith all restrictions imposed on the opponents of its hated *apartheid* laws. It was incumbent upon the United Nations to ensure that the Pretoria régime obeyed General Assembly resolution 3055 (XXVIII), which had received overwhelming support at the previous session of the General Assembly. The Western countries which had sponsored the draft text of that resolution had a special responsibility to see to its implementation.

3. Following the mass arrests, as well as the arrest of some of the leaders of the other South African liberation movement in the same year, the United Nations had established the Special Committee in order to monitor the situation in that country and arouse international public opinion against the racist practices of the South African white minority régime.

4. The achievements of the Special Committee were there for all to see. Its record reflected a determined effort to achieve better results from year to year under the inspiring leadership of its successive Chairmen. His organization wished to pay a special tribute to the work carried out by the current Chairman. General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) declaring the liberation movements to be the true representatives of the Azanian people had been a singularly important victory. The Chairman of the Special Committee was also to be thanked for drawing the Special Political Committee's attention to the sinister activities of the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and their Western imperialist allies, whether through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or individually. PAC was waiting to see whether the report that Japan would compel its business corporations to disengage themselves from South Africa was genuine, or whether it was a stratagem to undermine the vigilance of the opponents of the South African régime.

5. Reports were pouring in of an intensified terror campaign by the South African police against opponents of *apartheid* inside South Africa. All security police leaves had been cancelled, and dawn raids were the order of the day against members of the black consciousness movement, who were accused of organizing large mass meetings and demonstrations to mark the installation of the predominantly FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) government in Mozambique. It had been confirmed that the *apartheid* régime intended to hold political show trials as a result of the country-wide arrest of members of the South African Students' Organization, the Black People's Convention and the editor of an English language daily newspaper.

6. At the same time, the *apartheid* régime had had the temerity to send a delegation from its fraudulent Bantustans and so-called Indian and Coloured representative councils to the current session of the United Nations. His organization believed that the delegation, which represented Vorster rather than the Azanian people, should be expelled in view of the decision by the Credentials Committee (see A/9779, paras. 14 and 15) and the General Assembly (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)) to reject the credentials of South Africa. Moreover, General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) had unequivocally stated that the South African régime had no right to represent the people of South Africa and that the liberation movements

recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people. Consequently, PAC wished to reiterate its demand that the Security Council should ratify the majority decision of the General Assembly and expel outright the South African racist régime.

7. The rationale that expulsion would set a bad precedent was an imperialist trick to defend not South Africa, whose case was beyond hope, but the Zionists in Tel Aviv. They, with South Africa, shared the ignominious record of invading other people's lands, seizing State power and depriving the indigenous population of its rights. The Azanian and Palestinian people did not seek to expel any whites or Jews who were prepared to abide by the democratic rules laid down by the indigenous majority. South Africa must be expelled outright by the Security Council, and if any member chose to use the right of veto to protect the racist régime, it would bear full responsibility for the consequences. That was not an idle threat: the Azanian people were not powerless to take independent and decisive action to gain their just demands.

8. The collapse of the Caetano régime had destroyed the unholy alliance between Lisbon, Pretoria and Salisbury. However, southern Africa was faced with the very real threat of an even more sinister alliance under the auspices of NATO. The Chairman of the Special Committee had already reported (908th meeting) on the top-level meetings held between the Pentagon and the Commander of the South African Defence Forces only days after the fall of Caetano. There had also been reports that NATO would take over the Simonstown Agreement in the event that a victorious Labour Party in the United Kingdom broke off all military contacts with the Pretoria régime.

9. If it were not a matter of life and death, the Brazilian representative's attempt to explain away his country's growing ties with the South African racists would seem like a joke by comparison with the article entitled "An Assessment of United States Strategic Interests", by Captain Raymond A. Komorowski, written for the United States Navy. The article envisaged a South African defence alliance, under NATO's tutelage, in which Brazil and South Africa would play leading roles. It would be a waste of valuable time to condemn those evil machinations, because everyone was aware that imperialist aggression was motivated by capitalist avarice and would yield only to revolutionary pressure. However, he wished to stress that now, more than ever before, it was important for the progressive and fair-minded nations of the world to rally solidly behind the liberation movements with generous material support. The liberation movements had learned from the heroic people of Indo-China, from their brothers and sisters in Algeria, and lately, in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, that a people united behind a revolutionary ideology could defeat any enemy, no matter how powerful. Its forces were determined to wage revolutionary warfare on the battlefields of Azania, as their brothers were doing in Zimbabwe.

10. In a newspaper report of 17 August 1974, the South African Defence Minister had disclosed that because of the "increased terrorist threat" his régime whose defence budget exceeded £400 million, planned to spend over the

next five years what normally would have been spent in 10 years. The admission that it was the so-called terrorist threat which compelled South Africa to spend more on weapons from France and to secure training for its forces in such countries as the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States invalidated the excuse often used by countries like France, which supplied South Africa with military equipment, that such equipment was for external defence. As Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda had always said, there was no external force threatening South Africa. The only threat came from the African masses and their liberation movement in Azania.

11. The liberation movement had no hope of matching the South African defence budget, but it expected those who genuinely supported its cause to provide assistance that took account of the enemy's military strength. The countries bordering the combat Territories should be assisted in every way because, in the event of the outbreak of a third world war over the control of southern Africa and its surrounding waters, they could become the earliest casualties. They were already subjected to repeated military violations at their frontiers, and many of their innocent nationals had already been killed by the Fascist troops.

12. His organization urged Member States to ensure that the United Nations stood squarely behind the Azanian national liberation movement as it waged the armed struggle which was the only weapon capable of bringing about the total liquidation of *apartheid* and imperialist oppression and exploitation in Azania.

13. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius) formally requested that the inspiring statement by the representative of PAC should be circulated in full to the members of the Committee.

14. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at its 2236th plenary meeting, the General Assembly had approved the recommendation of the General Committee (see A/9750) to authorize the Special Political Committee to obtain, on specific request, transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings or portions thereof. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed that a transcription should be made of the statement by the representative of PAC in accordance with the special authorization and the request by the representative of Mauritius.

*It was so decided.*<sup>1</sup>

15. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden) said that since the Committee had last debated the question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa, the combined pressure of the liberation movements in Africa and popular and military forces in Portugal had brought about a total revision of Portuguese colonial policy. Guinea-Bissau, the weakest link in the system of Portuguese colonial domination, had first gained independence and Mozambique would soon follow. One must trust in the Portuguese Government's assurance that it intended to grant freedom to Angola and to set up an independent Government with the active participation of the liberation movement. The repercussions of those changes were already evident among

<sup>1</sup> The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated in document A/SPC/PV.910.



the white settlers in southern Africa. Those members of the white minority in Mozambique who were unwilling to live under the FRELIMO Government in spite of assurances that there would be no racial persecution were leaving the country, some of them moving to South Africa. In view of the new conditions prevailing in the area, Southern Rhodesia no longer attracted white settlers, and there was demoralization among the supporters of Mr. Smith's illegal Government. In South Africa, there were signs of a lessening of confidence among the white ruling minority about the future prospects of their abhorrent system of government. The overwhelming majority of non-white inhabitants were showing signs of stronger resistance to *apartheid* in all its forms despite the extensive system of police repression established by the Pretoria Government. Some changes could be noted in official statements by the South African Government concerning the future of Namibia.

16. It was, of course, impossible to predict future developments in southern Africa. There could be no doubt that some of the white settlers outside South Africa were hoping for military intervention from Pretoria in order to strengthen their privileged position. That had evidently been so in the case of the recent abortive coup in Lourenço Marques. The Salisbury régime was certainly anxious to increase co-operation with the police and military forces in South Africa. Thus far, South Africa had not moved openly, and great vigilance was needed to deter it from intervening militarily in any of the neighbouring countries. In spite of the official statements, the international community could not have confidence in the sincerity of the white minority régime in Pretoria, and white mercenaries might again play the same fateful role as in the past in other parts of Africa. However, even if South Africa refrained from direct or indirect military intervention against her neighbouring newly independent States, the fact remained that the political, economic and military power of the white minority régime exercised a considerable influence on future developments in those countries. On many occasions, the General Assembly had drawn attention to the gap between the rich and poor countries. Most African countries, including those bordering South Africa, were poor, whereas the white minority in South Africa had achieved a considerable measure of prosperity which had had an inevitable impact on economic conditions in a number of African countries.

17. Against that general background, Sweden had for many years tried to modify to some extent the existing economic imbalance in Africa by devoting a considerable part of its development aid to African countries living under the threat of South African economic and political penetration. His delegation believed that the industrialized countries should make a joint effort to promote the economic bolstering of African States which opposed South Africa's ambitions for domination. When Angola and Mozambique had achieved full independence, a concerted effort would be necessary to reduce their traditional dependence on South Africa, for otherwise the danger of neo-colonialism based in Pretoria would continue to exist. Only when the African States had gained both political and economic independence could there be any hope for an end to the new forms of imperial ambitions represented by the South African régime.

18. Parallel with efforts to strengthen the African States, pressures inside South Africa would doubtless continue to build up. The liberation movements inside South Africa had a historic role in the struggle against racial discrimination and injustice as well as against economic exploitation. His delegation hoped that they would find new allies and supporters in South Africa. World public opinion must never forget the system of brutal oppression prevailing in South Africa.

19. It could not be denied that both national and multinational corporations made profits from injustice in South Africa. The shameful system of migratory labour met the demands of the white-controlled economy for a continuing supply of cheap labour. The non-white workers in South Africa were cruelly exploited and deprived of any opportunity to change their own situation. The struggle against *apartheid* was therefore also a struggle of the non-white working people for their elementary economic rights. The role of foreign enterprises in South Africa had recently attracted increased attention. Trade unions in the developed countries were becoming increasingly aware of the need to fight racial discrimination within the South African branches of multinational enterprises, and that had also been a matter of concern to other important non-governmental bodies such as the World Council of Churches. Piecemeal attacks against the system of *apartheid* were, of course, insufficient in themselves, but might help to form a basis for more concerted and effective international action.

20. The decisions taken a number of years earlier to impose economic sanctions against the Southern Rhodesian régime had not produced the expected results. That failure was due not only to the open defiance of United Nations decisions by South Africa and the former Portuguese régime but also to the fact that a number of other countries had neglected or circumvented the sanctions, which was a bad omen for the authority of the United Nations.

21. The possibility of economic sanctions against South Africa had been under discussion for more than a decade. Sweden maintained that discussions should be pursued actively with a view to creating effective pressure on the South African régime to abandon its policies. However, the experience gained in the application of economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia should be kept in mind.

22. South Africa's military dominance in the southern part of Africa had become increasingly obvious. On the initiative of the Scandinavian Governments, an arms embargo against South Africa had been recommended by the Security Council (resolution 181 (1963)) more than 10 years earlier. It was a matter of regret that some arms-exporting industrial nations had ignored that recommendation. Sweden, itself a producer of arms, had faithfully applied it. The question should be raised once again within the United Nations, and those States which maintained any form of military co-operation with South Africa should be reminded of their international responsibilities.

23. Turning to the important decisions regarding South Africa taken by the General Assembly at the current session, his delegation wished to reiterate its view that the formal review of credentials could not involve judgements

as to whether a Government had a legitimate popular mandate or not. That had always been the position of his Government; it was based on unambiguous statutory provisions and involved a question of orderly procedure which was vital to the functioning of the United Nations.

24. The decision, in General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX), that the Security Council should review the question of the Organization's relationship with South Africa marked a new departure in the annals of the struggle against *apartheid*. It was a clear manifestation of the frustration felt at the absolute intransigence of the Pretoria régime in the face of virtually the entire membership of the United Nations. It should serve as a further warning to the South African Government that time was fast running out. The recent developments in the Portuguese Territories had served to raise fresh expectations all over the world that the hour of freedom for the subjugated majority in South Africa was not far away. Sweden had voted in favour of that decision and was looking forward to the Security Council's review of the problem.

25. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden had pointed out in the General Assembly (2243rd plenary meeting) that the fact that so much time and effort was devoted to the problem of *apartheid* meant that the international community rejected an overly narrow interpretation of the expression "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" as contained in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. *Apartheid* was a particularly serious attack upon basic human rights and had dangerous international repercussions. However, the international community's continued rejection of that hateful system should be combined with steadfast support of all other human rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

26. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) paid a tribute to Sweden's contribution to the cause of humanity. He welcomed the three new Member States to the Committee and congratulated the new Government of Portugal on its policy of granting independence and self-determination to Territories formerly under its domination. He expressed the hope that other former colonial Territories would take their place in the United Nations as independent States and that Palestine, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia would be represented by authentic representatives of the people.

27. He praised the report submitted by the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1) and thanked the Special Committee for its continuous efforts to obtain factual information about the white minority South African Government and make it known to other countries. The continued existence of the régime and its indifference to United Nations decisions and resolutions affected the prestige of the Organization and disappointed the hopes of those who trusted in it. The decision to review the relationship between the Organization and South Africa was therefore a positive step. He hoped that similar steps would be taken.

28. Everyone knew that *apartheid* was a flagrant violation of fundamental human rights and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It was also well known that the South African Government pursued a policy of torture

and oppression towards its opponents. It was therefore astonishing that some members of the international community still tolerated the minority régime, thus enabling it to continue to exist. He reminded the Committee of the contents of paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2547 B (XXIV). Considerable progress had been made in undermining support for the racist, colonialist régime. The twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly had shown that the countries of the third world were aware of their rights and intended to secure them. The South African régime was aware of that and was making desperate efforts to escape from its isolation; the international community must make sure that those efforts were unsuccessful. A total embargo on arms to the minority régime was an essential element of the campaign. It had come as no surprise to learn that Israel and South Africa had elevated their diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level, for both régimes had been established on the principle of oppressing the indigenous population. But history marched on relentlessly. The Government of South Africa must rectify the situation before it was too late. His delegation, which held that *apartheid* was totally contrary to moral values, was prepared to contribute to international efforts to bring an end to the régime and liberate the peoples of southern Africa.

29. Mr. KANIARU (Kenya) said that the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had done an excellent job as the voice of the international community in its efforts to eliminate *apartheid*. The immediate implementation of the many useful suggestions and recommendations in its report (A/9622 and Corr.1) would be a further step towards reversing the policies of the Pretoria régime and granting fair representation and equality of opportunity in all walks of life to the majority of the population.

30. His country had made sacrifices by terminating trade and other ties with South Africa. It remained resolute, relentless and uncompromising in its determination to fight against *apartheid* until the situation was completely redressed.

31. He noted that the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had reported on both the negative and the positive sides of the situation. The most important positive development was Portugal's abandonment of its policy of colonialism and its acceptance of independence and self-determination for colonized peoples.

32. South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were not immune to the winds of change. They should learn from the experience of Portugal, which had once been their ally, and realize that the Charter and justice would triumph against racial bigotry. South Africa and its allies could help to remove the item from the agenda of the United Nations by instituting in that country revolutionary measures to ensure the free exercise by everyone of social, economic and civil rights and equal opportunity irrespective of race or creed. Until that happened, the international community should not abdicate its responsibility to the principles of the Charter and to the oppressed masses of South Africa.

33. The international community had no reason to lose heart. Although it had taken a long time for the spirit of change to make itself felt in South Africa, there had been



results. First, *apartheid* was universally condemned and had been declared a crime. Secondly, no one any longer entertained the thought that a ruthless institutionalized racial policy of massive oppression was a matter of solely domestic concern; the General Assembly's persistence had secured the United Nations an honoured place on the side of justice as an uncompromising advocate of the rights of the oppressed. Thirdly, the South African clique was almost totally isolated and almost universally harassed in the United Nations and its specialized agencies; indeed, it had become an outlaw in some of the agencies. Fourthly, it was universally conceded that South Africa had persistently defied the wishes of the international community and the Charter of the United Nations by its ruthlessly applied policy of institutionalized inequality and racial discrimination. Fifthly, all countries were embarrassed at being found to maintain any relations with South Africa. The situation was very different from what it had been when the item was first included in the agenda of the United Nations. To that extent, therefore, the international community had won victories. The decolonization process in the Portuguese Territories was a tangible and inspiring achievement. More pressure must be brought to bear on South Africa and its known and secret collaborators.

34. South Africa was not an invincible, self-sufficient Power. It had been able to survive the measures taken by the international community because of the double standard adopted by certain countries. Its principal collaborators were the Western industrial nations and Japan. Nearly all the Western nations had diplomatic relations with South Africa; the NATO countries had explicit or implicit military links. But South Africa had other benefactors. Regrettably, some of them were from the third world, as was shown by paragraphs 113 to 123 of the Special Committee's report and the statement made by the Nigerian representative (908th meeting). That was a matter of serious concern to his delegation. The common interests of the countries of the third world were not limited only to areas where their specific interests were directly involved. They fought against injustices together. For a third country of Africa, Asia or Latin America to ignore that and to establish and maintain diplomatic relations and active contacts with the racist régimes was politically unwise, embarrassing and unworthy. It undermined the unity of purpose of the third world and contributed directly to the decline of the moral authority of the United Nations. The third world should dissociate itself from such a course, and the Special Political Committee should condemn the collaborators.

35. Some of South Africa's collaborators, particularly those in the Western European group, resented the harassment of South Africa in the United Nations and invoked high-sounding principles to justify South Africa's remaining in the Organization. He called on those collaborators to demonstrate their sincerity of purpose. Some of them maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa. They sold arms and traded with South Africa and were its allies in war and peace. For them, human dignity and human rights were not of primary importance in relations between States, particularly when there was an abundance of cheap labour with consequent vast profits. It was perhaps time for OAU and committed Members of the United Nations to review gradually their relations not only with South Africa but also with the benefactors of that country. Those who

professed devotion to justice, principle, the Charter and Africa must choose between Africa and the racist régime in South Africa.

36. The Bantustan policy was a shoddy and blatant insult to the intelligence of man. It was the epitome of economic, moral, social and political injustice and oppression. The 18 million indigenous inhabitants were to be herded into 13 per cent of the land area of South Africa, while 4 million whites enjoyed all the most fertile and productive land. The purpose of the Bantustans was to perpetuate the colonial policy of "divide and rule". The size of the Bantustans underscored their lack of viability; their administration smacked of colonialism. They had no police force or army; they were nothing but a calculated fraud to conceal the true situation in South Africa.

37. The indigenous peoples of South Africa and those committed to the righting of fundamental wrongs within the country had a major role to play in overturning the inequities of the *apartheid* régime. A general popular insurrection could cause the illegitimate rulers to rethink and re-evaluate their system of unrepresentative government. The approach had worked in other countries and should be set in motion in South Africa. The cost would be heavy, of course; there would be deaths and destruction of property. Those were sacrifices which the people of South Africa were ready to make. If a bloodbath occurred, the Powers that wielded influence with the régime would perhaps set in motion the means of achieving a settlement and legitimizing a newly conceived, widely representative government of all the peoples of South Africa. Kenya would join with others in recommending measures that would help to bring the United Nations closer to its goals. It would be a gesture of further goodwill on the part of Portugal to deny South Africa airline landing and other rights in its colonial possessions on the West Coast of Africa. The recommendations of the Special Committee were a sound starting point and deserved the support of all delegations. Special missions to Latin America should be given some priority. He noted that many countries of Latin America had close ties with the racist régimes. Many of them had not signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. Moral and material assistance to all those fighting against *apartheid* should be increased. Nations that maintained trade or other relations with South Africa should again be invited to terminate them and to inform the next session of the General Assembly of the steps taken in that regard.

38. Mr. VRAILAS (Greece) extended a welcome to the three new Members of the Organization. He noted that there had never been a problem of racial discrimination in Greece because the concept was alien to Greek thinking and national character. The restoration of democratic liberties in his country would give fresh impetus to its contribution to the effort to end the oppression of the peoples of southern Africa. He hoped that Greek trade unions would participate more actively in any campaign to eradicate racist policies.

39. Experience had shown that, where *apartheid* was concerned, words were not enough. At the same time, it was illogical to contend that discussion of the problem

constituted interference in a country's domestic affairs. His delegation shared the opinion expressed by the Secretary-General of OAU (908th meeting) that there was a need to safeguard the moral authority of the United Nations. The history of *apartheid* provided a concrete example of a Member State of the United Nations which consistently refused to comply with or even discuss any resolution or decision concerning the fundamental rights of the overwhelming majority of its population. His delegation would try to co-operate with the majority of other delegations in considering, within the context of the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the best ways to put an end to a racist policy which, in the final analysis, did not

even protect the interests of the minority it was supposed to serve.

40. Mr. LINDENBERG SETTE (Brazil), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that one of the previous speakers had referred to an article published by a person who was not an officer of the Brazilian navy or of the South African armed forces. The speaker had said that Brazil had some explaining to do. He objected very strongly to the speaker's innuendo. There were no South Atlantic defence alliance arrangements between Brazil and South Africa, and none were contemplated.

*The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.*

## 911th meeting

Friday, 11 October 1974, at 3.35 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.911

### AGENDA ITEM 37

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)** (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines), speaking as Rapporteur of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, recalled that on 2 October 1974 the Chairman of the Committee had issued a statement appealing to all Governments and organizations to take action to secure the release of Mrs. Mandela and other political prisoners in South Africa, in accordance with the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions; also on 2 October he had sent a letter to the Secretary-General asking him to use his good offices to that end.

2. Recent events in South Africa showed that opposition to the *apartheid* régime had continued to grow in spite of the intensification of repressive measures. The Government had become increasingly concerned about the possible internal repercussions of the changing situation, particularly after the accession to power of the transitional Government in Mozambique led by (FRELIMO) (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique). While claiming to be neutral towards FRELIMO, it had begun a repressive campaign against black groups supporting the Mozambican revolution. On "FRELIMO Day", 25 September, armed police with dogs had charged a peaceful crowd of FRELIMO supporters at a solidarity rally in Durban organized by the South African Students' Organization and the Black People's Convention in defiance of a one-month ban on such meetings. The Government had been alarmed by reports that the Students' Organization had contacted FRELIMO leaders and that FRELIMO members were to address solidarity rallies

in South Africa. Under the Riotous Assemblies Act, anyone attending a banned gathering could be arrested and charged with violating the Act. A rally at the University of the North at Turfloop, although not falling under the ban, had also been broken up by armed police with dogs. In both instances the demonstrators had included Africans as well as Indians and whites; some of them had had to be treated for head wounds and dog bites. The police had arrested a number of people, including some undergoing treatment in hospitals. They had stated that they would arrest anybody who had attended the meetings and could be identified from photographs.

3. The security police had now begun a crack-down against the South African Students' Organization, the Black People's Convention, and other black organizations. The raids were secret, but it was known that armed security men with dogs had conducted raids in several towns; offices and homes had been searched, documents and equipment confiscated, and officials arrested. Some people were reputedly being held under the 180-day clause of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1965, and the chief of the Security Branch had said that those in custody could be charged under security laws other than the Riotous Assemblies Act. The number of arrests had not been disclosed, but the security police had been reported to be working around the clock, with all leave cancelled.

4. He read out a partial list of those held in custody or released on bail; it included the editor of the *Daily News*, who had reported that the rallies would be held in spite of the ban. The security police was also reportedly investigating charges under the Act against the *Argus* and *Die Burger*, for having published reports of the banned meetings.

5. Mr. GOMAH (Egypt) noted with sadness that the South African régime still based itself on the inhuman policy of *apartheid*, despite the appeals made to it by the United Nations and the international community, over the pre-

ceding 28 years, to abandon its policy. The régime had remained indifferent to the frequent warnings, and the international community had recognized that it could not be moved in its obduracy: there could be no freedom and peace in southern Africa unless effective measures were taken against the *apartheid* régime.

6. His country believed that *apartheid* was not only a violation of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also a crime against humanity and a threat to international peace and security which must be eradicated. To tolerate it was to remove any hope of international co-operation.

7. Egypt had always stated clearly its attitude to the struggle between justice and injustice. The racist clique imposed its control on the majority of the population of South Africa, denying its full exercise of human rights, and exploiting the wealth of the country for its own ends. The majority had long been struggling under the leadership of the national liberation movements to regain their inalienable rights, their freedom and dignity.

8. Egypt opposed the political crime of *apartheid* because it was itself proud to be an African country and was aware of its responsibility to help rid the African continent of all injustice and oppression. In the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other international bodies it had always affirmed the right of all African peoples to freedom, independence and self-determination. The people of Egypt shared in the joy of the African peoples that had gained independence, but they could not rest while their African brothers still suffered under *apartheid*. Africa must be restored to the sons of Africa. That would be achieved through the struggle of the peoples of Africa and all other peace-loving peoples. As a peace-loving country, which believed that peace was indivisible, Egypt denounced *apartheid* as a threat to the peace of Africa and the whole world.

9. More than 10 years had elapsed since some of the leaders of the African national liberation movements had been sentenced to life imprisonment. The South African régime had also resorted to the murder of other leaders, even some who had managed to flee to neighbouring countries. Thus, it constituted a threat to the peace and security of the neighbouring countries that supported the freedom fighters.

10. The régime had illegally occupied Namibia, had sent its troops into Zimbabwe, and clearly constituted a threat to the whole African continent. It was the linchpin of racism in southern Africa and even had links with the racist régime in Israel, for all racist régimes imposed their methods on others and sought strength from their ties with other racist régimes.

11. The United Nations was seeking to eliminate all forms of racism. His country respected the United Nations resolutions and helped the United Nations to consolidate its role in the maintenance of peace and security. Its attitude was based on the belief that the principles of justice must prevail everywhere and that the struggle of the oppressed must continue. He reviewed the resolutions against racism that the United Nations had adopted since 1946 and

affirmed that his country had always acted in support of them.

12. The South African régime claimed that *apartheid* was a domestic policy outside the scope of the General Assembly and that the establishment of the Bantustans was in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Such ludicrous arguments deserved only condemnation. The equally shaky arguments used by the imperialist forces to explain their collaboration with South Africa were also unacceptable. The right to self-determination meant that a people must be able to decide its own future and exercise its national rights without interference. Any other interpretation was merely defiance of world public opinion. The régime was confident that through force and with the support of its allies it could perpetuate its crimes against the South African people. The problem was grave but not insoluble. Changes in the world political situation indicated that the South African people would reap the fruit of their just struggle against the white minority: in May 1974 the liberation movement had won victory in Guinea-Bissau, and Portugal had abandoned its colonial policy and initiated an era of co-operation with the African peoples; in 1974, too, all the countries of the third world had declared a new economic order to be established on the basis of justice, sovereignty over natural resources and protection of national independence.

13. The decisions of United Nations bodies had brought home to all people the crimes of the South African régime and its close links with Israel and the other countries whose co-operation it enjoyed. The decision to invite the representatives of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) to participate as observers in the Committee's debate on the item was one of the most important measures ever taken by the United Nations and would enable the true representatives of South Africa to explain their views on a problem that affected their rights. His country had supported General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX), calling upon the Security Council to consider the question of South Africa's membership in the United Nations in the light of its violation of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was unacceptable for a racist country to be able to state its views in an international organization. The South African régime should be expelled from the United Nations. He hoped, however, that the developments he had described would prompt the régime to abandon *apartheid*. The struggle of the liberation movement was long, but victory was sure.

14. His delegation appreciated the efforts made by the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, notably its campaign to disseminate information and encourage world public opinion to participate in the struggle against *apartheid*. The Special Committee's report on recent developments in the relations between Israel and South Africa<sup>1</sup> revealed the complicity between the two countries, where the decision to raise the status of their diplomatic missions to the embassy level had been greeted with joy. There has been considerable South African investment in Israel since the South African Government had relaxed controls on the transfer of funds. The Prime Minister of South Africa had

<sup>1</sup> A/AC.115/L.383.



stated that if Israel lost the October war, its defeat would have important consequences for South Africa. The South African Defence Minister had described Israel and South Africa as bulwarks of the West and had said that South Africa would show its sympathy for Israel in a practical manner. It had done precisely that: according to a report in the *Daily Telegraph* of 31 October 1973, a South African Air Force Mirage aircraft had been shot down by Egyptian forces over the Suez Canal; other press reports alleged that South African military personnel had participated in the war on the Israeli side for training purpose; on 1 December 1973 *The Star* of Johannesburg had reported that hundreds of South African volunteers had flown to Israel in response to an appeal by the South African Zionist Federation. An Israel-South Africa Chamber of Commerce had been opened in Tel Aviv in January 1974 and trade between the two countries had recently shown a marked increase. South Africa used Israel as a means of circumventing the boycott on its goods and to find outlets in the European Economic Community. There were plans for joint companies to be set up in Israel and Israeli banks might be playing a role in channelling international financial capital to South Africa. Contacts were growing in other areas, such as sport.

15. Egypt had often drawn attention to the intensification of co-operation between South Africa and Israel and the Special Committee had repeatedly expressed concern at the growth of political, military and economic relations between the two countries. Clearly, Israel had always been a supporter of the South African régime but such facts merely confirmed the conviction that the racist forces were interdependent and were mobilizing against the peace-loving forces of the world.

16. His country approved of the Special Committee's annual report (A/9622 and Corr.1): the increasing isolation of the régime was bearing fruit; the specialized agencies and international organizations must make every effort to deprive South Africa of the benefits of membership. It was no longer acceptable for some Governments to maintain relations with South Africa. His country opposed the argument that economic sanctions harmed all the people of South Africa, for the wealth of South Africa was exploited by only a small minority. The people of South Africa would have to make even greater sacrifices to regain their lawful rights. Nor was it admissible for international financial institutions to continue to make loans to the régime. The régime was not affected by empty words; there must be a united front to convince it that its policy was wrong, indeed, that any policy imposed by force would lead to widespread fighting. For their part, the Africans in South Africa had demonstrated their tolerance and their desire to co-operate with their neighbours. His delegation welcomed the Special Committee's proposal for an international convention against emigration to South Africa. There should be an international campaign in 1975 to inform the public of the crimes committed by the South African Government and the true role of its allies. His country would do all it could to that end and it looked forward to the victory of all the free and peace-loving countries.

17. Mr. ABDULDJALIL (Indonesia) said that his delegation had noted with satisfaction the progress achieved in the struggle against racism and colonialism in southern

Africa during the preceding year. Much of that progress had without doubt been due to the untiring efforts of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, whose special session in Europe had done much to contribute to a broader public awareness of the problem of *apartheid* and to rally public support for its eradication in many of the developed countries. Those efforts were indeed laudable, and in the view of his delegation, should be continued and intensified.

18. Indonesia endorsed the recommendations of the Special Committee for extended contacts with Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies to promote concerted action by the members of the international community. It also endorsed the suggestion by the Special Committee that its membership should be enlarged to enable more States to participate directly in its work. Such a development would hasten the day when the ultimate goal of the Special Committee and the United Nations would be achieved.

19. Despite the progress against racism and colonialism elsewhere, there had been increased repression in South Africa as its Government had sought to impose its plan for a divided society upon an increasingly resistant majority. That continued resistance to *apartheid* was all the more remarkable in the face of the strong measures adopted to forestall such opposition, and to punish it severely when it occurred. The series of strikes by black workers, despite the *apartheid* labour laws designed to prevent them from exercising their right to organize trade unions, had been the most significant of those acts of resistance, and had effectively given the lie to the South African Government's claim that the majority of the people accepted their subjugation.

20. Unfortunately, the continued application of the *apartheid* laws and the cruelty attendant upon such a policy of racist oppression had continued. The forced mass transportation of hundreds of thousands of black Africans to Bantustans, in direct defiance of General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII), had continued. The policies of the South African régime even extended to the countenancing of the assassination of those who vigorously opposed the legal system of *apartheid*. Such acts and the infamous killings at Carletonville should be sternly condemned by the international community.

21. In the light of the flagrant violations of human rights, the Charter, and Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, it was extremely regrettable that certain nations continued to maintain diplomatic, economic, military and cultural relations with the South African régime. In the view of his delegation, those countries would do better to emulate the recent example of the people of India whose tennis team had declined to meet the South African team in the final round of the World Lawn Tennis Championship. His delegation agreed with the Chairman of the Special Committee who had said (908th meeting) that the ending of any form of military co-operation with the South African régime was the first and minimum step in action against *apartheid*. Other States permitted their nationals to invest large sums in the South African economy, thus providing substantial aid to those who sought to preserve its archaic political, social and economic system. His delegation deplored such activities to shore up a régime which

had been repeatedly condemned by the international community and urged them to cease such collaboration and to acknowledge the rights of the majority of the South African peoples.

22. General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX) had once again condemned the South African régime. In addition, it had called upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa, thus setting in motion the process by which the United Nations would be able to take appropriate action against that State for its consistent violations of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

23. It was clear that the South African régime had not the slightest intention of abandoning its policies; on the contrary, it had been utilizing every means at its disposal to consolidate its grip upon the people of that country. Nevertheless, the liberation of the Territories under Portuguese domination had undoubtedly created a new situation in southern Africa. In the face of the refusal of the South African Government to change its policies, the General Assembly had been compelled to examine at length the participation of the delegation sent by the white minority régime of Pretoria to the United Nations. The successive rejections of the credentials of that delegation by the General Assembly had constituted warnings of the most direct and explicit type. South Africa had not only chosen to ignore those warnings but had chosen to challenge the authority of the United Nations by violating the sanctions imposed against the Rhodesian régime and by sending its troops into Southern Rhodesia in an effort to maintain the Smith régime. In addition, the Pretoria Government had repeatedly refused to relinquish control of Namibia as demanded by the General Assembly in numerous resolutions and required by the decision of the International Court of Justice.<sup>2</sup>

24. His delegation fully agreed that the time had come to adopt concrete and decisive measures to put an end to the intolerable situation in South Africa. It was prepared to support the strongest action possible and the most severe measures to destroy the last bastion of racism and colonialism in southern Africa.

25. Mr. BARTOLOME (Philippines) said that his Government's record clearly indicated its long-standing commitment to the total eradication of *apartheid*. In compliance with the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, it had no relations whatsoever with the racist Government of South Africa, and had taken various executive and administrative measures to implement the military, economic and cultural sanctions against that régime. Its unequivocal stand against racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid* in the United Nations had been demonstrated on many occasions, one of the most recent being when the Credentials Committee, under the chairmanship of the Philippine delegation, had rejected the credentials of the South African delegation on 27 September 1974 (see A/9779, paras. 14 and 15).

<sup>2</sup> See *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1971, p. 16.

26. His delegation had been gratified to note from the report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1) that the international campaign for the elimination of *apartheid* had been gaining momentum all over the world. Portugal's acceptance of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples must be considered an encouraging development. It was to be hoped that its change of policy would lead to the emancipation and independence of the other Portuguese Territories of Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde.

27. His delegation had learned with pleasure that the special session of the Special Committee in Europe had proved useful in publicizing the efforts of the United Nations to promote international action against *apartheid*. It was gratifying to note that the consultations of the Special Committee with various Governments in Western and Eastern Europe, New Zealand and Japan, as well as specialized agencies, anti-*apartheid* movements, and non-governmental organizations, had helped to promote the objectives of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

28. His delegation deeply regretted, however, that instead of heeding the appeals of the United Nations for an end to violence, the South African Government had doubled its military budget as compared with that for 1972-1973 and that it continued to enjoy the support and assistance of certain countries. In view of the numerous violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions by the South African Government, his delegation considered it reasonable that the General Assembly, in resolution 3207 (XXIX), had called upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa.

29. His delegation had noted the statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in June 1974 to the eleventh Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, warning that when fundamental rights were denied and the advocates of orderly change were ignored or suppressed, no one should be surprised if violent conflict ensued. South Africa and its allies should therefore heed that warning if they wished to avert a wider conflict in that country. Those allies of South Africa who invoked the argument of universality should not forget that South Africa denied the black majority their fundamental human rights. The major Western Powers should, before it was too late, bring their influence to bear on the South African régime and withdraw their assistance.

30. His delegation endorsed the Special Committee's recommendation that the United Nations should greatly expand its efforts to secure concerted international action against *apartheid*, and that the General Assembly and the Security Council should launch an urgent appeal to Governments and world public opinion for an immediate end to any form of military collaboration with South Africa. It supported the recommendation for special international campaigns to be launched in 1975, under United Nations auspices, for the intensification of the arms embargo against South Africa, the cessation of collaboration by banks and multinational companies with the South African régime, the cessation of emigration to South Africa,

and the release of political prisoners in South Africa. In addition it supported the recommendation for liaison with the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference of Trade Unions against *Apartheid* with a view to promoting maximum participation by the trade unions at the national and international levels in action against *apartheid*, and welcomed the intensified action against *apartheid* by an increasing number of trade unions in implementation of the unanimous decision taken at the International Conference of Trade Unions against *Apartheid* held in Geneva in June 1973. It also supported the recommendations for an increase in the membership of the Special Committee, to enable as many regional groups as possible to be represented, and for changing the name of the Committee to the United Nations Special Committee against *Apartheid*. It favoured the expansion of United Nations efforts in the dissemination of information on *apartheid* and the production of more films and other audio-visual material and wider distribution of publications. It supported the holding of a seminar in 1975 in a Western European capital to discuss the current situation in South Africa and the means for promoting public action against *apartheid*.

31. His delegation welcomed the co-operation developed by the Special Committee with the United Nations organs concerned with southern Africa as well as with OAU. It considered that the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia was in recognition of the work of the United Nations in upholding the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

32. His delegation hoped that the coming year would witness more concerted international action against racism and *apartheid*.

33. Mr. KAHILUOTO (Finland) said that during the current year, the firm desire for self-determination on the part of the African liberation movements and their willingness to explore all possibilities in the quest for a peaceful settlement, combined with the policy adopted by the new Portuguese Government, had opened the way to self-determination and full sovereignty for the peoples of the Portuguese Territories.

34. South Africa, however, remained a potential crisis area, and the United Nations would now have to turn all its efforts towards eliminating the last bastion of colonialism and racism in Africa. His Government deeply deplored the fact that, 26 years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and despite the subsequent adoption of numerous resolutions and decisions by the General Assembly and the Security Council, it was still necessary to emphasize the need to eliminate racism and racial discrimination.

35. The report of the Special Committee had traced the continual deterioration of the situation in South Africa and the South African Government's pursuit of its policy of *apartheid* in defiance of the reiterated appeals by the United Nations and by world public opinion for a peaceful and just solution.

36. It was indeed more alarming that the Government of South Africa had also extended its policy of *apartheid* and

racial discrimination to Namibia. His Government's position on *apartheid* was well known; it firmly rejected any form of racial discrimination incompatible with its concept of human rights based on the dignity and equality of man. It viewed institutionalized racism as more heinous still because such doctrines provided the basis for the systematic pursuit of racial discrimination, and *apartheid* was unique in that it formed the very basis for a whole social system. It was the opinion of his Government that the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa was not only a menace to the sound and peaceful development of the region but, in a wider perspective, was a threat to the harmonious development of the world as a whole. No country, however far away, could afford to ignore that danger. His Government therefore felt that the United Nations must not fail in its efforts to put an end to the system of *apartheid* and that the likelihood of achieving that aim would be considerably enhanced if the recommendations and decisions of the United Nations were supported by as many of its Members as possible.

37. His delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX), which called upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa and hoped that the Council would consider in a constructive manner other effective measures which might be implemented to ensure a change in the policies of the South African Government.

38. The report of the Special Committee had indicated that the resolutions on the arms embargo against South Africa, which his delegation considered to be of great significance, had not been observed by all Member States. His Government believed that the embargo should be made effective and that the relevant Security Council resolutions should be fully implemented. For its part, Finland had fully implemented those resolutions.

39. His delegation furthermore considered it essential that the campaign for the release of all persons imprisoned, interned or otherwise restricted in South Africa for their opposition to *apartheid* should be continued and extended as recommended by the Special Committee.

40. The statement by the Rapporteur of the Special Committee (908th meeting) had shown clearly the importance of giving attention to that question. The overwhelming condemnation of *apartheid* within the United Nations was of vital importance for the development and maintenance of world public opinion against racial discrimination. International organizations could contribute substantially to education within member countries on the fundamental factors of racial discrimination. Factual information on racial discrimination in South Africa would influence basic attitudes. That was the reason for his delegation's support for the launching of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and the Programme for the Decade.

41. A valuable contribution to mobilizing public opinion in favour of the suppressed peoples of southern Africa had been made by the Special Committee's special session in Europe and its consultations with non-governmental organizations, United Nations specialized agencies, and OAU.



42. His delegation welcomed the presence of representatives of the national liberation movements and the consequent opportunity to obtain first-hand information on the actual situation in South Africa. It concurred with the view of the Special Committee that representatives of those movements should be invited to participate in both the Special Political Committee and the Special Committee. He noted the influence sports could have on world public opinion and the usefulness of a recommendation to national sports federations to boycott racially selected teams.

43. His country would be increasing its contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, and the United Nations Fund for Namibia. It had already contributed to the Assistance Fund for the Struggle against Colonialism and *Apartheid* established by OAU and would continue to do so.

44. His delegation did not share the view that the United Nations would be unable to find a peaceful solution to the remaining problems in southern Africa. He urged members to increase political pressure on the South African Government and intensify humanitarian work for the victims of *apartheid* with the ultimate goal of eliminating *apartheid* and reaching a just and peaceful solution.

45. Mr. AL-JARWAN (United Arab Emirates) said he welcomed the new policies of the Government of Portugal and hailed the struggle of the freedom fighters.

46. The General Assembly had been discussing *apartheid* since 1953 and passed many resolutions condemning the policies of the South African Government. But that Government continued to pursue its policies none the less and denied the South African people the freedom to exercise their rights in accordance with the principles of the United Nations. Despite international action, some countries were still not complying with General Assembly and Security Council decisions, particularly those relating to supplies of armaments to South Africa. As the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* showed, that policy had encouraged the racist Government to continue its racist policies.

47. The South African people were not the only people to suffer. For more than 25 years the situation had continued to constitute a threat to the peace and security of neighbouring countries.

48. Israel had fought four wars against the Arab countries; the people of Palestine had fallen victim to Israel's racist policy. They had been expelled from their lands and had been subjected to barbaric treatment that had left them living in conditions of poverty and disease. Those policies had been condemned in international documents, including resolutions adopted by the Special Political Committee. But Israel continued to ignore all that.

49. The policies of South Africa and Israel were very similar. The South African Government represented a group of settlers: Israel was an intruder in Arab Palestine. The bonds between South Africa and Israel were very clear, as

was shown by the latter's failure to support General Assembly resolutions condemning South Africa. What was needed was effective action against the South African Government, and not mere words. His country wished to support the liberation movements in every way to ensure that the aspirations of the African people, particularly in South Africa, were fulfilled. In his own country, the Government had helped its peoples to secure their rights, freedom and territorial integrity. It was in that spirit that it had provided the liberation movements with material and moral assistance and had placed a total embargo on sales of oil to South Africa. With the support of the international community and all those who were on the side of liberty and independence the will of the people would triumph.

50. Mr. KAMARA (Mauritania) welcomed the representatives of the three new Member States to the Committee.

51. The problem of *apartheid* had troubled the United Nations for more than 25 years and threatened to plunge the international community into a dangerous situation whose consequences were incalculable. It had proved impossible to carry out the appropriate Security Council and General Assembly resolutions because of the attitude of certain Western Powers. South Africa's arrogant attitude to the United Nations and world opinion has been brought out clearly in the reports submitted by the Special Committee on *Apartheid*.

52. He asked what the principles of the Charter could mean to the general public when the Pretoria régime violated its obligations as a Member of the United Nations openly and with impunity. The General Assembly and Security Council had warned the Government of South Africa that its policies and activities were not in keeping with the duties of a Member State and had recognized that they were a serious threat to peace. OAU had called the attention of the international community to the true character of the Pretoria régime in the Manifesto on Southern Africa, signed at Lusaka in September 1969.<sup>3</sup> He reiterated his delegation's tribute to the Government and people of Portugal for having understood the need for decolonization. The Portuguese example should inspire the racist minority of South Africa to abandon a policy that had been unanimously rejected and condemned by the international community.

53. The United Nations must take a careful look at the threat to peace and security posed by the racist régime of South Africa. The international community must act together to fight the scourge of *apartheid*. Was it not time to take practical steps that would be better understood by Vorster and his team? Yet certain Powers continued to maintain relations of all kinds with South Africa: they systematically violated United Nations resolutions condemning *apartheid*, and their military assistance to South Africa enabled that country to continue to pursue its cynical and offensive policies. The attitude of those countries was deplorable, for it seriously handicapped the efforts made by the Organization and acted as a total brake on its noble aspirations.

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7704.

54. Violations of human rights, whether committed in southern Africa or in the Arab territories occupied by the other arrogant usurper, the Jewish State, were a real danger and a permanent threat to international peace and security. As long as there was any injustice, racism and discrimination, there could be no real détente or lasting peace and the very existence of the United Nations would be constantly threatened. Every effort must therefore be made to find appropriate solutions to the problems as soon as possible. Africa and the Arab world were determined that they would never again allow themselves to be subjected to any form of domination. They would fight through their liberation movements for the total independence of all Arab and African territories.

55. Mr. IPSARIDES (Cyprus) welcomed the representatives of the three new Member States, and of the liberation movements of South Africa, to the Committee.

56. Condemnation of *apartheid* was virtually universal. The situation brought about by the application of the doctrine was also considered by an overwhelming majority to be a grave threat to international peace. But the situation in South Africa continued to deteriorate. All the efforts of the United Nations had been to no avail. Nevertheless, the Organization had a solemn responsibility to prevent the violation of human rights and to deal with threats to international peace. All Member States must apply themselves to meeting that challenge and to secure the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter with regard to South Africa. The international community had not failed to express its conviction that *apartheid* was abhorrent and had passed resolutions that contained pious exhortations. But it had failed in its practical application of its professed beliefs and in the effective and faithful implementation of the measures which most Members voted for. While no country was free of collective responsibility for that failure, a grave responsibility rested particularly upon those States which, by putting economic, political and strategic considerations above the requirements of conscience, aided and abetted South Africa in its attitude. The attitude of Governments which supplied South Africa with the means of continuing the oppression of the African majority was especially deplorable.

57. There were several areas in which United Nations efforts could be concentrated. The international community could rededicate itself and take a collective position

which would convince South Africa in fact and not merely in words that it was facing a united front of opposition to its racial policy. All Member States could do their utmost to influence States that traded with South Africa to place the dictates of conscience above economic or other considerations. As the Chairman of the Special Committee had indicated in his statement (908th meeting), efforts of that kind appeared to be producing some encouraging results. Efforts could also be directed to convincing those in authority in South Africa that the consequences of their current policies would be catastrophic and that they would be well advised to revise their attitude. Public opinion should also be enlightened on the evils of *apartheid*; he fully endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee to that effect.

58. The international community should be prepared to consider more specific steps to strengthen the general attitude of condemnation to *apartheid*. His delegation supported the proposal to call once more upon the Security Council to take appropriate and effective action. It was prepared to give due consideration to other relevant proposals. His Government was willing to support by word and deed all United Nations initiatives intended to remedy the situation in South Africa. It had carefully noted and would give due consideration to the conclusions and recommendations in the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1). His country had no relations with South Africa. It was contributing regularly to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, the relevant OAU programme and the United Nations programmes of scholarships for Non-Self-Governing African Territories. Its contributions would continue despite the tragedy which had lately befallen it. The aim in South Africa, as elsewhere in the world, should be the abolition of artificial and unwarranted distinctions based on racial or ethnic criteria. His delegation condemned the establishment of Bantustans. The compulsory transfer of whole populations infringed the most fundamental human rights and freedoms and served the political aims of a minority contrary to the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the South African people. The ultimate aim should be the attainment of majority rule based on universal suffrage with full guarantees of the rights of all citizens in accordance with the generally accepted democratic principles laid down in the Charter.

*The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.*



# 912th meeting

Monday, 14 October 1974, at 3.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.912

## AGENDA ITEM 37

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. NOKWE (Observer, African National Congress of South Africa) said the Committee had to deal with some of the most vital problems of the world. It was discussing the policies of *apartheid* at a time when outstanding victories had been won by the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola and when the struggle for national liberation in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa was being intensified. Credit for the collapse of the fascist régime in Portugal must be given to the heroic and selfless struggle of the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola whose persistent armed struggle had been decisive in demonstrating the futility of Portugal's predatory wars and had thus laid the basis for the internal revolt of the Portuguese people against half a century of Fascist tyranny. The process of decolonization of former Portuguese Territories was still incomplete. For the sake of the struggle for the destruction of *apartheid* and racism, Portugal should accelerate the process of restoring their birthright to the people. There was no justification for unnecessary delays.

2. He welcomed the fact that the Credentials Committee had recommended (see A/9779, paras. 14 and 15) to the General Assembly the rejection of the credentials of the representatives of the racist Fascist régime of South Africa. The subsequent rejection of those credentials by the General Assembly (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)) was an important contribution to the struggle to combat and eliminate *apartheid* and racism. It was a practical expression of the wrath and disgust of the peoples of the world with a group of racists whose policies and practices were reminiscent of Nazi Germany. It was an affront to humanity that international criminals should find shelter, respectability and acceptance in an organization which they treated with such contempt and in which they fraudulently claimed to be representing the peoples of South Africa. The peoples he represented had always contested the legitimacy of the racist white minority régimes of South Africa. For over 250 years, his country had been the target of the most brutal colonial invasion and oppression by whites of mainly Dutch and British descent. The colonial aggression and monopoly of political, economic and military power had culminated in the South Africa Act of 1910. That act was the source of all the vicious racist and *apartheid* laws in the country. The South African Constitution had been fashioned by the

white minority for the white minority and against the black majority. It was inherently racist and discriminatory in character and had been passed in the British colonial Parliament despite vigorous protests from the African people. The Constitution was grossly illegal, as was the South African régime born of it.

3. The African National Congress (ANC) had been formed in 1912 as the mouthpiece of the African people and their instrument for national emancipation and liberation. It had sought to create a State within a State. Its policies were diametrically opposed to those of the white régime and thus challenged its sovereignty. What it had lacked when it was formed was an army. In 1919, it had sent a delegation to Versailles to condemn the white South African régime and to warn that German South West Africa should not be handed over to the white South African régime because the people of Namibia would suffer the same fate as had the people of South Africa. But its protests had been to no avail. The illegal, illegitimate and inhuman régime had won international recognition, and the people, land and wealth of Namibia had been handed over to the white racists on a silver platter. There were very sharp lessons to be drawn from that event. He would remind the Committee that General Smuts, who had played an important part in drafting the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, had been the head of a régime which had violated every single principle contained in the Preamble. The injustice of granting international recognition to the white minority régime was being increasingly realized as growing recognition was being given to the leaders of the vast majority of the people. That was as it should be. The Charter was basically a covenant between peoples who delegated their powers to their governments. But the racist *apartheid* régime of South Africa was not the government of the people of South Africa. It was a government composed of whites, acting for whites, and elected by some whites. It had no moral or legal right to claim to be the government of the majority of the people of South Africa. It imposed its rule on the overwhelming majority of the people by armed force. Paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII), which stated that the liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people, should be fully put into practice within the United Nations itself. He wished to commend particularly the work of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and asked for its structure to be re-examined in the light of the new situation. It was also necessary to accord most explicitly due recognition to the true representatives of the overwhelming majority of the people. The representatives of the criminal régime should be expelled. Indeed, they should be standing trial before an international tribunal for their crimes and atrocities against humanity.

4. Those who pretended to condemn *apartheid* while supporting it overtly and covertly were guilty of giving the system the political, economic and military wherewithal to sustain and extend its life. They were sabotaging and subverting all the efforts of the United Nations to combat and eliminate the system of *apartheid* and the South African régime. So deeply involved were the United Kingdom and the United States of America in the crimes committed by the Fascists that they had voted with them against the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. He was not in the least impressed by British eloquence against *apartheid*. Deeds spoke louder than words, and by its deeds the United Kingdom stood condemned in terms of the solemn declaration of the Charter for collusion and alliance with a system condemned as a crime against humanity. The "Rule Britannia" dream did not seem to be fading away despite the hard realities of life and human history. United Kingdom foreign policy was based not on human interests but on British interests and British profits at any cost. The United Kingdom would invest anywhere and at anytime for maximum profit at the expense of human rights and the very lives of millions of people. Thus it was that it had sponsored and was sustaining in South Africa a system condemned by humanity. A clear demonstration of that fact was the Simonstown Agreement with its joint United Kingdom and South African naval exercises, which were conducted in total violation of international law and the resolutions of the General Assembly. On that point, he would refer representatives to the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1).

5. Military alliances with the *apartheid* régime were either offensive or defensive. If they were offensive, they were a direct violation of the Charter. If they were defensive, as the parties claimed, he wanted to know what and whom they were defending against what. The majority of the people of South Africa were not party to the agreements, they were the direct victims of them. He did not wish to be told that the United Kingdom was defending the Africans from communism. What the Africans needed was to be defended against capitalism and fascism. They would handle communism when the time came and would not need British naval bases to do so.

6. His people's patience was running out, but time was still very much on their side. Despite the losses they were suffering, they were determined to fulfil the mission of transforming the nightmare of horror and terror imposed upon them and the peoples of the world. His people were bitter, and their bitterness was directed against fascism and those who collaborated with it in racist South Africa. Their hope lay in concerted action by the peoples of the world but they knew that, as always, they would bear the brunt of the struggle. He hoped that the United Kingdom delegation would exercise its power in conformity with the aspirations of the British people and the world at large. That hope was based on the experience that the question of racial domination and *apartheid* received more sympathetic attention from the British masses than from the United Kingdom Government. It was ironical that a country whose people and cities had been destroyed by Nazi Germany during the Second World War and which had been party to the prosecution at the Nuremberg trials should pretend to be blind to *apartheid*'s crimes against humanity. Were they

waiting for another world disaster and another Nuremberg trial? The United Kingdom had an enormous stake in the most brutal oppression and exploitation of South Africa's land, wealth and peoples. From generation to generation, the United Kingdom had inherited the wages and profits of sin in his country and had protected its instrument of exploitation, racism and *apartheid*. He wished to make it clear, however, that he was referring not to the general public in the United Kingdom, but to those who maintained South African racism and *apartheid*, fascism and nazism as an outpost and citadel of colonialism and imperialism and the launching base for the recolonization of Africa. He reminded the Committee that United Kingdom investments still amounted to nearly 60 per cent of all foreign investments in South Africa. In addition, United Kingdom investments played a major role in the rest of racist-controlled southern Africa. There had been no action by successive British Governments to stem the flow of investments and trade.

7. One alarming aspect of the continuing collaboration was the naval exercises that had recently taken place between the United Kingdom and South Africa, supposedly for the defence of the Indian Ocean. The United Kingdom must withdraw physically, legally and morally from its imperialist colonialist position and from its support for racism and *apartheid*. He called for a specific resolution from the Committee and the General Assembly urging the United Kingdom to implement forthwith the stated policies of the British Labour Party for non-collaboration with the racist régimes of southern Africa. He hoped that in the Security Council the United Kingdom would make an effort to change its inhuman attitude.

8. The United States, which claimed to be a power with no colonial history, was the most dangerous enemy of human rights and self-determination in the world. It was notorious for its violence and murderous interference in the internal affairs of peoples of all continents of the world, while claiming to act as the gendarme against communism. But whatever it might profess, the United States practised and supported racism and *apartheid* to the hilt. By United States, he meant what was known as the establishment and not the people. It was sometimes difficult to distinguish the United States delegation from the representatives of the South African régime as far as their reactions and votes were concerned. He hoped that the United States would still have time to exercise good sense and reason and abandon its defence of racism and *apartheid*. United States interests operating in southern Africa had given the United States Government a great stake in military links between the United States and southern Africa. The developing alliance between Pretoria and Washington had become especially dangerous in view of the racism practised against Coloured people inside the United States itself.

9. In support of his argument he quoted three points from the findings of the Economic Commission of the International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations against *Apartheid* and Colonialism in Africa, which was held at Geneva in September 1974. He suggested that the findings of the Commissions of the Conference should be circulated to the Committee, for they were relevant to the item and the Conference had been held as part of the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism

and Racial Discrimination. He also quoted an extract from the booklet by Gwendolen M. Carter entitled *Southern Africa: Prospects for change*, published in 1974 by the Foreign Policy Association, which gave an indication of the extent to which the United States was militarily involved in South Africa. An even more alarming analysis was to be found in an article by Tad Szulc entitled "Why are we in Johannesburg?" in the October issue of *Esquire*. He quoted extracts from the article and recommended it for study.

10. ANC hoped that the United States would cease to fight on the side of fascism and would take up the cause of human rights in Africa. The United States would enhance its prestige in the United Nations if it did not exercise its veto in favour of *apartheid*.

11. ANC had noted the close relations and military alliance between France and South Africa. France was the foremost supplier of arms to South Africa and its military collaboration permitted the transfer of valuable expertise to the South African forces. The South African Ministry of Defence had sent a military mission to France in 1959 to study French counter-guerrilla tactics and the methods of torture used against Algerian patriots. On the return of the mission the South African defence and armed forces had been reorganized and the South African intelligence forces had since received training in France. A memorandum concerning the economic relations between France and South Africa had been submitted by ANC to the Special Committee on *Apartheid*.<sup>1</sup> The French Government should be compelled to desist from its support of the racist régime and begin to implement United Nations resolutions on the arms embargo. France was one of the major military allies of the régime and was plotting to perpetuate colonialism, racist oppression and exploitation in southern Africa.

12. The Federal Republic of Germany was rendering increasing economic, political and military support to the white racist régime. ANC had details of that support, in particular of the collaboration designed to make the Federal Republic itself and South Africa into nuclear Powers. The Federal Republic of Germany was a party to the violation of United Nations resolutions. It had said much but done little to dissociate itself from the nazism of the past; it was incumbent on the Federal Republic to take decisive action to that end. He urged that the Government, transnational corporations, banking institutions and cultural and sporting associations of the Federal Republic should immediately dissociate themselves from the *apartheid* régime, whose policies and practices were modelled on those of Nazi Germany.

13. Despite its anti-Semitic background, the South African racist régime had established an alliance with Zionist Israel. Once again, the common denominator was the desire for profits from the exploitation of cheap black labour. The Jews should be among the people most sensitive to racism and fascism, for they had been direct victims of those evils, but the violence of zionism seemed to equal that of nazism and *apartheid*. He called upon the Israeli régime to withdraw from the occupied lands in the Middle East and abandon its expansionist and aggressive policies. He would not go into details of the involvement of the other racist

régimes with South Africa, but he cited Japan and Switzerland as examples of such régimes.

14. The South African régime had all the characteristics of a colonial and imperialist Power; its basic policy was expansionism and aggression. The racist settlers had been international exploiters and oppressors from the moment they had arrived at the Cape of Good Hope. It was no accident that the roots of slavery and genocide had been planted in South Africa by sailors who had landed ostensibly to establish a vegetable garden to supply the ships of the Dutch East India Company. The history of the country since then had been one of expansion and robbery; indeed, even the South Africa Act of 1910 envisaged the incorporation of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. The Bantustans were the extension of South Africa's colonialist policy, a policy that had had its acid test in Namibia. He stressed that the crimes against humanity enunciated in the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* were crimes that had been committed by the South African régime from the moment it had become the centre of international capital and the greatest exploiter of African and international labour. The racist aggression had become more blatant in Namibia, in the military activities in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe and in the subversive actions against Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania. The monster must be curbed. The policy of *apartheid* was being discussed at a time when the General Assembly had adopted the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. He emphasized that the Programme was one of action.

15. There was no need to elaborate on the implications of the International Convention. Suffice it to say that those who claimed to be opposed to *apartheid* had not yet signed or ratified it. The people of South Africa urged that the Convention should immediately be signed and ratified and that action should be taken to establish tribunals to try and convict the international criminals.

16. Mr. HACÈNE (Algeria), supported by Mr. BEAVOGUI (Guinea) and Mr. JAZZAR (Syrian Arab Republic), requested that a transcript of the statement by the representative of ANC should be circulated to the Committee.

17. Mr. YUSUF (Somalia) supported the Algerian request and the suggestion of the representative of ANC.

18. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the General Assembly, by the decision taken at its 2236th plenary meeting, had authorized the Special Political Committee to obtain, on specific request, transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings or portions thereof. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed that a transcription should be made of the statement by the representative of ANC in accordance with the special authorization and the request that had just been made.

*It was so decided.*<sup>2</sup>

19. The CHAIRMAN said that due note would be taken of the suggestion of the representative of ANC, supported by

<sup>1</sup> A/AC.115/L.395.

<sup>2</sup> The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated in document A/SPC/PV.912.



the representative of Somalia, and that inquiries would be made as to whether the documentation in question could be made available to the Committee.

20. Mr. FADHLI (Democratic Yemen) paid a tribute to the Chairman, the representative of a country known for its humanitarian aid to others.

21. The discussion of the item had revealed the complicity between South Africa and certain countries that claimed to have humane policies. The patent ties between South Africa and Israel, proof of which could be found in the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1), did not serve the cause of peace and harmed the peoples that were victims of the two régimes.

22. The policy of *apartheid*, which had had tragic effects in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia, would not be possible without the support of the Western imperialist and other reactionary Governments that rendered military and political assistance to South Africa. International monopolies were exploiting the African people and their natural resources in the service of the white minority. Other African countries had now learned the true nature of the Israeli régime and had broken off relations with it. The Government of South Africa had been among the first to give military aid to Israel when it had attacked the Arab countries. He paid a tribute to Lebanon which had broken off relations with South Africa and to India which had refused to play against South Africa in the Davis Cup tennis competition. He urged all the Governments that were collaborating with South Africa to reconsider their policies.

23. Effective measures were needed to end South Africa's racist policies. First, pressure must be brought to bear on the imperialist countries to persuade them to cease collaborating with South Africa. Secondly, material assistance must be rendered to the African liberation movements fighting against the South African régime and international monopolies. Thirdly, the imprisoned African leaders must be released and an end must be put to the terrorism inflicted on them by the régime. Fourthly, the international community must show its solidarity with the South African people by adopting measures to deter the Government and expel it from the community of nations.

24. In July 1974 his country had signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and it had been among the sponsors of the text adopted as General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX), calling upon the Security Council to reconsider the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa.

25. Mr. BEAVOGUI (Guinea) paid a tribute to the Chairman, whose country was making a positive contribution to the struggle of the peoples of Africa to liberate themselves from all types of domination.

26. He commended the members of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, in particular the Chairman, for their efforts to eliminate *apartheid*, and the Rapporteur for the quality of the annual report (A/9622 and Corr.1). The Special Committee's mission to Europe had been successful in mobilizing international opinion, and such initiatives

deserved high praise. But despite the efforts of the Special Committee, it must be admitted that the measures adopted by the United Nations had not succeeded in making the minority régime of South Africa respect the values embodied in the Charter. There were more and more examples of massacres of workers for demanding just treatment, brutal repressions, assassination of outstanding members of the population, mass arrests, sentencing without conviction, torture and forced relocation of families.

27. For more than 20 years the United Nations had been passing resolutions ranging from simple warnings to recommendations for sanctions against the racist minority. The régimes' defiance destroyed the moral authority of the Organization. Could it be true that the racists were stronger than the United Nations? One reason for their persistence was the support that they received from the alliance of Western Powers, which claimed to be opposed to *apartheid* but helped to arm South Africa and shared with it the profits accruing from the exploitation of the South African people. He wished to remind South Africa's defenders that in the not very distant past they had themselves taken up arms to rid Europe of Hitlerite fascism. Hitler's policy differed very little from that of Vorster. The countries which talked of non-interference in the internal affairs of South Africa must understand that humanity and human rights had no colour and must be applied to all men without distinction.

28. The problem of *apartheid* was not stated correctly: it was not a problem of the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but a problem arising from colonial domination. As the Secretary-General of OAU had stated at the 908th meeting, the struggle against *apartheid* was a struggle for liberation, and history had showed that the problems of national liberation were solved by the victory of the freedom fighters.

29. The goal of the struggle in South Africa was to restore all powers to the Azanian people, who would exercise them through their democratically elected representatives. That concern had inspired the majority of the members of the General Assembly when it had adopted resolution 3151 (XXVIII) which accepted the liberation movements recognized by OAU as the authentic representatives of the South African people. Acting out of the same concern, the General Assembly, in approving the recommendation of the Credentials Committee (see A/9779, paras. 14 and 15), had recently rejected the credentials of the minority régime (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)) and had adopted a resolution (3207 (XXIX)) calling upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa.

30. When his delegation spoke of restoring power to the African majority it did not mean that it wanted to expel the whites from South African society. The idea of democratic and fraternal co-operation had in fact been underlined in the statement at the current session of the General Assembly (2262nd plenary meeting) by the Chairman of the eleventh session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU with regard to Portuguese nationals in African territories. The aim of the struggle was to be able to enjoy peace in Africa in liberty and dignity and maintain fraternal relations with all men. The struggle



would be carried on to victory, despite the obstacles raised by the allies of the minority régime.

31. His delegation expressed its gratitude to all Governments, anti-*apartheid* organizations and men, who, linking their declarations of intent to specific action, were helping to establish peace in South Africa and the African continent by eliminating *apartheid*.

32. Mr. MAHAYA (Uganda) said that the item under discussion was a perennial issue. For many years, the United Nations had appealed to South Africa to abolish its diabolical system, but to no avail. Its lack of success was not due to the fact that the racist régime was unaware of the grave dangers of following its inhuman policy, but because the appeals had been directed towards the wrong group. To combat *apartheid*, one must first identify its source of strength. The practice of *apartheid* in South Africa was a criminal conspiracy involving not only the white racist minority in South Africa, but also large and powerful Western imperialist Powers, and its perpetuation was dictated by the economic greed of those Western Powers.

33. The representatives of those Powers sat in the United Nations and professed to share the concern felt over the policy of *apartheid* in South Africa, but in reality they supported and would continue to support that policy, since it offered a guarantee for their continued plundering of the enormous resources of that unfortunate African country. The system of *apartheid* was, therefore, a well organized international criminal syndicate whose purpose was to appropriate the wealth of South Africa by the most cruel machinery possible. The representatives of the racist régime in South Africa could only be described as the on-the-spot operatives of the syndicate whose bosses were living in the Western capitals. It was therefore clear that the United Nations would have to attack at the root of that syndicate if it was to eradicate the crime of *apartheid*.

34. In the light of the recent events in Portugal, his delegation wished to issue a warning to those influential Western Powers which had invested in *apartheid* for their own comfort and self-aggrandizement. It wished to recall that a year earlier those Powers which had invested in *apartheid* had felt certain that Portugal would continue to control its colonies for a few more decades, hence their immense investment in the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme in Mozambique. His delegation did not believe that the 2 million whites in South Africa could hold down forever an indigenous population more than 10 times their number without the collusion of some big Powers. It hoped that when the Republic of Azania was proclaimed, the same Powers which were perpetuating *apartheid* would not turn round and appeal to African States to use their influence with the Government of Azania to protect the same interests now serving as the instrument of *apartheid*.

35. Mr. ARNAUD (Argentina) noted that despite intensive and continued international action to put an end to the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa, that policy had persisted. Those who practised *apartheid* were even attempting to create confusion and misunderstandings in order to weaken the efforts of those who opposed racial segregation in all its forms.

36. The Government and people of Argentina traditionally rejected every form of slavery, racial segregation, colonialism and the so-called policy of *apartheid*. Argentina, which had emerged as an independent State in 1810, had been one of the first nations to condemn slavery in 1813. The Coloured population had mingled and become integrated with the indigenous population and the descendants of European origin, and the resulting human mixture had been enriched by immigrants from all countries, without distinction as to creed, colour or race. The Constitution of Argentina did not allow prerogatives of blood or birth, and it proclaimed that all inhabitants were equal before the law and that ability was the sole criterion for acceding to employment. Accordingly, the people of Argentina had consistently rejected in the most categorical manner all forms of discrimination and segregation such as *apartheid*, the oppression of minorities, racial supremacy and religious persecution.

37. Non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States was also an Argentine tradition, which his Government reaffirmed. However, the policy of *apartheid* was not a country's domestic affair, for it violated the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, which bound all its Members. In accordance with its own practices and national sentiment, Argentina had, from the very first, rejected and condemned publicly and specifically the policy of *apartheid* in South Africa and the régime which practised that evil policy, and had voted and would vote in favour of United Nations resolutions condemning it.

38. His delegation had studied with particular attention the report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1) and the statements by its Chairman and Rapporteur at the 908th meeting of the Committee; it had listened with interest to the statements by the representatives of the liberation movements of South Africa at the 908th and 910th meetings.

39. The independence of Guinea-Bissau and the preparations for the independence of Mozambique were gratifying developments. His delegation hoped that they would be followed by other successes bringing to an end the last vestiges of colonialism in the world. It hoped that the problems of the Rhodesian régime would soon be overcome and that the policy of *apartheid* would be eradicated in South Africa.

40. Mr. MACKI (Oman) said that the policy of *apartheid* pursued by the white minority in South Africa was not, in the opinion of his delegation, a local problem whose adverse effects were confined to South Africa, but a problem of fundamental concern to the United Nations in view of the repeated and flagrant violations by the South African régime of the Charter, General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the established rules and instruments of international law. The arbitrary laws described in the report of the Special Committee showed up the isolation of the South African régime, particularly after the recent events in Portugal, as a result of which the Territories under Portuguese domination were acceding to independence.

41. In that connexion, his delegation wished to draw the Committee's attention to paragraph 119 of the Special

Committee's report, in which it was indicated that the Government of Israel had upgraded its diplomatic mission in South Africa to an embassy, despite the fact that the maintenance of diplomatic relations with South Africa ran counter to a number of General Assembly resolutions. His delegation had not been surprised at Israel's action, since that country had frequently violated United Nations resolutions.

42. The Government of Oman was firmly convinced that men must be given an opportunity to exercise their inalienable rights and to lead a life of dignity and worth. Therefore, Oman maintained no diplomatic ties with South Africa and its citizens did not engage in trade or maintain relations with that country. Oman had consistently denounced the policy of *apartheid* at international gatherings. In implementation of General Assembly resolution 3068 (XXVIII), Oman had been the seventh country to sign the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. Oman supported the recommendations formulated by the Special Committee in part II of its report. It believed that South Africa should not be allowed to receive assistance from other countries, and that the world should be alerted to the dangers arising from the provision of such assistance. Oman believed that no Government should pursue a policy of discrimination based on the colour of the skin, and was ready to participate in any action to eliminate the unjust policy of *apartheid*.

43. Mr. ABUCHAIBE (Colombia) said that there was a general feeling in the United Nations that little progress had been achieved towards resolving the problem of *apartheid*, despite numerous General Assembly resolutions condemning that policy. It was a sad fact that the United Nations had debated South Africa's racial and colonial policy since 1946 and that the situation of the South African people had not improved. It was also unfortunate that after 14 years of unceasing work by the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the policy of *apartheid* was being enforced more harshly in South Africa than ever before. Those considerations could lead only to the painful conclusion that the United Nations was currently in the throes of a serious institutional crisis. Greater coercive action and more effective instruments based on the Charter and the rules of procedure of the General Assembly were clearly required to meet the current situation. Article 6 of

the Charter stated that a Member which had persistently violated the principles contained in the Charter might be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. It was obvious that the principles of the Charter had been repeatedly violated by South Africa, but the Security Council had never taken action, because the crisis had originated in the Security Council. Since 1969, Colombia had advocated a revision of the Charter because it believed that when dealing with issues such as *apartheid*, the United Nations must be able to avail itself of different and more effective means of action. At the current session of the General Assembly (2251st plenary meeting), the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations had expressed the view that the Charter had been based on archaic notions of sovereignty and needed to be revised and updated to make it more effective and dynamic, and in 1969 the present President of Colombia had called attention to the need to revise the Charter, since it had been drafted in the light of geopolitical conditions which no longer existed. He had pointed out that today the Charter gave rise to delays, duplication, vagueness and lack of precision, and had reassured those who feared that revision of the Charter would mean a break with the spirit of the United Nations and perhaps a leap into the void.

44. *Apartheid* and peace were contradictory concepts for black people and incompatible in any part of the world. It was inconceivable that they would be accepted for long by the people of South Africa in a land which had formally belonged to them and in which they constituted the overwhelming majority. The Special Committee had made undeniable progress outside South Africa, but inside that country the situation had deteriorated. More arms despite the embargo, continued diplomatic relations, cultural visits and normal economic relations with South Africa in spite of General Assembly resolutions, might convince African people that they would do better to seek solutions directly, outside the framework of the United Nations and then formalize them, once they had been achieved.

45. Colombia supported the people of South Africa in their struggle against *apartheid* and maintained no diplomatic, trade, cultural or other relations with South Africa.

*The meeting rose at 6 p.m.*

## 913th meeting

Wednesday, 16 October 1974, at 11.05 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.913

### AGENDA ITEM 37

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)** (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804, A/9806, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

(a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;

(b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. FOUM (United Republic of Tanzania) said that the reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and the statements of its Chairman and Rapporteur at the 908th meeting of the Special Political Committee reflected two facts: on the one hand, there was increasing awareness of the dangers represented by the system of *apartheid* and consequently the struggle against that system was being intensified; on the other hand, the situation in South Africa was deteriorating as the Pretoria régime was refining its oppressive machinery.

2. Once again, no doubt, there would be some who would insist that the United Nations should use persuasion to change the *apartheid* régime. But such opinions were fallacious for to do so would be to forget the lessons of history since that system was so profoundly racist and oppressive.

3. In South Africa, the State doctrine was based essentially on racial tyranny and the denial of humanity. The Pretoria régime had enacted laws which, based on the racial supremacy of the whites, determined every aspect of human activity and dictated the course of life. South Africa was the only country in the world where a human being was not the equal of another human being if he or she was not white. Any opposition, even peaceful opposition, was regarded as rebellion and punishable by banning orders, indefinite detention, police brutality and torture.

4. The régime had also sought desperately to mislead world public opinion and to give credence to the apologists of *apartheid*. As an example, he referred to the policy of Bantustans, which was supposedly aimed at promoting self-determination, but which the régime used merely to drive the Africans from the richer lands into barren areas. That policy was, in fact, inseparable from the grand design of the authors of *apartheid*: to ensure absolute control of the country by the white racist minority.

5. Only the previous year, the Pretoria régime had adopted legislation authorizing it to order a tribe or part of a tribe to leave one area for another. It was therefore a régime whose avowed aim was to separate human beings from one another. It was clear that the régime's policy of Bantustans was aimed solely at promoting *apartheid*, depriving the

inhabitants of their natural rights, determining the destiny of their country, dismembering it and dispersing its people; it was clear that that policy was nothing but a criminal fraud.

6. In paragraph 14 of its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII), the General Assembly had condemned that aspect of the South African régime's policy of *apartheid*. He hoped that at the current session the Assembly would pay special attention to that question and that it would call for concerted action to make the evils of the Bantustan policy more widely known and take the necessary measures to ensure that that policy was neither recognized nor accepted.

7. The Pretoria régime, seeking by any means to gain time, had appointed three non-white representatives, who were nothing but puppets, to its delegation to the United Nations. That gesture, which was designed to mislead the international community, was both contemptible and dangerous and the international community should heighten its vigilance.

8. The reports of the Special Committee also showed that the situation in South Africa was deteriorating and represented a genuine threat to international peace and security. The responsibility for that explosive situation lay to a great extent with those countries which collaborated with the régime in various ways, particularly in the military and commercial fields. Recent figures showed that several Member States had not only continued, but even in some cases considerably expanded, their trade relations with South Africa. That was a betrayal of the legitimate aspirations of the people of South Africa, since such activities only served to encourage the *apartheid* régime materially and morally and thereby contributed to the threat to international peace and security.

9. Any military collaboration with the Pretoria régime could only encourage that régime in its internal oppression and external aggression. In that context, the activities of countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France required immediate action: that was one of the important points which the Committee must consider. The United Nations had a duty to condemn such activities and to call upon the countries concerned to desist from them.

10. Referring in particular to paragraph 205 of the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1), he said that his delegation also wished to condemn categorically the collusion between the Fascist South African régime and Israel, which had both consistently flouted the decisions taken by the United Nations against the occupation of territories and the resolutions relating to the inalienable rights of peoples. His delegation was also concerned at the continued co-operation between some



Latin American countries and South Africa. It had been disturbed, in particular, to see the diplomatic relations between Brazil and Pretoria raised to the ambassadorial level and to note the cordiality of the relations between Paraguay and the *apartheid* régime. Such attitudes could only jeopardize the efforts at co-operation between the peoples of Africa and Latin America and their solidarity in the struggle against *apartheid*. For that reason, he asked the countries of South America to sever links which could only raise South Africa's credit, to express their abhorrence of *apartheid* and thereby to reinforce the isolation of the system of *apartheid* until its total elimination.

11. Similarly, relations between South Africa and some Asian countries, such as Iran, were a source of concern. In view of the efforts which that country had in the past made to combat *apartheid*, a brotherly appeal should be made to Iran to take all necessary measures to sever all links with the *apartheid* régime.

12. Despite the awesome repressive capacity of the South African régime, the people of South Africa, led by their national liberation movement, had not been cowed into submission. Their struggle was the struggle of all the peoples of the world, for *apartheid* was a challenge to the international community and a threat to international peace and security. Concerted action must be taken to ensure the total isolation of South Africa. In that connexion, his delegation was encouraged by the statement which the representative of the new Portuguese Government had made to the Special Political Committee (909th meeting). Portugal's change of attitude was the inevitable result of the struggle of the peoples for their liberation, which must ultimately be achieved.

13. The Committee should take into account the fact that the General Assembly, in approving the recommendation of the Credentials Committee (see A/9779, paras. 14 and 15), had recently rejected, by an overwhelming majority, the credentials of the representatives of South Africa (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)); thus it had once again expressed universal condemnation of a system which represented a flagrant violation of the Charter. His delegation hoped that that condemnation would lead the Security Council to confirm South Africa's isolation. During the course of the Committee's work, his delegation would have an opportunity to express its full support for the conclusions and recommendations formulated by the Special Committee in its report.

14. Mr. HACÈNE (Algeria), after welcoming the delegations of Bangladesh, Grenada and, in particular, Guinea-Bissau, said that everything had already been said on the question of the policy of *apartheid*. However, further information had been provided in the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1), in the statement by the Chairman of that Committee (908th meeting), and by the representatives of the people of South Africa whom the Special Political Committee had heard (908th, 910th and 912th meetings).

15. His delegation merely wished to say that it was the universally held view that the South African régime survived only because of the assistance of certain Powers which had a totally false idea of their own well-understood

interests. He referred to the statement made at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of his own country who had said (2150th plenary meeting) that it was impossible at the same time to show friendship for Africa and to give the proponents of *apartheid* the support which enabled them to consolidate their régime.

16. He then drew attention to the similarity that existed between the racist domination which the white minority in Pretoria exerted over the South African people and that which Tel-Aviv exerted over the Palestinian people. The aim of both those régimes was to serve the strategic and economic interests of imperialism and by that very fact they represented a threat to international peace and security. The feeling that they were united by the same destiny had impelled them to weave with each other a very dense network of links of all kinds: military, diplomatic and economic co-operation. The existence of a Pretoria-Tel Aviv axis was fundamental to the problem of *apartheid*.

17. In rejecting the credentials of the South African delegation and adopting, by an overwhelming majority, resolution 3207 (XXIX) calling upon the Security Council to reconsider the whole question of the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa, the General Assembly had made an important advance. It depended on a few countries to put an end to a régime which was reviled by the whole international community. It was high time that the actions of those countries conformed with their statements. The next meeting of the Security Council would give them an opportunity to respect their solemn undertakings.

18. With the recent accession of Guinea-Bissau to independence and the forthcoming independence of Mozambique and Angola, the geopolitical face of southern Africa had been completely changed. The régime of Ian Smith was condemned. The Azanian nationalists had indicated to the Committee that they were determined to pursue their struggle. The whole of Africa, including Algeria, would continue to support that struggle, as would the whole of the third world and all countries which loved justice and peace.

19. Mr. MARTYNENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa was a continuing cause of concern to the United Nations and many other international organizations. *Apartheid* had for a long time not been merely a local phenomenon. The aim of that policy was not only to oppress the non-white population of South Africa, but also to crush the African national liberation movements. *Apartheid* prevailed also in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia.

20. The current process of détente and improvement in the international situation favoured positive changes in the African continent. The overthrow of the Fascist régime in Portugal had helped to put an end to the colonial war waged against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The emergence of a new independent African State, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, and its admission to the United Nations represented a great victory for the national liberation movements in Africa.



21. However, racist and reactionary régimes continued to exist in Africa and threatened the freedom and independence of African peoples. The most dangerous was unquestionably the *apartheid* régime in South Africa.

22. At the political level, *apartheid* was racist dictatorship by a white minority. At the economic and social level, it was the pitiless exploitation of African workers. Such a system could be maintained only by violence, and institutionalized violence laid down in racist laws, by the oppression of the non-white population, by terror and by massacres.

23. The *apartheid* system was contrary to mankind's concepts of justice, fraternity among peoples, equality and liberty. The question of *apartheid* had appeared regularly on the agenda of the General Assembly and the Security Council and had been regularly condemned by them.

24. However, despite the appeals and condemnations of the United Nations, the racist régime in South Africa continued its criminal policy with impunity. It was able to do so largely because of the position of some States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which, notwithstanding United Nations resolutions, were providing political, military, economic and other support to the racist régime in South Africa.

25. The international monopolies had invested thousands of millions of dollars in the South African economy and were in effect the principal "shareholders" in *apartheid*. Assistance from its overt and covert allies prevented the implementation of the United Nations decisions calling for the complete isolation of the Pretoria régime and permitted it to pursue its policy of *apartheid*.

26. His delegation agreed with the conclusion repeatedly reached by the General Assembly and the Security Council that the *apartheid* régime posed a threat to world peace and security. South Africa threatened the sovereignty of its neighbours. It was continuing to develop its military potential with the active help and support of States members of NATO.

27. All progressive forces were ceaselessly combating racism and *apartheid*. The universal and complete isolation of the racist régimes and the total implementation, by all States, of the relevant United Nations resolutions were among their most important goals in that struggle.

28. The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* would play an important role in the fight against racism and *apartheid*. The Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had been among the first States to sign that important document in the hope that it would enter into force as soon as possible.

29. In that connexion, it should be stressed that the countries of the socialist community had consistently pursued and would continue to pursue a policy of active support for the African peoples in their fight against colonialism, racist oppression and *apartheid*.

30. Mr. TAÏEB (Morocco) welcomed the representatives of Bangladesh, Guinea-Bissau and Grenada. He thanked the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* for its excellent report. He noted that the efforts of the international community were meeting with total intransigence from the racist régime, which was completely disregarding the resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations.

31. The Kingdom of Morocco, which had always scrupulously implemented the resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), viewed with growing concern the continuation of the policy of *apartheid*. That was a matter of concern not only to the oppressed peoples of southern Africa and their neighbours but to all countries in the world which respected liberty and human dignity.

32. While, on the one hand, the international community had watched the favourable evolution of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination, it had also witnessed the growing subjugation of the South African people. The desperate efforts of the Vorster Government had been directed against African students and South African militants in exile.

33. The South African Government could not have defied the international community without the assistance of certain Powers. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco had denounced that collusion in the General Assembly (2249th plenary meeting).

34. Evidence of the similarity between the policies and doctrines of Israel and South Africa was provided by the fact that the two countries had raised their diplomatic relations to embassy level and had strengthened their military, economic and cultural ties. Moreover, as a result of the Zionists' control of information media throughout the world, the international community was not fully aware that the policy of the Zionist régime in Palestine was based not only on ethnic and religious discrimination but above all on the liquidation of the Palestinian entity and the people of Palestine. If one condemned the policy of *apartheid*, one must also condemn its Israeli counterpart, which constituted a very serious threat to world peace.

35. The occupation and exploitation of Namibia by South Africa constituted a further serious challenge to the world community. In the face of the provocation by Pretoria, it was not enough to deplore and condemn. The relationship of the United Nations with the South African Government must be reconsidered in its entirety. It was in that spirit that his delegation had voted in favour of the reconsideration of the credentials of the representatives of the white South African minority. However, more practical and energetic measures must be taken to put an end to the intolerable situation prevailing in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Concerted action by the members of the international community was more necessary than ever in order to maintain and consolidate the momentum developed by the launching of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

36. Mr. TÜZEL (Turkey) welcomed the representatives of Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau and noted that, as a

result of the combined action of the Portuguese opposition and the liberation movements, Africa was freer today than it had been a year before. He hoped that Mozambique and Angola would also attain independence at an early date. That auspicious development should not, however, lead one to forget the continuing sufferings of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Azania and Namibia. The presence of Africans in the South African delegation had deceived no one. The statements by the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) had depicted the situation prevailing in South Africa.

37. While endorsing the recommendations made in the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1), which was excellent, his delegation believed that they would not suffice to solve the problem. It was the Azanian people's yearning for freedom that would bring them victory.

38. It could not be denied that there were obstacles and obstructions in the way of concerted action by the United Nations. However, the majority of Member States were determined to continue the struggle; the fact that the General Assembly had rejected the credentials of the representatives of the Vorster régime demonstrated that determination. His delegation sincerely hoped that the Security Council would render justice to the South African people when it considered the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa, as the General Assembly had requested.

39. An important process of evolution was under way. As the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had said, "The wind of freedom, after the pause on the banks of the Zambezi, has now reached Limpopo." The question now was whether it would soon reach the Cape. The reply to that question was important; it was important for the South African people, whose fate depended on it, and it was also important for the rest of the international community, which day after day had to witness the shameful spectacle of *apartheid*, a crime against humanity and a threat to international peace and security.

40. Mr. ABDEL RAHIM (Sudan) congratulated the Chairman and the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on their excellent work. Their reports showed that the Pretoria régime, a victim of its own blindness, was stubbornly refusing to take the outstretched hand of the African peoples and rejecting the appeals to reason launched by the United Nations and other international organizations. The forces of liberation would not, however, succumb. Guinea-Bissau was already a Member of the United Nations although the Fascist régime against which it had had to struggle and which for so long had been an apparently invincible ally of South Africa had done everything in its power to oppress it exactly as South Africa was oppressing the peoples still under its domination. Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola had been able to stand up to that régime and, by liberating themselves, had enabled the people of metropolitan Portugal itself to overthrow their oppressors and also regain their freedom. By the same token, when the freedom fighters of Azania liberated their brothers from the Fascist yoke, they would, at the same time, bring liberty to those other victims of

*apartheid*, the South African whites. Paradoxically, liberty must sometimes be imposed by force; it might therefore be necessary to impose it on the white communities of South Africa and Zimbabwe. In the final analysis, if the freedom fighters of those countries wished to restore and protect human dignity, they wished it for all men, including those who, by adopting racism in theory and in practice or sympathizing with it, had been no less its victims.

41. As the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had so clearly brought out in the reports he had submitted to the Committee and in the statement introducing them (908th meeting), what was delaying the liberation of both the victims and the perpetrators of racism in South Africa was that certain senior States Members of the United Nations, in total disregard of international opinion, numerous United Nations resolutions and the interests of the people of South Africa, were continuing to sustain the Pretoria régime by providing it with weapons, economic assistance and other forms of aid. Together with all the peoples of Africa, and in unison with the international community at large, his country called upon the countries concerned, if only in consideration of their own long-term interests, to desist forthwith from aiding the racist régime of South Africa. Considering the continuous flouting of all such calls to reason, his country had the week before signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and it wholeheartedly supported the various other recommendations made in the Special Committee's report with a view to combating and eradicating *apartheid* and all forms of racism and racial discrimination throughout the world.

42. In the course of his statement introducing the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the Chairman of that Committee had expressed concern at the fact that the South African régime and Israel had strengthened their diplomatic, military, cultural and other ties. It was ironical that the African peoples had given their lives in the war against the Nazi racists, who had exterminated millions of Jews, and African rulers had tried to promote a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, yet an alliance was emerging between Israel and the Nazis of South Africa. His delegation was by no means surprised that there should be such an alliance for both were colonial settler States. Both looked on themselves as "chosen people", superior to the indigenous population whose lands they had stolen. Both were client States and agents of international imperialism seeking to preserve imperialist interests, one in the southern part of Africa and the other in North Africa and the Middle East. In consequence the international community and the United Nations had repeatedly condemned the policies and practices of the two régimes. However, both régimes had reacted in the same way; as they became increasingly isolated, they claimed that the numerous condemnations made against them were nothing but the result of the "mechanical majority" in the General Assembly. Such a claim was ridiculous.

43. The struggle for the elimination of all forms of racism and colonialism, whether in the form of *apartheid* or Zionism, would proceed unabated. The adoption of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, the launching of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimi-

nation, the hearings in the United Nations of the representatives of the peoples and liberation movements of Palestine and South Africa, the demand to expel South Africa and subsequently Israel, from the United Nations all clearly showed that mankind had resolved to move in the direction of the total liberation of oppressed peoples and of the elimination of all forms of racist tyranny and colonial oppression.

44. *Apartheid* and zionism would understandably continue to defend themselves and to ally themselves with each other and with similar racist and colonial régimes. They would too continue their efforts to sow confusion in peoples' minds, to misrepresent facts, to infiltrate the ranks of freedom fighters, to kill and murder even innocent civilians, whether at Sharpeville, in Botswana or in the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon. But neither deception nor any increase in violence and oppression would hold back those who were resolved to struggle for freedom, humanity and the right of peoples to self-determination. Inspired by the ideals and principles laid down in the Charter and by the resolutions of the United Nations, and backed by the peace-loving majority in the General Assembly, the fighters for freedom everywhere would win.

45. Mr. BRUNO (Uruguay) welcomed the three new Member States of Bangladesh, Guinea-Bissau and Grenada, who would from now on be sitting in the Committee.

46. Uruguay was opposed to all forms of racial discrimination, a principle which was inherent both in its traditions and in its positive law. It had been the first country to make the declaration laid down in article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and thus to recognize the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to receive and examine communications from persons and groups of persons who complained that they were the victims of a violation of any of the rights listed in the Convention. Uruguay could not view with indifference any form of racial discrimination which violated one of the fundamental principles which had led to the creation of the United Nations.

47. Ever since the adoption of its first charter in 1830, Uruguay had adhered to the principle that all men were equal and had prohibited any discrimination based on race, origin, religion etc., a principle which was explicitly laid down in the Uruguayan Constitution. That Constitution stated, *inter alia*, that all men were equal before the law and that any distinctions between them were due to their personal abilities. By reason of such equality in principle before the law, it was forbidden, for example, to apply any special legislation to certain minorities or persons because of the colour of their skin or their ethnic origin. That same principle of equality before the law ensured in Uruguay complete equality before the courts. Furthermore it ensured that all enjoyed equal protection in legal matters. Consequently the elaboration and adoption of international rules for the abolition of discriminatory practices for racial reasons were regularly given priority in Uruguay. Genuine respect for human rights by every State was essential for the maintenance of international peace and the violation of such rights anywhere in the world was therefore a threat to peace.

48. The reports submitted by the Special Committee on *Apartheid* to the Committee and the statements introducing those reports made by the Chairman and the Rapporteur of the Special Committee showed that that Committee was working along lines which his country approved, namely it was ensuring that the international community was endeavouring to give to millions of individuals the protection they obviously needed against the policy of *apartheid* which burdened their existence. The work of the Special Committee was important also because *apartheid* was an international problem which constantly put to the test the ability of the United Nations to act.

49. There was no doubt, judging by the reports of the Special Committee, that the policy of *apartheid* was almost universally regarded as contrary to law and justice, and world public opinion should realize that fact. The reports also showed that numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations which condemned *apartheid* had remained ineffective. That was not necessarily the fault of the Organization, which was not a world Government, whose decisions were not mandatory, and which was often thwarted by the political will of certain States.

50. The various elements of the Special Committee's action programme were the ones that Uruguay had supported at previous sessions and which should meet with general approval. His delegation hoped that the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination would mark the beginning of a new era in which all men would live as true brothers in freedom and equality.

51. Mr. BRIGHT (Sierra Leone) deeply regretted that the Committee should once again be directing its attention to the question of *apartheid*. If they failed to oppose that hateful policy, the States Members of the United Nations would be accepting the absurdity of a principle which amounted to negating the basic equality and the common destiny of all mankind. Among the States that should be singled out in that respect were those which enjoyed special economic and cultural relations with the South African régime. Consequently a special obligation rested on them to help, together with the rest of the international community, in creating a new South Africa. If those States rejected *apartheid* as categorically as they professed, they should be engaging in dialogue with South Africa about the elimination of *apartheid* instead of recommending dialogue to the United Nations.

52. The black people of South Africa were struggling not for a slight improvement in their material living conditions, but for the complete elimination of *apartheid* and for full equality for all the people in South Africa. On that question, there could be no compromise and no doubt. There could be no question of preventing the black people of South Africa from fighting for their freedom when so many other peoples had, as in Europe, been able to do so, by having recourse to armed struggle if necessary. It was unacceptable that those black people should have to wait for charity from their oppressors or to rely on the good offices of others.

53. The African people of South Africa believed in peace. In fact the Nobel Peace Prize in 1960 had been awarded to Chief Albert Luthuli. But the South African régime had

done everything in its power to prevent a peaceful and legitimate struggle for freedom. Repression could only compel oppressed people to resort to other forms of struggle. If the United Nations believed in peace, it was its duty to put an end to such repression. The African people in South Africa, OAU and the United Nations had repeatedly called for a peaceful solution, but the South African régime had consistently rejected all such initiatives.

54. Every item of armament supplied to the racist régime of South Africa released local funds which it used to repress the freedom fighters and which encouraged it to embark on military adventures. By revitalizing the South African economy with arms and investments, certain Member States

were indirectly contributing to South Africa's aggressions against independent African States.

55. His delegation wished to appeal once again to all the special friends and trading partners of South Africa to join in a vigilant universal boycott—diplomatic, cultural and economic—against that country. If it were cut off from the mainstream of its ethnic, cultural and economic heritage, the racist minority in South Africa could not long survive its isolation. It was only necessary to ensure that the boycott was comprehensive in scope and universally applied.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*

## 914th meeting

Wednesday, 16 October 1974, at 3.30 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.914

### AGENDA ITEM 37

**Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa**  
(continued) (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804, A/9806, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on Apartheid;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. N'DIAYE (Senegal) congratulated the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on its excellent work over the previous year.

2. At a time when it was welcoming the three new States Members of the United Nations, Guinea-Bissau, Bangladesh and Grenada, the Committee had to reopen the sinister dossier on *apartheid*. For a short time the régime in Pretoria would be placed in the dock at the United Nations, and the officials of that régime and their puppets in the Committee would ask themselves what the future held for *apartheid* and for those who supported it.

3. Recent events, such as the initiation of the process of decolonization by the democratic Government in Portugal and the categorical rejection by the Credentials Committee of the credentials of the representatives of the Pretoria régime (see A/9779, paras. 14 and 15), gave a new dimension to the situation.

4. The content of the documents before the Committee, in particular three of the reports of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9780, A/9781), were too familiar to require re-examination.

5. The racist régime had two options open to it: the Government in South Africa could renounce its dead-end policy of *apartheid* and accept the investiture in Azania of a

democratic government representing the majority of the population of the country; alternatively, and more to the liking of the neo-Nazi protagonists of Hitlerian philosophy, it could continue to reinforce the *apartheid* system in isolation.

6. His Government, in accordance with its humanistic policy, sincerely hoped that the minority racist régime in Pretoria would learn from the recent example of Portugal, the overwhelming vote in the General Assembly and the categorical rejection of the credentials of South Africa by the Credentials Committee, and that it would henceforth choose the path of reason. Above all, it should accept General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and withdraw immediately from the Territory of Namibia. It should also accept and implement all resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) concerning the question of South Africa and the policy of *apartheid*. Were it solemnly to undertake to act in that way, it would find the necessary support in the international community to establish a social and economic system free from racial, political or religious discrimination and a democratic government representing all races and religions in Azania.

7. Unfortunately, there was currently no indication that the racists in Pretoria were prepared to choose the path of peace particularly while their friends continued to increase their assistance to them despite their numerous declarations against *apartheid*. Although certain apparently progressive juridical and administrative measures had been adopted, all the indications were that the oppressive régime in South Africa would choose to remain in isolation and strengthen its system of domination and racial discrimination. For that reason, his delegation fully supported the recommendations made in the report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1), particularly those designed to strengthen international action against *apartheid*. Following the rejection of the credentials of South Africa, the Security Council should



not hesitate to adopt the requisite measures against the puppet racist régime in Pretoria.

8. Until such time as a government representing the entire population of South Africa was established, the participation of the minority white régime in the activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should be suspended in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions adopted by that body and by OAU.

9. The time had come for strict implementation by all countries, without exception, of the sanctions decreed against South Africa. It was necessary to condemn, yet again, all those who collaborated with the racist Government, and certain Western Powers which continued to use fallacious arguments as a legal basis for their collaboration with and assistance to South Africa. There was evidence that States which supported the cause of the African people were strengthening the military power of the racist régime. He noted with regret the large arms sale by an Arab country to South Africa for the illegal Smith régime, although the terms of sale of those arms had specified that they should not be sent to Rhodesia.

10. The racist minority in South Africa should understand the determination of Africans to eradicate the cancer of the policy of *apartheid* and domination practised by the minority régimes in southern Africa.

11. When Portugal and Spain completed the process of decolonization of their Territories in Africa and when Mozambique, Angola and the Cape Verde Islands acceded to independence, United Nations action should be focused on the struggle against *apartheid* and the minority régimes which enforced that policy. Material and financial assistance to the freedom fighters and to the oppressed peoples of Azania, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia should be increased. The struggle against *apartheid* and the minority régimes in Africa could end only in a victory which might be very bitter for those régimes.

12. He appealed to the racist officials in South Africa and to all minority Governments in Africa, through their friends in the Committee, to learn and act before it was too late, since no force in the world could resist the unleashed anger of a people long trampled upon and exploited.

13. Mr. PAVIČEVIĆ (Yugoslavia) welcomed the representatives of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the People's Republic of Bangladesh and Grenada and also the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), the true representatives of the large majority of the people of South Africa, and emphasized the political significance of their participation in the work of the Special Political Committee. He congratulated the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on its excellent reports. His country fully endorsed the important work of the Special Committee. Its reports on the various aspects of *apartheid* and the struggle against it would contribute to the success of the work of the Committee.

14. It was universally recognized that the policy of *apartheid* pursued by South Africa and the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia was the most evil system of violation of

fundamental rights, and there was a long list of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions condemning the racist policy of the régime in South Africa and the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and providing for the adoption of measures against those régimes. South Africa continued to disregard the demands of the United Nations to end the policy of *apartheid* and its illegal occupation of Namibia and, though a Member of the United Nations, systematically ignored and violated the resolutions of that Organization. Furthermore, it was strengthening the inhuman system of *apartheid* by military, economic, legal, police and other repressive measures. It had adopted a régime of suppression, force and total discrimination towards the majority, the non-white population of South Africa. The extension to Namibia and Zimbabwe of an economic and social system based on *apartheid* and the most brutal exploitation of people who had been deprived of all their rights gave rise to the gravest concern.

15. Internationally, the South African racists were attempting to offset the effects of the boycott of their country by the international community by linking themselves to the forces of imperialism and international reaction. They threatened the security of independent African States and sought to impede the process of decolonization in the Portuguese colonies. With assistance from abroad, they were determined to maintain the system of *apartheid* which enabled them to enrich themselves through unlimited exploitation of the majority of the population. They were therefore responsible for the dangerous and critical situation in southern Africa.

16. Recent events had brought about changes in international relations and constituted an evolution in the fight against *apartheid*. Resistance by oppressed populations to *apartheid* and racist régimes was growing in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The changes in Portugal and in the colonial policy of that country had wide international implications and were of particular importance in the context of the struggle against *apartheid*. They represented the beginning of the eradication of the vestiges of colonialism in Africa and in the world.

17. He endorsed the view expressed by the Chairman of the Special Committee (908th meeting) that the momentum of the struggle against *apartheid* must be maintained. As emphasized in the report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1), that struggle should be waged on a broad front and should include action by the United Nations, the specialized agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, trade unions and other democratic movements, with a view to securing the political isolation of the South African racists. Economic blockade and the breaking off of all relations with the racist régimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia by all countries would lead to the downfall of *apartheid* which was a crime against humanity and an indignity which the United Nations was still compelled to endure.

18. As stated in the report of the Special Committee, the fact that the arms embargo against South Africa, imposed in accordance with the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, was not respected by some industrially developed Western countries, gave rise to grave concern. The racist régime sought the support of Western

countries and Israel, which itself conducted its relations with Arab countries on the basis of force and occupation. Currently, that was the most serious obstacle to the solution of the over-all problem of *apartheid* and the successful completion of the process of decolonization. Weapons sold by those countries to South Africa would be used against the majority of the population of that country. Furthermore, they constituted a threat to independent neighbouring African countries. Countries supplying weapons to the racist régimes were aware of that situation and bore full responsibility for possible consequences.

19. The report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the statement by the Chairman of that Committee, and in particular the substantive statement by the representative of ANC (912th meeting) had shown the enormous economic, financial, technological and military involvement of some Western countries in South Africa. The imperialists and colonialists had vast financial and strategic interests in the extremely rich part of Africa where the racist régimes had established themselves. By fighting to preserve the system of *apartheid* the racists were securing a basis for their unlimited enrichment. Hence, by supporting the racist régimes and, thereby, *apartheid*, the Western countries secured their interests in South Africa and their share of the super-profits derived from the exploitation of that country. However, it was the view of his delegation that that was not the best way of safeguarding those interests. Recent developments in international relations demonstrated that people throughout the world were struggling for freedom and more equitable international political and economic relations. The attention of world public opinion should be concentrated on countries which maintained relations with racist régimes. The General Assembly should call upon all the countries to cease all military co-operation and all other forms of relations with South Africa in accordance with the positions they had adopted in the United Nations and their strong condemnation of *apartheid* before world opinion, as distinct from their actual practices.

20. Non-aligned and developing countries regarded the struggle against *apartheid* in South Africa as part of the struggle for the final eradication of colonialism and at the same time as a struggle against the forces of imperialism and international reaction which constituted the mainstay of resistance to the efforts of the peoples of the developing countries to effect a change in the unfair system of international political and economic relations. The people of South Africa were fighting against *apartheid* and the exploitation of a people numbering several million by the white minority which used them as a cheap labour to exploit the riches of their own land. Those people wished to share fully in the benefits deriving from the wealth of their country of which they had been deprived through colonialism, racial discrimination and *apartheid*. African solidarity with the just struggle of Arab countries against Israeli aggression and occupation, in the form of political, military and particularly economic boycott of Israel and its allies, had produced concrete results. Similar solidarity among all non-aligned and developing countries was essential in the struggle against colonialism, racism and *apartheid* in South Africa.

21. His country's position and its contribution to the struggle against colonialism, racism and *apartheid* were well

known. It assisted and supported the struggle against colonialism in accordance with the decisions of the Conferences of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and those of OAU. It had consistently implemented all resolutions concerning South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and, within its possibilities, provided all-out support and material and other assistance to the liberation movements in Africa and to the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

22. His Government would shortly sign the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. It had also adopted measures for the implementation of the Programme of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

23. The presence of the true representatives of the people of South Africa at the United Nations, the decision of the Credentials Committee and General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX) calling upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and the racist régime in South Africa were indicative of the pressure of world opinion on the Organization to isolate that régime.

24. His country fully supported the recommendations and decisions of OAU and the recommendations and decisions of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, in particular, those concerned with the arms embargo against South Africa, the cessation of all economic, sporting and other relations with the racist régime, the prohibition of emigration to South Africa, all forms of economic and financial co-operation with South Africa, and pressure to release prisoners gaoled for their struggle against *apartheid*.

25. The expansion and strengthening of the struggle of the enslaved peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe and Azania in the face of growing terrorism by the white racists showed that the collapse of the system of *apartheid* was inevitable. There must be full support for the growing internal resistance by the non-white population in South Africa with a view to the destruction of the racist system.

26. He endorsed the view expressed by the representatives of Sweden (910th meeting) and Finland (911th meeting) that southern Africa was a potential hotbed of crisis. Oppressed people fighting to liberate themselves from colonialism, imperialism and exploitation would triumph in the end and South Africa would become a community of equal peoples and races.

27. Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic) said that the resolution adopted at the twenty-eighth session had underscored the right of the people of South Africa to use any means necessary to fight for their freedom. One particularly important provision was that contained in paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) calling upon all States that maintained relations with South Africa to recall their military attachés and close down their commercial offices; the provision in the same paragraph calling on States to refuse to grant trade credits or investment guarantees to South Africa was also an important weapon in the fight against *apartheid*. At the twenty-eighth session it had clearly been established that the liberation movements recognized by OAU were the legitimate representatives of the people of South Africa.



The rejection of the credentials of the representatives of the racist régime, the decision to request the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa, and the admission of Guinea-Bissau as a Member of the United Nations, were important contributions in the struggle to eliminate the last traces of colonialism and racism from the continent of Africa. He noted with satisfaction the growing movement against *apartheid* in South Africa itself and throughout the world during 1974. A substantial contribution to the increasing solidarity with the struggling peoples of South Africa had been made by the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, which, as its Chairman had stated, had engaged in a very useful exchange of opinions with representatives of the public organizations of the socialist countries at its meetings in Berlin. He was pleased that the meetings in Berlin had provided further impetus to the struggle of peoples against *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

28. Despite world-wide protest, the racist régime in South Africa was stepping up its campaign of terror. There was copious incriminatory material in the report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1). The successes of the liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola had obviously frightened the leaders of the racist régime, who continued to believe mistakenly that they could prevent their own downfall by oppressing the people still more. They were extending their conspiracy with the reactionary forces in Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola with the intention of preventing the democratic and independent development of those countries. The illegal annexation of Namibia and the extension of the policy of *apartheid* to that country were being speeded up.

29. His delegation fully shared the view that greater efforts must be made to put an end to the policy of *apartheid* and the constant threat to peace in South Africa. The struggle would undoubtedly be successful. The developments in Portugal and Greece showed that there was no future for the reactionary régimes in South Africa or in Chile.

30. The report of the Special Committee showed that certain States were still failing to comply with decisions of the General Assembly against colonialism, racism and *apartheid*. South Africa's major trading partners bore a definite responsibility for the steadily deteriorating situation in South Africa and for the suffering of the peoples of Azania. The continuing supply of arms to South Africa was a particularly serious matter. The States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) responsible for that situation were providing the régime directly with the means to carry out its repressive policy. He welcomed the growing opposition from democratic forces and peoples with humanitarian leanings to military support of the régime in South Africa.

31. His delegation supported the intention of the United Nations to examine the activities of international monopolies and their operations in South Africa. The sixth special session of the General Assembly had brought to light further information on the growing status of international monopolies in South Africa. It was no secret that almost all the major monopolies had business interests there and made enormous profits from exploiting the African peoples.

Although politicians in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany frequently made the point that there was a big difference between trade and politics, there was no denying that the policies of the Pretoria régime would have failed long ago without the support and co-operation of the international monopolies. As his delegation had pointed out at the previous session (867th meeting), Governments bore the final responsibility for observance of the principles of the Charter by companies and individuals.

32. General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) mentioned the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa by all available means, including armed struggle. Reservations on that point helped to continue the domination by the colonialists and racists. It was clear that continued oppression of the population by the racist régime left the South African people no other way to protect their lives and rights. The changes in the former Portuguese colonies showed that such a struggle was inevitable and would succeed.

33. To side firmly with peoples fighting for their freedom was an important principle of his country's foreign policy. It therefore maintained no relations with the racist régime of South Africa. It had ratified the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* in the belief that if individual States assumed international undertakings, that would show the representatives of the racist régime how fallacious and fraught with destructive consequences their actions were. It would be extremely useful if all States became parties to the Convention, thereby showing their readiness to back the struggle against *apartheid* with deeds, not words.

34. His country would continue to give political, moral and material support to the fight against *apartheid*. It advocated the consistent implementation of all United Nations decisions against racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid*. It supported the implementation of the General Assembly recommendation to institute sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter. It expected the Security Council to take decisions that took into account the fact that South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligations as a Member of the United Nations for many years. His country would continue to be on the side of the people of Africa in their fight against the policy of *apartheid*, would continue to give the national liberation movements political, moral and material assistance, and would take an active part in preparations for the proposed world conference on action to combat racial discrimination. The German Democratic Republic had prepared an extensive programme in support of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. Studies would be published during the Decade on the role of multinational monopolies in the maintenance of racial discrimination in southern Africa. A documentary on *apartheid* was being filmed and preparations were being made for an international symposium on racism and racial discrimination. His delegation supported the recommendations made in paragraph 238 of the report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1). The international monopolies and banks should be required to refrain from investing in South Africa or granting it credits; the international monopolies should also be required to withdraw political investments and credits from the country.

35. His delegation was convinced that the possibilities had not been exhausted in the fight against colonialism. Despite the desperate resistance of the inhuman racist régime, the peace and human rights of the people of Azania could be secured.

36. Mr. MELHUIH (Australia) expressed his Government's regret that the Chairman of the Special Committee had not had time to include Australia among his visits for consultations with Governments. Australia's utter rejection of the intolerable practice of *apartheid* had been reaffirmed by its Prime Minister's statement to the General Assembly (2249th plenary meeting). South African sporting teams selected on a racial basis were not allowed to enter Australia and the Government consistently exerted pressure to dissuade Australian teams from taking part in sporting events in that country. Australia maintained an embargo on all exports of arms to South Africa and had requested the Government of that country not to replace the military attaché in Canberra. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had requested the heads of Australian companies with subsidiaries or associated companies in South Africa to adopt improved standards of pay and conditions for their non-white employees in South Africa and continually to seek opportunities for their advancement. The Australian Trade Commissioners in South Africa had been instructed to cease active promotion of trade and investment in that country and official Australian trade missions were no longer sponsored. Moreover, the Australian Government had undertaken to support any decision by the Security Council to impose sanctions against South Africa, provided that they were observed by South Africa's major trading partners. Australia also contributed to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa.

37. Australia, which was implacably opposed to racism and colonialism, hoped that the white minority who clung so desperately to the unjust system of *apartheid* would soon realize that their interests would be better served by abandoning their racist pretensions and joining with the majority of peoples in a spirit of democratic co-operation.

38. Mr. CHOU Chuch (China) said that over the previous year the African people had won new and inspiring victories in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, racism, zionism and hegemonism. The Fascist régime of Portugal had been overthrown at last. The Republic of Guinea-Bissau had been unanimously admitted into the United Nations, while the people of Mozambique had achieved historic progress on the road to independence and the Angolan people had continuously won new successes in their struggle. Even in South Africa, which was under ruthless Fascist domination, there was growing militant unity and mutual assistance and support between the African countries and people. The continent was full of vitality, and an excellent situation prevailed in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. The handful of racists and colonialists were panic stricken; they had found themselves in greater isolation.

39. The situation in Africa had been strikingly reflected in the United Nations. The Credentials Committee and the General Assembly (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)) had re-

jected the so-called credentials of the representatives of South Africa's racist régime, and the General Assembly had adopted resolution 3207 (XXIX), the draft text of which had been submitted by the African and other third world countries calling upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa. The South African Foreign Minister had been compelled to withdraw from the list of speakers in the general debate.

40. Nevertheless, the South African white racist would never step down from the stage of history of their own accord. They were desperately resorting to counter-revolutionary dual tactics in a vain attempt to save themselves from defeat. They had taken a number of palliative measures to dupe world public opinion and weaken the struggle of the Azanian people against racial discrimination and *apartheid* while intensifying, with the support of imperialist Powers, their violent repression of the mass struggle of the Azanian people. The experience of the African people had made them increasingly aware of the need to use revolutionary dual tactics in return. They must continue to expose the counter-revolutionary deceptive tactics while constantly mobilizing the masses to deal telling blows to the South African white colonialist authorities. The Solemn Declaration on General Policy adopted in 1973 at the Tenth Conference of Heads of State and Government of OAU had pointed out the correct road to liberation for the African people.

41. The Azanian people had won even broader sympathy and support from the people of Africa and the rest of the world in their struggle against white colonialist rule, racial discrimination and *apartheid*. The United Nations must sternly condemn the South African white colonialist authorities for their policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination. It must expose the counter-revolutionary dual tactics, further isolate South Africa in the international arena and apply total and effective sanctions against it. It must expose and condemn imperialism for its political, military and economic support of the South African racist régime and must call upon countries and peoples that upheld justice to give effective support and assistance to the just struggle of the Azanian peoples.

42. The World Peace Council had for a long time been the hired tool of a super-Power. While paying lip-service to opposition to imperialism, colonialism and *apartheid*, it was actually betraying the revolutionary struggles of the national liberation movements and the South African people. The world must not allow itself to be duped by such an organization.

43. His Government and people had consistently supported the just struggle of the Azanian people against colonialism and racism. They were confident that the heroic Azanian people would smash the vicious colonial system and emerge victorious with the support and assistance of Africa and the rest of the world.

44. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) expressed concern at the acceptance by the Secretary-General of credentials signed by a South African official whose credentials had already been rejected by the General Assembly. He did not fully understand the rules and regulations which governed United Nations practice and



his organization could of course not expect to influence or reform them from outside. However, when the people of Azania had attained independence through their determined struggle, they hoped to be able to join with other nations in updating those regulations. In any case, the acceptance of those credentials was inopportune at a time when delegation after delegation was expressing solidarity with the victims of unjust laws and enforced movements of population leading to effective genocide. Those victims and the freedom fighters could not be expected to understand that the hands of the Secretary-General were tied by rules supposedly designed to defend human rights and just causes.

45. White South Africans had come to realize that their régime must be changed and were trying to obscure the issue in the minds of the international community by gradually transforming the Bantustans into independent puppet régimes. In that way they were trying to buy time even though the national liberation movements must eventually win. The time would soon come when the States which had fought Nazi oppression, aided by all the sons and daughters of Africa, would have to vindicate their oft-repeated belief in the lofty ideals enshrined in their constitutions and choose between a régime led by supporters of nazism and the movements of national liberation.

46. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines), Rapporteur of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, introducing two further special reports (A/9803 and A/9804) submitted by the Special Committee in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3151 D (XXVIII), said that the former report, on assistance provided by Governments and non-governmental organizations to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements, outlined the needs of those people and the assistance to their legitimate struggle for freedom that could be provided in three major areas, namely, humanitarian assistance, educational assistance and political and other assistance. Paragraphs 27 to 49 gave details of the assistance provided in those fields. Paragraph 49 drew attention to the inadequacy of contributions to meet the humanitarian and educational needs of Africans and the political and other needs of the liberation movements.

47. In paragraphs 50 to 52, which contained the conclusions and recommendations, the Special Committee expressed the hope that the positive changes in the colonial Territories in Africa would enable donors, especially from the developed countries, to provide greater assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements. An appeal should be made to all Governments and peoples to provide more generous assistance to meet the various needs. The Special Committee intended to ensure greater publicity for those needs through further consultations with Governments, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations in consultation with OAU and leaders of the liberation movements.

48. Ever since its establishment, the Special Committee had stressed the importance of the contribution of the specialized agencies and other institutions within the United Nations system, regional organizations and other intergovernmental organizations to the international campaign to eliminate *apartheid*. That action was reviewed in

document A/9804. The Special Committee regretted, however, that little information was available on the action taken by intergovernmental organizations other than those within the United Nations system. Paragraphs 13 to 19 of the report discussed the action taken within the United Nations system to implement the General Assembly resolutions calling upon international and intergovernmental organizations to deny facilities to the South African Government until it denounced the policies of *apartheid*, and regretted that South Africa continued to be a member of some 25 intergovernmental organizations and approximately 10 organizations within the United Nations system. Although the World Bank had refrained from granting loans to South Africa since 1966, the benefits derived by that country from membership and participation in agencies such as GATT and IMF required further study.

49. No information was available on the implementation by the specialized agencies and other international organizations of the General Assembly's request in resolution 2506 B (XXIV) that they refrain from extending facilities to banks and other international financial institutions which provided assistance to the Government of South Africa and to companies registered there. Although, as stated in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the report, a number of agencies had allowed the representatives of liberation movements recognized by OAU to participate in their conferences and meetings, no programmes of assistance for the liberation movements had yet been undertaken.

50. Pursuant to several General Assembly resolutions, the Special Committee had continued to extend co-operation to the specialized agencies in their action against *apartheid* and noted with appreciation the co-operation of the ILO. However, no information was available on the employment of qualified South Africans who were victims of *apartheid* in the secretariats and programmes of the agencies or on the assistance by the agencies to the national liberation movements directly or through OAU.

51. The material and educational assistance and legal protection extended by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to all *bona fide* South African refugees without distinction was described in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the report.

52. The dissemination of information, the importance of which had always been stressed by the Special Committee, was discussed in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the report. UNESCO and the ILO had made a substantial contribution in that respect and after consultations with the Special Committee, FAO and WHO had undertaken to co-operate more fully.

53. The conclusions and recommendations in paragraphs 47 to 52 of the report were self-explanatory. The Special Committee considered that the information provided in the report could be very useful if obtained periodically and would continue to consult with the heads of the specialized agencies and, if and where necessary, make appeals to their Member States.

54. He regretted that the remark in paragraph 50 had been taken as a criticism of UNESCO, which was so greatly contributing to the fight against *apartheid* and racial

discrimination. No such criticism had naturally been intended. UNESCO's action was greatly appreciated and it was merely hoped that it would soon formulate a definite programme and that other specialized agencies would consider doing the same.

55. The Special Committee would submit another special report on assistance provided by foreign economic interests to the South African régime as soon as possible.

56. Mr. KANIARU (Kenya) said he had understood that the representative of PAC had requested clarification from the Secretariat on the acceptance by the Secretary-General of credentials signed by a South African official whose credentials had already been rejected by the General

Assembly. He trusted that such clarification would be forthcoming in the Committee in due course.

57. The CHAIRMAN said that the matter was under study in the Secretariat and the Committee could revert to it when that study was completed.

58. Mr. BEREZOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, referred to the statement by a previous speaker well known for his slanderous allegations against his country. That speaker had now begun to slander all peace-loving forces in the world. His remarks were an unprincipled attack on those who were actively engaged in the struggle against *apartheid*.

*The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.*

## 915th meeting

Thursday, 17 October 1974, at 3.45 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.915

### AGENDA ITEM 37

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa  
(continued) (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804, A/9806, A/SFC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. GUYER (Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs) said that at the preceding meeting of the Special Political Committee, the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania had expressed concern at the fact that the Secretary-General had received the credentials of the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations. Later at the same meeting the representative of Kenya had expressed the wish that a clarification might be given by the Secretariat on that matter.

2. By resolution 3206 (XXIX), the General Assembly, in approving the report of the Credentials Committee (A/9779), had decided not to accept the credentials of the South African delegation to the twenty-ninth session. Its decision, which was similar to that adopted by the Assembly at its three previous sessions, related solely to the credentials of representatives to the General Assembly and did not deal with those of Permanent Representatives to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General. The credentials of Permanent Representatives were different from those that the delegations to the General Assembly had to submit to the Secretary-General and which, according to rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, were then examined by a Credentials Committee appointed by the Assembly. With regard to the appointment of Permanent Representatives, United Nations

practice since the beginning of the Organization had not required the prior agreement of the Secretary-General as was the case in bilateral diplomacy.

3. It should be recalled that the General Assembly had also adopted resolution 3207 (XXIX) by which it called upon the Security Council "to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa in the light of the constant violations by South Africa of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". As the Security Council had not yet reviewed that relationship, the Secretary-General had to follow the established procedure which had been consistently adhered to in the past.

4. Mr. KANIARU (Kenya) thanked the Under-Secretary-General for his clarification, which he requested should be reproduced *in extenso* in the summary record, in view of its bearing on related matters which might come up in the future.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that in the absence of any objection, he would take it that the Committee endorsed that request.

*It was so decided.*

6. Mr. GHELEV (Bulgaria) said that the work of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had greatly contributed to the mobilization of world public opinion against the policy of the racist South African régime. During the preceding few years, it had been directed towards more specific proposals, in order to help the United Nations formulate a more positive and effective programme of action against *apartheid*. The resolutions adopted and the recommendations made by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session, in particular resolution 3057 (XXVIII) on the

Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and resolution 3068 (XXVIII) on the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, constituted new support for those fighting for freedom and human dignity in South Africa. However, despite the mass of documents accumulated and the useful work of the United Nations in fighting *apartheid* and promoting decolonization, no improvement had been made in the tragic lot of the victims of Fascist terror and exploitation.

7. There were however signs of progress. *Apartheid* was now universally condemned, the credentials of the representatives of the minority racist régime of Pretoria had been rejected by the General Assembly and representatives of the liberation movements had been invited to speak on the situation. It was gratifying to note that the vast majority of Member States finally endorsed the views always held by the delegations of the socialist countries, who had always supported the struggle of oppressed peoples and insisted that strong measures be taken to eliminate colonialism and racism.

8. His country's position on *apartheid* had always been clear: any form of racial discrimination was anathema to the Bulgarian people. That attitude was based on the fundamental principles of the socialist State and was reflected in Bulgaria's legislation and Constitution. *Apartheid* could not be tolerated by the international community because it was the denial of all the principles of the Charter.

9. Bulgaria scrupulously respected the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. An example of his country's practical action against that system was the opposition of the Bulgarian Gymnastics Federation to the participation of a South African team in the Seventeenth World Gymnastic Championships to be held in Varna, referred to in paragraphs 108 to 110 of the report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1). He was pleased to report that the International Gymnastics Federation had finally agreed to hold the Championships in Bulgaria.

10. However, as many previous speakers had said, *apartheid* was not merely a local problem of the violation of human rights. The intransigence of the racist régime, which was endangering peace and security in Africa and throughout the world, was encouraged by foreign forces of reaction and imperialism. The documents before the Committee clearly showed that the violations of the arms embargo by certain States and their increased economic co-operation with the Fascist régime were one of the major obstacles to international action against *apartheid*, which must be intensified in order to isolate the South African racist régime completely.

11. The long heroic struggle of the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola and the democratic forces in Portugal had finally triumphed, thus eliminating one of the last bastions of fascism and colonialism in Europe. Guinea-Bissau was already a Member of the United Nations and Mozambique would soon join it. The victory of the Portuguese people was the victory of Africa and that of the progress of human society towards justice. Faced by the progress of the liberation forces in southern Africa, the Pretoria régime had not only intensified its brutal repres-

sion but also increased its military preparations. There was a danger that the racists in southern Africa would increase their aggressive activities, not only in their own countries, but in those of their independent neighbours. In preparing the draft resolutions to be submitted to the Committee and its recommendations for the future work of the Special Committee, it must be realized that foreign interests were unlikely willingly to renounce their use of South Africa as a bastion of reaction and imperialism.

12. His delegation approved most of the recommendations made in the Special Committee's report. However, without denying the usefulness of consultations with the leaders of countries which continued to co-operate with the South African régime, and with those of the large international banks and multinational firms, it considered that the efforts of the United Nations should be directed above all towards energetic action to end a situation in which its resolutions were completely ignored by certain States. It had rightly been said that the authority of the Organization was at stake. His delegation was ready, as always, to co-operate in drafting resolutions to that effect.

13. The improvement in the international climate over the preceding few years created new possibilities of success for the fight of peoples against colonialist, neo-colonialist and racist oppression. Constant strong international pressure on the racist régime and those who still encouraged and helped it was the most effective way to support the courageous struggle of the South African people for their rights and freedom and at last to rid the world of the scourge of racism and fascism.

14. Mr. COTTON (New Zealand) expressed his Government's satisfaction at the recent developments in Portuguese colonial policy and congratulated the Government of Portugal on the steps they were taking in southern Africa.

15. New Zealand was determined to maintain the unwavering stand that its late Prime Minister had adopted on the question of *apartheid* and thus show its conviction that the best way of bringing home to the South African Government the complete unacceptability of its policies was through solidarity of international opinion.

16. General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX) calling upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa in the light of that country's constant violation of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which had been supported by his Government, was a significant development.

17. His delegation fully supported the recommendations of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* for the furtherance of its consultations with Governments, trade unions and other organizations, which were an effective way of bringing home the true situation to the people of the world.

18. It welcomed the information that UNESCO had produced the educational kit on *apartheid* and would like to hear from the representative of that organization when publication in the various languages would be completed and how the distribution of the material to teachers would be arranged. His Government, which had always strongly

supported the arms embargo, had been pleased to note the recent actions taken by the Government of the United Kingdom in that respect. The New Zealand Government was also a strong supporter of the campaign for the release of prisoners and was particularly interested in the reference made at the 908th meeting by the Chairman of the Special Committee to the course of action suggested in the report by the Group of Experts<sup>1</sup> appointed to investigate that matter, which might lead to a peaceful solution of the question. His delegation would support further resolutions calling for the release of political prisoners as a first step towards the establishment of conditions in which the future of South Africa could be discussed by all its people.

19. In view of the importance of the dissemination of information to counter the costly propaganda put out by South Africa, his delegation would welcome a resolution which strengthened and encouraged the work of the Unit on *Apartheid*. The New Zealand Government was actively considering the recommendation that Governments should make voluntary contributions to the work of the Unit.

20. New Zealand contributed to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and the United Nations Fund for Namibia. It had also decided to contribute more than \$200,000 over a two-year period to a joint project with UNICEF to provide humanitarian assistance through liberation movements to the displaced persons from Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and Angola currently living in Zambia.

21. The Government and people of New Zealand would not rest until man's inhumanity to man in southern Africa was halted.

22. Mr. GHEORGHE (Romania) said that the accession to independence of Guinea-Bissau, which proved that the efforts of the United Nations were not in vain and that the last vestiges of colonialism would soon disappear, made the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination, especially when they were fundamental bases of State legislation, appear even more anachronistic. The same economic interests and political and social factors which were at the basis of the continuation of classic or new forms of colonialism also supported the policy of *apartheid*. The profits obtained from the exploitation of the indigenous labour and national wealth of a land explained not only the existence of *apartheid* but also the refusal of certain States to implement the recommendations of the Security Council and the General Assembly. At a time when the progress of science and technology provided an opportunity for all mankind to enjoy a high standard of living and to foster their dignity and human value, many human beings were still nothing less than slaves.

23. The social consequences of the crime of *apartheid* described in the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1) and the punitive action of South African military units both in South Africa itself and in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia were clear proof that

the Pretoria régime was the defender not only of *apartheid* but also of colonialism in southern Africa. The inhuman policy of *apartheid*, which the United Nations had called a crime against humanity, was being subjected to the harsh light of international public opinion and to growing isolation.

24. The Romanian Government's attitude towards *apartheid* stemmed from its strong opposition to any policy of force or domination of one country by another and its attachment to the unanimously recognized principles of international law. Its people strongly condemned any kind of racial discrimination, *apartheid*, any action contrary to the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Romanian Government and people welcomed the radical changes in the policy of the new democratic régime in Portugal towards the African Territories. With the downfall of the colonialist régime in Portugal, the African national liberation movements had won a great victory and it was to be hoped that the new Government's negotiations with those movements would achieve the desired results. The Portuguese forces fighting for democracy and decolonization must therefore be encouraged and supported at the international level.

25. Romania considered that the peoples still under colonial domination had the right to use any means, including armed struggle, to regain their freedom and become masters of their own country. The Romanian people, which had made great sacrifices to free itself from foreign domination and to attain unity and national independence, understood and admired that struggle. During his visit to Africa, the President of Romania had assured the leaders of the national liberation movements of his country's determination to provide political, moral and material support for all those fighting for freedom and independence. Romania's relations with the national liberation movements in southern Africa had become even closer after the leaders of those movements had visited the country. SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization), by agreement with the Romanian Government, had subsequently designated a permanent representative at Bucharest to represent the interests of the Namibian people fighting for liberation. Similar agreements had also been signed with other national liberation movements in southern Africa.

26. Romania had consistently supported the measures adopted by the United Nations with a view to eliminating *apartheid* and any form of racial discrimination. It unreservedly implemented the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions which contained specific measures in conformity with the Charter to place constraints on the racist régime in southern Africa. It maintained no diplomatic, economic or other relations with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. It supported General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX) calling upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa in the light of that country's constant flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It had signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and hoped that all other States which opposed that policy would do the same. It would support any proposals concerning means to provide

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964*, document S/5658, annex.



the maximum amount of humanitarian and material assistance to the victims of *apartheid*.

27. It favoured increased activities by the United Nations Office of Public Information concerning *apartheid* and racial discrimination and in particular designed to expose the harm done by those policies to international co-operation, economic and social development and peace and security throughout the world.

28. The Romanian people would continue their full support for the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and take specific steps to work out a general policy.

29. His delegation supported the measures advocated in the report of the Special Committee and its proposal that the United Nations should launch a campaign of international action to accelerate the elimination of *apartheid* in 1975. It intended to support any measure, including measures on decolonization and *apartheid*, designed to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the United Nations and to affirm the inalienable rights of all peoples to a free, full and prosperous life.

30. Mr. VOOGD (Netherlands) said that the basis of democracy in his country was the conviction that all human beings were fundamentally of equal worth, whatever their origin, sex, colour or race. Everyone, therefore, had equal civil and economic rights and freedom of conscience. Such was not the case in South Africa and that was why his Government had repeatedly rejected the policy of *apartheid*. The persistent violation of human rights in South Africa was demonstrated by many hundreds of articles of the law intended to discriminate between whites, who considered themselves superior, and non-whites, who were considered inferior except by those courageous whites who opposed *apartheid*. If the United Nations was recognized as an important and indispensable organization—and South Africa clearly wished to be a Member of it—such a fundamental violation of fundamental human rights could not be an internal affair.

31. It was well known that his Government still sought to maintain a dialogue with South Africa in a persistent attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation. It was not encouraging to carry on a dialogue in the Committee when the seats of the South African delegation were constantly empty. But his delegation would continue to follow that path for the sake of fighting *apartheid*. It would continue to reject both *grote apartheid*—the division of land and peoples—and *kleine apartheid*—division of whites and non-whites. The former would not be economically feasible and was neither socially admissible nor morally permissible. The latter was not a petty affair but a constant humiliation of and insult to people. The régime in South Africa treated Coloured people as the least of the human race. Although South Africa considered itself to be a Christian nation, it did not practise charity.

32. There had been reports that certain aspects of the policy of *apartheid* were being reconsidered in South Africa. If that was true, it might have been brought about by the wind of change that had blown over other parts of southern Africa that year, and also by the constant pressure

on the South African Government through the United Nations and other channels. The world must continue that pressure and try to convince the South African Government that whites and non-whites could create a harmonious society together. If that were done, the day might come when there would be an end to the humiliation of human beings in South Africa.

33. Mr. ABASSEM (Togo) commended the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on its work. His delegation had consistently condemned *apartheid* as a policy which contravened the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations and supported all the concrete proposals in the report of the Special Committee. The situation in South Africa, Namibia, and Rhodesia had scarcely changed since the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. In spite of the numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) the Fascist régime in Salisbury still refused to allow the people of Zimbabwe to participate in the running of that country. Government policy in South Africa was based on racial segregation and the majority of the people were oppressed and deprived of any opportunity to exercise their basic rights. His delegation believed that if the international community did not speak out on matters affecting people whose only crime was to claim the most elementary freedom recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it inevitably became an accomplice to the atrocities which were committed. His delegation did not intend to go into the matter of the disturbing attitude of certain supposedly friendly countries which continued to provide financial, economic and military support for those racist régimes. Moreover, recent important political events were indicative of mankind's aspiration to the ideals of peace, security and justice. However, he emphasized that change in South Africa could not be brought about through internal activities alone; the goodwill of all peace- and justice-loving nations was also needed.

34. His delegation therefore requested the Special Committee on *Apartheid* to continue its representations to States directly or indirectly involved to review their position with regard to the situation in southern Africa and particularly in Rhodesia, with a view to adopting a more positive attitude towards the solution of the problem of *apartheid*. He also called on the Security Council to re-examine the question of *apartheid* and the implementation of decisions already adopted by that body, and expressed the hope that the moral conscience of the international community would lead to a better future for mankind.

35. Mr. AL-ATIYYAH (Iraq) welcomed the representatives of Bangladesh, Guinea-Bissau and Grenada and looked forward to fruitful co-operation with them in the Committee. His country had consistently respected and implemented all United Nations resolutions on *apartheid* as racist practices were alien to the heritage and tradition of his country. In that connexion, he referred to the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the General Assembly at the 2262nd plenary meeting in which he had stated that the persistence of racist régimes in South Africa and Rhodesia constituted an insult to the entire world and that those régimes should be obliterated.

36. He commended the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on its comprehensive report on conditions in South Africa

and the inhuman practices of the régime in Pretoria whose crimes were well known from past reports to the Committee. The problem of *apartheid* had wider implications than violation of human rights and should be viewed in the context of the entire colonialist system which was based on oppression and support from Western Powers and which had also led to the creation of the Zionist State. *Apartheid* was a political issue which affected international security. South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia which deprived the people of that country of their independence, and its support for the illegal Smith régime constituted a threat to the stability of independent States in southern Africa. All efforts by the international community to find a solution to that situation had failed and South Africa continued to violate United Nations resolutions. His delegation had supported the resolution adopted by the General Assembly calling on the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa and had expressed satisfaction at the invitation extended to the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, the authentic representatives of the majority of the peoples of southern Africa, to participate in the work of the Special Political Committee.

37. Although the problem of *apartheid* had been discussed in the United Nations since its foundation, no concrete results had been achieved and debates alone would not liberate South Africa, though they were helpful. However, if the peoples of South Africa felt that armed struggle was the only way to achieve their independence, they should be given every support.

38. The accession to power of a democratic Government in Portugal had opened up new horizons in Africa. It was to be hoped that the independence of Guinea-Bissau would shortly be followed by that of Angola and Mozambique. The unholy alliance between South Africa, the illegal Smith régime and Portugal had been broken and the isolation of those régimes had been increased. There had been reports that Coloured persons would be included in the South African delegation to the United Nations. The international community should not be deceived by such attempts to disguise the true situation in that country. The liberation movements, and not the régime in Pretoria, in whatever form it chose to adopt, were the only true representatives of the people of South Africa.

39. His Government fully supported the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1). It was important to promote international campaigns against *apartheid* in co-operation with the liberation movements. The Special Committee should pursue its contacts with States, the specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to that end.

40. His delegation noted with regret the evidence of increased co-operation with South Africa indicated in paragraph 204 of the report of the Special Committee. There was still a wide gap between the principles invoked in United Nations resolutions and implementation of those resolutions. The report of the Special Committee and the statements of the liberation movements indicated that those Western Powers which violated the embargo were

responsible for the non-implementation of those resolutions and that financial, diplomatic and cultural relations between South Africa and certain Western Powers had increased.

41. The situation in South Africa was part of the international struggle between progressive forces and colonialism and racism throughout the world. The ultimate victory of the former was inevitable as had been demonstrated by recent events in Portugal which would have beneficial repercussions in the struggle for the liberation of Africa. Paragraph 205 of the report of the Special Committee indicated that Israel had continued to develop close relations with the South African régime in political, military, economic, cultural and other fields. Despite the geographical distance between Palestine and South Africa both countries had been the victims of British colonial interests in the past. The South Africa Act of 1909 and the Balfour Declaration which had respectively deprived the inhabitants of South Africa and Palestine of their rights and identities were evidence of the inherent racism of Western society. Israel and South Africa had long been the bulwarks of British interests in Africa and the Middle East. Currently they played a similar role on behalf of the United States of America which was obstructing the development of progressive forces in the world. Indeed, a South African official had stated that Israel was the guardian of the interests of the free world and that South Africa fully supported Israel's struggle against communism.

42. Giving a detailed exposé of co-operation between Israel and South Africa in political, diplomatic, economic, financial, military, cultural, and other fields, he said that as the isolation of the settler colonialist States in South Africa and the Middle East became more pronounced, co-operation between them had also been strengthened. There was evidence of increased South African participation in Israeli industries and Israel served as a vital base for South African institutions which could not deal directly with black African States. Israel also played an important role in the transfer of South African investments from and into Europe and Israeli weapons were being manufactured in South Africa for use against the liberation movements.

43. It was the duty of peace- and freedom-loving forces throughout the world, in particular those in Asia and Africa, to eliminate the colonialist settler régimes.

44. Mr. SHUKE (Albania) said that one of the many problems occupying the mind of freedom-loving peoples and countries was the policy of *apartheid* that the Government of South Africa had been blatantly pursuing for many years. The existence and activities of the Pretoria Fascist régime of the white minority were a source of uninterrupted tension and danger in Africa and a serious threat to the national interests of the independent countries of the continent. During the debates at the United Nations every year, the whole of progressive mankind condemned and denounced *apartheid*. The Committee's debate was being held at a time when the struggle of the freedom-loving peoples and national liberation movements in Africa had embarked on a new stage. The establishment of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the recognition of the independence of Mozambique had been a heavy blow to imperialism, colonialism and racist cliques. Those victories



were also a fresh encouragement to the new States of Africa in their endeavours to realize their national aspirations. The events that were taking place were making the situation of the Pretoria régime even more difficult and were opening up new prospects for an intensification of the armed struggle of the Azanian people against the white racists. The rejection of the credentials of the South African delegation was not only an expression of the strong condemnation of the Pretoria Government by the peoples of the world: it was a new step in the efforts of Member States to bring an end to the policy of *apartheid* and was a serious warning to the régime in South Africa.

45. The many facts that had been laid before the Committee testified clearly to the inhuman treatment of the non-white population in South Africa and to the acts of genocide and other serious crimes which the Government of Pretoria had turned into an official policy. South Africa resembled a prison. The white racists forced the indigenous population to live in the notorious Bantustans or in separate isolation camps. The facts were well known to all, and his delegation could not but express its deep indignation at the monstrous crimes committed by the Fascist Pretoria régime against the people of South Africa. That régime must be condemned and isolated with the utmost determination. The white racists denied the 15 million Africans even their most elementary rights. That had been demonstrated once again by the election farce of 1974 which had belied the imperialist propaganda alleging that there were new winds of change in South Africa. No progressive party or movement could operate in South Africa. The Suppression of Communism Act, the Terrorism Act and others closely resembled the former Nazi laws. Modern history showed that oppressors, reactionaries and Fascists always wished to legalize their crimes and campaigns against progressive people and freedom fighters with the flag of anti-terrorism and humanitarian slogans. But history also showed how they had finished up. That fact should be borne in mind by the racist high officials of Pretoria, who were inspired by the ideology of Hitler. The imperialist Powers which gave every political and military support to the Government of South Africa bore heavy responsibility for the continuation of the policy of *apartheid*. Despite the sanctions adopted against South Africa, those Powers maintained many links with the Pretoria régime and collaborated closely with it. South Africa was their bastion against the freedom of the African peoples and peace in southern Africa. It was a permanent base for their aggression against the African countries. The alliance, like their collaboration with the Southern Rhodesian clique, constituted a definite danger to the African countries, as was proved by South Africa's serious provocation against Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and other countries.

46. Many speakers had emphasized the large economic interests of the United Kingdom, the United States and their monopolies in South Africa. The activity of Western companies was a testimony to the Machiavellian attitude of the Western Powers towards *apartheid* and to their cruel exploitation of the natural riches of South Africa.

47. Military and economic co-operation between the Pretoria régime and Israel was growing. After the October war, the racists of South Africa had extended substantial

aid to the Zionist aggressors and had hastened to raise their diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level. His delegation vigorously condemned that collaboration, which was directed against the just struggle of the fraternal Arab and African peoples. But no amount of support for the Pretoria régime would prevent the peoples of Azania and Namibia from realizing their lofty aspirations. The struggle against the *apartheid* policies was a question of national liberation. The just struggle of the peoples of Azania and Namibia was an integral part of the struggle of all peoples against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The freedom-loving African people and countries were determined to support to the end their brothers in South Africa who were fighting against racial suppression. His delegation welcomed the decision taken on that matter by the eleventh Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU.

48. The Albanian people were resolutely on the side of the peoples of Africa. They condemned the policies of *apartheid* and any other form of oppression and exploitation of peoples. His country had never maintained any relations with the racist régime of South Africa and would always side with the people of Azania who, in unity with the other African peoples and with the support and backing of all peoples of the world, would inevitably achieve true national liberation.

49. Mr. WEIDINGER (Austria) said that the General Assembly had adopted a series of important resolutions concerning *apartheid* at its twenty-eighth session. Since then, significant developments had taken place on the African continent. The new policies of the Government of Portugal towards Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola might also have a positive influence on the situation in South Africa and Namibia. His delegation hoped that the changes would induce the Government of South Africa to move towards policies that would bring about a peaceful evolution of political rights and equality for all people in South Africa. Portugal's new policies must also be seen as an important encouragement for the work of the Special Political Committee and the Special Committee on *Apartheid*. In particular, they would strengthen those who were directly involved in the struggle for political freedom and equality and who, because of their beliefs and rejection of the policy and practise of *apartheid*, were suffering in South African prisons.

50. The 1974 special session of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had made a significant contribution to the first year of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. It had provided a useful opportunity for the Special Committee to hold consultations with Governments, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations. The meetings had also offered an effective means of promoting wider public awareness of United Nations action against *apartheid*. The Government of Austria had been pleased that the Special Committee had been able to arrange a visit to Vienna. In a meeting with the Committee, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had emphasized his country's strong rejection of any policy based on human inequality. He had underlined the fact that *apartheid* was not only an abstract political concept, but also had concrete effects. No one could close his eyes to the human suffering endured as a consequence of the policy of *apartheid*. The Foreign Minister had also assured the Special



Committee that his country would always support its fight for equality for all people in South Africa.

51. As in the previous year, his country's financial contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, and the United Nations Fund for Namibia would be more than doubled.

52. The struggle for political freedom in South Africa could not be the concern of Governments alone. Both the general public and the non-governmental organizations must play an important role in shaping government policies and in contributing directly to action programmes. His country's trade unions, for example, had generously supplemented the Government's contribution to assist the people in Namibia. The role of non-governmental organizations had been considerably enhanced by the International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations against *Apartheid* and Colonialism in Africa. He therefore agreed with the suggestion that the Special Political Committee should also consider the results of the Conference.

53. *Apartheid*, like all violations of fundamental human rights, had to be seen as a violation of human morality and an affront to the belief in the dignity of man. It must therefore be of concern to all people.

54. Mr. STUBBS (Peru) said that his delegation agreed with the recommendations of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*. Their application would contribute to the eradication of *apartheid*.

55. He welcomed the fact that the Security Council would be reviewing the relationship between the South African régime and the United Nations. He hoped that appropriate steps would be taken to make the Pretoria régime put an end to the crime of *apartheid*.

56. Concerted international action, in which the Special Committee would play an indispensable role, would enable peace-loving countries to intensify their efforts to eradicate *apartheid*. His Government sided with the people of South Africa in their fight against *apartheid*.

57. Mr. SEGEL (United States of America) said that no word had been spoken in the Committee in defence of *apartheid*. *Apartheid* was absolutely indefensible and burdened the conscience of all mankind. But what could be done to redress its wrongs? The world-wide attention that had been focused on the problem, principally through the efforts of OAU member nations, was a great help. The United States was among those countries that had taken unilateral action to help move the problem towards solution, but there had been some incorrect information disseminated regarding his Government's activities and position on the matter. His country had strongly urged the relatively small number of American firms with facilities in South Africa to set an example by improving the working conditions and earnings of their non-white workers. That policy had borne fruit. A number of United States firms in South Africa were following the extraordinary practice for

that country of providing equal pay for equal work, regardless of race. They had also set the pace in providing improved educational, legal and medical benefits to non-white workers in South Africa. The United States recognized that it was wrong for any country to assist the South African Government in enforcing its *apartheid* policies and had therefore imposed an arms embargo against South Africa even before the United Nations had done so. It had observed the embargo very carefully and continued to do so. It had not engaged in any military or naval co-operation with South Africa in the previous 10 years. Despite allegations to the contrary, his country had not co-ordinated defence strategy with South Africa and did not intend to do so.

58. His Government and people would like *apartheid* to end as soon as possible. The people of South Africa had suffered far too long under that oppressive system. That change, as his country knew from its own painful struggle with racial discrimination, must be pursued vigorously and in many fields. Although five years had passed since the Manifesto on Southern Africa was issued at Lusaka, it was painfully obvious that the Government of South Africa had not risen to the challenge of that considered and responsible document. His delegation believed that *apartheid* could still be ended peacefully. It was clearly in the best interests of all the people of the world that change should come about that way.

59. His country called on the Government of South Africa to re-examine its policies and position in the light of current realities. The repressive racial system was indefensible; it was both wrong and unwise to try to maintain it. He strongly urged the South African Government to bring a timely end to its *apartheid* policies and racial injustice and to recognize that it was in its own best interests to do so as rapidly as possible.

60. Mr. OLUMILUA (Nigeria) said he had been very gratified to hear the representative of the United States condemn *apartheid* and dispute some of the facts about that country's position on South Africa. He formally requested that the statement by the representative of the United States be circulated in full to the members of the Committee.

61. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the General Assembly, by the decision taken at its 2236th plenary meeting, had authorized the Special Political Committee to obtain, on specific request, transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings or portions thereof. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed that a transcription should be made of the statement by the representative of the United States in accordance with the special authorization and the request of the representative of Nigeria.

*It was so decided.<sup>2</sup>*

*The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.*

<sup>2</sup> The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated in document A/SPC/PV.915.

## 916th meeting

Friday, 18 October 1974, at 11.05 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.916

### AGENDA ITEM 37

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804, A/9806, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

(a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;

(b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. KAMARUDDIN (Malaysia) paid a tribute to the Chairman and to his country, Sweden, which had always worked for the protection of human freedom and dignity. He also expressed his satisfaction that the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) were able to take part in the Committee's debate.

2. His delegation condemned unreservedly and totally the system of repression and discrimination imposed on the black people of South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by a white minority which did not hesitate to use force in order to ensure the application of repressive laws.

3. The continued existence of the racist régime in South Africa was not only an affront to human dignity, but was also a constant and grave threat to peace and security in all of southern Africa. His country, which had always been in the forefront of the fight against *apartheid*, would continue to press its opposition, together with practically all the States Members of the United Nations. Indeed, time was running out for the South African régime. The General Assembly in approving the recommendation of the Credentials Committee (see A/9779, paras. 14 and 15) had already rejected by an overwhelming majority the credentials of South Africa (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)). That country would have to conform to the norms of behaviour accepted by all if it did not wish to run the risk of being swept away by the tide of indignation and opposition that was steadily eroding the very foundations of the *apartheid* system.

4. The changing situation in southern Africa, as shown in the disintegration of the Portuguese colonial empire, had, moreover, just dealt a severe blow to the Pretoria régime and its ally and protégé, the illegal white racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. In South Africa itself, the freedom fighters were scoring significant gains despite the harsh punishments that they risked.

5. The work of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* also was useful and encouraging, for the reports submitted showed that the international community was gradually isolating the South African régime, although much re-

mained to be done. In particular, his country was concerned that a number of countries, ignoring the appeals of the United Nations, were stepping up their trade and other relations with the South African régime, thereby only encouraging the régime to persist in its policy of *apartheid*. It was even more distressing to find that a handful of countries were selling arms and collaborating militarily with South Africa. That was why the Pretoria régime had been able to undermine the arms embargo that the Security Council and the General Assembly had repeatedly urged Member States to observe. As a result, South Africa had been able to build up a formidable military machine with which it was now menacing other African countries.

6. The white minority in power in South Africa was making the grave mistake of becoming more determined to pursue its suicidal course and to entrench itself ever more deeply in South Africa. Despite the resolutions and appeals of the United Nations, it continued to introduce even more repressive and discriminatory laws and regulations aimed against the black majority; the leaders of the black majority and the opponents of *apartheid* were gaoled or forced into exile. Defenceless workers were beaten or massacred like the miners at the Lorraine Gold Mine in May 1974, and those at the Harmony Gold Mines in June 1974; the same régime continued to occupy Namibia illegally, in open defiance of United Nations decisions. And the support, especially the military support, which it rendered to its neighbour the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia had helped to maintain that régime in power.

7. That situation must not be allowed to continue. The programme of action and the strategy outlined by the Special Committee on *Apartheid* in its report (A/9622 and Corr.1) provided the necessary basis for waging a realistic struggle against *apartheid*. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, especially at its twenty-eighth session, the adoption of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, the approval of the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination were all initiatives in the right direction. What was now needed was that all the countries that abhorred South Africa's policy of *apartheid* should co-operate more closely and intensify their concerted action. His country wished it to be known that it stood ready to co-operate fully in the efforts of the United Nations and it appealed to all Member States, particularly those that were in a position to bring the white racist régime to its knees, to cease rendering it aid and support.

8. Mr. RASOLONDRABE (Madagascar) observed that every year the General Assembly had to take up the problem of *apartheid* and that, leaving aside its outward show of unanimity on the condemnation of *apartheid* in principle, the United Nations had made very little progress

towards a settlement of the problem. Of course, the unwillingness of the Pretoria régime lay at the heart of the matter. But the lack of progress was also due to the fact that the aims of Member States might not always be the same, a fact which would affect the form of action that different States might take. For the purposes of truly effective joint action, it was essential that Member States should have a unified concept of the struggle to be waged in South Africa and of the changes to be made there. He doubted that such a unified concept really existed.

9. Indeed, in the view of some Governments, South Africa's prosperity should be protected on all sides and should even benefit from foreign investments, which would always provide new jobs for the blacks. Sometimes those Governments even brought pressure to bear on the big international companies to persuade them to raise the wages of their black South African employees. For them, the economic and social progress of the African majority was a function of the general economic prosperity of the country. They thought, too, that to achieve that prosperity the Pretoria régime should, in time, relax, and even abandon, its policy of discrimination. In any event, such a change in favour of the blacks would come about only slowly and in an orderly manner.

10. The African majority could not of course rest content with such reasoning. Those who accepted it forgot that *apartheid* was practised in order to prevent the economic and social development of its victims, and that the claims of those victims were so urgent that it was unthinkable for them to have to wait and rely on some hypothetical favourable development, which would not fail to run up against the opposition of the Pretoria régime. They also forgot that the racist minority, even if it must one day free the Africans, would not want to give up either its political influence or its wealth, and least of all the lands it had usurped.

11. What must be done therefore, was to listen to the Africans directly affected. For a long time the leaders and the fighting wing of ANC and the other associated movements had preached racial co-operation in an atmosphere of reciprocal goodwill. They had been imprisoned, tortured, massacred. Today, animated by a new political awareness, the South African fighters were saying that the goal of their struggle had been broadened. Henceforth they were fighting not only against *apartheid* but also for the attainment of political rights. Henceforth, the main question was to decide who should hold power. Furthermore, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had himself told the Committee (908th meeting) that the problem of *apartheid* could not be considered as simply a problem of human rights, since in future the problem would be one of national liberation.

12. Thus, different people saw the problem in different perspectives and adopted different positions or took different courses of action. There was no doubt as to his country's reply to the question whether the Charter should serve to protect and bring about the triumph of the principles it proclaimed rather than to defend a retrograde régime founded on the negation of those very principles. But the reply of some Governments that were friends of the Vorster régime was less clear, if not frankly misleading.

13. For their part, the African countries had shown great patience and had sought to explore with those Governments whose aims did not truly coincide with their own all avenues that might have contributed to peaceful change. The African countries had put forward, in Lusaka, the Manifesto on Southern Africa and it had been ignored. The Security Council had proposed (see resolution 191 (1964)) a settlement plan based on a general amnesty for political prisoners and on freedom of association and expression, but its resolutions had remained a dead letter. One after another, Pretoria had closed all the available doors that might have led to the peaceful political solution in which no one believed any more.

14. That was a challenge to common sense, to the principles of the Charter, and to the whole international community. Yet, despite that challenge, Pretoria insisted on remaining a Member of the United Nations. He wondered in fact whether it really wanted to do so or whether it was not also duping the countries which were helping it to remain in the Organization. What direct or indirect interest had the latter countries in thus protecting the Vorster régime, and were those interests compatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations? He could see no rational explanation for such an unnatural marriage between countries which claimed to uphold democracy and the country of *apartheid*. Madagascar called upon those countries to shoulder their responsibilities and to state clearly whether or not the Vorster régime was entitled to represent the African majority of Azania in the United Nations, whether or not *apartheid* and the crimes committed daily in its name were compatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and whether or not the constant violation of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions constituted an adequate motive to pronounce its exclusion. Member States had in fact answered that last question by rejecting the credentials of the Vorster régime by an overwhelming majority. The Security Council, and above all its permanent members, must now choose between the true people of South Africa and the selfish interests of a power-hungry minority.

15. He wished to congratulate the members of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and especially its Chairman and Rapporteur on their excellent work during the preceding year. In particular, their constant efforts to inform world public opinion should soon produce the hoped-for results.

16. Mr. JAZZAR (Syrian Arab Republic) expressed his delegation's congratulations to the officers of the Committee, and especially its Chairman, whose country had always defended human rights, on their election.

17. During the discussion of the question of *apartheid*, account must be taken of the following four points: first, the collapse of the fascist régime in Portugal and the disintegration of the alliance of the racist régimes in southern Africa; secondly, the raising of the level of diplomatic representation between Israel and South Africa and the strengthening of their imperialistic alliance; thirdly, South Africa's consistent defiance of the United Nations; and lastly the adoption at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*.



18. Once more, the Special Political Committee was discussing the question of *apartheid* when there was no sign of improvement in the situation. The reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* showed that the policy of oppression and repression was continuing. Since the item had been included in its agenda, the General Assembly had adopted dozens of resolutions inviting Pretoria to renounce its racist practices and to listen to reason. It must be remembered that all the appeals addressed to that country, far from being an encouragement of violence, had always been aimed at the re-establishment of peace in dignity. That was also the aim of the South African people's liberation movements in their struggle against *apartheid*. Yet for the preceding 20 years, those appeals had been in vain. It was regrettable to note from the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1) that the murders and repressions were continuing. In the name of the *apartheid* laws, tens of thousands of citizens were thrown into prison every year.

19. The Syrian Arab Republic had been one of the first countries to call the attention of the General Assembly to the long-term dangers of *apartheid*. The General Assembly and the Security Council had adopted numerous measures, including Security Council resolution 181 (1963) imposing the embargo on arms for South Africa and General Assembly resolution 3151 (XXVIII) recognizing the liberation movements as the true representatives of the South African people. All Member States had been requested to break off diplomatic, commercial, economic and other relations with South Africa. All those measures were obviously peaceful measures, which had been adopted by an overwhelming majority. However, racism would never be conquered unless all Member States, and especially the Western group of countries, sincerely worked together to that end. Yet it was quite clear from the work of the Special Committee that the Western countries were in fact co-operating with South Africa, thus becoming accomplices in the crime of *apartheid* and responsible for the survival of the minority régime and for its economic progress.

20. At the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, as on other occasions, his delegation had denounced the connexion between the support given by imperialism and Zionism to South Africa and the situation in that country. It should be stressed that the problem in South Africa was not only one of human rights but also of neo-colonialism.

21. Only a small number of countries—and precisely those which claimed to uphold democracy—supported the *apartheid* régime. Surely it was not necessary to remind them that “democracy” meant government of the people by the people and that the Pretoria régime represented only a minority of 3 million whites, whereas 16 million blacks, deprived of their right to self-determination, were treated as foreigners in their own country, of which they should, in fact, be the true masters. In order no longer to encourage racist war, those countries need only stop deforming the truth and respect the resolutions by which the United Nations had proclaimed the equality of all mankind.

22. His delegation appreciated the efforts made by the Special Committee, which had already produced constructive results, such as the anti-*apartheid* movement in South Africa itself and the information campaign to make world

public opinion aware of the crimes of *apartheid*. It therefore considered that the means at the disposal of the Special Committee should be strengthened, particularly the Unit on *Apartheid*, which had made it possible to launch the anti-*apartheid* campaign. It was owing to these efforts that *apartheid* was now considered a priority question at many international conferences.

23. The mission carried out by the Special Committee in Europe in December 1973 and the contacts with political leaders established at that time were important signs of progress. It must be hoped that the countries concerned would soon adopt measures in keeping with the warm welcome they had extended to the members of the Special Committee.

24. The collusion between Israel and South Africa was a well-established fact which had often been exposed in the United Nations. Various documents of the Special Committee<sup>1</sup> showed that the economic, political and social ties between Tel Aviv and Pretoria had been strengthened. Zionism and *apartheid* were drawn together by their common racist philosophy. The propaganda by which the Zionists were endeavouring to remind the world of the sufferings of the Jewish people under the Nazis was a flagrant example of their hypocrisy, because they were today taking the side of the Nazis of South Africa.

25. The United Nations had made substantial progress in its opposition to South Africa by adopting at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. The Syrian Arab Republic had the honour to have been the first country to sign that Convention, and it urged all Member States to do so as soon as possible.

26. No victory over *apartheid* could be achieved without the sincere co-operation of all States Members of the United Nations and without putting an end to the racist régime's participation in the work of the Organization and to co-operation of certain countries with the criminals by the adoption of the necessary sanctions against South Africa. The specialized agencies must also provide the national liberation movements with all necessary help.

27. The Syrian Arab Republic, which was waging a bitter fight against Israel in order to recover the illegally occupied territories, affirmed its support of the struggle of its South African comrades.

28. Mr. ŠMÍD (Czechoslovakia) expressed regret that forces whose very existence was based on colonialism, racism and racial discrimination should still exist in the world. However, the course of history could not be turned back, as was proved by the constant victories of peoples fighting for freedom and independence, the overthrow of the Fascist régime formerly in power in Portugal and the realistic attitude of the new Government of that country towards the Territories under Portuguese administration, and the entry into the United Nations of three new independent States—the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, and Grenada.

<sup>1</sup> A/AC.115/L.383, L.389 and L.396.

29. Czechoslovakia attached great importance to the work of the United Nations to combat the vestiges of colonialism, racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid* and welcomed the practical measures the Organization had adopted to that end. Yet the General Assembly had had to concern itself with the policy of *apartheid* of South Africa for over 20 years, since the South African Government paid no attention to the resolutions and appeals of the Organization and refused to conform to the Charter. His delegation had therefore supported the decision to request the Security Council to re-examine the credentials of the South African delegation, in the spirit of General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) which stated that the liberation movements recognized by OAU were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people.

30. The report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1) and the other documents submitted by it irrefutably exposed the inhumanity and ruthlessness of the policy of *apartheid* practised in South Africa. They showed that colonialism was inseparable from imperialism and synonymous with humiliation, degradation and exploitation. Nowhere in the world were the inhabitants submitted to the arbitrary will of colonialists and to systematic racial discrimination as they were in South Africa. That was especially the case in Namibia, where the South African Government had imposed *apartheid*.

31. While an overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations condemned the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination and implemented the Organization's decisions, it was regrettable to note that, for commercial reasons, several Western Powers were continuing to evade the relevant United Nations resolutions and to co-operate with South Africa, particularly in matters of economics and technology. That attitude could only strengthen the South African régime and encourage it in its policy of *apartheid*. South Africa continued to receive the most up-to-date weapons from countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); it was becoming a bastion of imperialism in that part of the world and thus posed a serious threat to international peace and security.

32. Racial discrimination was completely alien to the national character of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and all forms of racial persecution were forbidden under its Constitution. His country therefore supported the black people of South Africa in their struggle to recover their rights. It had been one of the first to sign and ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; it strictly applied the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on sanctions against the Republic of South Africa and had, in 1963, broken off all relations with that State. It condemned the policy of *apartheid* and, at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, had voted for the adoption of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*.

33. His country supported the South African people and national liberation movement politically, morally and materially in their legitimate struggle. It provided numerous scholarships and, among other things, contributed to the International Defence and Aid Fund. Its representatives had

played an active part in many international activities against *apartheid*.

34. His country would support all constructive measures which the United Nations might adopt with a view to putting an end to the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

35. Mr. SINGH (Nepal) welcomed the three new Members of the Organization, Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau, and expressed satisfaction at the latter's attainment of independence. He commended the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on its report.

36. He deplored the situation which continued to exist in southern Africa and emphasized that all efforts to achieve lasting peace in that region would be doomed to failure while the racist régime remained in power in Pretoria and Salisbury. It was highly desirable to focus the attention of public opinion on the degrading and inhuman conditions imposed on the people of South Africa by Mr. Vorster's racist régime. Members of the Committee were well acquainted with the dimensions of the problems confronting the United Nations in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, where a white racist minority was ruthlessly exploiting the rest of the population and prevented them from exercising their most basic rights. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the natural wealth of those territories was being plundered by interest groups which were continuing, both directly and indirectly, to collaborate with the *apartheid* régimes in power.

37. In the face of the mounting injustice to which it had been subjected for decades, the African people of southern Africa had no alternative but to take up arms against their oppressors. His delegation sincerely hoped that their heroism would be rewarded. The extension and institutionalization of the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination openly challenged the authority of the United Nations. In addition to violating all the General Assembly and Security Council decisions calling for its withdrawal from Namibia, the Pretoria régime was now exporting to that country the obnoxious policy which it had long enforced within its own frontiers. It was a well-known fact that the support which the racist régimes received from certain major Powers and foreign interests was more conspicuous in Namibia than in the remainder of southern Africa. That situation must be ended immediately, and the liberation movements must be given the assistance they needed in their struggle to free their homeland from the scourge of *apartheid*.

38. The attitude of the new Government in Portugal towards the Portuguese African Territories was encouraging. Recent events in those Territories should serve as an eye-opener to the racists in Pretoria. If the latter ignored those warnings and refused to mend their ways, they would one day be overwhelmed.

39. His delegation expressed satisfaction at the results of the special session which the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had recently held in Europe and felt that such sessions should be held at frequent intervals in order to promote concerted action against *apartheid*.

40. In spite of the appeals of the international community, Mr. Vorster's racist régime continued to pursue its

inhuman, brutal, barbaric policy. His country would continue, as in the past, to condemn that policy and to support the struggle of the liberation movements. International condemnation alone was not enough to eradicate the odious policy of *apartheid*. Action was required. Pretoria's major allies should stop supplying it with sophisticated arms and military goods. South Africa's trading partners should cease to collaborate with it. The arms embargo should be intensified. If the international community genuinely implemented the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on *apartheid*, the last vestiges of colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination could be eradicated.

41. It was high time the Pretoria régime came to its senses; if it refused, it would be forced to do so by violent means. Its time was running out. It would be better for the world in general, and South Africa in particular, if an equitable solution to the problem could be found through "normal" processes. Otherwise, the solution would inevitably be achieved through other means.

42. Mr. PINTÉR (Hungary) congratulated the Chairman and the officers of the Committee on their election. The report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1), the statements made by delegations and the resolutions adopted regarding *apartheid* showed the deep concern and indignation which the policy of *apartheid* aroused in all peace-loving, progressive peoples.

43. It was well known that the relevant resolutions of the United Nations were based on the desire to eliminate policies of racial discrimination and the vestiges of colonialism and to bring about social development based on racial equality with a view to reducing the tension prevailing in southern Africa.

44. As a member of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, his delegation favoured continued efforts to bring about the enforcement of the relevant United Nations resolutions. In that connexion, it was important to note that the vast majority of representatives who had participated in the general debate in the General Assembly at the current session had demanded, more categorically than ever, the eradication of *apartheid*. His delegation fully supported the resolutions recently adopted by the General Assembly regarding the credentials of the South African delegation (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)) and the relationship between the United Nations and the Republic of South Africa, (resolution 3207 (XXIX)) and it looked forward with interest to the consideration of that issue by the Security Council.

45. In statements by previous speakers, particularly the representatives of ANC and PAC, and in the report of the

Special Committee it had been noted that the racist régime was intensifying its activities. South Africa would be unable to pursue such policies without the support given to it by certain Western countries in violation of United Nations resolutions. He emphasized that, if applied, the United Nations resolutions could bring about the disappearance of the racist régime. Those Western Powers which were helping the South African régime to increase its military strength against a so-called "communist peril" therefore bore a heavy responsibility.

46. His country's position regarding *apartheid*, racism and colonialism was very clear: it condemned *apartheid* and the countries which supported the South African régime, and it condemned all forms of racism. Hungarian social organizations and official organs often expressed that opinion, as the members of the Special Committee who had visited Hungary had learned. His country had therefore been one of the first States to sign the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. To the best of its ability, it provided political, moral and material assistance to the African liberation movements and contributed to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. It fully agreed with the report of the Special Committee and felt that the effective measures recommended in that report should be urgently applied. Finally, his delegation was convinced that further progress could be achieved only through the joint efforts of Member States and by a radical change of attitude on the part of the countries which were lending their support to *apartheid*.

47. The CHAIRMAN read out a letter dated 18 October 1974 from Mr. Dennis Brutus, President of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, Chairman of the International Campaign against Racism in Sport and representative of the International Defence and Aid Fund at the United Nations, in which he asked to be heard before the Special Political Committee on the subject of *apartheid*, with special reference to support for *apartheid* in the cultural and military spheres.

48. He recalled that representatives of numerous non-governmental organizations, including those represented by Mr. Brutus, had addressed the Committee at previous sessions during its consideration of the question of *apartheid* and that such requests to be heard had been unanimously accepted.

49. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to accede to Mr. Brutus' request.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*



# 917th meeting

Monday, 21 October 1974, at 11 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.917

## AGENDA ITEM 37

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)** (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804, A/9806 and Corr.1, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

*At the invitation of the Chairman, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 916th meeting, Mr. Dennis Brutus (South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee) took a place at the Committee table.*

1. Mr. BRUTUS (President, South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee) praised the efforts made on behalf of the victims of *apartheid* by States Members of the United Nations and by the Special Committee on *Apartheid*.

2. *Apartheid* had been rightly designated by the United Nations as a crime against humanity. It was a crime not only in the political field, against the voiceless and voteless oppressed majority, but in every field of human activity. It was the humanity of the people of South Africa that was being attacked by the racist minority régime. Their human dignity was denied, their aspirations stifled, their cultural impulses and development crushed and their very psyche mutilated. The cruel restraints of *apartheid* were visible in every area of life, and particularly in sport. Sport was important in South Africa because the supporters of *apartheid*, who had made the country a cultural desert, had fixed their attention on it as an area to enhance their image and retain contacts with a world from which they were being increasingly isolated. It was also the area in which the anti-*apartheid* forces had been able to mount some of their most effective attacks, and in which the United Nations and the Special Committee had been able to apply pressure most effectively.

3. He paid a tribute to India for its refusal to play against the racist South African team in the Davis Cup tennis competition, to Guyana for recently cancelling a cricket tour by a team which had visited South Africa, and to Australia and New Zealand for discontinuing sports relations with "national" South African teams. Ever since the State of South Africa had been established in 1910, in the form of the Union of South Africa, only whites had been included in "national" teams. With the advent of the *apartheid* Government in 1948, racism in sport had been intensified. At the same time, the people of South Africa had conducted a non-remitting campaign of protest against that racism which took organized form in 1958, with the formation of the South African Sports Association and subsequently of the South African Non-Racial Olympic

Committee in 1962. Since then they had waged a long and frequently successful struggle which closely paralleled the political struggle. One of the most successful campaigns had been to exclude South Africa from the 1968 Olympic games. Perhaps the most important success was the expulsion of South Africa from the International Olympic Committee in 1970. That action by an international organization could be an instructive example.

4. In their defence, the racist minority had claimed that they discriminated against black and brown South Africans because South Africa was really a multi-nation, consisting of a number of embryonic states. Yet in that case, the question of its legitimacy as a single State member of the international community should again be raised.

5. The importance of sports to the racist régime was demonstrated by the number of concessions made in that area. However, such concessions did not liberalize *apartheid*: they were grudgingly made in the hope of retaining membership of the international community while at the same time consolidating *apartheid*. Nevertheless they were evidence of the effectiveness of applying pressure. That was the strongest argument against the friends of *apartheid*, notably the United Kingdom, the United States and France, which contended that by contact and by keeping South Africa within international organizations, change could be effected. However, change had come about only as a result of pressure: 50 years of sporting contacts had had no effect. It was still a criminal act for a black South African to participate in a sporting event with a white South African. The only exceptions were special events, used for window-dressing in an attempt to stave off expulsion from the few remaining international sports bodies to which South Africa still belonged.

6. The current crucial issue was the proposed tour of France by a "South African" rugby team. That was a matter for urgent protest. The President of the French Rugby Federation had said that only the Government could cancel the tour, and the Special Political Committee should therefore resolve to approach the French Government and call for the cancellation of the tour in conformity with the United Nations resolutions calling for an end to sporting and cultural exchanges with *apartheid* organizations.

7. Sporting links with South Africa should not be considered in isolation. France was also the principal and virtually the only supplier of arms to South Africa. The United Kingdom, which had sporting contacts with South Africa, was also its largest trading partner and had recently engaged in significant naval exercises with the forces of the racist régime. The United States, as had now been revealed, had been "tilting" in favour of the white supremacists, while deceitfully claiming to support African aspirations.

8. The friends of *apartheid* had an interest in *apartheid*, and would seek to protect it: they were therefore the enemies of the South African people. By concerted and positive action, recognition could be given to the true representatives of the South African people, and all links could be severed with the racist criminals. The United Nations should take immediate and unified action to end the intolerable and illegal situation.

9. Mr. KANOUTÉ (Mali) said that he was gratified by the election as Chairman of a representative of a country that had always made a valuable contribution to the struggle against colonialism; and he welcomed the three new Members of the United Nations. He also congratulated the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on the quantity and the quality of its work.

10. Almost since its creation, the United Nations had been studying the problem of *apartheid*. The various infamous laws, the most abject criminal practices and the hateful policy of Bantustans had all been exposed and condemned by the United Nations, which had attempted to make the minority racist régime see reason and tried to find a peaceful solution to the intolerable situation in all southern Africa.

11. Unfortunately, the racist régime had treated with contempt the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The solemn warnings addressed to the South African Government by the Presidents of the preceding four sessions of the General Assembly had had no effect. The South African Government continued its inhuman policy that constituted not only a crime against man, and thus against humanity, but also a grave and permanent threat to international peace and security. *Apartheid* could only lead its victims, namely, the great majority of the population, to revolt: there would be a terrible conflagration if the white racists persisted in their mad arrogance.

12. The report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1) revealed a worsening of the situation in South Africa. The racist régime had adopted the largest military budget in the history of the régime, strengthened its military potential, passed new repressive laws, massacred African miners and perpetrated murders and kidnappings in neighbouring States. It had also pursued its cynical Bantustans policy, under which the African majority, already deprived of its land, was forcibly uprooted and divided on an allegedly tribal basis. It had continued its illegal occupation of Namibia, exporting its policy of *apartheid*, persecuting the population and systematically looting the wealth of the country. It had also continued to provide enormous economic, political and military support to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, despite the mandatory United Nations sanctions.

13. However, it was well known that if the white racists had thus been able to flaunt the international community for decades, it was because they received assistance, more and more openly, from certain States Members of the United Nations which were blinded by their sordid interests and their desire to dominate. Together with countries like Israel, there were the countries of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) which, despite the special responsibilities of certain of them in the United Nations, maintained close relations with the racist South African Government in the economic, military, political and cultural fields and in the world of sport. They not only violated the arms embargo and carried out military manoeuvres with the South African Government, but also participated in the systematic exploitation, through their multinational enterprises and banks, of the African and non-white populations. However, though they might delay, they could not prevent the overthrow of *apartheid* and of the racist régime, as recent events had shown.

14. Since the fall of fascism in Portugal, and the consequent breakdown of the "unholy alliance", which had been one of the main strengths of *apartheid*, the supporters of *apartheid* found themselves more and more isolated. That had been revealed by India's categorical refusal to play against the South African team in the Davis Cup tennis competition; in the exclusion of South Africa from the forthcoming world gymnastics championship in Bulgaria; and in the renunciation of South African nationality by a famous tennis player.

15. The struggle against *apartheid* continued to grow both within South Africa and within the United Nations. At the twenty-eighth session the General Assembly had adopted the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*; the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination had been launched; and General Assembly resolution 3151 (XXVIII) had been adopted, which, *inter alia*, declared that the South African régime had no right to represent the people of South Africa and that the liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people. Another decisive step had been taken on 30 September 1974 when the General Assembly, in approving the report of the Credentials Committee (A/9779), had rejected the credentials of the representatives of the South African régime and had adopted the historic resolution 3207 (XXIX), in which it requested the Security Council to examine the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa.

16. In resolution 311 (1972), the Security Council had decided, as a matter of urgency, to examine methods of resolving the current situation arising out of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. Nothing had come of that decision. It was time that the Security Council resumed its responsibilities with regard to South Africa. Only the Security Council was in a position to act in a suitable practical way.

17. By its excellent work, the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had given new scope and impetus to the struggle against *apartheid*. His delegation therefore fully supported the recommendations made in its report (A/9622 and Corr.1), particularly those relating to consultations, the organization of a European seminar, increasing the Committee's membership, and strengthening United Nations information activities. With regard to the recommendation in paragraph 258 of the report concerning the change in the Committee's name, his delegation formally proposed that

the Committee be called "United Nations Special Committee for Action to Combat *Apartheid*". He concluded by welcoming the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), and assuring them of his conviction that, as in Portugal, racism and fascism would be swept from South Africa.

18. Mr. BANGO BANGO (Zaire) said that he was gratified by the election as Chairman of a compatriot of the late Dag Hammarskjöld who had died for the United Nations, for Africa and for Zaire. He welcomed the representative of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, a country which had wrested its independence from the Portuguese colonialists by a heroic struggle. His country had been among the first to recognize the independence of Guinea-Bissau, and was determined to strengthen relations between the two countries in all fields. He also welcomed the representatives of Grenada and Bangladesh.

19. The problem of *apartheid* was as old as the United Nations. His country was strongly opposed to *apartheid*, and totally committed to combating it and all the puppet régimes of southern Africa inspired by it. At the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, President Mobutu had stated (2140th plenary meeting) that Africa now remained the only continent in which colonization, racial segregation, *apartheid* and contempt for man because of the colour of his skin continued to be practised and that Zaire was mobilized to combat all the racists and colonialists of southern Africa.

20. In the past, the discussion of *apartheid* had always linked the name of Portugal to that of South Africa. However, since the armed forces had taken power in Portugal, a new era had opened up for the Portuguese African Territories. The new Portuguese Government had announced and undertaken the process of decolonizing its former possessions in Africa. The proof which it had given of its desire to decolonize was a guarantee for the future. It had recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau, which had been proclaimed on 10 September 1973 by the courageous people of that country. The Lusaka Agreement of 7 September 1974 between Portugal and the representatives of FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) had fixed the timing of the accession of Mozambique to independence on 25 June 1975. With regard to Angola, his delegation was pleased to inform the Committee that a Portuguese delegation had been sent to Kinshasa for talks with the representatives of the Angolan liberation movements.

21. The leader of the Portuguese delegation had described the discussions on the ways and means of bringing peace and brotherhood to Angola as very useful. Furthermore, the new Portuguese Government had not hesitated to prevent a rebellion by nostalgic settlers—unlike Great Britain, which had sacrificed the interests of the African majority for a white British minority. However, his country had decided that it was premature to reach a definite decision on relations with Portugal so long as decolonization was incomplete. It was the duty of the new Government to break completely with South Africa, and implement the relevant General Assembly resolutions. Such a course would have serious consequences for Portugal; but it

would show the world that the new Government intended to work for international peace and for the oppressed peoples of southern Africa.

22. He congratulated the Special Committee on *Apartheid* for its valuable report which reflected its evident desire to inform the Committee in an objective manner. His delegation endorsed the conclusions in the report and, in view of the situation described in the report and the information in its own possession, condemned the policy of *apartheid* with renewed vigour. It noted that, in spite of the General Assembly resolutions calling upon South Africa to bring an end to *apartheid*, that country was even attempting to extend that system to other regions of Africa.

23. Other African countries were hostile to the South African administration, not because it was controlled by whites, but because it was anti-democratic and based on the forcible repression of the majority by a minority and because it denied the black population the fundamental rights recognized for everyone by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

24. *Apartheid* had become an instrument to ensure the exploitation of the African workers by the white minority. The advocates of *apartheid* claimed that they were acting in the interests of the black population, but the truth was that the white minority was progressively enslaving the African majority.

25. The determination of independent Africa to support struggles for liberation arose from its attachment to the principle of equality among races and peoples and the principle of self-determination, principles consecrated in the Manifesto on Southern Africa, signed at Lusaka in 1969.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, the reports of the Special Committee indicated that the situation in South Africa was progressively deteriorating, as shown by the recent massacres of African gold miners in the Orange Free State and the murder of a student leader in Botswana and of a representative of ANC in Lusaka. His delegation also noted that the implementation of economic sanctions and the embargo on arms deliveries to South Africa had proved totally inadequate. The economic and financial Powers with interests in that part of Africa were not concerned with considerations of morality or equity. In order to ensure an ever-increasing productivity and safe profits, those Powers tolerated genocide in South Africa.

26. Since in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) the General Assembly had reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle by the black population of South Africa using every means at its command, his delegation believed that the international community should increase its assistance to the liberation movements of southern Africa. His own country would spare no effort in helping those movements.

27. The establishment of Bantustans on a tribal basis was designed solely to create dissensions among the black population. His delegation believed that the Committee should reaffirm, by a new resolution, the objectives assigned to UNESCO, the ILO and other governmental and

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.



non-governmental organizations in contact with the black population of South Africa with a view to developing among them a spirit of fraternity in order to create a national consciousness and to diminish the *apartheid* régime's effort to Balkanize the country.

28. The tripartite unity formed by the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zaire which had common borders with the territories under foreign domination was aware of the role it must play. Zaire was ready to do its part and would associate itself with those who were determined to struggle for the liberation of southern Africa.

29. Mr. GUTIERREZ MACIAS (Mexico) noted that though the question of the racial policies of the Government of South Africa had been on the agenda of the General Assembly since 1946, 7 million more persons had suffered under the *apartheid* régime in 1974 than in 1960. That demonstration of powerlessness on the part of the international community affected the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of world public opinion. His delegation, which had frequently expressed its strong condemnation of the policy of *apartheid*, had stated in the General Assembly (2248th plenary meeting) that the numerous resolutions adopted by the Assembly had been useless and that another procedure existed to achieve the common goal, namely the application of a provision in the Charter which would prove more effective in exerting pressure on South Africa, thus hastening the end of a repugnant and universally condemned policy. The procedure would involve the suspension of South Africa from the exercise of its rights and privileges of membership, as provided in Article 5 of the Charter. The conditions laid down in that Article had been fully met in the case of South Africa.

30. His country currently maintained no diplomatic relations with South Africa. It had previously had an honorary consulate in Cape Town, which had been closed on 1 March 1974, in conformity with Mexico's votes supporting the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

31. He recalled that South Africa had not participated in the Olympic Games in Mexico in 1968. The position of Mexico, as the host country, had played a decisive role in that decision. With regard to trade relations with South Africa, his Government had taken all decisions available to it, prohibiting government firms from entering into any trade relations with that country and discouraging transactions by private firms.

32. The Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had informed the Committee that the Special Committee intended to send a special mission to Latin America the following year. Mexico welcomed that mission and offered its friendly co-operation.

33. Mexico had also signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*.

34. Since the beginning of its independence, Mexico had respected human rights. It had been the first country in the continent to abolish slavery and continued to be firmly

opposed to any form of racial discrimination in any part of the world.

35. Mr. AL-SHAKAR (Bahrain) expressed his delegation's satisfaction at the presence of representatives of the national liberation movements and its hope that they would soon occupy their rightful places as members of the international community.

36. His delegation wished to express its appreciation to the Chairman, Rapporteur and members of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* for their numerous reports on the situation in South Africa. The scope of their work and its high quality were indicative of the dynamism of the Special Committee. His delegation endorsed the recommendations of the Special Committee.

37. Recent events in Africa, stemming from the changes in Portugal, augured well for the future. Thanks to the realistic attitude of the new Portuguese Government, the way was opened for freedom and independence for Mozambique, Angola and Cape Verde. However, despite the efforts and achievements of the United Nations, the situation in South Africa was disastrous and the systematic violation of human rights practised by the régime could not be ignored.

38. Bahrain, in its national Constitution affirmed human rights, basic freedoms, human dignity, equality and justice as the basis of law. It scrupulously observed the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all declarations and decisions of the United Nations, particularly those concerning the eradication of *apartheid* and racial discrimination and had denounced the policy of *apartheid* in numerous international conferences.

39. His delegation considered that the South African Government's violation of basic and fundamental human rights could not be regarded as an internal matter. The very existence of racial discrimination made détente impossible and presented a serious threat to international peace. It was obvious that the racial conflict in South Africa was the result of the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination practised by the South African Government. In spite of the efforts of the United Nations over the preceding 28 years, the situation in South Africa continued to deteriorate. South Africa had rejected all appeals for a change in its policies and his delegation believed that the oppressed peoples of South Africa were now convinced that they would have to resort to armed conflict if they were to achieve their basic rights. His delegation supported the struggle of the oppressed people by all means at their disposal in order to overcome oppression and discrimination.

40. The South African Government had ignored the United Nations resolutions denouncing the policy of the Bantustans which violated the rights of the overwhelming majority of the African people. The object of the Bantustans was to fragment and divide the black people of South Africa and strengthen and consolidate the control exercised by the white minority.

41. His delegation had noted that the South African régime had arrested and imprisoned large numbers of

students and workers and called upon the South African Government to liberate forthwith all political prisoners and detainees.

42. His delegation supported United Nations resolutions calling for sanctions on all military, economic and financial assistance to South Africa and wished to urge, in particular, general observance of the arms embargo against that country. It had noted the developing relations between the racist régime in South Africa and that of Tel Aviv. The report of the Special Committee had pointed to the strengthening of diplomatic ties between the two countries in defiance of United Nations resolutions. The co-operation between the two régimes was no surprise since they had much in common. Both were based on the theory of the "chosen people" which had the right to live at the expense of the majority, occupying territory by force and working for the interests of imperialism against the African and Arab peoples. Intensified military co-operation between Israel and South Africa, while therefore not unexpected, was none the less highly dangerous.

43. The historic decision taken by the General Assembly to reject the credentials of South Africa reflected the universal disapproval of a régime based on racial superiority. The Security Council was now called upon to assume its fundamental responsibilities and to take action in accordance with the will of the majority. It hoped that the Council would act in a decisive manner and exclude South Africa from membership in the United Nations. The eradication of *apartheid* would be achieved only by a concerted effort on the part of the international community to impose total isolation on the South African régime. Experience had shown that denunciation was not enough and that real and effective measures were required.

44. Mr. AMISSAH (Ghana) welcomed the fact that Guinea-Bissau had achieved independence and was soon to be followed by Mozambique, Angola and the other Portuguese Territories in Africa. But that situation had been achieved not without war, nor without the shedding of innocent blood. That sordid history, however, caused no ill feeling between the nationalists and the current Portuguese Government. Rather, it established an indisputable fact, namely, that the liberation movements were the authentic representatives of the vast majority of the people in the Portuguese Territories and southern Africa.

45. For over a decade, the people of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique had fought to liberate their motherland, a struggle which had depleted the human and economic resources in both the colonies and the metropolitan country. The futility of war had made the Portuguese realize the costs involved and the benefits that could be realized by ending it. But for the indomitable resistance put up by the nationalists, the change that had taken place in metropolitan Portugal would not have had effects in the colonies. While that change had led to the normalization of conditions in the Portuguese colonies, it had had no significance in southern Africa where *apartheid* was clearly gaining strength every day.

46. Colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism denied men the capacity to recognize their own capabilities because they reduced them to the level of sub-humans.

*Apartheid* combined all three situations and had other unique features which were not only abominable but also destructive. It was for that reason that the problem had engaged the attention of the United Nations for over two decades. Unfortunately, no solution had been found to the problem because appeals had fallen on deaf ears. Those in a position to take positive action to restore human dignity and freedom to the vast majority in southern Africa had adamantly refused to do so because of the colour of the skin of the victims and because of the vast economic gains that accrued to them as a result of the perpetuation of the abominable system of *apartheid*. It was known that Africa did not matter to those countries and that they therefore felt no moral duty to ensure that the principles of the Charter were adhered to by South Africa. It was deplorable that those same countries which found it unconscionably right to refuse to take any such action found it morally right to ensure the perpetuation of *apartheid* for their own economic and military ends. However, since no situation was permanent, *apartheid* would someday crumble with unfortunate repercussions and those countries would have to accept a greater part of the responsibility.

47. At the 2233rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the French representative, in congratulating Guinea-Bissau on its admission to the United Nations, had referred to the proverbial generosity of the Africans. The truth was that African hospitality had been abused and misused. Africa's resources, both human and economic, had been plundered with impunity. However, the perpetrators of those acts did not recognize the reciprocal duty which they had to Africa. At the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, a number of Western countries had opposed the efforts of the majority of the members of the General Assembly to include in the provisional agenda of the twenty-ninth session the item entitled "Illegal occupation by Portuguese military forces of certain sectors of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and acts of aggression committed by them against the people of the Republic". However, when Guinea-Bissau's sovereignty became irrefutable, those same countries had showered that country with praise.

48. The Committee had heard those Western countries state their opposition to *apartheid*. However, the action of those countries contradicted their words. Indeed, fallacious arguments had been advanced to oppose proposals for the isolation of South Africa in all spheres of activity by the entire world because of its obnoxious *apartheid* policy. Members had been told of the absolute independence of private companies, of sporting organizations and cultural groups. Granted that those organizations were absolutely independent of their Government, it was not those organizations which issued entry visas.

49. It was disheartening to note that instead of being isolated, South Africa enjoyed the respectability and support of some Western and other countries. His delegation considered it immoral to accord any form of respectability to South Africa by engaging in relations with it. The United Kingdom was the principal trading partner of South Africa. It also defiantly engaged in military relations with that country. Security Council resolution 181 (1963) on an arms embargo against South Africa had made no distinction between arms for internal use and arms for

external defence. In that regard, his delegation found it difficult to accept any such fine distinction made by France in connexion with its violation of that resolution. It appealed to France to reconsider its position and to take concrete steps to terminate its arms deal with South Africa.

50. His delegation also noted with considerable concern reports of contacts between the United States military and the South African régime. It condemned those relations because they did not augur well for the future of the oppressed peoples of southern Africa.

51. It had been argued that for military and strategic considerations, the West could not afford to lose that part of Africa. His delegation would point out that any situation which violently denied freedom and justice to the majority of the people, which made it possible for the minority to thrive and flourish on the exploited cheap labour of the majority and which degraded the human being was bound to crumble eventually.

52. The South African Government had increased its violent suppression of the majority of the people of South Africa and had carried that violence beyond its own borders. In that connexion, he mentioned the murder of a leader of the South African Students' Organization in Botswana and of the deputy representative of ANC in Lusaka. Those acts were a challenge and an invitation to counter violence with violence and showed that the Government of South Africa did not recognize the sovereignty of peace-loving nations.

53. Even as colonial territories African countries had fought with the allies against nazism. They had fought to save Jews from Nazi atrocities, a duty which had been undertaken in recognition of the fact that the suffering of any group of people should be the concern of others. The descendants of the Jews whom the Africans had helped escape the gas chambers and who had found a new haven in Israel had decided to go against the facts of history. They had identified themselves with the descendants of men and officers who had served in the Nazi régime and who had found a haven in South Africa to perpetrate their atrocities and inhuman deeds. The Jews had either forgotten or had chosen to close their eyes to the historic reminders. The Africans remembered, however, and had no cause to regret the actions they had undertaken. They were not enemies of the Jews in Israel or anywhere else. They stood for a principle. It would therefore be wrong for Israel to consider them enemies and to ally itself with the racists and oppressors in South Africa. History demanded that Israel should act to force South Africa to abandon its iniquitous ways. In his delegation's view, it was not too late for Israel to realize its wrongdoing and to rectify it.

54. The African countries had made every effort to find an answer to the situation in the Middle East. They called on Israel to desist from its relations with South Africa, which constituted a support for the continued existence of *apartheid*.

55. His delegation also wished to make a special appeal to the Latin American countries, particularly Brazil and Paraguay. In spite of the common identities of African and Latin American nations as developing countries, some Latin

American States had supported South Africa by their words and deeds. His delegation could not accept the reasons given for raising the Brazilian legation in South Africa to the level of an embassy. In fact, compliance with the various United Nations resolutions on South Africa and a careful look at recent world events should have been enough to cause Brazil to realize the need to break off relations with South Africa. His delegation recognized Brazil's determined efforts to win the friendship of African countries and its attempts to champion the cause of the developing world. However, those actions were contradicted by Brazil's support for South Africa. His delegation addressed an urgent appeal to Brazil and Paraguay, whose Head of State had exchanged visits with the South African Head of State, and to all other Latin American countries which continued to fraternize with South Africa to desist from such fraternization. It also appealed to Iran and Japan to end any form of collaboration with the *apartheid* régime.

56. Instead of learning from the events in Portugal's colonial Territories in Africa, South Africa had embarked on a massive military build-up which had turned it into a strong military fortress. The South African military now controlled the defences of Southern Rhodesia and dealt deadly blows to those neighbours of Southern Rhodesia who did not agree with its evil policies. While the United Kingdom still claimed responsibility for Southern Rhodesia, it was clear that the racists in southern Africa were in direct control of affairs in that country.

57. For more than two decades, the United Nations, because of the stubborn opposition of a few Members, had refused to act positively against *apartheid*. The time had now come to act. Africa had suffered enough. Africans would persist in their struggle, which would undoubtedly be arduous, bitter and long, though victory would eventually be theirs. In that endeavour, Africans needed the support of all those who loved human dignity and peace.

58. At the previous session, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 3055 (XXVIII) calling on South Africa to release all political prisoners forthwith. That resolution had been submitted by Africa's traditional Nordic and Scandinavian friends and such countries as Australia, Ireland and New Zealand. His delegation called on those countries to make a somewhat greater effort since their support was needed to reaffirm that the liberation movements, and not the racists, were the authentic representatives of the vast majority of the people of South Africa and Namibia.

59. Mr. ZENKYAVICHUS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the problem of the policies of *apartheid* of the racist South African régime was one which greatly affected the vital interests of millions of Africans and persons of Asian origin and was a matter of serious concern to independent African countries and all progressive mankind.

60. In view of the relaxation of international tension and the anti-colonial developments sweeping through the African continent, it was becoming more and more essential to put an end to the policy of *apartheid* which threatened international peace and security. Not only was that policy intolerable from the standpoint of elementary legal prin-



ciples and standards, but it now extended beyond the borders of South Africa itself and was being pursued on the illegally occupied Territory of Namibia. The South African racists who had supported the colonial wars of the former Fascist Government in Portugal against the liberation struggle of the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique had not abandoned their attempts to block the decolonization process in Africa. South Africa was providing protection to and supporting the illegal Ian Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia and was blatantly violating the Security Council sanctions imposed against that régime. The South African racists were accelerating the build-up of their military and economic potential, thus increasing the threat to the independent African countries.

61. The United Nations had been concerned with the question of *apartheid* in South Africa for many years and had adopted many resolutions and decisions on the question, including resolution 1761 (XVII) adopted by the General Assembly on 6 November 1962, calling on Member States to adopt measures against the South African racist régime; Security Council resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963) and 191 (1964) placing a ban on the sale of arms and military equipment to South Africa; and the decisions calling on the Pretoria régime to put an end to the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination. Furthermore, the policy of *apartheid* itself had been vigorously condemned by the United Nations as a crime against humanity.

62. As was clear from the reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the South African authorities were stubbornly continuing to pursue the racist policy of *apartheid* in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and in defiance of the demands of the world community.

63. At the current session of the General Assembly, a number of steps had been taken in the struggle against the racist South African régime. He recalled that the Credentials Committee and subsequently the General Assembly had rejected the credentials of the South African delegation as not representing the majority population of South Africa. Furthermore, in resolution 3207 (XXIX) the General Assembly called upon the Security Council to review the relationship of the United Nations with the South African Government, in the light of the constant violations by South Africa of the Charter. He noted that the Security Council had now begun to consider that important question. Like the delegations of the other socialist countries, his delegation firmly supported those new steps taken on the initiative of the African countries.

64. It should be pointed out that *apartheid* and racism in the South African Republic continued to be applied so vigorously because of the support which the régime received from abroad. It was no secret that without such support South Africa would not have dared to oppose the United Nations and that the South African Government counted on the direct assistance of a number of Western countries, primarily the member countries of NATO and the imperialist monopolies. It should be noted that the latter, violating the numerous Security Council resolutions concerning the cessation of the sale of all types of weapons to the South African Republic, were providing South Africa with military and economic assistance. Well-known circles

in NATO and the imperialist monopolies were seeking to strengthen the South African Republic as a bastion for crushing the national liberation struggle.

65. His country's position of principle in the struggle against colonialism, racism and *apartheid* was well known. The Soviet Union categorically rejected racism, colonialism, *apartheid* and Zionism and regarded them as incompatible with communist ideology and the socialist bases of the Soviet State, which united more than 130 peoples and nationalities in a free and voluntary union.

66. Guided by Leninist principles aimed at helping the peoples of the world to achieve freedom, equality and the right to self-determination, his Government was in favour of the full liquidation of colonial and racist régimes. The Soviet Union would continue to provide comprehensive assistance to the national liberation movements in southern Africa in their struggle against colonialism, racism and *apartheid* and in their efforts to achieve national independence.

67. The socialist countries consistently supported the struggle of the colonial and dependent peoples for national independence. The basic principles of the anti-colonialist policy of the socialist countries were reflected in the communiqué issued at a meeting held in the Crimea in 1973 by the leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the socialist countries. That anti-colonialist position and support for the liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America had found further confirmation in the communiqué issued by a committee of the States members of the Warsaw Pact on 18 April 1974.

68. On the basis of those principles, the Soviet Union supported all anti-colonialist measures and decisions taken by the United Nations and would continue to exert all efforts for a positive solution to the question of the liberation of the peoples of southern Africa from the yoke of colonialism, racism and *apartheid*.

69. Mr. KHAN (Bangladesh) thanked the members of the Committee for the welcome they had extended to his delegation.

70. He noted that, although the United Nations had discussed the question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa in some manner or other over the preceding three decades, the Pretoria régime had defied all appeals that it should abandon its policies. At the same time, the Powers best able to influence its actions had chosen instead to follow the path of expediency and appeasement. Meanwhile, despite its unequivocal condemnation of *apartheid*, the great majority of concerned humanity had not been able to make any significant headway in bringing that hateful policy to an end.

71. While that position had not altered radically, there were welcome signs of change which were setting a new stage in the campaign against *apartheid*. The recent General Assembly decision to reject the credentials of the minority régime in South Africa and to invite the Security Council to take up the question was indeed a potent reminder of the need to safeguard the moral authority of the United Nations against a Government which had flagrantly violated

its obligations under the Charter. The admission of Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau had marked further progress towards universality and the vindication of the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination and independence against oppression, exploitation and colonialism. The change of régime in Portugal and the emergence of an enlightened Government had ushered in a new era of transition leading to independence for the remaining Territories under Portuguese domination, which could not but have an impact on the remaining bastions of colonialism in southern Africa. The invitation extended by the Committee to representatives of the national liberation movements had demonstrated the awareness and inevitability of recognition of the legitimacy of the liberation movements in southern Africa in their struggle for freedom and independence. The campaign for the elimination of *apartheid* had acquired increasing momentum, eliciting more concerned response from public opinion and Governments alike. Internally, within South Africa, the determination to resist had gained strength despite mass arrests, deportation and punishment and many other oppressive acts.

72. In the view of his delegation, the problem of *apartheid* was two-dimensional. It encompassed human rights issues and political issues. His delegation believed that the two components could not be viewed in isolation, but were part and parcel of a composite whole.

73. The human rights dimension of the problem needed no elaboration. The numerous reports of the Special Committee and other United Nations bodies had spelled out in detail the extent and scope of the problem. It was

now universally recognized that *apartheid* was a total denial of the fundamental principles of human dignity and equality and constituted a gross violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

74. From the political viewpoint, *apartheid* was not only a serious obstacle to international co-operation but a potent threat to international peace and security. The white minority in South Africa had chosen to remain intransigent, escalating its brutality and repression with ever-increasing fury. The Lusaka Manifesto had sought to stem the growing tide in favour of violent upheaval by proposing a workable framework for a peaceful solution including a declaration of amnesty for all political prisoners, negotiations with the liberation movements and an extension of fundamental rights on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations. Those efforts having been spurned, the option of struggle by all available means remained the only alternative. In South Africa the determination of the freedom fighters had proved that oppression could not withstand the surging tide of human resistance and in the international sphere the campaign against racism and racial discrimination had gathered momentum. The launching of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, the expanded activities of the Special Committee and the concerted activities of governmental, non-governmental and anti-*apartheid* movements all over the world were contributing to the universal determination to end the blight of racism. Bangladesh and its people solemnly reaffirmed their commitment and determination to support all measures directed against the eradication of *apartheid*.

*The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.*

## 918th meeting

Tuesday, 22 October 1974, at 10.55 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.918

### AGENDA ITEM 37

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)** (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804, A/9806 and Corr.1, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. BYAMBA (Mongolia) said that the inexorable historical process of development of the contemporary world continued to move in a direction favourable for the peoples fighting against colonialism and racism. The new Government of Portugal had recognized the right to independence of the people of Guinea-Bissau which had now become a Member of the United Nations. Moreover, the day was not far off when the peoples of Angola and

Mozambique would finally win their struggle for independence.

2. The fall of the Fascist colonial régime in Lisbon had dealt a grievous blow to the rulers in Pretoria and Salisbury and would undoubtedly increase the effectiveness of the struggle against *apartheid* in South Africa.

3. For more than 20 years the racist South African régime had been conducting an official policy of *apartheid* in violation of the many General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and in defiance of world public opinion. It was seeking to extend *apartheid* to Namibia, thus attempting to perpetuate its annexation. The list of crimes committed by that régime against the African and Asian population of South Africa and against the freedom fighters was constantly growing. Those crimes were indicative of the weakness of the régime, which was vainly trying to maintain at all costs its inhuman policies. It was clear

that it had no support from the majority of the population of South Africa. On the contrary, the leaders in Pretoria had encountered opposition from progressive organizations, individuals and groups within the country. In July 1974 hundreds of thousands of African and Indian workers had declared strikes, involving many factories and plants in the major cities of the country. Anti-racist tendencies were also growing within the more far-sighted circles of the white population. The régime was becoming increasingly isolated both within and outside the country. Its continued existence was due primarily to the political, economic and military support which it received from reactionary circles in certain States. A number of member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declared their opposition to *apartheid* but in fact supported the South African racists. The South African régime also maintained close co-operation with the Zionist circles in Israel, and the Government of Israel had decided to raise its diplomatic representation in South Africa to the ambassadorial level. It was unfortunate that some Member States of the United Nations maintained active contacts with South Africa, a situation which in fact constituted a blatant defiance of the numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling for the breaking off of diplomatic relations with South Africa and the application of economic sanctions.

4. His delegation commended the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on its report (A/9622 and Corr.1), which reflected the useful work done by that Committee since the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. In accordance with the General Assembly resolutions, the Special Committee had held meetings in the capitals of four European States and had participated in the preparation of the International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations against *Apartheid* and Colonialism in Africa. Those meetings had shown that world public opinion unanimously condemned *apartheid* and racial discrimination as a criminal act against mankind and a threat to international security and called for the adoption of appropriate measures for the prompt liquidation of that evil.

5. Only two weeks previously the General Assembly had rejected the credentials of the South African delegation (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)) and had adopted resolution 3207 (XXIX) calling upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa in the light of the constant violations by South Africa of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His delegation considered that the Security Council, which was currently examining that question, should adopt positive decisions in the matter.

6. The time had come for the United Nations to take more energetic measures against South Africa's policy of *apartheid*. His delegation's position on the question had been stated at previous sessions of the General Assembly and remained unchanged. He noted that in the spring of 1974 his Government had signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and he assured members that the Mongolian people and Government would continue to support in every way the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa. He urged those States that had not yet done so to sign the

Convention and thus make their contribution to the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

7. His delegation called on all Governments which maintained direct or indirect contacts with the racist South African Government to break off such contacts and to abide strictly by the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

8. Mr. KENNEDY (Ireland) expressed his delegation's appreciation to the Chairman, Rapporteur and members of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* for their untiring efforts in the course of the preceding year, as reflected in their reports.

9. His delegation was particularly pleased, of course, that the Special Committee had found it possible to accept the invitation of his Foreign Minister to visit Dublin in the course of its special session in Europe, and that the visit had coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Irish Anti-*Apartheid* Movement. The visit had provided an opportunity for the widest dissemination of information on the evil of *apartheid* and had enabled the Special Committee to see for itself with what abhorrence *apartheid* was viewed by Irish public opinion. The repeated condemnations of *apartheid* by his delegation in the Special Political Committee were not merely the rhetoric of official statements, but accurately reflected the deeply felt sentiments of the Irish people.

10. Some encouragement was to be derived from the Special Committee's report. The proposals of the Bantustan "leaders" for a federation of the Bantustans, for example, although rejected by the South African Government, might none the less point a growing awareness, among the black community, of the need for unity and solidarity if the Bantustan policy was effectively opposed. Recent developments in the Coloured Persons Representative Council, and continued resistance by black workers, students and churches in South Africa were all encouraging signs.

11. However, most encouraging of all, perhaps, were the very welcome developments in relation to the former Portuguese Territories in southern Africa. The attainment of full independence by Angola and Mozambique, which his delegation hoped would not be long delayed, must inevitably force the South African Government to reconsider seriously its current policies. In the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization (A/9601/Add.1), the Secretary-General had expressed the hope that the minority régimes in southern Africa would recognize that the march of colonial peoples towards self-determination and independence was an irreversible process of history and would agree, without further delay, to begin discussions with the representatives of their African majorities for a just and peaceful solution of their many political problems in that area. His Government was convinced that the way forward was not through violence, but through the individually small but systematic successes of peace and persuasion.

12. On the whole, however, the Special Committee's report made depressing reading. The relentless pursuit by South Africa of the racist policy of *apartheid* continued unabated, and the whole *corpus* of repressive legislation was still being ruthlessly enforced.



13. The Bantustan system, which his Foreign Minister had described as a fraud and a device for ensuring that cheap labour was in constant supply and total subjection, was being implemented and expanded. Not only was the black population exploited to provide that cheap labour, but within the black population itself families were broken up in the name of a system which by its very nature degraded those who practised it as much as its victims.

14. There was unfortunately no doubt that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was flouted in many parts of the world, and each violation of its principles must be of concern to all. However, South Africa was surely a special case: the systematic suppression of human rights not only occurred daily, but had been institutionalized as an instrument of government policy. Not only did the Government make no attempt to adhere to the principles of the Declaration but it seemed to be trying to devise new ways of violating them.

15. Large numbers of people were still imprisoned in South Africa, not because they had committed crimes, but merely because they had dared to oppose *apartheid*. Many were detained without access to the courts, their lawyers or their families; they were subjected to the psychological terror of indefinite detention; and there was overwhelming evidence that many too were subjected to physical torture.

16. His delegation was gravely concerned at the continuing military build-up in South Africa and particularly that it should continue in the light of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) calling for an embargo upon the sale of arms to South Africa. Ireland, for its part, would continue to observe strictly its obligations under that resolution.

17. It was regrettable that sporting organizations in many countries persisted in sending teams to South Africa to compete with racially segregated teams. The report of the Special Committee had referred to one such case in Ireland, namely, the Irish and British Lions Rugby tour of southern Africa in the current year. His Foreign Minister had written to the Irish Rugby Football Union pointing out the evils of *apartheid* and the Irish Government's attitude towards it. A declaration opposing the tour had been signed by 225 prominent Irish people, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The tour, however, had gone ahead. His delegation would, none the less, hope that the clear statement of position by the Foreign Minister of Ireland would be taken as a guideline by sporting organizations which faced a similar decision in the future.

18. It might be thought that since, over the years, the General Assembly had so repeatedly condemned South Africa and its policies, there was little more to be done for the present. However, the continued and forceful condemnation of South Africa's policy by the Special Political Committee and by the General Assembly, and the ever-growing pressure of world public opinion, would inevitably force South Africa to think again. In that context, his delegation wished to recall General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX), adopted by an overwhelming majority, calling on the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa.

19. Some practical measures could be taken to ease the effects of South Africa's policies on those who were their

victims. In the current year, Ireland had been able to increase its contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa by some 50 per cent in each case. It urged other countries, particularly those which did not currently do so, to contribute generously to those funds.

20. Mr. HOUNTON (Dahomey) said that the practice of *apartheid* was an imperialist device, and that ideologically and economically, *apartheid* was a by-product of the doctrine of the domination of capital over labour. There was no doubt that the racist régime in Pretoria offered the best guarantees to capitalists and monopolists, who made huge investments in South Africa and who, at the same time, condemned *apartheid*. The assurance of easy gain and huge profits was essentially based on the exploitation of a malleable black labour force. Culturally and politically, *apartheid* was based on the theory of racial superiority, in defiance of every principle enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

21. Those Governments which had formerly pursued the policy of colonialism, were today pursuing that of neo-colonialism and gave their full support to the impenitent racists of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. While the contempt and indifference shown by those States for the cause of liberty and human dignity should be stigmatized, their declarations of opposition to *apartheid* and racism should also be viewed with suspicion. The collaborators and friends of the racists would be the first to congratulate the Azanian people, as they were now congratulating the people of Guinea-Bissau, on their victory over the forces of evil. His delegation believed that the criticism and condemnation of the world community would not produce a change of heart in the allies of the Pretoria régime. Victory could best be ensured and freedom and justice regained by the peoples of Azania, Zimbabwe and Namibia through their own efforts. It was on precisely that aspect of the problem that the Committee should focus its attention by urging all Governments, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to continue and increase their assistance to the national liberation movements of South Africa. His delegation believed that the Pretoria régime would yield only in the face of continued and increasing harassment and of direct threat brought to bear on it by the peoples it was seeking to degrade and enslave to ensure their exploitations.

22. The conclusions of the report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1) clearly showed that the Fascist Government of South Africa was being confronted daily by signs of revolt on the part of those who would not accept *apartheid*, despite the strengthening of unpopular laws and brutal and savage repression. The leaders of the Bantustans, who had been depicted as partisans of the policy of separate development, had protested against *apartheid* and had called for more justice for the South African peoples. It was incumbent upon the United Nations to encourage and support the positive developments which were taking place in South Africa.

23. His delegation believed that the struggle against *apartheid* could be won if all the peoples united to isolate the racist régime of Pretoria and deprive it of the

expectation of receiving moral and material support from certain States. Once again, his delegation wished to appeal to all those countries which continued to assist South Africa to place the principles of the Charter before their own selfish interests. Of those countries, Israel should be specially mentioned in view of its open collusion with the Government of Pretoria. The decision taken by most African countries to break off relations with Israel after October 1973 was a correct decision, not only in the interests of the Palestinian people, but in those of the people of South Africa, whom the Tel Aviv authorities so obviously despised.

24. The General Assembly's timely decision to reject the credentials of the representatives of the South African régime had underscored its isolation and affirmed its illegality. The Security Council was now required to consider the relationship between the Fascist régime and the United Nations, and to dispell existing misunderstandings about the sovereignty and diplomatic representativeness of the racist State. Parallel to those actions, his delegation wished to urge support for the recommendation by the Special Committee that the United Nations should launch special international campaigns against *apartheid*.

25. Mr. ALI (India) said that every country had to fight one form or another of discrimination with varying degrees of success. It was only in South Africa that a form of slavery was actively encouraged by the Government and had indeed been elevated to constitutional status under the sinister name of *apartheid*. It had inflicted suffering and indignity on millions of Africans and had led to the exploitation of African human resources.

26. In 1946, his country had brought the question of racial discrimination before the Security Council and subsequently before the General Assembly. Since then, the abhorrent policies of racial discrimination and *apartheid* of the South African Government had been discussed at each session of the General Assembly. There was an understandable tendency to belittle the attempts made so far by the United Nations to remove those evils. It should not be forgotten, however, that the United Nations achievements in that respect were not inconsiderable. First, the South African doctrine of domestic jurisdiction had been effectively demolished. Secondly, over 150 resolutions and decisions had been adopted on the subject and, in spite of the contempt with which South Africa had treated them, his delegation believed that they had contributed to a climate of international opinion in which every Government, without exception, had clearly expressed its opposition to *apartheid*. Thirdly, a large number of countries maintained a diplomatic, economic and social boycott of South Africa and that movement appeared to be gathering momentum. Fourthly, more and more national and international gatherings and mass organizations had become involved with the anti-*apartheid* movement. Fifthly, arrangements had been made for the provision of organized assistance to the freedom fighters and to the victims of *apartheid*.

27. However, Member States must place those gains in perspective by looking at the dimensions of the problem facing the Organization. One of the important points made in statements in the Committee by representatives of

African States and liberation movements was that the actions of some countries, for whatever reasons, encouraged the evil of *apartheid*. The actions in the fields of trade and investment by the 10 most important trading partners of South Africa illustrated that point. Their trade with that country had more than doubled since 1960 and their investments amounted to more than \$1,000 million annually. It was clear that the current policy of those countries was not likely to induce the South African Government, which obtained ever greater benefits from its existing practices, to follow a different course and to come to terms with the majority of the population. In that connexion, his delegation was concerned at the evidence during the preceding year of continued and even increasing collaboration of some States with the racist régime. Declarations of opposition to *apartheid* could not be reconciled with the upgrading of diplomatic relations with South Africa, increased economic collaboration, the supply of arms or the holding of joint naval and other military exercises.

28. It was to such actions which encouraged the racist régime in South Africa that the Special Committee addressed itself in its recommendations. The success of FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) in Mozambique and the change in the Portuguese régime had altered the situation in southern Africa. The General Assembly had rejected the credentials of the South African delegation and had invited representatives of the South African liberation movements as the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people to participate in the debate on *apartheid* in the Special Political Committee. The Security Council was now engaged in a review of the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa. In his delegation's view, there was need for parallel and concerted action at the national level to make the South African régime realize that until it changed its policy, it would be ostracized by the international community.

29. The recommendations of the Special Committee asked for the minimum that could be expected from countries which declared their abhorrence of *apartheid*. For its part, India had not waited for United Nations resolutions to act against South Africa. It had been the first country to sever trade relations with South Africa in 1946 in protest against that country's racial policies. In 1963, his Government had informed ICAO that it would not permit flights over its territory by aircraft belonging to the Government of South Africa or to companies registered under South African laws. His country had prepared an effective training programme for persons belonging to the liberation movements of southern Africa and had contributed, within its limited means, to funds established by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations for the struggle against *apartheid*.

30. Representatives of the liberation movements who had spoken in the Committee had expressed their commitment to armed struggle and sacrifice. The struggle against their foe, who was rich and powerful, would be long and a heavy toll of death and destruction might have to be paid. Anything which the United Nations could do to shorten the struggle would therefore be worth while.



31. Mr. OHTAKA (Japan) said that his delegation wished to congratulate the Chairman, Rapporteur and other members of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on their excellent work. His delegation had studied the reports of the Special Committee, which had presented a clear picture of recent developments in the South African Government's policy of *apartheid*, and it had been particularly impressed by the Special Committee's activities in expanding international efforts to combat that evil policy.

32. Japan's firm opposition to *apartheid* was well known, and Japan had always co-operated in the United Nations efforts to eradicate all forms of racial discrimination. His Government had been pleased to welcome a mission from the Special Committee to Tokyo in September 1974. The visit had provided an opportunity for a useful exchange of views and had, in his opinion, greatly enhanced the mutual understanding between his Government and the Special Committee. The visit had also enabled the general public to learn more about the evils of *apartheid*. In a democratic country such as Japan, the public's understanding of that problem was very important. Moreover, the Special Committee had had an opportunity to gain a fuller understanding of Japanese policy in opposition to *apartheid*, and the general trend of opinion in Japan on the question. Japan would continue and intensify its co-operation with the Special Committee in its efforts to eradicate *apartheid*.

33. The developments regarding the Portuguese Territories in southern Africa had reflected eloquently an historic and inevitable trend towards freedom and equality for all mankind. It was significant that the developments had taken place peacefully, through negotiations between the parties directly concerned. Japan hoped that those Territories would soon accede to independence by peaceful means and would be admitted to the United Nations.

34. His country also hoped that the South African Government would soon make a radical change in its policy, terminate the policy of *apartheid* and strive to construct a society based on freedom and equality for all, regardless of colour or race. It would be most regrettable if the South African Government chose instead the path of military build-up and repression, but the information in the report of the Special Committee on South Africa's repressive measures and military build-up was most disquieting. In order to prevent the South African Government from pursuing that course, a strict enforcement of the arms embargo was most important. Japan had faithfully observed the relevant United Nations resolution and had imposed a total ban on arms exports to South Africa. It was extremely difficult to make a valid distinction between arms for external defence and arms for internal purposes. It therefore urged those countries that continued to supply arms to South Africa to observe the arms embargo strictly and unequivocally.

35. Japan had also co-operated with other United Nations efforts against *apartheid*. It maintained no diplomatic relations with South Africa and had no intention of establishing such relations unless and until the South African Government terminated its policy of *apartheid*. Since June 1974, Japan had refused to issue visas for South Africans seeking to enter Japan for the purposes of sports, cultural and educational exchanges.

36. Japan had also contributed to United Nations funds to assist victims of *apartheid*. In 1974, its contribution to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa had been increased from \$80,000 to \$100,000. Japan was also ready to consider a contribution to the Unit on *Apartheid*.

37. Several speakers had referred to Japan's economic relations with South Africa; his delegation wished to stress that Japan was a trading nation which relied on trade with all countries of the world for its very survival. Vigorous and expanded trade were also necessary to enable it to continue and increase its co-operation with developing countries to help them to meet their development needs. However, the Japanese Government had treated South Africa as an exception, and had firmly discouraged economic as well as political relations. For instance, although his Government had liberalized Japanese investments abroad, no firms transacting business in Japan, either Japanese or foreign, were allowed to make direct investments in South Africa. Moreover, in a radical departure from its general trade policy, his Government had refrained from adopting any measures to increase trade with South Africa and had made no preferential trade arrangements with that country. The recent rate of increase of Japanese trade with South Africa had been substantially lower than that of Japanese trade with other African countries, and had also been lower than the rate of increase of Japanese trade with the world as a whole. The extent of Japan's trade with South Africa should be viewed against that background.

38. He wished to express his delegation's firm conviction that the trend of history was irreversible and that the end of *apartheid* was inevitable.

39. Mr. EL HIRIK (Libyan Arab Republic) congratulated the Chairman on his election and welcomed the new Members of the United Nations. The heroic struggle of the people of one of the new States, Guinea-Bissau, against Fascist imperialism provided an example of a nation ridding itself of the bonds of slavery.

40. The General Assembly had studied *apartheid* for many years and had adopted a number of resolutions condemning it, which the racist South African régime had not heeded. The current policy of that régime towards the South African population was a real tragedy. The civilized world should denounce the situation in the strongest terms and make every effort to put an end to it. *Apartheid* was an odious international problem which the international community should unite to overcome.

41. He paid a tribute to the liberation movements combating the Nazi régime which was trying to retain the land it had stolen and to maintain a brutal system of repression of the population and its leaders. There was now a calculated plot to increase white immigration to South Africa after despoiling the indigenous population. The régime co-operated with the imperialist and Zionist enterprises in exploiting the African workers and blocking their attempts to establish their right to a decent standard of living in line with that of the white immigrants.

42. It was regrettable that so-called leaders of the civilized countries were supporting the régime by providing weapons



and money and maintaining diplomatic relations, contrary to the simplest moral precepts. Such co-operation should cease: the international community should denounce it and declare that any country co-operating with the *apartheid* system was thereby a partner to it, and therefore liable to the severest of sanctions. However, Zionist sympathy with the South African régime was not surprising, since both followed the same policy, namely, the oppression of the legitimate population of the territories they occupied. *Apartheid* and racial discrimination in South Africa were closely paralleled by the Zionist occupation of Palestine and expulsion of the Arabs with the help of the imperialist countries. Indeed, some of the Zionist leaders had come to Palestine from South Africa, bringing their racist theories with them. The same interests were acting in collusion with, and providing arms to, the South African régime and the Zionists in Palestine. Therefore, when denouncing racial discrimination and *apartheid* in South Africa, the world community should also denounce the oppression and injustice suffered by the Arab population of Palestine at the hands of the Zionists.

43. The United Nations should appeal to all Member States to implement all the resolutions against *apartheid*, and call to account those States which failed to do so. *Apartheid* was a crime against humanity and an obstacle to economic and social development and international peace. It was a clear violation of human rights and of the principles of the United Nations. In denouncing that policy, his country was inspired by its Islamic and Arabic heritage, and by its sense of belonging to a civilized society. He wished to conclude by congratulating the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on its valuable contribution to the fight against *apartheid*.

44. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) congratulated the Chairman, who represented a country notable for its achievements in the field of human and social rights, upon his election.

45. The question of *apartheid* was perennial. A distinction should be made between prejudice and racial discrimination. It was often stated that prejudice, like class distinctions, existed everywhere. *Apartheid*, however, struck at human dignity. It was sometimes argued that progress in the economic situation of the blacks in South Africa would bring an end to *apartheid*. However, no such progress could take place when the whites had a stranglehold on the economy, since their interest was to maintain a source of cheap labour. A similar sort of sickness was to be seen in Europe, where cheap labour was imported from north Africa and Asia.

46. Social, economic and political factors were all interconnected in the problem. It seemed insurmountable, but it could be surmounted with the goodwill of those who were supporting the South African régime; without their co-operation the sanctions policy remained a dead letter. The white régime in South Africa was obsessed by the fear that it would lose its white identity. In that connexion, tribute should be paid to the countries of Latin America, particularly Brazil, which had done away with racism. Africa had awakened over the preceding 25 years, and the United Nations had played a role in bolstering the morale of the populations which had been under colonial occupation. The

very principle of self-determination had been proclaimed in article 1 of the International Covenants on Human Rights, although at the time of drafting those Covenants it had been difficult to convince certain European countries that freedom was not the prerogative of whites alone.

47. There were three alternatives for dealing with the problem of South Africa: war, civil disobedience and persuasion. War should seem inconceivable in the era of the United Nations, but the African population of South Africa had been suffering for 20 years while Member States talked with their South African colleagues. The régime was entrenched and armed to the teeth by countries which paid lip-service to the principles of the Charter. If guerrilla warfare took place, the innocent would suffer. A policy of civil disobedience could be adopted, in which the blacks would go on strike, supported by the United Nations which would distribute funds to them through the churches and the Red Cross, until the South African régime surrendered. However, the goodwill of the entire international community would be needed.

48. There was one peaceful solution, which he himself had proposed in 1966.<sup>1</sup> South Africa should declare Namibia independent and transfer all powers to the Trusteeship Council and thus eventually to Namibia itself. The blacks could then emigrate from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, or remain in South Africa if they so chose. The transfer of power would be supervised by two administrators from neutral countries. The time had come for action, and the United Nations should concentrate on persuading South Africa to listen to reason.

49. Mr. VARGAS (Costa Rica) said that his delegation wished to record its energetic condemnation of the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination. In the context of the Latin American nations, whose record of opposition to every form of racial discrimination had been one of the greatest social achievements of the preceding two centuries, Costa Rica had pursued a policy of complete respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction, as proclaimed in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. His country had faithfully observed the principles laid down therein. At the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly (2136th plenary meeting), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of his country had reaffirmed that Costa Rica supported all United Nations resolutions condemning all forms of racial discrimination and *apartheid* and his delegation had repeatedly condemned that policy.

50. It was clear, however, that resolutions by the United Nations were not enough. The great Powers had advocated the policy of détente as the best way of achieving peaceful coexistence and in that way assuring the future of mankind, but that policy should also imply a spirit of co-operation between the great Powers to ensure that the United Nations played a real role in political decisions and could implement any measure for the general welfare of peoples. If the interests of the international oligarchy of the great Powers were eliminated, his delegation was convinced that the decisions of the United Nations could be implemented.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1449th meeting, paras. 172-178.

51. His delegation had studied the informative and interesting report of the Special Committee which showed how the policy of *apartheid* led to every kind of brutal act incompatible with human dignity and fundamental freedoms. Accordingly, his delegation urged the United Nations to take new action to ensure the implementation of measures to eliminate *apartheid*. The international community could not allow mankind to continue to be subjected to conditions of political, social and economic inferiority. His delegation condemned the intolerable conditions prevailing in southern Africa and elsewhere and reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed peoples to free themselves from racism, racial discrimination, *apartheid*, colonialism and foreign domination.

52. Mr. TCHERNOUCHTENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the question of the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa had been included on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1946 on the request of the Government of India. Since the beginning of its participation in the work of the United Nations, the Byelorussian delegation had constantly called for the unconditional liquidation of colonialism and the eradication of racism and *apartheid*.

53. Together with other socialist countries, the Byelorussian SSR had always favoured the adoption of the most energetic measures against the racist policies pursued by the South African Government. His delegation considered that the struggle against the policy of *apartheid* was indissolubly linked with the struggle being waged inside and outside the United Nations for the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

54. The South African régime was one of the last bastions of colonialism and practised a policy of racism involving the domination of the white minority over the black majority. South Africa was also a fertile ground for the monopolies of the Western States which received unusually high profits from investments there.

55. Members were well aware that the process of decolonization had achieved outstanding successes. That was demonstrated by the fact that the membership of the United Nations had increased since its establishment by more than 60 young independent States which had freed themselves from colonial dependence. With regard to the recent successes of the national liberation movement in Africa, he drew attention to the fact that representatives from the newly sovereign African State of Guinea-Bissau were attending the current session on an equal footing with other countries.

56. The General Assembly had recently rejected by an overwhelming majority the credentials of the South African delegation (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)) and had adopted a resolution (3207 (XXIX)) calling on the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa.

57. In spite of the open terror existing in South Africa, the struggle against the policy of *apartheid* was growing in the country. While in 1970, only a few hundred African workers had gone on strike in South Africa, in 1973 hundreds of thousands of persons had been involved in strikes in that country.

58. The growing isolation of the South African racists was an indisputable fact. Further and more energetic international efforts were needed in order to complete the decolonization process in the shortest possible time and to put an end to the policy of *apartheid* in South Africa. It should be pointed out that while the United Nations had been considering the question of *apartheid* in the South African Republic, the ruling racist minority in that country had not altered its evil course and had even intensified its policy of racial discrimination, enacting new laws based on the system of *apartheid*. Dozens of the racist laws in South Africa were in flagrant violation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The South African Government had consistently refused to abide by the decisions of the Organization. The General Assembly had declared that *apartheid* constituted a crime against humanity and that the racial policies pursued by the Government of the Union of South Africa were a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. At the preceding session, the General Assembly had adopted the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and his country had been one of the first to sign that Convention. In so doing, it had once again demonstrated its consistent policy of opposition to racism and *apartheid*. His delegation called on Member States which had not yet done so to sign that important document.

59. He recalled that during the Second World War, the Byelorussian people had fought against Hitlerite fascism, which had been based on the idea of the superiority of the Aryan race over all others. One fourth of the population of Byelorussia had perished in that war. His country would never forget the evil deeds of Hitlerite fascism and its racial superiority practices. The Byelorussian delegation had been one of the first to indicate the spiritual similarity between the ideology of Hitlerism and the policy of the South African racists and to urge that *apartheid* should be declared a crime against humanity.

60. The United Nations had rightly stated that *apartheid* created a serious threat to world peace. South Africa continued to defy world public opinion and constituted a threat to neighbouring African countries. It had substantially increased its military expenditure over the preceding few years. In that connexion, he drew attention to press communiqués which gave evidence of a war psychosis in South Africa and which indicated that the military forces in that country were in a state of battle readiness.

61. The United Nations could not allow a situation in which a State conducted a policy of *apartheid*. It was necessary to ensure compliance with the General Assembly resolutions on the question of *apartheid*. Those resolutions made specific recommendations for such measures as the breaking-off of diplomatic and trade relations, an arms embargo and the withdrawal of capital investments. Such measures, if implemented, would undoubtedly create a situation in South Africa in which the racists would no longer be able to remain in power.

62. The main responsibility for the failure to implement the Security Council decisions lay with the western Powers which protected the interests of international monopolies. The aggressive imperialistic forces and the military circles of

NATO had given South Africa an important place in their strategic plans concerning the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

63. Nearly all representatives who had spoken in the Committee had indicated that the movement against the policies of *apartheid* was gathering momentum throughout the world. In that connexion, he drew attention to the important role played in the mobilization of world public opinion against *apartheid* by the World Congress of Peace Forces held in Moscow in October 1973.

64. The Byelorussian people had always supported the struggle against colonialism and expressed their solidarity with the freedom fighters in South Africa.

65. The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, as a member of the Security Council, attached great importance to the review which the Council was currently making of the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa.

66. Together with all socialist countries and other States which were strongly opposed to imperialism, colonialism and racism, the Byelorussian SSR would persistently strive to achieve the adoption of decisive measures designed to put an end to the policy of *apartheid*. It would continue to fight for the full and definitive liquidation of the system of colonialism, for the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, and for the strengthening of peace and international security.

67. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that in contrast to the hope expressed by the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* that his remarks would be taken in the friendly and constructive spirit in which they had been made, it was unfortunate that a number of statements made in the Committee had been anything but constructive whenever reference had been made to Israel. Representatives had repeatedly referred to the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1) and to the report of the Sub-Committee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa entitled "Recent developments in the relations between Israel and South Africa".<sup>2</sup> Reliance had been placed on those reports in order to add some measure of authority to the accusations usually made against Israel in whatever context and whatever the subject-matter under discussion. It was interesting to note that representatives of States which made those baseless charges against Israel had seen to it that they were treated in a report singling out Israel. That report had been prepared by a sub-committee composed of 10 countries, 8 of which had chosen not to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. Those representatives have quoted from that report as proof of the truth of their allegations. It should be clear to any person who approached the matter with some objectivity that no value should therefore be attached to those allegations against Israel.

68. Some speakers had referred to Israel as a racist State. Everyone knew that Israel was the expression and fulfilment of the age-old longing of the Jewish people, the classic

victim of racial persecution, to live a free life of its own in a State of its own.

69. Similarly, it was known that even before its establishment, Israel had had to defend itself against persistent Arab aggression, the latest example being the attack against Israel on 6 October 1973 by Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic.

70. All attempts to slander Israel with slogans on racialism, aggression and the like were beneath contempt and were but examples of the political and propaganda warfare which the Arab countries were waging against Israel and in which they spared no effort to embroil other countries. Some of those countries had already understood the use to which they were being put by the Arab group and others who were beginning to realize the true situation.

71. Whenever the subject of Israel was raised in connexion with *apartheid* in South Africa, the Committee was faced with a list of fabrications, some of which were outright inventions, while in the case of others the facts had been completely distorted or blown up out of all proportion.

72. Occasionally new allegations were made, such as the rumour of a joint promotion of South African and Israeli oranges. That allegation had been investigated and had been found devoid of any factual basis, like so many others. Other charges were perennially revived, such as the fairy-tale of arms deals and military co-operation between Israel and South Africa. Repeating lies did not make them true. Such propaganda was neither positive nor constructive, and his delegation would draw the necessary conclusions from the continued expression of unabated animosity.

73. A number of speakers had said that Allied soldiers, and in particular African soldiers, had laid down their lives in order to save Jews from the Nazi gas chambers. The Jewish people would be eternally grateful to every soldier who had fought against the Nazis, each one of whom had contributed to the eventual destruction of the Nazi régime, and thus to saving the lives of those Jews in Europe who had not yet been exterminated by 1945. It was equally true that about 1 million Jewish soldiers had fought with the Allies on all fronts against the Nazis. The tens of thousands of Jewish soldiers from Palestine who had fought with the Allies against the Nazis in North Africa had helped to avert the fate which Hitler had reserved for the African peoples, as described in *Mein Kampf*.

74. When the war had broken out in 1939, the situation of the Jews in Europe had become desperate. However, no specific military action had been undertaken by the Allies to save them. At that time, certain Arab leaders had been actively collaborating with the Nazis and urging them to intensify the persecution and extermination of the Jews. When the existence of the infernal gas chambers and the mass murder of Jews had been revealed in 1942, the Allies had been asked to bomb the gas chambers: the requests had been turned down on so-called technical grounds. Six million people had gone to their death. The war had been fought to defeat the Nazis, and not to save the Jews.

<sup>2</sup> A/AC.115/L.383.



# 919th meeting

Wednesday, 23 October 1974, at 10.55 a.m

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.919

## AGENDA ITEM 37

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804, A/9806 and Corr.1, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

(a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;

(b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden), Chairman of the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, introducing the report of the Committee of Trustees (A/9806 and Corr.1, annex) recalled that the Fund was made up entirely of voluntary contributions and was used to make grants to organizations engaged in providing humanitarian assistance to persons persecuted under discriminatory and repressive legislation in South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia.

2. The Fund had enjoyed virtually unanimous support in the United Nations, which had recognized that such humanitarian assistance was not only appropriate but essential. About 60 Member States had made contributions to the Fund, which had also received the support of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and of numerous non-governmental organizations concerned with the situation in the territories under consideration.

3. The Committee of Trustees, which had been entrusted with the task of promoting contributions to the Trust Fund and deciding on the grants, had made every effort to ensure that the voluntary contributions were properly and effectively utilized for the purposes set out in the terms of reference of the Fund.

4. On behalf of the Committee of Trustees, he wished to express its great appreciation of the dedicated work of the voluntary agencies concerned, some of which had had to provide assistance in the face of serious difficulties created by the white minority régimes.

5. The Committee had always encouraged direct contributions by Governments to voluntary organizations in addition to contributions through the Trust Fund, especially since the Fund's terms of reference did not enable it to cover all the humanitarian needs in the three Territories. He noted with satisfaction that those direct contributions which were taken into account by the Committee of Trustees in deciding on the level of its own grants to the voluntary agencies, were quite substantial and increasing in number.

6. During the preceding year, the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had made a special appeal to Member States for

direct contributions to the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa.

7. While the Committee of Trustees was heartened by the increasing support to the Trust Fund, it felt obliged to draw attention to the fact that needs had been growing and outstripping the resources of the Fund, which now had a very low cash balance. That was why, at its last meeting, the Committee of Trustees had had to decide on two grants subject to the receipt of further grants resulting from outstanding pledges. To meet the increasing needs with ever-rising costs, the Committee of Trustees had had, during the current year, to draw on the balance of previous years. The situation was not entirely satisfactory, since the possibilities of granting contributions in any emergency cases that might arise were impaired. He therefore appealed to all Governments for more generous contributions to the Trust Fund in order to enable it to meet the needs more adequately.

8. As the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had reported, there had been increasing repression against students, leaders of non-white organizations and others in South Africa in the preceding year. A number of persons had been detained recently and several were being brought to trial under various repressive laws. In Namibia, there had been constant arrests, trials and floggings, especially of the leaders and supporters of the South West Africa People's Organization.

9. The situation in Southern Rhodesia had deteriorated further during the preceding year. There was no sign that the minority régimes were prepared to heed the resolutions of the United Nations and to ban racial discrimination and repression. As a result, the needs for humanitarian assistance had continued to increase, and the costs had grown both because of practical difficulties in providing assistance and because of inflation.

10. He expressed confidence that Member States would continue to increase their assistance until the efforts of the people of the territories and the international community succeeded in putting an end to injustice and hardships in South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia.

11. He wished to inform the Committee that the Fund had received a contribution of \$6,000 from Ireland and that France and Finland had indicated that they intended to increase their contributions to the Trust Fund.

12. Mr. KI (Upper Volta) said that since the question of the problem of *apartheid* had been on the agenda of the United Nations for more than 20 years, it might appear that the Organization's efforts to combat that evil had been in vain. However, to judge from the statements made by

Member States, it might be concluded that the system of *apartheid* had run its course.

13. It was clear from the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on violations of the Charter and General Assembly and Security Council resolutions by the South African régime (A/9780) that despite the resolutions condemning *apartheid* and calling on the South African régime to cease its barbaric practices, the South African racists were determined to ignore the appeals and warnings of the United Nations and were not prepared to implement its decisions.

14. It was no secret for anyone that the practitioners of *apartheid* had strengthened their hateful system, which was virtually a hell for many millions of Africans who lived under it and were subjected to arbitrary arrests, persecution, imprisonment and hanging for the simple reason that their skin was black.

15. No society could tolerate such a policy and no people could endure it. It was even less realistic to ask the black people to accept it. On the basis of reliable testimony, the United Nations had considered that *apartheid* was a crime against humanity. That policy was indeed a crime to the extent that it denied to some men equality with others, that it established racism as a doctrine and that its goal was to exploit some men at the expense of others.

16. Faced with that problem, the United Nations had first adopted an attitude of complacency, even complicity. There had of course been resolutions and recommendations but in no case had those who could have put an end to the problem seriously considered taking the necessary steps. It was clear that they could not have done so, since they had considerable interests in South Africa.

17. The United Nations had decided several years previously to take radical decisions to stifle *apartheid*. The boycott had not been effective, since some of the most influential States Members of the United Nations had systematically ignored and flouted the decisions which they themselves had helped to make. Thus, in spite of the pertinent General Assembly resolutions, some Members not only continued to maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa, but openly proclaimed that they had decided to intensify those relations. Some States, primarily Western countries, had continued to develop their trade relations with South Africa and not only encouraged their firms to be established in that country but also acted as brokers to sell South Africa's products. Such investments by the developed countries constituted the best form of assistance that could be hoped for by the South African Fascist régime.

18. Other States defied Security Council resolution 181 (1963) on an embargo on arms intended for South Africa. Those States were the worst enemies of the black population of southern Africa since they were well aware that the weapons they sold would be used to hunt down and kill thousands of black persons. These States made no secret of the fact that they were the best defenders of the policy of *apartheid* by claiming that the weapons were to be used to ensure the security of the South African régime. They would have to bear the heavy consequences of their acts in the eyes of history.

19. A matter of great concern to his delegation was the fact that some States, with which the black population had close ties, supported the Pretoria régime. Some Arab States, in fact, were involved in deals to sell arms to South Africa while certain Latin American States maintained the most cordial relations with the South African régime. That was a highly regrettable situation and his delegation urged those countries to reconsider their position. In any event, Africa was closely following the development of the relations of those countries with South Africa and would not fail to denounce them.

20. The time had come to act since South Africa was intensifying its policy of *apartheid* from day to day. The black people in southern Africa had understood that they would achieve their salvation only by fighting for it. The freedom fighters had long understood that freedom was not given but taken. The recent events which had led to the independence of Guinea-Bissau and the favourable prospects for Mozambique had given new hope to the peoples of Namibia and South Africa. It would be well if South Africa and its protectors drew the necessary lessons from the example set by Portugal, which had wisely given up a colonial war clearly contrary to the vital interests of the Portuguese people. Unfortunately, history had shown that the most effective weapon against the Fascist violence of oppression was the revolutionary violence of resistance. That was the road which the States that ignored the decisions of the United Nations and those which helped South Africa had forced the black population of South Africa to take. On that difficult road, the freedom fighters would require moral and material assistance. The urgency of such assistance had been recognized by OAU, which had decided to spare no effort to put an end to *apartheid*. In that connexion, his delegation wished to thank those States which had realized the importance of such assistance, in particular the Scandinavian and socialist countries.

21. Parallel measures would also have to be taken. The problem of *apartheid* was not a question which could be restricted to one region alone. It was essentially a world problem and concerned all. The United Nations had characterized *apartheid* as a crime against humanity and it was therefore at the level of mankind as a whole that it should be fought.

22. He commended the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on the work it had done. His delegation approved the guidelines set out in the report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1) and considered that they were such as to make it possible to intensify the struggle against *apartheid*, thereby constituting an invaluable support for the freedom fighters. The consultations undertaken with various Governments should be pursued and intensified. Personal contact and discussions with Governments of goodwill which had so far not grasped the true nature of *apartheid* should be continued. Action in that area should be directed primarily towards Latin America so that the countries in that region would have greater solidarity with the African peoples who were struggling for their freedom.

23. His delegation also approved of the system of special sessions. The session which had been held in Europe in the current year had had a considerable impact in that it had not only enabled the liberation movements to have a voice

but had also made it possible for the European people concerned with the problem to become more fully aware of it.

24. In view of the constant refusal of the South African racist régime to heed the decisions of the international community, radical measures must be taken. The most that could be said about the legitimacy of the so-called South African Government was that it represented the small minority of whites in the country. It should be pointed out, however, that some whites were opposed to *apartheid* and were being harassed for the cause which they defended. His delegation considered that the representatives of the racist régime in South Africa had no place in the Organization and every possible action should be taken to ensure that their seat was given to the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority.

25. It was in that spirit that for a number of years the General Assembly had rejected the credentials of the representatives of South Africa. During the current session, a further step had been taken. Not only had the Credentials Committee rejected the credentials of South Africa and the General Assembly endorsed that decision (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)), but the General Assembly had approved (2254th plenary meeting) the recommendation of the Special Political Committee (A/9774, para. 5) to invite the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people to take part in the discussion and had called on the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa (resolution 3207 (XXIX)). All those facts should be taken into account by the Security Council in its consideration of the question with which it had been entrusted.

26. With the exception of the Hitlerite régime, there had never been a system in which racism had been raised to the level of official policy and ideology. The United Nations had been created for the purpose, *inter alia*, of promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Everything possible should therefore be done to ensure that that ideal prevailed by expelling those who sullied it.

27. Mr. MAROOFI (Afghanistan) welcomed the representatives of Guinea-Bissau, Bangladesh and Grenada to the Committee, and also the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, who had provided valuable information about the inhuman policies of *apartheid*.

28. For over a quarter of a century, the United Nations had sought to persuade the racist régime of South Africa to abandon its policies of *apartheid* and to desist from its oppression of the overwhelming majority of the people of that country. However, South Africa, although one of the founders of the Organization, had paid nothing but lip service to the principles laid down in the Charter. Despite unanimous condemnation by world public opinion, the South African régime had continued to violate the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations, which had declared *apartheid* to be a crime against humanity.

29. Ridding the world of all forms of racial discrimination was and should be one of the most important tasks of the United Nations. What had seemed to be an ideal yesterday

must become a reality today if the ultimate goal of international peace and security was to be achieved. In fact, the denial of human dignity and freedom for the individual were potential threats to peace and security.

30. The system of racial discrimination existing in South Africa was one of the most outrageous forms of discrimination. The Government of South Africa had gradually intensified its discriminatory policies and regulations, suppressing all legitimate protests through so-called laws which were contrary to recognized principles, including those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

31. Over the years, the United Nations had spared no efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the situation existing in South Africa. However, those efforts would remain fruitless unless all Member States co-operated with the United Nations and observed strictly the resolutions and decisions adopted by the Organization with regard to South Africa. In that connexion, particular emphasis should be placed on the policies of those Member States which were South Africa's main trading partners.

32. In spite of Security Council resolution 181 (1963) on an arms embargo, South Africa had continued to build up its military potential. Some Member States which had always posed as champions of freedom and human rights were among the most lax in defending those rights in the case of South Africa and had maintained their trade relations with that country.

33. His delegation supported the recommendations in the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1) that the Special Committee should continue and intensify its consultations with the main trading partners of South Africa and that it should urge them to find alternatives to trading with that country. It also agreed that those trading partners should discuss among themselves, in consultation with the Chairman of the Special Committee, what practical and concerted steps they should take to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions.

34. Important developments had recently taken place in the field of decolonization. The heroic struggle of the people of the Territories under Portuguese domination had opened a new era for the transition to independence of the peoples of Mozambique and Angola.

35. His delegation was happy to note that in spite of the ruthless repression practised by the South African régime, resistance to *apartheid* was continuing in South Africa and that the liberation movements of the South African people had gained increasing international recognition. His delegation wished to stress the positive role which the Special Committee on *Apartheid* could play in continuing to review all aspects of the question of *apartheid* and related problems and to consider what further measures including universally applied sanctions could be taken to bring about a change in the racist policies of the South African régime.

36. The time had come for the international community to unite its efforts to ensure that oppressed peoples in Africa and all over the world received the assistance they needed in the struggle they were waging in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the



Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was high time for the world community to adopt more practical and effective measures to eliminate the evil policies of *apartheid*. It must be borne in mind, however, that the constant efforts of the United Nations and the bodies of the United Nations family had done much to increase the number of opponents to *apartheid*.

37. His delegation reaffirmed its support for the principles of the Charter and fully subscribed to the idea that the scope of sanctions against the racist South African régime and the racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia should be broadened. It was prepared to support any measure designed to make United Nations action along those lines more effective. His delegation had accordingly voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 207 (XXIX) calling on the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa. It believed that such a measure would serve as yet another serious warning to the Pretoria régime to desist from the application of its racist policies and to adhere scrupulously to the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations.

38. Mr. WYZNER (Poland) said he found it heartening that the most distinctive and common feature of the debate was the total condemnation of the criminal practices of the Pretoria white minority régime and of its persistent and flagrant violations of the principles of the United Nations.

39. Significant changes had taken place in southern Africa during the previous year. The bloc of the "unholy alliance" of white supremacy in that area had been broken down, and the white minority régimes in South Africa and Rhodesia had become more isolated than ever before. There was a growing awareness throughout the world of the inhuman nature of *apartheid* and there were new signs of determination to fight its shameful policies. The best example of the growing commitment to the fight was the resolute condemnation of *apartheid* at the International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations against *Apartheid* and Colonialism in Africa. But despite its awareness of the dangers inherent in the policies of *apartheid*, the United Nations had been confronted with a clear challenge for over two decades. The South African régime had consistently acted in flagrant defiance of United Nations resolutions; in its efforts to consolidate a system of racist supremacy and exploitation, it continued to inflict immense sufferings on the oppressed people of South Africa.

40. The main obstacle to the effective eradication of *apartheid* was the help that the Pretoria régime received from those Western States, mostly members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which maintained and had even further developed close political, military and economic relations with the racist régime. Some States continued to deliver arms and equipment to South Africa and to maintain other forms of military co-operation with its Government in complete defiance of the embargo ordered by the Security Council. They thus helped the racist régime to build up a military potential which could be used against the liberation movement—a potential that was therefore a serious threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African States and to peace and security in the region. They bore the entire

responsibility for the explosive state of affairs in the region. His delegation fully agreed that the racists must be denied once and for all any form of military co-operation as the first and minimum step in any effective struggle against *apartheid*.

41. A second obstacle in the struggle against *apartheid* was the influx of foreign capital and goods into the Republic of South Africa. The attempt to justify such practices as a means of change or of eradicating *apartheid* from the inside was totally hypocritical. The major corporations had simply helped South Africa to consolidate an economic system based on the exploitation of cheap labour and on racial and social injustices. The system of *apartheid* had apparently served the interests of multinational corporations so well that its policies had been expanded to include Namibia. That was how foreign investments in South Africa "weakened" *apartheid* from the inside. Every possible international pressure must be brought to bear to terminate the collaboration of banks and multinational corporations with the racist régime of Pretoria.

42. Despite increasing repression, the struggle against the racist régime was continuing at terrible human cost. The courage and devotion of the liberation movements and black workers to the cause of liberation and the eradication of racial discrimination called for further assistance, particularly at a time when the problem was receiving even more international attention as a grave danger to peace and security.

43. His country had signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* on 7 June 1974. It was of vital importance that the Convention be signed and ratified soon by as many States as possible. When it came into force, it would undoubtedly serve as an effective and important legal instrument in the world-wide campaign against the crime of *apartheid*.

44. His Government had implemented General Assembly resolution 3057 (XXVIII) on 10 December 1973 by proclaiming the beginning of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. A special programme for the Decade had already been prepared. It included special courses on the evils of *apartheid*. The courses would be introduced in schools at all levels so as to bring up the younger generation in a spirit of solidarity and brotherhood with all peoples, irrespective of race, colour or creed. Polish youth organizations and women's organizations would be participating actively in the day-to-day implementation of his country's national programme for the Decade. The mass media would give priority to publicizing the struggle against *apartheid*, racism and colonialism, and there would be a further increase in the number of special publications on those problems. The victims of racism, *apartheid* and colonialism would be widely commemorated, particularly on days of special significance in that respect. His Government intended to continue and where possible increase its consistent material, moral and political assistance to the heroic people of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia.

45. He recalled with satisfaction that the socialist countries had always unhesitatingly supported the just cause of the South African non-white population in both word and

deed. His country complied with all United Nations resolutions on *apartheid* and on the other policies of the Government of South Africa. His delegation would support all constructive draft resolutions recommended for adoption by the General Assembly.

46. Mr. LINDENBERG SETTE (Brazil) said that *apartheid* had been condemned by the moral standards of contemporary civilized men and that it was doomed as a political, economic and social system.

47. It was frustrating that *apartheid*, a solitary and isolated testimony to the worst aspects of the world's colonial past, was still being practised despite universal repudiation. If Security Council decisions were not respected, it threatened to continue to be a cause of bloodshed in the future. It constituted a very special chapter in the history of human oppression, for it used the concept of racial superiority to justify political and economic exploitation.

48. His delegation had been gratified to note the contents of paragraph 216 of the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1). It would support the recommendation of the Special Committee that the contacts mentioned should be continued and intensified, because it believed that that approach was one of the most effective ways of dealing with *apartheid* and of ensuring the implementation of relevant United Nations resolutions. He regretted that, as pointed out, in paragraph 239 of the report, the arms embargo against South Africa was not yet fully effective.

49. After reading document A/9780, no one could doubt the wisdom of General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX) calling upon the Security Council to review the relationship between South Africa and the United Nations. Even countries which had questioned the usefulness of sanctions to solve political questions had begun to view the situation from a different perspective in the light of South Africa's adamant refusal to recognize and accept the reality of the international condemnation of *apartheid*. The universal values of human conscience would prevail sooner or later.

50. There had been some unfortunate references to his Government in one of the statements made at the 917th meeting. The misplaced emphasis that had accompanied those references had been based on a total misapprehension of the structure of Brazilian society. Any Brazilian was a Brazilian regardless of his faith, country of birth or tint of skin. Another apparent misapprehension concerned Brazil's co-operation with Africa. The African countries and Brazil had collaborated very effectively for many years in defending products which were important to their trade and which, in some cases, represented their very livelihood. That solid economic foundation of relationship that went well beyond the effects of trade had been and would be one of the mainstays of his country's economic policy. It was thus quite incorrect to say that Brazil used the presence of any group of its citizens for any purpose whatsoever. The people of Brazil constituted a nation in which any specific contribution from different cultures enriched and united all instead of being a pretext for dissociation. The contribution made by African culture was an outstanding one.

51. He had been puzzled by allegations that his country attempted to champion the cause of the developing world. He could not see how his country's contribution to the creation of ECA, its efforts in UNCTAD, and its actions in the Economic and Social Council could be grounds for accusations or could be attributed to any hidden motivation.

52. Mr. HUSSEIN (Somalia) said his delegation supported the recommendations contained in the reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*. It hoped the Committee would vote unanimously in their favour.

53. In the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization (A/9601/Add.1), the Secretary-General had treated the basic problem facing the Committee and the United Nations generally with candour and forthrightness, and his words should inspire Members to strengthen their efforts to eliminate *apartheid*.

54. The debate on *apartheid* was of particular significance in 1974 because of the Security Council's review of the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa. The General Assembly's rejection of the credentials of the South African delegation four years running and the call for a Security Council decision on South Africa's membership was evidence of the general dissatisfaction and frustration over the failure of previous United Nations efforts to end *apartheid*.

55. It was generally agreed that *apartheid* was one of the greatest crimes of the century, but it had become increasingly clear that it would not be eliminated by routine debates. The African States were unshakable in their determination to liberate the oppressed peoples of South Africa because they believed that if part of Africa was not free, then the whole of Africa was not free. The world community must take account of the fact that a new and more determined phase of the struggle against the forces of racism and colonialism had begun.

56. The Mogadiscio Declaration of 1971 on the total eradication of *apartheid* was evidence of an approach based on the realistic assessment of the fact that all peaceful avenues of change had been tried without success. The world community must face up to the question whether *apartheid* could be eliminated by anything but force. He observed that the very countries that had won their freedom by revolutionary struggle—the United States, France and England—opposed in varying degrees the struggle of Africans fighting against even more fundamental attacks on their human dignity. Did they believe that Africans were less worthy or capable of enjoying freedom from oppression than Europeans? Was the economic, military and political collusion between the Powers of the Western alliance and the racist régime in South Africa a form of racism? Those were hard questions that must be asked and answered. A well authenticated report in the United States press had revealed that the United States secret policy for Africa was to draw closer to the white minority régimes and give them increased support while giving token and ineffectual support to the African liberation struggle.

57. The record of the previous two decades showed that South Africa's main trading partners thought in terms not

of human values, but of dollars, pounds, francs, marks and yen. That attitude was also illustrated in the Middle East question where Western countries had taken a stand not on the basis of justice, international law and morality, but on the basis of narrow material interests. Although the former triangle made up by Lisbon, Pretoria and Tel Aviv had been broken, collusion between Tel Aviv and Pretoria continued to increase. Israel had raised its diplomatic, consular, military and economic relations with South Africa to the highest level; South Africa was one of the dwindling band of Israel's supporters in the United Nations. The former victims of the Nazis saw no irony in their collusion with the direct heirs of the Nazi philosophy.

58. But Israel and South Africa's main trading partners should be able to see the writing on the wall. The General Assembly's vote in favour of inviting the representatives of the Palestinian people to participate in its deliberation (resolution 3210 (XXIX)), its rejection of the credentials of the South African delegation and its call on the Security Council to review South Africa's relationship with the Organization were signs that the United Nations had begun to deal with the forces of injustice and racism in a realistic and positive way.

59. At the 918th meeting of the Committee the representative of Israel had accused a number of Member States of being responsible for the inclusion in a report of the Sub-Committee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa<sup>1</sup> of statements that were not only untrue but utterly ridiculous. In reply he could only say that the report, which had been endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the members of the Committee, contained nothing but the truth.

60. The Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination had had an auspicious start and had been given added momentum by a new gust of the wind of change in southern Africa. That momentum must be maintained until the seat held by the representatives of the illegal minority régime in Pretoria was occupied by the representatives of the majority in South Africa. It had to be understood, however, that the Africans did not support the use of force for its own sake. It was not too late for the *apartheid* régime and its allies to show readiness to make positive and significant commitments to bringing about fundamental social change. Africa's goal was the establishment of a society based on justice and peace for all races. But much as the African States would prefer peaceful solutions, the realities of the situation demanded that South Africa's unprecedented attack on the humanity of millions of Africans must be opposed with all the determination, courage and integrity that could be mustered by the oppressed people and by those who supported their struggle.

61. The removal of threats to peace and the promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms were fundamental purposes of the United Nations. Those purposes were challenged and impeded by the white minority régime of South Africa in all the main organs and bodies of the United Nations. The twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly should be recorded as the session at

which the United Nations, refusing to have its authority flaunted and its principles cynically ignored, had taken a stand against a uniquely inhumane system and, with the overwhelming support of its main organs and bodies, had decided to expel a recalcitrant member from its ranks, reserving the seat so vacated for the legitimate majority of the people of South Africa. It should be recorded as the session which had established without any shadow of a doubt the abhorrence of the world community for *apartheid* and its firm determination to take whatever measures were necessary to eliminate it in the name of human brotherhood.

62. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia), after congratulating the officers of the Committee on their election, said that *apartheid* was still on the General Assembly's agenda because South Africa had not put an end to its gross and persistent violations of the Charter and had been able to flout the United Nations, whose resolutions had all remained without effect. The challenge of *apartheid*, which had been recognized as a crime against humanity and a threat to international peace, continued with impunity because certain countries, while making pious declarations, did not carry out the relevant recommendations. How much longer could the international community tolerate that a racist minority should maintain its privileges by the use of force, against the long-term interests of all nations? The African delegations could derive some comfort from the statement of the representative of Sweden, who had pointed out (910th meeting) that his country had scrupulously respected the arms embargo, and had reminded the other arms-exporting countries, and all countries engaged in military co-operation of any kind with South Africa, of their international obligations.

63. At a time when the world was facing the economic problems arising from the over-development of some countries and the under-development of others, and seeking new and fairer relations, vigorous and concerted action should urgently be undertaken to deal with the anachronism of *apartheid*. The permanent members of the Security Council in particular should recognize that once Africa was wholly decolonized, and the Middle East problem settled, the industrialized Western countries could replace their seemingly profitable relations with South Africa with the constructive relations with African and Arab partners called for by a rapidly changing world.

64. Pretoria thought in terms of *apartheid*, Africa in terms of co-operation. That had been shown by the statements of the African and Arab delegations during the current session, and by the fact that the African group had agreed to hear the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs. Tunisia had re-established diplomatic relations with Portugal, whose change of Government had increased the isolation of Pretoria and Salisbury. Other favourable developments had taken place. The General Assembly had rejected the credentials of the Pretoria delegation; the Security Council had begun to examine the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa; and the General Assembly had invited the representatives of the South African liberation movements to participate in the discussion on *apartheid*. The information provided by the delegations of those movements, which were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people,

<sup>1</sup> A/AC.115/L.383.



together with the excellent report of the Special Committee on *apartheid*, called for the taking of rapid decisions.

65. The Special Political Committee should adopt draft resolutions dealing in particular with: the Bantustan policy and the increased repression carried out by the South African régime; the determination and the appeal of the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African peoples; and the recommendations of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*.

66. The Security Council should assume its responsibilities so as to avoid a racial conflict in the whole of southern Africa. In view of the deterioration of the situation in South Africa and Rhodesia, and the withdrawal from the African Territories embarked upon by Portugal, the members of the Security Council could take a position which would restore some credibility to the United Nations. Alertness was still called for in view of the seriousness of the situation in the region. Her delegation utterly condemned the principle and practice of *apartheid*, which was a criminal violation of the fundamental rights of man as guaranteed by the Charter, and a threat to peace.

67. Her delegation was firmly convinced that the last bastions of colonialism in Africa would fall before the unshakable will of a people to recover its inalienable rights. The South African people was in a position of self-defence, and the forces of progress gathered around it in ever-increasing numbers: whites in Africa and Europe, clergymen and confirmed anti-racists, giving their moral and material support to a just cause. The officers of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, who had travelled to Europe and elsewhere to establish a positive dialogue, were also working for peace by trying to avoid a conflict and open the way for a just and peaceful settlement.

68. She welcomed the new Members of the United Nations and expressed the hope that others would soon join their ranks.

69. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) congratulated the officers of the Committee on their election, and welcomed the representatives of Guinea-Bissau, Bangladesh and Grenada.

70. The task of the Special Political Committee had been greatly facilitated by the work of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, which had laid a solid foundation for the future struggle against the crime of *apartheid*. The Special Committee on *Apartheid* should be congratulated on its untiring efforts in organizing and co-ordinating international efforts to bring about a change in the policy of the South African régime. The consultations with Governments and co-operation with other United Nations agencies had been particularly useful and the Special Committee's meetings in Europe seemed to have been of considerable benefit to all concerned. The Special Committee had also met with considerable success in making available to ever-widening circles factual information which would contribute to a better understanding of *apartheid* and its risks and evils.

71. His country had consistently reaffirmed its opposition to all policies and ideologies of racial discrimination, because they offended its sense of justice and were incompatible with its fundamental concepts of human

rights and dignity and its whole way of life. It had also defined its position with respect to such collective measures as were required for success in the struggle against *apartheid*. It was of vital importance that all States should abide by the Security Council resolutions imposing an arms embargo on South Africa. However, the tendency to confuse the issue by condemning NATO or other regional groups, which bore no responsibility either for the embargo or for violations of it, should be resisted. The embargo was exclusively a matter for individual nations, and the responsibility for any infraction lay with the individual State which broke the embargo.

72. His Government's condemnation of *apartheid* had led it to believe in the necessity of active assistance to the victims of *apartheid*. It had made an annual contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa ever since its establishment in 1965, and the contribution for 1973/1974 had been raised to 600,000 Danish kroner. Annual voluntary contributions had also been made to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa since 1965, with a contribution for 1973/1974 of 850,000 Danish kroner.

73. Recent political developments had placed the policy of *apartheid* in a new perspective. Guinea-Bissau had now been welcomed as a Member of the United Nations, Mozambique would obtain full independence in June 1975, and the Portuguese Government had given assurances that it would continue on the road of decolonization with respect to Angola. His Government was most satisfied with the course of events. However, it was to be hoped that those developments would not serve to harden the position of the South African Government but rather induce it to give up once and for all a political system which had been universally condemned.

74. Mr. EL-HENDAWY (Egypt), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it was regrettable that the representative of Israel thought that by making accusations he could win over world opinion. He had dismissed the facts contained in the documents prepared by the Special Committee on *Apartheid* as "lies"; but he would have done better to refer to them and refute them. Besides, all those facts were to be found in other publications not produced by the United Nations, such as the *Jewish Year Book*. In the place of allegations against various countries, it would be preferable to hear that Israel had severed or was considering severing its relations with South Africa.

75. The information had been given that Israel had raised its diplomatic relations with South Africa to the ambassadorial level and would be receiving an ambassador from the racist régime: Israel had therefore been asked to deny it. The Prime Minister of South Africa had stated that there had been military co-operation between South Africa and Israel during the 1973 war. Those were the facts contained in the United Nations documents, which Egypt felt obliged to point out and which Israel had been challenged to refute.

76. Mr. JAZZAR (Syrian Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that Israel's action against United Nations efforts to put an end to *apartheid* in South Africa was well known. Israel had misused the right

of reply by indulging in lies and allegations, and daring to throw doubt on the facts presented by the Special Committee on *Apartheid* which had the support of all the States Members of the United Nations except Israel and South Africa. The fact that Israel and South Africa were opposed to it was proof of the Special Committee's success in carrying out its mandate.

77. Who could deny that Israel was a racist State, since it was based upon the notion of the "chosen people of God"? If Israel was not an aggressor, how had the State of Israel been established? Why were so many Palestinians still refugees? Why were the Arab territories still occupied?

78. He recalled that African and Arab countries had also made sacrifices in the struggle against the Nazis. Tens of thousands of heroic Arab soldiers had fallen in that struggle, and provided proof of the Arab stand in opposing fascism.

79. The information in the report of the Sub-Committee on Implementation<sup>1</sup> had been culled from newspapers such as the *Rand Daily Mail*, the *Sunday Times*, and the *Daily Telegraph*. The other documents of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* gave information showing the strong ties between Israel and South Africa in all fields. He challenged Israel to deny or denounce its co-operation with South Africa. *Apartheid* had been denounced by the General Assembly as a crime against humanity: he challenged Israel to denounce it. Israel had not voted for any of the eight resolutions condemning *apartheid* which had been adopted at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, not even the humane ones concerning such subjects as the treatment of political prisoners in South Africa.

80. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that it was hypocritical of the representatives of some Arab countries to make allegations concerning Israeli dealings with South Africa when it was the Arab countries themselves that engaged in lucrative business deals involving enormous amounts of money with South Africa. Such deals had been publicly denounced by President Nyerere of the United Republic of

Tanzania who had pointed out that the oil-producing Arab States were spending millions of dollars buying gold from South Africa instead of using that money to develop their own countries or helping African liberation movements. Mention had been made recently, in the Fourth Committee (2093rd meeting), of important sales of tanks and other military equipment by Jordan to Southern Rhodesia, which made interesting reading when one listened to the Arab chorus of fabrications directed against Israel.

81. It should be clear to everybody who had been following the debate that the Arab representatives had again been utilizing and abusing the forum of the General Assembly for their propaganda campaign against Israel, with scant regard for the facts concerning the item under discussion and taking good care to conceal their own involvement.

82. Mr. KI (Upper Volta) said that he would like to clarify part of his earlier statement, which might have been misinterpreted. When he had questioned the actions of certain Arab and Latin American States, he had been referring only to one or two of them which had dealings with South Africa either officially or indirectly through multinational enterprises. Arab solidarity with the African countries was well known, and his own country had very friendly relations with both the Arab and the Latin American countries. He had merely wished to point out that some of them had dealings with South Africa, and that when a multinational enterprise had such dealings, the country concerned should be considered responsible inasmuch as it had not prevented them.

83. Mr. HACÈN (Algeria) said that the representative of the Zionist authorities had made an attack on the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, but had not answered the charges concerning its relations with South Africa and how it had voted on the resolutions against *apartheid* adopted at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

*The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.*

## 920th meeting

Thursday, 24 October 1974, at 10.55 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.920

### AGENDA ITEM 37

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa  
(continued) (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254,  
A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651,  
A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/  
9781, A/9803, A/9804, A/9806 and Corr.1, A/SPC/167  
and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. HAYATOU (United Republic of Cameroon) said that not only had his Government expressed its position on

the policies of *apartheid* of the so-called Government of South Africa in different United Nations organs, but the President of the United Republic of Cameroon, when President of the sixth Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), had submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session the Manifesto on Southern Africa,<sup>1</sup> which was signed at Lusaka in September 1969 and which was still the charter of Africans fighting against racial discrimination and *apartheid*. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of his

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

country had reaffirmed his Government's position on *apartheid* at the current session of the General Assembly (2257th plenary meeting) and the head of his delegation would shortly make a statement on that subject to the Security Council<sup>2</sup> during its examination of the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX).

2. He therefore merely wished to reaffirm his country's condemnation of the practice of *apartheid* and its supporters and to endorse the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*. His delegation was deeply concerned at the failure to implement the embargo on the supply of arms to the white minority Government in South Africa and appealed to all Governments which were continuing to co-operate with South Africa to change their policies and to bring pressure to bear upon that Government to respect the Charter. It called upon multinational firms and banks to stop supporting that régime and requested the United Nations to denounce publicly those which continued to do so. It also denounced the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration for encouraging emigration to South Africa. Lastly, it called for the unconditional liberation of all political prisoners in South Africa in accordance with the Security Council and the General Assembly resolutions.

3. In the light of General Assembly resolutions 2671 F (XXV) and 2646 (XXV), which had declared that *apartheid* constituted a crime against humanity and that any State whose official policy was based on racial discrimination contravened the principles of the Charter and should therefore have no place in the United Nations, he hoped that the Security Council would come to a decision in support of those principles.

4. Mr. EHSASSI (Iran) said that at the current session, the Committee was discussing the item on *apartheid* under greatly changed circumstances. With the downfall of the colonialist régime in Portugal, the African national liberation movements had won a great victory and it was to be hoped that the new Portuguese Government's negotiations with those movements would speedily achieve the desired results.

5. *Apartheid* was one of the most tragic episodes in the history of the United Nations. Against the background of the imminent emancipation of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, the shameful policy had been intensified. At the same time, the struggle of the oppressed majority of South Africa for the establishment of their dignity and fundamental human rights had registered gains. The liberation movements inside South Africa would gradually consolidate their position and find more active allies and supporters within the country. The shameful system of migratory labour which met the demands of the white-controlled economy for a continuing supply of cheap labour could not continue indefinitely. The United Nations had an indispensable role to play in harmonizing the struggle against *apartheid* and in that connexion credit was due to the inspiring efforts of the Special Committee.

6. The special session of the Special Committee had made a significant contribution to the first year of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. It had provided a useful opportunity for that Committee to hold consultations with Governments, non-governmental organizations and organizations within the United Nations system, thus promoting wider public awareness of the Organization's action against *apartheid*.

7. Iran's unwavering condemnation of racial discrimination stemmed from its opposition to any policy of force or domination of man by man and its attachment to the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It had contributed regularly to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and the United Nations Fund for Namibia and was considering substantial increases in its contributions over the coming years. The references made by some speakers to Iran's possible links with South Africa were unfounded. His country had no diplomatic relations with South Africa and did not intend to establish any; it had unreservedly implemented the arms embargo and urged those countries which had not done so to do the same and it would continue to support measures adopted by the United Nations with a view to eliminating *apartheid* and any form of racial discrimination.

8. Mr. YEDRA (Cuba) welcomed the constructive statements by the representative of Portugal concerning the future of the Portuguese African Territories and the fact that the struggle of the African liberation movements had helped the cause of the progressive forces in Portugal itself.

9. The horrifying details of the oppression to which over 16 million people were subjected merely because of the colour of their skin which were described in the documents before the Committee and in the statements of the authentic representatives of the people of South Africa might have been taken from the cruelest days of the era of slavery. The arbitrary laws and regulations set forth in the relevant report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9781) showed how the racist, Fascist white minority of Pretoria maintained its authority. The murders of a leader of the South African Students' Organization in Botswana and of the Deputy Representative of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) in Lusaka showed that the South African régime did not hesitate to murder people outside its own borders. Despite the censure imposed by the régime, its participation in the suppression of the struggle of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe was well known.

10. Those activities were carried out with the collusion and support of the Western imperialist Powers, including the United States, which had a long history of racial discrimination, and which was cynical enough to condemn *apartheid* in words and to continue its trade treaties with the white minority, in flagrant violation of the recommendations of the United Nations. The members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continued to contribute to the repression of the South African people and to heighten tension in the region by increasing the military power of the racist régime. The United Kingdom had supplied it with helicopters and had engaged in joint

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, 1808th meeting.*



naval manoeuvres with South Africa and France and the latter country was even co-operating with the régime in the production of nuclear missiles.

11. The United Nations had condemned *apartheid* as a crime against humanity and had adopted numerous resolutions designed to put an end to racial discrimination. The system was also condemned by world public opinion, trade union and students' organizations.

12. Cuba supported the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and had initiated constitutional steps to ratify the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. It was also considering the establishment of a committee responsible for co-ordinating all activities concerning the programme established for the Decade at the national level.

13. The rejection of the credentials of South Africa, first by the Credentials Committee (see A/5779, paras. 14 and 15) and subsequently by the General Assembly itself (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)), and the latter's request to the Security Council to review the relationship between South Africa and the United Nations (resolution 3207 (XXIX)) were positive steps towards the elimination of the policy of *apartheid*. His delegation fully supported the African countries' call for South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations. The international community should seize every opportunity to encourage international action against *apartheid*. The fight against that policy concerned the whole world. His delegation therefore called upon all forces opposed to racism and racial segregation to join together to endow the anti-*apartheid* campaign with a fighting spirit and to increase effective material and political assistance to the African liberation movements. The expulsion of the Pretoria régime from the United Nations would be a first step towards its inevitable defeat.

14. Mrs. GJERTSEN (Norway) said that, despite the new developments in southern Africa which had led to a further isolation of the South African white minority Government and even when faced with increasing opposition from within its own borders, that Government had continued to pursue its policy of *apartheid* regardless of repeated appeals by the United Nations and world public opinion for a peaceful and just solution. It had also increased repression and intimidation in Namibia. It was therefore more than ever necessary for the international community to increase its common efforts to exert the greatest possible moral and political pressure on the South African Government. The United Nations must develop a comprehensive and effective strategy for the peaceful elimination of oppression and *apartheid* in that area.

15. Her delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX) calling upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa and hoped that the Council would consider further constructive measures to bring about a peaceful change in the policies of that country's Government.

16. Her delegation strongly regretted that all countries did not implement the Security Council resolutions on the arms embargo and urged all Governments to do so.

17. It again rejected the allegations of collaboration between NATO and South Africa. That organization had no political, military or other connexion whatsoever with the Government of South Africa and any contacts between South Africa and other countries that were members of NATO were strictly bilateral and had no connexion whatsoever with such countries.

18. It was important that the international community should provide appropriate political, moral and humanitarian assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa. Her Government would continue to contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and to give humanitarian assistance through other channels.

19. The international community could no longer condone a situation where reason and justice were confronted with naked force. Her delegation urged the South African Government to repeal all repressive laws and regulations and to grant unconditional release to all political prisoners and internees both in South Africa and in Namibia, which South Africa continued to occupy unlawfully.

20. Norway, which was committed to the United Nations and to the struggle against *apartheid*, would support all constructive efforts to bring about a peaceful change in South Africa.

21. Mr. TROTTA (Italy) said that, at the current session, the Committee was discussing *apartheid* at a time when the granting of democratic liberties to the Portuguese people had logically led to the recognition of the rights of all citizens of former Portuguese colonies. That defeat for the advocates of white supremacy was to be expected because the future belonged to law, to equality among men, and to non-discrimination and peace among them. The trend of history was against *apartheid* and the sooner the white minority realized the fallacy of their philosophical and political beliefs the better. Italy favoured all action under the Charter which would lead to equality among all citizens of whatever colour in the Republic of South Africa. It was confident that international moral pressure would not fail to produce the hoped-for results. The Italian Government considered the visit to Italy by the Chairman of the Special Committee and the fruitful exchanges of views with him in Rome a significant contribution to the struggle against *apartheid*. Nothing was further from the Italian mentality than the very concept of *apartheid*.

22. Italy strictly implemented Security Council resolutions, particularly with reference to the sale of arms. The severe control on trade applications prevented goods intended for military use from reaching South Africa from Italy. Although acceptance of those applications would have brought Italy valuable additional exports and made a significant contribution towards meeting its payments deficit, the rules on the appraisal of trade applications were strictly applied, because Italy considered it its duty to fight *apartheid* not only with words but also in practical ways.

23. Mr. MAZARI (Pakistan) said that the report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1) had drawn attention to the current situation in South Africa and showed

the stage reached in the international campaign to eradicate *apartheid* and racial discrimination from that country. It was a matter for regret that, instead of heeding the repeated calls made upon it to abandon its policies, the racist South African Government had persevered in its defiance of the international community. It had even extended the abhorrent system of *apartheid* to Namibia, which it continued to occupy illegally, and it was providing military assistance to the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia.

24. However, developments during the preceding year had signalled a new stage in the struggle of the people of South Africa and the efforts of the international community. The General Assembly's rejection of South Africa's credentials and its call upon the Security Council to review South Africa's relationship with the United Nations, the granting of observer status to the national liberation movements and their participation in the consideration of the item under discussion indicated a growing disapproval of South Africa's policies of *apartheid* and showed that the claim of the racist minority to represent the people of South Africa was being increasingly challenged.

25. In view of the disapproval expressed throughout the world of the *apartheid* policies of South Africa, and the action taken or recommended by the international community to eradicate them, any Government in the place of South Africa would have found it extremely difficult not to change its policies. However, it was well known that the South African régime was being sustained in its obduracy by the support it received from foreign military, economic and other interests which, for considerations of profits and strategy, were not fully complying with United Nations appeals for complete severance of all relations with South Africa. The Special Committee's report showed that the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council more than a decade earlier, in its resolution 181 (1963), was not yet fully effective and that military collaboration with the South African régime continued in various guises. In order to bring maximum pressure to bear upon that régime, the letter and spirit of the resolutions adopted by the various international bodies must be implemented by all.

26. During the preceding year, the Special Committee had done useful work in intensifying the campaign to isolate still further the racist régime and to mobilize governmental and public pressure for the elimination of racial discrimination and repression in South Africa. His delegation supported the recommendations made by the Special Committee and attached particular importance to the proposed special international campaigns to be launched in 1975 on the issues of the arms embargo against South Africa, collaboration by banks and multinational companies with the South African régime, emigration to South Africa and the release of political prisoners in South Africa. The task set for itself by the Special Committee for the coming year would require increased participation by all the bodies within the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations. His delegation was confident that their response would match the gravity of the challenge created by the situation in South Africa.

27. While pursuing the goal of the elimination of racial discrimination and oppression in South Africa and the restoration of the rights of the majority of its population,

the international community had rightly ensured the provision of legal assistance to those persecuted under the repressive and discriminatory legislation of South Africa, relief and education for such persons and their dependants, and relief for refugees from South Africa. The United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, of whose Committee of Trustees Pakistan was a member, had since its establishment done much valuable work along those lines and the gradual increase in contributions and in the number of contributors had indicated the growing recognition of its usefulness. Lately, however, in view of the deteriorating situation in South Africa, the needs to be met through the Fund had also increased. His delegation was confident that an increasing number of States would come forward with larger contributions to enable the Trust Fund to meet the increasing claims on its resources.

28. Pakistan had always supported every action designed to hasten the eradication of *apartheid*. It had condemned the policies of South Africa in every forum, had never established diplomatic relations with that country, and would not do so as long as it continued to pursue its current policy. Pakistan had imposed a complete trade boycott against South Africa, did not grant landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft, had closed its port to vessels flying the South African flag, banned the sale of all kinds of weapons and other strategic goods to South Africa and had suspended all cultural, educational and sports exchanges with that country. Pakistan's news media gave due coverage to the policies of racial discrimination and oppression pursued by the Government of South Africa. Pakistan contributed, as far as it was able, to the Trust Fund, and also contributed towards United Nations programmes to educate and train South Africans living outside their country.

29. Pakistan's opposition to *apartheid* or any form of discrimination and oppression stemmed from its Islamic heritage which enjoined respect for human dignity and the equal rights of men. Pakistan remained fully committed to the elimination of *apartheid* in all its manifestations and to the restoration of majority rule in South Africa. It reiterated its unswerving support for the people of South Africa in their just cause and legitimate struggle and looked forward to the time when the true representatives of the people of South Africa would take their places at the United Nations.

30. Mr. ABDOUL (Chad) said that his delegation wished to welcome to the Committee the courageous representatives of the newly independent countries of Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau. The name of Guinea-Bissau had special significance in the Committee's debate, since it was identified with the liberation of the Portuguese people who had rid themselves of the dictatorship imposed on them by the Caetano régime. The independence of Guinea-Bissau and the clear-sightedness of the current rulers in Lisbon marked the beginning of the end of colonialism and racism in southern Africa.

31. His delegation was pleased to note that pursuant to the logical decision of the General Assembly taken at its 2254th plenary meeting, the representatives of African liberation movements were taking part in the Committee's discussions, since they alone could provide valuable infor-



mation about the situation they had endured for so long. That was why his delegation had immediately supported the idea of having them associated closely with the work of the Special Political Committee and of the Special Committee.

32. Nevertheless, his delegation continued to feel bitterness and sorrow when it thought of the fact that after more than 20 years of debate on the problems posed for mankind by the policy of *apartheid*, the United Nations was still discussing the abominable legislation which the South African Government had enacted against the non-whites in the name of Christian morality and Western civilization. In essence, *apartheid* was a crime committed by a gang of selfish racists who did not even think of their own future. It was a disguised form of slavery the first victims of which were the Azanians; it was a pernicious form of colonialism which threatened peace and security not only in Africa but throughout the world. In his Government's opinion, it was an important political question which no country could afford to ignore and the international community must therefore take the most energetic and practical measures promptly to eliminate *apartheid* for all time. In any event, the people of Chad, faithful to the precepts of the social and cultural revolutionary movement founded by the President of the Republic, declared that Africa should belong to the Africans and affirmed their solidarity with the struggle being waged by their black brothers to liberate African Territories still under the yoke of colonialism.

33. The Afrikaners and their henchmen in Salisbury should make no mistake about the determination of the Africans to free themselves from racism and its constraints. The victory of the Azanians was inevitable, since they were obliged to fight with weapons in their hands in order to regain their dignity.

34. His delegation approved all the recommendations contained in the exhaustive report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1) and could not but welcome the results of the international campaign conducted during the preceding year against *apartheid*.

35. It was, however, regrettable to note that the Pretoria régime had rejected all appeals to reason and was continuing to maintain in prison several Azanian leaders arrested 10 years previously. It was also resorting, in desperation, to terroristic measures against those who had found refuge in independent neighbouring countries. Such actions were indeed characteristic of a police régime. In that connexion, he recalled *inter alia* the statement by the former Prime Minister Verwoerd who had told the Parliament in 1963 that South Africa must be kept white and that to do so could mean only one thing, namely white domination. It was clear that in order to keep South Africa white, it was necessary to use police measures so as to ensure that the Azanian political leaders were incapable of doing any harm and to enact legislation designed to preserve white supremacy. The South African rulers had flouted General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) and were deporting hundreds of thousands of Africans to the Bantustans. The régime of Prime Minister Vorster was illegally occupying Namibia, a Territory which he intended to Balkanize, and intervening in Salisbury and Tel Aviv where his supporters were applying his methods to the

indigenous population of Zimbabwe and Palestine. He noted that the leaders in Tel Aviv were fraternizing with a man whose brother, the Reverend J. D. Vorster, had publicly proclaimed that Hitler's *Mein Kampf* had shown the road to greatness, which was that of South Africa.

36. Using false pretexts, Vorster had doubled his military budget over that of 1972-1973, thanks to his collusion with sharks of high finance, who valued their financial interests and unbridled exploitation of African natural resources more than human beings, and had warned African States against attacking *apartheid*. However, no one in Africa would retreat before such threats.

37. In view of that intolerable situation, his delegation believed that the time had come to prevent the South African régime from precipitating a disaster and to help the South African people to find a solution. In that regard, his delegation supported General Assembly resolutions 3206 (XXIX) approving the recommendation of the Committee Credentials to reject the credentials of the Pretoria delegation and 3207 (XXIX) calling on the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa. It would be quite appropriate to expel the representatives of the Vorster régime from the United Nations, pending the subsequent arrival of the true representatives of the majority of the South African people, who respected the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

38. In spite of its flagrant and constant violations of the Charter, of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Vorster Government continued to benefit from the collaboration of certain Member States which continued to maintain with it diplomatic, economic, military and cultural relations or were preparing to strengthen them. Those Governments were encouraging *apartheid* and were enabling Vorster and his henchmen to defy the United Nations and world public opinion. Those States advanced absurd reasons to justify their action, claiming that they were seeking to defend Africa and the free world and that by supporting South Africa militarily they were helping the Afrikaners to resist an imaginary "black peril" and thus defend "Western civilization".

39. The strange alliance between those Governments and that of Pretoria must be strongly denounced and made the subject of a comprehensive investigation with a view to restoring the moral authority of an institution in whose establishment they had played a part. Similarly, the ostentatious attitude of those who claimed that United Nations resolutions were always adopted by a tendentious mechanical majority and should therefore not be taken into account should also be denounced. It was that situation which enabled *apartheid* and its ally zionism to continue to exist in Azania, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine. Instead of supporting *apartheid*, the Governments in question should rather persuade Vorster to heed the winds of change sweeping through southern Africa and to follow the path of reason.

40. His Government, which had just signed and ratified the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, approved the idea



of organizing in 1975 an international campaign for the dissemination of information on the crimes committed by the South African Government.

41. Mr. MAKATINI (Observer, African National Congress of South Africa) said that the international community had at last become aware of the pressing duty to lend active support to the people of South Africa in their difficult struggle, not only for national liberation but also for the eradication of *apartheid* whose repressive designs were now generally regarded as second only to those of Nazi Germany. ANC welcomed the unequivocal stand taken so far by the members of the Committee and in the Security Council as correctly reflecting the indignation of mankind in the face of the illegal reign of terror and brutality imposed on the people of South Africa in the name of Christianity, white civilization and the "Free World", which the Pretoria régime claimed to defend on the continent of Africa.

42. He noted with satisfaction the growing number of Western countries which wished to be counted on the side of justice against foreign domination and racism in South Africa. Guinea-Bissau had recently joined the community of nations and Africa would shortly be celebrating the independence of Mozambique. That important victory was an outstanding milestone in Africa's struggle against foreign domination in all its forms and marked a decisive turning-point in the efforts of the liberation movements to achieve the total liberation of the continent. In addition, it marked the beginning of the end of the illegal Ian Smith régime. Angola, which would undoubtedly be followed by São Tomé and Príncipe as well as the Cape Verde Islands, would be the next Territory to commemorate the end of 500 years of Portuguese colonialism and fascism. Angola's imminent independence would certainly make it easier for the United Nations to assist the armed struggle of the people of Namibia led by SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) and thus help to free Namibia from Pretoria's illegal occupation.

43. He was sure that all those developments would be highly welcomed by Member States which had been loyal to the Organization's proclaimed resolve to crush the illegal Smith régime and would help to bring about democratic majority rule in Zimbabwe. The emergence of the new Portuguese Government which had repeatedly expressed its readiness to conform to all United Nations resolutions on decolonization gave reason to hope that it would close the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques to the Southern Rhodesian régime. That would not only hasten the liberation of Zimbabwe but would also help to increase and consolidate the friendship which the new Government in Lisbon was in the process of winning amongst African and other justice-loving nations throughout the world.

44. In the interests of Christianity and the democratic ideals which the European countries professed to champion, his delegation hoped that they would not stop at verbal condemnation and expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, but would go further and lend an active hand to the people of South Africa to ensure the triumph in that country of the principles consecrated in the Charter of the United Nations.

45. It was common knowledge that the military, economic, political and cultural collusion existing between the Pretoria régime and the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany was in violation of a number of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. History would undoubtedly hold those countries guilty of all the past, present and future crimes of the neo-Nazi Pretoria régime against the indigenous peoples of South Africa and some neighbouring countries. Led by France, the self-proclaimed friend of Africa, which had expanded that virtual military alliance to nuclear production, all those countries had spared no effort building up Pretoria's repressive and aggressive potential. ANC called on those countries to reconsider their position in the Committee and in the Security Council and to join the international community in its efforts to avert a disaster. He recalled that Vorster had engaged in pro-Nazi activities during the Second World War and had stated in 1942 that South Africa stood for "Christian nationalism... called fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany". The record of the Vorster régime left no room for doubt that he still adhered to that statement.

46. Referring to the brutalities committed by that régime, he pointed out that according to United Nations statistics, South Africa was responsible for nearly 50 per cent of the executions carried out in the world, and that the killing of blacks by shooting was a favourite pastime for the Fascist police in that country. In addition, 87 per cent of the land was owned by whites, while the Africans were packed in the remaining 13 per cent, where they were ravaged by hunger and starvation.

47. Gloomy as the general picture might appear to be, ANC had derived some encouragement from the General Assembly decision, adopted by an overwhelming majority, to reject the credentials of the Pretoria régime (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)). It regarded that action as being in conformity with the United Nations decision to recognize the liberation movement as the authentic representative of the oppressed people of South Africa (see General Assembly resolution 3151 G (XXVIII)) and considered that it raised the problem of *apartheid* from the level of mere moral indignation and condemnation to that of active support for the imminent armed struggle which the Organization had recognized as legitimate.

48. In order to adopt a correct approach which would be in keeping with the aspirations of the people of South Africa, the international community must examine the roots of the problem of *apartheid*. In South Africa, the biggest colonial invasion had been followed by a concentration of settlers from Europe, who had progressively severed their ties with their respective metropolises. The problem of *apartheid* therefore resulted from a special type of settler colonialism with the worst form of racism serving as an instrument of exploitation. It was therefore not an internal problem involving human or civil rights that could be redressed through piecemeal reformism by the illegal régime. Rather, it was a struggle for national liberation in the same way as had been the case in all African countries that had achieved independence through constitutional means or armed struggle. The only difference was that in the case under consideration, the metropole was in South Africa itself.

49. The indigenous people, through its spokesman, ANC, had always contested South Africa's "independence", "sovereignty" and membership in the United Nations on the grounds that as a consequence of colonial conquest its régime was illegal. It was important to note that the granting of international recognition to the colonialists had been due to the fact that the League of Nations had been dominated by the colonial and imperialist Powers and that the overwhelming majority of the countries which had since joined the international community as free nations had themselves still been under colonial subjugation. That had enabled the settler authorities in South Africa to achieve in 1910 what the Ian Smith régime had failed to do in 1965. In view of that gross miscarriage of international law and justice, the time had come for the international community to take the first step towards redressing that wrong by expelling the South African régime from the United Nations and to hasten the admission of a truly independent democratic and anti-racist South Africa by giving that country's liberation movement political and material assistance. His delegation would refer those who would understandably seek guarantees for the rights of the white minority in a liberated South Africa to the principles set forth in the Freedom Charter which had been adopted on 26 June 1955 and which the ANC leaders and allied organizations had courageously defended and to the statement by Nelson Mandela in 1963 that he cherished and was prepared to die for the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons would live together in harmony and with equal opportunities.

50. Turning to the question of political prisoners, he wished to commend the Special Committee on its efforts to secure the release of such outstanding leaders as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Abram Fischer and many others. He also wished to express his deep appreciation of the statement made on the occasion of the recent arrest of Winnie Mandela. Mrs. Mandela had, for many years, been subjected to harassment and persecution by the South African police. Since January 1974, she had been restricted, under increasingly stringent banning orders and had been under house arrest at night and during week-ends. Mrs. Mandela had been arrested repeatedly since 1954, and on one occasion had been held incommunicado for 600 days and had been brutally ill-treated, despite a heart condition. It was clear that the treatment meted out to her was part of a campaign to instill fear into those who saw Nelson Mandela and his colleagues as inspiring examples of devotion and selflessness.

51. ANC hailed the decision taken by the Special Committee to observe 11 October 1973 as a day of solidarity with the political prisoners in South Africa. It wished to request the United Nations to consider, during the current session, appropriate action to secure the release of all political prisoners in that country, and based its request on the statement made on 12 June 1974 by the Chairman of the Special Committee.

52. Mr. AUSTIN (Guyana) recalled that the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania had indicated that, despite the increasing repression and brutality of the South African police, those who opposed *apartheid* had united behind the liberation movements in South Africa. While the closing of ranks behind the liberation movements was an

indication of the determination of the black majority to win its freedom, the recourse to repression and violence by the South African Government should cause concern to the United Nations since it might be a prelude to a more generalized attempt to curb the psychological, diplomatic, political and material successes of the liberation movements.

53. The revelation that the South African racist régime was intensifying its terror campaign as a result of the accession to freedom of those African States adjoining South Africa should jolt some members of the international community out of their complacency with regard to the situation in southern Africa. It was possible that the South African Government might be considering pre-emptive action against the newly independent States and the liberation movements, in view of the recent substantial increase in its military budget and the traffic of military personnel between Pretoria and one Western capital. The international community must therefore complement diplomatic action with substantial material assistance both to the liberation movements and the newly independent States of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The former Portuguese Territories had had substantial trade links with South Africa, and it could be assumed that South Africa was prepared to do all within its power to ensure the survival of *apartheid* and to prevent the newly independent States from becoming truly independent. A strong Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau would ensure an early end to *apartheid* and bolster the efforts of the liberation movements. A setback, both economical and political, in any of those States would be a severe psychological blow to those fighting for their freedom. The liberation movements stood for freedom, justice and liberty; the South African Government stood for fascism and obscurantism.

54. The General Assembly had called upon the Security Council to review the relationship between South Africa and the United Nations; the Security Council must end the undermining of the moral authority of the United Nations by expelling the Government of South Africa from the United Nations, in accordance with Article 6 of the Charter.

55. His delegation wished to thank the Chairman and other members of the Special Committee for their informative and comprehensive report.

56. Mr. WORDSWORTH (Liberia) said that his delegation wished to congratulate the Chairman, Rapporteur and members of the Special Committee on their report; it hoped that the Committee would now be in a better position to seek more realistic solutions to the situation prevailing in South Africa and South West Africa.

57. It had become obvious that the reluctance of certain Western countries to implement the sanctions imposed against the racist régime of South Africa had made it almost impossible to bring an end to the atrocities and crimes committed against the innocent people of South Africa and South West Africa.

58. The question of *apartheid* in those countries would certainly be resolved, some day. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia had pointed out in his address to the

current session of the General Assembly (2251st plenary meeting), the peoples of Africa still subjected to exploitation and discriminatory treatment were determined to be free, to enjoy human dignity and to take their rightful place in the life of their respective countries and the world. The sooner the white minority of South Africa permitted common sense and decency to play a more active and effective role in the search for solutions to the problems created by the policy of *apartheid*, the better the chances of bringing lasting peace and happiness to the troubled peoples of southern Africa. However, the longer the racist régime continued to pursue its abhorrent policies, the closer it would bring itself and the world to the abyss of destruction. If that was what the Western countries were seeking in their obdurate support of the South African régime, it would be better for them to end their pretence of desiring world peace and security. Their policy of supplying unlimited quantities of arms and ammunition to the racist régime in contravention of the sanctions imposed by the

United Nations could only increase the peril to world peace and security.

59. His delegation commended the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonial Territories for their courageous struggle against the cruelest and most inhumane type of colonialism. It congratulated the Portuguese Government for having changed its attitude towards its African colonies and having recognized the rights of the people of those colonies to self-determination, and it believed that the recent actions taken by the Portuguese Government had ushered in an era of peace and goodwill between Portugal and the peoples of Africa.

60. It was the fervent wish of his delegation that the Government of South Africa would be induced to review the situation in the light of current world trends and to revoke forthwith its policy of *apartheid*.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*

## 921st meeting

Monday, 28 October 1974, at 3.20 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.921

### AGENDA ITEM 37

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa**  
(continued) (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804 and Corr.1, A/9806 and Corr.1, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany had asked to be included in the list of speakers, even though that list was already closed. In the absence of any objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to that request.

*It was so decided.*

2. The CHAIRMAN informed the members of the Committee that the Deputy Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), Mr. Om Prakash Paliwal, and the Secretary-General of the World Peace Council, Mr. Romesh Chandra, had requested a hearing before the Committee. In accordance with its usual practice, he took it that the Committee agreed to that request.

*It was so agreed.*

3. Mr. CHOU Chueh (China) said that, in his statement to the Committee at the 914th meeting, the representative of China had stated the position of principle of the Chinese delegation on the World Peace Council, pointing out that

that organization had long been reduced to the level of a hired tool of a super-Power. Consequently, his delegation had reservations about inviting the World Peace Council to attend and address meetings of the Special Political Committee. His delegation's position had been repeatedly stated in other organs of the United Nations.

4. Moreover, the Chinese delegation's position concerning AAPSO was well known. It had reservations also about inviting the representative of that organization to address the Committee. He requested that his delegation's position should be reflected in the summary record.

5. The CHAIRMAN confirmed that the Chinese delegation's statement would be so recorded. The two organizations which had requested a hearing would be asked to make their statements at an appropriate moment.

6. Mr. AUGUSTIN (Haiti), after welcoming the new States Members of the United Nations, Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau, said that the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/9622 and Corr.1) would certainly contribute to the success of the Committee's work on the question.

7. It was regrettable that, 26 years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and despite the numerous resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, it should still be necessary to discuss the need to eliminate racism and racial discrimination. It was also deplorable that, after 14 years' unremitting work by the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, Vorster's Fascist régime should continue to intensify its campaign of repression and discrimination against the



non-white majority in South Africa, and it was alarming that the social and economic régime based on *apartheid* was being extended to Namibia and Zimbabwe.

8. However, despite the cruel policy of repression, resistance was being intensified in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe and the trade union protest movements were categorically refuting the statements by the illegal Government of South Africa that the majority of the people accepted their subordinate status. It should be pointed out in that connexion that the recent events in Portugal and the changes in its colonial policy had changed the structure of international relations and constituted important developments in the struggle against *apartheid*.

9. His Government's position on *apartheid* was well known. Haiti firmly rejected and condemned any form of slavery, discrimination and racial segregation and was opposed to all forms of *apartheid*, which it considered a threat not only to the orderly and peaceful development of southern Africa but also to the peaceful development of the whole world. The Government of Haiti believed that the United Nations should try to put an end to *apartheid* in South Africa whatever the cost and that that objective would be attained if all the Members of the Organization were equal to dealing with the situation.

10. His delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX) and fully supported all the recommendations in the report of the Special Committee, especially that the United Nations should expand its efforts to secure concerted international action against *apartheid*, and that the General Assembly and the Security Council should launch an urgent appeal to all Member States to cease all forms of military co-operation with South Africa immediately. It also endorsed the Special Committee's recommendation that special international campaigns should be launched in 1975, under United Nations auspices, to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa, to put an end to all economic, sporting and other relations with the racist régime and to forbid emigration to South Africa.

11. His delegation was happy that the authentic representatives of South Africa, the African national liberation movements, which could supply information on the true situation in that country, were participating in the work of the Committee. He believed that the time had come to adopt concrete and decisive measures to put an end to the dangerous situation in South Africa and it was ready to support the strongest and most rigorous measures to that end.

12. Miss PARRIS (Jamaica), after warmly welcoming the new Members of the United Nations, Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau, said that at the preceding session, her delegation had introduced the draft text adopted as General Assembly resolution 3151 B (XXVIII) on the programme of work of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* for the year 1974 and was gratified by the vigour and determination with which that Committee had discharged its mandate during the year, and with the considerable success which had attended its efforts to promote intensified and more co-ordinated international action to secure the eradication of *apartheid*. Moreover, the dramatic breakthrough

achieved by the liberation movements in the Territories which had been under Portuguese domination had led to the attainment of independence by Guinea-Bissau and the promise of a speedy transition to independence for Mozambique and Angola.

13. Those events must surely have made it apparent to the régimes of Pretoria and Salisbury that their response of desperation in the face of their increasing isolation from the international community could only be self-defeating. The action taken by the General Assembly in 1974 in respect of the credentials of the delegation of the minority South African régime were a fair indication that the patience of the international community with the intransigence of the Vorster régime was running out.

14. Her delegation considered it essential for the States Members of the United Nations to exert a relentless political and economic pressure against the *apartheid* régime of South Africa so as to hasten the process by which the true representatives of that country could take their place in the United Nations. Accordingly, her delegation once more called upon those States that continued to collaborate with the South African régime to desist immediately from providing it with military, economic or moral support of any kind. It must be realized that the issue of *apartheid* was pre-eminently an issue of international morality and humanitarian principles. The guidelines for effective action had been clearly set out in the various resolutions on the subject adopted by the General Assembly and all that was needed was speedy and total compliance with their provisions. At the same time it was even more essential and urgent that the liberation movements in southern Africa should be afforded the maximum degree of moral and material support. In 1973, the Jamaican Government had decided to make an annual financial contribution to the liberation movements through the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

15. Her delegation hoped that, before the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, further changes would have taken place in the situation in southern Africa and that far-reaching progress would have been made towards eradication of *apartheid* in South Africa and according to the oppressed majority of that country their rightful place as free members of the world community.

16. Mr. DABLAN (Jordan) welcomed Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau and said that the emergence of a new and independent African State, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, and its admission to the United Nations represented a great victory for the national liberation movements in Africa. He hoped that Angola and Mozambique would soon attain independence also.

17. It was regrettable that the Committee should once again be directing its attention to the question of *apartheid* which had been discussed in the United Nations since its foundation. Numerous resolutions had been adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council condemning racial discrimination but the international community had not yet found the means to end the evil of *apartheid*. Yet the United Nations must continue and intensify its efforts against the racial system of South Africa, which was an affront to the dignity of man and to his basic rights and

humanity. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority, had recently rejected the credentials of the representatives of South Africa (see resolution 3206 (XXIX)) and had called on the Security Council to reconsider the whole question of the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa (resolution 3207 (XXIX)).

18. The report of the Special Committee (A/9622 and Corr.1) described the measures which the Pretoria régime was pursuing in order to enhance its repressive racial system and also showed that the situation in South Africa was deteriorating and constituted a genuine threat to international peace and security. The Government of South Africa had ignored and defied every effort of the United Nations to put an end to a situation which violated the Charter and it had been supported by certain States Members of the United Nations that were maintaining economic and other relations with that régime. The increase in the volume of South Africa's international trade demonstrated that its trading partners had been providing considerable assistance to the racist régime of South Africa.

19. Although it was not necessary to reaffirm Jordan's position on the issue, he wished to do so on account of the attempt by the Israeli representative to drive a wedge between the Arab and African countries by repeating a distorted press report that Jordanian military equipment had been sold to South Africa. That attempt by the Israeli representative would mislead nobody since Israel's record in that connexion was known to all. The Chairman of the Special Committee had expressed his concern that the South African régime and Israel had strengthened their diplomatic, military and cultural ties.

20. Upon the publication of that report the Jordanian Government had issued successive statements, the last of which had been a letter—which he read out—dated 23 September 1974 and addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee by the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations upon instruction of his Government.<sup>1</sup>

21. Jordan, which condemned South Africa's policy of racial discrimination and oppression, would join in any effort and support all measures taken by the United Nations and by any other organization to force South Africa to change its policy of racial discrimination. It also believed that the fight against *apartheid* should be intensified by mobilizing both governmental and non-governmental efforts to that end. It supported the recommendations made in the report of the Special Committee and its proposal that a campaign of world-wide action to accelerate the elimination of *apartheid* should be launched in 1975, under United Nations auspices, and to support any measure designed to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the United Nations.

22. Baron VON WECHMAR (Federal Republic of Germany) reiterated that the Government and people of the Federal Republic resolutely opposed any violation of human rights and especially the policy of *apartheid*. His Government acted resolutely with regard to South Africa—

and the same applied to Namibia and Southern Rhodesia—although the liberal character of its governmental and economic system made it more difficult for his Government than for others to intervene.

23. The Federal Republic adhered strictly to the resolutions of the Security Council and did not supply arms or other military equipment to South Africa. The Federal Government promoted the economic development of all States members of OAU through investment promotion measures, but investments in South Africa were excluded from any such State promotion. Its endeavours to discourage sports contacts with South Africa where the participation of racially selected teams was involved were proving successful. His country contributed to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and to the other United Nations assistance funds for that region.

24. It was understandable that the debate should be fraught with emotion since the dignity of man was at stake. For that reason, it was necessary to refer with objectivity and frankness to the Federal Republic's foreign trade with South Africa: the Federal Republic was one of the major trading countries of the world and, over the preceding few years, its foreign trade with most countries had greatly increased. However, although its foreign trade with South Africa had also grown, its exports to other African countries had tripled over the first five years, while imports had reached almost twice their former volume.

25. It was precisely because of its economic potential and its foreign trade that the Federal Republic had been able to provide development assistance and could continue doing so. The Federal Republic undeniably provided much more development assistance than other countries which tried in vain to discredit it. For example, the representative of the German Democratic Republic had recently quoted from an article on investment in South Africa in a magazine published in the Federal Republic which was critical of the Federal Government. For obvious reasons, he would find it difficult to quote from a newspaper published in the German Democratic Republic whose views were contrary to the policy of that country's Government.

26. He pointed out that trade restrictions always affected the general population. In the case of South Africa, as in any other country, the achievement of a higher standard of living would also benefit that part of the population which was subject to discrimination.

27. He once again called upon the Government in Pretoria—as he had done on other occasions—to do everything in its power to bring about peaceful change and urged it, as a gesture of goodwill, to release all political prisoners immediately. His delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX) in the hope that a constructive solution would be found. The essential point was to avoid perpetuating rigid attitudes and to do everything possible to achieve the speedy and total elimination of *apartheid*.

28. Mr. MUBANGA (Zambia) congratulated the Chairman, whose country, Sweden, provided so much support to the national liberation movements. He welcomed the

<sup>1</sup> A/AC.115/L.393.

delegations of Bangladesh, Guinea-Bissau and Grenada, and expressed confidence that they would contribute to the work of the United Nations. In that respect, he paid a tribute to the memory of Amílcar Cabral, who had met his death at the hands of Portuguese Fascists when he had been on the verge of achieving the objective to which he had dedicated his entire life. He also thanked the Special Committee on *Apartheid* for the excellent report which it had submitted to the Committee.

29. Much had been said about the diabolical system of *apartheid*, but condemnations had had no effect in Pretoria. The plight of the non-whites was beyond question; what was questionable was the sincerity of nations which condemned *apartheid* but at the same time maintained cordial relations with the military in South Africa.

30. In South Africa 3 million whites professing Christian principles had taken it upon themselves to regulate the lives of more than 14 million of their fellow-men. That was the most flagrant violation of human dignity, but the tragedy was that those nations which were the foremost advocates of the principles of freedom and justice and which would be prepared to pay the highest price if their nationals were the victims of *apartheid* were engaged in activities which helped to strengthen the hand of the racists. It was sufficient to mention the recent joint naval exercises carried out by South Africa and the United Kingdom, the continued sale of French arms to the racists and the flourishing trade relations of other Western countries with the South African régime.

31. Worst of all, however, South Africa continued to export *apartheid* to the Territory of Namibia, thereby challenging the authority of the United Nations. He paid a tribute to the people of Namibia who, under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization, were continuing to wage an untiring struggle against the racists in Pretoria, and reaffirmed his conviction that that unrelenting struggle would soon culminate in South Africa's withdrawal from the United Nations Territory.

32. Zambia would continue to give moral and material support to the liberation movements in southern Africa until victory was achieved. Zambia had lost too many lives and too much property to give up the struggle and it had suffered much simply because it had refused to succumb to the evil machinations of the racists.

33. Only a few days earlier, at its 2269th plenary meeting, the General Assembly had given an ovation to General Francisco da Costa Gomes, an act which demonstrated that the Africans were prepared to forget. What had happened with the Portuguese could also happen with the racists of South Africa if they changed their policy and accepted the inalienable right of the African to participate in the affairs of his country. Africa forgave its oppressors.

34. The fact that the General Assembly had recently rejected the credentials of the delegation from South Africa and had invited the liberation movements to participate in the debate on *apartheid* had given more impetus to the struggle that was being waged in southern Africa.

35. He thanked all the countries and private organizations which were working for the elimination of *apartheid* and, in particular, those Swedish journalists who had told the world about the plight of Namibians. He also condemned Israel for trying to fill the gap left by Portugal.

36. Mr. SEIGNORET (Trinidad and Tobago) thanked all those speakers who had congratulated the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on the work which it had done. He was confident that the valuable suggestions that had been made during the Committee's debate would be reflected in the draft resolutions to be adopted by the Committee.

37. The representatives of the national liberation movements—the authentic representatives of the oppressed people of South Africa—had once again stressed the need to isolate South Africa and had repeatedly rejected as mistaken the argument that the oppressed people of South Africa would be the ones to suffer most if sanctions were imposed on South Africa. There was therefore no need to reiterate the absolute necessity of stopping all economic and military collaboration with South Africa, although the more those truths were repeated, the more likely it was that the political and economic leaders of countries which supported South Africa would take effective measures to accelerate the eradication of *apartheid*.

38. It was his view that the concept of negotiation embodied in the Manifesto on Southern Africa, signed at Lusaka in 1969, remained the only way in which South Africa could defuse the time-bomb of racial war in southern Africa which, if it was allowed to explode, would be felt throughout the world. The new Government of Portugal had provided practical proof that negotiation was the most reliable way of moving from war to peace. Portugal had adopted that course of action after more than a decade of war and repression, during which the people of Portugal had carried the burden of a colonial war until the way of negotiation could no longer be postponed.

39. His delegation associated itself with those which had already spoken in urging all Members of the United Nations to implement its resolutions, since that was the only way in which the situation could be changed by peaceful means. All States members of the United Nations, including those which collaborated with the South African régime, publicly condemned the policy of *apartheid*, but they had not yet been able to reach agreement on the implementation of measures designed to isolate and eliminate that régime of terror. Those who maintained relations with it were postponing the advent of peace in South Africa and the establishment of a régime of respect for the rights of its people. As long as those ties were maintained, the South African régime would maintain the policies which made possible the high profits that attracted certain Western capitalists.

40. In resolution 3055 (XXVIII) the General Assembly had again called upon the Government of South Africa to grant forthwith unconditional release to all persons imprisoned or subjected to other restrictions for their opposition to *apartheid* and had expressed the conviction that such release was essential for a peaceful solution of the grave situation in that country. That resolution had been adopted by an overwhelming majority, which had included the five



permanent members of the Security Council. The Government of the white minority had ignored the resolution, as it had many previous resolutions. There were, however, Governments which had imposed sanctions against other States without even consulting the United Nations but found it impossible to do the same against the *apartheid* régime, despite the appeals of the United Nations to do so.

41. He welcomed the statement of the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany; it was his hope that the Governments of the other countries which were major trading partners of South Africa—in particular, France, the United Kingdom and the United States—would take effective measures to secure the release of political prisoners and respect for their right to free movement within South Africa or to travel abroad if they wished. If the South African régime was induced to take that first step, which was not impossible or without precedent, the next step, that of holding consultations with the authentic representatives of the majority, would be facilitated.

42. He expressed his appreciation for the attention which the United States delegation had given to the problem of racism in South Africa at the current session of the General Assembly. He referred to the affirmation made by the Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, at the 2238th plenary meeting to the effect that the United States would support the aspirations of Africans to participate in the fruits of freedom and human dignity, and to the statement made by the United States delegation at the 915th meeting of the Special Political Committee, in which it had stressed that *apartheid* was absolutely indefensible. He noted with appreciation the position of the United States with regard to the arms embargo; he shared the belief that *apartheid* could be ended peacefully and hoped that the United States also shared his belief that, to that end, it should co-operate in the total economic and diplomatic isolation of the South African régime.

43. The Special Committee on *Apartheid* joined in the gratitude expressed by the Chairman of the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa to the Governments which had contributed to that Fund and, in particular, to those which had announced that they would increase their contributions. He paid a tribute to the work of the Committee of Trustees and to the generosity shown by the Nordic countries in their contributions to the Trust Fund and other similar bodies. He endorsed the appeal of the Chairman of the Committee of Trustees for larger contributions in 1975 and hoped, in particular, that the developed countries which had not yet done so would join the list of contributors.

44. Voluntary contributions were also needed for the expansion of the activities of the Unit on *Apartheid*, which was very satisfactorily carrying out the difficult task of disseminating information on *apartheid* to the widest possible audience. The international campaign against *apartheid* was becoming increasingly effective as public opinion gained greater awareness of the evils of that régime, and such information was more necessary than ever because of the enormous resources which the ruling circles in South Africa devoted to the dissemination of deceptive propaganda. He expressed appreciation to the Governments of Japan and New Zealand, which had announced that they

would make contributions for that purpose; he hoped that other Governments would also contribute generously.

45. The Special Committee on *Apartheid* had recommended that its name should be changed to the "Special Committee against *Apartheid*". Unless there were objections, he proposed that the Committee should endorse that recommendation in its report to the General Assembly on the item under consideration.

46. *Apartheid* was not a regional problem, but a world problem. That had to be borne in mind in future work on the item under consideration. The Special Committee on *Apartheid* wished to hold broad consultations on the draft resolutions and hoped to receive co-operation from all groups. It hoped that it would be able to submit those draft resolutions within a few days and that the work of the Committee could be so arranged that there would be time to hold the necessary consultations.

47. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania), speaking on behalf of the organization he represented and of all the people of Azania, thanked those who had spared no effort to ensure that at the current session particular attention would be paid to the situation of that country and to the obstinate and arrogant attitude of the minority régime towards the United Nations and other organizations which were working for peace and progress. It was impossible to list all those who had condemned *apartheid* because the number of countries which had joined the just cause of those struggling against that régime was larger than ever.

48. He noted that there was no difficulty in winning the active support of the non-aligned countries and welcomed, in particular, the contributions of the Scandinavian countries. Examples of recent favourable developments were those in Portugal, a country whose attitude had already been commended, although with some reservations, and Australia, a country which belonged to the Western bloc, although not geographically. Recognition should be given, subject, again, to reservations, to the constructive attitude Australia had recently adopted towards the struggle against *apartheid* and, in particular, towards the question of the credentials of the representatives of the minority régime.

49. In contrast to the attitude of those who, on the basis of false reasoning, continued to maintain ties with the South African régime, the expressions of solidarity with the struggle against *apartheid* had been received enthusiastically by the people of Azania and had helped to create doubts even in the minds of the members of the white minority.

50. The isolation of the South African régime had not been achieved, and not all the statements made had been helpful. Brazil, for example, had questioned the affirmations made by the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (908th meeting) and the Pan Africanist Congress (910th meeting) on the basis of valid investigations, thus showing that it was collaborating in military matters with South Africa for the benefit of the Western imperialists.

51. Concerning the attitude of Israel, he referred to a statement by General Dayan expressing the hope that Israel's relations with South Africa would not deteriorate and would even improve.

52. Replying to those who accused African leaders of being too vehement in their statements at the United Nations, he said that such vehemence seemed to him entirely justified when struggling against slavery and for the human rights of those who were imprisoned without any justification and when denouncing the policies of the Government of South Africa, which was making war not only on those who bore arms but also on civilians and children. As an example, he cited the case of Mrs. Mandela.

53. That the Western Powers were collaborating with South Africa was shown, among other things, by the fact that during the week in progress Great Britain would carry out military manoeuvres jointly with South Africa, thus collaborating in the military preparation of the *apartheid* régime for its struggle against the national liberation movements, i.e. against its own people. For it was clear from the Lusaka Manifesto that the African countries had no intention of attacking any country; consequently, South Africa had no need to arm itself against them.

54. The United States had affirmed that *apartheid* was absolutely indefensible and that it was a burden on the conscience of mankind, but that it was nevertheless necessary to keep the channels of communication with South Africa open. Everything that could be said against *apartheid* had been said; it only remained to ask what were the motives prompting those who continued to support the Pretoria régime and what were the true intentions of those who continued to co-operate with South Africa, resorting to all kinds of unacceptable excuses, while the people of Azania continued to suffer oppression.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee, Mr. Om Prakash Paliwal (Deputy Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization) took a seat at the Committee table.*

55. Mr. PALIWAL (Deputy Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization) said that it was a matter of great satisfaction that the Chairman of the Special Political Committee represented a country that was playing a significant role in the struggle against *apartheid*. AAPSO had been among the most consistent supporters of the peoples of southern Africa and one of its objectives was to strengthen the activities of the liberation movements of Africa and to link them with other progressive forces in their efforts to ensure independence for the peoples still under racist régimes, since there could be no peace in the world until colonialism and racism were completely liquidated.

56. Thanks to its contacts with the liberation movements, AAPSO had been able to launch campaigns of assistance to the people of Namibia. In that regard, it should be mentioned that the eleventh Council Session of AAPSO, which had been held in Baghdad in March 1974, had condemned the policies of *apartheid*, supported the demand of the peoples of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia for the release of all political prisoners and also hailed the decision of the Arab Heads of State to impose an oil embargo on the white minority régimes of South Africa and Rhodesia.

57. On 11 October 1974, the Secretary-General of AAPSO, Mr. El Sebai, who was also Minister of Culture of Egypt, had called for the release of all political prisoners in southern Africa, stating that that part of the world had become a prison run with the support of world imperialism. However, there was a world-wide process in favour of the release of political prisoners, as had been clearly demonstrated by events in Portugal and Greece. Thus, the campaign for the release of political prisoners was more urgent than ever. AAPSO called upon the international community to give the greatest possible support to the national liberation movements and to enforce an oil and arms embargo on the racist régimes of southern Africa.

58. AAPSO was currently engaged in preparing an international conference in support of the Zimbabwe people's struggle for freedom and independence. The conference, which would be convened in co-operation with OAU and the national liberation movements, was designed to secure material assistance to support the armed struggle in Zimbabwe.

59. He supported the demand for the expulsion of the régime of Pretoria from the United Nations and expressed regret that there were still many who continued to collaborate with South Africa, thus violating the Charter of the United Nations. To justify its military collaboration with South Africa, the United Kingdom Government would have to admit that its collaboration was prompted by the enormous profits which British firms reaped thereby. Similarly, the United States had recently declared that its Government had asked United States firms involved in South Africa to treat both white and black labour on equal terms. The 1974 report of the Director-General of the ILO on the matter left no doubt as to how black labour was treated by such firms.

60. The Pretoria régime and its apologists urged that efforts should be made to avoid a confrontation, but it was they who had blocked all attempts to bring about peaceful change because they were not prepared to accept all human beings as equal. Nevertheless, history had already put Pretoria in the dock before the conscience of mankind.

61. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) regretted that he was compelled to speak in exercise of the right of reply because one delegation had seen fit to repeat an already time-worn statement concerning the Committee's decision to hear representatives of the World Peace Council and AAPSO. His delegation had already explained its position in that regard and did not deem it necessary to engage in polemics with incorrigible slanderers.

62. Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany had referred to certain articles published in the press of the Federal Republic. Those newspaper reports were not pertinent to the debate being held in the Special Political Committee. On the other hand, he believed the Committee would be interested in knowing why some States continued to invest in South Africa despite the resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

63. Mr. CABRAL DE MELO (Brazil), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he had no intention to refer once again to the charges made against his country. He had already categorically denied that Brazil was co-operating militarily with South Africa and had further stated that it had no intention of doing so in the future. His delegation did not need to wait for the thirtieth session of the General Assembly to demonstrate its solidarity with the peoples of Africa; the position it had taken during the current session sufficed to demonstrate that.

64. Mr. HANSEN (Federal Republic of Germany), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that it was unfortunate that the representative of the German Democratic Republic should again attack him. He repeated that the Federal Government promoted the economic development of all States members of OAU by encouraging investments; however, investments in South Africa were excluded from any government promotion. Nevertheless, some agricultural enterprises which had citizens of the Federal Republic in South Africa had given the Federal Government the opportunity of improving the working conditions of blacks.

65. The CHAIRMAN said that the list of speakers being exhausted, the Committee had concluded the general debate on agenda item 37, "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa". Even though the debate had taken three weeks, unfortunately no draft resolution had as yet been submitted and, for that reason, the Special Political Committee had to take up another item.

#### *Organization of work*

66. The CHAIRMAN said that at its 907th meeting, the Committee had considered the time-table in document A/SPC/L.300 and had decided to begin its work with item 37 and to postpone any decision on the consideration of the other items until the Chairman had submitted a new proposal on the time-table.

67. On the other hand, the President of the General Assembly, at the end of the 2268th plenary meeting, had announced that on Monday, 28 October, the General Assembly would begin its consideration of agenda item 110, "Question of Cyprus", and that some time during the week beginning 4 November, it would resume its consideration of agenda item 108, "Question of Palestine". In accordance with that decision, the General Assembly had begun its consideration of item 110 at the 2270th plenary meeting.

68. The Chairman then read out the letter dated 28 October from the President of the General Assembly (A/SPC/171), concerning consideration of item 110.

69. On the basis of the decision of the General Assembly at its 2270th plenary meeting, he suggested the following time-table for the consideration of the items allocated to the Special Political Committee: on Tuesday, 29 October,

the Committee would hold two meetings to consider the item "Question of Cyprus". After carrying out the decision of the Assembly on that item, it would take up item 41, on the effects of atomic radiation, on the basis of the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (A/9632). He suggested that two meetings, on Wednesday, 30 October and Thursday, 31 October, be devoted to the consideration of that item and, if necessary, it would be completed at a third meeting on Friday, 1 November. Since it was essential for the Committee to complete its work on item 37, it seemed reasonable to hope that the relevant draft resolutions would be submitted at the meeting on Friday, 1 November and that that meeting and part of the following week could be devoted to the consideration of, and a vote on, the draft resolutions. Between 7 November and the middle of that month—during which it was expected that the General Assembly would consider item 108, on the question of Palestine, the Special Political Committee could consider item 39, on the question of peace-keeping operations. He understood that the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations would be available in time. Finally, the time remaining after the General Assembly had concluded its consideration of the question of Palestine could be devoted to item 38, on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and item 40, on the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. The work should be concluded by 6 December 1974.

70. It should be understood that the proposed time-table would be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the necessary readjustments which circumstances might require.

71. Mr. SEIGNORET (Trinidad and Tobago) said that every effort would be made to adhere to the proposed time-table with respect to the submission of draft resolutions; however, since those drafts were the subject of consultations among the non-aligned countries, compliance with the proposed time-limits would depend on the availability of conference services.

72. The CHAIRMAN explained that that necessity had been taken into account in his suggestion of the time-table.

73. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia) wished to be informed, if that was possible, of the time of the meetings on the following Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.

74. Mr. HERNDL (Secretary of the Committee) said that the Wednesday and Thursday meetings would be held in the afternoon and the Friday meeting in the morning.

75. The CHAIRMAN said that if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee approved the provisional programme of work which he had outlined.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.*



## 922nd meeting

Tuesday, 29 October 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/PV.922

### AGENDA ITEM 110

**Question of Cyprus (A/9743, A/9766-S/11517, A/9778-S/11521, A/9783-S/11524, A/9791-S/11531, A/9811-S/11541, A/9818-S/11548, A/9819-S/11549, A/SPC/171)**

1. The CHAIRMAN: This meeting has been convened in accordance with two decisions of the General Assembly taken in connexion with item 110, the question of Cyprus. The first decision was taken at the 2237th plenary meeting, on 21 September 1974, when the General Assembly decided:

“In connexion with item 110 (Question of Cyprus), which is to be considered directly in plenary meeting, that during consideration of the item it would invite the Special Political Committee to meet in order to give the representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to speak before the Committee in order to express their views, and that it would then resume consideration of the question, taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee.”

2. The second decision of the General Assembly was taken yesterday, at its 2270th plenary meeting, when it decided to invite the Special Political Committee to hold a maximum of two meetings today, Tuesday, 29 October, for the purpose of hearing the views of the representatives of the two Cypriot communities. The Assembly also decided that verbatim records should be kept of those meetings of the Special Political Committee. It further decided that it would resume its consideration of the item on the morning of Wednesday, 30 October.

3. These decisions of the General Assembly were taken on the basis of an understanding reached as a result of consultations. At yesterday's meeting I informed the Special Political Committee of these decisions of the General Assembly and the Committee decided to meet today in accordance with them.

4. The first name on my list of speakers is that of the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Vedat A. Çelik. I invite him to make his statement.

5. Mr. ÇELİK: For the last 11 years the United Nations has been hearing the one-sided Greek story of the Cyprus problem. Today I shall try to present to the Special Political Committee the sad story of the Turkish Cypriot community.

6. The United Nations has been burdened with the Cyprus problem for almost two decades now, and every time it comes before this Organization it is without exception with increased gravity. In order, therefore, to enable this Organization to make a constructive and fruitful contribu-

tion to the problem, towards a just and durable solution, we should try to see what happened to Cyprus in the past; what is happening on the island today; and what might happen in the future.

7. What is the Cyprus problem all about? Why are the Greek and Turkish communities of the island separated and in a state of conflict? Why has the Cyprus problem remained unresolved for almost 11 years? In short: what is the Cyprus problem? Is it a constitutional problem? Is it a struggle for independence, as the Greek Cypriots are trying to make it appear to be? Is it an organic problem? Is it an artificially created political problem? What is it? With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I intend to elaborate on various points, which I hope will help to illuminate and lead to a better understanding and healthier appraisal of the whole situation.

8. Let us begin by examining how the Cyprus problem started and how the independent Republic of Cyprus came into being. As is common knowledge, the Republic was created by the Zurich and London Agreements in 1960, after five years of fighting, bloodshed and misery. In April 1955, the Greek underground terrorist organization, EOKA, had embarked upon a campaign of terror with the sole aim of uniting the island to Greece. This aim was made public. The Turkish community, which wanted an independent Cyprus and did not want to change the British yoke for the Greek yoke, resisted the movement, as a result of which the struggle in Cyprus took the form of a triangular fight: the Greeks fighting the British for *enosis*, the Turks fighting the British for independence or partition, and the Turks and Greeks fighting each other over whether Cyprus would remain independent, go to Greece or Turkey, or be partitioned. For the Turks partition has always been the antidote for *enosis*.

9. At Zurich and London, the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, Mr. Zorlu and Mr. Averoff, and the representatives of the two communities of Cyprus came together and agreed on an independent sovereign Republic with the two national communities participating in the administration of the island, in a bi-communal partnership. But, whereas the Turkish community accepted this independence as an end in itself and honestly and wholeheartedly worked to make it a success, the Greek community considered it only as a means to an end—as Archbishop Makarios later called it, “a spring-board for *enosis*”. Hence the trouble.

10. I shall not burden this Committee with details as regards the constitutional and legitimate rights of the two communities on the island. In brief the Constitution provided as follows. A Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President are elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and the Turkish communities respectively. The

official languages are Turkish and Greek. The President and the Vice-President have separately and conjointly the power of final veto over legislation and decisions of the House of Representatives and decisions of the Council of Ministers on foreign affairs, defence and security matters. The purpose of that veto was to prevent *enosis* and safeguard the Turkish community against military attack. There is a Supreme Constitutional Court, composed of one Turk, one Greek and one neutral president. Each community has its own Communal Chamber, composed of a number of members which it should determine. They have the right to levy taxes for the needs of their respective communities and the right to exercise legislative and executive authority on matters falling within their jurisdiction. In the five largest towns of Cyprus, the *de facto* separate municipalities which existed at the time of the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959 were formally recognized.

11. Together with the Constitution of Cyprus, a Treaty of Guarantee<sup>1</sup> was signed, which formed the foundation-stone of the State of Cyprus. The Treaty of Guarantee has been given that title because the signatories have undertaken to ensure the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and Cyprus undertook not to participate in whole or in part in any political union with any other State.

12. Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee reads:

"The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

"It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island."

13. Article IV of the same Treaty, which stipulates the rights and obligations of guarantors against violations of Article I, says:

"In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

"In so far as common concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty."

14. How did the Greek Cypriots regard the Constitution and independence? Treaty obligations are created for specific purposes; they are created to be respected and to be observed. Treaty rights are recorded to make those who forget and violate their treaty obligations respect them. That is how honourable States understand their rights and obligations.

15. Now let us see how the then President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and the Greek mainland Govern-

ments treated those agreements and the Constitution with regard to the independence of the island. From the date of the establishment of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Cypriot leadership, despite an express provision in the Constitution prohibiting any activity likely to promote union of the island with any other State, proceeded to declare openly that the Zurich and London Agreements and the establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus were not the ultimate aim for which the Greek Cypriots had struggled and that the London and Zurich Agreements should be regarded as a springboard for the ultimate consummation and the real objective of their struggle; namely, the union of Cyprus with Greece.

16. Those efforts culminated in November 1963 in a 13-point memorandum, presented by the Archbishop to the Turkish community, demanding the amendment of all the basic articles of the Constitution with recognized the equal partnership status of the Turkish community and provided safeguards against discrimination, such as the separate majority vote, the right of veto, the right to trial by a judge of one's own community, and the separate municipalities. Greeks have deliberately misinterpreted those rights as "excessive rights for the Turks". None of those rights was excessive or contrary to any democratic principles. The aim was to destroy the bi-communal structure of the State of Cyprus and abolish or make ineffective the Treaty of Guarantee, which guaranteed the independence of the island, and thus remove stumbling blocks to *enosis*.

17. Suffice it to recall here that Archbishop Makarios, at the end of three years of application of the "Greco-Turkish partnership Constitution" between 1960 and 1963, had had so much success in his efforts to undermine the Constitution in order to make the State a Greek-dominated State that the President of the Constitutional Court, Professor Ernst Forstoff, in despair had to resign.

18. The Constitutional Court in Cyprus is supposed to be headed by an outsider so as to make it an impartial body. An interview given on 27 December 1964 by Professor Forstoff to an Associated Press correspondent gives a sufficient account of the background of Professor Forstoff's resignation. That interview constitutes a conclusive answer to all the Greek charges against the Constitution. In the interview Professor Forstoff said: "The crisis was the result of President Makarios's anti-Turkish policy". We are not saying that; Professor Forstoff, an eminent German jurist, is saying that. He was chosen as President of the Constitutional Court of Cyprus because of his personal integrity and honesty. He added that he himself was convinced that "If the Government of Cyprus had been able to stick to the Constitution for five years, most of the problems would have been mastered. I have told Makarios that time and again". Five years: that is not much. But probably this is the danger that the Greek political leadership saw. They were afraid that if they stuck to the Constitution for five years, then Cyprus would be consolidated as a fully integrated, independent and peaceful State. It was against that danger that they thought they should fight.

19. For our part, we have far exceeded all the limits of goodwill. We agreed in the intercommunal talks to revise the Constitution so that mutually acceptable formulas

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

could be worked out through negotiation. But no agreement could be reached because, in Makarios's own words, he "would never sign any agreement which barred *enosis*". That statement was made by Makarios to the Greek Cypriot press on 9 March 1971, while the intercommunal talks were going on; he well knew that the Turkish Cypriot side could not afford to sign any agreement that did not effectively close the door to *enosis*.

20. But that goodwill which Professor Forstoff thought so essential was never forthcoming from the Greek side because the Greeks were interested only in destroying the constitutional rights of the Turks, as a first stage in preparation for further steps towards the achievement of their final objectives. The Constitutional Court was established by the Constitution to prevent Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots from infringing each other's rights. The Court ruled on constitutional questions in cases involving discrimination and on conflicts between the Federal Parliament and the separate Turkish and Greek Communal Chambers. There was no appeal against those decisions.

21. In his first interview, which I have already mentioned, Professor Forstoff said also that he had resigned because he was convinced that Archbishop Makarios had no intention of abiding by a single one of the Court's decisions. He added: "The root of the Cyprus tension lies in the move to abolish Turkish rights on the island". Is that not revealing? And even after all this, can the Greek Cypriot delegation to the United Nations pretend to be representing the Turkish community interests? Is this not a sheer mockery? Since it cannot be argued therefore that the Cyprus problem is a constitutional problem, what is it, then? Is it a struggle for independence? "Unfettered independence", as the Greek Cypriots called it, when it suited their aims?

22. I would like to emphasize strongly, and underline, that the Greek Cypriot community, with their President, leadership and people, never wanted independence. Although they have been, and still are, trying to present themselves to the world as the champions of independence and liberation fighters, the Greek Cypriots have never fought for independence as such. They have always fought for *enosis*.

23. How did it all start in Cyprus? When Archbishop Makarios was ordained in church as the Archbishop of Cyprus, in 1950, he took a holy oath—that is what he still calls it—to the effect that he would fulfil the historic mission of the Church by annexing Cyprus to Greece during his lifetime. To this day, Archbishop Makarios lives under the influence of this oath. As late as 19 August 1970, in an interview with *Eleftheros Kosmos* and *Ta Simerina* of Athens, he could say: "... I shall never violate my oath and I shall never deviate from my goal. I have always desired *enosis*, and I have never struggled for anything other than its achievement." Makarios is still faithful to his pledge for *enosis*, and so are his associates. A couple of quotations from Archbishop Makarios and his various Ministers will help prove the point.

24. In a statement to the *New York Herald Tribune* on 27 September 1960, only one month after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, as President of Cyprus, could say: "The cause of *enosis* has not died. I cannot say that *enosis* has been forgotten".

25. In an interview published in *Uusi Suomi* of Helsinki on 5 September 1963, Makarios confessed: "It is true that the goal of our struggle is to annex Cyprus to Greece".

26. In another speech at Yialousa village on 14 March 1971, Makarios said: "Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of its history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over, Greek and undivided we shall preserve it, Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece".

27. At this point I should like to say a few words about Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Greek Cypriot administration, and head of the Greek Cypriot delegation to the current session of the General Assembly, so that the representatives in this Committee and the General Assembly are not misled. While Mr. Kyprianou and his delegation are trying to give the impression that they are representing the Republic of Cyprus, they are in fact striving to destroy the independence of that very Republic.

28. The following statements by Mr. Kyprianou, which disclose his real identity and the purpose which he is serving, I think are very illuminating. First, a speech at Ayia Phylaxis village, Limassol, on 16 July 1966:

"The national leadership which voices the wish of all the people is not prepared to accept any compromise solution adulterating the people's national restoration, the Cyprus people want union of the whole of Cyprus with Greece... The Greek Cypriot people will continue to struggle, having as their standard the Greek flag, the Greek virtue and the Greek ideals."

Second, there was his speech at Limassol on the occasion of the 1 April anniversary on 1 April 1967:

"The Cyprus question is neither political, nor a party, nor a personal matter. It is a national issue both for Cyprus and Greece and the solution cannot be anything else than *enosis*. If need be the Cypriot people will fight and win again... At this critical stage the Cyprus struggle is passing through, there is a great advantage which did not exist in 1955 and that is the fact that Cyprus is now an independent and sovereign State and therefore her struggle for union with Greece is easier and shorter than before."

This is taken from the Greek Cypriot Public Information Office Press Release of 1 April 1967.

29. What is the advantage of being a State? The advantage is this: the Greek Cypriots, having forcefully ousted all Turks from "the Government of Cyprus", has presented only the Greek views at the United Nations, the non-aligned countries' conferences and other international fora where the Turks were not allowed to attend and present their case.

30. This is the first time that my community has been given the opportunity to address the Special Political Committee.

31. I am glad to note that today many countries are fully aware of the hypocritical game being played in Cyprus.



32. In an interview with the editor of the *Daily Star* of Beirut on 19 April 1967 the following statements were made:

"Editor: There have been reports that your Government is willing to accept a NATO base on the island in return for *enosis*, is this true?

"Kyprianou: Greece is a member of NATO. In case of *enosis* Cyprus would normally be part of Greece in the same way, vis-à-vis NATO, as any other part of Greece. The question of a NATO base, therefore, should be viewed in the light of this reality.

"Editor: There are suggestions that your Government is not actively in support of *enosis* at this present stage, is that true? Is your Government still committed to union with Greece?

"Kyprianou: The Cyprus Government has always been committed to a solution of the problem in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the people of Cyprus in the exercise of their right of self-determination. The vast majority of the people of Cyprus desire union of Cyprus with Greece, as is well known."

33. The statements I have quoted were made by the President and the Foreign Minister, respectively, of an administration which professed devotion and still pretends to pay allegiance to the policy of non-alignment.

34. With the Committee's indulgence, let us examine how sincere the Greek Cypriot administration was in its professed dedication to non-alignment. In an interview in the *Washington Post* on 20 September 1964, Makarios said: "I want something higher than being a temporary President of Cyprus. My ambition is to connect my name with history as the architect of *enosis*." In an interview in *Mahi* on 21 August 1964, he said: "My ambition is to accomplish the union of Cyprus with Greece... I will unite Cyprus integrally with Greece, and then the borders of Greece will extend to the shores of North Africa."

35. But, three months later, Makarios would go to Cairo, to the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held between 28 November and 5 December 1964, preach independence and non-alignment, and secure the adoption of the resolution which states that "[The Conference] calls upon all States... to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus." It further states that Cyprus must be free to choose its political future in accordance with the principal of self-determination. A self-determination which, as we have just heard in the quoted statements of his Foreign Minister, means nothing but *enosis*.

36. Three weeks after that resolution, in his New Year's message on 31 December 1964, Makarios would reiterate: "We shall reach our ultimate aim of *enosis*."

37. In a speech at Rizokarpaso, Cyprus, on 26 May 1965, he said: "Either the whole of Cyprus is to be united with Greece or become a holocaust...". I repeat: "Either the whole of Cyprus is to be united with Greece or become a

holocaust...". This he has achieved; he may be proud of his success.

38. A few months later, Makarios would come to the United Nations and very innocently plead again for support for independence. With the support of the good-intentioned members of the group of non-aligned countries, he would manage, in December 1965, to have the Cairo resolution endorsed by the world body—only to go to Greece two months later and sign a joint communiqué with the Athens Government on 2 February 1966 stating: "The two Governments object to any solution ruling out the island's union with Greece...". I do not think any further comments are required. So much for Makarios' dealings with the non-aligned countries.

39. But, how did Makarios and his Administration treat the Turkish Community on the island? I quote him: "Unless this small Turkish Community forming a part of the Turkish race, which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism, is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated." That is what Makarios said in his speech at Panayia Village, Cyprus, on 4 September 1962, and that is what he has been trying to do since 1963—expel or exterminate the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus which he considered and still considers the "enemy of Hellenism", the enemy of *enosis*.

40. Here lies the answer to the Cyprus problem: on the one hand, the Archbishop continually preached *enosis*, armed his men to the teeth and attacked us; and, on the other, he sat down and pretended to be negotiating independence with us.

41. To try to fool the world for ever is bad politics, and this is what Archbishop Makarios and his aides have been trying to do for the last two decades.

42. A community which, with its President, Ministers and people thought *enosis*, spoke *enosis*, wanted *enosis*, and fought not only us the Turks but also each other for *enosis*, could not be devoted to independence and non-alignment. I think it is high time for them to be honest with themselves and with the world.

43. A question frequently asked by representatives is: Since both Makarios and the Greek mainland Government wanted and still want *enosis*, why then was the coup of 15 July 1974 carried out against Archbishop Makarios? This is a very pertinent question. Did Makarios not want *enosis*? Was it because, in the eyes of Athens, he had now turned into a traitor and did not want *enosis* that it became necessary to depose him? No; both Athens and Makarios had the same objective—*enosis*. The divergence between them did not concern substance; it concerned, rather, the timing and the modality of application, and was to a great extent due to personal and other reasons between the junta and the Archbishop. And I used the word "Athens" not inadvertently but knowingly.

44. During his recent addresses before the Security Council<sup>2</sup> and the General Assembly [2251st plenary

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, 1780th meeting*.

meeting/, Archbishop Makarios criticized the junta in Athens for the coup, implying that the Athens Governments in the past were not involved with the *enosis* movement in Cyprus. This is wrong. The *enosis* movement did not start with the junta, just as we are sure it will not end with the return—we hope in the near future—of Athens to democratic rule.

45. During the period 1963 to 1966 when the Cyprus crisis was at its worst and the *enosis* agitation at its peak, Greece was ruled by democratic Governments. It was the Papandreou Government that sent 20,000 troops and heavy artillery into Cyprus in 1964; and it was Archbishop Makarios who, addressing the troops sent from Greece to Cyprus surreptitiously, on 9 April 1966 said:

“In the persons of you all, I greet our mother country. I greet eternal Greece, whose presence in Cyprus is becoming a reality . . . The Greek Cypriots and the entire Greek nation are struggling so that this great island of Cyprus may be united with Greece. Long live the nation! Long live the King, long live the Army, long live *enosis*.”

46. It was the same Makarios who, on the occasion of the presentation of credentials by the new Greek Ambassador in Cyprus on 27 August 1964, said:

“It is my wish and prayer that you may be the last [Ambassador], and that your term of office in this capacity may be of very short duration, with the early materialization of the union of Cyprus with Greece.”

47. As late as 2 July 1974, in a letter to General Gizikis, President of Greece, the Archbishop wrote: “The State of Cyprus should be dissolved only in the event of *enosis*.” That was on 2 July 1974.

48. What therefore was the problem? Makarios, a pro-royalist, was not in a hurry to unite with Greece under the junta, with which he had developed personal feuds. Every time Makarios took a trip outside Cyprus, he made a point of calling on King Constantine, the exiled King of Greece, which angered the Colonels. There were frequent allegations of assassination attempts by both sides and rumours that diplomatic pouches were being used to dispatch explosives and weapons for those purposes. Makarios was in close touch with Greek opposition elements and there were constant rumours about attempts to set up a Greek government-in-exile in Nicosia.

49. So, while Makarios, following the slow but, according to him, sure way of achieving *enosis*—by first taking care of the Turkish community on the island through economic, political, administrative and military pressures which were aimed at, and which to a great extent were successful in, forcing the Turks to emigrate from the island—and hoping that by then the Monarchy would have been restored in Athens and a democratic government would have come to power, the Greek Colonels and their EOKA agents on the island thought that the time had come. They hoped that through a coup they could kill two birds with one stone: they could get rid of Makarios, whom they disliked and personally distrusted, and they could achieve *enosis* and save face both at home and in Cyprus.

50. On 15 July 1974, they put their plans into action: They overthrew Makarios; and fierce fighting started on the island; not between pro-*enosis* and anti-*enosis* groups, but between pro-junta and pro-Makarios groups. A professional killer, a cold-blooded murderer who was known as the assassin of many innocent Turkish men, women and children, and who took pride in the fact that he had murdered Turks indiscriminately and took pride in writing about it in his own newspaper—the notorious *Sampson*—this man the Greeks appointed as President of Cyprus. This was done not only with the indirect help and support, but also with the active participation of a country which had affixed its signature to the international agreements under which it assumed the obligation and responsibility of respecting and preserving the independence, territorial integrity and constitutional rule of a country which they were out to destroy.

51. With this movement, whatever legality was left in Cyprus under the Constitution, under Makarios’ administration, was swept away. The State of Cyprus as it had been created by international agreements was brought to an end. This was not the only consequence of the *putsch*. The entire population of the island was thrown into a state of chaos; an extremely dangerous and explosive situation was created for the entire region. It became incumbent upon those who had assumed, under the same international agreements, the obligation and responsibility of maintaining the independence, territorial integrity and constitutional rule of that island, to take measures to redress the situation. It was under these circumstances that Turkey undertook its peace operation in Cyprus.

52. Another pertinent question frequently asked by representatives is: Why had not a feeling of national unity developed in Cyprus? The answer to this question was given by Archbishop Makarios himself, through a statement he made to *Frankfurter Rundschau* in May 1974—a few months ago. The correspondent observed that one could seldom see a Cyprus flag and that people flew the Greek and Turkish flags respectively, and he inquired what the Government was doing to promote a Cypriot national consciousness. Archbishop Makarios responded:

“It is only on the Government buildings that Cypriot flags can be seen. The Greek inhabitants of Cyprus use the Greek flag and the Turkish inhabitants use the Turkish flag. This way they express their national feelings, because in fact the Cyprus Republic is a new State but not a new nation, and it is not the intention of the Cypriot Government to create a national feeling.”

53. Why has there not been any national unity in Cyprus until now? An episode taken from the very recent past is illuminating and relevant. The former Greek Cypriot Minister of Education on Cyprus, Mr. Petrides, appearing on the Greek Cypriot controlled television in Nicosia, two years ago, as the organizer of a quiz programme for elementary school children put the following question to the pupils: “Who crucified Christ?” The immediate reply by one of the children was: “The Turks”. Petrides’ response was as prompt as it was surprising: “No”, he said, “it was not the Turks who crucified Christ, but I shall give you full marks all the same, because you know who your national enemy is”.

54. That was said by the former Greek Cypriot Minister of Education—not in private, not in a classroom, but on television, where not only a couple of innocent elementary school children, but the whole of Cyprus, could and did hear him. And what was the reaction to that very harmful and provocative statement by an ex-Minister? No reaction whatsoever: no reaction from the so-called President, no reaction from the press, no reaction from the public—I mean the Greek public.

55. This mentality, this philosophy and practice could not but jeopardize and adversely affect intercommunal relations on the island. It was certainly far from being conducive to the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust, confidence, respect and co-operation, let alone a feeling of national unity.

56. How did separation start in Cyprus? With the pre-planned armed attack on the Turkish Cypriot community in December 1963, all the governmental machinery and public services were seized by the Greeks. The Turkish civil servants, Turkish members of the police and other Turkish Cypriot government employees whose places of work were in Greek sectors were chased away by threat of armed force—some of them were actually killed or abducted—and their salaries and remunerations were stopped as of that date. All public services were denied to the Turks, and all public funds of the Republic were seized and used for the benefit of the Greek community only.

57. Although the Greek Cypriot administration, which had usurped all government authority, continued to collect taxes—especially indirect taxes—from the Turkish community, amounting to about 10 million Cyprus pounds per annum, not a single penny was expended in Turkish areas; not a single Turk was employed in the so-called “government civil service”, with the notable exception of one or two quislings.

58. Even the freely elected representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community have been ousted and locked out by force, or threat of force, from the Constitutional Government of the Republic. Various appeals by the Turkish Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus for a joint meeting of the Turkish and Greek Ministers remained unanswered, and an attempt by the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives in July 1965 to return to the House was frustrated by an ultimatum that, unless the Turkish deputies agreed to the abrogation of the Constitution and endorsed the unconstitutional laws enacted in their absence by their Greek counterparts, their return would be prevented by force. This incident was related in the report to the Security Council of 29 July 1965 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.<sup>3</sup>

59. Under the circumstances, out of sheer necessity, and in order to fill the governmental vacuum thus created, the Turkish Cypriot administration was set up in stages, in order to cater to the needs and requirements of the Turkish Cypriot community. Within a few years, the Turkish Cypriot administration, with its own executive under the Vice-President, its separate House of Representatives, its

own judiciary, radio, police force and civil service, became the effective administration of all the Turkish Cypriots living in the Turkish-controlled areas, with all the characteristics of government. For every governmental department or service on the Greek side, there exists today a Turkish counterpart on the Turkish side.

60. But the Greek Cypriot political leadership has only itself to blame for this separation which the Turkish community never wanted.

61. Many argue that the Cyprus problem is an organic problem. Although it would appear at first glance that the Cyprus problem is an organic problem in that the population consists of two separate ethnic groups having completed different cultures, languages, religions, and political loyalties to their respective motherlands—Turkey and Greece—it is not so. The problem is an artificial, man-made problem, and its architect is Archbishop Makarios. It can only be considered organic in that the Head of the Greek Orthodox Church, Archbishop Makarios—a man so ardently devoted to *enosis*, a man who considered that the Moslem Turks were the only obstacle to *enosis* and that they should be subjugated or exterminated—became the President of the bi-communal and bi-religious Republic at a most delicate period, when strong statesmanship and great impartiality were needed to cruise the tormented island to safety and prosperity.

62. When the Head of State of a country disowns one ethnic and religious group of his people, a group that was a co-founder in the achievement of independence, and sets out with all the means in his power to liquidate it, then it is obvious that trouble and calamity will ultimately ensue. Had it not been for the relentless struggle by the Greek Cypriots under Archbishop Makarios to achieve *enosis* and the planned onslaught on the Turkish community which constituted the only obstacle to *enosis*, there would have been no reason why the two communities could not live together in peace and harmony.

63. At this point I would like to say a few words about the refugee problem in Cyprus, which today is one of the most widely spoken of problems and one which is being harshly exploited by the Greek Cypriot administration. The refugee problem is a problem common to both communities. For 11 years the Greek Cypriot authorities have refused the rehabilitation of 24,000 Turkish Cypriots. There are now 50,000 Turkish Cypriots in the Greek sector who live in daily fear for their lives and who are seeking asylum in the Turkish region of Cyprus. More than 20,000 of these are new refugees who had all their property and livestock ransacked and looted by Greek gunmen. For the past 11 years, 24,000 Turkish Cypriots have been living as displaced persons in temporary refugee accommodations under unhygienic conditions, and every time we applied for their rehabilitation the reply of the Greek Cypriot administration was that this problem could not be resolved before a political solution of the Cyprus question was reached.

64. The Greek Cypriot administration rejected our repeated proposals for setting up a joint committee under the chairmanship of the United Nations to secure the rehabilitation of the Turkish refugees, free from all political motivations and bias. It refused to repair the homes of the

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1965*, document S/6569.



Turkish refugees, and it refused to give drinking water and electricity to these villages. All Turkish Cypriot-owned lands in Greek-controlled areas which they had to abandon were, and still are, cultivated by the Greeks without any payment or compensation, while the Greek Cypriot authorities looked on without taking any measure to put an end to this inhuman usurpation and exploitation. For so many years there was no mention by the Greeks of a refugee problem. For so many years the United Nations was not requested by those who pretended to be the government of Cyprus to give relief assistance to refugees because all the displaced persons happened to be Turkish.

65. For all these years the Greek Cypriot administration has refused to recognize equal rights for the Turkish community. Could it not at least recognize equal rights for the Turkish community in their plight and sufferings, in their status as refugees? It is most unfair for the Greek Cypriot administration—which, despite its numerical and military strength, did not allow the rehabilitation of 20,000 Turkish refugees during the period 1963-1974 for security considerations, as they put it—now to insist that we allow 100,000 Greeks to come into the Turkish region at a time when the illegal Greek mainland officers and personnel who carried out the coup of 15 July are still in Cyprus, at a time when Sampson and his men are still at large and free from any prosecution. Yesterday he delivered another fiery speech in Limassol on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the death of the EOKA leader, Grivas. Addressing 40,000 Greek Cypriots, Sampson has stated openly in that speech that the struggle of Cyprus is continuing and will continue until *enosis* is achieved. They insist on that now at a time when we are being threatened with guerrilla warfare and when Greek attempts to infiltrate into Turkish areas for sabotage purposes are continuing.

66. The refugee problem is a common problem which can and will be solved through negotiations and mutual accommodations only within the framework of a final settlement.

67. What does the future hold for Cyprus? The Turks of Cyprus are in favour of an independent, non-aligned, biregional federal republic. In a State like Cyprus, where the nationalism of the two communities is so deep, while the necessity for coexistence is so necessary, "federation" is the only way to peaceful coexistence, co-operation and ultimate realization of a common identity. A biregional federal republic not only will provide security of life and property for the Turkish Cypriot community, but will at the same time guarantee a lasting independence and non-alignment for the island.

68. The Turkish Cypriot community, being numerically smaller, economically poorer and militarily by far the weaker, has always been the losing party in Cyprus. The Turkish community, considered by the Greeks as a national enemy and the only obstacle to *enosis*, has suffered three major attacks during the last two decades from the united Greek Cypriot and Greek mainland armed forces.

69. Three times the Turkish community in Cyprus was subjected to terror, mass murder, and heavy material losses. Three times the Turkish community in Cyprus was brutally uprooted from its homes and villages and forced to become

refugees. Three times the Turkish community in Cyprus was dispossessed of its property and belongings; and three times the Turkish community was deprived of its income. There must be no fourth time. There shall be no fourth time.

70. The mass graves from which whole populations—men, women and children—of Turkish villages have recently been unearthed in the presence of foreign correspondents and members of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) are ample proof of what the Greeks can do and will do. This must be prevented. The Turkish community in Cyprus must be given the actual and physical guarantee which it badly needs. The answer to this is geographic federation.

71. Archbishop Makarios and Spyros Kyprianou, in their addresses before the General Assembly, said that they were not prepared to talk federation because federation would mean partition. Why? "Because the Turks would have a part of Cyprus as their autonomous area." Now if the Turks having an area to themselves in Cyprus can be equated to partition, then our fears must be appreciated when we say that with the Greeks all over Cyprus and relying on their numbers, *enosis* is unavoidable. Therefore, to avoid *enosis* we must have federation.

72. I should like here to remind members of the Special Political Committee of the statement by Makarios to the effect that his aim is to unite the whole of Cyprus with Greece and not only a part of it. That is why he objects to federation—because he knows that federation will prevent him from uniting to Greece not only the whole of Cyprus, but even a part of it.

73. Again in his address before the General Assembly Makarios said that he was at the United Nations to ask for justice, freedom and dignity. In the words of the Vice-President, His Excellency Mr. Denktaş:

"If Makarios wanted freedom, he should have given freedom to his people. The Turkish community was part of that people. If he wanted dignity, he should have acted with dignity towards us. If he wanted independence, there was no reason at all for the 1963 events—none whatsoever. He created the trouble in order to destroy that independence. That attempt of his had led, 11 years later, to the coup by the junta in order to finish his own work, to unite Cyprus with Greece. That is why the intervention by Turkey was necessary."

74. Makarios says: "Federation would involve transfer of populations and would therefore not only be inhuman but also change the identity of Cyprus." Makarios speaks against uprooting and transfer of populations, but this is what he was actually doing to the Turkish community for the past two decades. With the recent events in Cyprus, thousands of Turkish Cypriots have been displaced and have become refugees for the third time during the past 20 years. Hardly are they rehabilitated each time when they suffer a new attack, they lose everything they own, and they have to start from scratch again.

75. There are about 10,000 Turkish refugees in the British sovereign bases in Limassol. If these people were to risk

their lives and leave the bases today, they would have nowhere to go. Their homes have been looted, burnt and destroyed. No Turkish Cypriot leader has the moral right, or can take the responsibility, to ask these people to go and settle in the Greek-controlled areas again and trust that they will be safe and immune from Greek attack for a fourth time in the near future. We are not prepared to do so. We have no right to do so. The Turkish community has suffered enough, and our refugees rightly and very wisely demand that they be rehabilitated in the Turkish-controlled northern part of the island and thus avoid the danger of further losses of life and property in Greek hands.

76. As regards the identity of the island, nothing will change. Cyprus has always been and will continue to be a bi-communal State. If the Turkish community is regrouped in such a way as to enjoy a relatively better security of life and property and find the opportunity to develop and prosper economically, free from pressure and discrimination, the identity of Cyprus will not change. All that might change is the false image that the Greeks have been trying to create that Cyprus was a Greek island.

77. Only under federation—geographical federation—will the two communities treat and respect each other not as enemies or virtual or potential hostages but as equals in a jointly established Federal Republic, and co-operate to make Cyprus a peaceful and prosperous island.

78. It is the Turkish community, at the cost of many lives and sufferings, that has kept Cyprus an independent Republic. Had it not been for the Turkish community and the Turkish guarantee, neither the super-Powers nor the United Nations would have been able to prevent the union of the island with Greece. Cyprus would have been annexed by Greece long ago, and those who are here today pretending to represent Cyprus and advocating independence and non-alignment would have been out of office, because there would have been no so-called "Government of Cyprus" to represent—unless, of course, they had become full-fledged members of the Greek Mission.

79. In conclusion, I would say that one must take into account all these facts and events if one wishes to make a realistic and impartial appraisal of the present situation in Cyprus.

80. What should be the ultimate solution of the Cyprus problem is indicated by past history. No durable solution of the problem can be reached by ignoring that history. The island must be given a new status, so that none of this will happen again in the future. That is what the Turkish community is hoping to attain.

81. By confusing issues, by ignoring past sufferings, by introducing into this already complicated situation one's own political motivations, one cannot contribute to finding a just and durable solution of the problem. If this Committee is to contribute in any manner to the attainment of a durable, just and honourable solution, to benefit both the Greek and Turkish communities, we must start doing it by condemning the past practices which brought us to this point.

82. The 1960 Constitution was a functional federation, but it failed to provide protection for the Turkish Cypriot

community, because as we have seen, Archbishop Makarios chose to ignore the rights of the Turks and finally tried to destroy the Constitution and the Turkish Cypriot community by resorting to violence.

83. The 15 July coup destroyed all hopes for the security of the Turkish community under the existing system of functional federation. No matter what Archbishop Makarios, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou or any other Greek Cypriot says, the coup was directed against the Turkish Cypriots. We were the ultimate aim of the coup. If the coup had succeeded, the Turks would have been wiped out within a month. We are in possession of plans showing that lightning attacks on the Turks in the Turkish enclaves would have been carried out with heavy arms within a short period after the coup, had it succeeded. That is what they wanted; that is what they were waiting for.

84. The only solution which will give the Turkish community the actual and physical guarantee of its life and property—a guarantee it desperately needs—is a federation based on two territories. The general principles of such a federation, its structure, its organization and its boundaries, we are prepared to discuss in all sincerity and goodwill. We are ready to discuss them in all fairness and with mutual concessions.

85. The past 14 years have clearly proved that the salvation of the independence of Cyprus depends on the ability of the Turkish Cypriot community to defend both itself and independence. Biregional federation, on which we are now working, is the permanent answer to this artificially created problem.

86. The Turkish community's position regarding the present situation in Cyprus is the following. First, we are, I repeat, the defenders of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

87. Secondly, we stand for a biregional federal State based on the existence of two national communities, which brought about the Cyprus State in 1960, under conditions of equality.

88. Thirdly, we favour the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus within the framework of a final settlement, and after actual and physical guarantees have been achieved for the Turkish community, which has been the only guarantee of the independence of Cyprus but has suffered greatly in its efforts to maintain that independence.

89. Fourthly, we believe that the Cyprus problem can be solved only through direct negotiations between the interested parties; that is, the Turkish and Greek communities, and Turkey and Greece. I must elaborate somewhat on that. We are not prepared to let either of the two parties lose through the signature of a new agreement in Cyprus. It is not enough for the Greek Cypriots to say that they are against *enosis*. We want the Greeks to say the same thing; indeed, we shall insist on it. We have suffered enough from these double games and, as I said earlier, we are determined to see to it that this problem is solved once and for all. Any agreement reached in Cyprus should be binding on the two communities as well as on Greece and Turkey.

90. Fifthly, we further believe that any resolution adopted by the General Assembly should aim at facilitating the task of the leaders of the two national communities currently engaged in negotiations on the island—Messrs. Denktas and Clerides, in their efforts to find a peaceful and just solution to the problem; and we therefore hope that we shall have a draft resolution which will enjoy the consensus of all the interested parties.

91. The problem of Cyprus may perhaps appear very complicated, but in fact it is very simple. It is the relentless struggle of the Greek Cypriots and of their mainland, Greece, to achieve *enosis*, and the efforts and sacrifices of the Turkish Cypriot community and their motherland, Turkey, to prevent it.

92. I should like to point out that Cyprus is the only country in the world that has armed itself to the teeth not to protect its independence but to destroy it. In these circumstances, only a bi-communal and biregional Federal Republic can permanently safeguard the independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot community will continue to struggle to attain that solution.

93. In his statement to the General Assembly yesterday [2270th plenary meeting], Mr. Spyros Kyprianou referred to attempts to obtain compromises to accommodate the aggressor. I do not know whom he means by "aggressor"; I am sure that we attach different meanings to the word "aggressor". Neither did he tell us what he meant by "accommodate" in relation to the Turkish Cypriot community. He referred also to the legalization of *faits accomplis*. I must admit that the Turkish community has proved to be a very bad student of the Greeks. We have not benefited from their ability to create and then try to legalize *faits accomplis*. We are not trying to do that; we do not intend to do that. Again he said "We expect the support of the non-aligned countries, the group to which we belong."

94. I have tried to explain where Cyprus stands so far as non-alignment is concerned. I have tried to point to the

insincerity of Cyprus as regards non-alignment. Non-alignment has been only a forum for the Greek Cypriot administration, where they could exploit their position and that of the so-called Government in order to pave the way for the ultimate realization of their national aim: *enosis*, union of Cyprus with Greece. If the non-aligned countries want permanent independence for Cyprus, they should support not the intransigent position of the Greeks but equal rights for the two communities. The Turkish community is the only guarantee of the independence of Cyprus.

95. This brings me to the draft resolution<sup>4</sup> submitted yesterday by Mr. Spyros Kyprianou. First of all, I should like to make it absolutely clear that the draft resolution is not a Cyprus draft resolution; it is a Greek Cypriot draft resolution. I do not recall Mr. Kyprianou consulting with me on the draft resolution; he has not. I think this is the Cyprus trouble, that is why we are here. That is why we cannot solve the problem at all. It is a Greek Cypriot draft resolution which serves only Greek Cypriot interests. I am sorry to say that this mentality, which insists on considering the Turkish community as a minority to be given human rights and nothing else, has not changed on the part of the Greek Cypriots.

96. If adopted, this draft resolution would breakup the negotiations and kill all hope for a negotiated settlement in Cyprus. I have been directed by the Vice-President to make this absolutely clear. I was not surprised, because those so-called representatives are more interested in their own personal interests and ambitions than in the interests of the people of Cyprus. A solution to the Cyprus problem can be found only through the negotiations between Mr. Denktas and Mr. Clerides. This draft resolution, if adopted, would remove all chances and possibilities for success of a negotiated settlement in Cyprus.

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*

<sup>4</sup> Subsequently circulated as document A/L.738.

## 923rd meeting

Tuesday, 29 October 1974, at 3 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/PV.923

### AGENDA ITEM 110

**Question of Cyprus (continued)** (A/9743, A/9766-S/11517, A/9778-S/11521, A/9783-S/11524, A/9791-S/11531, A/9811-S/11541, A/9818-S/11548, A/9819-S/11549)

1. The CHAIRMAN: This afternoon the Special Political Committee will hold its second meeting in accordance with a decision adopted yesterday by the General Assembly [2270th plenary meeting], in which it invited this Com-

mittee to hold a maximum of two meetings on Tuesday, 29 October, for the purpose of hearing the views of the representatives of the two Cypriot communities. This morning we heard the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community. I now invite the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, to make his statement.

2. Mr. PAPADOPOULOS: I am grateful to have been offered this opportunity of addressing the Special Political



Committee on the tragedy of Cyprus—and such exactly is the situation in Cyprus. It is a tragedy of wanton destruction, of death, of invasion and aggression—although to hear the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, one would hardly believe that an aggression had taken place, that foreign troops are stationed in the island, that they are bent on destroying the very existence of the State, by perverting its independence, which Turkey had guaranteed, destroying the very thing that Turkey had already guaranteed. To hear the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, nothing has happened recently in Cyprus; there was no invasion; the only thing that did happen were several statements made by the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, by Mr. Kyprianou and other leaders of the Greek community in favour of *enosis*; and because these statements were made—about 10 years ago—and because these statements are being referred to out of context, we are to believe that the destruction of independent Cyprus in 1974 is justified.

3. But the story of *enosis* is not new; it is well known to the United Nations. Indeed, it is no secret that we the Greek community, alone, fought an anti-imperialistic war against the colonial administration of our country; we came to the United Nations seeking self-determination and *enosis*, but in spite of our sacrifices, we succeeded in getting only independence.

4. The aspirations of the Greek Cypriot people are not secret, and there is nothing to be ashamed of. We fought a liberation struggle, and we believe we have had the support of all well-meaning countries in an era when the fight for independence and liberty was the destiny of the world. But for our President and our other leaders to speak about these aspirations is now presented here as amounting to an effort to destroy the very independence which our fight won; yet the Turkish Cypriot leaders, including Mr. Denktaş, who, after all, is being referred to as Vice President—although it has not been explained under what Constitution he is Vice President; if it is under the 1960 Constitution, it means that the Constitution is valid and acceptable; but if it is no longer valid and acceptable, then I cannot see how he is the Vice President—yet, as I was saying, the Turkish Cypriot leaders and Mr. Denktaş sided with the British and their professed aim was the continuation of the British administration of Cyprus.

5. But even, as I said, if all the statements made were correct—and certainly they are not, and certainly they are taken and referred to here out of all context—can the Turkish aggression against Cyprus find any justification in the statements made? It seems that whilst we, the Greek Cypriots, were “talking”, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were “doing”; we were talking about *enosis*, they say. But they were talking about partition. And whilst we limited our activity to talking about it, it was Turkey which, with the use of a formidable force against the virtually defenceless island, brought about its time-honoured and long-planned scheme of partitioning the island.

6. For every statement made by any one of our leaders in favour of *enosis*, I could recount equally strong statements made by Turkish leaders about partition or federation, which, at least as described here, is equated to partition, and is, in fact, nothing else but partition in disguise.

7. Is the suggestion, then, that Cyprus should be divided, causing uprooting of populations, causing forcible movement of populations, in order to avert *enosis*? But if Cyprus is united in one integral State, and in spite of all the brave talk of President Makarios and other leaders about *enosis*, *enosis* was not brought about, why would it now be a threat to the security of the Turkish community of the island, if the island remains integral, united and independent? If Turkey, as we hear, was the only one that really strengthened, supported and saved the independence of Cyprus, it is not logical to expect that some equally effective international guarantees could now ensure that what the Greek Cypriots did not achieve with their brave talk of the last 20 or so years will again not be achieved? And if all the statements that were cited here—I repeat again, out of context—were true, how is it then that Makarios was overthrown and nearly lost his life, because, as the forces that overthrew him stated, “he was not pursuing *enosis*”? Or perhaps it was the Turks who overthrew him because he was for *enosis*. Because he was overthrown and the coup did initially succeed, and those responsible had control over the whole of the island for eight days; yet there was no move or statement made for *enosis*, but, on the contrary, even that puppet President, even those forces that staged the coup, came out for the continuation of the independence of Cyprus, the continuation of the bi-communal talks in order to find a viable constitutional solution of the problems of Cyprus.

8. Let us suppose, therefore, that all the brave talk about *enosis* in 1964 were true and let us suppose that those armed forces had succeeded in preserving their hold and their control over the Republic of Cyprus, could not the Turkish Cypriots still have the same guarantees that they claim they had under the Treaty of Guarantee?<sup>1</sup> Was it necessary to invade the island before the diplomatic avenues had been explored and exhausted, in order to restore the *status quo*, the *status quo* which, under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey had guaranteed. But yet Turkey had to abolish it, and Turkey is now pursuing its abolition and its replacement by a different form of constitutional régime in Cyprus.

9. Cyprus finds itself now in the most critical and desperate hour of its long history and life. Its very existence as an independent State is, as a result of the Turkish aggression and as a result of that aggression alone, now in jeopardy. The hopes of its people and the interest of its people are centred in the deliberations of this august body. Only in the United Nations do the Cypriot people repose their hopes for achieving justice. The hopes of Cyprus for its survival as an independent State lie in the United Nations and in its Charter, lie in the support it can find amongst the Member States for a just cause, and in the dedication of Member States to the principles of the Charter as demonstrated in their decisions.

10. At this very moment, while the Cyprus question is being debated, the beleaguered and desperate people of Cyprus are attentively and hopefully following our deliberations. They have placed high hopes in the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; they rightfully expect to obtain justice from the Members of the Organization, and

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

expect the Organization to demonstrate those principles through its pronouncements. Above all the issue before us is whether the solution of political disputes must be pursued through peaceful means or whether the world is returning to outdated methods, to military aggression, to occupation and exploitation of areas through military might, the use of force and domination for the creation of rights through military occupation, through tolerance of the principle of the law of war—*jus belli*—now revived again. This is mainly what the Cyprus question is all about. It is not the statements which its leaders made; it is not what happened 10 or 20 years ago; it is what is happening now. And after everything is said and done here, after the issue is stripped of its diplomatic nomenclature and the niceties of double-talk, when the compromise of political expediency is uncovered, one and only one issue starkly remains: the issue of aggression and the position which the United Nations is prepared to take on it. Nothing else is now of such paramount importance and urgency.

11. Cyprus has undoubtedly been the victim of the Turkish military aggression against its independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. That aggression was effected in two phases. And even if the first aggression against Cyprus could be covered under the pretext of being an action in pursuance of the Treaty of Guarantee, what possible excuse or pretext can there exist for the second phase of that aggression which took place 15 days later and which expanded the initial bridgehead which the Turkish forces established on the island from 150 miles to 1,200 now occupying 40 per cent of our land, which I heard today being described as “the Turkish region” of Cyprus?

12. The question before the Organization is whether aggression, no matter what the political excuses and pretexts might be, will be condoned. Are we to condone the invasion and the continued occupation of our land? Can there be any pretext, any argument, any expediency whatsoever under which the United Nations can condone or excuse such an aggression, even if there do exist legitimate complaints on the part of the Turkish Cypriot community? Is there any course open other than the unequivocal and unconditional condemnation of such an aggression and a demand for the immediate and unconditional cessation of that aggression?

13. The Turkish invasion turned a flourishing and independent Cyprus into a divided, occupied and devastated island of death, destruction and desolation. In political terms, it violated the integrity of an independent State. In economic terms, it shattered the island's flourishing development. In human terms, it turned half the population into refugees, detainees, a beleaguered people, cut off from their homes, families and loved ones by military lines. In this the protection of the legitimate rights of the Turkish community on the island? Is this the best method of safeguarding that security?

14. The Turkish invading army now controls about 40 per cent of the total area of Cyprus, which, however, is the most fertile, productive and developed part of the State. It is land mainly owned by the Greeks since the total Turkish ownership of privately owned land in Cyprus is only 12.8 per cent. Is that occupation justified by the purported need to protect the security and the interests of the Turkish

minority on the island? The occupied area, although only 40 per cent in extent, contributes over 70 per cent of the total gross economic output of the island. The area now occupied previously housed a population of 215,000 people, of which 170,000 are Greek Cypriots. Eighty per cent of the total island production of citrus fruits, 79 per cent of cereals, 45 per cent of olives, 25 per cent of potatoes, 100 per cent of tobacco, 86 per cent of carrots, 47 per cent of livestock, 56 per cent of minerals was produced from the occupied areas and now is claimed as the war loot of the Turkish invading army. Is this the way to protect Turkish rights in Cyprus?

15. Millions of pounds have been invested in this area, mostly by Greek Cypriots, in hotels and in other tourist facilities which were attracting 70 per cent of all the tourist trade of Cyprus. These are now under the control of the Turkish invading forces, which unashamedly are announcing plans for operating them as their own war loot and advertising in Europe and elsewhere invited tourists to come and be accommodated in properties that do not belong to them, whilst the legitimate owners are kept away from their properties by threat of arms.

16. The accumulated stocks and agricultural produce of the Greek Cypriots, such as citrus and other fruits, cereals, oils and so on, buses, motor cars and other vehicles, household goods and utensils, in an unprecedentedly methodical campaign, have been looted by the Turkish invading forces and transported to Turkey, where they have been exhibited in newsreels with their Greek names painted distinctly on them in the victory parade held in Turkey, whilst the other products have been sold in Europe and elsewhere. Is this protection of the Turkish rights on the island?

17. Two hundred and thirty thousand Greeks from the occupied and adjacent areas have been brutally driven from their homes without putting up a fight, and they are now living in the fields and under trees in conditions of untold misery. The various reports of the Secretary-General, which have been circulated as official documents, give a clear, if tragic, picture of the misery and sufferings of these people who are not fighting. Such has been the aftermath of the Turkish aggression which has been euphemistically termed by the aggressors a “peace-keeping operation”. Such has been the result of the operation which was mounted against Cyprus under the pretext of protecting the rights of the minority—because pretext it is, and nothing more.

18. The invasion was formally announced by the Turkish Prime Minister on 20 July 1974. Both in the formal statement of the Prime Minister as well as in later official statements this callous and unprovoked attack on a small and virtually unarmed State was described as “a police operation with a limited intention of re-establishing the constitutional order and of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community”. I claim that this is simply a crude pretext, and the conduct of Turkey ever since has exposed it as such. The real motive behind the infamous Attila Plan and the true aims of the military attack against Cyprus are now clear and should be clear to all well-meaning people. It is nothing else but to create by the use of arms the necessary prerequisites for the partition of the island under the transparent disguise of a federation based on two geograph-

ical and separated zones. Indeed, we heard it confirmed this morning that this is the present position of the Turkish Cypriots and of Turkey. First, forcibly to remove the people, to separate them, to divide them; and then—just to pay lip service to the need for preserving the independence of Cyprus—loosely reunite it again in a very loosely held federation or, I would say, confederation, since the words “equality of rights of the two communities” are being used though in a rather muted way.

19. As is well known, Cyprus is a very small island of about 3,500 square miles, or 9,000 square kilometres, having a maximum length of 150 miles and a maximum width of 60 miles, with a total population of 632,000 people, out of which 516,000 or 81.6 per cent, are Greeks, and 116,000, or 18.4 per cent, are Turks. In the Greek population one should also count three other minority communities existing on the island, notably the Armenians, the Maronites, and the Catholics who have voted and elected to belong to the Greek community for the purposes of constitutional structure.

20. These three other communities live together with Greeks, enjoy all the fruits of the developing economy of the country, and are totally in line with the views that I am expressing here today.

21. This population is widely and indiscriminately dispersed within the boundaries of the Republic, Greeks and Turks being widely and in no particular pattern interspersed like grains of sand on a piece of paper. Nowhere on the island is there any area in which a Turkish population is preponderant. As a matter of fact, if I were to draw on the map of Cyprus a circle with a radius of not more than 5 kilometres, no matter where the point of the compass might drop, the Greek population in the circle would outnumber the Turkish population in that circle.

22. It should be obvious from these facts that, if Turkey were to achieve its very old plan of partitioning the island into two zones, whether in the form of outright partition or under the guise of a biregional federation, it had to create the necessary prerequisite, that is to say, a geographical area in which the Turkish element would be in the majority, to be the basis for such a geographical federation, to be the basis on which to justify that geographical partition which under the guise of federation might be projected as a single and independent State.

23. In the realities of Cyprus that could be done only by either driving the Greek population out of its areas or attempting to concentrate the Turkish population in one or more defined areas. Both these courses have been pursued with consistency by Turkish Cypriots and by Turkey, and the Attila Plan, now unfolding in Cyprus, is the culmination of the efforts that have continued methodically since 1964. What subtle persuasion failed to achieve became the task of the forces of Attila, that is, to drive the Greek Cypriots out of their lands, homes and properties, so that the geographical area necessary for the Turkish design of partition might be created. That this has for a long time been the plan should now, in the light of what has happened and what is happening, and the policies pursued by Turkey, be considered undisputed. Furthermore, that this is a non-viable plan, that it is an inhuman solution and in fact will be no solution at all, should also be considered undisputed.

24. As early as 1956, when the Greek Cypriots were waging their liberation war against the British colonial administration, the British had invited as an expert Lord Radcliffe, an eminent constitutional lawyer, and asked him to investigate and advise them on the constitutional future of Cyprus. Lord Radcliffe sought and obtained the views of all communities on the island—Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites and Catholics—and when the claims of the various communities and their suggestions were put to him he did indeed consider, but rejected, a Turkish Cypriot claim for such a separation of the population. This is what he said:

“But can Cyprus be organized as a federation in this way? I do not think so. There is no pattern of territorial separation between the two communities, and the only way to create it is by forceful removal of populations.”

25. However, if that is old history, if that is an expert invited by the British colonialists, we have the same Turkish claim, the same grand design, repeated much later to a man of undisputed objectivity and status. I am referring to Mr. Galo Plaza, at present Secretary General of the Organization of American States, who, as the Committee knows, had been appointed as Mediator on Cyprus by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in pursuance of the Security Council resolution [186 (1964)] on Cyprus dated 4 March 1964, and submitted his report to the Secretary-General on 26 March 1965. That report was issued as a United Nations document.<sup>2</sup> That report also includes the statement that a similar claim, coupled with a claim for compulsory movement of populations, was submitted to him by both the then Government of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. It is significant that at that stage even a dividing line was suggested to him, and it now becomes sadly relevant that the line then suggested is, both in direction and in the area it covers, disturbingly identical to the infamous Attila I line. Now, of course, the Turkish forces in Cyprus have exceeded even that line, and we are half-way into the implementation of the equally infamous Attila II line. Rejecting the proposition, this is what Mr. Galo Plaza said:

“... But to my mind the objections raised also on economic, social and moral grounds are in themselves serious obstacles to the proposition. It would seem to require a compulsory movement of the people concerned—many thousands on both sides—contrary to all the enlightened principles of the present time, including those set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights... Such a state of affairs would constitute a lasting, if not permanent, cause of discontent and unrest.”<sup>3</sup>

26. That advice was not heeded either by Turkey or by the Turkish Cypriots, but in that statement of the facts one can find the reason which led the Turkish Cypriot leadership to encourage thousands of Turkish Cypriots to move into pre-selected areas and to turn them into self-made refugees. So when the Turkish Cypriot leadership

<sup>2</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1965*, document S/6253.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 153.



speaks of the plight and the tribulations which the so-called Turkish refugees of the 1963 conflict suffered, we know that to a very great extent these were self-made displaced persons. Indeed they suffered. They suffered as much as the Greeks, but they were only pawns in a gigantic plan orchestrated from outside, serving interests alien to Cyprus and having as its main theme the shifting of the population, the creation of separate Turkish Cypriot zones, where none existed, on which the claim for partition, the claim for division of the population in separate areas, could be plausibly based 10 years later.

27. It is easy to make the claim now that these people were the victims of the Greek Cypriots, when it is well known to all those who ever visited the island that, though they chose to term themselves “refugees”, they were in fact free, as far as the Greek Cypriots were concerned, to move freely about and to reside wherever they chose. If they were not free, the obstacles in the way of their movement were not placed there by the Greek Cypriots; they were placed in their path by their own leadership.

28. On that point I should like to quote from three reports of the Secretary-General.

29. The first quotation is from the Secretary-General’s report of March 1965. It reads:

“The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together. . . . The result has been the seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation imposed by the Turkish Cypriots”.<sup>4</sup>

30. The second quotation is from the Secretary-General’s report of March 1966. It reads:

“... some steps should be taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership towards relaxing its policy of discouraging Turkish Cypriots from circulating freely in places outside its control . . .”.<sup>5</sup>

31. This is the third quotation; it is from the Secretary-General’s report of December 1966: “This ban appears to be enforced as a matter of political principle”—that is, the ban on going out of the enclaves and associating with the Greeks—“with little attempt at justification on practical grounds.”<sup>6</sup>

32. There are several other reports by the Secretary-General in 1966 and 1967 that are more or less on the same lines. But I think the point is clearly made in the foregoing quotations that the Turkish Cypriots who were concentrated in pre-selected areas by the Turkish Cypriot leadership were so concentrated simply and solely to serve the grand design of creating separate zones for the Turkish Cypriots so that a claim to federation on a geographical

basis—which is nothing else but another name for partition—could be justified and pursued.

33. Indeed these people have suffered. But I can counter every instance of suffering by the Turkish Cypriots with a similar instance of suffering by the Greek Cypriots. The reports of the Secretary-General are full of sad stories of suffering.

34. The result of the fighting in 1963 and 1964 was that soon after the fighting ended the plan to force the separation of the two main communities on the island, to divide them into separate zones so that they could be artificially united again, began to be put into effect. But despite what I have described as the “subtle persuasion” by the leadership or other measures used to force the people into that concentration, not more than 25,000 Turkish Cypriots out of a total population of about 120,000 heeded the advice. The others continued to live peacefully and unmolested in the rest of the island.

35. We frequently hear allegations—this is not a new story—about the great suffering of these self-made Turkish Cypriot refugees. But we are not told that during the same 10 years the Turkish Cypriot leadership, in a separatist mood, sealed off the areas in which the Turkish Cypriots had been concentrated, allowing no Greek Cypriots to enter those areas or, if they did enter, to do so at the pain of instant death. All in all, 55 Greek Cypriots lost their lives from the time fighting ended in 1964 until 1967 for having committed no other crime than losing their way and venturing into those areas. Since 1963 I myself, along with thousands of other Greek Cypriots, have not been permitted even to cross through those areas, unless under escort of the United Nations forces.

36. But during all that time the Turkish Cypriots, no matter where they lived, in the enclaves or elsewhere, were free to come and go as they wished all over Cyprus. Over 30,000 Turkish Cypriot workers were employed daily in Greek Cypriot areas by Greek Cypriot employers. They received exactly the same wages and had exactly the same conditions of employment as Greek Cypriots. They negotiated together and even went out on strike together. Not one of them was molested. During all that time, for 10 solid, uninterrupted years, the Turkish Cypriots in the enclaves demanded and got electricity, water supplies and telecommunications services, even though they refused, flatly and without any justification, to pay for such services. Millions of pounds are due to the respective authorities that provided those services and supplies. Yet no attempt was made to disconnect these services, in order not to feed the Turkish propaganda machine with any possibility of saying that the Turkish Cypriots were being deprived of basic and essential services. I know of no Greek whose electricity was not disconnected if he had not paid his bill.

37. No Turks living in the Turkish enclaves made any contribution to the Social Insurance Fund, out of which pensions are paid. No Turks living in the Turkish enclaves paid any income tax. I noted with some satisfaction that the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community referred only to indirect taxes. He knows very well that no Turk ever paid any income tax or any other direct tax. And

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1965, document S/6426, para. 106.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966, document S/7191, para. 94.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1966, document S/7611, para. 109.

yet, despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriots living in those enclaves made no monetary contribution, by way of direct taxes or otherwise, to the expenses of the State, the Turks living in areas outside the enclaves received the same services as Greek Cypriots, the same contributions for their development, the same assistance from the United Nations Special Fund. Even their wheat and barley—which are heavily subsidized by the Government—were collected and paid for.

38. It seems to me obvious that when one expects payment of wages from a Government, one has to offer services to that Government.

39. It has been alleged that the Turkish government employees were expelled and driven away from their offices. That is incorrect. They withdrew themselves from their offices, whether by design or because they were told to do so by their leadership. But they were free to come and join the services if they wanted to do so and if they agreed to serve the legitimate Government of the Republic.

40. In spite of the aforementioned undeniable facts, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot propaganda have been trying always to convince the world that the Turkish Cypriot population of Cyprus was suffering general deprivation of its most basic and fundamental rights. Well, in the aftermath of the destruction and suffering brought to the Cyprus people by the Turkish aggression, by the invading Turkish army, all those complaints fade almost into insignificance. But yet, in spite of all those protestations of such important sufferings, and although Turkey is a member State of the Council of Europe and a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights, it has not in all this period of 10 years filed before the European Commission on Human Rights a State recourse against Cyprus for its alleged violation of human rights in Cyprus. Turkey, it seems, has always preferred an arm with the gun rather than the arm of the law.

41. But as Mr. Kyprianou stated in his speech yesterday before the General Assembly [2270th plenary meeting], we are prepared to accept and receive an investigating committee of the General Assembly or of any other organ of the United Nations and have it visit Cyprus and investigate the suffering, the destruction and the conditions of life now prevailing on the island. These facts clearly reveal, if further proof were necessary, the real aims and objectives behind the present Turkish aggression against Cyprus. In a peace operation, which is what the aggression of Turkey against Cyprus was euphemistically called, one does not bring war and wanton and indiscriminate death to fleeing civilians. One would not expect the so-called peace-keeping forces to use planes to bomb civilian targets—hotels, hospitals and factories—or that they would use napalm and rockets, armoured tanks and long-range cannon in order to bring about peace. One would not expect occupation of areas and administration of areas—that cities, villages and whole areas inhabited by Greek Cypriots, where not one single Turk was living before, would be occupied and their rightful and legitimate inhabitants driven out. One would not forcibly drive out defenceless and unarmed people, old people, women and children. One cannot excuse the denial of entry into the occupied areas even to the International Red Cross and the United Nations peace-keeping forces, but they are

denied entry. Even now, as I speak, they are denied entry into the areas which are occupied by the Turkish “peace-keeping force”. It is a fact that even when entry is allowed to the United Nations Forces it is sparingly granted, and even when it is granted their movements are controlled and severely restricted, and this applies both to the International Red Cross and to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This can be readily ascertained by anyone by reading the Secretary-General’s reports, and I will refer only to the very latest one, of 17 October 1974.<sup>7</sup>

42. We have stood witnesses to a dire act of aggression, and we are now standing silent and impotent witnesses to the continuation, the intensification and the solidification of the aggression and its consequences. That is why we hope—indeed, we believe—that the General Assembly of the United Nations cannot remain silent on such a question of principle, a principle which forms the corner-stone of the Charter. That is why we hope—indeed, we believe—that the Assembly of the United Nations cannot, by silence or inactivity or through general statements, condone such an act of aggression. It is our firm belief that on questions of principle, principles of such importance, there can be no compromise, obscurantism or parochialism. To call it otherwise in a vain attempt at accommodating the aggressor together with the aggressed—and in order to avoid the same confusion which the representative of the Turkish Cypriots felt about Mr. Kyprianou’s statement, I make it clear that by “aggressor” I mean the Turkish invading forces and Turkey—would only be a retrograde step in the pursuit of peace. It would lead humanity on the path of moral degradation and physical doom. No excuses as to what happened in the past or as to what was stated in the past by any Greek Cypriot leader can be a justification in solving by war what is basically a political dispute. It is not even a political dispute amongst the Cyprus people, but a political dispute of countries outside Cyprus and of interests totally unrelated to the interests of the Greek Cypriot people which cannot form a legitimate foundation for an aggression of this magnitude and nature.

43. We expect that the General Assembly will be clear and unequivocal in its condemnation of the aggression against Cyprus and of the declared and undeclared effects of such aggression. We believe that the Assembly will be clear and unequivocal in its call for the return in conditions of safety of all the refugees—and we stress, all the refugees—to their homes and properties now, as a fundamental and inalienable right. And such a right cannot be made subject to any conditions, bargaining, compromise or delay. It cannot be viewed, as was stated this morning, only within the framework of an over-all final political solution to the Cyprus question, because to put forward such a proposition would mean that we accept that the human suffering, the plight of defenceless people driven out of their homes, is to be used as a political weapon, as a form of blackmail. It is not true that this was a position of the Cyprus Government in the case of the self-made refugees of 1963 because it was not then the Cyprus Government that was imposing any political conditions on their return. It was the Turkish Cypriot leadership which was imposing the condition that if

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1974, document S/11468/Add.4.

those people were to return they would not owe loyalty to the State as such, and the State would not have a right of entry into their areas and the Turkish Cypriot administration would be the dominant power over those areas.

44. It may be said—and indeed it has been said, though in a muted way—that the invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish Army was not an act of aggression but the exercise of a legitimate right. Understandably, the point was not elaborated because I do not believe it can stand the test of scrutiny. Indeed Turkey, in an attempt to mollify international public opinion and to cover up its crime against peace, has invoked the legal fiction of having purportedly acted under the so-called Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. The said Treaty, however, does not and could not give such a right of military intervention by force, as it would then, by coming into conflict with the basic provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, be invalidated under Article 103 of the Charter.

45. Furthermore, the very nature and conduct of the Turkish military operation in Cyprus were and are contrary to the declared purposes of the Treaty, because they are directed at destroying, instead of protecting, the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

46. The document which came to be known as the Treaty of Guarantee is a Treaty signed by the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, and is inseparable from the Treaty of Establishment under which Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom “recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus”.

47. The Treaty of Guarantee contains five articles, article IV of which speaks of the functions, duties and remedies of the guarantor Powers. It was partly quoted this morning, so I shall quote it again:

“In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

“In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.”

48. I respectfully submit that it should be obvious from the letter and the spirit of the text just quoted that the invasion by Turkey, a clear act of aggression, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be held to fall under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey is not by virtue of that article the guarantor of the Turkish community on the island, any more than Greece is of the Greek community there or the United Kingdom of the British subjects there. All three are guarantors of the independence of the island and not of any one community.

49. The provisions of article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee which I have just quoted are clear enough and unambiguous, and I think that simply in reading that article the following points stand out.

50. First, Turkey—and, for that matter, any other guarantor Power—may not intervene unilaterally in any way, except as stated in article IV, “In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible . . .”.

51. Secondly, in a case of justified intervention, the intervention should be limited to “the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty”. In other words, it should be limited to the re-establishment of the 1960 constitutional order and nothing else.

52. This morning I heard and the Committee heard the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community speak in rather laudatory terms about the 1960 Constitution. I thought the logical sequence of that statement coupled with the statement that Turkey allegedly intervened in Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee would be a call for the re-establishment of the 1960 constitutional order. I do not know whether or not the 1960 constitutional order, which the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community has considered a very logical and democratic document, is now acceptable. But I repeat here what was said by the representative of the Greek community at the Geneva Conference, Mr. Clerides, namely, that he is prepared, at any time, to accept the re-establishment of the whole of the 1960 constitutional order and to study and consider ways and means for the speedy re-establishment of that constitutional order—which, after all, is the only thing that Turkey had guaranteed under the Treaty of Guarantee.

53. Thirdly, there is no right, under the Treaty, of protecting the individual—or communal rights for that matter—of any one individual or of any one community. There are other remedies provided for that. There is no right, under the Treaty, to occupy, far less to administer, any part or any area of the Republic of Cyprus, as Turkey is now doing in Cyprus, far less to take over the crops, the produce and property of others and apply them to one's own use. And I reject the allegation made this morning that Turkish Cypriots who wished to go and cultivate their fields in any part of the island had ever been prevented from doing so, or that any areas cultivated by Greeks were not accounted for to their rightful owners.

54. Fourthly, there is no right under the Treaty to seize the property of anyone or to expel persons from their homes and property, but yet that is exactly what the Turkish invading forces are doing.

55. It was said here this morning that Turkey has not learned about implementing *faits accomplis*. I am afraid that it has graduated in that technique; in less than three months of occupation of our land, it has already been described as “part of the Mesirna province of Turkey”. Stamps are being used; the Turkish pound has been made the legal tender in the area and the cities and villages, now standing as ghost areas in the occupied territory which had previously been exclusively occupied by Greeks, are turned over to people who are being settled there, either indigenous Turkish Cypriots or Turks brought over from Turkey on the official admission by the Turkish military forces; all the names of the villages are being changed, separate administrations have been set up and in general there is colonization and exploitation of the area, as if it were a Turkish province.



56. Fifthly, and finally, on this point, there is no right under the Treaty to seek, pursue, demand, far less to impose, any political or constitutional solution other than the constitutional order of 1960 under the Treaty of Guarantee. Yet, what we hear since the debate on Cyprus has commenced in this body, is that a new constitutional order must be found, and what is more, that new constitutional order, or even the pursuit of such a constitutional order, must be made the exclusive right of Greece and Turkey, of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus.

57. Are we going to accept another conference such as the parody in Geneva? Is this the type of conference that can lead to the pursuit of a peaceful political solution? Are we going to accept that one side can dictate to the other who their representative is going to be, as the Turkish Cypriots are trying to do in the case of the Greek Cypriots? Are we going to accept that one side can impose conditions as to the type of negotiations that may be held? Are we to tolerate a statement that if such a body as the General Assembly of the United Nations adopts a resolution which is not to the liking of one side or another, that is a cause for breaking off negotiations? Is that not political blackmail? Perhaps even the political blackmail that we have in Cyprus now is not as strong as this is—and I am referring to the existence of 40,000 troops, with armoured tanks, and 200,000 refugees on the island.

58. But apart from these flaws of the legalistic cloak under which Turkey has tried to cover its attack and aggression against the State of Cyprus, let us also mention that two days before the invasion of Cyprus—on 20 July of this year—the Turkish Prime Minister had been present in London, on 17 and 18 July, in an effort to win the support of the United Kingdom for joint intervention. The Turkish Prime Minister said, on 19 July on leaving London, that he was “still intending to find a peaceful solution”. On the same day, Britain had asked Greece to send to Britain its own representative for discussions under the Treaty of Guarantee, and Greece announced that it was sending its then Minister for Foreign Affairs to London on Monday, 22 July, for discussions with the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, as the Treaty of Guarantee provides. He never got to London, however, because the following day, and before the talks aimed at “concerted” action had been completed, Turkey attacked and invaded Cyprus.

59. It is thus clear that Turkey, having already charted its course for partitioning the island, did not intervene as provided for by article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. If there is any lingering doubt in this regard, let me say that this view was shared also by one of the Guarantor Powers, namely the United Kingdom, since the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Callaghan, in the course of the parody of a conference at Geneva, stated in no uncertain terms that he considered the Turkish action as having occurred outside the framework of the Treaty of Guarantee.

60. Turkey, quite simply, had only partly followed the procedure provided by the Treaty, in order to disguise its true aims and plans concerning Cyprus. And as if that was not enough, even after all the firing had ceased and long after the Sampson régime had been toppled and the constitutional order restored—and thus even after the last

shred of pretext for its dastardly initial act of aggression had been eliminated—Turkey arrogantly ignoring Security Council resolution 353 (1974), and ignoring even the cease-fire agreement it had signed in Geneva on 30 July 1974, proceeded on 14 August 1974 to a second aggression, one more shameful and more extensive in its scope, thereby increasing the land area of Cyprus it occupied by about 10 times and forcing out of their homes about 200,000 people.

61. It has sometimes been argued that the new situation that has emerged after the Turkish invasion should be accepted as a “fact of life”. Equally, though, it should be accepted that lasting solutions to political problems cannot be founded on *faits accomplis*, far less on *faits accomplis* created through war, invasion and aggression; to hold otherwise would be tantamount to justifying aggression and military might, to justifying the theory of *jus belli*.

62. But what are these so-called new realities? In June 1974, Mr. Denktaş, the representative of the Turkish Cypriots in the bi-communal talks, presented to Mr. Clerides a document which included the suggestions of the Turkish Cypriot community to the Greek Cypriot representative for a political solution of the Cyprus question. It was clearly stated there that those proposals were aimed at safeguarding the security and the rights of the Turkish Cypriots on the island. There was no suggestion for a geographical separation in those proposals. Therefore I now ask: Why is it that what was good for the Turkish minority in June 1974, as fully safeguarding their security and legitimate rights, is not good now?

63. Did anything further happen to make their need for security greater, to make their claim to rights greater, to justify their demand for more rights? The only thing that had happened was the Turkish invasion of the island, the Turkish attack on the Greek Cypriots, and not vice versa. It is the Greek Cypriots who now require security. So that the only thing that had happened to make the proposals made on 14 June 1974 “inoperative”—to use a current term—was the Turkish invasion. This is the new reality that has been created; the rights and power, the bargaining position that has been acquired through war and aggression. Are we going to agree that political rights are affected by such gains from military aggression?

64. So we try to understand this new reality—what are we being asked to understand and accept, in an effort to be flexible? Are we to watch in silence or in muted sympathy the plight of 200,000 Greek refugees, while their undeniable right to return in safety to their homes and properties is made, expressly or by implication, subject to the wishes of the Turkish aggressor; while they are being turned into an instrument for exerting political pressure on the Greek Cypriot leadership? Are we to condone the carving-up of a unitary and independent State, and continuing threats of a new offensive in the so-called Turkish peace operation—with the declared aim, declared once more this morning, of creating two separate zones that will later be united into a confederation?

65. Are we to condone the abolition of Cyprus as an independent and non-aligned State? Because nobody should harbour any illusion: Cyprus cannot, and will not,

for very long remain either independent or non-aligned if the occupation of our land continues, or if we tolerate the forceful movement of populations. Cyprus cannot survive or be non-aligned, because other arrangements will be made which will enclose part of the island in other alliances; and, whether it is accepted or not, Cyprus, from the very inception of the non-aligned movement, has been a very consistent and active participant.

66. I believe that the role and stand of Cyprus within the non-aligned group is well known and, I hope, appreciated by the non-aligned group; so it needs no elaboration from me. I would only say that the much-heralded veto of the Turkish Vice President in the affairs of Cyprus was exercised only twice; and the first time it was exercised was in 1961, in order to block the participation of President Makarios in the first Conference of non-aligned countries, because the then Vice President, Dr. Küçük, stated that his community was not in favour of the policies and platforms advocated by the non-aligned group.

67. We are not here simply to put our views on record. We are not interested in a vague declaration which will accommodate the designs of the aggressor for the partition of our country. We are pleading for the very survival of our country as an independent, integral and non-aligned country.

68. We ask you to recognize and declare that the fate of people is important, indeed fundamental, in the pursuit of a peaceful political solution. And no organization may disregard the inalienable rights of human beings. Certainly the United Nations cannot, and should not, sacrifice such rights on the altar of accommodation and of political expediency. Complacency on such issues is an affront to common human decency and the moral sensitivities of all people.

69. This is a non-negotiable issue—not because we wish to give a show of obstinacy, and not because we are unyielding, but because we want to be conciliatory, and in order to do that, we have to be realists. And the truly realistic approach is that no common ground can be found, no meaningful and free negotiations can be carried out, as long as the return of all the displaced persons to their hearths and properties remains unresolved. For as long as the mighty military force of occupation remains on our land, constituting in incessant threat of renewal of hostilities at the first sign of disagreement, no Greek Cypriot leader can realistically expect to pursue meaningful and free negotiations under the shadow of the turrets of tanks or under the threat of long-range guns. With the millstone of the plight of 200,000 people who have to be fed, who have to be found refuge and shelter—with that millstone around our necks, making our so-called negotiating ability subject to the whims of the aggressor as it exercises more pressure, our position is not unrealistic. What is unrealistic is to expect that anyone can carry out such negotiations, because—to paraphrase a great American—“though we are not afraid to negotiate, we shall not negotiate out of fear”.

70. We have stated, time and again, that Cyprus is prepared to listen to and explore every proposal, every possibility of a solution of the Cyprus question. But we

intend to see that these negotiations will be meaningful and fruitful, that they will not be another parody of a conference like the one witnessed in Geneva. It will not be negotiations under the threat of further military intervention; it will be negotiations based on elementary, fundamental human rights; and one such human right is the inalienable right of every human being to reside and live where his home and property lie.

71. We bear no animosity towards our Turkish Cypriot compatriots for past differences, not even for the suffering we have had now, because they, as we, are the victims of outside intervention; they, as we, have suffered on the altar of foreign interests. The only thing is that we have suffered more, both in extent and in consequences, and so we extend to them a hand of friendship and pledge our sincere endeavours in the effort to work out a just and equitable constitutional system within which we can live in safety and friendship, as we did in the past, without anybody having to abandon his property and place of abode; without anybody being forcibly driven from his property and land. Within this broad framework, I am sure that fair and equitable solutions can be devised. I am sure that the world council, the United Nations, can devise and propose adequate international guarantees to ensure the safety, development and happiness of both communities. Cyprus is a small and powerless country. It has been attacked by a vastly superior force armed with all modern and sophisticated weapons; it has been invaded by an armada of warships and a powerful air force, of which Cyprus has none, being virtually unarmed, except for the light weapons of volunteers.

72. Turkey organized festivities and demonstrations to mark and celebrate its so-called victory over a small and defenceless island—a shallow and inglorious victory. It was only a victory against the international legal order, against the United Nations and its Charter, and against every norm of decency in a civilized society. Cyprus was sacrificed so that the interests of foreign Powers might be served. Cyprus has paid the price of the so-called détente. But Cyprus is but an example: Cyprus might become—though we sincerely hope not—the dress rehearsal for other tragedies of a similar nature, for other countries in another latitude of the globe at another time. And it will become such a dress rehearsal unless the conscience of the world, as reflected in the United Nations, rises up in anger and condemns the aggression and declares that no aggressor shall reap the fruits of military aggression.

73. We are beaten but we are not yet vanquished. We have been defeated but we have not perished. We have been conquered but we do not accept defeat. Our courageous and spirited people still have hope. It reposes its hope in the common sense of Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, in their common desire to live together, in their ability to build together their future and their prosperity. It reposes its hope in this body, in this assembly, and in the principles this body professes it still believes in. And as long as the hope lingers, life goes on. The agonizing question which the people of Cyprus are asking is whether the United Nations Organization will live up to the expectations of all the peoples throughout the world. Whether the constituent members of the Assembly will live up to such principles and once more prove their devotion and dedication to such

principles by giving their unswerving support to the just cause of Cyprus by adopting a resolution that will be their guideline for finding a fair and equitable solution. And I do not believe that this body should tolerate any of its resolutions being the cause of disruption of negotiations, because to hold otherwise would be to arm any Member that wants to be obstinate with a power to blackmail the General Assembly into inactivity.

74. I have great faith in the principles as enunciated in the Charter and in the dedication of the vast majority of the constituent members to such principles, and I am sure that in the end justice will prevail. I sincerely hope so, for the good of the people of Cyprus, for world peace, for the survival of moral values. And we shall, indeed, be grateful.

75. The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community.

76. Mr. ÇELİK: The distinguished member of the Greek Cypriot community, referring to my quotations regarding *enosis*, stated that those quotations had been taken out of context and that they were made far back in the 1960s. I shall quote only one more from Archbishop Makarios, dated 2 July 1974. In his letter to General Gizikis, President of Greece, he wrote: "The State of Cyprus can be dissolved only in the event of *enosis*."

77. The representative also implied that such statements were made only by the Archbishop and by Mr. Spyros Kyprianou. With the Committee's indulgence, I will take yet another quotation from another of the ministers of the Greek Cypriot administration.

78. The Minister of Labour, speaking at Morphou on OHI Day on 27 October 1967, said:

"Our national tradition and ancestral endowment have pre-charted the course of our evolution in history and no power, no pressure, no threat, no intervention, no sacrifice, no time consideration can divert the course of history from its natural evolution, which leads to freedom and to union with Greece . . . It is high time Cypriots and others made it their conviction that union of Cyprus with Greece is a historical necessity . . . There can be no freedom for Cyprus outside the boundaries of Greece."

79. I regret that I had to make this quotation, but that Minister of Labour happened to be the representative we have just heard. He said that the independence of Cyprus lies within the United Nations. I very much hoped and expected that he could say, that he would say, that it lies in the hearts of the peoples of Cyprus.

80. In another part of his statement the representative referred to a legitimate government, and added that Turkish civil servants refused to serve this legitimate Government. In my statement this morning [922nd meeting], I said:

"Even the freely elected representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community have been ousted and locked out by force, or threat of force, from the Constitutional Government of the Republic. Various appeals by the Turkish Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus for a joint meeting of the Turkish and Greek Ministers remained

unanswered, and an attempt by the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives in July 1965 to return to the House was frustrated by an ultimatum that, unless the Turkish deputies agreed to the abrogation of the Constitution and endorsed the unconstitutional laws enacted in their absence by their Greek counterparts, their return would be prevented by force. This incident was related in the report to the Security Council of 29 July 1965 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations."

This is the legitimate Government which the representative says that we refused to serve.

81. At another point in his statement, the representative said that we do not pay income tax or indirect taxes. As I stated this morning, direct taxes are paid according to the Constitution by both communities to their respective communal chambers. Paragraph *f* of article 87 of our Constitution reads:

"Imposition of personal taxes and fees on members of their respective community in order to provide for their respective needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their control, as in article 88 provides".

82. He mentioned at one point that our people were not allowed by their leaders to leave the Turkish areas, that they were not subject to our taxes, that they were not subject to atrocities, that they were not subject to killings. But if I may ask, why is UNFICYP in Cyprus? Is it in Cyprus in order to protect the Greek 80 per cent of the population from being eliminated by the Turkish 20 per cent? I think, the answer is self-evident.

83. I tried this morning to elaborate on the roots of the Cyprus problem. The representative of the Greek Cypriot community pretended that there was nothing wrong until the coup of 20 July, when Turkey intervened in Cyprus. But I quoted from Archbishop Makarios when he said that he would either achieve *enosis* or turn the island into a holocaust. There was something going on—there was suffering, and the trouble did not start in 1974 but goes back to 1963, not to say 1955.

84. He also referred, in the same way as Greek representatives have previously, to the question of the transfer of population, and he said that it was inhuman. Is it inhuman to transfer a group of the population and solve the problem rather than suffer the annihilation of the entire Turkish community?

85. The representative quoted Mr. Galo Plaza, who went to Cyprus. After he saw the situation there he became convinced that all the Greek Cypriots were for *enosis* and that they would not change. Rightly or wrongly—and I think very wrongly—he chose to suggest *enosis* as a solution, but he was fully aware that under *enosis*, under Greek control, it would be impossible for the Turks to live on that island. And he went as far as to recommend the transfer of the whole Turkish community to Turkey. He said:

"In addition, it would be just and fair to recognize that however effective the safeguards that can be devised, any



Turkish Cypriot who fails to find in them a basis for reasonable confidence”—he was aware of that—“in the new order of things, would have the right to resettle in Turkey, and should be assisted to do so, with adequate compensation and help in starting a new life.”<sup>8</sup>

86. It was very generous of Mr. Galo Plaza to offer compensation to those who were prepared to sell out to Cyprus. But unfortunately the Turkish community do not seem to be prepared to sell out and move out. If it is inhuman to move from one place to another within Cyprus, it is more inhuman to move from one country to another.

87. The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Turkey, who has asked to speak.

88. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): In connexion with the statements we have just heard from the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, my delegation has some comments to make, and I should like to see these comments reflected in the report of the Special Political Committee on this subject.

89. We have heard from the Turkish Cypriot representative a bitter history—a history of suffering, misery, discrimination, deprivation and oppression. It is the Greek territorial ambitions which have subjected the Turkish Cypriots to this treatment. I am, of course, referring to the policy of *enosis* and its tragic consequences for the Turkish Cypriots. This is no secret. *Enosis* is neither a Greek dream nor a mere Turkish Cypriot nightmare. Although it is inadmissible under the international agreements and treaties, the Turkish Cypriot community has nevertheless been the victim for the past two decades of this Greek territorial ambition to take over the island of Cyprus. This is a fact, and no amount of rhetoric can disguise this fact. It is the duty of the General Assembly to recognize this fact.

90. The collusion between Greece and the Greek Cypriot leaders on the illegitimate policy of *enosis* has always been all too evident to us. It may have been less for others in the past. The policy of *enosis* has been very cunningly and very expediently pursued. All avenues have been fully exploited in accordance with the opportunities of the moment and the opportunities which separately presented or present themselves to Greece and the Greek Cypriot leaders.

91. Thus—and it is public knowledge today—while Greece has been actively engaged in seeking support for its ambitions, its illegitimate ambitions, mostly in Western country circles, using local Greek pressure groups and financial power as necessary, the Greek Cypriots have chosen other ways of handling the same matter with the same aim. The Greeks of Greece—or part of them—remind us of the Greek military adventures encouraged by the victorious imperialist Powers at the end of the First World War. It was then that Turkey set the first heroic example of the anti-colonialist struggle.

92. Today, of course, there is a new element. There has been a stooge in Cyprus who usurped all government authority from the Turks and who claims to be non-aligned.

In fact, while Greece has been concentrating on the West, he and those who serve him have been concentrating on the non-aligned world. But the purpose is the same—the Greek Cypriot leaders have not disguised it—the realization of the union of Cyprus with Greece. The representative of the Turkish community has given just a few examples of the quotations which can be made of statements by the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. His then Foreign Secretary has also been quoted by Mr. Çelik, and I suppose that it was because he did not wish to tax the patience of this body that he did not continue to quote recent remarks by them.

93. On the surface, the so-called non-aligned leaders of the Greek Cypriots appear to ask for help to free themselves from foreign interference. The flaw in their argument is that they have no right to act on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus. In fact they are asking for a free hand to deal with the Turkish Cypriots and the freedom to unite Cyprus with Greece. Never has the principle of non-alignment been so cunningly exploited to get rid of treaty obligations and to achieve the annexation of a territory to a fully aligned country. The events of July last have proven that such efforts cannot bear fruit. However, the General Assembly must put an end to this mockery.

94. In the light of what has happened over and over for the past 11 years and what has been said here today by the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, the General Assembly is in duty bound to recognize the necessity of greater security and protection for the Turkish Cypriot community. My country considers it an indispensable necessity. In the 14 years of the independence of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot community has been attacked three times—just to cite the major attacks, the massive attacks, by the illegal Greek military and paramilitary forces introduced into the island by Archbishop Makarios himself. Three times the Turkish Cypriot population was subjected to atrocities and large-scale massacres so that the Greeks might achieve *enosis*. Three times substantial Turkish Cypriot populations were displaced from their homes, dispossessed of their properties and deprived of their incomes. As Mr. Çelik has said, there will not be a fourth time.

95. The Turkish Cypriots—being the only reason for Cyprus to be independent—have also been the only victims of the policies of *enosis* up to 1974. In all these instances it was only Turkey's determination that saved the Turkish Cypriot community from annihilation and total subjugation. Nothing could have more clearly demonstrated than the events of July last that, were it not for Turkey's intervention, no Power could have prevented the realization of the union of Cyprus with Greece. The Turkish guarantee emerged as the only reliable guarantee for the continued independence of Cyprus. It is true that, with the creation of the present deplorable situation on the island following the military coup of 15 July 1974 staged by the illegal Greek forces upon the instructions of Athens, there have been this time Greek Cypriot victims as well, but the Greek Cypriots can certainly have no one but their own leaders and Greece to blame.

96. It is an established historical fact that policies of *enosis* are responsible for all these developments, and no

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1965, document S/6253, para. 161.

personal feud between Archbishop Makarios and the Greek military junta or any other leaders in Athens can disguise the collusion between Greece and the Greek Cypriot leaders on this score. It is a fact that when Turkey had to intervene as a counteraction to the Greek military intervention, an intervention that lasted for over 10 years, and following the failure of all peaceful avenues that Turkey tried, its action at that time was widely cheered by many in the United Nations as well as in Cyprus. But surely no one was naive enough to think that the sole purpose of Turkey's act was to restore the régime of Archbishop Makarios, which had long since become illegitimate. As for the Archbishop, he has himself proved his arrogance before the General Assembly by not admitting any of his grave mistakes which have caused so much suffering to the Turkish Cypriots. In fact he chose to ignore the existence of the Turkish community. At least in that respect he remains consistent with himself.

97. Now I turn to the statement made by the representative of the Greek Cypriot community. First of all, I must congratulate him on the honesty of his title, an honesty we are not accustomed to seeing from the Greek Cypriots here in the United Nations, where usurped titles have been and are used by other representatives of the same Greek community. Furthermore, I welcome him here to express the views of the Greek Cypriots, as long as he does not purport to represent also the Turkish Cypriots. Of course, the fact that he shares identical views, even to the extent of using the same sentences, adjectives and expressions, with the so-called representatives of Cyprus—of which a blatant example was given yesterday—does not and cannot surprise me. However, this fact alone may serve to bring home to many of my colleagues the anomaly in the representation of Cyprus which I have been at pains to explain. The representatives will have noticed that towards the end of his statement the representative of the Greek Cypriot community could not resist the temptation of speaking again on behalf of Cyprus.

98. As for the substance of the statement of the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, I have found nothing surprising in what he said, because we have been accustomed to hearing this kind of slander from the so-called representatives of Cyprus. Suffice it for me to say that, instead of making slanderous remarks against my country, it would be more advisable for his community to look for the responsibility for what has happened where it really lies—among its own leaders and Greece—and accordingly with the Turkish Cypriots for a better future which would not permit the mistakes of the past.

99. It seems that words have different meanings for the Greek Cypriots. Take the word "refugee", for instance. Refugees are refugees if they happen to be Greek. The other refugees—the refugees who have been refugees in the technical sense of the term for over a decade—are merely Turks, not refugees. On the other hand, when it comes to troops, troops in Cyprus are called "foreign" only when they happen to be Turkish. Greeks, of course, are always considered to be at home—at the best as guests of the Archbishop and at the worst as henchmen of Sampson.

100. I would now turn to another aspect of the question. It is the point of the Cyprus question having been put on

our agenda for more than a decade and of our being told here that the past has to be forgotten and that the Cyprus question is one that goes back for the past three months at the most. This political blindness is at least as dangerous as the attitude of those who are its defenders.

101. We are told that the Greek Cypriots have suffered. Apparently the Greek suffering of the past three months is to be equated with the decades of Turkish suffering. That, again, is in consonance with the strange attitude that consists of calling people "refugees" when they are Greek and not calling them "refugees" when they are Turks; of calling troops "foreign" when they are Turkish and not calling them "foreign" when they are Greek. That is a strange frame of mind. It is a frame of mind we have to fight against because it is what in fact has rendered the Cyprus problem so insoluble. Basically, the Cyprus problem is much easier to solve than many of the other problems with which this Organization has had to deal and is dealing now.

102. We are told that the Greek community is not prepared to discuss matters under the shadow of Turkish armaments. Again we see this strange attitude. The Turkish community negotiated with the Greek community for more than seven years under this shadow of the guns of the militia and the imported praetorian guards of the Archbishop. Are we being told that even the conditions of negotiations applied to Turks must be different from the ones applied to Greeks? That is a strange mentality.

103. There is something we have to unmask: the myth of defenceless, unarmed Greek Cyprus. For years the Security Council had to deal with the problem of how to put a stop to the illegal importation of armaments by the Greek Cypriots and how to control those armaments. In fact, some of those armaments were put under the control of UNFICYP. That relates only to the illegal armaments whose importation has been controlled; it does not relate to the tens of thousands of officers and men of mainland Greece who have served in the ranks of the various armies or para-military groups on the island of Cyprus. The Greek side had more than one way of keeping troops in Cyprus. The Archbishop, on one of his frank days, explained some of the ways to the Security Council. The verbatim record of that meeting is very illuminating.

104. There is something else we have to unmask: the game of turning the issue of the 1960 Constitution on and off at will—proclaiming the Constitution to be non-existent when it suits a momentarily triumphant Archbishop, who considers that the Turks are finally at his mercy; and then trying to salvage the Constitution when those plans ignominiously fail.

105. Mr. Denktas's title has been questioned this afternoon by the representative of the Greek Cypriot community. What about the titles of all those representatives filling the corridors of the United Nations in the name of Cyprus? Except for Mr. Papadopoulos's title, they all seem sham to me.

106. We are being asked to believe also that the proclaimed aim of all the leaders of the Greek Cypriots to unite Cyprus with Greece should be disregarded and that,

despite those proclamations, we should blindly believe in the non-aligned policy of Cyprus.

107. Furthermore, we are asked to believe—and this really adds insult to injury—that a federative system would be injurious to that non-aligned policy. I submit that such a statement is an affront to the intelligence of the members of this body.

108. Having said all that, I would assure everyone here that, regardless of what is being said, Turkey only wishes well for both communities in Cyprus—provided that *enosis* is effectively barred. It is our sincere desire to see a happier and a more prosperous Cyprus, based on respect between the two communities, and respect between Greece and Turkey, which would ensue. My country does not see any reason at all why the two communities of Cyprus should not try to achieve a unity of purpose and common prosperity within an independent and federal State. It is morally inadmissible, however, not to see the need at the present stage for a geographical basis for such a federation. A geographical federation not only is the best safeguard against *enosis*, and therefore the best guarantee of permanent independence, but is now a compelling social necessity because of what has unfortunately happened in Cyprus—especially to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, which live in fear of each other.

109. Before concluding, I should like once again to emphasize that the General Assembly must recognize the compelling necessity of absolute security and effective protection for the Turkish Cypriots. After 11 years of bitter experience, and after the statement of the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, there can be no excuse for not knowing what the situation is. As for my country, the security of the Turkish Cypriots is far too serious a subject to be taken lightly. We are resolved to provide that security until a peace settlement can be reached through negotiations.

110. Turkey and Greece, as well as the Turkish and Greek communities of Cyprus, are geographically and historically bound to live together side by side. Our earnest hope is that that will soon be possible again and that the Eastern Mediterranean, which is yearning for peace, will see a new era of harmonious and friendly relations between Turks and Greeks everywhere.

111. The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Greece on a point of order.

112. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): It had not been my intention to take part in this phase of the debate. We have heard two very detailed and important statements from the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus. I had something to do with their having made those statements, because it was I personally who arranged with the representative of Turkey the way in which the representatives of the two communities would come here and address this Committee. I am only too happy that I was able to do that. I am really pleased to have heard both statements. I thought it was their show to play, and it was not my intention to steal their show. I am only sorry that the representative of Turkey did not think the same. We shall have our show to play in the days to come, in the plenary

meetings of the General Assembly, and I only hope that we shall play it as well as the representatives of the two communities have played their show here.

113. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, as it happens that I have the floor, I should like to make one comment to the representative of the Turkish community. I listened very carefully to his statement this morning and I will refer only to one point he made. As a matter of fact it is not in the text he distributed. Towards the end of his statement he said that not only the Greek Cypriots but also Greece itself must say that it is against *enosis*. I suppose other representatives must have had the same feeling as I had. The representative of the Turkish community in Cyprus seemed to me very frightened by this idea of *enosis*, and I later saw that the representative of Turkey is as much obsessed with this same idea. I know the Ambassador of Turkey and I have the impression that he is a very intelligent man. I do not know the representative of the Turkish community in Cyprus, but this morning he gave me the impression that he is a very intelligent man. I thought that they could have realized that even if Greece wanted to unite Cyprus with Greece, Greece would not have the power or the means to do it. But in spite of that—and here the representative of the Turkish community may be excused, because I think he was not here from the beginning of the general debate—my Minister made a statement at the beginning of the general debate [2239th plenary meeting] in which he stressed in very precise words that, for *enosis* to come about, the Cypriot desire alone is not enough. For *enosis* to come about, Greece has to accept it, and Greece's answer to this is no.

114. The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Turkey on a point of order.

115. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): On a similar type of point of order. I believe that we have to face two problems here. One is the fact that having heard the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus—which in fact are Cyprus, when they are heard together or consecutively, and no other voice is Cyprus—having said this, I believe that the main point is that we can, of course, comment on what we have heard. That is the whole idea of the exercise. One cannot merely hear representatives here and then say that everything is finished, because otherwise we could have asked those two gentlemen kindly to have their written statements circulated as documents of the General Assembly or handed over to delegations. We have many things to elucidate, and that is why I spoke.

116. Now, on the second part of the statement on a point of order made by the representative of Greece, I have found that I am again in full agreement with him. It happens very often until we go deeper into the matter. That is exactly what we mean. If we are—to use his expression—so much obsessed by the idea of *enosis*, it is because we know that it exists. We know that every Greek—whether on the mainland or otherwise or even in the streets of New York, where we have seen it God knows how many times during the whole summer—is trying to achieve *enosis*. If it is only Turkey's might—I am sorry if we have some kind of might—which is the only element between the achievement of *enosis* and the independence of that State, then I think it should be welcome. If that might of Turkey makes the



realization of *enosis* an impossibility, it is only due to the fact that there exists a Turkish community in Cyprus which Turkey has to protect. If that community did not exist, if the Galo Plaza report, to which the Greek Cypriots always refer, had really been implemented, what Mr. Çelik had just said would have occurred: *enosis* would have been achieved, the Turks would have left Cyprus, and Cyprus would have been a totally Greek island. How many times have I had to hear that phrase, "Greek island". Sometimes it is said voluntarily, sometimes it is a slip of the tongue, but it is always the "Greek island" of Cyprus.

117. In order to make Cyprus the Cypriot island of Cyprus, you need Turks, and that is why Turks are there and have to be protected by Turkey, whose might makes the realization of *enosis* impossible for Greece. I fully agree with my colleague from Greece.

118. I do not have anything more to add at this stage on this point of order.

119. Mr. PAPADOPOULOS: I have been listening with some gratification to the exchanges of good wishes between the representatives of Greece and Turkey. My only comment is that I hope that their own *détente* and the restraint of Turkish might does not happen at the expense of Cyprus.

120. I asked for the floor because I have here a couple of examples of using the same words with a different meaning. First, I refer to a quotation from my statement, referred to by the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, and I would ask him kindly to be careful in the use of his words. He said that my understanding of independence was of a Cyprus within the framework of the Greek State. I used the word "freedom" in my speech, and not "independence". All those who are well versed in the conditions and circumstances which govern the Cyprus Constitution will realize that that freedom to which I referred has been gravely restricted in more than one way.

121. Not only do we have the Treaty of Guarantee, not only do we have an imposed and not a chosen constitution, but we do not have the freedom, even if Greeks and Turks on the island agree to change anything in that constitution. And when all the quotations are being recalled here—and I am sure that many more will be found—I ask all those referring to them to consider the possibility that Greeks and Turks on the island should be free to decide their own future and that freedom does not of necessity presuppose the imposition of the will of the one on the other.

122. But the same indiscriminate use of terms has been exhibited in other remarks made by the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community. For example, he referred to article 87 (c) of the Constitution. If he had referred to article 87 (2) of the Constitution he would have read:

"Nothing contained in this paragraph"—paragraph (1) of this article—"shall be construed as in any way curtailing the power of the House of Representatives to impose, in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, any personal taxes."

The section to which he referred relates only to the power of the Communal Chambers to impose personal levies for

services rendered for the needs of the respective Communal Chambers which have responsibility for religious and other cultural affairs, in which both communities have absolute freedom and equality and administer them outside the framework of the Central Government. And article 88, to which he also referred, would make it clear that the extract to which he directed attention relates only to such levies imposed by the Communal Chambers, which do not exclude the imposition of taxes by the Central Government, and it was those taxes that I referred to throughout my speech.

123. The representative of the Turkish Cypriots wondered why we need UNFICYP in Cyprus if the Turkish community was not in danger during the last decade. Let me remind him—I suppose I do not have to remind representatives present here, because they must have been present when UNFICYP was set up—that UNFICYP was asked for and formulated by a decision of the Security Council at a meeting of the Security Council that was called for by the Government of Cyprus, and it was the Greek representative to the Security Council who fought hard and long to gain the Security Council's approval for the setting up and dispatch of UNFICYP to Cyprus.

124. There was no doubting Mr. Dentaş's title; I am not doubting it at all. In fact, he is free to use any title he wishes. I am a little bit puzzled about how he picks and chooses from the Constitution. He picks the provision making him a Vice-President, but he chooses to ignore all other provisions of the Constitution. My comment was meant to be a question, which I asked before and repeat now: Do we recognize that constitution? We do. Do we accept that constitution? The Greek side does.

125. But let me remind representatives that it was the real Vice-President, Dr. Küçük, who, on 7 January 1964, declared in no uncertain terms that the "constitution is dead"; and it was after a lapse of two years that the question of the return of the Turkish Members of Parliament was brought up. In the meantime, of course, the State could not be run without laws, and it was unrealistic and impractical to expect that all those laws which had been enacted in the meantime, and which had created vested and other interests affecting the individual, would be just scratched off and not accepted.

126. But I heard one very serious statement—far-reaching in its effects—by the representative of the Turkish Cypriots. He asked: "Is it inhuman to transfer a part of the population and solve the problem?" My answer is: Yes, it is the most inhuman thing you can do—to push somebody away from his life investment, from the place where he was born and has lived his whole life, drive him across a technically created military line, or a border if you like, from where he can look at and see his land and house and produce and be prevented by force from returning. And that is why the statement—referred to by Mr. Çelik, out of context again—from the Galo Plaza report does not apply in this case.

127. Mr. Galo Plaza did not say that any Turk would be forcibly moved away from Cyprus, as is the case with the Greek Cypriots. He simply spoke of any Turkish Cypriot who, after all the guarantees Mr. Galo Plaza had enumer-

ated, still felt that he was unsafe; he would then be free to leave. They would not be forced to flee, far less would they be forced to flee by the strength of arms. And we have heard a lot today about the need of the Turks to regain their confidence in their safety. My answer is that if somebody does not want to be convinced, he cannot have the confidence that he is safe. The only thing is that a person sometimes says that he cannot be confident and convinced because he has other plans in mind, which is the case with the Turkish Cypriots.

128. Another and final point from Galo Plaza's report: Mr. Çelik said that Mr. Galo Plaza stated that "he found all Greek Cypriots for *enosis* and he would not have that." I am sorry, this is not correct. I have had the opportunity to read that report several times in the past, and I read it again this morning. That is not at all what Mr. Galo Plaza said. On the contrary, he made the statement that no Greek Cypriot leader spoke to him about *enosis*. And, in the paragraph of his report in which he sets out Archbishop Makarios' position, he said:

"... the position of the Greek Cypriot community ... [is that they] insist that any settlement must be founded on the unfettered independence of Cyprus, in the sense that the Republic must be freed from the limitations imposed in 1960, and on the right of self-determination, which they point out is an inevitable corollary of unfettered independence."<sup>9</sup>

129. There was also another statement—disturbing in its ramifications—to the effect that, after all that has happened during the last weeks and months, "federation is now a compelling necessity in view of what has taken place." But federation was not a compelling necessity in June 1974. The proposals made then by the Turkish Cypriot leaders did not provide for a federation, did not provide for a partition, did not provide for a division of the island; they provided for a unitary State within which Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would have their functional autonomy, without any movement of population.

130. What has happened since then to make it a compelling necessity? The Turkish invasion? Has the Turkish invasion, the invasion of the aggressor, made it a compelling necessity that the aggressor should now reap the fruits of his aggression? What has happened that has made provisions that were applicable and operative in June inapplicable and inoperative in October? Nothing from the Greek side. It was only the Turkish invasion.

131. Since we are talking about the inapplicability of the Constitution, and the sufferings that the Turks have allegedly undergone during the last decade at the hands of the Greeks, let me mention only these two points. It was the Turks who started the game of smuggling guns into Cyprus. They were caught red-handed while doing it. This is no Greek Cypriot propaganda, because they were caught by the British colonial Administration in October 1959, during the so-called transitional period before power was handed over to the Government of Cyprus. It was then that there occurred a well-known case, that of the caique *Deniz*, which was caught unloading arms and ammunition at a

Turkish village on the shores of Cyprus, even before the Constitution of Cyprus was enacted. As far as smuggling arms into Cyprus is concerned, the Secretary-General's records are replete with reports of gun smuggling from both sides.

132. The roots of the problem lie in the unorthodox *sui generis* provisions of the 1960 Constitution, which is a technical way attempted to equate a minority of 18 per cent with a majority of 82 per cent—not in the matter of human rights, because we always wanted such equality; we actually fought for such equality because the Greek Cypriots did not enjoy any equality or rights with the Turkish Cypriots. It was those provisions, each one of them leading toward segregation of the two communities and not towards their integration.

133. If both Greece and Turkey, together with the Turkish Cypriots, seem to be obsessed with the danger of *enosis*, we are obsessed with the danger of partition. We are obsessed because we have seen partition being practised along the lines of division, separatism and segregation that the Turks have all along tried to apply, asking for their pound of flesh in respect of every provision that the Constitution contained.

134. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The only reason why we are having this meeting today and why we had the meeting of the General Assembly yesterday, and the reason for the recourse to the United Nations, is the aggression by Turkey and its invasion of Cyprus. Then, following that, there was a second aggression, with a further invasion, not only doubling but redoubling by 10 times the forces brought into the island in violation of the Security Council resolution, which called not only for a cease-fire, but also for a withdrawal from Cyprus of the Turkish forces. Meanwhile, in complete disregard of, and contempt for, that resolution, not only have they not ended the fighting, not only have they continued their invasion and the expansion of their territory, not only have they not withdrawn their forces, but openly, without any regard for the Security Council and for international legal order in the Mediterranean area, or for the permanent members of the Security Council which hold the power in the Mediterranean, they have brought in more and more forces, 10 times more, against a country that had no navy, no air force, no kind of defence against an attack such as this, carried out with the weapons of a country that is a member of an alliance and had those weapons in its possession, as a member of that alliance, for use only for defensive purposes within that alliance and not for aggression.

135. Now, in this situation, it was to be expected that those carrying out this mission would try, by all means, to blur the effect it had on world public opinion. We must say here that world public opinion reacted in a most healthy way, an encouraging way that gives rise to hope, with regard to this aggression and the crimes that were committed in the course of the attack and invasion. In order to blur that situation, they could think of only one or two things to do as there was nothing else. They could think only of declarations about *enosis* and expressions of aspirations that have been but natural feelings in Cyprus for over a century, aspirations of a people under foreign

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 91.

domination who aspired to national freedom and who could not possibly conceive of that national freedom, at that time, in any other way than through incorporation into the nation to which they belonged. These were the things that they thought of, things which, as a matter of fact, were well known. As a matter of fact, in the United Nations the question of Cyprus had been discussed for five years in various Committees and in the General Assembly on the basis of self-determination, in full knowledge that what was meant by "self-determination" was the idea of union with Greece. This is not a new thing that has just sprung up and caused the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey to exclaim, "Oh, what is this new thing?" They knew this very well. But this was abandoned for the sake of an independent Cyprus, and we accepted a resolution for an independent Cyprus instead of one for self-determination, honestly believing that we wanted to have that independence. But when the moment came for giving independence to Cyprus, the independence we received was a curtailed independence, an independence such as no other country had, an independence confined in the strait jacket of the so-called Zurich and London Agreements and the Treaty of Guarantee that was intended to be the guarantee of the situation there—a treaty that was not a guarantee but one designed to ensure that the Constitution of Cyprus would always be enforced with no change whatsoever for making it more workable. Yet, the Government of Cyprus and the people abided by the situation.

136. But the people of Cyprus could not be prevented from enjoying their normal festivities; their prayers and their aspirations for union with Greece could not, all of a sudden, be cut off; they could not be told, "You are not ever going to have the doxology, or anything you ever had before, because now you are separated from the rest of the Greek nation, both sentimentally and in every other way". Therefore, there had to be, for the sake of smooth development in the situation, certain statements and declarations. These were well known to the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriots and they were completely innocuous. There was no indication in them that there was going to be a coup for union, none whatsoever. Nor has there been any coup. Nor was the *putsch* in Cyprus a coup for union with Greece. There was no coup whatsoever, and the Turkish Government knows, better than anyone else, that that *putsch* was not really intended to bring about union with Greece. The reasons were different. We are not going into those reasons, but the reasons for that *putsch* were different, and there was no danger that there was going to be union with Greece.

137. In fact, I will say something now that nobody can deny. When Grivas was in Cyprus and he was organizing the forces against the danger of aggression from Turkey and the aggressive attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leadership—I repeat, the aggressive attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which can easily be proved in a few words by reference to the reports—when Grivas was there, as I say, there was some trouble. There was some trouble in Kokkina and in other parts, and in 1967 an effort was made to overcome that trouble by intervention. There was a constructive intervention to overcome the trouble and we overcame it. There was then a demand by Turkey that Grivas should go away, and Grivas went away, he left Cyprus.

138. But when he clandestinely returned in another sense, in 1971, and the Turkish Government heard about it and the Turkish representative here knew about it and spoke with the Secretary-General about it, would it not have been natural to expect that as there was a movement for union with Greece they would object to his returning? No objection was expressed to the Secretary-General at all. The Turkish Government was careful not to object to the return of General Grivas to Cyprus, because it knew that there was no danger of union with Greece. But it also knew that the presence of General Grivas in Cyprus was to complicate matters and facilitate the position of Turkey in its partitionist and annexationist policy towards Cyprus. That is the situation.

139. Now, they knew very well, as does everyone who knows anything about the situation in Cyprus, that it is mere hypocrisy to blur the issue here of the international crime of the invasion and aggression in Cyprus. Every single particular relating to the invasion army in Cyprus reveals a crime against humanity. One need only delve into the details. They are there; the newspapers have written about them, and they are available for the whole world to see, so I need not refer to them here or speak about them.

140. That was the first ground they found to blur the issue. The second was to say: "Why do you complain about the refugees? We had Turkish Cypriot refugees for 11 years and you did not care about them: they were thrown out of their homes; they were placed in enclaves."

141. I could read here what Mr. Olcay wrote in his letter and what was said here today and what is continually repeated by the various Turkish propaganda instruments about Turkish Cypriots being the victims of suppression and discrimination by the Government for 10 years, compelled to be secluded in enclaves, deprived of their freedom of movement and even of travel from one enclave to the other—those are the exact words—and otherwise mistreated.

142. The falsity of those charges was unanswerably exposed in the Security Council on 30 August, at the 1795th meeting; but inasmuch as they have been repeated here tonight, I should like to say a few words about them.

143. What is the reality? Have the Turkish Cypriots been the suffering victims of segregation and isolation and all the consequences of that miserable situation? And who is responsible for those conditions?

144. The semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General explicitly state where the responsibility lies. The representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, when he spoke, had in his hands so many quotations about the festive expressions of wishes for union with Greece, but he did not care to find one quotation from the concrete reports of the Secretary-General—objective and unbiased—to support him in what he was saying. I will facilitate his getting the reports of the Secretary-General; let me do so.

145. Now, those reports conclusively demonstrate that the situation in Cyprus in this regrettable development has been the very reverse of what Mr. Olcay and the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community have said. The Turkish



Cypriot minority had full freedom of movement, as far as the Government is concerned, throughout the island, and it was the Greek Cypriot majority, strange as it may sound, that had been all these years deprived of its freedom of movement by the arbitrary action of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The report states: "Whereas Turkish Cypriots may move freely throughout the island"—this is the report—"except in a few militarily restricted areas,"—where no one was allowed to go, Greeks or Turks—"access to Turkish Cypriot enclaves, a number of Turkish Cypriot villages and certain roads"—among which important roads—"continues to be denied to Greek Cypriots. Of particular concern is the lack of free access to the following public trunk roads"—and the report lists the important trunk communication roads, among which, Nicosia-Kyrenia; Famagusta-Chatos-Nicosia; and so on, and then the report continues. "This abnormal situation,"—created by the Turkish Cypriot leadership—"if not remedied, could mar the present favourable atmosphere because there is a growing impatience and discontent"—naturally—"among Greek Cypriots, now that the Turkish Cypriots have enjoyed full freedom of movement over the whole island for some time, whilst the Greek Cypriots are still prevented from using some of the Republic's main roads."<sup>10</sup>

146. And in a policy of preventing conciliation and normalization, the Turkish Cypriot leadership persists in not allowing any freedom of movement for Greek Cypriots within the Turkish enclaves, and it is stated in the report: "Except in rare and special cases, the Turkish Cypriot leadership denies entry into areas under its control to all Greek Cypriots, whether government officials"—for any work there—"or private individuals. This ban appears to be enforced as a matter of political principle and with little attempt at justification on practical grounds".<sup>11</sup>

147. It was not a question of security; it was a matter of political reasons. And what were those political reasons? They were two-fold: to give the impression that there is a separation to force the people into the enclaves against their will. The bulk of the Turkish Cypriots are the victims of this policy of their leadership, inspired from Ankara to create the conditions for partition, with an eye to annexation. This has been, from the very beginning to the very end, the cause of the suffering of the Turkish Cypriots, who were sacrificed, immolated, in the national cause of the annexation of Cyprus and of the Greek Cypriots at the same time. That was the cause of the invasion; that was the reason for our having this discussion tonight; and it is the cause of the whole trouble in Cyprus.

148. Incidentally, I can prove every word I say here tonight from the reports: not a word I have said is without proof, and I challenge either the Turkish Cypriot representative or my friend Mr. Olcay to prove the contrary—but not irresponsibly to throw out sweeping declarations about the action of the Greek Cypriot community or Government, without having concrete evidence to prove them.

149. The segregation and forcible retention of Turkish Cypriot enclaves over the years has been a politically

motivated move pursued by the Turkish Cypriot leadership under the direction and with the assistance of military officers from Turkey and the Turkish terrorist organization, TMT, the infamous organization that was terrorizing the Turks; and I have here a pile of complaints by Turkish Cypriots against that organization. They wrote to General Timaya, the Commander of UNFICYP, saying: "Save us from the Turkish Cypriot TMT."

150. And what was the TMT trying to do? To force separation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots to prevent their conciliation and to prevent normalization. That is the very opposite of what the United Nations Force was there to do.

151. Shall I show the Committee one proof of this? Now this was quoted twice in the Security Council and was not denied, and I will say what the representative of Turkey said when this thing was quoted. This is taken from the provisional verbatim record of the 1270th meeting of the Security Council. It contains the statement that an order was issued by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, printed in black and white and circulated to Turkish Cypriots, to stop them from having any relations with the Greek Cypriots, because there was a natural feeling among the people, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. They wanted to be reconciled, they wanted to work together, to live together as they did in the past, but they were stopped by force by their Turkish Cypriot leadership, and that is the fact. I quote:

"Turkish Cypriots not in possession of a permit are forbidden to enter the Greek Cypriot sector."

They were forbidden to leave the enclave.

"Those who disobey the order with a view to having trade connexions with the Greek Cypriots [or any talks with them] should pay a £25 fine or should be punished with imprisonment.

"A fine . . . will [also] be imposed on:

- "(i) Those who converse or enter into any negotiations with Greek Cypriots or accompany any stranger into our sector;
- "(ii) Those who come into contact with Greek Cypriots for any official work;
- "(iii) Those who appear before the Greek Cypriot courts."<sup>12</sup>

What they refer to here as Greek Cypriot courts are the courts of the Republic. The Chief Justice was a Turkish Cypriot, and was there for a number of years, until he was threatened and forced to resign, in order to break up the Republic, in order to break up the State which they declared was dead, and they wanted to have the invasion from Turkey so as to be as free as possible to partition it, as something which they have achieved; and let me congratulate them for this achievement, but it will not work in the interest of the Turkish Cypriots at all. It may work in the interest of nationalistic, imperialistic aims, but

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1969, document S/9233, para. 55.

<sup>11</sup> See foot-note 6.

<sup>12</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, 1270th meeting.*

not in the interests of the citizens of Cyprus—Greeks and Turks alike.

152. Now, those who visit the Greek Cypriot hospitals are going to be punished. If they are ill they must not go to the Greek general hospital, which was bombed during this time. And so on. I will not detain the Committee; but it goes on to say that they would be punished if they went out for a walk, and those who disobeyed had to pay a very heavy punishment, and I can show you here exactly what the situation was. They were . . . That's the terrorist way of TMT.

153. It was in pursuance of this policy that 25,000 Turkish Cypriots were, through various means, compelled by their leadership, directed from Ankara, to abandon their homes and lands, and live as self-made refugees. Now, they called them refugees. They were self-made refugees, and not even voluntarily self-made but forced by their leadership, which was inspired and directed in every move from Ankara, to become refugees in segregated captivity. These words appear in the reports. They are not my words; they appear in the reports. In enclaves, with all the hardships involved in the restriction of their freedom of movement, of work, of association. They had to abandon their fields and their work as farmers, or any work, and live there in miserable conditions, and in sadness because they had to be sacrificed for the sake of annexation of Cyprus.

154. Now, for any movement, exit permits were required and were limited to the minimum time strictly necessary for the purposes of exit. The recipients of such permits were never allowed to be accompanied by members of their families, who had to stay behind as hostages in order to ensure the return of the persons going out on parole. These extreme hardships were inflicted by the Turkish Cypriot leadership on the poor, miserable and innocent Turkish Cypriots. This is the situation. They take this situation and throw the responsibility on the Government and on the Greek Cypriot community, and I dare them to contradict that with any evidence, not with mere words thrown to the winds.

155. The Secretary-General's report of 15 June 1964—I am sorry to take up time but this thing has to be cleared up once and for all, because this is the whole core of the fictitious case put up in defence of the aggression and invasion of Cyprus—states:

“ . . . the lack of movement of Turkish Cypriots outside of their areas is also believed to be dictated by a political purpose, namely, to reinforce the claim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation.”<sup>13</sup>

This was the reason for the suffering of these Turkish Cypriots: in order to show that there was a case for geographical separation, which was intended to mean partition, and that, I must repeat, was intended to mean annexation.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, *Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964*, document S/5764, para. 113.

156. A subsequent report, of 10 June 1965—a year later—says:

“The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together, or which might place Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would have to acknowledge the authority of government agents. Indeed . . .”<sup>14</sup>

157. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): Point of order.

158. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I will finish. Mr. Chairman, I will not allow this kind of intervention on the pretense of points of order such as we heard before. I was patient enough to listen. I am quoting from the reports; if he is challenging the reports, yes; but noise in order to blur again what happened I will not tolerate.

159. The CHAIRMAN: I have to recognize the representative of Turkey on a point of order, but not of the kind that we had before.

160. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): If Mr. Rossides had been patient for a second, he would have seen that I did not intend any disrespect for him. I am always willing to listen to what he has to say and I have done so many, many times. The only thing I wanted to ask as a point of clarification, just for my own clarification, was whether statements in exercise of the right of reply are subject to a time-limit or not. If there is a time-limit, what is it? If there is no time-limit, I have absolutely no reason for asking for one.

161. The CHAIRMAN: There have been statements before which I have considered as rights of reply, but we have not decided on a time-limit. Of course, in view of the late hour we might come to the point where we would have to limit the time of rights of reply and I was intending to recall the mandate that we had from the General Assembly that the main purpose of this meeting is to listen to the views of the Cypriot communities. I was going to appeal to members, also in view of the late hour and the extensive debate that we have heard, to limit their interventions as much as possible, and limit them to rights of reply rather than general statements. I think that the rule that makes it possible to limit rights of reply could be applied since I have two more speakers on my list who, I assume, will want to speak in exercise of their right of reply, namely, Greece and Turkey, in that order.

162. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): Mr. Chairman, you have raised a point which has forced me to raise a point of order.

163. You have just mentioned that you were trying to persuade representatives not to speak except in exercise of the right of reply, if I understood you correctly. Have you discouraged any would-be speaker from speaking except in exercise of the right of reply. I hope that I misunderstood what you have said.

164. I shall try to make what I have said a bit more understandable. Mr. Chairman, did you or did you not at

<sup>14</sup> See foot-note 4.

any time during the meeting today discourage any member from speaking except in exercise of the right of reply? I want to say—and this is the important point—that my first intervention was not in exercise of the right of reply. It was a statement on my part and I consider that any representative has the right to make a statement in any meeting. The fact that the two gentlemen, who are after all outsiders, have been allowed to speak today does not mean that any member of this Committee should not be able to speak.

165. I do not insist on this point. The hour is late and I do not want to create any further difficulty but I do want this to be included in the record of this meeting.

166. The CHAIRMAN: My answer to the question of the representative of Turkey is that I have so far not discouraged anyone from speaking in this meeting. As I said a while ago, I think we have come to a point where, perhaps after the representative of Cyprus has finished his statement, it will be necessary to limit statements to rights of reply and also even to limit the time of those replies.

167. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I was interrupted when I was quoting from the report of the Secretary-General. I shall continue to quote from that report:

“Indeed, since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed to physical and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy.”<sup>14</sup>

That is, a policy of co-operation and understanding.

“The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots.”<sup>14</sup>

The Government’s contention is thus borne out that:

“... the hardships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership’s self-isolation policy, imposed by force on the rank and file.”<sup>14</sup>

168. Under the same policy of separatism, the Turkish Cypriots in the enclaves were not allowed by their leadership to return to their homes and properties. They went there and after a time they said, “Well, let us go back.” They were told, “No, you will not go back; you will stay here forever.” Except in one or two cases of proximity to the military confrontation on the “Green Line”, such as Omorphita and Neapolis, where their return would have served a strategic purpose by acting as a cause of increased friction and fighting, no other returns were allowed.

169. The Government not only did not obstruct such return, as the Turkish representative from Cyprus implied and as irresponsibly alleged by the Turkish delegation, but, on the contrary, it offered every assistance to that end. The report of 10 December 1965 of the Secretary-General states: “... the Government was prepared to provide concrete assistance [for their return] as follows: (a) to repair or totally reconstruct all Turkish Cypriot houses which might have been damaged or destroyed in any village;

(b) to give financial assistance”—by the Government which was supposed to be prosecuting and persecuting the Turkish Cypriots—“for the rehabilitation of all the Turkish Cypriots”—and I underline the word “all”—“who had been forced by their leadership to abandon their villages”—this is from the report—“(c) to provide them with the means for the exercise of their profession or vocation and to assist them in finding work,”—a very paternal attitude on the part of the Government—“as well as to give financial assistance to those who, owing to incapacity, were unable to work; and (d) to take all the necessary measures for their complete safety and protection.”<sup>15</sup>

170. Another report of the Secretary-General, dated December 1966—as you see I am covering the period from 1964—states:

“But the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of refugees to their homes and deters them from going back to their villages . . .”<sup>16</sup>

Then we read:

“For a considerable time, the Government has urged the refugees to return to their homes and . . . it has repaired or rebuilt abandoned Turkish Cypriot houses. . . [But] it is known that the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of the refugees to their former houses located in Government-controlled areas at present. To justify this position, the Turkish Cypriot leadership stresses considerations of security . . . although there can be little doubt that [there is no question of security,] . . . one of the major reasons for its attitude is a political one.”<sup>17</sup>

171. Now in consistency with their policy, the report shows that they have repaired a large number of houses—343 houses were repaired. But unfortunately, in almost every case the Turkish Cypriot owners were not allowed by their leadership to return, in spite of their protests and in spite of their desperate moves to go back.

172. In a relevant letter from Mr. Clerides—I heard the representative of Turkey mention Mr. Clerides, so I am very happy to mention him also—to Mr. Denktaş of February 1971, he listed the villages where houses were being repaired. It was pointed out again that:

“You will no doubt appreciate that repaired buildings, if unoccupied, deteriorate, both due to natural causes as well as due to the unfortunate practice of the furtive removal of building material from houses long deserted.”

173. We read in another report of the Secretary-General that:

“... UNFICYP feels that . . . some steps should be taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership towards relaxing

<sup>15</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1965*, document S/7001, para. 157.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1966*, document S/7611, para. 139.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1967*, document S/8286, para. 127.



its policy of discouraging Turkish Cypriots from circulating freely in places outside its control . . .”<sup>18</sup>

174. The word “discouraging” in the report is an understatement. The prohibition of moving out of the enclaves was ruthlessly enforced against the Turkish Cypriots by their leadership as in the case of Hassan Hussein alias Kivatch of Palekythron, who was publicly shot in the square of Mora by the Turkish forces on 19 June 1964 in the presence of his wife and five children—that requires considerable cruelty—as an example of the punishment that awaits those who seek to do what?—to return to their homes and resume normal life.

175. This is the suffering of the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. There are many cases, and I have not mentioned them all. Similarly, in the case of Yerovassa in which the victim was murdered while trying to escape, as a further relevant terrorist warning—because he was warned before not to leave and he was killed.

176. In the same manner, Kemal Hussein of Neohorio was shot while in the act of escaping. Having survived, however, he described to foreign correspondents in Nicosia the conditions of Turkish terrorism and oppression within the enclaves.

177. It might be mentioned here that more than half of the Turkish population remained outside the enclaves. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, in its policy of preventing any improvement in the relations between the two communities, prohibited them from having any contacts and threatened them by the various means of the TMT from such contacts. This terrorist sway of the TMT was extended beyond the enclaves, as I said, into all parts of Cyprus. In a parallel way, outside the enclaves, through the terrorism of the TMT, the moderate elements among the Turkish Cypriots were under continuous threat of being eliminated. Thus, Dervish Kavazoglu, a well-known Turkish Cypriot leader and trade unionist who had been prominent for his positive work towards reconciliation between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, in order to build the State, in order to have co-operation, was ambushed and killed in the vicinity of the Turkish terrorist-controlled village of Lourodjina while on his way to Larnaca to attend a Turkish Cypriot meeting studying the report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus. As he was a reasonable and moderate leader and he would speak in favour of the report, which provided a workable solution for the problem, he was ambushed and killed before he got there.

178. Similarly, those who dared to speak the truth were brutally murdered, like Himet and Gurkan, two lawyers and journalists who advocated peaceful co-operation with the Greek Cypriots. But, in spite of the brutality and inhumane treatment to which the Turkish Cypriots were subjected by instruments of division, a number of prominent Turkish leaders, still defying all risks and dangers, continued to advocate and support the view that co-operation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots was not only possible but necessary in the interests of all, Greeks and Turks alike. It was pointed out that their community was “lead to misery” as a result of an erroneous policy by their extremist

leadership in forcing innocent Turkish villagers to desert their homes and properties and to endure misery, a policy that cannot be reconciled with nationalism or humanitarian feelings. These are the feelings of Turkish Cypriots. So you now see the true situation, which they have tried to present in a completely different light from reality.

179. The President of the Cyprus Turkish Union in London, Mr. Tahir, in a letter dated 12 July 1965 to the Prime Minister of Turkey at the time, Mr. Orguplu, took a firm stand against the policy of division and in favour of a more positive and realistic approach to the problem of Cyprus. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot Patriotic Front, through its leaders Nurettin Seferoglu and Ibrahim Aziz, reaffirmed in a communiqué of 7 August 1965 their faith in a peaceful solution to the problem of Cyprus. In a sense of co-operation, the communiqué denouncing the partitionist policy and the pretended “impossibility of coexistence” asserted that “thousands of Turkish workers, farmers and others are working side by side with the Greeks in a spirit of trust and mutual respect”.

180. Now I come to something which is very important. The foregoing views are reinforced also by the statement of a very high official of Turkey, the former Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus, Dr. Ermin Dirvana, a man of very high standing, who was Ambassador to Cyprus but was also a reasonable and just man. Published in the Istanbul daily, *Milliyet*, on 15 May 1964, this statement speaks of “the irresponsibility of the extremist terrorist Turkish Cypriot leadership in Cyprus, which disregards the true interests of the Turkish community and concentrates on promoting division and friction between the two communities”. This is a Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus, who speaks the truth, because the Turkish nation is a great nation, and Ambassador Dirvana is a man who lives up to the standards required for diplomats and statesmen in their policies towards other countries.

181. And there were appeals by moderate Turkish leaders to the Commander of UNFICYP, General Timayia, on behalf of Turkish Cypriots to rescue the Turkish Cypriot community from the hands of “Nero-like Turkish terrorists who were threatening those Turks who returned to their homes and villages in order to compel them to go back to the enclaves”.

182. Now I want to make only one thing clear. In the sweeping allegations and charges made by the various representatives of Turkey, the lack of any effort to substantiate them is manifest. There is no effort to substantiate anything, except the quotations of statements about union with Greece. Nothing else was quoted. What was said was in reality a figment of the imagination, intended to create confusion in the United Nations and serve as a smokescreen for the unthinkable atrocities and ignominies committed by the Turkish invading forces, with which the international press has been replete. Examples were given at the 1795th meeting of the Security Council, on 30 August 1974. Turkish propaganda seeks to present the Turkish Cypriots as having been during the past decade the weak side, on the defensive, whereas the truth is that, under the dictatorial rule of an extremist leadership imposed on them from Ankara and acting as the agents of its policy of partition, the rank and file were forced to

<sup>18</sup> See foot-note 5.

become aggressive and militant all along emboldened in their course by the Turkish Army contingent in Cyprus and by Ankara's constant threat of partitionist invasion. They have been aggressive from the very start. I heard it said today that UNFICYP was sent to Cyprus to protect the Turkish Cypriots. Not at all. UNFICYP was sent at a time when the Security Council was convened because Cyprus was threatened with invasion. The first convening was on 27 December 1963. In the first report of the Secretary-General, in June 1964, it was stated—showing the aggressive attitude of the Turkish side: “The Turkish Army national contingent remains astride the Kyrenia Road between Orta Keuy and Geunyely, and on one occasion objected to UNFICYP patrolling in their area,”<sup>19</sup> while the Greek Army national contingent was quietly in its barracks.

183. In his first report, the Secretary-General stated that the Turkish Army remained outside its designated barracks and was provocatively “astride the Kyrenia road”. He stated also that Turkey was creating tension by its continuous threats of aggression and invasion. He said that the recurrent threats of a landing of Turkish military forces in Cyprus were impeding the efforts of the United Nations to restore normal conditions and to prevent fighting in the island of Cyprus. He went on:

“Such threats serve as well to make the Turkish Cypriot leadership less amenable to the acceptance of arrangements designed to contribute to a return to normality in the island. The most recent threat of this kind... touched off considerable excitement both within and outside of Cyprus. Such actions are certainly not consistent with the appeal made to all Member States by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its resolution of 4 March [1964].”<sup>20</sup>

That was what the report of the Secretary-General said about the situation in Cyprus and UNFICYP's problems. And who caused the problems? Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

184. The Secretary-General's first report—a report covering the very first months after UNFICYP's arrival in the island—referred also to the dangerous interference with air-traffic control by a pirate radio station manipulated by Turkish Cypriots, and stated that the quality of the signals emitted revealed a high technical level of personnel and equipment—obviously supplied by Turkey. The report states:

“The operations of this station not only increase tension by virtue of the suspicions aroused as to its purposes but also create an actual and serious safety hazard for aircraft on normal flights in and out of Cyprus.”<sup>21</sup>

185. The report stated also that the proper functioning of the electricity authority of Cyprus had been paralysed in the Turkish Cypriot sector because Turkish Cypriot em-

ployees stopped working, engaged in sabotage and froze the collection accounts. As a result of that obstructionist policy, the Turkish Cypriots have since then not paid their electricity bills. That information is contained in subsequent reports by the Secretary-General. And yet the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community has complained here that Turkish Cypriots have not been supplied with electricity. The fact is that they have been regularly supplied with electricity.

186. This is what the Secretary-General stated in his report of December 1967:

“Ever since December 1963, Turkish Cypriots in certain areas, notably the main enclave and the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, have refused to pay their electricity and water bills although they have continued benefiting from these public utilities.”<sup>22</sup>

In his report of December 1973 the Secretary-General stated:

“... UNFICYP felt it necessary to draw the [Turkish Cypriot] leadership's attention to cases where villages were several months behind in their electricity payments, as well as to instances of tampering with meters and illegal connexions.”<sup>23</sup>

I could quote other excerpts from reports of the Secretary-General to indicate the true position with regard to electricity, but I think the ones I have already quoted are sufficient.

187. Reference has been made to mass graves. Again, we are dealing with a story made up to cover the existence of the mass graves created by the actions of Turkish officers and men in Cyprus. It is well known that hundreds and hundreds of persons were massacred in Cyprus. Their bodies must have been placed in graves. An attempt was made to demonstrate that those graves contained the victims of Greek Cypriots. They took members of UNFICYP to see a grave supposedly containing 57 bodies. They showed only five bodies. When the members of UNFICYP said, “Let us examine the situation”, the reply was, “No, no; we will not allow you to look any further. It is not necessary”. In another case, the Secretary-General reported that a grave had been shown to members of UNFICYP but it had not been possible to say whether the bodies were those of Greeks or Turks. However, on one of the victims a kind of ornament was found which would be worn only by a Greek. Another victim had in his pocket a cheque drawn in his name, and it was a Greek name: Cristadolou; there was also in his pocket a letter addressed to him. So at least those two bodies could be identified as those of Greeks.

188. We do not want to hear any more of these stories. They cannot cover up the international crime of the invasion and occupation of Cyprus. The very survival of Cyprus is threatened. It was therefore ludicrous to hear the

<sup>19</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964*, document S/5764, para. 115.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 119.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 19.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1967*, document S/8286, para. 139.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1973*, document S/11137, para. 63.

representative of the Turkish Cypriot community indulging in trivialities in this Committee.

189. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): In deference to the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus—whose excellent performance has now been destroyed—I shall not say another word, unless I am forced to reply to something said here.

190. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): My Greek colleague is in the happy position of having two other Greek representatives here; he therefore does not have to reply to what has been said. But I am in the unhappy position of always being alone, and therefore I have to reply. I apologize for having to do so. I shall be brief—and I think that those who know me know that when I say I shall be brief, I at least try to be brief.

191. I think I have done part of my job today—that is, to expose the position of the Greek Cypriots. The frenzy of the speech we have just listened to from the Greek Cypriot representative reveals a certain frame of mind.

192. Mr. Rossides referred to the Constitution they had agreed to. They usually say that the Constitution was imposed upon them; I do not remember whether he used those words this time. Treaties are always imposed on the Greek Cypriots, and, strangely enough, they always quote Hitler. Mr. Rossides said that the Constitution was an unorthodox one. At the outset I would say that the most unorthodox aspect of the Constitution was the provision that the head of the Orthodox Church should be the temporal head of a bi-religious nation.

193. What has happened since July? It has been proved that a praetorian guard could, when it so chose, stage a coup aiming at *enosis*. That is what we all feared all along. It is what happened and it was the prolongation of such a situation that we prevented. Therefore, our desire to have a geographical basis for federation is very justified. Otherwise, knowing how the henchmen at the service of the Greek Cypriot administration can act, we might have found that the Turks in the small enclaves were caught without any way of reacting, and it would have been too late for Turkey to intervene, for there would have been no Turks left on the island.

194. The possibility of a federation has always been mentioned—at least by me; of course, I can only vouch for what I have said. I have been here for more than two years and I have constantly been saying that a federal solution is the only way in Cyprus. We have to say that we were too optimistic, because such a solution was rejected—I shall not enter into all the details here. In any case, I still maintain that only a geographical federation can offer a way out of this mess in Cyprus—a mess that we have not caused.

195. Strangely enough, whenever the word “federation” has been mentioned by any Turk anywhere in the United Nations there has always been an uproar, usually on the part of Mr. Rossides himself, and my answer has always been: after all, it is not a sin to be a federation. There are many countries, very honourable countries, in this Organization which are federations. Furthermore, there are also many countries, very honourable countries, in this august

body which have some kind of limitations to their sovereignty. Why is it that only in the case of Cyprus is this considered as impossible, undesirable, a sin?

196. We have again been forced to listen—in my case it is my duty but for others it takes patience—to talk about a “sentimental attitude” which has finally taken the form of an attempt to end the independence of Cyprus in favour of *enosis*. Usually it is presented as a “sentimental attitude”, the great sentimentalists being Grivas, Makarios certainly, and another sentimentalist we heard yesterday, the other Greek representative, Mr. Kyprianou. There has also been Mr. Sampson—again a great sentimentalist—all those gentlemen have always looked for the annihilation of the Turks. Some, being more sentimentalist than others, have opted for their emigration from the island. The main thing was to have the Greeks all powerful in their own island, the Greek island, which ultimately would be attached to Greece. EOKA-B is one form of this sentimentalism. Then Grivas went, but the Greek troops remained, probably to further this sentiment.

197. Now we are at the end of this sentimental game and we think that it is time for reason and a logical approach to take the place of sentiment. Whatever Turkey does is an international crime anyway, but it is not an international crime, in the view of Mr. Rossides, to denounce a treaty that you have just signed as invalid, and then proclaim, if you are the signatory, that your aim is totally opposed to what the treaty says, saying that the time is not ripe for it, but that on the day when the circumstances will allow you to do so, you will do so. But this is not an international crime. International crime starts when you act according to the treaties.

198. There are so many things to which I will not reply, not for lack of material but out of respect for your patience and for my own promise that I would be brief in my intervention. But I would ask Mr. Rossides—wishing that he will not reply here—about his mention of the existence of full liberty of movement for the Turks as opposed to the absence of liberty of movement for the Greeks in Cyprus, except in a few military areas. I should like to know on what constitutional basis those military areas were established on this otherwise defenceless island where there has never existed any armament or army or anything except for the Greek armies which the Turkish soldiers had to fight against—tens of thousands of them, but they were there.

199. There has been reference to the “festive mood” of Archbishop Makarios, of Mr. Kyprianou or of Mr. Papadopoulos, taking the form of statements in favour of *enosis*, and of the taking of a solemn oath for *enosis*, probably again in this “festive mood”, and we are asked to disregard that. Now, could Mr. Rossides tell me when we have to accept the words of his leaders at their face value? Shall we have each time to know whether it is again in a “festive mood” or in a serious mood? How can you negotiate with people given to so much flippancy in their official statements and in their official acts? It really is a problem. I would call this problem hilarious if I were not to find it “Makabrios”—I apologize for the pun, which is involuntary.

200. They have mentioned Turkish “terror organizations”. I can say at least one thing in favour of those “terror

organizations”: they have never produced presidents in Cyprus.

201. I shall not quote entire pages, chapters and verses from official documents and reports, again not because of lack of material but because I never know where to look for a possible misrepresentation of whatever particular aspect of the Cyprus issue Mr. Rossides—much, much longer in the job than I myself—is going to address himself to. Therefore I usually find that it is difficult, unless I have all the documents ever produced by the United Nations, including the reports of the Secretary-General, which I would advise the members of this Committee to read in their spare time. They would find interesting documents, interesting quotations, interesting points which would sometimes—not always—prove that what Mr. Rossides says is not necessarily always true.

202. There has been a mention of victims of the Turkish Cypriot administration. Names were mentioned. I suppose that if Mr. Rossides has mentioned them he has them from a source which, until proved otherwise, I must consider as serious. But mention of internecine feuds and their victims will result in a very sorry list for Mr. Rossides to cope with, if I had to mention the number of Greek Cypriot politicians and high officials who did not die in their beds.

203. I know that, unfortunately, most of the bouts between Mr. Rossides and myself take the form of endless exchanges, but to reassure the members of this Committee I would say that I have finished what I have to say, and I will not answer even if I have to.

204. The CHAIRMAN: It is getting very late. I still have the name of the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community on my list, and I will call on him to speak in spite of the late hour because he, unlike the representatives belonging to the delegations, will not have the opportunity of speaking in the General Assembly which will begin its discussion tomorrow morning. I give the floor to the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, in exercise of his right of reply.

205. Mr. ÇELİK: I should like most sincerely to thank the representative of Greece for the polite comments he has made about me. Although I appreciate his statement that Greece does not want *enosis*, I am sure he will appreciate my position when I say that I would like, as does the Turkish community, any agreement reached on Cyprus to be binding on both the Greek Cypriots and the Greek mainland and vice versa, the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey, in view of past experiences.

206. Again, although it may be a fact that the Greek Cypriot community and the Greek mainland are not militarily strong enough to achieve *enosis* by force today, this very fact was not enough to keep us out of trouble in Cyprus for so many years. We must therefore be sincere and take effective action to put an end to all this conflict and suffering.

207. The representative of the Greek Cypriot community has challenged me twice to come out with a statement about the 1960 Constitution and the constitutionality of Mr. Denktaş' vice-presidency and, of course, likewise the

president or presidents of the Greek Cypriot community. We recognize the 1960 Constitution. What I said this morning was that in view of past experiences, in view of the sufferings that I tried to describe this morning, we feel that a new status should be given to Cyprus which will prevent the recurrence of the unfortunate events of the last decade.

208. Mr. Denktaş is a constitutionally elected Vice-President, and no one can challenge his constitutional position. Therefore, there is no problem there. With reference to a president who is a Greek, I have tried to avoid referring either to Archbishop Makarios or to Mr. Clerides as the President because, to be frank, I am not sure who is the President. A President has been expelled from Cyprus and someone else has been sworn in. An acting president is not sworn in as a president. His previous position as President of the House of Representatives has been declared vacant and has been filled. For the Turkish Cypriot community, the question of the presidency in Cyprus is not a problem—the Greeks elect the President—because whoever is elected and accepted is good enough for us. But it now appears that they have a roving President abroad and one stationed locally, so it is for them to decide.

209. The representative of the Greek Cypriot community referred to the smuggling of arms into Cyprus by Turkish Cypriots in October 1959. That was only an allegation and there was no concrete evidence at the time to substantiate it. But I should like to draw the attention of the members of this Committee to the date of the alleged smuggling of arms: October 1959. That was four years after EOKA, the Greek Cypriot underground terrorist organization, had been established and armed and had been indiscriminately killing people for four years. Even if we accept the statement as true that Turks tried to smuggle arms into Cyprus in 1959—four years after the Greek Cypriots had been fully armed—I think representatives will agree with me that that was done in self-defence, especially considering that we were outnumbered and outgunned.

210. Another question was asked twice by the representative of the Greek Cypriot community: what has happened since June 1974 to make the Turks insist, request or demand more security rights or measures than they had demanded before? And he implied that the question of federation has been newly introduced into the negotiations in Cyprus—after the coup of 15 July 1974. With all due respect to the representative, he is misinformed. The two leaders of the two communities have been discussing federation—be it a cantonal federation with five cantons, or two territories, regional federation or confederation. The fact still remains that the question of federation is not new; that this feeling of the Turks for extra security measures was there from the outset when the talks started in 1968.

211. It may be irrelevant, but I think that I should state that I was Under-Secretary to Mr. Denktaş, the Turkish representative at the talks, and I had the privilege of keeping most of the minutes of the negotiations. So I think the representative of the Greek Cypriot community will give me the credit for at least knowing what was discussed during those negotiations.

212. As regards the Galo Plaza report, which I do not intend to go into in any detail, the representative of the



Greek Cypriot community stated that no Greek Cypriot leaders had spoken to Galo Plaza about *enosis*. Well, I am puzzled. They have spoken to so many, so many times and at so many different places, that this must have been done on purpose. If they have not spoken to Galo Plaza about *enosis*, then that was a very well-played game.

213. Mr. Rossides, among the very many topics on which he has touched tonight, has complained concerning the matter of freedom of movement, both ways. He claimed that we deny freedom of movement by the Greek Cypriots into the Turkish-controlled areas. He also claimed that the Turkish leadership denies freedom of movement by the Turkish Cypriots into the Greek-controlled areas. But there are distinguished members of this Committee who have served in their respective embassies in Nicosia—and I am glad of that, because I do not have as many reports to quote from here as Mr. Rossides has; but there are people here who have been to Cyprus recently and who do know what the actual situation is. The representative of the Greek Cypriot community, during his speech this afternoon, said that tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots were working in Greek sectors, and that they were paid well. Now, I will not go into detail on that, but the fact still remains that there are tens of thousands of people who are or were in Greek areas and who were working there. Mr. Rossides claimed the contrary. He said that not a single Turk could speak to, or co-operate with, a Greek Cypriot without being shot in the back by some organization he mentioned here. But either the one or the other must be true; and since Mr. Rossides has been in the United States since 1960, whereas the representative of the Greek Cypriot community has only very recently come from Cyprus, I think we should take the latter's statement as being more correct.

214. There is another point that I would like to stress. The representative of the Greek Cypriot community happens to be the Minister of Labour of the Greek Cypriot administration, and I think he is in a better position to know how many Turks were working with, or employed by, or co-operating with the Greek side.

215. Mr. Rossides spoke at some length of the generosity of the Cyprus Republic, the so-called Government of Cyprus that was so generous and that treated the Turks so nicely that they paid for their social insurance and for all social allowances, and so forth. Following the general onslaught on the Turkish Cypriot community in December of 1963, the payment of all social insurance benefits to members of the Turkish community was suddenly and completely stopped. Even those Turkish Cypriots who had already qualified for old-age, widows' and orphans' pensions before the trouble started were refused payment of their benefits on flimsy and frivolous pretexts. There were about 1,200 Turkish Cypriots entitled to receive old-age pensions. Some of these have since died in destitution, without being able to enjoy the fruits of their contributions throughout their working life. After long and strenuous efforts on the part of UNFICYP, payment of old-age and widows' pensions was partially resumed to a comparatively small number of Turkish pensioners in March 1966, but the bulk of the Turkish pensioners are still being illegally deprived, to this very date, of their benefits. The United

Nations Secretary-General made the following comments in his report of 9 March 1968, to the Security Council:

"The Force has not succeeded in securing an enlargement of the March 1966 arrangement for the payment of old-age and widows' pensions, which is effective mainly in the Nicosia enclave, and Turkish Cypriots in the smaller enclaves such as Famagusta, Larnaca, Paphos and Lefka are, with the exception of a few individual cases, not receiving such benefits."<sup>24</sup>

216. I would like to come back again to the matter of freedom of movement. Freedom of movement is freedom of movement and should be accorded to all. But when the Greek side, as always, tried to attach political conditions to freedom of movement, it is true that we ran into difficulties. Every movement had political strings attached to it. Whenever a Turkish Cypriot moved into a Greek-controlled area, he was subjected to Greek police control, he was taken to Greek courts, and he was made to abide by Greek laws. The few roads—the very few roads—that we controlled were the last defensive positions left to the Turks when they took refuge and hoped to save their lives. So out of necessity they had to be very careful about having Greek Cypriots coming into their areas. But they were never refused. We made all this public, and it is in the Secretary-General's reports, that everyone who applies to us—genuine applications, in other words—would be accepted, would be approved, and that those Greek persons would be allowed to use roads under Turkish control.

217. Right after that, there came the condition. Now, what happens if a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot are involved in a traffic accident? That was the question. They insisted that the Greek traffic police and the Greek judges should come into Turkish areas and try accident cases. In other words, that was a condition for us to accept the illegitimate authority of the illegitimate Government of Cyprus, in exchange for our granting them permission to use our roads, or the Turkish-controlled roads.

218. Mr. Rossides touched on the electricity question. Although every single Greek Cypriot village in Cyprus is electrified—even small habitations of up to five to six people were electrified years ago—there are today about 100 Turkish villages, some of them big towns of 6,000 people or more, as yet not electrified. Mr. Rossides quoted a couple of reports, but again he seems to be outdated. I am sorry I do not have them with me here, but I would request representatives to look at the most recent, the last two reports of the Secretary-General, in which this particular question of electricity in Cyprus is referred to in some detail. Those reports will speak amply and very loudly in favour of the Turkish Cypriot community.

219. We have just heard an allegation that the Turkish Cypriots do not pay for electricity consumed. That is wrong. Turkish Cypriots do pay for electricity consumed. In most of the villages, they pay the electricity authority of Cyprus; in a couple of areas they pay the Turkish Cypriot administration, that is true. But Mr. Rossides did not mention one point: Where does this money go? The money

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1968*, document S/8446, para. 125.

paid by the Turkish consumers to the Turkish Cypriot administration goes to pay for the salaries of the staff of the Turkish electricity authority, for maintaining their electricity system in the Turkish areas. It goes to pay for the equipment that we buy and use for the purpose.

220. Now, if a so-called Government denies all services to a part of its population, and those people try with the limited means at their disposal to provide such service, naturally they have to pay for it; and we, as the Turkish wing of the Republic of Cyprus, tried to, and did, provide some services for the people—the whole Republic of Cyprus.

221. I have taken much of the Committee's time at this late hour. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and through you, each and every member of the Committee, for your time and patience.

222. The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Cyprus, who has assured me that he will be very brief. I appreciate that very much, since I have a feeling, which I sense is shared by the Committee, that it would be desirable to be able to adjourn this meeting very soon, in view of the late hour and in view of the work we all have ahead of us, not least the Secretariat which, among other things, must prepare the report which should be before the General Assembly tomorrow morning.

223. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The Turkish Cypriot representative comes back again to the question of *enosis*. They do not like the idea of our abandoning *enosis*, because that would deprive them of an argument. They know it is only an argument that they have.

224. He said he is against our draft resolution which was presented yesterday to the General Assembly [A/L.738] by Mr. Kyprianou. In its preambular part it clearly states: "Noting the position of the Government of Cyprus that it is opposed to the annexation of the Republic of Cyprus or any part of it by any other State,"—we heard it said here that the Government of Cyprus, and Archbishop Makarios, aim at the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. Well, here is a very distinct statement that the Government of Cyprus is opposed to the annexation of the Republic or any part of it by any other State—"or to the merge of the Republic of Cyprus or any part of it with any other State, or to its partition or division in any form".

225. If they were really concerned about statements they made on festive occasions on their sentiments towards *enosis*, he should have welcomed this very important statement of policy in the General Assembly draft resolution. Yet he never said a word about it; he disregarded that draft resolution. He is against it. Probably, one of the reasons he is against it is that it denies *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece and, therefore, deprives him of his only argument, here and elsewhere, including Turkey. That argument can no longer be used after the clear statement in the draft resolution; so that is all that has to be said about it.

226. The representative of Turkey spoke about federation being honourable. Of course, a constitutional federation is honourable; most of the great countries have it. This

country and various other countries have it; Yugoslavia and many other countries have it. But in a federation, in the normal course of events there are separate states or cantons, with different peoples who had been separate, as in the case of Switzerland, and were joined together into one federal State. That is a positive move to get them together; but to take one country, cut it in two, dismember it, and to do so in the way Turkey has done, by blood and iron, by uprooting and throwing out the population, and indeed by killing and exterminating the population—and I can prove every word of this—and then to say, "let us federate the two parts": is that the same? Is that honourable? Is that humane? It is like having three or four separate crystal glasses. You join them together. Is that the same as taking a crystal glass, breaking it in two, taking the pieces and saying "Let's join them together"? The difference is enormous, and it is obvious to anyone.

227. Now, about *pacta sunt servanda*, of course it is necessary to respect the pacts and the treaties, but it is Turkey which has violated the Treaty, obviously violated it in the eyes of everyone. President Johnson told Turkey so when it was intending to do what it is doing now: "What you are going to do is not protect Cyprus but dismember and partition it, and that is against the Treaty which you pretend to protect." That was President Johnson of the United States of America writing to Mr. Inonu, the Prime Minister of Turkey. So let us not hear of *pacta sunt servanda* from those who have violated the Treaty, the Charter and everything else by their aggression in Cyprus. Let the Turkish Cypriot representative think of the interests of Cyprus and not of political ambitions or the annexation of Cyprus against the interests of the Turkish Cypriots.

228. The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of the Greek Cypriot community.

229. Mr. PAPADOPOULOS: Just to dispel the confusion arising from the doubt in the mind of the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community as to who the President of the Republic is, I had the opportunity beforehand, to refer to the Constitution, as he had. The only thing is that I referred to the full article of the Constitution when I referred to one, which he seems not to have done. In article 36 (II) of the Constitution it is clearly stated that in the event of a temporary absence of the President of the Republic his duties are assumed by the President of the House of Representatives. And since we like to believe and hope that the absence of Archbishop Makarios from Cyprus is a temporary one, Mr. Clerides is performing those duties; so there should be no confusion about it, legally or constitutionally.

230. I shall refer very briefly to three other points made by the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community.

231. First, concerning the social insurance payments, I assure the Committee that all insurance payments are made according to the law to those entitled to them under the law. I suppose all those who are involved in such schemes know that no payment can be made if somebody does not pay his contribution. That may seem a technicality to those who are uninitiated in the complexities of a social insurance scheme, but to me and to those who have studied the

matter it is a very important technicality. If somebody does not pay his contribution, why should he expect to get any benefit out of the scheme?

232. As for the Turkish villages which are not supplied with electricity, the only reason is that access to employees of the electricity authority of Cyprus has not been allowed to instal that facility. Also because the appropriate agreement for payment for current consumed has not been signed. That is why they have been left out of the electrification of Cyprus. It is a peculiar theory that we have heard here, that because suddenly somebody has decided that he wants to have an alternative electricity authority it is fully justified and proper that the current which he consumes, which somebody else produces, can of course be taken over and all the proceeds can be received for that electricity. It must be a very profitable electricity authority that they are running, if they collect money for electricity consumed which is produced by somebody else.

233. The representative of the Turkish Cypriot community mentioned "a few areas". It so happens that those few areas are the ones in which about 80 per cent of the Turkish community is concentrated, the three main enclaves of the island, and that is significant enough.

234. But there is one very important point, I think, in what the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community

has said. He did now at last say that the 1960 Constitution is recognized and accepted. They one may ask: what is the Turkish army doing in Cyprus? What is all this talk about the federal system, because the Treaty of Guarantee which is part of that Constitution expressly prohibits that kind of solution and certainly does not give to Turkey any right to pursue, promote or demand any other constitutional solution than the constitutional order existing in the *status quo ante*. It is perhaps gratifying that that Constitution is now recognized and that the recognition is coupled with the statement "that after all that has happened"—and we know that "all that has happened" was the Turkish invasion of the island—"a new status must be given to Cyprus". By all means let us give it a new status; but that is the concern of the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots alone. It is certainly not the concern of Turkey, if the Constitution of 1960 is accepted.

235. The CHAIRMAN: Before we adjourn, may I take it that the Committee decides that a report, in accordance with the General Assembly decision of 21 September, be submitted immediately to the General Assembly so as to be available to the Assembly when it resumes consideration of the item, Question of Cyprus, tomorrow morning?

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 7.35 p.m.*

## 924th meeting

Wednesday, 30 October 1974, at 3.35 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.924

### AGENDA ITEM 41

#### Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (A/9632, A/SPC/L.301, A/SPC/L.302)

1. Mr. SCALABRE (France) said that the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation was a scientific body composed of experts who, with great objectivity, studied measurable data on levels of radio-activity throughout the world. Its conclusions must be considered with the same objectivity, in a politically dispassionate manner and, above all, without confusing the issues. The Special Political Committee was called upon only to determine whether radio-activity had increased because of human activity, particularly nuclear tests, and whether that increase—if there was one—was of alarming proportions. In his opinion, the conclusions contained in the Scientific Committee's latest report (A/9632) did not appear to be alarming.

2. His delegation did not deny that vigilance should be maintained in all matters relating to nuclear tests; indeed, it strongly affirmed that point. Its purpose in introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.301 was to remind the Scientific

Committee that it must redouble its vigilance and continuously observe the levels of radio-activity throughout the world.

3. With regard to the introduction of a draft resolution, his delegation, as at the previous session, had been in contact with the States of the Pacific area, which had a legitimate interest in the matter. The Australian delegation, in particular, had shown a most praiseworthy spirit of understanding in its deliberations with the French delegation. An agreement had been quite near, and he hoped that a text could still be prepared which would receive general approval. If such an agreement was reached, his delegation would be prepared to withdraw its draft resolution (A/SPC/L.301), whose merit, he reiterated, lay in that it was in keeping with the tradition of scientific objectivity to which the Special Political Committee had for so long adhered.

4. He therefore proposed an amendment to operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.302, on which there was still disagreement between his delegation and the sponsors of that draft, and he hoped that the spirit of conciliation that prompted his amendment would be appreciated.

5. Mr. COTTON (New Zealand), speaking on a point of order, asked whether an amendment could be proposed to a draft resolution that had not yet been introduced.

6. Mr. SCALABRE (France) said that, although draft resolution A/SPC/L.302 had not yet been introduced, it had been circulated. In introducing its draft resolution (A/SPC/L.301), his delegation wished to make clear the conditions on which it would be withdrawn, and to that end he was suggesting amendments<sup>1</sup> to the other draft. He therefore proposed that in operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.302 the words "with concern" should be deleted and the adjective "light" should be inserted before the words "radio-active contamination". He believed that if his amendment was accepted, the text would gain in objectivity.

7. Mr. WYNDHAM (Australia) said that, since he had not had time to consult the other sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.302, he would confine himself to commenting briefly, on his own behalf, on the amendment proposed by the delegation of France.

8. The report of the Scientific Committee was essentially a progress report which the Committee had decided to submit on an annual basis, pending submission of its next comprehensive report to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. For that reason, there was no need for the General Assembly to take major decisions on the effects of atomic radiation. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.302 had been prepared with that in mind. The preambular paragraphs had been drafted along the lines of previous draft resolutions, with the exception of the final paragraph, which took note of the Scientific Committee's intention to submit a comprehensive report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

9. Similarly, the operative paragraphs covered no new ground except in referring to specific points in the Scientific Committee's report. For example, paragraph 2 had been drafted in the light of section III of the Scientific Committee's report, paragraph 9 of which stated that in 1974 radio-active contamination by iodine 131 had been higher than in the previous two years. Australia, as a member of the Committee, had submitted data which showed that the thyroid doses from iodine 131 had been more than 10 times as great in 1974 as in 1973.

10. The sponsors believed that that was cause for concern and had said as much in operative paragraph 2. In view of the extent of the increase in radio-activity from iodine 131, he hoped that the Committee understood his position with regard to the amendment proposed by the French delegation calling for the insertion of the adjective "light", which was not justified by the increase that had occurred. Similarly, he was not certain that the words "with concern" could be deleted, since it seemed to him that there was abundant cause for concern.

11. Under the circumstances, he thought he should repeat what he had said during the preceding session, at the 903rd meeting of the Committee, namely that even the 1962 report of the Scientific Committee stated that the study of

the relationship between dose and effect at cellular and subcellular levels did not give any indication of the existence of threshold doses and led to the conclusion that certain biological effects could follow irradiation, however small the dose might be.<sup>2</sup> The report also stated that it was prudent to assume that some genetic damage might follow any dose of radiation, however small.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, it was stated in publication 9 of the International Commission on Radiological Protection that there was no wholly safe dose of radiation.

12. With regard to operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.302, he reminded the Committee that at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly mention had been made of the financial implications of the implementation of the decisions of the General Assembly and measures had been suggested to reduce the expenditures of the developing countries. That aspect of the matter had not been covered in the paragraph, and no attempt had been made to do so.

13. He repeated that his delegation attached great importance to the work of the Scientific Committee, which had made valuable contributions to the welfare of current and future generations. He therefore hoped that the draft resolution which he had joined in sponsoring would be adopted by the Committee.

14. Mr. COTTON (New Zealand) said that he would refer in more detail to the Scientific Committee's report at a subsequent meeting. However, in the light of the French proposal—which he would transmit to his Government—he reminded the Committee that at the preceding session the General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority, had adopted resolution 3063 (XXVIII), in which it noted with regret that nuclear tests had been conducted in the atmosphere, and resolution 3154 A (XXVIII), in which it deplored environmental pollution by ionizing radiation from the testing of nuclear weapons. Since there had been no important changes or improvement in the situation, he did not believe that there was any justification for amending draft resolution A/SPC/L.302.

15. Mr. NATALE (Argentina) said that his delegation had always attached the greatest importance to the work of the Scientific Committee and was therefore gratified that in 1977 the Committee would submit a new scientific report. He was certain that like the previous reports, which had made a great contribution to knowledge of the physical and biological aspects of radiation, that report would merit acceptance by the international scientific community. The Committee's assessment, regarding irradiation from nuclear generators seemed particularly important and were fundamental in enlightening public opinion. Argentina, which had undertaken an ambitious programme in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, wished to stress that aspect of the Committee's work without detracting from the other items of interest.

16. Argentina had contributed data and scientific information on practically all the topics dealt with by the Scientific Committee, and its contributions had been

<sup>1</sup> Subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/L.303.

<sup>2</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 16, chap. VII, para. 34.*



particularly important in the Committee's evaluations of radiation doses resulting from test explosions of nuclear weapons, medical irradiation and occupational exposure.

17. Argentina could have provided no better support for the Committee's work than in agreeing to deprive itself temporarily of the services of a scientist of the calibre of Dr. Beninson, who had recently been appointed Secretary of the Committee. In that connexion, he expressed his gratitude to the former Secretary of the Committee, Dr. Sella, who had won the respect of all.

18. Finally, he emphasized that the Committee's study (see A/9632, paras. 11-18) on decision 9 (II) of the Governing Council of UNEP<sup>3</sup> was extremely valuable, and he noted the quick response of the Committee in establishing the machinery to carry out the new responsibilities authorized in General Assembly resolution 3154 (XXVIII).

19. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) said that in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization (A/9601/Add.1) the Secretary-General had warned that great economic and social issues were confronting the world with "a global crisis of extraordinary dimensions" and that "the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices could create almost unimaginable dangers for the survival of our civilization and the human race". The world was caught between the twin fears of economic disorder and the threat of annihilation.

20. A United States scientist had recently said that a nuclear war could destroy the ozone layer in the stratosphere—which had already decreased following large atomic explosions carried out by the two super-Powers in 1960 and 1961—thus possibly upsetting, if not destroying, the biological processes upon which men depended for survival; a United States Senator had also said recently that the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be the most critical problem currently facing the world. A fantasy of nuclear warfare was fully laid out in an Australian novel entitled *On the Beach*, published in 1957. He hoped that none of the countries in the world would have to face the gloomy experiences described in the novel.

21. His delegation had protested against the nuclear tests being conducted in the Pacific, had welcomed all earnest efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons and had supported a comprehensive nuclear test ban as the head of the Philippine delegation had reiterated at the 2243rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

22. It was in that light that his delegation supported the work of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, whose report was under consideration, and it was grateful to that Committee for its vigilance in bringing to light new information on radio-active contamination. It took note of the view expressed in paragraph 10 of the report that "radio-active contamination from nuclear explosions needed to be kept under review in the light of both future data and of increased knowledge of the mechanisms through which radio-active material spreads in the environment and is distributed in the human body".

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 25, annex I.*

Above all, it shared the Committee's concern at the new nuclear weapons tests that had been conducted.

23. He was confident that the Scientific Committee would be equal to its additional responsibilities under General Assembly resolution 3154 C (XXVIII) and agreed with its view, in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the report, that the terms of reference and composition of the group of experts it was authorized to appoint, at the request of the Government of a country, to hold scientific consultations and inform the Committee of those consultations could only be determined in the context of a specific request from the Member State concerned.

24. The importance of the Scientific Committee's co-operation with UNEP could not be overemphasized. Also of importance was the recommendation in paragraph 16 of the report that "among the nuclides to be monitored after atmospheric nuclear tests, priority be given to iodine 131 in milk in areas exposed to fresh fall-out and where fresh milk is an important component of the infants' diet"; that was especially pertinent in the light of a recent statement by UNICEF concerning the situation of some 500 million children in 70 countries. Children needed, above all, to grow and develop in a healthy environment. They were, as was often observed, "the leaders of tomorrow".

25. His delegation endorsed the Scientific Committee's plan to report annually to the General Assembly on the progress of its work in assessing doses, effects and risks of radiation from all sources. It was gratifying that the Committee had been strengthened by the appointment of five additional members—the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Peru, Poland and the Sudan—under General Assembly resolution 3154 C (XXVIII).

26. On behalf of his delegation, he congratulated the outgoing officers of the Scientific Committee on their dedication and sense of responsibility and also the officers who had just been elected; he hoped that the Committee would continue to contribute to wider knowledge and understanding of the levels and effects of atomic radiation.

27. Mr. KULAK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation had prepared and drafted its report on the basis of the new information it had received about radio-active contamination and proposed to continue studying the genetic and somatic effects of radiation from different sources on the basis of the information it obtained in the future. As was stated in paragraph 4 of the report, the data available to the Committee covered the years up to and including 1973 and some extended into 1974.

28. Paragraph 7 of the report was correct but rather optimistic when it stated that since the previous report the estimated increase in the doses due to long-lived radio-nuclides was less than the uncertainties in the estimates of the total doses. An uninformed reader might deduce from paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 that there had been no nuclear explosions in the atmosphere during that period. He might also conclude from the report that, by the year 2000, a dose equivalent to that of two years' natural radiation would be reached. Such misleading conclusions should be prevented. It must be realized that nuclear tests were still

continuing and that the situation might become much worse than expected. What must be done was to put an end to all nuclear tests throughout the world.

29. His delegation praised the work of the Scientific Committee and felt that the Special Political Committee should recommend that it continue its investigations, since nuclear tests and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes posed new questions concerning local levels and doses of radiation.

30. His delegation wished to study draft resolutions A/SPC/L.301 and A/SPC/L.302 and reserved the right to refer to them at subsequent meetings.

31. Mr. SCALABRE (France) said that the representative of Australia had referred mainly to iodine 131. It was true that, according to the report of the Scientific Committee, that element had been detected in various parts of both hemispheres. It should, however, be remembered that iodine 131 was a short-lived element which disappeared in a few weeks. According to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the report the deposits of strontium 90 and caesium 137, both of which caused consternation among the experts, had been very low. Consequently, his delegation maintained its

proposal that the adjective "light" should be inserted before "radio-active contamination" in operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.302 but was ready to consider any other suggestion likely to lead to agreement on the wording and hoped that the other members of the Committee were ready to do the same.

32. He hoped that that reply would satisfy the representatives of both Australia and New Zealand.

33. The comments made by the representative of Argentina were interesting and would be studied by his delegation.

34. He shared the concern of the representative of the Philippines about the dangers of nuclear war and the destruction of the ozone layer in the stratosphere but felt that such matters should be discussed in the First Committee.

35. He endorsed the Argentine representative's remarks concerning Dr. Sella and welcomed the new officers of the Scientific Committee.

*The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.*

## 925th meeting

Thursday, 31 October 1974, at 3.30 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.925

### AGENDA ITEM 41

**Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (concluded) (A/9632, A/SPC/L.301, A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1, A/SPC/L.303)**

1. Mr. WYNDHAM (Australia), introducing the revised draft resolution in document A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1, said that it was the same as draft resolution A/SPC/L.302 except that operative paragraph 2 had been amended as suggested by the representative of Mexico, which had joined the original sponsors. The changes did not signify a disavowal of the viewpoints which had been expressed and those views would again be expressed in the First Committee.

2. His delegation had no objection to draft resolution A/SPC/L.301 and, in the spirit of understanding and co-operation referred to by the representative of France at the previous meeting, he asked the French delegation to consider the possibility of withdrawing its own amendments (A/SPC/L.303) and agreeing to the adoption of the revised draft he had just introduced.

3. Mr. SCALABRE (France) said that the representative of Australia had not appealed in vain to the spirit of co-operation of the French delegation. In that spirit, it withdrew its own amendments (A/SPC/L.303) to draft

resolution A/SPC/L.302 and did not oppose the adoption of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.301 and A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1.

4. The CHAIRMAN said that, before taking a decision on the draft resolutions, the Committee should complete the general debate on the item under consideration.

5. Mr. ABDULDJALIL (Indonesia), after praising the Scientific Committee for its report, said that his delegation was pleased to note from paragraph 11 of the report that the Governing Council of UNEP had decided that UNEP should assign high priority to the monitoring of radio-nuclides resulting from nuclear tests and report regularly to it on that matter. Such monitoring was an essential precaution as the potentially harmful effects of atomic radiation were particularly frightening. Consequently, Indonesia had long opposed all nuclear tests in any environment. The effects of such tests had again been pointed out in a letter in *The New York Times* magazine section on 31 March 1974, in which it was stated that it was possible that modern technology did not employ adequate safety margins to protect the population.

6. Additional hazards attendant upon the peaceful application of nuclear energy, namely, environmental pollution and occupational diseases, had only recently received widespread attention. Those dangers included, for example, certain biological effects occurring in proximity to atomic

power plants. His delegation was pleased to note from paragraph 2 and the annex to the report that the Scientific Committee intended to deal with those problems in its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session and that it had established an interim procedure for setting up groups of experts from among its members to discharge its duties under General Assembly resolution 3154 C (XXVIII).

7. With regard to the site and scheduling of the meetings of the Scientific Committee, it would be advisable for them to be held in advance of the opening of each session of the General Assembly so that Scientific Committee members would be freed from the necessity of preparing their reports in a severely limited amount of time and so that representatives would have the opportunity to consider the Scientific Committee's findings well in advance. In the interests of economy and efficiency, the Committee might meet in only one place, perhaps Vienna, in view of the decision to provide facilities there for the Committee's secretariat.

8. As a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1, his delegation hoped that the Committee would adopt it unanimously.

9. Mr. CRAFOORD (Sweden), after paying a tribute to the work carried out by the Scientific Committee since its establishment and pointing to the need for the work to continue, said that his delegation welcomed the report presented by that Committee and its intention of continuing its assessment of the effects of radiation from all sources. It was gratifying to learn that the General Assembly would receive a comprehensive report on the effects of atomic radiation at its thirty-second session.

10. It was impossible not to feel concern at the proliferation of the artificial sources of ionizing radiation—for example, plans for the establishment of numerous atomic power plants had been speeded up in many countries as a result of the current energy crisis—a situation which would need particularly careful attention in order to prevent potentially serious environmental consequences. It was important that the Scientific Committee continue its work in that field in closer co-operation with UNEP.

11. His delegation regretted the fact that nuclear weapons continued to be tested in the atmosphere and expressed grave concern at the increase in contamination and the consequent dangers. In paragraph 9 of its report, the Scientific Committee noted that iodine 131 had been detected in both hemispheres in 1974 and in previous years. His delegation would be interested to know the possible differences between the doses observed in the northern and southern hemispheres in recent years and the possible connexion between those differences and the conducting of nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

12. With regard to the need for adequate facilities for the secretariat of the Scientific Committee in Vienna, referred to in paragraph 20 of the report, his delegation wished to emphasize the importance of providing such facilities without delay so that the Committee might effectively continue its work. The decision to move the secretariat to Vienna had been based on the assumption that such facilities were in fact available; if that was not the case, the General Assembly would have to reconsider the question.

13. Mr. COTTON (New Zealand) congratulated the outgoing and incoming officers of the Scientific Committee and welcomed the addition of five new members to that Committee.

14. His delegation had studied carefully the report of the Scientific Committee and commended its preparation, its sound scientific basis and the full use made of information provided by many Governments, among them the Government of New Zealand. His Government deeply regretted that the atmospheric nuclear tests carried out by the Governments of China and France had once again compelled the New Zealand National Radiation Laboratory to measure radio-activity throughout the South Pacific with a view to monitoring short-term and long-term radiation hazards and contributing, through the Scientific Committee, to the international evaluation of those problems. Vigilance must be maintained as long as nuclear explosions continued. New Zealand had noted with relief and appreciation the statement made by France that it did not intend to carry out further tests in the atmosphere in 1975. However, public anxiety and the need for vigilance would not diminish until it was certain that no more tests would be conducted in the atmosphere in the South Pacific.

15. As the Scientific Committee stated in paragraph 4 of its report, a number of nuclear explosions had been carried out in the atmosphere in both hemispheres since the period covered in its report to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.<sup>1</sup> In that connexion, he wished to point out that the most recent report submitted by the New Zealand National Radiation Laboratory to the Scientific Committee,<sup>2</sup> stated that in 1974 seven nuclear devices had been tested in the atmosphere at Mururoa—one in June, three in July, two in August and one in September. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the report in question summarized the situation revealed by the surveys carried out by New Zealand and reported by it to the Scientific Committee. In paragraph 9, the Scientific Committee confirmed the existence of increased thyroid doses of iodine 131 resulting from the testing in the Pacific area of more powerful weapons than those tested in the preceding two years. The measurements made by New Zealand confirmed that, during the current year, iodine 131 levels were of the same order as those observed in 1967, 1968, 1970 and 1971.

16. In paragraph 10 of its report the Scientific Committee noted that "radio-active contamination from nuclear explosions needed to be kept under review in the light of both future data and of increased knowledge of the mechanisms through which radio-active material spreads in the environment and is distributed in the human body", a statement with which New Zealand's scientists were in complete agreement. As man's knowledge grew, so did his responsibility to future generations.

17. Referring to section IV of the report, he said that his Government fully agreed with the emphasis placed by the Scientific Committee on the monitoring of radio-active contamination from nuclear weapons tests and the accompanying risks, as compared with those from other sources

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 25.

<sup>2</sup> See A/AC.82/G/L.1496.

of radiation exposure; his Government also agreed with the Committee's suggestion that the ranking given by UNEP to the measurement of strontium 90 and caesium 137 should not be over-emphasized to the detriment of the monitoring of iodine 131 after atmospheric nuclear tests. Although the representative of France had stated at the previous meeting that those radio-nuclides were short-lived and consequently should not be a cause for concern, the Special Political Committee should be guided by the report submitted by the Scientific Committee, a body established by the General Assembly, which did not corroborate those assertions and which in paragraph 16 stated that short-lived gamma emitters, in particular, could be important contributors to the external radiation dose that might be received by the populations exposed to fall-out in the few weeks following an atmospheric test. The New Zealand Government considered that the Scientific Committee had surveyed the data submitted to it by Governments with scientific impartiality and had reached certain conclusions with which his Government was in complete agreement.

18. Almost one year had passed since the Special Political Committee had last considered draft resolutions on the work of the Scientific Committee, a year in which nuclear explosions had taken place in the atmosphere and under ground and in which the monitoring of the spread of radio-active contaminants from those explosions had continued. At the twenty-eighth session, the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations had noted (903rd meeting) that, in 1973, the French explosions in the Pacific had been of collectively low yield. However, New Zealand's monitoring systems had shown that in the current year French tests had been of higher yield. Again in 1973, the New Zealand representative had referred to the phenomenon of "blow back" that had occurred twice during that year's series of tests in the Pacific. The same phenomenon had occurred in the 1974 series of tests and once again, despite all the precautions of the French Government, the wind had changed and radio-active debris, instead of being carried eastwards towards the open sea, had been brought westwards and deposited on inhabited islands.

19. Of the two draft resolutions before the Committee, the draft submitted by France (A/SPC/L.301) referred only to the work of the Scientific Committee and made no reference to nuclear explosions in any environment, which were the *raison d'être* for a great part of the Scientific Committee's responsibilities. The other text, draft resolution A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1, had been introduced by the representative of Australia and was sponsored by the New Zealand delegation and the delegations of many other States. The sponsors of both drafts hoped that they would be adopted without objection.

20. Mr. SIKIVOU (Fiji) said that his delegation had two important observations to make with regard to the report submitted by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Firstly, paragraph 2 stated that, under General Assembly resolution 3154 C (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the Scientific Committee in response to a request by the Government of a country which was situated in an area of nuclear arms testing or which considered that it was exposed to atomic radiation by reason of such testing, had been authorized to appoint a

group of experts from among its members for the purpose of visiting that country, at the latter's expense, and of consulting with its scientific authorities and informing the Committee of the consultations. He recalled that, at the previous session, the Fiji delegation had strongly objected to that part of the resolution, since it had considered that a country which had suffered the effects of radio-active contamination as a result of nuclear explosions was in no way responsible for the expenses of the group of experts. That responsibility devolved fully on the Power or Powers which had caused the contamination. However, since they would be unwilling to accept that simple and basic principle of justice, his delegation had believed, and still believed, that the United Nations should bear the costs.

21. In making those observations, he was referring in particular to France. Fiji, like many other countries, some represented in the United Nations and some not, had earnestly requested France by various means, including United Nations resolutions, to stop its tests in the South Pacific. Since the United Nations was unlikely to compel France to heed those requests, the least that it could do was to pay for the advisory visits of the Scientific Committee.

22. After reading out paragraph 16 of section IV of the report, which referred to the dangers of radio-active fall-out in connexion with the contamination of milk where milk was an important component of the infants' diet, he said that that statement gave cause for alarm and would justify the condemnation of those responsible for such indiscriminate endangering of innocent human lives.

23. As a consolation to the affected countries, the representative of France, in his statement at the previous meeting, had referred to that part of the report which stated that the levels of contamination were low in many respects. However, the countries of the South Pacific wanted absolutely no level at all of atomic radiation as a result of tests conducted by France or any other Power. The representative of France had also said that the countries in that area should not be alarmed or concerned in view of the low level of existing contamination; but that was a matter of concern and alarm for the countries in the area. If the atomic radiation effects resulting from the French atmospheric tests were indeed harmless and since the tests were being conducted for the benefit of France, he saw no reason why that country could not conduct them within its own territory. The fact that the Government of France was conducting those tests far from its own country could give the impression that the French, like the Pacific islanders, were not absolutely sure that the effects of such low-level atomic radiation were harmless, or could give rise to the suspicion that the Government of France regarded the citizens of the Pacific Territories as second-class citizens who could be used as guinea-pigs for its experiments.

24. Mr. TYLNER (Czechoslovakia) expressed his satisfaction at the report submitted by the Scientific Committee, a useful document prepared with scientific objectivity pursuant to the relevant resolutions. Czechoslovakian scientists had prepared a study on the effects of radiation on different population groups for distribution to the members of the Scientific Committee, whose future work his country would fully support.



25. The CHAIRMAN assumed that the sponsors of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.301 and A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1 agreed that both should be adopted. The French delegation had withdrawn the amendments submitted in document A/SPC/L.303.

26. Unless any representative requested a vote, he would take it that the Committee adopted draft resolution A/SPC/L.301 without objection.

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.301 was adopted.*

27. The CHAIRMAN said that, since no representative had requested a vote, he took it that the Committee wished to adopt draft resolution A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1 without objection.

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1 was adopted.*

28. Mr. CHOU Chueh (China) said that, as the representative of New Zealand had referred to the nuclear tests conducted by China and they were also referred to in draft resolution A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1, he wished to reiterate his country's position.

29. It was well known that the super Powers had embarked on a frantic race to produce more and more nuclear weapons, in order to increase their spheres of influence and achieve a monopoly in that field, and were thereby blocking the way to peace and progress. Faced with that situation, the Chinese Government had been obliged, in legitimate defence, to manufacture nuclear weapons to prevent such a monopoly from being established. However, it had always carried out its nuclear tests inside China. His Government would continue to support the total prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and would stop producing them as soon as all such existing weapons were prohibited and destroyed.

30. For those reasons, China did not support draft resolution A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1.

31. Mr. SCALABRE (France) said that, as he had announced at the beginning of the meeting, his delegation had withdrawn its amendments (A/SPC/L.303) to draft resolution A/SPC/L.302 in order that the two draft resolutions might be adopted without objection.

32. At the Committee's 924th meeting, his delegation had stated its conclusions with regard to the report of the Scientific Committee and had said that it would have preferred a more objective wording for operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.302, as suggested in its amendments. He reiterated that the Scientific Committee's conclusions did not appear alarming and that the radioactive contamination caused by nuclear tests was extremely slight.

33. He would not enter into a technical discussion, but shared the opinion of some delegations, especially Sweden, concerning the advisability of pursuing certain studies, particularly those on iodine 131, in order to allay certain doubts. Furthermore, he would like the Scientific Committee, which was doing excellent work, to specify the

effects, on human health, of the amounts of radioactivity observed in the world. That task had, moreover, been expressly entrusted to it by the General Assembly in its terms of reference.

34. At the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, his delegation had already answered (876th meeting) the representative of Fiji, who had then put forward the same arguments as he had at the current session. He therefore did not wish to embark upon a fruitless argument or give the discussion a controversial turn, but preferred to end by welcoming the spirit of understanding which had been shown.

35. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) welcomed the adoption by the Committee of a decision which, in his view, would encourage the Scientific Committee in its future work. As he had said already, the only true solution would be a total prohibition of nuclear weapons by all States everywhere. That was the fundamental position of the Soviet Union, which had been confirmed by the XXIVth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in 1971. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, L. I. Brezhnev, had also recently stated that his country was ready to agree on the complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

36. One of the draft resolutions just adopted by the Committee referred to General Assembly resolution 3151 (XXVIII); the Soviet Union had abstained in the vote on part C of that resolution. He reiterated his delegation's position concerning that General Assembly resolution.

37. As usual, the representative of China had strayed from the item under discussion: the Committee was discussing the need to put an end to nuclear weapon tests, and China was expatiating on some kind of hegemony. The Soviet delegation was ready to give specific replies to specific questions. For example, the representative of Fiji had proposed that there should be an end to all nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union was ready to accept that concrete proposal. He wondered what would be the reply of the representative of China in that connexion.

38. Mr. LOGAN (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had been happy to participate in the adoption of the two draft resolutions, but still had reservations on operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1, the only paragraph which attempted to reflect the Scientific Committee's latest conclusions on contamination. That paragraph noted that there had been further radio-active contamination from nuclear tests. However, although the Scientific Committee's report stated that the thyroid doses from iodine 131 in 1973 were approaching the levels observed in the years 1965, 1966 and 1967, it also said that the annual depositions of strontium 90 and caesium 137 in 1972 and 1973 had been the lowest recorded since the beginning of systematic measurements. His delegation therefore considered that that paragraph did not adequately reflect the over-all conclusions of that Committee.

39. His delegation also believed that any nuclear explosions should be carried out within the international framework established by the Partial Test Ban Treaty and

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and was opposed to the continuation of above-ground testing. It therefore interpreted operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1 as referring to radioactive contamination resulting from tests in the atmosphere.

40. Mr. NORBURY (United States of America) shared the reservations expressed by the delegations of France and the United Kingdom concerning operative paragraph 2 of the initial draft resolution (A/SPC/L.302) introduced by the Australian delegation. However, it believed that the text of that paragraph in the revised draft (A/SPC/L.302/Rev.1) could be looked on as an effort to remove any implication that the nuclear-testing issue was a proper subject for consideration in connexion with that General Assembly item. The United States naturally continued to support fully the work of the Scientific Committee.

41. Mr. CHOU Chueh (China) said that the Soviet Union was vying with another super Power for world hegemony, and had therefore unceasingly been manufacturing nuclear weapons since 1963. It had also carried out hundreds of nuclear tests, thus seriously threatening the security of

peoples throughout the world. Its acts belied its words. It was obviously exploiting the good faith of the third world.

42. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that a delegation from a third world country had just proposed that all the nuclear Powers should cease all nuclear weapon tests. His delegation had said that it was prepared to accept that proposal from a third world country. But China had given no answer to that specific question.

43. Mr. WEIDINGER (Austria) said that the representative of Sweden had referred to paragraph 20 of the report of the Scientific Committee, concerning the moving of the offices of that Committee to Vienna. The information in the report should be brought up to date. From January 1975, the secretariat of the Scientific Committee would be housed in the new UNIDO building. In the meantime, it was occupying other offices, also at the UNIDO headquarters. Austria had therefore obviously provided adequate facilities for the secretariat of that Committee. Moreover, from 1978, all the organizations of the system would be housed in the new buildings in the Donaupark.

*The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.*

## 926th meeting

Monday, 4 November 1974, at 11 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.926

### AGENDA ITEM 37

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)\* (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804 and Corr.1, A/9806 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299, A/SPC/L.304):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of members to draft resolution A/SPC/L.304 on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and to the addendum to the report of the Secretary-General on the subject (A/9806/Add.1).

2. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway) announced that Botswana, Guyana, Italy, Malaysia, Somalia and Trinidad and Tobago had joined the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.304. He recalled that the Trust Fund had been established nine years previously to provide humanitarian assistance for the victims of racism in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. While contributions had increased, so had the needs, particularly for legal expenses, so that additional resources were required. The purpose of draft resolution A/SPC/L.304 was to encourage Member States to increase

their contributions, and its sponsors had no doubt that it would receive unanimous support.

3. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at its 921st meeting, the Committee had decided to authorize the representatives of the World Peace Council to address the meeting.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Romesh Chandra, Mr. Filifing Sissoko, Mr. Tibor Pethö and Mr. Farouk Mas-sarani took places at the Committee table.*

4. Mr. CHANDRA (Secretary-General of the World Peace Council) expressed his organization's satisfaction at being able to speak to the Special Political Committee which was chaired by a representative of Sweden, a country which, like the other Scandinavian countries, had distinguished itself in the defence of human rights.

5. The World Peace Council which grouped together national, regional and international non-governmental organizations, such as trade unions and women's organizations, from 120 countries, represented hundreds of millions of people whose commitment the World Peace Council was bringing before the United Nations. The Council was particularly satisfied with its relationship with the Special Committee on *Apartheid* which attached great importance to collaboration with all non-governmental organizations, as shown during the previous summer by its invitation to the latter to participate in the session held in Europe. That was

\* Resumed from the 921st meeting.

also true of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Indeed, without the participation of non-governmental organizations, it was impossible to ensure respect for United Nations resolutions. That was why the United Nations should seek to collaborate with them as far as possible. The International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations against *Apartheid* and Colonialism in Africa, held in Geneva in September 1974, had adopted very important decisions concerning the application of United Nations resolutions.

6. The struggle against *apartheid* had reached a new stage in its evolution. Indeed, the resolution in which the General Assembly had stated in so many words that the South African régime had no place in the United Nations was representative of the will of the peoples of the whole world, including those countries whose Governments supported South Africa. Reference had been made to the need to ensure that South Africa was represented. The World Peace Council felt that the liberation movements of South Africa, and not the current South African Government, which did not respect the will of the people, were the true representatives. Thus it failed to see why the liberation movements had been accorded only observer status which entitled them to participate in the work of those bodies dealing with the question of *apartheid*. The World Peace Council felt that the liberation movements should be allowed to participate in the consideration of all the problems which concerned their people, in other words all the problems of interest to the Governments of all the countries of the world. The recent discussions in the General Assembly had shown that observer status was no longer sufficient. The Council therefore requested the United Nations to consider the question of the status of liberation movements.

7. The representatives of the South African régime had admitted to participating with other countries in military operations under a plan which was a threat to the independence of African States and States in the Indian Ocean and, to that end, had authorized the installation of military bases on its territory. Such a régime did not have the right to speak in the United Nations. It was to guard against that danger that the World Peace Council, with other organizations, was organizing an important international conference against military bases in the Indian Ocean, to be held in New Delhi from 14 to 17 November. Among the items on the agenda for that conference were action against the militarization of South Africa, against the Simonstown Agreement and against all those States which were arming South Africa.

8. Although the opposition of three permanent members of the Security Council had prevented that body from respecting the will of the majority of the States Members of the United Nations, it was none the less true that opposition to the South African régime had never been so strong. It was for that reason that the World Peace Council, with other non-governmental organizations, intended to intensify the struggle against *apartheid*, particularly in the territory of the three permanent members of the Security Council, making every effort to obtain the support of the people of the United States, the United Kingdom and

France through their trade unions and other non-governmental organizations. The people of those countries supported the United Nations resolutions and should be allowed to express their views.

9. Similarly, the World Peace Council was carrying out a campaign in all countries for the implementation of a total embargo on arms, against the activities of transnational corporations and for an end to investment and emigration to South Africa. Finally, the World Peace Council requested that all political prisoners detained in South African prisons should be released and that all countries should forbid the organization of sports competitions with teams from South Africa. In that respect, the World Peace Council welcomed the measures taken by several Governments, particularly those recently adopted by the Indian Government concerning the Davis Cup tennis competition.

10. He asked the Committee to support his organization's request that the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity should co-operate closely with the non-governmental organizations which represented the people in each country. Similarly he asked members to support its proposal for an immediate change in the status of liberation movements and to consider a change in the status of non-governmental organizations vis-à-vis the United Nations, particularly with regard to *apartheid* and decolonization. The World Peace Council suggested that the United Nations should put forward a formula similar to that of consultative status for non-governmental organizations in their relations with the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the United Nations Council for Namibia. That would enable the major mass organizations with a record for work in the field in which those United Nations bodies were working, to exchange information with them and co-ordinate their activities.

11. He said that the activities of the non-governmental organizations were meaningless without the United Nations, while the activities of the United Nations would be far more effective with the advice and support of the non-governmental organizations.

12. Mr. STUBBS (Peru), supported by Mr. LAHIRI (India), requested that the statement by Mr. Chandra should be reproduced *in extenso* and issued as a separate document.

13. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the General Assembly, by the decision taken at its 2236th plenary meeting, had authorized the Special Political Committee to obtain, on specific request, transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings or portions thereof. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed that a transcription should be made of the statement by Mr. Chandra in accordance with the special authorization and the request of the representatives of Peru and India.

*It was so decided.*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The full text of the statement is contained in document A/SPC/PV.926.

14. Mr. SISSOKO (World Peace Council) welcomed the opportunity to be able, like many others, to denounce the policy of *apartheid* from which Africa suffered and which was a threat to peace. Adventurers had occupied the homeland of the peoples of southern Africa and had deprived them of their rights. In order to justify their acts of extermination, those adventurers denied the existence of black peoples in South West Africa, claiming that it had been uninhabited when they had occupied it.

15. The persecutions endured by the authentic peoples of South Africa were well-known. The United Nations, which seemed to have been aware of the dangers of *apartheid* since 1946, had nevertheless given the trusteeship of Namibia to the racist régime, thus tacitly recognizing the right of one people to manage another as an enterprise. However, the membership of the United Nations had increased, its attitudes had changed and, under the pressure of peace-loving peoples, the trusteeship of Namibia had been taken away from South Africa, which, with its usual arrogance, had rejected the decision of the United Nations. Moreover, that act of defiance was understandable, since the sanctions taken against South Africa were being violated by many States Members of the United Nations.

16. It was time to eliminate the régime of *apartheid*, which was becoming more and more expansionist in nature, as shown by the creation of satellite States such as Rhodesia and the Angolan province of Cabinda, where South African mercenaries, Portuguese reactionaries and former policemen from Katanga were preparing to partition Angola.

17. The World Peace Council continued to have confidence in the United Nations, but was disturbed by the unusual turn of recent events and, in particular, by the results of the latest vote taken in the Security Council on 30 October 1974 on the expulsion of South Africa. That vote had dampened the hopes born as a result of the new positions taken against the policies of South Africa.

18. Mr. MASSARANY (World Peace Council) said that, for 25 years, the World Peace Council had been taking all kinds of action in support of the struggle of peoples against colonialism and *apartheid* by mobilizing international public opinion. The United Nations, which was becoming increasingly sensitive to the demands of world public opinion, had adopted resolutions designed to put an end to the practice of racial discrimination and *apartheid*, particularly in southern Africa. The United Nations had also taken measures against crimes which were similar to *apartheid*, for example, by establishing a special committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the civilian population in Palestine and the other occupied Arab territories. The World Peace Council, which knew from experience what a gap there could be between the adoption of a resolution and its implementation, was intensifying its activities in order to hasten the implementation of those resolutions, which were, in its opinion, an invaluable contribution.

19. In particular, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth

session had very broad legal and political scope since it was firmly based on the principles embodied in the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

20. The World Peace Council had therefore endeavoured to derive the greatest possible advantage from the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, both because it was an effective instrument of international law and because it was an effective instrument in the hands of all those who were struggling against racial discrimination. In particular, at the International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations against *Apartheid* and Colonialism in Africa, organized by the Sub-Committee on Decolonization, Racial Discrimination and *Apartheid* of the Special Committee of Non-Governmental Organizations on Human Rights, of which the Secretary-General of the World Peace Council was Chairman, the legal committee of that Conference had made a careful study of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*; it had endeavoured to decide what measures could be taken to denounce the juridical system which legalized racial discrimination and *apartheid* in South Africa and Rhodesia and violations of human rights committed with the protection of that legislation, and also what measures could be taken to strengthen support for the struggle against racial discrimination by making use of the procedures and weaknesses of the legislation in force in South Africa, so that the anti-racist measures adopted by the United Nations might have some effect or, at least, hamper racist legislation.

21. It was obvious that co-operation between the World Peace Council and the United Nations was proving extremely useful. The Council would make increased efforts to strengthen such co-operation and hoped that the United Nations would take into consideration the proposal to that effect just made by the Secretary-General of the World Peace Council.

22. Mr. PETHŐ (World Peace Council) observed that since its foundation more than 25 years earlier, the World Peace Council had firmly stood by the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America and had supported them in their struggle for political and economic independence.

23. Giving examples of the World Peace Council's initiatives in support of United Nations action to eliminate the scourge of *apartheid*, he pointed out that the Council published a monthly news-letter entitled *Spotlight on Africa*, in which the decisions of the United Nations, the statements and resolutions of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and other issues relating to *apartheid* were highlighted. In June 1974, the World Peace Council, under the auspices of UNESCO, had organized a seminar on population and development in Brazzaville. In the discussions on population and *apartheid*, the World Peace Council had sought to bring out the fact that the application of the



*apartheid* laws in South Africa continued to have a decimating effect on the African peoples. The Council had also appealed to all the peace committees represented in it for all-round material assistance to the liberation movements of southern Africa. In 1975, the Council was going to organize an international seminar in Budapest about the problems of development in Africa and Asia.

24. The draft resolutions adopted by the Special Political Committee, the Security Council and the General Assembly reflected the profound indignation which the policy of the racist régime of South Africa and its notorious supporters aroused among the delegations and in their countries, which were concerned about international peace and security and respected human rights. It was necessary to continue to seek ways to bring about radical changes to encourage compliance with and respect for the relevant United Nations resolutions. It should be noted that the vast majority of the representatives who had taken the floor in the general debate of the General Assembly at the current session had demanded more categorically than before the eradication of *apartheid*. Furthermore, the United Nations had declared that the abolition of *apartheid* was of vital interest to the whole Organization. It was satisfying to note that the process of liberation and decolonization was progressing: the people of Guinea-Bissau, after a long period of heroic struggle, together with the peoples of Mozambique and Angola, had achieved a great victory that had even helped to liberate the people of Portugal. The liberation of South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia was near, since the process of liberation was irresistible, whatever difficulties might lie in the way. Only the liberation movements were truly entitled to speak on behalf of their peoples, who had the inalienable right to achieve their self-determination and their independence by all available means.

25. Speaking not only as a member of an international organization, but also as a Hungarian, he observed that a recently published book entitled *The Other Livingstone* dealt with the great Hungarian explorer Laszlo Magyar who, at the time of Livingstone, had travelled extensively in the western part of southern Africa. However, unlike Livingstone, he had not wished to place those territories under colonial rule, and had married the daughter of the King of the western territories and remained there until his death, as an African, a living proof of the brotherhood and equality of Europeans and Africans. That was also the attitude of the whole Hungarian people.

26. The struggle of the oppressed peoples of South Africa and support of their cause were the main guarantees of their freedom and of the implementation of the United Nations resolutions. It was a common struggle against *apartheid*, colonialism and imperialism, for democracy and social progress.

27. Mr. GHELEV (Bulgaria) asked that the statements of all the members of the World Peace Council who had

spoken after the Secretary-General of the Council should be published in full.

28. The CHAIRMAN said that if there was no objection, the Committee would have a transcription made of the statements in conformity with the authorization to that effect given to the Special Political Committee by the General Assembly at its 2236th plenary meeting, which he had previously invoked.

*It was so decided.*<sup>1</sup>

### *Organization of work*

29. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee might be able to take up agenda item 40 on the afternoon of 7 November, in view of the fact that consideration of the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories should be finished by 12 November, since the General Assembly was to take up the question of Palestine on 13 November. The report should be distributed on the morning of 7 November. However, he pointed out that he had not yet ended his informal consultations with the delegations concerned with regard to that idea.

30. Mr. BOURY (Israel) said that he would prefer postponing consideration of agenda item 40 to a later date; he requested that in any event the Committee should not decide immediately to study item 40 on 7 November.

31. Mr. COTTON (New Zealand) wondered whether the Committee might not take up agenda item 39 instead, since the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/9827) had already been distributed.

32. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) pointed out that no objection had been made to the proposal to study agenda item 40 between 7 and 12 November. All that was required was that the Chairman should reach an understanding on the subject with the representative of Israel.

33. Mr. TCHERNOUCHTENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his delegation would probably not be ready to begin studying agenda item 39 on 7 November, since that study had originally been assigned to a much later date.

34. The CHAIRMAN said that he would continue his consultations taking into account the statements which had been made. He would inform the Committee of the agenda items it could begin to consider at its next meeting on the afternoon of 7 November.

*The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.*

## 927th meeting

Wednesday, 6 November 1974, at 3.40 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.927

### *Organization of work*

1. The CHAIRMAN said that since no draft resolutions on the question of *apartheid* would be forthcoming immediately, it was necessary to consider how the period of time between 4 and 13 November 1974, when the General Assembly was scheduled to take up the question of Palestine, should be employed. The Committee could either follow the tentative programme of work decided upon at the 921st meeting, which provided that it could take up either item 39 on 7 November 1974, on the basis of the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/9827), or item 40 on the basis of the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/9817).

2. Since it had not been possible to conclude consultations with all interested delegations in the course of the 926th meeting, he had undertaken, with the consent of the Committee, to try to reach an accommodation agreeable to all concerned. He wished to assure the Committee that he had done all in his power in the course of the consultations held with many of the interested parties to arrive at a solution, but he regretted to have to report that his efforts had not been successful. He had therefore concluded that the Committee itself would have to choose between adhering to the approved programme of work, to the extent possible in view of the lack of draft resolutions on the question of *apartheid*, and changing the work programme by taking up item 40.

3. Mr. HACÈNE (Algeria) thanked the Chairman for his efforts to find a solution. His delegation recalled that, at the previous meeting, when the Chairman had proposed taking up the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, only one delegation had raised an objection to the proposal, and had subsequently withdrawn it. Accordingly, his delegation believed that the Committee could take up item 40 at its next meeting.

4. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) said that his delegation wished to place on record its appreciation of the Chairman's efforts to achieve a compromise. His delegation could support the second course, namely that of taking up item 40, suggested by the Chairman, since the report of the Special Committee (A/9817) had already been circulated in English and would be available in all languages on 7 November 1974. His delegation also understood that the Chairman of the Special Committee was prepared to introduce the report. He also believed that a number of delegations had already inscribed their names to speak on the item.

5. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that he wished to add his voice to that of the members who had already thanked the Chairman for his efforts to achieve an agreement. His delegation wished to recall that at the 907th meeting of the Committee, the representatives of Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates had requested that the consideration of item 38, on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and item 40 should be deferred until after the conclusion of the debate in the General Assembly on item 108, the question of Palestine. The proposal had appeared reasonable on the face of it, and his delegation had not raised any objection. At the 921st meeting, the Committee had approved the programme of work in accordance with which items 38 and 40 would be dealt with after the conclusion of item 39 in order to accommodate the Arab delegations which had requested the postponement.

6. There now appeared to have been a change of mind within those delegations, and at the 926th meeting, the Chairman had informed the Committee of the suggestion to take item 40 before item 39, a suggestion that had been repeated at the current meeting. The report of the Special Committee had appeared only on the morning of 6 November 1974, and only in English. Obviously, there was not sufficient time to refer the report to one's Foreign Ministry and other authorities for any comments that might be necessary, and even if one were to cable or telex the whole report to the Ministry, there would be no time for its consideration and even less for the checking of the numerous allegations made in the report. It had been the practice of the Committee to leave sufficient time between the issuance of the report of the Special Committee and its discussion in the Special Political Committee; for example, the previous report of the Special Committee (A/9418) had been issued on 31 October 1973 and had been discussed in the Special Political Committee on 19 November 1973, leaving 19 days between the issuance and the discussion of the report. At the current session, because of the wish of Arab delegations to derive additional propagandistic advantages from the report and the resolution to be linked with it, the Special Political Committee was being stampeded into discussing the report at extremely short notice. As soon as his delegation had had an inkling of what was afoot, it had objected and continued to object very strongly to the current manoeuvre by the Arab delegations on the grounds already mentioned. What they were asking was most unreasonable; it made a mockery of the work of the Special Political Committee in particular and of the United Nations in general. His delegation therefore trusted that the Committee would not depart from its programme of work; it would not, however, request a vote on the question because there would be no point in doing so in the existing situation.

7. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka), speaking as Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, said that he was ready to introduce the report of the Special Committee (A/9817) at any time agreeable to the Special Political Committee. In his view, the delegation which had requested a postponement of the item should have been the last to do so, in view of its first-hand knowledge of the situation in the areas in question.

8. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) recalled that the Chairman had pointed out that the work programme adopted by the Committee was merely tentative. His delegation had said that item 38 should not be discussed concurrently with the General Assembly's consideration of item 108, the question of Palestine, and the representative of the United Arab Emirates had also indicated that only the item on UNRWA should not be discussed at the same time as the question of Palestine. It came as no surprise to his delegation that the Israeli representative was anxious to defer consideration of item 40 for as long as possible. However, since that item had been allocated to the Committee and since the report of the Special Committee was now available and its Chairman had indicated his readiness to introduce the item, his delegation felt that the Israeli representative should not seek to hold up the work of the Committee.

9. Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt) said that the point at issue was how the Committee could best take up the items allocated to it. His delegation agreed that since the report of the Special Committee was now available and since a number of delegations wished to participate in the debate on item 40, there was no reason why the Committee should not now take up that item. His delegation also considered that the Israeli representative was anxious that the Committee should not discuss an item which dealt with the atrocities committed by Israel in the occupied territories.

10. Mr. VAN DER KLAUW (Netherlands) said that his delegation was prepared to take up either item 39 or 40. It sensed, however, a general wish to go on to item 40. His delegation had also noted that the Israeli representative had indicated that he would not press for a vote to be taken on the question. However, since his delegation had not had an opportunity to study the report of the Special Committee, it hoped that consideration of the item could be deferred until 8 November, so that it would have an additional day in which to do so.

11. Mr. DORON (Israel) said it was on record that the Lebanese representative had suggested at the 907th meeting that the Committee should defer its decision as to the rest of the items until it took up items 38 and 40; it would thus be possible to avoid duplication of work, since the General Assembly had to consider the question of Palestine in plenary meeting and many members of the Committee would have to take part in that debate. In other words, the Lebanese representative had been requesting a postponement. Later in the same meeting, the representative of the United Arab Emirates had said that he wished to stress the importance of the comments of the representative of Lebanon on items 38 and 40, and that neither of those items, and in particular item 38, should be taken up by the Committee until the General Assembly had completed its consideration of them in plenary meeting. The representative of the United Arab Emirates had obviously meant that those items should not be taken up until the General Assembly had concluded its consideration of the question of Palestine, and his statement linked up with the request made by the Lebanese representative.

12. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) pointed out that the summary record of the 907th meeting, which had been referred to by the Israeli representative, did not, in fact, state that he had requested that consideration of the items should be deferred, but merely that he had suggested that the Committee should defer its decision on the items.

13. Mr. DABLAN (Jordan) agreed with the Netherlands representative that the Committee should take up item 40 on 8 November. Since there appeared to be no objection to that course, his delegation felt that the Chairman could give a ruling on the question forthwith.

14. The CHAIRMAN said that there appeared to be a general feeling that it would be desirable to avoid taking a vote on a procedural question.

15. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to begin its consideration of item 40 at its next meeting and to devote four, possibly five, meetings to the item before taking up item 39; it also agreed to consider draft resolutions on the question of *apartheid* during the period when the General Assembly was debating the question of Palestine, after which it would take up item 38.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.*

## 928th meeting

Friday, 8 November 1974, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.928

### AGENDA ITEM 40

#### Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/9799-S/11535, A/9817, A/9843)

1. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka), Chairman of the Special Committee, introducing that Committee's sixth report (A/9817), said that in the course of the year, one of its three members, Mr. Nur Elmi of Somalia had relinquished his membership and had been replaced by Mr. M'baye, the Chief Justice of Senegal, whose wide experience as a jurist had enabled him to make a valuable contribution to the Special Committee's deliberations.

2. In preparing the report, the Special Committee had, as in the past, relied on the continuing daily scrutiny of reports emanating from Israel regarding conditions in the occupied territories. It had met four times during the year to examine the information available to it.

3. There was a marked tendency in certain circles to belittle the work of the Special Committee and treat its visits to the Middle East as mere tourism. Such an attitude was only to be expected from those who wished to render the investigation futile, namely the Israeli authorities and those who supported them; they had little respect for such types of violations of human rights and had no interest in ensuring the application and enforcement of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,<sup>1</sup> and especially the fourth, the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

4. It was not from an exaggerated sense of duty that the Special Committee continued to discharge a most difficult task which exposed them to calculated calumny. The Special Political Committee and the General Assembly must consider whether they wished to know the true facts. If they wanted the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to remain an active element in the protection of persons under occupation as a result of hostilities, the choice should be clear. There appeared to be a determined effort to obstruct the due process of international law. It was all the more deplorable that that obstruction should come from Israel, because it had been the inhuman treatment of the Jewish people under Nazi occupation that had jolted the conscience of humanity into forging instruments that would ensure protection for persons under military occupation. He wished, however, to make it clear that he was not comparing the Nazi occupation with the Israeli occupation.

5. Another important aspect of the role of the Special Committee had evoked adverse comment. The General

Assembly had requested the Special Committee to investigate a situation existing under military occupation. The contention that such an investigation should not be conducted unless the treatment of certain minorities in other countries parties to the Middle East dispute was also investigated was therefore totally untenable. It was not for the Special Committee to suggest any initiative in regard to the investigation of the treatment of the minorities living under civilian rule under the jurisdiction of nation States.

6. The Special Committee's mandate was limited to the investigation of practices and policies that were in violation of human rights and not those which might improve the condition of the population. If it had been able to visit the occupied territories, it might have seen the benefits which the Israeli authorities claimed to have conferred on their inhabitants. The Israeli authorities gave no reason for their refusal to allow the Special Committee to investigate conditions on the spot, apart from their contention that the question of the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 must be left open, which was tantamount to stating that that Convention was not applicable to the territories occupied by them. A possible reason might be that their objection was founded on the premise that the territories were owned by historic right and therefore did not fall within the ambit of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. That was a challenge to the very Organization that had brought the State of Israel into existence and defined its boundaries, and a contemptuous dismissal of the content of all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

7. The Special Committee regretted to inform the General Assembly once again that the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907<sup>2</sup> and the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict,<sup>3</sup> of 1954, continued to be disregarded. Whenever any provisions of those instruments were observed in the territories occupied by Israel, it was because the occupying Power did not find it necessary to disregard them. Articles 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention concerning unwarranted destruction, article 49 concerning the establishment of settlements and the transfer of population and article 47 concerning measures of annexation continued to be ignored and violated by the occupying Power. The different forms of violation of human rights in those territories were listed in paragraph 36 of the report. However, not all those forms of violation were still being practised with the same intensity, the reason clearly being that after seven years of occupation the

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973.

<sup>2</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915).

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 249, No. 3511.



occupying authorities had all but exhausted the scope available to them for the disregard of such human rights.

8. The report was intended to document only those areas of civilian life where major changes had occurred as a result of measures taken by the occupying Israeli authorities. The basic policy of the Government of Israel continued unchanged and the scale and pattern of the violation of human rights of the civilians of the territories were such that they could not be justified on the grounds of overwhelming military necessity which could be invoked under the fourth Geneva Convention. The evidence came directly from the mouths of Israeli leaders and from reports in Israeli newspapers which, in the absence of denials and corrections, must be considered correct.

9. In May 1974, the Special Committee had heard the testimony of a number of persons, prominent in Palestinian life, who had been expelled from the occupied territories on 10 December 1973. It had also seen two films entitled "Jerusalem never" and "They did not exist", prepared in the occupied territories between 1969 and 1973, which the Special Committee had considered of such importance to its investigations as to justify the purchase of copies to form part of its permanent records. It hoped that the Special Political Committee would take the opportunity of viewing them.

10. A new factor in the Special Committee's investigation had been the destruction of the town of Quneitra, to which it had devoted a separate chapter, chapter V, in its report. In view of the implications of the fate of that town, the Special Committee felt it its duty to indicate that there were grounds for the appointment of a commission to study the legal consequences of its devastation, particularly within the context of articles 53 and 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and bearing in mind the provisions of Principle VI(b) of the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal as formulated by the International Law Commission.<sup>4</sup> Principle VI stated that the crimes set out under that Principle were punishable as crimes under international law and paragraph (b) stated that war crimes included "plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity". It was an unfortunate coincidence that the Special Committee had to cite the Nuremberg Tribunal and no insinuation should be read into that reference.

11. Although the Secretary-General had been unable to secure the services of the experts requested by the Special Committee, it had not considered such expert evidence indispensable to a finding. The nature of destruction had been such that for the most part it could not have been caused by aerial bombardment or ground shelling.

12. The conclusions of the Special Committee were largely confirmed by the observations in the reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), referred to in paragraphs 164 and 165 of the report of the Special Committee. The statements in the ICRC report quoted in

those paragraphs were a condemnation of the practices and policies adopted by the Israeli occupation authorities in violation of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. Any member who failed to condemn that type of violation would be guilty of a lack of conscience and an indifference to facts which could be explained, but not excused, only by flagrant partisanship.

13. He hoped that the Special Committee would be able to secure evidence from other reliable sources which it had not yet been able to examine. The search for truth was of transcendental importance and must override all other considerations except those which would cause intolerable embarrassment to individuals or institutions.

14. As he had done at the twenty-eighth session (890th meeting), he stated his great sense of mortification and regret that the General Assembly had still failed to take appropriate action on the Special Committee's recommendations regarding machinery for the supervision of the implementation of international laws protecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee was encouraged, however, by the support that certain delegations had given to its proposal to establish special machinery as an alternative to the Protecting Power formula. The Special Committee could not be expected to continue to fulfil its mandate until the General Assembly had given a practical demonstration of its faith in the provisions of the Charter.

15. Mr. MAHMUD (Pakistan) requested that the statement by the Chairman of the Special Committee should be reproduced *in extenso* as a Committee document. He also proposed that the two films mentioned should be shown to the Committee.

16. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the General Assembly, by a decision taken at its 2236th plenary meeting, had again authorized the Special Political Committee to obtain, on specific request, transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings or portions thereof. He therefore took it that the Committee agreed that the transcription of the statement by the Chairman of the Special Committee should be made in accordance with that authorization.

*It was so decided.*<sup>5</sup>

17. The CHAIRMAN undertook to ask the Secretariat whether a showing of the two films mentioned in that statement could be arranged.

18. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that the time available between the publication of the report of the Special Political Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/9817) and its discussion in the Committee had been much too short to enable his delegation to deal in minute detail with the many allegations against Israel in the report. As in previous years, the Special Committee had travelled a good deal and had visited Geneva, Beirut, Damascus and Quneitra. The annual budget

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 12*, part III.

<sup>5</sup> The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/PV.928.

of the Special Committee amounted to nearly \$100,000, which meant that every page of its 35-page report had cost the United Nations something like \$3,000. As was its wont, the Committee complained again that its work had been seriously hampered by the Government of Israel's persistent denial of access to the occupied territories. Those members of the Special Political Committee who had followed the debates in the preceding few years were aware that there had been and was no capricious refusal by Israel to admit the Special Committee. From the very beginning, when the question of setting up the Special Committee was being discussed, his delegation had opposed General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), which had prejudged the very issue the Special Committee was supposed to investigate, and the one-sided mandate which ignored the situation and human rights of the oppressed Jewish minorities in the Arab countries in disregard of Security Council resolution 237 (1967). His delegation had also objected to the highly irregular procedure of the most dubious legality adopted in the setting up of the Special Committee as well as its completely unacceptable and unbalanced composition. Originally the Special Committee had been composed of representatives of Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, none of which maintained diplomatic relations with Israel, and one of which, Somalia, was a member of the Arab League and even considered itself in a state of war with Israel. The political stand of the Governments concerned was sharply anti-Israel. When Somalia had decided to withdraw from the Special Committee, Senegal, again a country with no diplomatic relations with Israel, had been appointed in its place.

19. It would seem that much, if not all, of the evidence which the Special Committee had relied on in the report, had been heard by only two of its members, namely the Chairman and the member from Yugoslavia. Perhaps if the member from Senegal, an experienced judge, had been present, the Special Committee would not have accepted that evidence as readily and as gullibly as it appeared to have done.

20. Although the Special Committee asserted that its procedure had been and remained to determine whether the evidence before it proved beyond reasonable doubt the allegations of infringements of the rights of the population in the occupied territories, in actual fact its findings went far beyond, and there was hardly any allegation, however improbable and far-fetched, that was not accepted and interpreted against Israel. In paragraph 34, the Special Committee recalled that its Chairman had expressed the Committee's view at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly that it saw no further purpose in furnishing the Assembly with more evidence until and unless major changes in the situation took place. The report went on to say in the same paragraph that no change had occurred in the situation which formed the subject of its investigation. Yet the Special Committee had gone to Beirut to take evidence from seven persons from the West Bank who had been expelled from Israel shortly before giving that evidence.

21. On reading the transcript of the evidence of those witnesses, one was immediately struck by the fact that all denied having taken part in any subversive activities and pretended not to know the reasons for their expulsion. The

Special Committee would be interested to know that one of them, the former mayor of El-Bireh, had been included in the delegation of the so-called Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an organization devoted to the destruction of Israel. Was it reasonable to assume that PLO would have included him in its delegation had he not been intimately connected with it previously? As to his credibility, it seemed that it had aroused the suspicion of the two members of the Special Committee who were taking his evidence. The transcript clearly showed that the witness had clearly and obviously perjured himself and had even been disavowed by a fellow witness, and yet his evidence had been fully accepted, without any qualifications, together with that of the other witnesses from the same group who had likewise been allowed to make, under oath, the same kind of completely incredible and unsubstantiated allegations.

22. Although the Special Committee had, on a number of occasions, invoked the rule against hearsay evidence, and told witnesses to speak only from their own knowledge, it had seemed to be completely unaware of the existence of another, no less important rule, namely that the witness, especially in direct examination, must not be led or prompted. Such prompting had been going on throughout the taking of the evidence by witnesses before the Special Committee, as an examination of the transcripts of the testimony of witnesses showed.

23. The evidence on which the Special Committee had relied in its conclusions against Israel was completely worthless. Furthermore the approach of the Special Committee to that evidence and the conduct of its proceedings must invalidate any findings or conclusions drawn by it.

24. Once more, the Special Committee had been importuning ICRC in Geneva for information and once more it had received a well-deserved rebuff.

25. With regard to the reference made a number of times in the report to the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Chairman of the Special Committee had written an article published by the United Nations Office of Public Information in which he stated that the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 was being put to the test for the first time since it had come into existence. His delegation had asked last year and now asked again whether it had ever occurred to the Chairman and members of the Special Committee why that Convention had never been applied in any of the many wars involving the occupation of territories during the preceding 25 years? Furthermore, the United Nations had never intervened in any of those cases and had never decided on the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention. Those facts clearly demonstrated that the current instance had been singled out for United Nations attention only because it gave an opportunity for Arab countries to abuse the United Nations, its machinery and facilities for their propaganda campaign against Israel, although the true situation was well known and all the accusations and allegations raised in the course of the so-called investigation had no foundation whatever, but were utterly and completely untrue.

26. His Government considered that the fourth Geneva Convention did not apply in the current case for a number

of legal reasons and reserved its position on the applicability of the Convention in the administered areas. Notwithstanding that reservation, which had been consistently made since 1967 and officially explained to those competent on the matter, Israel continued to take the provisions of the Convention as standard. Israel's practical co-operation with the representatives of the Red Cross had been acknowledged time and again by that body. In his statement to the Special Political Committee at the preceding session (890th meeting), he had pointed out, as his delegation had done on previous occasions, that everything contained in the report in the context of the "allegations of a policy of annexation and settlement" was *ultra vires* the mandate of the Special Committee, and he had gone on to refute the allegations, insinuations, findings and conclusions of that Committee as baseless, wrong and misleading. As the same allegations were being repeated once again by the Committee and the same baseless conclusions drawn from them, he would repeat his reservation and refer the Special Political Committee to the record of his statement at the 890th meeting. In addition, he wished to point out that there was no evidence whatsoever of a policy of annexation, and as far as the few settlements which had been established were concerned, the vital need for them in the existing circumstances for the defence of Israel had been confirmed in the war sprung on it by Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic in 1973.

27. As to the allegations in respect to the demolition of houses, so-called mass arrests, prison conditions, curfews, administrative detention, expulsion and denial of the right to return, modes of economic exploitation, and the like, he had no intention of dealing with each and every one of those allegations, findings, conclusions or expressions of opinion contained in the report. That must not be taken as an indication of any kind of admission of a particular matter as being within the mandate of the Special Committee or of agreement with or admission of the correctness of any such allegations, findings, conclusions or expressions of opinion. It would just take much too long to go into each and every one of the absurdities one came across in reading the report.

28. Having made that reservation, he wished to comment that in respect of the question of demolition of houses, dealt with in paragraphs 65 to 80 of the report of the Special Committee, it was clear from the newspaper reports quoted in those paragraphs that all those demolitions had been carried out as individual punishment for terrorist acts. The number of houses involved was very small, about 25 or so for the whole of the period. It was well known that in all of the countries neighbouring on Israel, and in many others, whose representatives waxed so eloquent whenever such demolitions were mentioned, persons involved in activities such as those which brought about demolitions would have been shot or hanged without much ado.

29. He believed that the Special Political Committee would be interested to know the activities in which the persons whose houses were demolished had been engaged. Although the report referred to newspaper articles listed in the chapter on the demolition of houses, it was most reticent in disclosing the reasons for those demolitions, thus creating a false and misleading picture instead of disclosing

the information available to it, even in the newspaper reports. The report failed to mention that the punitive measure of demolition had been taken in respect of persons involved in acts of terrorism and sabotage and the possession of arms and explosives. That systematic concealment of the relevant facts should be a real eye-opener for anyone who had to form an opinion concerning the report.

30. The Special Committee devoted a chapter to what it called "mass arrests" and immediately drew the conclusion that all such arrests were carried out with the intention of intimidating the civilian population. Again, numerous quotations from newspaper reports were listed in paragraphs 82 to 107, but in most cases, the duration of the detention was not mentioned in the report and in the few cases where it was mentioned, it became obvious that the people concerned were detained for an extremely short period, in most cases a few days or even a few hours.

31. Again, the Special Committee's report followed the same misleading procedure of merely mentioning the fact of the arrest of a certain number of people on certain dates as reported in the press and on the radio, and except for three instances, it said nothing about the release of those people, nor did it give any reason for their arrest in the first place, although the reasons such as membership of terrorist gangs, conspiracy against Israel, acts of sabotage, possession of arms caches and contacts with foreign agents, had been stated in each instance in the newspapers on which the chapter of the report relied. Those revealing details were omitted from the report by the Special Committee, which was obviously not interested in disclosing those facts.

32. When a bomb went off or was discovered in time, it was only natural for the Security Forces to arrive as soon as possible at the scene of the crime, to surround it, to detain for questioning anyone who might appear suspicious and to release innocent bystanders after a brief investigation and within a very short period. That was an effective method of dealing with crime and certainly did not constitute harassment or intimidation. In fact, it served to save the lives of innocent people, including Arabs, and although it should be well known by now, Arab terrorism, more often than not, had been directed against fellow Arabs and had caused more deaths among them than among Jews.

33. The report also mentioned the preventive detention on 24 April 1974 of a number of people from the West Bank and East Jerusalem to forestall disturbances on Israel's Independence Day, and that on 28 April 1974 all those people, known to belong to extremist groups, had been released. Any security force in the world which received reliable information that a criminal offence was being planned, was fully justified in detaining the people concerned and did not have to wait until after the commission of the offence. The taking of people into preventive custody for short periods was something practised in similar circumstances, and even with far less justification, in many countries.

34. If a number of people, as stated in paragraphs 106 and 107 of the report, in fact around 800 persons in all, had been arrested since January, that only showed the vigilance of the security forces in circumstances of constant incitement and subversive activities directed from across the

borders. In that connexion, the report failed to mention that the vast majority of those suspects had been released after investigation, while the remainder, against whom sufficient evidence had been discovered, had stood or would stand trial in due course.

35. In respect of prison conditions, the fact that there had been newspaper reports concerning strikes or even minor riots by a number of inmates in the Nablus prison did not prove any misdeeds by the Israeli authorities. Strikes and disturbances of that kind occurred in prison in many democratic countries. It was only in countries with a different kind of régime that little was heard about such occurrences, because the press there was not allowed to publish anything about events of that kind and also because protests by prisoners were immediately put down with extreme severity.

36. In the chapter on curfews, administrative detention and other measures, the Special Committee had immediately concluded that any action by Israeli authorities was intended to harass the local civilian population. The examples given in the report under that heading did not justify any such conclusion. Curfews were a measure imposed by the Israeli authorities only very sparingly and only in order to facilitate the investigation of serious criminal offences, and they were lifted within a few days, or even after a shorter period. Generally, there was no curfew whatsoever in the areas administered by Israel, whereas there had been a permanent dusk-to-dawn curfew during the 19 years of the Egyptian Military Régime in the Gaza Strip and long curfews had been imposed from time to time in the West Bank by the Government of Jordan.

37. As for the detention of a number of persons in the West Bank "described as 'communists' on 23 July 1974", mentioned in paragraph 123, the Secretary-General of the group concerned, which called itself the Palestine National Front, had stated that their objective was the execution of sabotage activities in Israel and that they had been active since the preceding year. Many of the persons whose detention was mentioned in other paragraphs of the report were also members of that organization, and that fact was also mentioned in the newspapers referred to by the Special Committee, again without finding its way into the Special Committee's report.

38. During the heading of "Expulsion and denial of the right to return" the Special Committee reported that Israeli authorities were preparing to take measures to expel those who had not left after the expiry of their three-month permit to stay under the summer visitors programme and that 300 such persons were reported to be affected. Was there anything wrong in the authorities wishing to preserve law and order in the territories administered by them? Over 150,000 persons from Arab countries had availed themselves, in one year, of the facilities granted by the Israeli authorities to visit the territories and, indeed, Israel in general. If the authorities did not insist on compliance with the time-limit provided in the permit, there would be complete chaos.

39. Another example of the Special Committee's tendentious approach was the mention of the resettlement of refugees left homeless when security roads had been built in

refugee camps in the Gaza Strip; the truth was that the building of the security roads had literally saved hundreds of lives. It would be recalled that under the Egyptian Military Régime, the inhabitants of the Strip had not been allowed to participate in Egyptian life and economy and had been discouraged from going elsewhere. They had no political rights and few prospects of being absorbed locally. Conditions had been dismal and employment scarce. The policy of Israel had been to promote well-being and development, and the local population, as well as the refugees, had been eager to revert to gainful employment and normal life. When the Egyptian Government had realized that the situation in the Strip was changing and that people were not willing to co-operate with the terrorist organizations, a campaign of violence and murder had been unleashed, with the purpose of cowing the people, and particularly the refugees, into submission.

40. Between June 1967 and August 1971, 239 innocent local Arab residents and refugees had been killed and over 1,300 Arab inhabitants had been wounded in the terror campaign at the hands of Arab terrorists. Israel, as was its duty, had taken action to ensure safety of the inhabitants of the areas, under international law and Security Council resolution 237 (1967). However, as could be expected, the only result of Israel's humanitarian approach in the United Nations had been abuse and resolutions completely devoid of reality for saving the lives of local residents and refugees and enabling them to become once more useful members of the society.

41. Under the heading of "Economic measures" the Special Committee spoke of receiving evidence in support of exploitation of the resources of the occupied territory. That question had absolutely nothing to do with human rights and was just another example of how the Special Committee went far beyond its mandate. The Special Committee had referred to the fact that tens of thousands of workers from the occupied territories had found useful and remunerative employment in Israel. To call that "exploitation of the existing resources" was really incredible; those same people had, until 1967, been leading a life of hardship and in some cases utter misery. They were now enabled to earn the same wages as Israeli workers and could provide for their children and live a productive, decent life.

42. The theory propounded by the Special Committee in paragraph 170 that the occupation itself was a violation of the basic rights of civilian population showed that it had made up its mind to find fault with Israel from the beginning.

43. Chapter V of the report followed a pattern that was already familiar. It first set out the problem in a seemingly impartial manner, then mustered available evidence or whatever passed in its eyes for evidence, and finally drew its conclusions—always in a way inimical to Israel—in complete disregard of the fact that the evidence provided the most flimsy support or no support at all for the conclusions. If there was a conflict of evidence, it was invariably decided against Israel. The Special Committee had paid a five-hour visit to Quneitra at the request of the Syrian Government, obviously an interested party. Having been unable to obtain the services of an impartial expert, it had acted as witness, judge and jury. Undaunted by the lack of expertise in civil



engineering, ballistics and explosives, the members of the Special Committee had proceeded to pontificate and pass judgements on matters about which they knew nothing. They had done so after a visit of only five hours, which had included taking the testimony of two witnesses, meals and so forth. There was a clear contradiction between the statements made in paragraphs 140 and 141 of the report: if the whole of the town of Quneitra was a complete wasteland, how could one speak of "selective" destruction? Paragraph 141 of the report stated that the buildings there "were nearly all of solid concrete structure", whereas many of the houses were built of local basalt stone, and others of hollow concrete blocks held in place by mortar, both of which were far from solid; in the event of an explosion inside or outside the building the roof would fall down retaining its pattern and shape, and there would be no holes for the Special Committee to see. There was nothing in the report to show that the omniscient members of the Special Committee had considered those other possibilities. The Special Committee had concluded from the condition of the streets of Quneitra that the town had never been under fire. It would seem elementary that the occupying forces would immediately repair any damage to the streets so as to enable their vehicles to move about. The truth about the destruction of Quneitra had been pointed out in a letter dated 2 August 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.<sup>6</sup> The damage and destruction in Quneitra were the direct result of acts of aggression carried out by the Syrian Arab Republic in various periods since 1967. The claim that Quneitra was destroyed in one deliberate Israeli action was nothing but a crude propaganda fabrication. The Special Committee had chosen to disregard the implications of the article in the *Jerusalem Post* of 26 June 1974, referred to in paragraph 151 of the report. The evidence given by Mrs. Nassif was contradictory; he asked whether any reliance could be placed on the evidence of such a witness.

44. He wondered whether the members of the Special Committee were capable of distinguishing between the traces of tracks left by heavy equipment in general and those left by tanks. If Israeli tanks had taken up positions near a building and those buildings had been hit by Syrian artillery and tanks, the result would have been the same as that described in paragraph 155 (e) of the report. It was obvious that the assumptions, findings and conclusions of the Special Committee were hasty and unwarranted, and unsupported by any substantive evidence. Reports in the world press had shown that Quneitra had been substantially damaged long before 1974. In the light of the contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence, the Special Committee's opinions, references and conclusions were utterly wrong and worthless.

45. His delegation flatly rejected the baseless and unsubstantiated assertion made in paragraph 169 of the report. It likewise rejected all the sanctimonious proposals, suggestions and recommendations made by the Special Committee, particularly the proposal made in paragraph 171. It was well known that his country's administration of the

territories was probably the most enlightened of all such administrations in similar circumstances. In spite of all the attempts at incitement, provocation and trouble-making by parties not in the least interested in the well-being of the civilian population, that population, with few exceptions, did not want anything to do with activities of that kind. The human rights of the population were fully respected and protected by the Israeli administration. The population of the administered areas would no doubt wish to remember that when peace eventually came to the region, as come it must.

46. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt) said that the statement by the representative of Israel refuted that delegation's claim that it had not had time to consider the Special Committee's report (A/9817). He hoped that 1974 would be the last occasion on which the Committee would have to consider Israel's crimes. Israel stood accused of acts against the conscience of mankind, acts like those committed in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s and like those still being committed in southern Africa. The experiences of the Second World War had made civilized society realize the price that must be paid for atrocities. The report of the Special Committee drew a sombre picture of the situation in the occupied territories. The acts of Zionist barbarism and aggression committed there were contrary to international law and the Charter of the United Nations. A quick decision was needed to put an end to them. The Committee was discussing the occupation of the territory by a United Nations Member State which had expansionist designs that violated the population's right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination. The provisions of the Charter did not allow such a country to remain in the Organization.

47. Israel had demolished towns and villages in the occupied territories and had forcibly resettled large numbers of people in violation of numerous international instruments and principles of law and justice. Property had been seized, monuments and treasures had been pillaged, and there had been interference in the free life and culture of the population. His delegation could never accept the annexation of Jerusalem or the colonization by means of kibbutzim by settlers whose ancestors had never lived in the region but who replaced inhabitants with an inalienable right to the land. It was clear that Israel intended to keep the land in violation of the principle of non-annexation of territory by force. The international community must remain vigilant and take effective steps to prevent such action, in accordance with the principles of the Charter. There had been no Charter when the world had opposed nazism: the world now had a Charter that invited it to oppose aggression. It must make joint efforts to counter the crimes being committed against humanity and progress.

48. When preparing its report, the Special Committee had drawn on information from two sources: reports in the Israeli and international press, and information provided directly by witnesses who had been tortured by Israel. There were also the two films that had been made. It was clear that Israel feared not the international community but world Jewry which could not accept that Israel was acting in its interest. The report of the Special Committee contained a great deal of reliable information and an analysis of the situation. He pointed out that ICRC was

<sup>6</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974, document S/11408.

co-operating with the Special Committee and had approved and supported its conclusions.

49. It was pointless for the Prime Minister of Israel to say that he was opposed to the policy of making the territories freely available to Israelis when gradual annexation was government policy. It was the Government of Israel alone that could decide when and where it was setting up its colonies. Israel intended to continue its policy of annexation and had already announced plans to establish five settlements on Egyptian territory. His country could not accept Israel's rejection of the principle of territorial sovereignty. In the light of the statement by Israel's Foreign Minister that the settlements must become security posts within the next 10 years, Israel's peace initiatives were quite valueless. Egypt considered it to be her historic task to recover her lost lands. He asked what was to become of peace negotiations in the face of Israel's refusal to abandon its settlements on the Golan Heights and its arrogant intention to keep the Jordan valley under its control. Israel's plan for Jerusalem would displace the Arab population and replace their dwellings with large numbers of new flats. Like the Nazis in the past and the current Pretoria régime, Israel was living outside the world.

50. Despite Israel's denial of the existence of the Palestinians, and despite the many years of despotism they had endured, the Palestinian people would obtain their freedom. The representative of PLO would be speaking in the General Assembly in the name of the Palestinian people within the next few days. The Palestinian people had a right to their land. No matter how many Israeli settlements and buildings there were, they would all disappear. As could be seen from the 1973 ICRC report, Israel had demolished villages and towns in the occupied territories, and had expelled thousands of Palestinians who were forced to live without shelter.

51. The Special Committee's report on its visit to Quneitra showed how Israel had destroyed the town completely before withdrawing. No experts were needed to see what had happened. There was an odious parallel with nazism in the way Israel ill-treated the population; it had arrested an intolerable number of people. With the information provided by witnesses and in the United States press, no further details were necessary. Israel had violated decisions of the United Nations and had pillaged property. Workers in the occupied territories received minimum salaries and worked for Israel's economy. The evidence provided by ICRC, the Special Committee and witnesses belied Israel's claim that the occupation was a happy one. It could not be happy when it was based on the theory that some people were superior and some were to be exploited. General Assembly resolution 3092 (XXVIII), which Israel rejected, was an assessment of the situation. The only possible course of action was to terminate Israel's occupation. The Special Committee must make that its responsibility and would be supported by the Arab countries. The Arab world was convinced that the situation could not remain as it was. Israel could not deceive the Special Political Committee; the international community understood that the Israeli occupiers were trying to make the world accept a fait accompli. The report of the Special Committee was clear proof that Israel could not defend itself and that its

arguments were based on the logic of an aggressor and an occupying Power in violation of fundamental principles.

52. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) pointed out that, although at the preceding meeting the representative of Israel had said that he would have no time to prepare a statement, he had managed to make one lasting one and a half hours.

53. The report of the Special Committee (A/9817) clearly showed the treatment of the inhabitants of the Arab territory annexed and occupied since the Israeli aggression in 1967. Israel had refused to co-operate with the Special Committee lest its guilt be known to the world.

54. The Israeli representative appeared concerned about the cost of the preparation of the report, but even if each page did cost \$3,000, it would be well worth it if it could bring an end to Israel's occupation and violation of the Geneva Conventions.

55. He noted that perhaps for the first time the Israeli representative did not seem to contest the fact that populations of the occupied territories were living in miserable conditions. He had not brought out his slogans about their prosperity and happiness. Perhaps he had learned from the debate on *apartheid* that such arguments had been dismissed once and for all.

56. Israel continued to commit grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, while Israeli authorities even denied any knowledge of them. In violation of the fourth Geneva Convention, international law and the Charter, Israel continued to annex and settle the occupied territories. All the statements quoted in paragraphs 38 to 64 of the report had been made by Israeli leaders, including their Prime Minister. Did the representative of Israel wish to deny them?

57. Again in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention, articles 33 and 53, Israel continued to destroy and demolish Arab houses and property, as indicated in the report (*ibid.*, paras. 65-80). The representative of Israel said that those were punitive measures, but under what law had Israel the right to punish people in the occupied territories? Surely the Geneva Conventions did not authorize the demolition of a house because one person in it had allegedly committed what the Israeli representative called crimes. The Israeli representative had also stated that only scores of houses had been demolished, whereas Israeli sources had stated that the number was 18,000. In violation of the fourth Geneva Convention, article 33, Israel continued to intimidate the civil population by indiscriminate mass arrests (*ibid.*, paras. 81-107). Thousands of Arabs were currently rotting in Israeli prisons.

58. It was also continuing the ill-treatment of detainees in violation of article 17 of the third Geneva Convention (*ibid.*, paras. 108-117). The beatings and torture to which suspects were subjected during interrogation by the Israeli security service had been mentioned by an Israeli lawyer on 17 June 1974. Israel also continued to enforce curfews and other measures to harass the civilian population, in violation of article 33 of the fourth Geneva Convention (*ibid.*, paras. 118-124) and to expel inhabitants of the occupied territories and deny them the right to return in violation of

article 49 of that Convention (*ibid.*, paras. 125-129). *The New York Times* had reported on 5 November 1974 that Israeli authorities had banished four Palestinians to Lebanon because they were said to have solicited support for PLO and thus had incited the populace against the Israeli authorities and tried to disrupt public order, law and security. Did Israel really expect to be welcomed by the inhabitants of the territories it was occupying? The heroic Palestinians were resisting Israeli occupation just as the French and Norwegians had resisted that of the Nazis. The representative of Israel had said that only terrorists were expelled from the occupied territories. Yet in a recent interview with a reporter from the Columbia Broadcasting System, members of the Arab population had said that Israel was deporting people merely for signing petitions supporting PLO.

59. The destruction of the town of Quneitra, mentioned in chapter V of the report, clearly manifested Israel's vengeance and bigotry. The Special Committee had visited the ruins of that town and had described what it had seen (*ibid.*, paras. 136-147). That description also showed that Israel had no respect even for the dead. Yet the Special Representative appointed by the Secretary-General in implementation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) had stated in his report dated 2 October 1967 that, according to Israeli sources, Quneitra had been taken without fighting.<sup>7</sup> Israel was carrying out a scorched earth policy and had left the town of Quneitra as Hitler had left a large sector of Warsaw.

60. The continued Israeli occupation and annexation of the Holy City of Jerusalem had desecrated its holy shrines. On 7 November 1974, UNESCO's Commission for Social Sciences, Humanities and Culture had condemned Israel's action aimed at altering the features of the Old City. Israel's objective was to remove all traces of Christianity and Islam from Jerusalem and if the international community did not act swiftly to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions, those aims would be accomplished.

61. The Jews who had suffered at the hand of the Nazis were now applying the same tactics against the Arabs. *The New York Times* of 5 April 1974, reporting on the testimony heard by the House Sub-Committee of the Committee of Foreign Affairs in Washington, had mentioned that a survivor of the Belsen concentration camp had declared that no experience in his life had shocked him so much as witnessing the blowing up of Arab houses by Israeli demolition squads in the occupied territories.

62. Israel encouraged Jews from all over the world to come to Israel yet denied the Arabs the right to return to their homes across the border. He challenged the representative of Israel to contest the reason given by Menahem Begin, the terrorist who led the largest party outside the Cabinet in the Knesset—that Israel should solve the demographic problem in the West Bank in anticipation of more Jewish immigrants. Israel, although claiming to be a democratic country, was a racist society which denied an Arab the right to return home only because he was not a

Jew. The underlying motives of the Israeli call for Jewish emigrants were quite clear. They were needed to consolidate its occupation of Arab territory and further its expansionist designs.

63. Israel, which had uprooted and evicted the Palestinian people and occupied their entire homeland and the territories of Arab States, was now pursuing a policy aimed at dispersing and exterminating them and punishing the civilian population in the countries in which they had taken refuge. Since its creation through intimidation and violence, Israel had pursued a policy of lawlessness, demonstrating its intent to live only by the sword. Israel was the only State Member of the United Nations not living within international borders in accordance with the Charter and international law. It was the only case since the fall of the Third Reich of a State based on conquest and occupation, whose frontiers were determined by its military power and its aggression against its neighbours. Its ex-Prime Minister, Mrs. Meir, had said that its borders were fixed by the people living along them and that if they retreated, somebody else might fix the borders for them. That policy was utter negation of the newly recognized international order established after the defeat of nazism. Unless Israel was made to withdraw completely from all the occupied territories, its continued aggression against the Arabs would lead to further sufferings and turmoil in the area and might bring untold hardships to the world community.

64. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, most emphatically rejected once again the malicious parallel drawn between nazism and zionism by the representative of Lebanon, who claimed that the Palestinians were fighting Israel as the French and Norwegians had fought nazism. Neither the French nor the Norwegian resistance fighters had attacked and killed women and children as the Arab terrorists specialized in doing. The resistance fighters themselves had repeatedly and categorically rejected any attempt by the Arab terrorists to compare themselves with members of the French or Norwegian resistance. In view of the late hour, he reserved the right to reply to the rest of the statement by the representative of Lebanon at a subsequent meeting.

65. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, pointed out that the representative of Israel had not submitted any evidence for his rejection of his statement, which had been based on quotations from Israeli sources. If the Israeli representative wished to reject the parallel between nazism and Israel, his country need only cease its policy of occupation, expansion and aggression. When it had annexed Jerusalem, an Arab city occupied by Israel in defiance of the Security Council and the world community, Israel had said that it had liberated it, just as Hitler had said that he had liberated Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The representative of Israel had called the members of PLO terrorists, yet representatives of those "terrorists" had been invited by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations to speak in the General Assembly. Israel seemed to be reverting to the "three noes": no negotiation, no recognition of the Palestinians and no peace with that people.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1967, document S/8158, para. 31.

## 929th meeting

Monday, 11 November 1974, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.929

### AGENDA ITEM 40

#### Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (*continued*) (A/9798-S/11535, A/9817, A/9843, A/SPC/L.305-307)

1. Mr. KELANI (Syrian Arab Republic)\* said that Israel had done everything to prevent international organizations from making a direct survey of the situation in the occupied territories, in defiance of resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Such obstinacy was not surprising since Israel, like its ally South Africa, was a particularly blatant incarnation of colonialism.

2. That being so, the reports of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories were the only means by which the United Nations could assess the situation in the occupied territories and the only link between the United Nations and the population of those territories.

3. The drafters of the sixth report of the Special Committee (A/9817), currently before the Committee, were to be commended for the objectivity and accuracy with which they had discharged their task.

4. Careful study of the report confirmed that in the occupied territories Israel was still pursuing the policy of annexation and colonization denounced in the Special Committee's five previous reports. It was therefore not surprising that the Special Committee had restated its view that the situation of the civilian population of the occupied territories would only be rectified once occupation, itself a violation of their basic human rights, had been terminated. The Israeli forces, without the slightest feeling of humanity for the inhabitants and with a brutality worthy of the Nazis, had systematically demolished houses in the occupied territories, thereby rendering tens of thousands of people homeless. The demolitions had been accompanied by expropriation, torture, collective sanctions and other measures, not to mention the economic exploitation of the people. As part of its policy of annexation and Judaization of the occupied territories Israel had not scrupled to expel the inhabitants of whole villages or prevent them from returning, in defiance of resolution 237 (1967) adopted by the Security Council on 14 June 1967, in which the Council called upon the Government of Israel to facilitate the return of the inhabitants who had fled the areas in which military operations had taken place. Israel had

refused, and continued to refuse, to abide by that resolution and had substituted a "family reunion" programme which had helped only a few people.

5. It was not surprising therefore that the population of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan had steadily declined since 1967. In the Golan Heights Israeli forces had forced the inhabitants to flee their villages and seek shelter in the Syrian Arab Republic. The establishment of kibbutzim in the occupied territories was being pushed as part of a large-scale annexation plan which the Israelis were vainly trying to cover up, though recent statements by Mr. Rabin and Generals Bar-Lev and Dayan confirmed it.

6. According to the Israeli press one month previously several thousand "wild settlers" had squatted in various places on the West Bank of the Jordan and the Israeli forces had driven them out. Whether they had actually withdrawn or not, the account showed how Israel was attempting to create a *de facto* situation in the occupied territories.

7. The Israeli Government's attitude constituted a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant Geneva Conventions. The Government refused to apply the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 on various pretexts, such as the claim that a certain territory had become part of Israel.

8. The occupied territories were of growing economic importance to Israel as a market for its exports and as a source of manpower. The press had recently quoted a figure of 80,000 workers from the occupied territories employed in Israel.

9. Israel had made a radical change in the economy of the Golan Heights, which had now become purely Israeli. Israel had spoken of it as "economic development", apparently forgetting or pretending to forget that no people in the world could agree to sell its liberty and its homeland for material gain. With reference to the relevant part of the Special Committee's report (A/9817, paras. 50-55), he stressed that Israel's attitude in the Golan showed its determination to colonize and annex the whole region, which it regarded as an integral part of its territory. That was confirmed also by the kibbutzim which had been established or were to be established there, the sums devoted to the foundation of a new town in the region and the developing or projected industrial programmes, all policies which obviously presupposed the destruction of Syrian firms and installations which had previously existed in the Golan.

10. He also wished to provide some details concerning the destruction of Quneitra by the Israeli forces before their withdrawal from the town in accordance with the Agree-

\* The full text of the statement made by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/PV.929.



ment of Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces of 31 May 1974.<sup>1</sup>

11. Quneitra had been a busy and prosperous town of 40,000 inhabitants. On 26 June 1974, when the Israeli forces departed, it lay in ruins. In its report (*ibid.*, paras. 139-147), the Special Committee gave an objective account of the devastation prevailing in the town when it arrived there on 9 September 1974: all the buildings, with the exception of that used by the United Nations Disengagement Observation Force and that which was serving as the office of the Governor of Quneitra, had been destroyed or were uninhabitable. The school building, which had been able to accommodate approximately 1,500 children, had not been spared, nor had the military hospital, which had been used by the Israeli forces for target practice. Public facilities had also been rendered unusable. To complete the horror, the Christian cemetery had been devastated, the coffins opened and the jewels and offerings looted. Following a visit by members of parliament of the nine member countries of the European Economic Community, Mr. R. Offroy, a French member of parliament, had observed, according to a report in the newspaper *Le Monde* of 14 September 1974, that the spectacle recalled that of Oradour-sur-Glane, which had been ravaged by the Nazis. In that connexion, the action of Israeli nazism, which sought to prevent the Syrians from returning to live in their town once again, had achieved its purpose, because Quneitra was still a ghost town.

12. According to a dispatch of Reuter's news agency, the Israeli Chief of Staff had stated on 27 June 1974 that part of the town had been destroyed during the 1967 and 1973 hostilities. He had further indicated that other parts had been razed before the withdrawal of the Israeli forces to make possible a more precise demarcation of the cease-fire line, and that certain dwellings had been destroyed to facilitate the protection of the Golan agricultural holdings. On the other hand, the Israeli Government, not worrying about the contradiction, had claimed in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, dated 2 August 1974,<sup>2</sup> that the damage and destruction were the "direct result of acts of aggression carried out by Syria in various periods since 1967".

13. The Special Committee had sought to determine (*ibid.*, paras. 148-155) whether the devastation had been caused by acts of war, and, if so, whether they dated from 1967 or 1973, or had occurred during attacks launched from Syrian territory against Israeli forces when the latter held the town, as Israel claimed.

14. However, in 1967, as Mr. Nils-Göran Gussing, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, had indicated in his report dated 2 October 1967, Quneitra had been taken without fighting.<sup>3</sup> Nor had there been any fighting in 1973. In the meantime, the town had not been bombarded. The destruction had not therefore been caused by acts of war. That conclusion was confirmed by several considerations, in particular the fact that despite the destruction of buildings, the roads were undamaged; the fact that the method of destruction was everywhere the same, supporting structures having been weakened by the force of heavy equipment, such as bulldozers, the roofs remaining virtually intact; and also the fact that traces of the tracks of heavy equipment leading to certain demolished buildings were still visible.

15. The Special Committee had therefore become convinced (*ibid.*, paras. 156-157) that the destruction had been deliberately caused and had taken place from the ground. Moreover, when the Israeli forces had occupied Quneitra, the town had been virtually undamaged. The destruction had been carried out in a systematic and orderly manner just before the withdrawal of those forces.

16. That was an act for which there was no justification, an expression of barbarism which was a challenge to the values for which mankind had been struggling for centuries. That war crime was a clear violation of the principles enshrined in the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also constituted a violation of article 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and as such fell within the scope of the provisions of article 147 of that Convention. Moreover, Israel had been duly condemned by the Security Council; Israel had been condemned by the International Committee of the Red Cross for having refused to allow its representatives to visit civilian prisoners. Israel had been condemned by WHO for having prevented experts from investigating the health situation; Israel had been condemned by UNESCO for having violated the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict, of 1954. Over 40 countries had severed diplomatic relations with Israel, which had been found guilty of all the aforementioned violations.

17. But Israel forgot the lessons of history. It must realize, however, that the struggle against the oppressor would continue on all fronts till the Palestinian people recovered all the occupied territories, without exception.

*The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.*

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1974, document S/11302/Add.1, annex I.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974, document S/11408.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1967, document S/8158, para. 31.

## 930th meeting

Monday, 11 November 1974, at 3.20 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.930 and Corr.1

### AGENDA ITEM 40

#### Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (*continued*) (A/9799-S/11535, A/9817, A/9843, A/SPC/L.305-307)

1. Mr. KANOUTE (Mali) requested that the statement by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic at the preceding meeting should be circulated in full to the members of the Committee.

2. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the General Assembly, by the decision taken at its 2236th plenary meeting, had authorized the Special Political Committee to obtain, on specific request, transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings or portions thereof. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed that a transcription should be made of the statement by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the special authorization at the request of the representative of Mali.

*It was so decided.*<sup>1</sup>

3. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) commended the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its report (A/9817) and for the tireless work that it had put into its investigation. It had overcome many difficulties, not least the Israeli Government's refusal to co-operate. If the Israelis were not engaged in massacres or terrorist activities in the occupied territories, why had they prevented the Special Committee from visiting the territories? They were afraid that their arbitrary policy of occupation would be exposed. The signatories to the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which was designed to protect civilians in time of war, were required to observe its provisions. In the event of an apparent failure to do so, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was empowered to investigate. Israel had signed the Convention on 10 October 1951, ironically enough, the third anniversary of the Deir Yaseen massacre. ICRC had condemned Israel for its failure to fulfil its obligations under the Convention. The Commission on Human Rights had also condemned Israel for the operations it had carried out against the civil population of the occupied territories, where Israel had established settlements by expelling the Arab population or forcing them to co-operate. It was ironical that the principle of collective guilt and punishment so dear to Hitler had now been espoused by Israel. And how could Israel explain to the people of Africa its military and economic collusion with the white racist régime in South Africa? The tragedy of the Palestinians and the other Arab peoples was an astonishing

phenomenon in an era of decolonization; more than 70 colonial countries had recently become independent, whereas the Palestinians had lost their very birthright.

4. The Arab part of Jerusalem had been annexed by the occupation authorities and attempts were being made to erase its historical Arab character, despite the condemnation of the international community and the United Nations resolutions calling on Israel not to alter the physical character of the city. The city had not only been altered but disfigured. The Commission for Social Sciences, Humanities and Culture of the Eighteenth General Conference of UNESCO had recently condemned Israel for its policy of altering the character of Jerusalem.

5. Between June 1967 and October 1973 Israel had set up 21 settlements on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip and was now implementing a scheme for settlements in the Golan Heights. Israel resorted to terrorism as part of its plan to confiscate Arab territories: farms had been drowned with pesticides, refugee camps bombed and thousands of refugees forced to live in the open desert. Israel's aim was to disperse the Palestinians so that they would be unable to return to their native land. Evidence of that aim could be found in paragraph 38 of the Special Committee's report. When the Israeli authorities spoke of peace they meant peace after the genocide of the Palestinian people. But the war of October 1973 had rallied to the Palestinians the support of the whole world, especially those countries that had gained independence through armed struggle. The Palestinian people was bound to achieve victory, regardless of the military might of their oppressors. The United Nations must respond to the appeals of the Palestinian people to be allowed to return to their own country and resume their legitimate rights. The world could not remain indifferent for ever.

6. It had been confirmed in the report and by many journalists that the Israeli forces had destroyed the Syrian town of Quneitra before withdrawing from it at the end of the October war. That action was in contravention of the fourth Geneva Convention. The international community should compel Israel to pay compensation for the damage so that the Syrian monuments and works of art could be restored.

7. That the occupation authorities treated the Arab population inhumanly was common knowledge, despite Israeli efforts to deceive public opinion. Many United Nations officials had given accounts of the refined torture practised on Arab detainees and an Israeli lawyer had confirmed that 80 per cent of detainees were tortured. Of course torture left indelible marks on the victims, which was why Israel had refused to allow ICRC to interview detainees. He was convinced that many Arab detainees had died as a result of torture.

<sup>1</sup> The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/PV.929.

8. The occupation authorities were still raiding houses, arresting Arab civilians and imprisoning them without trial. Of course courts martial and military governors had arbitrary powers and could extend periods of detention indefinitely. The report documented such arrests on the basis of information provided by the Israelis themselves.

9. The Israelis were also exploiting the human and natural resources of the occupied territories. Arabs were made to work at lower rates than those paid to Israeli workers doing the same job, the aim being to reduce production costs in Israeli factories. Furthermore, the majority of the Arab workers were engaged in unskilled labour with no opportunity for promotion. Like their black brothers in South Africa they did not enjoy the ancillary rights granted to other workers.

10. The policy of oppression was not designed merely to destroy the Arabs physically; the aim was also to destroy their hopes and their culture. For example, Arab textbooks with lessons about the struggle for independence had been abridged, while mosques and churches had been desecrated despite the protests of the Moslem and Christian religious authorities.

11. By disregarding United Nations resolutions Israel compelled the Special Political Committee to take energetic action to safeguard the prestige of the United Nations and reassure the peoples fighting for liberation throughout the world of its moral authority. If the racist régimes of Israel and South Africa did not respect the United Nations, why did they remain Members? A basic reason for the Middle East tragedy was the existence of a racist, reactionary régime side by side with the Arab people, who had always opened their doors to refugees and the oppressed, including the Jews. The solution to the problem was the establishment in Palestine of a society in which all citizens had equal rights regardless of their origins.

12. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan) welcomed the fact that the United Nations was discussing simultaneously in two different conference rooms both the future of the Palestinian people and what was currently happening on Palestinian soil, two questions that were inseparably linked. The tragedy of the Palestinian people had begun in 1947-1948, when Israel had forcibly expelled the majority of them from their homeland, converting masses of Palestinians overnight into refugees. Since 1967, Israel had been engaged on a plan which was no less obnoxious with the objective of fundamentally altering the country's physical character, historical legacy and identity. It was also designed to choke out the Arab inhabitants and annex to Israel one piece of territory after another.

13. Prior to 1948, an unscrupulous and aggressive force had descended upon the peaceful and prosperous Palestinian land. Under the protection of the colonial Power, it had built a chain of armed bastions from which the Zionist leadership had launched its war machine against the peaceful people of Palestine. Currently a similar spectacle was to be seen. Israel was establishing scores of military bases and settlements in the heart of the lands it had occupied in 1967. Strategic and historical landmarks were disappearing and the people of the occupied territories were being surrounded materially, economically, morally and

culturally. No international effort to reach a settlement could succeed because Israel was determined to duplicate its feat of 1948 and was executing its plan systematically and with great zeal. The United Nations must foil that plan so as to open the way to a complete and speedy Israeli withdrawal if it wished to spare the world a prolonged and bitter struggle and achieve a just and lasting peace.

14. The Special Committee had done its duty most admirably. It had presented a sober and comprehensive report within the limitations imposed by the circumstances in which it had had to perform its task, which included Israeli intransigence and hostility. The Committee had of course been the target of continuous vilification and slander from Israel, but that could not detract from the dignity of the Committee, which was composed of distinguished and competent persons of integrity and responsibility.

15. Perhaps the most serious and dangerous of the Israeli practices in the occupied territories was the policy of colonization which Israeli occupation authorities had begun to apply immediately after the occupation in 1967. That policy was aimed at planting and consolidating the Israeli presence in the occupied Arab territories partly through the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Sinai. By 1973 more than 50 settlements had been established and the October war had merely accelerated that movement. There were different kinds of settlement. The so-called security settlements included the Allon settlements in the Jordan valley and those in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. There were also the so-called separation settlements, such as those which Israel was preparing in the area between the Gaza Strip and Sinai on the outskirts of Rafah. Israel's aim there was to increase the population density so as to create a human barrier between Gaza and Sinai. The third type consisted of the economically oriented settlements, which included 28 factories in the West Bank and Gaza, in three industrial towns, and an agricultural town in En Yahav, with three settlements and an airport for transporting agricultural produce to Europe.

16. According to press reports dated May 1974, the occupation authorities had already started construction work on a new settlement built on Arab lands to the north-west of the village of Rantis on an 800-dunum area. Between five and eight other settlements were also being actively considered by the Israeli Government. Reports from the West Bank indicated that 14 new colonies were planned, 5 in the Golan Heights, 4 in the West Bank and 5 in the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh. The Israeli Minister of Defence had himself announced that 12 new Israeli settlements were to be built on the outskirts of Rafah. *Ha'aretz*, an Israeli daily, had announced on 15 August 1973 that a plan was being finalized to move the inhabitants of the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip to new settlements on the outskirts of Rafah, in addition to the existing ones. On 13 March 1974, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, an Israeli newspaper, had reported that plans were being finalized to form new colonies in the area to be known as Neviot, in the Tweniah area between Eilat and Sharm el Sheikh.

17. The Keren Kayemeth, an Israeli colonizing organization, had completed the levelling of 720 dunum of land on which buildings were to be constructed.

18. The ferocity with which the Israeli occupation authorities had carried out the alterations in the country's physical features was only matched by the ruthlessness with which they had destroyed the town of Quneitra on the eve of the evacuation of the city, as described in the report of the Special Committee. As for Jerusalem, the heart of Palestine and of the Arab and other worlds, it was the victim of Israel's policy of unabashed expansion and annexation. Notwithstanding the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the universal condemnation of the international community, the Israeli occupation authorities were continuing to sequester Arab lands inside and outside the walled city in order to build new Israeli quarters, and to destroy ancient Arab landmarks. With their disappearance went the disappearance of a long and honourable Arab history. Not a day passed without a new destruction at a historical monument or violation of sacred places. Israel's policy in the Holy City was clear. It was a premeditated plan to alter the demographic, historical and cultural landscape of the city and to destroy its Arab heritage, including the Christian and Islamic holy places. Jordan had warned of the consequences of such a policy to the cause of peace and justice but Israel had continued its practices as part and parcel of a plan designed to obliterate the age-old Arab heritage in the Holy City and supplant it by an alien culture.

19. He would give a few examples of such actions. First, in October 1974, the inhabitants of the Bab Alsilsilah quarter, on the western side of the Al Aqsa Mosque, had been ordered to vacate their premises along the southern route. Those premises had been undermined by the Israeli occupation authorities with a view to causing their collapse and abandonment. Thirty per cent of the premises had already been destroyed and 5,000 of the inhabitants evicted; if the new operation was carried out, the remainder of the population would be expelled. Secondly, Israeli excavations had caused menacing cracks in the Jawhariyah school, an historic landmark, and had forced its guardians to evacuate it. It and the contiguous compound containing 300 dwellings were now in imminent danger of collapse. Three thousand Arabs whose forebears had lived there for eight centuries would thus find themselves homeless. Thirdly, excavations had been going on through the wall of the Al Haram ash Sharif area and the southern wall of the Al Aqsa Mosque and were being extended to other nearby areas, threatening the collapse of the Al Aqsa Mosque itself. Fourthly, on 25 July 1974, *Yedioth Ahronoth* had disclosed a plan prepared by the municipal council of occupied Jerusalem to evict the entire population, numbering 18,000 people, of the old city of Jerusalem to the west and north of the Al Haram ash Sharif. As an excuse, the Israelis alleged that the buildings were getting old and that health standards were inadequate. It was well known that the buildings had been in good condition until the Israeli occupation in 1967, thanks to the care taken of them by their inhabitants. The Israeli destruction was not directed against insanitary buildings, but against the Arab heritage in the Holy City. The ultimate aim was to liquidate the Arabs of Jerusalem and obliterate the Arab identity in that city.

20. In addition, the Israeli occupation authorities had confiscated many dunum of land in Eizariyah and Anata, bringing the total area confiscated by them since the 1967

war to 22,000 dunum. Those areas, together with the Arab lands and buildings confiscated since 1948, constituted 80 per cent of the Arab possessions in the Holy City and its environs.

21. Lastly, the Israeli occupation authorities had recently confiscated another 50,000 dunum in the Khan el Ahmar area, 17 kilometres east of Jerusalem on the road to Jericho. The purpose, according to Israeli sources, was to build an industrial town which could absorb 20,000 new Jewish immigrants. Three new settlements were planned on the newly confiscated lands. The Israelis would eventually have encircled the Arabs of Jerusalem from every direction in a total of 16 Israeli settlements.

22. Even the judiciary had not escaped the encroachment of Israel's chauvinistic and destructive policies. The law courts in Arab Jerusalem had been paralysed since the occupation because they had been severed from the law courts of the West Bank. Arab judges in Jerusalem had been forced to forfeit their posts and were required to make new applications for appointment in accordance with Israeli laws. The Arab judges had of course categorically refused to serve and had remained idle ever since. Islamic philanthropic foundations had also suffered destruction from the occupation authorities. The most notorious example was the historic Magharbah quarter, which had been almost totally destroyed, and the Sharif quarter, which comprised important Islamic landmarks, including four mosques. Holy places outside Arab Jerusalem had fared no better. In the city of Hebron, Israel's encroachment on Al Haram al Ibrahimi was still fresh in Arab memories, and Israel was continuing to enlarge its settlements in locations directly overlooking the city of Hebron and the surrounding areas.

23. Israeli practices in the occupied areas were not confined to the drastic alterations he had described. One of Israel's basic aims was to absorb the economy of the occupied territories for purposes of exploitation. The report of the Special Committee abounded in instances of the continued exploitation of the resources of the occupied territories. They were merely an expression of the expansionist and colonizing policy of the occupation authorities. When Israel had occupied the West Bank of Jordan, the area had been prosperous and its economy healthy; but after some years of occupation, the economy, like the cultural and social institutions, had been systematically absorbed and exploited. As a result of that policy, Israel's exports to the West Bank had increased to more than five times its imports. The economy of the West Bank and of other occupied territories was intended merely to serve the needs of the Israeli economy.

24. Israel's colonization policy was unique in that it was all-embracing. Absorption of the economy and confiscation of land were only two aspects of such a policy. Other equally devastating aspects were the encirclement of the human being and the efforts to stifle and uproot his culture and his soul. The people of the occupied territories were subject to psychological warfare in every field and at every level. In the curricula of the schools, for instance, writings which taught the pupils their cultural and religious heritage were subjected to rigorous censorship, and references to well-known Arab heroes and historic events had been completely deleted. The material on the Palestine question



had also suffered the same fate. The introduction of one modern history book had been prohibited because it described the colonial exploitation of the resources of the Arab homeland and discussed Arab unity. In Jerusalem, the occupational authorities had imposed Israeli curricula in all schools, even though they conflicted with the national consciousness and sensitivities of the inhabitants. One of the more flagrant examples was the imposition of a book entitled *Israeli Civics*, which was being taught in high schools and was a blatant distortion of Arab and Islamic history. Another book on geography for the eighth grade described the Jordan River as dividing Israel into two parts, making no mention of Jordan.

25. In addition to expelling several hundred thousand Arabs and refusing to allow them to return, the occupation authorities had been deliberately getting rid of active political leaders. Only recently, four political leaders, including the editor of an Arab daily paper in Jerusalem, had been expelled across the armistice line into Lebanon. Israel was likewise promoting the emigration of young Arabs to Europe, Canada, the Americas and Australia, whenever opportunities existed for their acceptance. The inhabitants of Gaza had been given false Jordanian documents and the Jordan authorities had already arrested a number of them.

26. The Israeli representative had held forth to the Committee about the tolerance and justice of the Israeli occupation. He had also tried to justify the mass arrests, the collective punishments and the demolition of houses under the pretext of isolating the resistance and protecting civilians. The Committee had before it a clear-cut over-all pattern which everyone could see. It went beyond the violation of human rights under occupation to something much more serious: the devouring of a land on which its people had lived for thousands of years. The aim was to empty the land of its people in carefully planned stages, with the eventual goal of annexation. That was the problem which confronted the Committee, the problem which had faced the United Nations since 1967, and even before that. It was the duty of the United Nations to put an end to those most flagrant breaches of human rights. It should take whatever action was necessary to halt the ruthless colonization of the occupied territories, as a step towards ending the occupation itself and achieving a just and lasting peace.

27. Mr. AL-ATIYYAH (Iraq) said that it should not be forgotten that the root of the problem lay in Israel's occupation of Arab territories by force. Its claim that the inhabitants were well treated was therefore irrelevant. People could not be robbed of their wealth merely because someone else could exploit it better. The matter could not be solved by mere United Nations resolutions.

28. Zionism was based on two principles: first, that the Jews were a separate people who, when they coexisted with other peoples were isolated or oppressed; second, that they must therefore gather together Jews from throughout the world to create a permanent, independent State. It therefore called upon all Jews to go to Palestine and had passed the law on return, under which they were given Jewish nationality as soon as they arrived, and other laws to prevent Arabs from returning to their lands and to terrorize

those who wanted to remain. What was now called in Israel a "demographic question" was the impasse in which Israel found itself following the occupation of new Arab lands inhabited by Palestinians. Israel wanted the land but did not want the inhabitants, for fear they might change its identity, and had consistently prevented them from returning. Israel was obliged to acquire new territory and expel the indigenous inhabitants in order to enable Jews from throughout the world to settle in the region. It was the only entity in the world whose constitution and fundamental law did not mention frontiers. The question as to what were the official frontiers of the State of Israel had been answered by General Dayan on 5 July 1968, when he had said that since the frontiers recognized by the partition plan of 1947 had been attained, new demarcation lines had been successively established. The Zionist movement's determination to persuade Jews from throughout the world to go to Israel was creating difficulties for those Jews because in the modern world, the basis of a citizen's allegiance to a country was not based on religion. Not content with constant propaganda, the Zionists were offering financial incentives and even resorting to political pressure and causing fear and destruction in order to bring Jews to Israel.

29. The Special Committee's report provided irrefutable proof of Israel's persistent violation of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, which they had not even allowed the Special Committee to visit.

30. Because of Israel's concern to make Jerusalem completely Jewish, the Arab inhabitants had been subjected to imprisonment and expulsion and had had their houses destroyed. The Israelis had also annexed and settled in parts of the occupied territories.

31. On 29 August 1974, an Israeli newspaper had quoted a three-page document submitted by the heads of the Mapam party to the Israeli Prime Minister which had stated that thousands of Bedouins had been driven from their homes near Rafah and requesting him to rehouse them and to punish those responsible for their expulsion. That document stated that 30,000 dunum belonging to the Bedouins had been confiscated in 1969 and a further 120,000 dunum emptied of its population and closed off in January 1972, without either the Government or the Chief of Staff being informed. Ten thousand Bedouins had thus been obliged to leave their homes. The same document had described the torture inflicted on the population after evacuation. It said that the region had been closed off and so far not confiscated. It therefore still belonged to the Bedouins, although the Government claimed possession of the territory but could provide no valid proof of ownership. It had had recourse to threats and to arresting the inhabitants in order to make them sign documents renouncing their property. It had even resorted to forgeries and to making children sign such renunciations. No compensation had been given nor had the people been rehoused. Yet great propaganda had been made of the 60 primitive housing units built in 1960, which had been given to the Ba'ya tribe and not the evacuated population. The document also stated that there was a project to evacuate in stages 1.5 million dunum in the same area, in which the Bedouins from the whole of Sinai lived, to expel the population from all agricultural land and to colonize eight different sites. The size of the budget to be provided for the operation

showed that no compensation would be given nor would the inhabitants be rehoused, although at least 20,000 people would be affected.

32. The representative of Israel had said that the Israeli Government was intervening to prevent settlement of the West Bank but in fact Israel was not opposed to all settlements on the West Bank but only to those which went against their instructions. The Government had established an order of priority in accordance with the means available and its political and above all military policy. An article published in *The Times* of London on 13 September 1974 had said that it had recently been disclosed that the Government was considering expropriating a tract of land on the road to Ramallah, which was currently isolated, and building 45,000 new flats to house 50,000 people and create an exclusively Jewish area. The article said that at a conservative estimate, some 25,000 Jews were currently living in former Arab areas. Yet the Israeli representative had definitely declared in his statement at the 928th meeting that there was no proof that Israel was carrying out a policy of annexation.

33. With regard to violations of human rights in the occupied territories, the testimony of the President of the Israeli League for the Rights of Man and the Citizen, in a statement to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the United States Congress of 4 April 1974 concerning the investigation of the protection of civilians in the Middle East conflict in accordance with international law, had discussed some aspects of the situation which were clearly recognized by the Israeli Government. Innocent people, many of whom, owing to age or infirmity, were incapable of committing crimes, were being punished even when no accusation was made against them. Those punishments were carried out mainly when the suspect was in the hands of the authorities. The punishment was purely arbitrary and no reason was given why the houses of suspects were blown up. Yet no houses of Israelis were ever blown up, even in the case of convicted criminals or terrorists. Palestinian intellectuals and leaders living in the occupied territories were arbitrarily expelled to Lebanon, so that their families were often left without their breadwinner. Such measures had been approved by the Israeli Cabinet without any opposition or even abstention and constituted an obvious violation of article 49 of the Geneva Convention.

34. Paragraphs 106 and 107 of the Special Committee's report quoted newspaper reports of the number of people arrested. The Israeli representative, in his statement at the 928th meeting, had recognized that there had been arrests even though he denied all the allegations made in the report. That was understandable in view of a report in an Israeli newspaper on 4 September 1974 quoting from an important Jerusalem source that 3,434 people were then under detention, 2,474 of them from the occupied territories and the other Arabs living in Israel. Those included 60 women, 17 from the occupied territories and the others from other parts of Israel. The number of people detained for security reasons had risen from 1,825 at the end of 1973 to 2,474.

35. The Special Committee's report referred to economic measures adopted by Israel in the occupied territories but without giving any details or explanations. He considered it

his duty to do so in view of their effect on the population of those territories and the Arabs of the whole region. Israel was following the traditional economic policy of imperialistic capitalism. Its aim was to make large profits in non-industrial regions, to acquire new markets for its own industrial products, to exploit the raw materials of the region and the labour of the indigenous population. In 1952, Abba Eban had described<sup>2</sup> the possible pattern of trade between Israel and the Arab countries if the Arab boycott was lifted. Raw materials and agricultural products from the Arab countries would be sent to Israel in exchange for industrial products. That was the traditional pattern of trade between colonial countries and the colonizers. He had also said that Israel wanted to establish relations with her neighbours similar to those between the United States and the Latin American countries. However, the Arab boycott constituted an insurmountable barrier and Israel had had to resort to the African market to dispose of its industrial products. Seventy per cent of its trade was with the developed countries in Western Europe and North America. The occupation of new territories after the June 1967 war had enabled Israel to improve its own economic situation at the expense of those territories. The report of the Israeli Defence Minister on the evolution of the economic situation in Gaza and northern Sinai clearly described the relations between Israel and the occupied territories, which he said provided an additional market for Israeli goods and services and a source of manpower, especially non-skilled workers. In 1969, exports to the occupied territories had constituted 9 per cent of Israel's total exports, whereas in 1973 the occupied territories had become its most important market, except for cut diamonds, after the United States and before the United Kingdom.

36. Israel was increasingly importing Arab workers for unskilled work. Currently some 70,000 or 80,000 people from the refugee camps and peasants were doing such work. Although they obtained a higher salary than they would in their own countries, they were paid 40 per cent less than a comparable Israeli worker. That policy had resulted in an abnormal rise in wages in Gaza and the West Bank owing to the shortage of labour. The Arab workers had, however, high travelling expenses because they were unable to live near their work and there had been a rise of over 45 per cent in the cost of living.

37. An analytical study prepared by Sheila Ryan in January 1974 for Merib Reports No. 24 entitled "Israeli economic policy in the occupied territories: foundations of a new imperialism" summed up the economic effects on the Palestinian population. It showed that the Israeli occupation exercised a profound influence on every social class in the occupied territories. The inhabitants of the refugee camps, mainly peasants expelled from their lands in 1947 and 1948 and also some who had been obliged to leave the West Bank in 1967, were now working in Israel as unskilled workers. Some civil servants, professional men, farmers and shopkeepers had also been forced to do manual work whereas the intellectuals and highly skilled people were unable to find suitable work, which was reserved for the Israelis. The Palestinian capitalists were gradually losing their independence and becoming dependent on loans from

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 29th meeting, paras. 27/30.*

Israeli money-lenders. Since the Israeli Government granted very favourable conditions to Israelis who wished to invest in the occupied territories, Arab businessmen were obliged to share their profits with them and the number of joint Israeli-Palestinian firms had recently greatly increased.

38. The Israeli Government did not admit the existence of a policy to colonize the occupied territories, but what really affected the inhabitants was the day-to-day influence of the policy pursued by the military governors.

39. The result of Israel's decision to establish trade relations with the occupied territories had been the establishment of a common currency, although Jordanian currency was still tolerated as an alternative in the West Bank, relative freedom of movement between Israel and the territories and between them and the coast of Israel and the integration of means of communication linking the territories with the coast. Without taking account of the future of the political situation in those territories, that was tantamount to the beginning of a common market based not on equality between Israel and the occupied territories but on colonialist-type relations under which the markets in the colonized regions were full of products from the colonizing country and both raw materials and workers were being exploited.

40. The Israeli leaders had repeatedly declared that they would accept a settlement only if economic relations were re-established with Arab countries. That would enable them to continue the colonialist régime applied in the occupied territories since 1967 and perhaps even to extend it to other regions in the Middle East.

41. Chapter V of the Special Committee's report, on the situation in Quneitra, was a clear condemnation of Israel. Paragraphs 156 and 157 stated that the devastation was predominantly a single and deliberately executed operation, that it was recent and that it had taken place from the ground, nearly always by the application of heavy equipment, shortly before the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, who were therefore responsible. The international community must therefore condemn such actions and see that Israel assumed responsibility for them.

42. Mr. LECLERCQ (France) said that his delegation had always supported any resolutions and recommendations that might improve the lot of the innocent victims of the events under discussion. It had had reservations about the Special Committee since its establishment. It recognized that it came up against insurmountable obstacles in the exercise of its mandate. However, in view of the humanitarian and juridical aspects of the plight of the population of the occupied territories, the sources of information quoted should be beyond reproach.

43. His delegation recognized that the Israeli authorities' activities in the occupied territories were deeply regrettable and that some of the measures adopted were illegal. That was why it had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 3092 A (XXVIII) which called upon the Israeli authorities to respect and comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and of General Assembly resolutions 2799 (XXVI) and 2949 (XXVII). His

country had also undertaken to respect the provision of paragraph 8 of the latter resolution. He shared the concern expressed by the representatives of the occupied territories at the establishment of Israeli colonies in those territories, which was obviously contrary to the obligations imposed on the occupying Power by international law. It had also consistently denounced the violation of the Security Council resolutions concerning the policy of integrating the Arab town of Jerusalem in an administratively unified city.

44. The current report of the Special Committee devoted a special chapter to the situation in Quneitra, which had been liberated after the disengagement agreement between the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel. The desolation described by the Special Committee and also reported by many other witnesses and appalling. His delegation could only express its sympathy for the inhabitants who were now able to return to their homes but had found most of them in ruins.

45. In voting on the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee, his delegation would bear in mind those facts and the need to find the most appropriate means of ensuring respect for the rights of the population of the occupied territories in that provisional situation. The true issue before the Committee was obviously the peace settlement. The Committee must try to see that an end was put to any action which would prolong tension and resentment and compromise the chances of a settlement to which the inhabitants of the region and the whole international community aspired.

46. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) noted that the General Assembly, in its resolution 3092 B (XXVIII), had requested the Secretary-General "to ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat". His delegation wished to ask the representative of the Secretary-General if the steps taken in compliance with that request, as described in the report of the Secretary-General (A/9843), represented an extraordinary effort to give the widest publicity to the documents and information in question, or the normal procedure for disseminating and publicizing any report produced by a United Nations body.

47. With reference to the report of the Special Committee (A/9817), his delegation had been astonished to hear the representative of Israel, at the 928th meeting, estimate the annual budget of the Special Committee at nearly \$100,000, adding that such a figure meant that every page of its 35-page report had cost the United Nations approximately \$3,000. His recollection was that the budget estimates submitted by the Secretary-General and approved by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session amounted to \$46,400, as indicated in the relevant report of the Fifth Committee.<sup>3</sup> Such a large discrepancy between the official budget and the figures mentioned by the representative of Israel clearly required some clarification from the representative of the Secretary-General. The question also arose as to the underlying motives for the remarks made by the representative of Israel. He might have

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes, agenda item 79, document A/9392.



been prompted to appeal to the economical instincts of other delegations because of the undesirability, from Israel's point of view, of the continued investigation by the Special Committee of conditions in the occupied territories. The United Nations, however, should not place a price tag on the discharge of its obligations when the basic human rights of a people were at stake. Any attempt to shift the question of ensuring respect for human rights to one of the cost of achieving that goal was tantamount to calling on the General Assembly to abdicate its true responsibilities and to disregard the principles and purposes of the Charter. It was therefore difficult to resist the conclusion that there existed a vast difference between the way in which the Special Committee, as the agent of the General Assembly approached the matter, and the perspective in which it was viewed by Israel.

48. There were two main aspects to the problem under consideration: human rights on the one hand, and respect by an occupying Power for international law in its treatment of the population of occupied territories on the other. The Government of Israel, as the occupying authority, did not consider itself subject to international scrutiny or to international conventions relating to occupied territories, to which Israel was a party. The representative of Israel had stated that his Government considered the fourth Geneva Convention inapplicable in the current case for a number of legal reasons, and reserved its position on the applicability of that Convention in the administered areas. He had gone on to say that notwithstanding that reservation, which had been consistently made since 1967 and officially explained to those competent on the matter, Israel continued to take the provisions of the Convention as standard. He had further stated that his Government's position had been confirmed by ICRC as a practical matter, and that its co-operation with the representatives of the Red Cross had been repeatedly acknowledged by that body. Those were very serious statements for a number of reasons.

49. In the first place, the Government of Israel unilaterally announced that a Convention to which it was a party did not apply in precisely the type of situation governed by that Convention. It therefore unilaterally proclaimed that it stood above the law, and gave no reasons for such an attitude, confining itself to a brief allusion to explanations given to "those competent on the matter". It apparently considered that the Special Political Committee was incompetent in that respect and that it was not worth while naming the competent bodies to which it had explained its position. However, it suggested in a roundabout way that its position had been more or less accepted by ICRC. Nevertheless, it was a well-known fact that the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly, the Twenty-second International Conference of Red Cross Societies and the International Conference on Human Rights had all stated categorically that the fourth Geneva Convention was applicable in the territories occupied by Israel. Moreover, despite Israel's contention that the International Conference of Red Cross Societies did not represent the International Red Cross, since the former was a political body dominated by mechanical majorities, while the latter was wholly impartial and humanitarian, it should be noted that ICRC, as reflected in paragraph 164 of the report of the

Special Committee, deplored the fact that Israel's attitude had resulted in a situation which deprived victims in the occupied territories of full protection and of their rights under the fourth Geneva Convention. The Red Cross therefore rejected Israel's contention that that Convention was not applicable to the occupied territories.

50. The preceding example illustrated and brought out once again the vastly differing standards applied by the Special Committee in preparing its report and those on which the delegation of Israel based its reply to the report of the Special Committee. Whereas, the Special Committee considered itself bound by the rules and norms laid down in the fourth Geneva Convention, and therefore judged Israel's action in accordance therewith, the Government of Israel disregarded that Convention, and sought to justify its conduct in the occupied territories on the grounds of national interest. Moreover, the position of the Special Committee was strengthened by the support of the international community as reflected in the various bodies referred to above, whereas Israel had isolated itself from the mainstream of world opinion.

51. The best illustration of the different standards applied by Israel and the Special Committee could be seen in the conclusions of the latter concerning Israel's practice of demolishing houses. The demolition of the homes of the inhabitants of the occupied territories raised a number of issues. First of all, a house was destroyed as soon as the person was arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime, without waiting for a finding or judgement of a court that the suspect was guilty. In every instance cited by the representative of Israel to justify the demolition of homes, he argued that the Special Committee had shown tendentious selectivity in its references to Israeli press reports. However, the fact remained that in every case dealt with, the persons involved had been reported as suspects or alleged perpetrators, with no mention of a trial or conviction, and the demolition of homes had taken place sometimes within a few hours of their arrest. Such a practice was therefore an administrative punishment, and not a punishment for a crime after due process of law. Rather than lecture the Special Committee, the representative of Israel would do better to lecture his own Government on the basic legal principle that a person should be considered innocent until proven guilty. Secondly, the demolition of homes represented an additional rather than an alternative punishment for an alleged crime, since the person concerned, if convicted of the crime in question, was still liable to the penalty normally imposed in such cases. Thirdly, such a practice involved the collective punishment of both the guilty and the innocent, since in many cases the suspect was living in a rented house, in which case the true owner was punished unjustly, or in his family home, the demolition of which caused suffering to his innocent relatives. Collective punishment was, however, specifically prohibited in article 33 of the fourth Geneva Convention. Nor could such wanton destruction be justified as a means of inducing relatives of a suspect, or any third party, if they knew of the suspect's intentions, either to dissuade him or to report the matter to the authorities, since article 31 of the fourth Geneva Convention prohibited the use of force for such purposes. In the fourth place, the destruction of homes was prohibited by articles 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention regardless of the under-



lying motives for such destruction. It was therefore not at the discretion of the Government of Israel to inflict such punishment, whatever the offence, and its contention that the Special Committee emphasized the acts of demolition without explaining why they occurred was therefore irrelevant. Equally irrelevant was Israel's suggestion that the question was insignificant because of the small number of demolitions report. The tragedy of children rendered homeless was absolute, regardless of the numbers involved. The vindictive nature of the destruction was confirmed by the fact that it often took place on the eve of withdrawal from an occupied territory and even in unoccupied territories, as in the case of southern Lebanon.

52. He had referred to the practice of the demolition of homes to show that Israel violated the Geneva Conventions and considered itself above the law and free to pick and choose the international laws which it was prepared to observe. A similar analysis could be made of every other illegal practice with which Israel had been charged in the occupied territories. However, above and beyond the dispute between the Special Committee and the international community, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other, there were two vital issues. The first was the human rights of a people which had no one to defend its human rights except the United Nations, which had had more than its share of tragedy during the preceding 25 years, which was under occupation and could not appeal to the courts or the conscience of the occupying Power. The second was the integrity of international law, the sanctity of treaties and respect for the legal norms and rules laid down in conventions and agreements. At stake also were the principles and purposes of the United Nations, which, in the Charter, had pledged itself to safeguard human rights and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law could be maintained. Those points should be borne in mind by the Special Committee in considering the recommendations it wished to make to the General Assembly. Its decision would either enhance respect for human rights and the integrity of treaties, or set a dangerous precedent which would enable any occupying Power in future to disregard any international convention which it found inconvenient.

53. He pointed out that Israel was establishing settlements in the occupied territories and deporting the inhabitants, both of which practices were expressly prohibited under article 49 of the Geneva Convention.

*Mr. Martinez (Venezuela), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

54. Mr. URQUHART (Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs) said, in answer to the representative of Kuwait, that he had been informed by the Office of Public Information that paragraphs 4 to 8 of document A/9843 were exceptional. A special effort had been made to give publicity to the report of the Special Committee.

55. In reply to the Israeli representative he pointed out that the Special Committee's budget had been \$46,400, \$29,400 of which had been spent on foreign missions and \$17,000 on meetings in Geneva and New York. A further \$8,400 had been authorized as a supplementary estimate for the recruitment of a ballistics expert, but the funds had not been spent.

56. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) expressed appreciation to the Office of Public Information for the special publicity effort it had made. As to the budget, he could only suppose that the Israeli representative had been misled by the prevailing atmosphere of inflation.

57. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that he stood corrected, but be still considered that the costs of the Special Committee were too high.

58. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) said that the decision to establish the Special Committee had been approved by many United Nations bodies, of which Israel was a member. Israel was therefore bound by the decisions that had been taken.

59. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that there was a mechanical majority in many bodies which resulted in decisions that were not acceptable to all their members. They were therefore entitled to interpret them as they saw fit.

60. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) pointed out that there were some experts and impartial bodies to which the rule of a mechanical majority did not apply.

61. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that, thanks to the efforts of the socialist and other peace-loving countries, positive changes had taken place in international affairs in recent years. It was therefore all the more alarming that a dangerous situation should persist in the Middle East, where Israel was continuing its policy of aggression and occupation of Arab lands. He quoted an extract from the speech made by Mr. Gromyko on the occasion of the fifty-seventh anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, to the effect that Israel was trying to retain its hold on the Arab lands, with the help of its protectors, but that the situation contained a hidden danger for Israel itself. The Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko had said, had always advocated the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, but that goal would not be attained as long as Israel occupied Arab territories and the Arab people of Palestine were denied their lawful rights; the Soviet Union would continue to support the just struggle of the Arab peoples and urged the immediate reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference.

62. The question before the Committee was part of the general Middle East crisis caused by the aggressive expansionist policy of Israel. The report of the Special Committee was a convincing indictment that revealed Israel's flagrant violations of the human rights of the population of the occupied Arab lands; indeed, the unlawful occupation of Arab territories in 1967 had itself been a violation of human rights. The annexation of foreign territory had been condemned by the United Nations in its decisions concerning the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war. The facts set forth in the various reports before the Committee and in press reports were convincing evidence of Israel's systematic policy of annexation, colonization and establishment of settlements in the occupied territories, where the occupation authorities continued to practice discrimination, intimidation, expulsion and repression. Despite the fact that the Israeli Government had refused to permit it to visit the occupied territories, the

Special Committee had succeeded in gathering extensive material that revealed Israel's violations of human rights.

63. In its report the Special Committee stressed that, despite the agreement on the disengagement of troops in the Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli sectors, the situation of the Arab population of the occupied territories had not changed, indeed had worsened. His country felt deep sympathy for the people living under a hostile occupation, for during the Second World War a part of its own territory had been occupied by Fascist aggressors. Basing itself on the statements of Israeli leaders, the Special Committee had shown that the Israeli Government intended to persist in its policies in the occupied territories and was establishing settlements in the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the West Bank. It was driving the indigenous population from their homes, destroying their houses, constructing military roads and installations, carrying out mass arrests and changing the physical character and demographic structure of the occupied territories.

64. Further violations of human rights were the restrictions placed on services in international religious centres and interference in the educational system, notably the banning of textbooks approved by UNESCO. The barbarous plundering by the Israelis, which included the destruction of archaeological and cultural treasures, had aroused the indignation of world public opinion. The Israeli authorities were continuing to pillage the economic resources of the occupied territories in contravention of the rules of international law. According to the report, Israel received annually \$400 million for the oil extracted in the Sinai Peninsula. Thus, Israel was plundering the national wealth of Egypt.

65. All those violations of international law served the goal of annexation of part of the occupied territories, which was an expression of Israel's expansionist policy based on Zionist ideology, an ideology of racial discrimination and national hatred. Israeli activities contradicted the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. In that connexion, he recalled the resolution adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at its thirtieth session<sup>4</sup> in which it deplored Israel's activities, characterizing them as war crimes and an affront to mankind.

66. The crimes committed by the Israeli authorities in Quneitra warranted special condemnation. The report of the Special Committee left no room for doubt that the destruction of Quneitra had been planned and carried out by the Israeli authorities just before the withdrawal of Israeli troops in 1974. That action called to mind the criminal acts of the Hitlerites in their deliberate destruction of Soviet towns and of Warsaw during the Second World War. His delegation agreed with the Special Committee that the Israeli occupation forces were responsible for the

destruction of Quneitra and with its recommendation that a commission should be appointed to study the legal consequences. It supported the Special Committee's conclusion that the question of the violation by Israel of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories would not be resolved until the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories was itself ended. That must be achieved as part of a general political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the guaranteeing of the lawful national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. His country would do everything it could to help to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. True to the principles of solidarity with the struggle against aggression and for the independence and self-determination of peoples, the Soviet Union would continue to support the Arab peoples, the victims of Israeli aggression.

67. Mr. ALI (India) said that since its inception, the Special Committee had had to work under difficult circumstances. Its members had been subjected to persistent slanders by Israel, its constitutionality and mandate had been questioned, and of course, it had been denied access by Israel to the occupied territories. Israel had not even accepted that the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention applied to the territory it had occupied by aggression in 1967. The same slanders had been repeated again at the current session by the representative of Israel.

68. The members of the Special Committee had patiently and conscientiously fulfilled the mandate entrusted to them. The Special Committee's primary source had been the statements made by the members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders, as well as Israeli reports of measures being taken in the occupied territories, where such statements and reports had not been contradicted or refuted. Yet the representative of Israel had found the report to be full of lies and baseless allegations. If that was so, it should be in Israel's interest to provide access for the Special Committee to the territories occupied by it. Its refusal to do so could only mean that the Israeli assertions and denials were false.

69. The report of the Special Committee brought out clearly the alarming situation arising out of the continuance and implementation of the policy of annexation and settlement in the occupied territories. The refusal of Israel to allow the repatriation of the hundreds of thousands who had fled or been expelled from their homes after the 1967 aggression was most serious. That refusal was a grave infringement of the rights of the civilian population and a formidable obstacle to a just solution of the Middle East problem. To that had been added the outrage committed by the withdrawing Israeli forces on the Syrian town of Quneitra. The conclusions of the Special Committee had been arrived at after careful and objective sifting of the evidence which indicated that the Israelis emulated Nazi methods of revenge and collective punishment in their occupied territories.

70. His Government unequivocally condemned the persistent and flagrant violations by Israel of the basic rights of the populations of the occupied territories and outrages such as the one witnessed in Quneitra. It commended the Special Committee for its work and believed that it should

<sup>4</sup> Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 5, chap. XIX, resolution 1 (XXX).

continue. It shared the conviction of the Special Committee that the situation of the civilian population of the occupied territories would be rectified only when Israel vacated the Arab territories occupied by aggression in 1967.

71. Mrs. LI Sung-ling (China) said that the report of the Special Committee had provided first-hand information on how the Israeli Zionists had razed the town of Quneitra before their withdrawal, giving a more glaring picture of Israeli atrocities in the occupied territories. With an abundance of facts, the Arab representatives had also forcefully exposed the crimes committed by the Israeli authorities in savagely repressing and slaughtering the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in the occupied territories in brazen violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention and in enforcing a Fascist rule and wantonly plundering the resources of those territories. Her delegation felt great indignation at the atrocities of the Israeli aggressors, firmly supported the Arab countries' just position of condemning Israeli aggression, and appreciated the positive efforts made by the Special Committee in exposing the aggressive crimes of Israel.

72. The Special Political Committee had been discussing the question of the human rights of the populations of the Israeli-occupied territories for six years. However, the atrocities perpetrated by the Israeli Zionists had been intensified. After the Israeli aggressors had been dealt heavy blows in the war of October 1973, they had stepped up immigration to the occupied territories in pursuance of their policy of "zionization" in order to perpetuate their occupation of the Arab territories. The Israeli leaders had been clamouring that the Golan Heights were an inseparable part of Israel and the new Israeli Prime Minister had repeatedly declared that Israel would not return to the borders it had occupied before the 1967 war. In that connexion, the statement of an Israeli Minister that the settlements in the occupied territories presented the future map of Israel was a glaring example of their barefaced gangster's logic. The facts showed that the Israeli Zionists wanted to hang on in the occupied territories. Like all aggressors in history, they would never lay down their butcher's knives and become Buddha overnight.

73. It was precisely because of the two super-Powers that Israel, a country with very limited human and material resources, had dared to commit so much evil, act so truculently, and persist in making itself an enemy of the Arab peoples. Those super-Powers intended to maintain the tense situation of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East in order to contend for spheres of influence and to appropriate all resources and strategic positions in the region. One super-Power, openly declaring its commitment to Israel, had been giving energetic support and encouragement politically, militarily and economically. The other super-Power was more cunning and hypocritical. Often masquerading as a "benefactor" and "saviour" of the Arab peoples and alleging that they would not be able to move a single inch forward without its assistance, that super-Power had actually taken advantage of their difficulties in an attempt to infiltrate into and control the Arab countries, expand its spheres of influence in the Middle East and strenuously undermine the just struggle of the Arab people against aggression. On the surface, it occasionally condemned Israeli zionism, while in fact it was offering timely

assistance by sending a steady flow of manpower to Israel. At the critical juncture of the war in October 1973, when the Israeli ruling clique had been very concerned about its shortage of troops, that super-Power had broken its past record of monthly emigration to Israel. Its actions had evoked the strong indignation of the Arab people.

74. The Second Islamic Summit Conference, held in February 1974, had adopted a resolution condemning the countries giving human assistance to Israel and calling on them to desist immediately. However, that super-Power had gone even further: recently in begging for "most-favoured-nation treatment" from the other super-Power, it had not hesitated to betray further the interests of the Arab people by undertaking to multiply the rate of its emigration to Israel. Israeli leaders had immediately expressed appreciation of that action. Did that action not reveal the downright hypocrisy and duplicity of that super-Power? Its sham support and real betrayal, sham assistance and real control of the Arab and Palestinian people had been seen through by an increasing number of people.

75. Where there was oppression, there was resistance; where there was aggression, there was struggle against aggression. The Palestinian and other Arab peoples in the Israeli-occupied territories had never ceased their resistance and struggle. The attempt of the Israeli aggressors to extinguish the raging flames of their resistance by massacre and repression would only make them emerge stronger in fight. The Palestinian people had now become an important political force in the Middle East. They had won the ever-broader sympathy and support of the people of the world, as seen in the recent decision of the General Assembly (resolution 3210 (XXIX)) to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority of 105 to 4. On the other hand, the seemingly powerful super-Powers and Israeli Zionists had become increasingly isolated and had found themselves besieged by the Arab peoples and the people of the rest of the world. The entire situation was developing in a direction favourable to the Arab people and unfavourable to the super-Powers and zionism.

76. Her delegation had consistently held that the question of human rights in the Israeli-occupied territories was part and parcel of the whole Middle East question and that, in the final analysis, the two super-Powers' contention for hegemony in that region had long prevented the Arab and Palestinian peoples in the occupied territories from surmounting their misery. The solution to the question of human rights in the occupied territories evidently lay in the elimination of super-Power interference, the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people and the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories.

77. The Chinese people and Government had always deeply sympathized with the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and had firmly supported their just struggle against zionism and hegemony. They had assisted them within the limits of their capabilities. Although the struggle of the Palestinian and Arab peoples would be long and arduous, and they would encounter all kinds of difficulties and hazards, and although the super-Powers and Israeli Zionists would resort to various disruptive schemes and plots, the

Chinese Government and people were convinced the heroic Palestinian and Arab peoples would certainly realize their national aspirations and emerge victorious in that struggle.

*Mr. Lind (Sweden) resumed the Chair.*

78. Mr. EHSASSI (Iran) said that the after-effects of the war of October 1973 and subsequent international developments had created widespread expectations. It had been believed by some and hoped by many throughout the world that there would be a noticeable reorientation in Israeli policies of administration in the occupied territories. It had been widely assumed that the Government of Israel, having failed to arrest international trends moving towards recognition of the real issues in the Middle East conflict, would display a more realistic attitude. Unfortunately, those expectations had not materialized.

79. The sixth report of the Special Committee reflected the same sordid pattern of behaviour which had characterized the policy of the occupying Power during the preceding year. Even if one omitted the section pertaining to Quneitra, there was nothing in the report to indicate the possibility of any change. Despite the implementation of the agreements on disengagement of forces, the situation of the civilian population under Israeli military occupation had continued to deteriorate. The policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories pursued by Israel had continued during the preceding year. Except for a certain sophistication and a subtle shift in its emphasis, that policy had continued to exist and to be implemented. The Government of Israel had tried to present a less conspicuous profile in 1974 with regard to that policy, and the publicity surrounding a number of cases in which groups of unauthorized settlers had been evicted was a reflection of that deliberate shift in emphasis.

80. Of all the ramifications of Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, the policy of the demolition of houses had gained international notoriety. Together with mass arrests, internment, curfews and administrative detentions, the practice of demolishing houses was aimed at stamping out resistance on the part of those who opposed the occupying Power as well as at intimidating the civilian population. The evidence collected by the Special Committee had shown a marked increase in the implementation of that policy. According to the current report, the demolition of houses had assumed alarming proportions.

81. The section of the report devoted to the town of Quneitra was indeed appalling. It meticulously described the destruction alleged to have been caused by the Israeli forces before their withdrawal under the agreement on disengagement of forces in the Golan Heights. It would, of course, have been desirable for the Special Committee to have had access to expert advice to support its conclusions. However, the bulk of evidence accumulated by the Committee was such that no amount of denunciation could discredit it. It was clear that little, if any, damage had been inflicted on Quneitra during the wars of June 1967 and October 1973, and it had generally been agreed that no bombardment had taken place during the interim period. The spectacle of Quneitra as a totally devastated area and a complete wasteland led his delegation to share the opinion

of the Special Committee that its destruction had been a consequence of a deliberately executed operation. Whatever the pretext, it was a morally corrupt act and his delegation strongly condemned it.

82. His delegation had no need to stress the serious political and legal consequences of those acts or their far-reaching and devastating effect on the trust which must be gradually and painstakingly built up between the parties to the Middle East conflict.

83. There was no moral or legal justification for Israel to continue to keep occupied Arab lands or to effect changes in the physical and demographic composition of the territory under its administration.

84. His delegation wished to stress that security and peace in the Middle East rested not on the retention of land but on the ability to inculcate trust and to show respect for the rights of all those destined to live together.

85. Mr. MAROOFI (Afghanistan) introduced, on behalf of their sponsors, draft resolutions A/SPC/L.305 and A/SPC/L.306. He noted that both draft resolutions were self-explanatory and needed no further elaboration; he hoped that they would receive the unanimous support of the Committee.

86. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that there was not sufficient time to deal with every misleading statement and untruth his delegation had heard in the course of the debate. He believed, however, that he had provided sufficient information to show how the report had distorted the facts and misrepresented the true situation. The reply to most of the statements made so far in the Committee could thus be found in his statement at the 928th meeting. However, one particular allegation had been made in the statement of the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic (929th meeting), which, following the pattern of the report, was yet another deliberate attempt to mislead the Committee. The statement had alleged that there was a contradiction between a statement made some months earlier at a press conference by the Israeli Chief of Staff and the contents of the letter dated 2 August 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.<sup>5</sup>

87. He wished to state that there existed no such contradiction. Both the statement of the Chief of Staff and the letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel made it clear that the damage and destruction in the town of Quneitra had occurred in the course of military operations in that area over the preceding seven years. His delegation rejected the Syrian attempts to falsify history, as it had rejected similar attempts by the Special Committee.

88. The Syrian representative had also referred to a statement made in Damascus by the President of the so-called Parliamentary Association for European-Arab Cooperation in which he had tendentiously likened the destruction of Quneitra to that of Oradour. Quneitra had

<sup>5</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974, document S/11408.*



been visited towards the end of 1973 by a delegation of the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism, composed of former French ministers, members of Parliament and the President of the Confederation of the Veterans of the French Resistance. The delegation had denounced the statement, saying that it was an insult to the victims of Oradour and had stated that Quneitra had been in the first line of the fighting, had been shelled in both wars, and had been badly destroyed as a result of the fierce fighting which had taken place in the area.

89. Very recently, the Syrian Arab Republic, in its desperate attempts to pervert the truth about Quneitra had made use of the presence of a number of American newspapermen accompanying the United States Secretary of State on his recent visit to Damascus by taking them on a guided tour and trying to convince them of Israel's responsibility for the destruction of Quneitra. The reporters had stated, however, that they had not been convinced by the arguments of the Syrian officials that Israel had destroyed the town prior to handing it over to the Syrians. They had said that most of the houses they had seen had been hit by shells.

90. For years the Syrian Arab Republic had been shelling civilian settlements in the Jordan Valley, had started a war of aggression against Israel in June 1967 and again in October 1973, and had persistently shelled the town of Quneitra between 1967 and 1973 and even after the 1973 cease-fire. It should therefore be the last to make any kind of accusation against Israel.

91. He also rejected all the other baseless allegations of the Syrian representative and others who had tried to justify the conclusions of the report of the Special Committee. For instance, the representative of Kuwait had spoken at considerable length on the question of the demolition of houses from the standpoint of the Geneva Convention. He (Mr. Doron), repeating once more his delegation's reservations concerning the applicability of that Convention, wished to say that the Convention made an exception in respect of houses destroyed for reasons of military necessity. Houses from which bombs were thrown, shots were fired or in which arms were stored might be dealt with under the Geneva Convention in the way the Israeli authorities dealt with them. Those who murdered innocent civilians should think well in advance of the possible consequences for themselves and their families even if they did not consider the consequences of their acts for the families of their victims.

92. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the Israeli representative could not dismiss the findings of the Special Committee, which was composed of persons of authority and integrity, as "misleading statements". In any event, the facts spoke for themselves. To mention only two areas, housing and settlements, the evidence against the Israeli representative's contention was overwhelming. Israel was establishing settlements in the occupied territories. On the West Bank, the Israeli authorities had established 21 such settlements, on the Golan Heights 18, and in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, another 12. He had the names, locations and purposes of all those settlements. They existed. They were facts, not "misleading statements".

93. As to the demolition of housing, the evidence was incontrovertible there also. At least 8,535 dwellings had been destroyed since 1967 in several different areas, on the pretext for the most part that people living in them were engaged in resistance activities.

94. Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt) said that his delegation wished to underline the diversionary character of the statement made by the Israeli representative at the 928th meeting and his renewed attempt at the current meeting to divert the Committee from the subject before it. The acts and crimes of the Israeli authorities were committed as part of the expansionist designs of Israel and the Zionist movements. The Israeli measures to annex Arab territory, to establish Israeli settlements and to deport and expel the Arab population from their homes and lands were most deplorable. The instance of Jerusalem and its annexation was a case in point. The instance of Yanit, a town to be established on the Mediterranean in the Arab territories occupied by Israel, was another case in point, as was that of the expulsion of thousands of Arab families from the occupied territories. All those measures constituted a grave violation of the Geneva Conventions, and the statement by the Israeli representative, assuring the Committee that there was no evidence whatsoever of a policy of annexation, could not be taken at its face value or left unanswered. His delegation interpreted that statement as meaning that Israel was not annexing Jerusalem because Jerusalem, in the view of the Israeli authorities, was theirs and need not be annexed. His delegation wished to reply that Jerusalem, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and especially that of the non-acquisition of territory by war, would not and should not be annexed to Israel.

95. His delegation noted that the Israeli representative had acknowledged and confirmed the establishment of settlements in Arab territories on pretexts such as the "defence of Israel". All those in close contact with developments knew well the kind of settlements established in the occupied areas and realized that the reason for their establishment was to colonize the occupied territories in order to prepare the ground for their annexation, in direct violation of the fourth Geneva Convention as well as the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

96. With regard to the question of the eviction and deportation of the Arab population, the Israeli representative had asked whether there was anything wrong in the authorities wishing to preserve law and order in the territories administered by Israel. Was there anything wrong in expelling and deporting people? His delegation believed that such acts constituted a further grave violation of the Geneva Convention. The depopulation of the occupied territories and the annexation of certain parts of those territories were part and parcel of the Israeli policy of acquisition of territory by force, a policy which could not but constitute a serious threat to peace and security. His delegation trusted that the annexation of territory, the establishment of settlements, the eviction and deportation of inhabitants of the territories and the demolition of houses, all of which had been confirmed in the statement of the Israeli representative, would be taken into consideration when the draft resolutions before the Committee were put to the vote.

97. At its previous session the General Assembly, in its resolution 3092 A (XXVIII), had confirmed by an overwhelming majority the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention and had called upon Israel to apply its provisions. The reservation maintained by the delegation of Israel was based on the erroneous belief of the Zionists that the territories from the Nile to the Euphrates belonged to Israel. However, those territories were Arab territories and would remain so.

98. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the best answer to the delegation that had made slanderous allegations about Soviet policy was the telegram sent to Mr. Brezhnev by the leader of PLO, Mr. Arafat, thanking the Soviet Union for the position of principle it had adopted in support of the Palestinian people. That was the voice of the Arab people of Palestine, for PLO had been recognized as their sole representative. The voice that asserted the opposite was the voice of the slanderer.

99. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Israel had distorted a legal text when he had said that the Geneva Convention countenanced the destruction of houses "for reasons of military necessity". He read out article 53 of the Convention, stressing the words "except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations". Surely the representative of Israel could see the difference between his paraphrase and the authentic text. Was the destruction of the home of the man arrested on suspicion of bombing a bus really a military operation? The Israeli interpretation would make any act of vindictiveness a military operation.

100. Mr. KELANI (Syrian Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that there was a contradiction between the letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the representative of Israel and the clarification given by the Israeli Chief of Staff concerning the destruction of Quneitra. The Chief of Staff had said that parts of Quneitra had been destroyed in 1967 and 1973 but the remainder of the town had been demolished before the withdrawal of Israeli troops. That meant that part of Quneitra had been destroyed after the cessation of hostilities. Israel had accused the Syrian Arab Republic of bombarding Quneitra, disregarding the fact that in October 1973 Israeli planes had bombarded populated areas of Damascus, destroying housing and killing civilians, including diplomats. Israel had denied that fact but the action had been witnessed by United Nations officials and had been referred to in the Security Council. The representative of Israel was alone in asserting that the Syrian Arab Republic was responsible for the destruction of Quneitra. Evidence of the truth was to be found in the book entitled *The Yom Kippur War* by the Insight Team of the London *Sunday Times* and in a letter sent to the Syrian delegation in the Armistice Committee by the Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, which stated that Quneitra had been destroyed by Israeli forces before the commencement of the process of disengagement.

101. Mrs. LI Sung-ling (China) said that, although the Soviet representative had tried to confuse his audience, he could not disguise the flimsiness of his arguments. As he

had not been able to answer the basic points brought forward by the Chinese delegation, he had taken refuge in vituperation, which was, as Lenin had remarked in June 1914, a screen for an utter lack of principles and sterility and impotence on the part of those that used such language.

102. Lenin's words well described the plight of the Soviet representative. The current case was only one of many examples of the duplicity of Soviet social-imperialism. One instance was the fact that the Soviet delegation had voted for General Assembly resolution 3092 B (XXVIII), recommended by the Committee at its previous session, paragraph 5 of which declared that Israel's policy of annexation and establishment of settlements was in contravention to the purposes and the principles of the Charter. But the Soviet Government had continued to send emigrants to Israel at a steadily increasing rate, brazenly supplying manpower with which Israel could pursue its policy of "zionization". Thus, it had voted for the resolution on the one hand, and had openly violated it on the other. It had even committed itself to increasing the number of immigrants by seeking most-favoured-nation treatment from the other super-Power. Was not such sham support and actual betrayal a crying example of duplicity?

103. The Committee would adopt a similar resolution at the current session, and the Soviet representative would presumably vote for it. The Chinese delegation would like to point out to the Soviet delegation that as long as his country continued to step up its emigration to Israel, it would be unable to rid itself of the label of "hypocrite" and "double-dealer", however many affirmative votes it cast. Against incontrovertible facts, swearing and vituperation would be of no avail.

104. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, if the delegation of China were to use the energy it wasted in slander of the Soviet Union for worthy ends, such as giving strong support to the Arab victims of the war, that would be more useful to the Arab peoples than the Chinese representative's intervention in the current debate.

105. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, thanked the representative of Kuwait for correcting an error in the wording of the passage he had quoted from the fourth Geneva Convention. He had been quoting from memory and had expressed the idea, which was that of "military necessity". The commentaries on the Convention made it clear that the sole judge of the necessity of such military operations was the occupying authority. That was the only point he had wished to bring out.

106. Referring to the Syrian representative's statement, he said that neither books nor letters could prove a point when there was a huge body of other evidence to the contrary.

107. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that a slip of memory was understandable, but he preferred to keep to the original text. ICRC was among the authorities which could give their views on whether or not an action taken by the occupying authority on its own responsibility was justified.

In other words, the occupying authority was not sole arbiter of the action it should take under articles 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention. That was clear from paragraph 165 of the Special Committee's report (A/9817), in which the ICRC's views on the plight of the victims of the Israeli army's destruction of houses in occupied territory was given. ICRC stated categorically that that practice was contrary to articles 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention. It might be for the occupying authority to decide what military action it wished to take, but it could not maintain that vindictive punitive action was in accordance with article 53 of the Geneva Convention.

108. Mr. DORON (Israel), again speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the fact remained that the

occupying authority was sole judge of the action it took, notwithstanding the views expressed in paragraph 165 of the Special Committee's report. Israel took full responsibility for its own actions.

109. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking once more in exercise of the right of reply, said that Israel could not be sole judge of its actions in the current instance. It was being judged by the international community for using military action as a mask for its real intentions, which were not in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

*The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.*

## 931st meeting

Tuesday, 12 November 1974, at 10.55 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.931

### AGENDA ITEM 40

#### **Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (*continued*) (A/9799-S/11535, A/9817, A/9843, A/SPC/L.305-307)**

1. Mr. WASSAN (Pakistan) said that the sufferings of war never ended with the cease-fire. The international community, conscious of the need to protect the population of occupied countries, had long sought to formulate rules of international law to that end. Its efforts had resulted in some international instruments, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949, with which occupying Powers had to comply.

2. Since 1968, the Special Committee established by the General Assembly to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the territories occupied by it had repeatedly informed the General Assembly that Israel was pursuing a policy in violation of the international conventions. In its resolution 3092 A (XXVIII), the General Assembly had called upon Israel to respect and comply with the fourth Geneva Convention and other applicable international instruments.

3. The latest report of the Special Committee (A/9817) showed that there had been no change. The disengagement agreements in 1974 had had no effect on the situation. Israel, in contravention of articles 47 and 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention, was continuing its policy of annexation and settlement, demolition of houses, mass arrests and exploitation of the country's natural resources.

4. The latest example of that policy was the devastation to be found in Quneitra after the withdrawal of the Israeli troops. The ruins and rubble showed that the destruction

was not merely the outcome of hostilities, but the result of a systematic operation.

5. The report of the Special Committee did not give the full picture of the situation, since the Committee had voluntarily restricted itself to the examination of those areas of civilian life where marked changes were detected. The information in the previous report, among other things on the subject of Jerusalem, therefore remained valid. There was nothing in the current report to indicate that Israel had abandoned its policy of annexing and changing the city. However deep the sentiments of the followers of three major faiths in the world, which regarded Jerusalem as a holy place, the status of any territory could not be divorced from the sovereign rights of the people of that territory, nor could the special attachment of a people to any territory override principles such as the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force. The majority of the inhabitants of Jerusalem were Arabs who had been expelled from the western part of the city in 1948 and from the eastern part in 1967. The situation brought about by force in no way detracted from the rights of the Arab population of Jerusalem. Other peoples could claim only the right of access and worship. Such were the considerations that had led his Prime Minister to affirm, at the Second Islamic Summit Conference held at Lahore in February 1974, that any agreement which postulated the continuance of Israeli occupation of the Holy City or the transfer of the Holy City to any non-Muslim or non-Arab sovereignty "would not be worth the paper it was written on". In a resolution adopted at that Conference, the 38 Moslem countries taking part condemned the measures to Judaize the Holy City, to annex it and alter its religious and historic character, called for the immediate withdrawal of Israel and declared that the restoration of Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem constituted an indispensable condition for any solution in the Middle East.

6. His country supported the cause of the peoples struggling against injustice. It had always supported measures to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It fully supported any action by the Committee to stop Israel from disregarding the fourth Geneva Convention and other applicable international instruments. That was why his delegation, which was one of the sponsors of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.305 and A/SPC/L.306, wished to become a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.307 as well.

7. Mr. TYLNER (Czechoslovakia) thanked the Special Committee for its report in which, despite the difficulties created by Israel, it had been able to present an objective picture of the situation.

8. By extending its territory, in contravention of the fundamental norms of international law, Israel was seeking to consolidate its position as a permanent imperialist base in the Middle East, hostile to the Arab countries. Israel did not realize the danger of its short-sighted policy. It was true that its arrogance was due to the support it enjoyed from certain Western Powers.

9. In its report, the Special Committee had noted the preparations made with a view to colonizing the occupied lands, and described the demolition of houses belonging to Palestinians, mass arrests, the exploitation of natural resources and the brutality of the occupation troops. Finally, it showed in what state of devastation members of the Special Committee had found the town of Quneitra.

10. His delegation fully supported the conclusion of the Special Committee which, in paragraph 158 of its report, called for the appointment of a commission to study the legal consequences of the devastation of Quneitra.

11. The total withdrawal of Israeli troops was a prerequisite for any settlement. Israel should be called upon to honour its obligations under the third and fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949.

12. His country had always supported the just struggle of the Arab countries and condemned the aggressive expansionist policy of Israel. It fully supported the Arab countries which demanded the liberation of all occupied territories and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. His delegation was moreover prepared to support any measures to improve the lot of the Arab population in the occupied territories until they achieved their liberation. No doubt the Special Political Committee would support the protection of the human rights of the Arab population in the occupied territories and would take the relevant measures to help put an end to the intolerable situation in those territories.

13. Mr. MACKI (Oman) said that since 6 November 1974 the Israeli delegation had given its opinion on the question before the Special Political Committee by requesting that it should not be discussed. In a communiqué issued that same day, the Israeli delegation had cast doubt on the legality of the Special Committee. There was nothing surprising in such an attitude since the inquiry of the Special Committee interfered with Israel's policy.

14. As was stated in the report, there was no shadow of doubt that Israel continued to occupy the Golan Heights,

Sinai, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan, and that, in violation of the Geneva Conventions, it was bringing Jewish settlers there from all over the world. Israel had decided to allow no one else to settle there, which showed the racist character of its policy, similar to that of South Africa.

15. Israel has pursued its policy of destruction by demolishing houses belonging to Palestinians, as Mr. Israel Shahak had testified on 4 April 1974 before the United States Congress. Even children were not safe from expulsion, as was proved by the case of a five-year old girl expelled from Nablus.

16. Although it was impossible to draw up a complete list of violations of human rights committed by Israel in the occupied territories such violations included: the expulsion of the population from the West Bank of the Jordan; the imposition of restrictions on Arabs suspected of direct or indirect participation in the struggle against the occupation forces, restrictions which had been denounced by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in its 1973 report; the arrest at Nablus of 500 people, children among them—in many cases the family of the people arrested had not been notified, which was a violation of articles 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention; and the systematic demolition of Quneitra (see A/9817, paras. 134-147), which was further proof of Israeli barbarity. The town had been dynamited and bulldozers had razed the ruins. The irrigation network had been dynamited, and the tombs in the Christian cemetery profaned. On one slab of wall still standing, the Israelis had proclaimed in Hebrew their intention of restoring the town as a "heap of rubble".

17. The Special Political Committee must help the Palestinian people to recover its land and to regain its rights which had been recognized by the United Nations. It must do everything to establish the rule of justice in the world.

18. He thanked the Chairman and the members of the Special Committee for their objective report to the General Assembly, despite the difficulties which Israel, in its desire to conceal its crimes, had created by refusing them authorization to visit the occupied territories.

19. Mr. BATTISCOMBE (United Kingdom) said that his delegation, as it had made clear on a number of occasions, shared the concern expressed by other speakers that the rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories, and human rights in general, should be respected. However, it had some doubts about whether the Special Committee would be able to find a generally acceptable way to ensure respect for those rights. The United Kingdom had abstained on General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) which had established the Special Committee because of its firm belief that the United Nations could only play a valid role in promoting respect for human rights if it did so on a basis of strict impartiality and objectivity. In that respect the Special Committee had been unable to act as effectively as it should because of the way in which it had been established and had had to operate.

20. The Special Committee, unlike other organizations such as ICRC, had had to rely to a very large degree on



sources outside the area which it was established to investigate. An exception to that was the section of the current report devoted to Quneitra. The Special Committee had therefore been unable to produce a complete, objective and conclusive report, and given the circumstances under which it was set up, he considered it unlikely that that fundamental difficulty would be resolved.

21. The Special Committee, having visited Quneitra in September of the current year, had been able to report on the basis of first-hand investigations. For that reason, the United Kingdom Government would wish to study with special care that part of the report and the conclusions drawn by the Committee. Owing to lack of time, however, it had not yet been able to do so. However, his delegation considered that there could be little doubt of the scale of the destruction that had occurred at Quneitra described in paragraph 140 of the report. He wished to express the great concern of his delegation at the destruction of Quneitra and profound sympathy for the former inhabitants of the city for the tragic loss which they had suffered.

22. Like the Special Committee (see A/9817, para. 170), his Government was convinced that the most effective way of securing respect for the human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories was for the occupation to be terminated as part of a just and lasting settlement on the basis of the full implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). He also wished to remind the Committee of the principles set out in the joint declaration of the nine members of the European Economic Community made on 6 November 1973. His Government had given, and continued to give, its full support to the efforts under way to carry forward negotiations towards a settlement. Priority should be given to those efforts, and any action which might prejudice their chances of success should be avoided.

23. Mr. BARTOLOME (Philippines) noted that the Committee had before it the Special Committee's report, which provided irrefutable evidence of Israel's policy of annexation and settlement in the occupied territories, the demolition of houses, mass arrests, prison conditions, curfews, administrative detention and other measures, expulsions and the denial of the right of civilians to return to their homes, and measures of economic exploitation involving long-term Israeli investments in the occupied territories. That evidence clearly sufficed to condemn Israel, whose acts were clear violations of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not to speak of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

24. His Government considered the full implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), including the withdrawal of Israel from the lands that it occupied since 1967, a vital element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Moreover, it endorsed the Special Committee's view that the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 was fully applicable to the territories under Israeli military occupation, and felt that ICRC should be allowed to ensure the effective implementation of that Convention. However, in its annual report for 1973, ICRC had stated that it deplored a situation which deprived the victims of full protection and of their rights under the

fourth Convention. His delegation supported the ICRC findings.

25. Israel's continued process of expansion and consolidation in the occupied territories only made more difficult the solution of the problem. His delegation supported the Special Committee's conclusion (A/9817, para. 170) that the situation of the civilian population of the occupied territories would only be rectified once the occupation, itself a violation of their basic human rights, was terminated. It also endorsed the Special Committee's recommendations in its latest report, which it had already made repeatedly in previous years, concerning the adoption of an arrangement based on the concept of the protecting Power envisaged in the Geneva Conventions for the protection of civilians in occupied territories (*ibid.*, para. 171).

26. As it had stated (896th meeting) in the debate on the same question during the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, his delegation considered that another appeal should be made to Israel, for the sake of Israel itself, to refrain, pending withdrawal from the occupied territories, from fundamentally transforming the Arab lands under its temporary administration, to respect the rights of their inhabitants and to desist from further consolidating its rule over the territories.

27. He noted with appreciation that according to the Secretary-General's report (A/9843), the Office of Public Information had taken the necessary steps to ensure the widest dissemination of the Special Committee's report. The dissemination of information on the matter would help to broaden public understanding of the problems in the territories occupied by Israel.

28. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) said that racist zionism, the ally of the forces of imperialism, racial segregation and *apartheid*, had taken advantage of a moment of historical apathy and weariness of the human conscience to establish itself in Palestine, the Holy Land, cherished by all its children, whatever their origin. Once there, with the assistance of its imperialist allies, and taking advantage of its technical and military superiority over its neighbours, it had attacked them in order to annex and dominate them. It had sought to eliminate the Palestinian people by denying its existence. In order to expel the Palestinians from the land of their forbears, and perhaps to punish them for having converted to Christianity or Islam, it had not hesitated to resort to force, terror and massacres.

29. That had happened a quarter of a century earlier, when the world was almost entirely dominated by imperialism, the United Nations had only just been born, and the information media were controlled by the oppressors. Israel's policy of terror therefore succeeded. Determined to pursue its policy of expansion, it transformed its entire population into soldiers. The 1967 war brought Israel further victories, and made it more arrogant than ever and less concerned than ever about world opinion.

30. But the world had changed. The information media were free, the third world had broken its chains and countries believing in the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had become Members of the United Nations.

31. The International Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran in 1968 had marked the awakening of the world conscience. When the Conference had become convinced that Israel was flagrantly violating human rights, it had denounced Zionism, and on 7 May 1968, it had adopted resolution I, concerning respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories.<sup>1</sup>

32. The Commission on Human Rights had also become concerned about the situation, and had begun to devote increasing attention to the problem, while Israel continued more than ever to flout international conventions, the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1974, in view of the facts mentioned in paragraph 23 of its report on the work of its thirtieth session,<sup>2</sup> facts which showed that Israel was completely ignoring the appeals made in its resolutions 3 (XXVIII)<sup>3</sup> and 4 (XXIX),<sup>4</sup> the Commission had adopted a stronger resolution, resolution 1 (XXX),<sup>2</sup> entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East", in which it expressly condemned Israel.

33. The Special Political Committee had also taken up the matter, setting up the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

34. The Committee was considering the latest report of the Special Committee, the sixth since its establishment in 1968. Like the five previous reports, it contained irrefutable evidence of Israel's continued violation of human rights and complete disregard of the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations. The facts set forth in that report could not be disputed, despite the Israeli representative's frantic attempts to do so in his voluminous speech at the 928th meeting. His delegation wished to review a number of points stressed in the report.

35. As evidenced by the Israeli sources of information mentioned in the report, Israel had pursued its policy of annexation and colonization on a greater scale than ever.

36. The 1973 report of the International Red Cross, for instance, showed that Israel had systematically demolished houses in the occupied territories, leaving countless persons homeless. As could be seen from an article published in *The New York Times* of 10 November and captioned "... 'Modern Civilized Society' in the 'Liberated Territory' ", no less than 19,000 houses had been demolished. The historic patrimony of the occupied territories had not been spared either; only recently, that had prompted UNESCO to adopt a resolution condemning Israel for continuing to damage the historical monuments of Jerusalem and for carrying on excavations which threatened them. The Committee's report also quoted many news items from Israeli sources showing that Israel had pursued a policy of indiscriminate mass arrests; those were facts which the representative of Israel had been unable to deny.

<sup>1</sup> See *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.XIV.2), chap. III.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 5*.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No. 7, chap. XIII.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 6, chap. XX.

37. Although the Israeli Government had prevented the Special Committee from carrying out its investigation on the spot, the Committee's report contained much evidence of ill-treatment of detainees in the prisons. The report quoted irrefutable evidence of curfews, administrative detention, expulsion of inhabitants and denial of their right to return, and measures of economic exploitation. All those acts, together with those committed in the town of Quneitra, which were also set out in the Special Committee's report, were undeniable evidence of the policy pursued by Israel, which was continuing to flout the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, and even had the audacity to deny the existence of the Palestinian people. But the representatives of the Palestinian people were in New York and they were going to be able to make their voices heard in the United Nations.

38. He emphasized that Israel's policy was a threat to the peace of the Middle East and even of the whole world. The Special Committee should continue to fulfil its mandate and keep a close watch on Zionist practices and violations of human rights in the occupied territories. Although the conscience of the world was patient, patience had its limits.

39. Mr. KORNEENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Special Committee's report (A/9817) provided irrefutable proof of the fact that Israel was still trampling on the principles of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and also the many decisions calling upon it to desist from its practices in the occupied territories. From the information supplied by the Special Committee and by the speakers in the debate, it was clear that Israel, in utter disregard of the Security Council resolutions, was applying a systematic policy of annexation and settlement of lands which had never belonged to it at any time, that it was expelling the inhabitants and demolishing their houses, and preventing the people who had fled before its armies from returning to their homes.

40. That of course was why Israel was so determined to prevent the Special Committee from carrying out its investigation on the spot in the occupied territories; and that was why the representative of Israel on the Committee had no qualms about using any argument to denigrate the excellent work done by the Special Committee.

41. There was no practice about which Israel had any qualms either: the occupying Power had organized its systematic plundering remarkably well. It was drawing \$400 million a year from the exploitation of the Egyptian oil wells in Sinai. It did not hesitate to steal works of art and cultural property, and it even went so far as to rifle tombs.

42. Israel's defence was the resistance it was meeting from the Arab patriots. But what else could Israel expect when, contrary to the most elementary rules of international law, it terrorized whole populations in applying its outrageous settlement plans? The destruction of Quneitra, which the Special Committee had declared to be systematic and deliberately executed, had roused the indignation of the whole world. Such an act was reminiscent of the barbarous crimes of the Nazis, the traces of which had been found in the Ukraine when it had freed itself from the oppressor more than 30 years before. The delegation of the Ukrainian

SSR therefore felt entirely justified in endorsing the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee on the destruction of Quneitra (*ibid.*, paras. 156-158). Despite all the obstacles which Israel had put in its way, the Special Committee had succeeded in assembling an impressive body of valuable evidence on that point, as well as on the other points it had investigated, evidence on which action must be taken.

43. And yet, the Israeli delegation had tried to deny the facts and to draw an idyllic picture of the existence of the subjugated Arab peoples in Israeli occupied territory. Fortunately, such statements had produced exactly the opposite effect to what the Israeli representative had expected. As had rightly been said by several speakers, the occupation itself was only a prolongation of the aggression against the Arab States.

44. The item could not be taken off the agenda until peace had been restored; and peace would not be restored until an end had been put to the occupation begun in 1967 and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and nation had been duly recognized.

45. Mr. PITARKA (Albania) said that the Albanian Government and people had always supported the victims of Israeli aggression and were continuing to do so. Recent events showed that Israel's occupation of the territory of certain Arab States was a grave danger to the Arab peoples and to the whole Middle East. The report of the Special Committee demonstrated once again the aggressive and colonialist nature of Israel's policy. Israel was seeking by every means in its power to modify the demographic structure of the population of the occupied territories and even physically to annihilate the Arab population, in the hope of making its occupation permanent. Israel was continuing to drive out the native population by force, as it had already done at Nablus, on the West Bank of the Jordan, in the Gaza Strip, and it was sending increasing numbers of Israeli settlers to take their place. Furthermore, the heavy investment by Israeli companies in those territories and the construction of many factories showed that Israel had no intention of ending its occupation. The plundering of the Arabs' natural resources was becoming steadily more intensive: oil production in Sinai, for instance, had risen from 90,000 to 120,000 barrels a day.

46. In his statements to the Committee, the representative of Israel had tried to refute the accusations of the Special Committee. But if the situation described in the report of the Special Committee was so far from the truth, why had Israel refused the Special Committee access to the occupied territories? And there was one fact which Israel had not been able to prevent the Special Committee from observing: that was the total destruction of the town of Quneitra by the Israeli invaders.

47. All peace-loving peoples and countries were now calling for the condemnation of all aggressors and invaders; they were demanding the adoption of sound rules for the protection of the victims of occupation, whatever its kind. Those demands had been openly formulated once again at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which had been held in the spring of 1974 at Geneva.

48. The Albanian delegation felt bound to denounce the assistance of all kinds given to Israel by the United States of America, which was allowing the Israeli Government to continue its colonialist policy in the occupied territories. Furthermore, Israel was making use of the "no war no peace" situation in the Middle East and of the apparent rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which were really collaborating in order to dominate the Middle East. It was well known that in October 1973, those two super-Powers had tried to stop the liberation struggle of the Arab peoples. They had shown once again that they were in favour of the maintenance of the *status quo*. In addition, they were encouraging Israel's policy, the United States by providing arms and military equipment and the Soviet Union by authorizing the massive emigration of Jews to Israel, which was enabling Israel to send an increasing number of settlers to the occupied territories.

49. The Albanian delegation had already underlined on several occasions that Israeli practices in the Arab territories would end only with the ending of the occupation of those territories and the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people. It once again condemned Israel's colonialist practices in the occupied territories. Lastly, he wished to state that the Albanian Government and people would always support the struggle of the Arab peoples.

50. Mr. TALEB-BENDIAB (Algeria) recalled that on 24 May 1967, when, in accordance with the aggressive plans it had prepared, the Zionist State was about to attack three independent Arab States, General de Gaulle, the French Head of State, had said to Mr. Abba Eban, the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Israel would win the war because of its unquestionable superiority. But, he had also said, Israel would find itself involved in increasing difficulties, both locally and internationally, particularly as the war in the Middle East could not but aggravate world tensions and have unfortunate consequences for many countries; and Israel, which would have become a conquering country, would gradually come to bear the responsibility for those consequences. That analysis was based on the logical idea that any conquest of land belonging to others unavoidably forced the occupying Power to establish its domination by terror and persecution. The Israeli occupation of the Arab territories was no exception to that rule, and it was hardly surprising that the Zionist delegation was attempting to prove the contrary to the Committee. In trying to prove that the Israeli occupation had brought well-being, if not civilization, to the peoples the Israeli Government was trying to enslave and exploit, the Israeli delegation was only repeating the fallacious arguments that all colonizers put forward to justify their policy of colonization, and it was interesting to note that the representative of Pretoria had used just the same language as a justification for the South African Government's policy of *apartheid*.

51. The allegations made by the representative of Tel Aviv have already been shown to be baseless. The world was faced with an occupation which was every bit as bad as the Nazi occupation. The systematic destruction of the town of Quneitra, which had become a ghost-town after the Israeli retreat, was the latest example. Mr. R. Offroy, a member of the French Chamber of Deputies, had stated according to *Le Monde* of 14 September 1974, that the ruins of

Quneitra had reminded him of the town of Oradour-sur-Glane after the liberation of France. When he had seen for himself that the Christian cemetery of Quneitra had been desecrated and that the religious articles had disappeared, he had not hesitated to speak of Israeli Nazism and had appealed to the leaders of Tel Aviv to abandon practices worthy of their vicious predecessors.

52. It was well known that Israel disregarded all the United Nations resolutions against its policy of annexation, colonization and persecution. It was obvious also that Israel would continue to defy the rules of international decency and to ignore the lessons of history because it was blinded by a superiority complex of limitless proportions and was convinced that might was right.

53. But the Arab peoples had decided to resist until such time as common sense and right should triumph over unreason and injustice. The war of October 1973 had

clearly shown that the Arab peoples would not capitulate, and because their cause was just, they had the support of all freedom- and justice-loving peoples. It was also because the struggle of the Palestinian people, represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, was legitimate that nearly the whole international community had supported it and would continue to support it until the rights of the Palestinian people over the land of their birth, for which they had made so many sacrifices, were at last fully restored.

54. He paid a tribute to the Special Committee, which, by presenting a detailed and objective report, had done admirable work in publicizing the crimes perpetrated under a policy that was contrary to the most elementary of human laws.

*The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.*

## 932nd meeting

Tuesday, 12 November 1974, at 3.15 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.932 and Corr.1

### AGENDA ITEM 40

#### Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (*concluded*) (A/9799-S/11535, A/9817, A/9843, A/SPC/L.305-307, A/SPC/L.308/Rev.1, A/SPC/L.309)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that Chad and the Upper Volta had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.305, that Turkey and the Upper Volta had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.305, and that Afghanistan and Pakistan had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.307. He drew attention to documents A/SPC/L.308/Rev.1 and A/SPC/L.309, the notes by the Secretary-General on the administrative and financial implications of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.305 and A/SPC/L.307 respectively.

2. Mr. TAIEB (Morocco) recalled that after the Second World War, the Nazi defendants had based their defence mainly on the argument of the absence of international conventions protecting civilian populations. As the Jews had been the principal victims of the Nazis, the new-born State of Israel had been among the first to sign and ratify the relevant Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and it was indeed ironical that today those very victims of nazism were consistently violating the provisions of that Convention.

3. The report of the Special Committee (A/9817), which was objective and impartial, would help to enlighten world opinion on some aspects of the life of the oppressed

peoples of those territories as the military establishment of Israel had imposed an iron-curtain censorship and had launched a tremendous campaign of distortion of all views pertaining to "security questions". The occupied territories were administered by the Israeli Ministry of Defence. All types of self-expression and political organization were denied, and all organizations, including mutual aid societies and students' organizations, were banned. The policies pursued by the various military governors in the territory could be summarized as the expulsion of the indigenous population and denial of their right to return, annexation, confiscation and resettlement of land and demolition of houses, collective punishment, mass arrests, torture, prolonged administration detention and economic exploitation.

4. In his statement at the 928th meeting, the representative of Israel had tried to draw an analogy between the population in the occupied territories and "the oppressed Jewish minorities in the Arab countries". The Jewish minorities in the Arab world were citizens of Arab States, had lived in those countries by their own choice for many centuries before the creation of Israel, and long before the Zionist State had tried to impose itself as their spokesman. Most of the Jewish communities in the Arab world had found shelter there when they had fled the persecution inflicted upon them elsewhere, mainly in Europe. There was no record of any persecution of Jews in the Arab Islamic world because such persecution would be incompatible with the basic principles of its belief, tradition and civilization. Morocco took pride in its prosperous Moroccan Jewish community of tens of thousands of descendants of those Jews who had fled from Spain in the Middle Ages.



However, the Committee was discussing the fate of people living under foreign occupation and not the fate of ordinary citizens of other States.

5. The Israeli representative's denial of the policy of annexation was contrary to all statements made by Israeli leaders, including the Israeli Prime Minister. He must surely regard as evidence the repeated statements made by high government authorities and reported in official documents and on the official radio. There were many hundreds of statements by Israeli officials indicating that Israel would never leave the Golan Heights, Sharm el Sheikh and other parts of occupied territories which had some emotional link with the Jewish people. Was any additional evidence really needed to show that hundreds of civilian settlements had been established by Israel in almost every part of any occupied territory? The tenacity with which Israel held on to the newly acquired territories demonstrated beyond any doubt that Israeli expansionism was an inherent and permanent characteristic of zionism.

6. The representative of Israel had worked hard to show that the demolition of houses was carried out exclusively on an individual basis as a deterrent to terrorists or suspects, and the fallacy of his argument had been brilliantly exposed by the representative of Kuwait at the 930th meeting. Was it also personal punishment which had led to the destruction of the entire city of Quneitra and the demolition and razing of hundreds of Arab villages, with thousands of houses? What crime had been ascribed to the ancient and historic Moroccan quarter of Jerusalem, which had been entirely demolished on 12 June 1967 when the 400 families living there had received half an hour's notice to evacuate, and when the disabled and elderly people who had not been aware of that short notice or who had been unable to flee had been buried under the debris. The Israeli authorities' explanation of the demolition of the Moroccan quarter, built on a piece of Islamic *waqf* land in 1320 for Moroccan pilgrims travelling to Jerusalem as well as for the needy and elderly Moroccan residents of the city, was that a paved square had to be built in front of the Wailing Wall. It was interesting to note that the Wailing Wall and its surroundings had been declared by the International Commission of Enquiry in 1930 to be Moslem since they formed an integral part of the Dome of the Rock and the Al Aqsa Mosque, the pavement in front of the wall had also been made "*waqf*" in 1193 and consequently belonged to the Moslems.

7. The representative of Israel had stated that the people of the occupied territories were in no hurry to change the conditions under which they were living because they could now earn more money. He wished to assure him that the Arab people in the occupied territories, like most peoples elsewhere, considered their freedom and human dignity more important than material considerations and did not share his concept of greed.

8. The representative of Israel had praised the enlightened Israeli legal system and had said that no Arabs had been executed for crimes perpetrated in the occupied territories. If that was true, and he doubted it, under what law were thousands of innocent Palestinian men, women and children being killed by napalm from Israeli military planes in refugee camps in Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and

Lebanon, and under what kind of civilized law had the killing of the Palestinian leaders and their families in Beirut been perpetrated by the Israeli Secret Service on 10 April 1973?

9. Mr. BÁNYÁSZ (Hungary) said that the report of the Special Committee showed exemplary legal accuracy and a high degree of political and moral integrity.

10. His delegation regretted that the shameful issue of the situation of the population of the Arab territories occupied by Israel and related Israeli practices was once again before the United Nations. However, the passing of time did not grant absolution from the crime of subjugating others and it did not remove the causes which had led to the establishment of the Special Committee and made it necessary to engage in a debate each year.

11. The Israeli representative had again tried to deny the criminal charges brought against the occupation authorities and even to defend the régime of occupation. In the view of his delegation, it was an example of downright cynicism and an insult to common sense to assert that the Israeli administration was known to be probably the most enlightened of all such administrations in similar circumstances. If that was so, why had it rejected an on-the-spot investigation by the Special Committee and why did it resort to brutal violence, mass arrests and police measures to maintain itself? The Israeli standpoint that the so-called security measures were directed against representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led to the conclusion that PLO was indeed a genuine mass movement of the Arab people of Palestine.

12. His delegation believed that the Special Political Committee was in duty bound to make the facts contained in the report of the Special Committee known to world public opinion. There was some encouragement to be drawn from the knowledge that the question of Israeli practices in the occupied territories was probably appearing for the last time on the Committee's agenda. His delegation hoped that all Arab territories would soon be liberated from Israeli occupation, thereby removing the root cause of problems which had aroused the indignation of world public opinion. The sooner a complete and unconditional Israeli withdrawal took place, the better chance there would be that the bitterness caused by so much suffering would be replaced by a spirit of reconciliation.

13. His delegation wished to stress once again that the expansionist policy of zionism had proved a failure and was bound to be defeated. It was no longer unconditionally defended even by those who for a while, in the interests of their own imperialist ambitions, had given it their absolute and unconditional support. Israel would be able to extricate itself from its economic, political and moral crisis if it took prompt measures to change radically the policy which had turned it against all its Arab neighbours and practically against the entire progressive world. The aggressive policy of Israel had caused immense damage and suffering, primarily to the Arab States and peoples of the region, but it had also been harmful to the population of Israel and to the working people of Israel. Only the evacuation of the occupied territories, the immediate ending of the harassment of neighbouring Arab countries, and possible repara-

tions for damages caused could lead to a reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbours and to peaceful coexistence. It was up to Israel to take that first step as soon as possible.

14. Mr. KI (Upper Volta) said that the problem of the protection of human rights was a subject of increasing concern to the international community and was the item which appeared most frequently on the agenda of the United Nations. The United Nations had become a champion of human rights and had sought to enshrine them in its Charter and the relevant international instruments. A considerable body of legislation had also been established for the protection of human rights in wartime, particularly for the civilian population, and all the relevant international instruments had been signed by Israel and the Arab States involved in the present conflict. The refusal by Israel to apply the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 was a serious challenge to the legal organization of international society in so far as any State might consider itself bound or otherwise to a Convention according to whether or not it was favourable or unfavourable to it. That would be a highly dangerous precedent which his delegation could not accept. The international community, and principally the United Nations, had heavy responsibilities with regard to the application of international Conventions and its members would certainly be failing in their duty to the populations of occupied territories, if they chose not to apply the Convention which could best protect those populations. The Special Committee's recommendation in that regard was perfectly appropriate.

15. Neither the representative character nor the mandate of the Special Committee could be questioned, and to do so was a convenient way of disregarding the outcome of its work. His delegation could not accept the arguments of those who did so. The fact that Israel had opposed General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) could not be invoked as a pretext for disregarding the existence of the Special Committee. The decisions of the United Nations were binding upon all States, and Israel could not ignore the existence of the Special Committee and should co-operate with it in its mission. The Special Committee should be enabled to visit the occupied territories to ascertain at first hand whether or not there had been violations of human rights. Israel's refusal to allow the Special Committee to visit the occupied territories was obviously based on apprehension that its intention to annex those territories might be revealed even more clearly. The report of the Special Committee in fact showed that such a policy was becoming more apparent each day. A token of that policy was the expulsion of the Arab population to make room for Israeli settlers to take their places. His delegation could not condone such practices and condemned energetically the destruction of the Syrian town of Quneitra, a regrettable act unworthy of a civilized society. His delegation was led to wonder whether the construction of towns and kibbutzim in the occupied zones was not indicative of the clearly expressed will of Israel to continue to occupy those territories. His delegation was opposed to such a policy which was incompatible with the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force. That policy, however, could not guarantee the safe frontiers desired by Israel; the only safe frontiers were those which were duly accepted by

one's neighbours, on the basis of the relevant international instruments.

16. It seemed, therefore, that the problem far exceeded that of the mere protection of human rights. A genuine solution could be achieved only in a much broader context, namely, the definitive settlement of the Palestinian problem as a whole.

17. Mr. PAVIČEVIĆ (Yugoslavia) noted that, owing to the negative and unco-operative attitude of Israel, the Special Committee had been unable to visit the occupied territories. However, it had culled most of its evidence from statements by Israeli officials and the Israeli press in an effort to present current conditions in the occupied territories as objectively as possible.

18. The attempt to discredit the Special Committee and thus the United Nations itself by describing its members as anti-Israeli and partial could not succeed, because no member of the United Nations could countenance aggression, occupation or annexation, whether carried out by Israel or anyone else. The United Nations could not be impartial or be asked to pursue a policy of so-called non-interference when dealing with an aggressor and his victim, or an occupier and the populations under occupation.

19. Israel's statement had actually enhanced the value of the report and even supplemented it. It had not contested the basic findings of the Special Committee, namely, that by way of reprisals, the Israeli occupation authorities had destroyed and demolished a great many houses belonging to the civilian population, resorted to mass arrests, administrative detention and deportations and established new settlements in the occupied territories in contravention of the right of an occupation Power holding the foreign territory under military occupation on a temporary basis. The Special Committee's findings that Israel was exploiting the natural resources of the occupied territories was not denied either. The fact, quoted in the report on the basis of Israeli sources, that Israel was earning \$400 million per year in oil revenues from the Sinai oil wells called for no further comment and could not be weakened by assertions that the exploitation of natural resources did not fall within the mandate of the Special Committee. The destruction of Quneitra clearly showed the real face of the Israeli occupation. Theories about the humanitarian missions of occupiers and colonial Powers were well known to all. Those who advocated such theories in the United Nations obviously ignored the fact that most Members of the United Nations had either experienced occupation during the Second World War and subsequent wars and seen how similar theories were applied in practice by occupying Powers, or gone through the experience of slavery and occupation under colonial Powers.

20. The report of the Special Committee clearly showed that Israel's occupation and annexation of Arab territories closely violated the human rights of the civilian population of those territories as well as of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and numerous United Nations resolutions. The United Nations should condemn Israel's aggressive policy, its continuing occupation of Arab lands, its policy of annexation and other measures whereby the

Israeli authorities had violated the basic human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied regions as well as its looting of the natural resources of the occupied territories. The United Nations should undertake all necessary measures to ensure that such practices were brought to an end. His delegation believed that the recommendations by the Special Committee could be helpful in that respect. The fact that Israel had clearly rejected the Special Committee's conclusion that the occupation itself was a violation of the basic human rights of the civilian population clearly showed that Israel intended to prolong the occupation indefinitely. The urgent need for a just and lasting solution of the Middle East crisis, which would offer security and peace to the countries and peoples of the region was obvious. The solution, as had been reiterated time and again, could be achieved only on the basis of the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and later and full recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

21. Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic) said that, although the United Nations had condemned the Israeli armed aggression which had led to the grave situation in the Middle East and repeatedly called upon Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, that country was still continuing its policy of annexation. The detailed report of the Special Committee (A/9817) showed that Israel was using inhuman methods of repression and expulsion in those territories typical of those applied by the imperialist colonial Powers in order to prevent the liberation of the colonial peoples. In his long statement attempting to justify his country's position, the representative of Israel had been unable to refute the many allegations of violations of human rights in the occupied territories, although he attempted to interpret them in his own way.

22. The events of the preceding few decades proved that it was no longer possible to subjugate peoples indefinitely and to expel them illegally from their homeland. The policy of forcible Israelization of the occupied areas and the disregard of the rights of Arab citizens were therefore bound to fail. Nevertheless, since Israel's aggression and its occupation of Arab territories were a grave threat to world peace, the United Nations should urge strict Israeli compliance with its decisions. Israel must withdraw completely from the Arab territories it had occupied in 1967, restore the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine and finally comply with Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

23. His country reiterated its unwavering solidarity with the Arab peoples in their struggle against Israeli aggression and would support any action taken by the Special Political Committee with a view to achieving a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.

24. Mr. AL-JARWAN (United Arab Emirates) said that, since the item had been included on the agenda of the General Assembly, each year had added new details about the odious Israeli policy in the occupied territories, which was unparalleled in modern history. Despite the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations since 1970 and even since 1948, Israel's immoral violation of the Charter and of international conventions had been a flagrant defiance of world public opinion. In his statement at the

928th meeting, the Israeli representative had tried to justify his country's refusal to allow the Special Committee to visit the occupied territories on the pretext that its members belonged to countries which had no diplomatic relations with Israel. However, the real reason for that lack of co-operation was Israel's fear that that Committee would disclose the true situation and the sufferings of the Arab inhabitants of those territories whose rights were being trampled under foot. Israel's refusal to implement General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) had showed what its real policy was, because at that time the composition of the Special Committee had not been announced.

25. Israel's policy of settlement, demolition of houses and mass arrests was aimed at dislodging the indigenous population and replacing it by foreign immigrants. Israel said that the settlements were being established for reasons of defence. However, the real reason was given in the statement by the Israeli Minister of Tourism quoted in paragraph 38 of the Special Committee's report (A/9817). The imposing of curfews, carrying out of mass arrests, expulsion, denial of the right to return were all violations of fundamental human rights as mentioned in Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and a defiance of the principles laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Israel was resorting to odious means to force the indigenous inhabitants to leave their homes and denying them the right to return while doing its best to attract more Jews to Israel, which clearly showed its racist policy.

26. The Israeli occupying authorities had annexed the whole city of Jerusalem and altered its physical and Arab characteristics for fictitious reasons. They seemed unaware of the importance which the Holy City represented to other religions than their own. The international community must adopt the necessary measures to prevent Israel from irrevocably changing the character of Jerusalem.

27. New Israeli crimes were being unmasked day after day. The chapter of the Special Committee's report devoted to Quneitra showed the scope of the barbarous acts committed by a State Member of the United Nations. The Israeli representative's explanations had been contradicted by irrefutable evidence, in particular the traces of destruction left in the town. The occupying forces had even desecrated cemeteries, pillaged churches and mosques and destroyed cultural property. As stated in paragraph 157 of the report, the Special Committee was convinced that the devastation must have taken place recently and systematically and prior to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and that the Israeli occupying authorities were therefore responsible for the devastation of Quneitra.

28. In view of all those violations of international instruments, the international community must adopt strong measures to put an end to the crimes committed by Israel, which threatened peace not only in the Middle East but also throughout the world. His delegation therefore called upon the United Nations and the specialized agencies not to be satisfied with adopting resolutions but to take energetic action to put an end to such barbarous activities. It would be shameful for the aggressors to be free to continue their aggressive acts as and when they pleased. The international



community must no longer tolerate the dispersal of a whole people. The time had come for it to recognize their right to return to their native land.

29. Mr. ABDULJALIL (Indonesia) said that the Special Committee had again produced a detailed report despite Israel's refusal to allow it to enter the occupied territories. The report clearly showed that Israel's policy of annexation and settlement (see A/9817, paras. 37-64), had caused large-scale human suffering over the preceding seven years. The evidence reported in paragraphs 42 to 64 effectively proved that during that period, the policy of annexation and settlement had proceeded in all those territories.

30. In terms of human suffering, the additional measures engaged in by the occupying forces were equally important. The demolition of houses, sometimes only those of relatives of suspects, mass arrests often followed by long interrogation sessions, lengthy detention and barbarous conditions were further aggravated by the imposition of curfews, administrative detention and other measures. In addition, the cruel practice of expelling people from their homelands and denying them the right to return (*ibid.*, paras. 125-129) constituted an effort to alter the demographic conditions within the occupied territories. Finally, the Special Committee presented convincing evidence that Israel was engaging in the continued exploitation of the resources of the occupied territories in violation of international law. The extraction of \$400 million worth of oil from the Sinai wells (*ibid.*, para. 131), gave the impression that Israel hoped to exhaust the resources of the Arab territories before it was forced to return them to their rightful owners and the exploitation of workers (*ibid.*, paras. 132 and 133) added a poignant note of human suffering.

31. Perhaps the most serious of the apparent Israeli violations of the Geneva Convention of 1949, however, was the destruction of the town of Quneitra. While it was to be regretted that the Special Committee had not obtained the expert assistance which it had requested, the evidence given in the report (*ibid.*, paras. 139-147) supported the conclusion that the destruction of the town was indeed deliberate and did not result from the fighting which had taken place around it.

32. It was regrettable that the Israeli Government had not yet permitted members of the Special Committee to visit the territories in order to verify their conclusions. There could be no better way of providing the members of that Committee with the opportunity to correct the "distortions" which, according to the Israeli representative, seriously impaired their findings. In the absence of such an invitation and of a commitment by the Israeli Government to apply the provisions of the Geneva Conventions to the occupied territories, the international community could only draw its own conclusions.

33. Fundamentally, of course, those matters merely reflected the deeper political reality underlying the situation in the Middle East. However, pending a solution of the wider problem, it was the General Assembly's duty to prevent the continuing violation of the human rights of the people living in the occupied territories. His delegation therefore urged the Committee to adopt draft resolutions A/SPC/L.305 and A/SPC/L.306 of which it was a sponsor.

Indonesia would also vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.307 and thought that the three draft resolutions would effectively foster the efforts being made to protect the rights of those living under Israeli occupation forces.

34. Mr. KANOUTE (Mali) expressed regret that despite repeated requests by the United Nations, the Israeli Government had yet again refused to allow the Special Committee to visit the occupied territories. None of the arguments put forward by Israel could justify such flouting of the Organization's authority.

35. The information provided in the report had therefore had to be obtained principally from the Israeli and international press, statements by Israeli leaders, Israeli reports and the publications of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). That information showed that Israel had continued its arbitrary, inhuman policies and practices, namely, the annexation and settlement of the occupied territories, arbitrary mass arrests to intimidate the population, ill-treatment and torture of detainees, restrictive and harassing measures such as curfews and administrative detention, the expulsion of the inhabitants of the territories and the denial of their right to return, and the exploitation of the material and human resources of those territories. The demolition of houses, often because they had merely been lived in by political suspects, had attained alarming proportions in 1974 and was a particularly inhuman practice. Israel's exploitation of the natural and human resources of the occupied territories was strangely reminiscent of South Africa's illegal exploitation of the international territory of Namibia. Those policies and practices constituted serious violations of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. They were inadmissible because the person and property of the inhabitants of such territories were entitled to special protection under a number of instruments of international law, namely the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Whatever Israel might say, those Conventions were perfectly applicable because the territories in question belonged to other States and were temporarily under Israeli military occupation. The violations also compromised the international community's endeavours to establish a just and lasting peace in the region.

36. Israel had also systematically destroyed the Syrian town of Quneitra during the withdrawal of its forces as a result of the disengagement agreement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. The intentional destruction, desecration and pillage described in detail in the statement of the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic (929th meeting) were abhorrent and should be strongly condemned by the international community.

37. Despite Israel's intransigent attitude, hopes of peace in the Middle East were growing. The invitation of representatives of PLO, as the sole representatives of the Palestinian people, to speak in the General Assembly was a step in that direction. Israel and all the other countries of the region needed peace so that all their efforts could be diverted to a single cause, that of the happiness and prosperity of their peoples. Peace could be possible if Israel renounced its policy of annexation, withdrew from the territories it had occupied by force since 1967 and recognized the legitimate



rights of the Palestinian people. Every effort should be made to make Israel listen to the voice of reason. Until it did so, the population of the occupied territories must be protected against the grave violations of their human rights by the occupier. In that connexion, the work of the Special Committee was not only useful but also necessary.

38. Introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.307 on behalf of his own delegation and that of Guinea, on the tragic situation of the town of Quneitra, he said that unless the international community strongly condemned Israel and brought home to it its responsibility for the systematic destruction of that town, other Arab towns currently occupied by Israel might suffer the same fate as Quneitra when Israel evacuated them, which it would eventually be obliged to do. The sponsors of the draft resolution therefore appealed to the members of the Committee to adopt it by a large majority.

39. Mr. KAMARA (Mauritania) drew attention to the importance of the item under discussion, both because of its effect on the lives of thousands of innocent people and because it concerned a flagrant violation of the most elementary principles of human rights, of the Charter, of numerous United Nations resolutions and various international conventions. The hesitations of the United Nations were responsible for the continuation of the atrocities committed by the Israeli authorities in the occupied territories.

40. Despite the Israeli authorities' refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee, the latter had been able to collect adequate proof that Israel's aim was the systematic destruction of the moral and spiritual values of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee's report listed the different types of violation of those international instruments which affected the welfare of the inhabitants of those territories. In view of the Israeli Government's obstinate refusal to allow the Special Committee to enter the occupied territories, it had had to base its report on statements by members of that Government, on Israeli and foreign press reports and on information communicated by ICRC. In their statements, the members of the Israeli Government did not hide the colonialist and expansionist nature of their policy. General Dayan had also stated that Israel's frontiers might eventually extend as far as Lebanon and perhaps to the centre of the Syrian Arab Republic, and as early as 1899, one of the original Zionists had said that it was impossible for 10 million Jews to live in an area of 25,000 square kilometres. It was therefore obvious that the State of Israel was based on the idea of annexation.

41. If Israel was allowed to continue its exploitation of the resources of the occupied territories, their economy would become almost completely dependent on that of the occupying Power.

42. Jerusalem was particularly important to his country, which was deeply concerned at the Israeli Government's policy of taking over the Arab part of the city which contained the holy places.

43. It also condemned the barbarous activities of the Zionist soldiers in Quneitra in June 1974. As the Mauri-

tanian Foreign Minister had said in the General Assembly (2251st plenary meeting), those who had been the victims of nazism had now become the most fervent addicts of the methods of its leader. The systematic destruction of Quneitra was yet another instance of the Israeli authorities' defiance of the international community and the Syrian Arab Republic had already asked that a United Nations commission should carry out an investigation of the destruction. Their systematic violation of the spirit and letter of the Geneva Conventions, the Charter and various United Nations resolutions were a threat to international peace and security. The sadistic acts committed by the Zionist authorities were confirmed by many witnesses.

44. The successive reports of the Special Committee showed that the Zionist authorities had committed crimes against the populations of the occupied territories which affected their most elementary human rights. They scrupulously followed the tenet of Herzl that, when occupying territories, they should annex land, incite the poorer inhabitants to leave it for neighbouring territories, and use the workers who remained for unhealthy work, with a high mortality rate. To carry out that policy, they applied in the occupied territories the 170 military laws already in force in Tel Aviv, which enabled them to expel anyone from those territories and prevent the inhabitants from returning home, to confiscate a house on the suspicion that a shot had been fired from it or to confiscate the property of anyone breaking those laws. Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) on the partition of Palestine between Arabs, both Moslem and Christian, and Jews, Israel had consistently refused to implement the resolutions of the United Nations and its specialized agencies concerning its many crimes committed against the Palestinians and the other inhabitants of the Arab territories occupied as a result of its unpunished aggression. Israel's action in those territories had been condemned by the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Algiers in September 1973, which had called them war crimes and an affront to humanity, as had the Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 3 (XXVIII).<sup>1</sup> Principle VI of the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg and in the Judgement of the Tribunal<sup>2</sup> had also recognized that the destruction of towns or villages not justified by military necessity constituted a war crime.

45. In the light of the irrefutable proof provided by the Special Committee and other equally convincing sources, the Special Political Committee must unequivocally condemn the odious practices which were so many challenges to the international conscience.

46. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia) paid a tribute to the Special Committee, which had carried out its work in difficult conditions. Israel had only itself to blame for those conditions, for it should have permitted the Special Committee to pursue its investigations in the occupied territories. She recalled that Israel had voted against

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No. 7, chap. XIII.*

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 12, part III.*

General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), under which the Special Committee had been established; Israel was now challenging the Special Committee's impartiality. The representative of Israel had said that human rights were fully respected in his country, but that was the language of a colonial Power that was seeking to camouflage reality. It was no surprise that the repression and atrocities in the occupied territories had grown worse. The political situation was changing, yet Israel persisted in increasing its own isolation. The strong could kill men and destroy towns but they could not deprive a people of its identity, for the day would come when the atrocities, by their very enormity, would cause the land to be restored to the people.

47. The Special Committee's report was based on irrefutable evidence. Her delegation could not accept the Israeli allegation that the questions asked had been slanted and that words had been put in the mouths of witnesses. The documentation of the destruction of Qibneira was eloquent evidence; evidence of that kind showed that the occupying Power was continuing its policy of harassment of the population of the occupied territories. She reviewed the activities of the occupying Power described in the report and asked whether such activities amounted to respect for human rights. Any State that claimed to respect human rights must also apply the international legal instruments that were designed for that purpose. Since Israel did not apply those instruments, it was clearly violating the principles of the Charter and the rights to self-determination and exercise of human rights. It was of course normal for United Nations resolutions to be ineffective in a situation in which a country thought itself above the law.

48. The item before the Committee was only one aspect of the question of Palestine, which the General Assembly was about to consider. Political pressure should be brought to bear on Israel, and indeed South Africa, to persuade them to revise their policies of usurpation and exploitation and renounce practices that were degrading for themselves. Everyone was aware of the suffering, courage and generosity of the Palestinian people. Time was on their side, but for the oppressor tomorrow was already yesterday. Her delegation had welcomed Portugal's decision to erase its past so as not to lose its future.

49. The United Nations was the forum in which a lasting solution to the Middle East question could be found, a solution guaranteeing peace and justice for all.

*Mr. Martínez (Venezuela), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

50. Mr. AL-SHAKAR (Bahrain) paid a tribute to the Special Committee, which had discharged its duty with great competence despite Israel's refusal to allow it to enter the occupied territories. The current report and those of previous years bore witness to the objectivity, integrity and sense of responsibility of the Special Committee, which had described with absolute impartiality the events connected with Israel's violations of human rights.

51. The report described the Zionist plans to establish settlements and implant foreigners in the occupied territories; since 1967 Israel had set up a network of colonies in order to consolidate its expansionist objectives. It persisted

in that policy despite the United Nations resolutions calling on it to desist and in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention. The report unmasked Israel's policy of annexation on the West Bank and the Golan Heights and in the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula as part of an imperialist and expansionist scheme to expel the indigenous Arab population. Israeli leaders had said that they would never give up any part of the West Bank, or indeed the other occupied territories, because of their strategic importance for Israel's defence and imperialist plans. The establishment of settlements in the occupied territories had clearly been carried out with the approval of the Israeli authorities.

52. Although the Palestinian people enjoyed world support, thanks to the efforts of PLO, the occupation authorities refused to allow them to return to their homeland; instead it encouraged Jews to immigrate into Palestine. Such immigration could only be to the detriment of the people and land of Palestine. The immigration laws made it possible for a Jew from, for example, Europe, to enjoy the rights of citizenship immediately on arrival in Palestine; that was perfectly in keeping with Israel's imperialist and racist policy. But the colonization of Palestine would never be a durable political factor.

53. The United Nations and the whole international community must denounce Israel's policies and compel it to desist from its expansionist and annexationist practices in the occupied territories. Even those countries that rendered assistance to Israel should take that action.

54. The report set forth clear evidence of the situation and sufferings of the population of the occupied territories, documenting in detail the oppressive acts inflicted by the occupation authorities on the civil population, in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Special Committee rightly denounced all such acts. The rights of the population of the occupied territories had been trampled underfoot by the Israeli armed forces in order to break their resistance. And their suffering was not over; no documentation could adequately describe the brutality of such measures as collective punishment, administrative detention and torture. Many Palestinian leaders had been expelled and their houses destroyed on the pretext that they had relations with PLO or for so-called security reasons.

55. Every day holy places were being desecrated; churches and mosques were inspected by the Israeli authorities with a contemptuous disregard for their holy character. The Israelis were altering the Arab character of Jerusalem in defiance of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

56. Despite those resolutions and the efforts of ICRC, the Israeli authorities refused to apply the fourth Geneva Convention or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its attempts to Judaize the occupied territories and its disfigurement of Arab cultural and historical property amounted to war crimes and an affront to all mankind. The United Nations could not permit the fourth Geneva Convention to be held in abeyance by Israel. Israel had signed the Convention and must be made to put it into effect.

57. The report also described the economic measures imposed on the population of the occupied territories and the exploitation of their natural resources. The occupation authorities used the land for the economic benefit of Israel and took no account of the needs of the Arab population. The representative of Israel had delivered a lecture on the happy situation of the Arab population and the economic benefits they were deriving from Israel's presence. The Committee could not accept that argument, indeed no one accepted that imperialism and the occupation of foreign territory could be justified by any considerations of the prosperity they brought. Israel was violating the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty over their natural resources. His delegation invited all countries to refrain from assisting Israel to exploit the resources of the occupied territories or alter their demographic and geographical character.

58. The report proved that the Israeli forces had devastated Quneitra before their withdrawal. The town, which used to be important and prosperous, was now in ruins. Its cemeteries, mosques and churches had been desecrated and its monuments plundered. The Special Committee had concluded that the Israeli forces had dynamited houses, schools and hospitals just before their withdrawal. That was evidence of Israel's blind hatred and folly. According to the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the destruction of a city not justified by military necessity was a war crime. Indeed, the devastation of Quneitra called to mind the destruction of European towns by the Nazis; a true analogy could be drawn between Zionist and Nazi brutality. The town had clearly not been destroyed as part of military operations, as the representative of Israel had asserted. His delegation hoped that the Israeli war crimes would be investigated and condemned by the General Assembly and the international community.

59. Israel was also seeking to exterminate the Palestinian people by attacking refugee camps in the southern part of Lebanon, killing men, women and children. The Israelis were surely aware of their crimes. The United Nations recognized the rights of the Palestinian people and required Israel to observe them. The problem of the occupied territories was closely linked with the whole problem of Palestine. The invitation to the representatives of PLO to speak in the General Assembly was legitimate because PLO had been recognized by the majority of countries as the sole authentic representative of the Palestinian people. The problem was being put in its proper context, which was a sign of the awakening of the conscience of the world. He was sure that PLO would contribute to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, but that peace would only be possible when all Israeli forces were withdrawn from the occupied Arab territories and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people were guaranteed. Since the United Nations recognized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, it must assist them in their struggle against the racist, imperialist Zionists in order to recover their full national rights.

60. Mr. VRAILAS (Greece) congratulated the Special Committee on the manner in which it had carried out its mandate and for its scrupulous impartiality, despite the obstacles it had had to overcome. It was evident and understandable that his country should have a special

interest in any question dealing with the protection of the populations of occupied territories. As a country of the eastern Mediterranean, Greece was anxious for the establishment of a just and lasting peace for the benefit of all the peoples of the region. It could not help being alarmed by any violation of international law, and especially of the fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

61. His country's position with regard to the Arab population of Palestine had always been based on a desire to ensure the protection of the rights of the civilian population living in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. His delegation must roundly condemn any practice connected with the annexation or colonization of territories under foreign occupation. The measures described in paragraphs 37 to 133 of the Special Committee's report, and any other administrative, military or economic measures likely to impede the exercise of human rights by the populations concerned were acts that degraded human dignity. Such measures destroyed any idea of justice and equity and any hope for the speedy establishment of a just and lasting peace. The devastation of Quneitra was a new element in the series of catastrophes to which the region had become so accustomed.

62. It must be noted that the enumeration of those practices, although corroborated in some cases by the press or by Israeli citizens, would have been better founded if the Israeli Government had authorized the Special Committee to visit the occupied territories. Such authorization would have met the reiterated appeals of the General Assembly and would have enabled the Special Committee to establish *in situ* the truth of the situation of the population of the territories. Accordingly, his delegation regretfully stated that the attitude adopted by Israel, instead of ensuring the security to which it was entitled, contributed to an atmosphere of hatred and suspicion between Israel and its neighbours, thus jeopardizing the efforts that had produced a glimmer of hope for a peaceful settlement for the whole region. In that connexion, it must always be borne in mind that until the territories occupied in 1967 were evacuated it would be impossible to establish peace in the Middle East or to put an end to the suffering and problems of the population of the region.

63. In the interest of the Arab population of Palestine his delegation had co-sponsored draft resolution A/SPC/L.306 and it would also vote in favour of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.305 and A/SPC/L.307. But with regard to the latter draft resolution, his delegation thought that the survey to be carried out by experts should precede the adoption of such a detailed draft resolution.

64. Mr. SHARAPOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) noted with satisfaction the results of the work which the Special Committee had been able to carry out despite the Israeli Government's refusal to co-operate. It had gathered a large amount of factual material which proved that Israel continued to pursue its policy of aggression, despite the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. The Israeli Government was still violating human rights in the occupied territories and persisting in its criminal activities against the Arab population, indeed, those activities were becoming even more monstrous. In

contravention of international law, Israel was exploiting the indigenous population and plundering the natural resources of the occupied territories.

65. His delegation trusted the Special Committee's report, for it was based on a painstaking and profound analysis of statements by members of the Israeli Government and on information received from such bodies as ICRC and UNRWA.

66. The crimes committed by the Israeli forces in Quneitra warranted special attention, for the town had been completely devastated just before the withdrawal of Israeli troops. That action resurrected memories of the monstrous crimes committed by the Hitlerites. He wished to remind the representatives of Israel that the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal specified heavy punishment for military crimes and crimes against humanity. His delegation endorsed the Special Committee's conclusion that the Israeli occupation forces were responsible for the destruction of Quneitra. His delegation, together with all peace-loving States, advocated a speedy settlement of the situation in the Middle East. The expansionist Israeli leaders were trying to sabotage implementation of the Security Council decisions and to prevent the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference. Moreover, Israel insisted that it would never return to the 1967 frontiers. Such a situation could not fail to cause concern in his own and in many other delegations.

67. The General Assembly must continue to deal with the item before the Committee and the attention of the United Nations must remain focused on the problem. Of course, delegations would be able to state their views on the importance of an immediate and just settlement of the Middle East problem more fully during the consideration of the question of Palestine by the General Assembly in plenary meeting. But even at the current stage, his delegation wished to stress that there could be no peace in the Middle East without the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories or without a solution of the problem of Palestine that took account of the Palestinian people. A political settlement in the Middle East was one of the most important international problems, for all the peoples of the world and the cause of peace and security would gain therefrom.

68. Mr. BART-WILLIAMS (Sierra Leone) congratulated the Special Committee on its exhaustive and impartial report, which justified the confidence placed in it by almost all the members of the Special Political Committee and of the General Assembly. Having read the report, his delegation was enraged at the Israeli action in the occupied territories, the population of which was entitled to protection under the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Israeli actions had been a persistent and flagrant violation of those Conventions. Since 1967 it had continued its policy of annexation and settlement, destruction of houses, mass arrests, subjection of the population to inhuman prison conditions, economic exploitation and other undignified inhuman treatments, while ignoring world opinion. The numerous allegations of Israeli violations of human rights could not possibly be exaggerated.

69. Despite the difficulties encountered by the Special Committee in its work, especially in its effort to gain access to the occupied areas, its inspection of the town of Quneitra had revealed carefully planned mass devastation by the Israeli forces before they withdrew. The deliberate destruction of the town was a glaring example of the violation of human rights by the Israelis, and also served to confirm the Special Committee's report of atrocities in other occupied areas.

70. His delegation deplored the Israeli policy of denying the Committee an opportunity to investigate the allegations of the population in the occupied areas, which confirmed the suspicion that there was much to hide. The Israeli cause had been further weakened by non-co-operation with the International Red Cross. The implementation of the agreements on the disengagement of forces had not altered the condition of the civilian population in the occupied territory; and Israel continued to ignore the General Assembly's resolutions.

71. The flagrant violation of the established principles of human rights by Israel called for severe censure by all those who shared respect for human dignity: the Charter and obligations of the United Nations could not be ignored by one State at its convenience. Further pressure should be brought to bear on the Israel Government to respect General Assembly resolutions, especially resolution 3092 B (XXVIII). His delegation supported the Special Committee's call for the appointment of a commission to study the legal consequences of the devastation of Quneitra.

*Mr. Lind (Sweden) resumed the Chair.*

72. Mr. ADDOU (Somalia) said that his delegation totally rejected Israel's assertions. He endorsed unreservedly the statements made by the representatives of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan and Kuwait.

73. Mr. PASIARDIS (Cyprus) said that the Committee had been dealing with the item under discussion for five years without any substantial results. Despite the Committee's condemnation of Israel for its persistent violation of United Nations decisions and other international instruments, Israel continued to refuse the Special Committee access to the occupied territories. Apparently, Israel's policy of destruction and ill-treatment was the response of a United Nations Member State that had signed the fourth Geneva Convention to international conventions and United Nations decisions. That was a tragic irony. If it was necessary to destroy buildings and towns and to ill treat the population in order to restore peace, the international community would need to find a new word for peace.

74. The CHAIRMAN announced that Madagascar and the Niger had become sponsors of the three draft resolutions before the Committee.

75. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that the statement by the representative of Morocco surpassed all others in the competition to attribute atrocities to Israel. He pointed out that the Special Political Committee was a main committee of the United Nations and was not a horror fiction competition. While there was probably no country in the world where prison conditions were ideal, Israel had no reason to be ashamed of the conditions in its prisons.



76. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.305 followed the established pattern and malpractice of previous resolutions on the same topic. It accepted blindly the contents of the report of the Special Committee and went beyond the report by expressing concern over matters that were not specifically dealt with in the report. He rejected the assertions made in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution. Israel had always desired a just and lasting peace with its neighbours; but it was those neighbours that were preventing the establishment of such a peace. Israel administered the occupied territories under local law, with the exception that the death penalty provided for under Jordanian law was not applied. That approach was in accordance with the fourth Geneva Convention. He pointed out that, as noted in the ICRC commentary, the prohibition on the destruction of buildings did not apply where such destruction was essential for military operations. The commentary indicated that it was for the occupying Power to assess the relative importance of the military advantages to be gained from demolishing buildings; he agreed that it was important to avoid bad faith in interpreting the situation. The Israeli military administration always considered very carefully the need to demolish any house or other building in the light of the military benefit to be derived therefrom.

77. Draft resolutions A/SPC/L.305 and A/SPC/L.306 had been circulated as working papers before the discussion of item 40 had begun. He therefore had no illusions as to the intentions of certain delegations that had made up their minds regardless of the facts. He hoped that some delegations would oppose the draft resolutions and reject the report of the Special Committee as being totally unfounded.

78. As far as draft resolution A/SPC/L.306 was concerned, his delegation's position on the application of the fourth Geneva Convention was well known. Although it had expressed reservations with regard to the Convention, Israel took its provisions as standard. That was a far better approach than that taken by certain countries which were prepared to sign and adhere to any convention but would then proceed to honour it in the breach rather than in the observance. Although there had been many situations in which the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention should have been applied, it was only in the case of the territories under Israeli administration that the United Nations tried to apply them.

79. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.307 was based on chapter V of the report of the Special Committee. The members of the Special Committee were not competent to deal with the matter and had no basis for their conclusions. The Committee should not allow itself to be pushed by the convictions of the Special Committee and should reject the report. None of the allegations in the report had been proved. Israel had not violated the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention; the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal was not applicable to the situation. The requests made in operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution were irrelevant. The draft resolution was an example of the way in which the Arab countries, with the support of certain other States, tried to shift responsibility for their actions to others. He hoped that the draft resolution would be rejected, despite the oil-powered Arab steamroller that was trundling through the corridors of the United Nations.

80. Mr. ABDEL RAHIM (Sudan) said that, despite the persistent failure of the Israeli Government to co-operate with the Special Committee, the sixth report of the Special Committee, like the five preceding ones, provided a solid body of evidence of Israel's continuing violation of the human rights of the population of the territories under military occupation. That occupation was continuing despite Security Council and other United Nations decisions on the non-admissibility of the annexation of territory by force. Reports from various sources and statements by delegations had brought to light the long list of gruesome acts committed by Israel and listed in operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.305. Israel's action to seek out and strike down opponents to its will extended to refugees, professional people, workers and even representatives of the Palestine people who were coming to New York to explain their views peacefully. The facts and figures provided in the reports were known to everyone except, it appeared, the spokesmen and agents of the Israeli Government.

81. The Government of Israel had persistently refused to comply with requests by the Secretary-General and the General Assembly to assist the Special Committee in its work. The representative of Israel had tried without success to cast doubts on the credibility of the Special Committee with arguments that included specious references to financial matters. Israel's attitude was part and parcel of a set pattern of disregard, arrogance and contempt for the United Nations and all it stood for. Its refusal to comply with requests emanating from many United Nations bodies showed a contempt for the majority and confirmed that it was Israel's intention to treat the international community with disrespect. Not even South Africa, that other racist and colonialist country, had gone as far as Israel in its violation of human rights and its contempt for the United Nations and world opinion. Neither on principle nor for the sake of its own long-term interests was Israel prepared to review its position and to bring itself into line with international legality and world opinion. It was up to the United Nations to consider very carefully how to deal with that menace to human rights, peace and security.

82. He stressed the importance of the conclusions in paragraphs 169 and 170 of the report of the Special Committee. Consideration and approval of the draft resolutions before the Committee must be seen as the first step in implementing those conclusions. He drew attention to the historical decision by the General Assembly (resolution 3210 (XXIX)) to invite representatives of the Palestinian people to speak in the General Assembly. It was the Palestinian people who would have to bear the brunt and the honour of implementing the recommendations of the Special Committee.

83. Mr. KANOUTE (Mali), speaking on behalf of the sponsors, said that the word "*Confirms*" in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.307 should be replaced by the word "*Endorses*".

84. Mr. KELANI (Syrian Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the Israeli delegation, in announcing beforehand its rejection of all three draft resolutions, had provided further evidence of Israel's defiance of the will of the United Nations.

Moreover, Israel had condemned itself by persisting in its refusal to apply the fourth Geneva Convention and by rejecting the evidence contained in the Special Committee's reports. None of the delegations which had spoken on the item in question had expressed any sympathy or support for Israel, which was regarded as a criminal in the dock.

85. The Israeli representative had stated that the Arab States had come to the General Assembly with the intention of using their oil resources and their wealth to attain their ends. He would point out that the Arab States had always come to the General Assembly determined to respect the principles of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions.

86. Mr. TAIEB (Morocco), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, noted that the Israeli representative had appeared to be very upset by the information which the Moroccan delegation had submitted on Israeli concentration camps, in particular that of Sarafand, and on the destruction of the old Moroccan quarter of Jerusalem. He pointed out that the information on the concentration camps had been taken from a document published by Amnesty International, a humanitarian organization of no political colour. As far as the demolition and destruction of the old Moroccan quarter of Jerusalem was concerned, he challenged the Israeli representative to deny that all the houses in that quarter had been destroyed by the Israeli army on 12 June 1967. It was interesting to note that, as recently as one month earlier, the Israeli authorities had advised the inhabitants of the quarter of Jerusalem adjacent to the old Moroccan quarter to leave their homes as they were in danger of collapsing. That had obviously been another trick to enable the Israelis to destroy more Arab homes in Jerusalem and to complete their policy of Judaization of the city.

87. The CHAIRMAN said that he intended to allow delegations to speak in explanation of vote either before voting began or after the voting on all three draft resolutions had been completed. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to follow that procedure.

*It was so decided.*

88. The CHAIRMAN said that the notes by the Secretary-General on the administrative and financial implications of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.305 and A/SPC/L.307, submitted in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, were contained in documents A/SPC/L.308/Rev.1 and A/SPC/L.309 respectively.

*At the request of the representatives of Egypt and Israel, a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution A/SPC/L.305.*

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan,

Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

*Against:* Bolivia, Israel, Nicaragua, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, El Salvador, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malawi, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 82 votes to 4, with 25 abstentions.*

*At the request of the representatives of Egypt and Israel, a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution A/SPC/L.306.*

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Bolivia, Costa Rica, Israel, Malawi, Nicaragua.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 102 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.<sup>3</sup>*

<sup>3</sup> The representative of Tunisia subsequently stated (2303rd plenary meeting) that her delegation's vote in favour of the draft resolution had not been properly recorded.

*At the request of the representatives of Egypt and Israel, a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution A/SPC/L.307, as orally revised.*

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

*Against:* Bolivia, Canada, Israel, Nicaragua.

*Abstaining:* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malawi, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

*The draft resolution, as orally revised, was adopted by 79 votes to 4, with 28 abstentions.*

89. Mr. MELHUIH (Australia), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had been unable to vote for draft resolution A/SPC/L.307 because it was not in possession of all the facts concerning the destruction of Quneitra, and because the terms in which the text was couched were not productive in the context of the search for an early settlement to the tragic situation in the Middle East.

90. Mr. BRUNO (Uruguay), speaking in explanation of vote, said that a distinction must be made between the formal and substantive aspects of the question. With regard to the substance, no nation which respected human rights could remain indifferent to the mission of the Special Committee. His delegation always gave full support to the United Nations when it attempted to defend the principles of human rights, justice and peace. From the formal point of view, however, there were certain drawbacks. His delegation believed that the membership of the Special Committee should be broadened, respecting the principles of geographic distribution, in order to ensure its impartiality and to guarantee the quality of its work. Year after year, the General Assembly condemned Israel without effect; but Israel's refusal to co-operate would lose its political basis if the membership of the Special Committee were broader. His delegation had therefore abstained on draft resolutions A/SPC/L.305 and A/SPC/L.307. On the other hand, it had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.306, which reaffirmed the principles of the 1949 Geneva Convention, because those principles were law in his country.

91. Mr. MUHONEN (Finland), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had voted for draft resolution A/SPC/L.305, although it had some reservations. It was most regrettable that the Special Committee could not be established in a way that would have created better conditions for it to discharge its humanitarian mandate. He deplored the continued refusal of Israel to allow it access to the occupied territories, which had affected the formulation of certain operative paragraphs of the draft resolution, such as paragraph 3, with which his delegation could not entirely agree.

92. His delegation had nevertheless voted for the draft resolution because of its concern for the living conditions of the population in the occupied territories. At the same time, however, it recognized the paramount importance of getting a reliable and full picture of the situation. He reiterated that his delegation could not accept any changes in the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or in the status of the occupied territories, and also emphasized that human rights in those territories should be respected. A just and lasting political solution must be found which would also take into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

93. Mr. FUENTES IBÁÑEZ (Bolivia), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had voted against draft resolutions A/SPC/L.305 and A/SPC/L.307 because it believed that the report of the Special Committee could only be regarded as an informative document. In paragraph 31 of the report the Special Committee itself recognized that it had been obliged to carry out its mandate on the basis of reports in the Israeli and Arab press. The grave accusations were therefore based essentially on information which was only accepted by one of the parties. His delegation considered that the validity of the allegations had not been sufficiently established and did not constitute sufficient proof in accordance with Bolivian law. That position did not mean that his delegation condoned the forced occupation of those territories, or the suffering of the civilian population, particularly as a result of the hostilities of 1967 and 1973. His country, true to the pacifist and humanitarian principles of Christianity, sympathized with the suffering of the civilian population. With regard to the occupation of the territories, his delegation reiterated its rejection of all violence and war, on a basis of respect for the principles of international law and national sovereignty. He emphasized that any new accusation which was not based on sufficient proof, gathered *in situ* by authorities fully accepted by both sides, would not contribute to the negotiations begun with so much difficulty, but would maintain the climate of tension with its harmful consequences.

94. His delegation would have liked to vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.306, which reflected humanitarian principles shared by his delegation. However, it had abstained because it rejected operative paragraph 2, on the grounds that the implied culpability of Israel was based only on the contents of the Special Committee's report.

95. Mr. BRUCE (Canada), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had voted against draft resolution A/SPC/L.307 because it was not satisfied that the findings of the Special Committee were objective and gave ade-

quately comprehensive as well as conclusive evidence of Israel's responsibility in the "deliberate and total" destruction of a town which had been subjected to major assaults in 1973. The draft resolution reflected, by its immoderate phrasing, only one side's account of the history of the destruction of the town. Furthermore, the search for peace in the Middle East would not be served at the current delicate juncture by passing resolutions, the contentious nature of which could only lead to acrimonious exchanges on the eve of a debate where reason and objectivity must prevail.

96. Mr. GUTIERREZ MACIAS (Mexico), speaking in explanation of vote, expressed his delegation's deep concern at the fact that resolutions adopted were not implemented. Certain Member States were ignoring with increasing frequency the resolutions and recommendations of the General Assembly and Security Council, which harmed the prestige of the United Nations. If States really wished to find a just and durable solution to the conflict in which they were engaged, they should make efforts to respect the provisions of the Charter.

97. The report of the Special Committee could have been more complete if it had been given access to the occupied territories. In the circumstances, his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution. He wished to reiterate that, in conformity with the traditional principles of his country's foreign policy, his delegation rejected the use of force in international relations and therefore refused to give any recognition to the occupation of territories or attempted territorial conquest.

98. Mr. LECLERCQ (France), speaking in explanation of vote, said that he was speaking on behalf of the delegations of the countries of the European Economic Community. With regard to draft resolutions A/SPC/L.305 and A/SPC/L.306, those delegations had renewed their votes cast on similar resolutions in the previous year. He wished to emphasize the significance of their positive vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.306: they felt that the fourth Geneva Convention did apply to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and therefore that the Committee had every reason to ask for it to be respected and applied.

99. Their delegations had logically abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.307, not because they doubted the tragic situation of Quneitra following the disengagement agreement, but because they felt that the Committee, before judging the causes of that situation, should be in possession of the results of a complete and thorough investigation, which the Special Committee itself admitted that it had been unable to conduct.

100. If a separate vote had been taken on the last preambular paragraph of that draft resolution, they would have voted against it because they considered the comparison contained in it groundless. He reiterated, however, their delegations' concern at the destruction of Quneitra.

101. Mr. NOGUCHI (Japan), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.305 because it did not agree with certain paragraphs, although it fully shared the concern

expressed in the draft resolution and supported its basic principles. His delegation's abstention, therefore, should not be construed as reflecting any lack of concern on the part of his Government towards the question of the human rights of the Arab population of the occupied territories. His Government maintained the position that Israel should withdraw from all the occupied territories, and therefore was opposed to the annexation by Israel of the territories it occupied and to any physical or demographic change which might render that occupation permanent. His Government's position on the question of human rights of the Arab population of those territories had also been made clear by its positive vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.306.

102. His delegation had also abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.307. Although it had reason to suspect that part of Quneitra had been intentionally destroyed by Israeli troops, it had no authoritative proof that the city had been destroyed by a single and deliberately executed operation as was suggested in the report of the Special Committee. In any case, it was premature to conclude that Israel was wholly responsible for the destruction of Quneitra and condemn Israel before a full investigation by the Special Committee had been initiated. That abstention, however, should not be regarded as a sign of a lack of concern at the fate of the town and its inhabitants, with whom his delegation deeply sympathized.

103. Mr. THAPA (Nepal), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had always opposed the annexation of territories and had therefore always supported withdrawal. It was also opposed to any military solution of the problem. The situation in the Middle East rendered any assessment of the problem extremely difficult. His delegation had therefore abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/SPC/L.307. He wished none the less to express his delegation's sympathy for the victims of the area.

104. Mr. FERGUSON (United States of America), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had voted for draft resolution A/SPC/L.306 in accordance with its traditional policy concerning the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention. It had voted against draft resolution A/SPC/L.305 because, as in previous years, it could not accept the allegations of that text as sufficiently verified. His delegation had abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.307. It regarded the kind of actions alleged in that text as very serious, but considered that the Special Committee's investigation had been limited in time and lacked the expert advice required. Furthermore, the reference to the Nuremburg Tribunal in the last preambular paragraph was irrelevant and unjustified.

105. Mr. ARVESEN (Norway), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.307 in conformity with its traditional position regarding resolutions based on reports of the Special Committee. He emphasized that if a separate vote had been taken on the last preambular paragraph, he would have voted against it, because his delegation could not accept the comparison established with the Nuremburg Tribunal.

*The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m.*



## 933rd meeting

Friday, 15 November 1974, at 3.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.933

*Tribute to the memory of H.E. Al-Sayed Omar Sakkaf,  
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia*

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he was sure that the members of the Committee would wish him to extend their condolences to the Saudi Arabian delegation on the death of Mr. Sakkaf.

*On the proposal of the Chairman, the members of the Committee observed a minute of silence.*

2. Mr. ALMARZOUKI (Saudi Arabia) thanked the Committee for its expression of condolences, which he would convey to his Government and people and to the family of the deceased.

### AGENDA ITEM 39

**Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/9827, A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1)**

3. Mr. AL-FARARGI (Egypt), speaking as Rapporteur of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, introduced the Special Committee's report (A/9827), drawing attention to the draft articles of guidelines (*ibid.*, annex, appendix) submitted by the Chairman of the Special Committee. It was clear from the report that the Working Group had made some progress although it had not yet been able to achieve agreed guidelines for the United Nations peace-keeping operations. Accordingly, the Special Committee recommended that its mandate should be renewed so that it could complete its work and submit the guidelines to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

4. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria), speaking as Chairman of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, recalled that when the Special Committee had been established it had been hoped that it would be able to draw up agreed guidelines as a means of avoiding difficulties in future United Nations peace-keeping operations. Peace-keeping operations played a vital role in the performance by the United Nations of its task of maintaining international peace and security, as could be seen from the functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and also from the assessment of UNEF by the Security Council in its resolution 346 (1974).

5. Through experience the United Nations had acquired some useful principles and practices in the establishment, organization and control of peace-keeping operations. But agreed guidelines were still necessary, for they could help to solve many problems, notably in the structure of the command and control of the operations, thereby enabling the United Nations to react more quickly to crises and increase the effectiveness of its forces.

6. The Special Committee had achieved some success in 1973, when it had agreed in principle on 12 items to be included in the final list of responsibilities to be exercised directly by the Security Council. During 1974 it had attempted to draw up draft articles of guidelines for peace-keeping operations, it being understood that the articles would be drafted on a broader but more concise basis than had been originally intended. The results of that work were set forth in the annex to the Special Committee's report. They should be read in conjunction with the draft articles concerning the responsibilities which it had been agreed earlier should be exercised directly by the Security Council. They were tentative and preliminary drafts and in some cases contained mutually exclusive language. Nevertheless, they represented a considerable achievement in a complex and sensitive field and could serve as a basis for further work. The Special Committee hoped that the Special Political Committee would recommend that its mandate be renewed for another year. If it was, the Special Committee and its Working Group would try even harder to achieve further progress.

7. Mr. PRUD'HOMME (Canada) said that in view of the forthcoming tenth anniversary of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, it seemed appropriate to reflect on its current activities and future prospects. Despite the bitter controversy which had attended its creation, over 10,000 military personnel, drawn from 25 countries in all parts of the world, were currently in United Nations service. In its efforts to elaborate a set of guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations, the Special Committee and its Working Group had taken those developments into account and had studied current United Nations peace-keeping operations in the Middle East as an experience which might assist them in making further progress. The draft guidelines annexed to the Special Committee's report were only a tentative set of articles subject to further consideration. It was to be hoped that the convergence of formerly opposing views on the respective roles of the Security Council and the Secretary-General as evident in UNEF and UNDOF could be the basis for further progress in the Special Committee. The draft guidelines represented a constructive basis for further work and his delegation believed that the Special Committee and its Working Group should be asked to renew their efforts.

8. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the UNEF experience had been the agreement reached on the respective roles of the Security Council and the Secretary-General outlined in paragraph 4 (a) of its mandate of 27 October 1973.<sup>1</sup> In that process of shared responsibility, the Security Council had been able to exercise its over-all authority to ensure that the operation was conducted in

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1973*, document S/11052/Rev.1.

conformity with the mandate and with a broad political consensus essential to the effectiveness of the operation, and the Secretary-General had been responsible for the operational management and functioning of the Force in the field under the over-all authority of the Council.

9. As a contributor to peace-keeping forces, Canada considered it essential for the effective functioning of the Force and for the security and safety of its personnel that necessary operational decisions could be made by the Secretary-General in response to changing circumstances. Those decisions might be open to review by members of the Council but it was impracticable for day-to-day operational control to be exercised by a Council of 15 members or by any subordinate body composed along similar lines. Canada had full confidence in the way in which the Secretary-General had discharged his responsibilities for the operational control of the current peace-keeping operations. Parallel with consultations between the Council and the Secretary-General, there had been a pattern of close consultation between countries which contributed to peace-keeping forces and the Secretary-General on a wide variety of matters.

10. With regard to the draft articles prepared by the Working Group, paragraph 2 of the introduction was drawn from that part of the UNEF mandate he had already quoted and could be a basis for future agreement. On the other hand, his delegation had strong reservations about the wisdom and feasibility of proposals such as that in article 4, paragraph 2—providing for operational control to be exercised by a subsidiary organ of the Council under Article 29 of the Charter, but was prepared to examine the possibility.

11. The three essential conditions for the effective functioning of United Nations peace-keeping forces, set out in article 9, paragraph 1, had been enunciated by the Secretary-General and approved by the Security Council when setting up UNEF, and should properly form part of any agreed guidelines. The first, that forces should at all times have the full confidence and backing of the Security Council, underlined the importance of a broad political consensus, not only on the establishment of a peace-keeping operation, but also on its conduct and operations. There should be no disagreement on the importance of the ultimate authority of the Council. The second, that the forces must operate with the full co-operation of the parties concerned, must be read in the context of the rights and duties assumed by Member States under the Charter, including the provisions of Article 24. The parties which consented to a United Nations peace-keeping presence must take full responsibility for the status and safety of the personnel of the force. The draft guidelines could be strengthened by spelling out what was implied in article 9. The third condition, that forces must function as integrated and efficient military units, should be read in conjunction with the concept of equitable geographical representation reflected in the three different formulations of article 10 of the draft guidelines. Care must be taken to apply the concept of balanced representation in a flexible manner because to apply it rigidly could make the task of setting up a peace-keeping force or a peace-observing mission very difficult. However, there need be no contradiction between broad geographical representation in a multinational force

and its effectiveness as an integrated military unit. Canada's own national experience in UNEF to date had been highly satisfactory. It had been asked to share responsibility with Poland for logistic support of the Force, a function which required closely integrated operations between units in the field, but despite different backgrounds in training, equipment and different languages, the two contingents had been able to discharge their responsibilities effectively. It was worth recalling that a number of possible guidelines had been examined in the Working Group in relation to observer groups under Model I, including the need for concurrence of host countries, ready availability of forces for dispatch in a crisis situation and effectiveness in contributing to good working relations.

12. With regard to article 11 of the guidelines on the financing of peace-keeping forces, his delegation shared the view, which had been widely expressed at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, that the concept of collective financial responsibility was an essential basis for United Nations peace-keeping operations. The Security Council's decision to that effect with respect to UNEF and UNDOF should be reflected in any agreed guidelines.

13. It had been suggested that UNEF had shown that the United Nations could mount peace-keeping operations successfully with little advance planning or detailed guidelines and that a high degree of improvisation was inevitable, since each operation would arise in a unique political and military setting. Clearly, nothing should impair the discretion of the Security Council in responding to each situation, as it arose, in the appropriate way. At the same time, his country, as a major force contributor to UNEF, realized that some of the delays and problems which had arisen at the operational and administrative levels could have been avoided with better advance planning. A distinction should be made between the political and operational levels of action. At the level of the political consensus, there were clearly limits beyond which it would be unrealistic to attempt to foresee the requirements of future peace-keeping activities. The Working Group was trying to achieve agreement on an outline of guidelines on a very general level submitted by the Chairman of the Special Committee.

14. The Special Committee should give increased attention to the operational level. Even with the long United Nations experience in peace keeping, the lack of systematic preparations and agreed procedures had been apparent during the first few months of UNEF and there was a clear need for guidance and for common standards to be established. The problems and delays in establishing common procedures, services and allocation of functions were of concern not only to the Secretary-General and the countries providing logistic support but also to the two parties in conflict in the field, who were manning precarious cease-fire lines in circumstances where a United Nations force was needed as quickly as possible to exercise a stabilizing influence and help prevent the renewal of fighting. They were also of particular concern to the troop-contributing Governments and various contingents deployed in the area in the first few days with only a minimum of logistic support. The ability of the United Nations to respond quickly to the needs of the situation in 1973 had been largely due to fortuitous circumstances which might not be present in future operations.

15. Much could be done to enhance the capacity of the United Nations to meet future needs in a more orderly, economical and efficient way. A number of suggestions and proposals on contingency planning and preparedness had been made in the Special Committee at various stages of its work. The Working Group had already reached agreement in principle on a number of such proposals and a number of other proposals had been and were still under discussion.

16. Obviously matters such as stand-by arrangements and detailed military planning could not be considered entirely in isolation from the political question relating to the establishment, direction and control of a peace-keeping force. The convergence of positions on those political issues during the establishment and operation of UNEF should encourage delegations to approach those less contentious matters with greater confidence. Progress on general guidelines in the new climate prevailing should be matched with parallel progress on practical and modest measures to enhance United Nations preparedness.

17. The UNEF experience suggested that it would be desirable for renewed attention to be given to training selected personnel from potential participants in various geographic regions of the world, necessarily on a modest scale. In his country's experience, a good United Nations peace-keeping soldier was basically a well-trained and disciplined national soldier and the skills and qualifications needed for United Nations peace-keeping work were not very different from those needed by national military establishments. Some thought could be given to additional training under United Nations auspices in special problems and needs that arose in a multinational operation. The memorandum submitted by the four Nordic countries at the previous session<sup>2</sup> illustrated the kinds of co-ordinated efforts which could be encouraged or undertaken under United Nations auspices to help potential participants meet those problems and needs.

18. When the Special Committee resumed its work, it might consider the possibility that UNITAR could undertake training and research for United Nations peace keeping. Within existing financial constraints, such a role would necessarily be on a limited scale, perhaps beginning with short courses on planning and preparedness for United Nations peace keeping for military staff officers from different countries. Consideration might also be given to certain practical needs, such as the preparation of manuals on standards of equipment and standard operating procedures for United Nations forces. His delegation hoped that the Special Committee would study such possibilities and make recommendations for inclusion in its report to the next session of the General Assembly.

19. He then introduced draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1 on behalf of the other sponsors and announced that the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and Peru had asked to be added to the list of sponsors. The draft resolution followed the pattern of earlier resolutions adopted by the General Assembly with a view to renewing the mandate of the Special Committee. It reflected the need for agreed guidelines to govern United Nations

peace-keeping operations and requested the Special Committee and its Working Group to renew their efforts to complete such guidelines for submission to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. In the light of its broad sponsorship, his delegation hoped that the draft resolution would be warmly supported by the Special Political Committee.

20. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden) said that his country's co-operation in peace-keeping operations was an essential part of its general United Nations policy, as could be seen from its contributions in personnel and money. His Government believed that through its peace-keeping operations the United Nations could play a unique role in the maintenance of international peace and security, but the operations must be a collective responsibility of all Member States. It was therefore regrettable that the Special Committee had not made more progress in achieving agreed guidelines, although its work in 1974 could provide a basis for further efforts. His delegation urged the Special Committee and its Working Group to complete its work in time for consideration at the thirtieth session. It hoped that the special study on the Nordic stand-by forces for United Nations peace-keeping operations undertaken by the Joint Nordic Committee for Military United Nations Matters could contribute to the Special Committee's work. Note should also be taken of the experience gained by UNEF and UNDOF.

21. Guidelines for peace-keeping operations could help to prevent hasty, uneconomical and risky improvisations in the establishment of peace-keeping forces, although, to be sure, the lack of prior decision on guidelines had not prevented the Security Council from agreeing on guidelines for UNEF and UNDOF. Experience showed that adequate preparations for the organization, training and use of peace-keeping forces were vital; his country, like a number of others, had already established stand-by forces for employment by the United Nations at short notice. His Government hoped that more Member States would consider doing likewise, for such preparations contributed to a better understanding of the problems involved in peace-keeping operations. Such stand-by forces were a prerequisite for enabling the United Nations to mount effective peace-keeping operations. The effectiveness of any peace-keeping operation depended largely on the availability of trained personnel and it was desirable that observers and contingents from potential participants should be given the opportunity of undergoing special training. Only if trained personnel were available from different parts of the world would it be possible to achieve a broad-based composition of peace-keeping forces. Consideration should therefore be given to the role that the United Nations might play in facilitating and co-ordinating such training.

22. Another prerequisite was the readiness of States to make financial contributions. His Government maintained that the costs of peace-keeping operations should be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by its Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. It was vital that a solution should be found to the problem of reimbursement of the States that contributed troops, for a broad-based composition of forces could not be achieved if such States did not receive reasonable compensation. The solution must not make the

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 44, document A/SPC/165.

financial burden on small countries so heavy as to prohibit them from contributing with the necessary continuity to peace-keeping operations, which tended to last for a long time.

23. His Government considered that the work of strengthening the peace-keeping machinery should be intensified so that the United Nations would be able to fulfil more effectively its main purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

24. Mr. TERRENOIRE (France) said that the Special Committee's report illustrated the disagreement among Member States with regard to general principles. The Special Committee and its Working Group deserved to be commended for doing everything possible to achieve agreed guidelines. Their work had enabled positions on various questions to be defined more accurately, although it was unfortunately not possible to speak of progress. On the contrary, some points which had seemed settled in 1973 now seemed to have been called into question again. That failure was not due to the Special Committee's structures, for it and its Working Group were the best instruments for carrying out the task. The cause of the disagreement should

be sought in the Member States' lack of will to agree and in the disregard of the principles of the Charter, which should be the guide in everything. Chapter VII of the Charter should be kept in mind in any discussion of the question of the responsibilities and powers of the various United Nations peace-keeping bodies.

25. Some Member States would like to proceed only on the basis of precedents, but precedents that were drawn from particular contexts and could not therefore be infallible guides. The Middle East operation was an example; its successful conduct was due to the skill and wisdom of the Secretary-General and to the agreement achieved among the States concerned. There were certainly lessons to be drawn from the operation, but not general rules.

26. His country approved of the draft resolution and hoped that the Special Committee would resume its work in a spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding that would lead to a successful conclusion.

*The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.*

## 934th meeting

Monday, 18 November 1974, at 3.20 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.934

### *Tribute to the memory of H.E. Mr. Erskine Hamilton Childers, President of Ireland*

1. The CHAIRMAN, speaking on behalf of the members of the Committee, expressed profound regret at the death of Mr. Erskine Childers, President of Ireland, a distinguished statesman whose death was a great and sad loss to his country. He asked the representative of Ireland to transmit the feelings of all the members of the Committee to his Government and country, and to the family of Mr. Childers.

*On the proposal of the Chairman, the members of the Committee observed a minute of silence.*

2. Mr. CORCORAN (Ireland) thanked the members of the Committee on behalf of his delegation for their expressions of condolence on the death of the President of Ireland. Ireland was mourning the death of a great Irishman who had dedicated his life and work to reconciliation and peace for all his people. He would convey the kind words of the Chairman to the Government and people of Ireland and to the late President's family.

### AGENDA ITEM 39

**Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (continued) (A/9827, A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1)**

3. The CHAIRMAN announced that Togo had been added to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1.

4. Mr. JOZAN (Hungary) said it was evident from paragraph 6 of the Special Committee's report (A/9827) that the Working Group had made progress during the current year in the matter of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Furthermore, paragraph 7 of the annex to the report referred to definite progress in the difficult task of achieving agreed guidelines on United Nations peace-keeping operations. His delegation agreed with that assessment.

5. Another positive feature of the current effort undertaken in the Working Group was the recognition of the role of the Security Council. That was no mean achievement, if some of the peace-keeping operations conducted in the past were recalled.

6. His delegation was certainly aware of the difficulties reflected in the various formulas, some of which tended to detract from the essential role of the Security Council in the establishment, direction and control of peace-keeping operations. His delegation considered that guidelines should contain clear-cut formulations for the institutional setting up of peace-keeping operations. For that reason, it supported all efforts aimed at producing guidelines that were based on objective criteria reflecting the principles of the



Charter. It was essential that the Security Council should set up an organ that would be entrusted with the task of dealing with peace-keeping operations.

7. It was with those considerations in mind that his delegation would determine its attitude when it came to vote on the draft resolution.

8. Mr. McGHIE (New Zealand) said that his delegation regarded peace keeping as the corner-stone of the United Nations itself, a position that was founded in Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter. It was encouraging, therefore, that during the current year the Working Group of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had produced a series of draft formulas which would provide a basis for the production of agreed guidelines.

9. His delegation agreed with the Secretary-General's statement at the 63rd meeting of the Special Committee<sup>1</sup> that those guidelines would be of great assistance in establishing and maintaining United Nations peace-keeping operations in the future.

10. Using the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) as the standard, he wished to refer briefly to the results of the Working Group's deliberations. The draft formulas in article 9 (see A/9827, annex, appendix) contained the three essential conditions set out in paragraph 3 of the UNEF mandate of 27 October 1973,<sup>2</sup> namely, that the United Nations forces must at all times have the full confidence and backing of the Security Council, must operate with the full co-operation of the parties concerned, and must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit. His delegation considered, however, that two other points must form part of any agreed guidelines, namely, the role of the Secretary-General and the basis on which the operation was to be financed.

11. In providing a structure for close consultation between the various areas of control, the mandate had overcome a potential area of conflict in the control of peace-keeping operations. In that respect he awaited with interest the Special Committee's final guidelines which he hoped would be in accordance with article 8, paragraph 2, of the draft formulas.

12. With regard to the question of financing, his delegation supported the principle of collective financial responsibility as laid down at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly and covered in article 11 of the formulas.

13. The degree of efficiency of the United Nations peace-keeping forces would depend on training and experience. Consequently, New Zealand would introduce in all branches of its armed forces special training programmes which would take into account the experience of other forces that had been employed in such operations, particularly that of the Canadian force. New Zealand forces would thus be equipped to participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations with trained units of various

branches of the armed forces. Instruction which would be introduced formally into the services at the commencement of the 1975-1976 training year would be both theoretical and practical. The New Zealand Government intended to increase the capacity of its forces to participate effectively in United Nations peace-keeping operations, should they be called upon to do so.

14. His delegation was happy to co-sponsor draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1 which it hoped would be unanimously adopted.

15. Mr. KARHILO (Finland) said that his delegation shared the feelings of disappointment and impatience felt by the Member States who had repeatedly stressed the need to arrive at an agreement on guidelines for peace-keeping operations.

16. When the General Assembly, under resolution 2006 (XIX), had established the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations in 1965, the very concept of peace keeping had been the subject of a great deal of controversy. In that respect a change for the better had taken place, for a growing number of Member States had recognized that peace-keeping operations had become an indispensable instrument in the hands of the international community for the containment and settlement of crises and conflicts.

17. Although it was understandable that in a matter concerning fundamental issues of principle, no quick results could be expected, it was regrettable that while discussion on the guidelines for future peace-keeping operations had been at a standstill, the Organization had been called upon in a situation of extreme urgency to set up peace-keeping forces and to resort to hasty improvisations in providing the peace-keeping services required by the situation in the Middle East.

18. In the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization (A/9601/Add.1) the Secretary-General stated that the United Nations had shown that, by means of its peace-keeping machinery, it could sometimes play a significant and unique role in the strengthening of international peace and security. He endorsed that view and thought that the peace-keeping activities both in the Middle East and on Cyprus had shown how indispensable those services had been in implementing the Security Council resolutions and the agreements negotiated between the parties.

19. The Government of Finland had consistently taken a strong interest in the United Nations peace-keeping operations and had given assistance through contributions and money or by placing military personnel at the disposal of the Secretary-General, or both. Furthermore, the Finnish Government had decided in 1968 to establish a stand-by contingent in co-operation with the Governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and to make other arrangements to enable it to respond promptly and effectively to any request for its services in a United Nations peace-keeping operation. Because of those arrangements, the Finnish Government had been ready to act immediately when the Secretary-General had made a request for troops, thus fulfilling what it considered a responsibility towards the international community.

<sup>1</sup> See A/AC.121/SR.63.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1973*, document S/11052/Rev.1.

20. Finland had not participated in the discussion on what had become known as the constitutional issue. It had preferred a pragmatic approach, concentrating its attention on peace-keeping operations initiated by the Security Council. He shared the view of the Secretary-General that the establishment of UNEF was a significant pragmatic advance towards reconciling the divergent views among Members of the Organization. It was clear that, in spite of the lack of agreed guidelines and in spite of controversies on principles, the United Nations had been capable of responding to the requirements of the situation. The co-operation of the parties to the conflict in the Middle East with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) had been another important factor in the success of those new peace-keeping operations.

21. Finland considered that the establishment and operation of the United Nations forces was a joint collective undertaking for the maintenance of international peace and security. As to the financing of the operation, the Finnish Government had consistently held the view that the principle of collective responsibility must be observed, and it had on other occasions expressed its satisfaction with the basic method of financing UNEF through the budget as agreed upon by the Security Council and the General Assembly in the previous year. The question of financing peace-keeping operations was closely linked with the question of the basis of reimbursement to the troop-contributing countries of the costs involved in United Nations peace keeping. It seemed that in the context of reimbursement the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment had gained ground, and he believed that the basic fairness of equal reimbursement was acceptable to all. However, it would be quite different were the small troop-contributing countries asked, in addition, to put up an unreasonably large share of the budget. Such would be the case were an unduly low flat rate used for reimbursement. That could make it more difficult to achieve the desirable broad-based composition of forces, including in particular troops from developing countries. Furthermore, that would not be right nor fair to the small countries in general. As a consequence, that line of action could not be successfully defended before the public opinion and the political institutions of the small troop-contributing countries. Thus, it would only undermine the whole concept and the foundation of United Nations peace keeping today and in the future. That tendency should not be allowed to take hold. On the contrary, Member States should work with determination to strengthen the positive potential in favour of peace keeping in all countries—including the small states from which the troops evidently had to be recruited even in possible future emergencies. He hoped that, in the question of reimbursement, a solution acceptable to all could be agreed upon during the current session of the General Assembly.

22. In supporting the renewal of the mandate of the Special Committee, his delegation would urge that everything should be done to arrive at an agreement. The draft formulas prepared by the Working Group could serve as a basis for further deliberations. An agreement on the guidelines for future United Nations peace-keeping operations presupposed the need for the political will of all Member States to support collectively those operations.

23. Mr. BART-WILLIAMS (Sierra Leone) paid a tribute to the members of the Working Group of the Special Committee who had been seeking to establish agreed guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations. He would have welcomed more rapid progress but he was fully aware of the difficult problems with which the Working Group had been confronted.

24. His delegation supported the Special Committee's recommendation that the General Assembly should renew the Working Group's mandate so that agreed guidelines could be submitted at the thirtieth session, thus ensuring that all the time and effort which had gone into its work would not be wasted.

25. He was aware that there were still many differences of opinion as to the control and conduct of peace-keeping operations. Thus in the draft formulas submitted by the Working Group the relationships between the role of the Secretary-General, the subsidiary body to be established by the Security Council under Article 29 of the Charter and the Military Staff Committee established under Article 47 of the Charter were not clearly defined. In that connexion, he observed that the purpose was not to draw up a detailed list of the functions of the Security Council, the Secretary-General and so forth, but to establish guidelines. However, as the Working Group itself had indicated, its report was tentative and not necessarily exhaustive and was subject to more thorough consideration.

26. Unlike most national forces, the United Nations force was a peace force and not a force for war. It therefore required special training, which would be effective only if sufficient time for it was allowed. For that reason his delegation supported the Secretary-General's request for the inclusion of training for United Nations peace keeping in the programmes of the armies of Member States.

27. He further observed that no organization could function effectively without adequate financial support. He therefore felt that contributions for peace-keeping operations should be fully paid up at all times. For all those reasons, he urged the Committee to renew the mandate of the Working Group and he supported draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1.

28. Mr. HULINSKÝ (Czechoslovakia) said that although in principle the settlement of controversies had been transferred to the political sphere, the role played by the security mechanism of the United Nations was becoming increasingly important, as demonstrated by recent events. It therefore seemed to him appropriate to call for the speedy fulfilment of the mandate entrusted by the General Assembly to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, for recent events confirmed the usefulness of peace-keeping operations and the need to base all the fundamental aspects of those operations on decisions taken by the Security Council.

29. In principle, the different positions taken by States on the complex questions relating to United Nations peace-keeping operations were dictated by contrary approaches to the Charter. According to one of those approaches, the Charter constituted a firm legal basis establishing the scope of the activities of the United Nations, the authority of its

organs and their mutual relationships. The Charter must be scrupulously respected; otherwise, the United Nations would be used for purposes incompatible with the Charter. The other approach to the Charter was a "pragmatic" one in accordance with which the Charter was interpreted in a flexible manner depending on immediate needs. That approach had been applied, in particular, in the interpretation of the responsibilities of the Security Council. According to one doctrine, if the Security Council was blocked by a veto, it could not perform its responsibility with regard to questions of peace and security and a so-called "residual" responsibility of the General Assembly should be applied. That doctrine also assigned extensive political functions to the Secretary-General in substitution of those of the Security Council.

30. The position of his delegation was based on the fundamental presumption that peace-keeping operations must be planned within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter. To leave that framework would be to violate the Charter and would imperil the very existence of the United Nations. The Security Council was still the sole organ with authority to take decisions on the establishment, duration and termination of United Nations peace-keeping operations.

31. Despite the fact that there were still differences of opinion on that matter among members of the Special Committee, he thought that the activities of the Committee were following the proper course and he therefore supported the proposal that its mandate should be renewed and his delegation had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1.

32. With regard to peace-keeping operations in the Middle East, he thought that they had, on the whole, been satisfactory and, moreover, he considered that they were practically the first operations of the kind which had been based on the provisions of the Charter. Nevertheless, there had also been certain negative aspects which had been criticized in the Security Council. For that reason, he did not share the view that the automatic application of the experience gained in those operations would be sufficient for working out agreed guidelines; secondly, he thought that the experience acquired in the Middle East demonstrated the need to establish a subsidiary organ of the Security Council under Article 29 of the Charter. That organ should consist of the permanent members of the Security Council and other Member States, particularly those which provided military personnel, and it should function continuously. The establishment of that organ could doubtless become a starting-point for the solution of all questions relating to peace-keeping operations. His delegation would therefore like to see the Special Committee and its Working Group devote particular attention to that question.

33. Thirdly, he thought that the question of including the Military Staff Committee in the direction of peace-keeping operations was of great importance. If peace-keeping operations were to remain within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter, that body could not be disregarded, since it was explicitly stated in Article 47 of the Charter that "there shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions

relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament." Moreover, it was stipulated in Article 47, paragraph 3, of the Charter that the Military Staff Committee should be responsible for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Council. Thus the participation of the Military Staff Committee in the direction of peace-keeping operations might make that body more active after the deadlock in negotiations that had taken place in the period 1946-1947 with respect to agreements on the numbers and types of forces under Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter.

34. Mr. MURRAY (United Kingdom) recalled that during the previous session, at the 898th meeting, the United Kingdom representative had questioned whether it was still appropriate to apply to the question of peace-keeping operations what had come to be known as the "microscopic" approach instead of concentrating on essential principles, which would allow for greater flexibility.

35. His delegation therefore welcomed the report of the Special Committee (A/9827), which made it clear that the Committee had devoted most of its attention to the elaboration of draft formulas for agreed guidelines. Although the text represented only a set of preliminary drafts, and a number of texts for each article had been submitted, it should be recognized that the draft articles covered most of the essential points and, in addition, it was now clear what were the main difficulties still to be settled.

36. His delegation had participated in the Working Group of the Special Committee and was the author of several of the formulations submitted (*ibid.*, annex, appendix). The Working Group had striven to reduce the number of alternative formulations for each article and, in consequence, those formulations represented attempts at compromise, even where there had been no agreement on a single text.

37. His delegation was not particularly happy with either of the introductions proposed for the articles. The first stated that the aim of draft guidelines was to ensure that peace-keeping operations should not be used save in the common interest of the United Nations. In his view, the introduction should state what the aim of draft guidelines was, not what it was not. The aim of draft guidelines was to ensure the effective implementation of a decision to establish a peace-keeping operation.

38. As to the second proposal, he thought that it was in itself a very important principle. Even if agreement were never reached on other articles, the acceptance of that principle alone would mean that the Special Committee had provided a basis for the establishment of peace-keeping operations which had hitherto been lacking. It should appear as article 1.

39. With regard to the responsibilities of the Security Council, appearing in draft article 1, his delegation doubted whether a full list of responsibilities of the Council should appear in the main text; perhaps they should be included in

an annex. With regard to article 3, this delegation preferred the first text because the second stated that "all authority shall be exercised in conformity with resolutions of the Security Council", a view which he did not share: for example, he felt that the Secretary-General had responsibilities which did not necessarily derive from resolutions of the Council.

40. With regard to article 4, concerning the question of the establishment of an organ under Article 29 of the Charter, he thought that the most appropriate formula would be one based on the wording of Article 29 itself. He would not be in favour of a text which would make it obligatory to establish such an organ for all peace-keeping operations, for there might in some circumstances be other more effective ways of dealing with the problem, and in others the problem might not arise. Therefore, his delegation could not accept a wording which would make the establishment of an organ under Article 29 obligatory.

41. As for the actual tasks of a committee established under Article 29, the second proposal seemed to his delegation to be quite unrealistic. Since quick action was essential to the success of a peace-keeping operation, it was doubtful whether such an operation could be conducted effectively if the force commander had to rely on specific instructions from a committee.

42. With regard to article 6, he recalled that the United Kingdom representative in the Working Group had taken the view that the term "Commander-in-Chief" meant such different things to different people in different places as to render it liable to highly subjective interpretation. For the reasons he had already explained in connexion with articles 3 and 4, the second alternative for article 6 was unacceptable to his delegation, which did not agree that the Secretary-General should perform only such functions as were entrusted to him by the Security Council, that a committee established under Article 29 should necessarily be established in all peace-keeping operations or, if there was one, that the Secretary-General should invariably act on the basis of guidance from it. In accordance with its belief that the first article in the agreed guidelines should be the text which now appeared as the second proposal for the introduction, his delegation preferred the third proposal for article 6.

43. With regard to article 8, his delegation preferred the second variant, which was taken directly from the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of UNEF,<sup>2</sup> its preference being based on the belief that wherever possible the Special Committee should employ language already used and agreed upon by the Security Council.

44. Turning to article 9, his delegation felt that the drafting of the first two proposals was misguided, since the implication of the phrase "essential conditions" might be that if those conditions were not met the peace-keeping operation in question would come to a halt. His delegation recognized the importance of the principles to which the first and second alternatives alluded, but its preference for the third derived from its desire to avoid a legal strait jacket which might one day be regretted.

45. As for article 10, his delegation recognized that equitable geographical representation was an accepted principle in the case of peace-keeping forces, but felt that that principle must be balanced by the need to secure the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity; for that reason, it preferred the second alternative.

46. He had already referred to the desirability of using wherever possible language which had already proved acceptable to members of the Security Council. For that reason, his delegation's strong preference for article 11 was for the text which appeared in the working paper shorn of all the additions which appeared in square brackets. That wording was again taken from the Secretary-General's report on the establishment of UNEF to which he had referred.

47. The final comment related to article 12. His delegation favoured the inclusion of an article concerning measures which would ensure that the United Nations was as well prepared as possible to undertake peace-keeping operations when the need arose, but it did not think that the reference to Article 43 of the Charter which appeared in the first alternative was appropriate, since that Article formed part of Chapter VII, which was concerned with enforcement rather than with peace-keeping operations. In the current circumstances, that did not seem to provide the right framework in which to secure readiness for peace-keeping operations. It was possible to envisage a range of measures which might be taken to increase preparedness if the text of the second proposal for that article were adopted. An example which would be both useful and readily attainable would be the preparation by military experts of a training manual for peace-keeping operations which could be used in the training programmes of national armies.

48. The views of his delegation derived from its belief that the Security Council's essential authority over peace-keeping operations must be reconciled with efficiency in the conduct of those operations. He had therefore favoured certain texts derived from the establishment of UNEF which exemplified his delegation's approach and had opposed some formulations which, by asserting the paramount authority of the Security Council, prevented effective day-to-day management. The distinction between policy control and day-to-day management was the basis for effective guidelines. Moreover, there was a need for flexibility. His delegation hoped that, on the basis of the texts under discussion, the Special Committee would be able in 1975 to work towards unified guidelines which reflected that approach.

49. Mr. GUARIGLIA (Italy) said his delegation believed that the problem of peace-keeping operations deserved utmost attention because its solution might be identified with the full implementation of the most important role of the United Nations: the safeguarding of international peace and security.

50. The latest report of the Special Committee was more encouraging than those of previous years; although it contained alternative formulations which reflected important differences of views, it showed that a sincere effort had been made to adopt a constructive approach and to find realistic solutions to the problems which had to be faced,



primary among them being the old question of conflicting competence among the principal organs of the United Nations relating to the establishment, direction and control of a peace-keeping operation.

51. His delegation deemed it essential to reach some definite goals if the United Nations was to be in a position to face its main responsibilities. First of all, it was necessary to create machinery which might permit the Organization to act rapidly in order to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Charter relating to the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. In 1973, the Middle East situation had shown that the lack of rules might jeopardize the implementation of those provisions. In the view of his delegation, it would be appropriate to adopt a more flexible and pragmatic approach to the problem of the delimitation of functions and responsibility between the Secretary-General and the Security Council, and the convergence of formerly opposing views that had been seen at the time of the establishment of UNEF and UNDOF could be the basis for further progress.

52. Secondly, his delegation considered that another important aspect of any such operation should be its effectiveness. It agreed with other delegations that the Working Group should examine further the distinction, once a peace-keeping operation had been set in motion, between decisions to be taken by the Security Council and those to be put into effect by the Secretary-General. The United Kingdom memorandum on decision taking in peace-keeping operations<sup>3</sup> contained useful suggestions on that point which deserved attention.

53. Thirdly, consideration must be given to the possibility of enlarging the list of the potential contributors to the forces, bearing in mind the principle of balanced geographical representation, which should, of course, be applied with flexibility.

54. Fourthly, due account should be taken of the problem of the financing of the force, which, in the opinion of his delegation, should be borne by all Member States as expenses of the Organization.

55. His delegation deemed it appropriate to consider any other possibility which might be of help in setting up a peace-keeping operation. One of those possibilities could consist in the establishment of a list of States that would be prepared to furnish contingents of armed forces to be placed temporarily at the disposal of the Organization. On that point, he would recall the recent experience of Cyprus, when the Secretary-General had immediately been able to call upon contingents already serving under the United Nations flag.

56. His delegation hoped that those suggestions would be further studied by the Special Committee, if—as it also hoped—its mandate was renewed.

57. With regard to the draft formula put forward during the discussions in the Working Group (A/9827, annex, appendix), his delegation favoured paragraph 2 of the

introduction, and the same applied to article 1. That article reflected almost a year of work by the Special Committee, and in the view of his delegation the list of responsibilities to be directly exercised by the Security Council should be more deeply studied, with a view to bringing about a solution of the problems, to which he had previously referred, relating to the distribution of competence between the Secretary-General and the Security Council. That problem could be overcome through goodwill and a realistic approach.

58. In accordance with the views he had expressed, his delegation favoured the first alternative for article 9 and the formulation of article 11, and considered that article 13 was of particular importance.

59. His delegation hoped that the Working Group would continue its work on the same basis, and with the same spirit of compromise and goodwill, and that it would submit reports more frequently to the Special Committee in order to enable those who were not members of the Group to voice their point of view and to submit any suggestions.

60. He therefore recommended approval of the report (A/9827) and adoption of the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1).

61. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that one encouraging feature of the current international situation was the trend towards reordering of relations, peaceful coexistence and possibilities for fruitful co-operation among States; thus, the work of the Special Committee acquired special significance. The USSR believed that it was particularly important to reach agreement on guidelines for peace-keeping operations, since the use of armed force was one of the gravest responsible actions of the United Nations.

62. His delegation believed that such operations, like all United Nations activities, should be based on the principles of the Charter and should accordingly be conducted without special advantage to or discrimination against any geographical group in respect of either the establishment or the conduct of such operations. They could be carried out only by the Security Council. Only then could peace-keeping operations be in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter and serve the common interest of all.

63. The recent experience with UNEF and UNDOF represented a certain degree of progress in bringing such operations more closely into line with the purposes and principles of the Charter. In the decision adopted at its 1754th meeting, on 2 November 1973,<sup>4</sup> the Security Council itself had selected contingents for those Forces on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical representation. The periodic consultations among the members of the Council were a positive step which helped to improve the conduct of the peace-keeping operations.

64. However, the absence of a Security Council working body to direct the operations of the United Nations forces

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 44, document A/9144.

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions, 1973, "Decisions"*, p. 12.

in the Middle East had already led to many unfavourable consequences. For example, the freedom of movement of contingents in the Israel-Egypt sector had not been guaranteed. In its resolutions 346 (1974) and 362 (1974), the Security Council had emphasized that UNEF must be able to operate without there being any distinction as to the status of the various contingents. Despite that, Israel was continuing to discriminate against the Ghanaian, Senegalese, Indonesian and Polish contingents. He wondered how UNEF could be regarded as a model peace-keeping operation when Israel was allowed to sabotage the Security Council's decisions concerning geographical representation in the make-up of the forces.

65. The lack of day-to-day control by the Security Council had led to a disproportionate increase in costs. The Security Council and the General Assembly had in fact approved an expenditure of \$30 million for six months for UNEF in the Middle East, or \$60 million per year for 7,000 men. During that year, however, UNEF had consisted on the average of 5,833 men—17 per cent fewer than had been agreed on—but the costs, instead of being 17 per cent lower, i.e. about \$50 million a year, had amounted to \$83.6 million or, in other words, had been 67 per cent higher than expected. It went without saying that such uncontrolled methods must not be allowed to become entrenched in future operations.

66. Another negative aspect was that there were no agreements, as provided for in Article 43 of the Charter, between the countries providing contingents and the Security Council, and that made the question of compensating Governments a serious problem.

67. Thus, there were three serious short-comings in the existing practice in respect of the direction of UNEF; first, the directives of the Security Council relating to the inadmissibility of discrimination in contingents were not being observed; second, that practice had led to colossal overspending; third, it had created tension between the countries providing contingents and the United Nations. None of those short-comings would have developed if the United Nations operations in the Middle East had been carried out in full accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

68. The Working Group of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had submitted draft formulas (A/9827, annex, appendix), a number of which were based on the Charter and on the positive aspects of the experience gained by UNEF. He was of the opinion that the majority of Member States supported the idea that peace-keeping operations should be carried out in strict accordance with the Charter, without discrimination and on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical representation with regard both to participation in the operations and to the arrangements for the control of those operations. The necessary prerequisites existed for the United Nations operations to be carried out in strict accordance with the Charter; those operations were too important to be left to the will of a small number of Secretariat officials. The machinery of the Security Council had to be used so as to put an end to improvisation. Such machinery could be provided by the Military Staff Committee or by a new committee to be established under Article 29 of the Charter.

69. On the whole, the Soviet Union was of the opinion that the work of the Special Committee and its Working Group had been positive and should be continued. To that end, it supported the request that the mandate of the Special Committee should be extended.

70. Mr. JACOVIDES (Cyprus) said that, in the absence of a system of collective security such as was envisaged in the Charter or of a permanent peace-keeping force—which, in his delegation's view, would still be the preferable alternative—such *ad hoc* peace-keeping operations by the United Nations as those in the Congo, in the Middle East and in Cyprus constituted pragmatic examples of the role the United Nations could play in that vital field of international peace and security.

71. As his delegation's views had already been expressed during the twenty-eighth session, at the 901st meeting of the Committee, he would merely state that, while the Security Council's authority over peace-keeping operations was paramount, the key to a breakthrough lay in striking a proper balance between policy control and operational management. Also, the guidelines to be agreed upon must be sufficiently flexible, so as not to frustrate the practical requirements of particular situations.

72. Peace-keeping operations were of vital importance to small and weak States that did not belong to any of the major military alliances and that found themselves exposed to the threat of superior military force from outside. Cyprus had always striven to find remedies to its problems within the framework of the United Nations, which it regarded as the best guarantee of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and its policy of non-alignment.

73. Consequently, Cyprus had a special interest in the topic. For more than 10 years the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) had been playing in an exemplary manner the role assigned to it by the Security Council. He expressed his appreciation to all who had made possible the success of the operation. The experience gained with UNFICYP showed both the strong and the weak points of the operation which was generally acknowledged to have worked well. The events of the previous summer had added new dimensions to the Cyprus situation. The consequences of those events had been examined in the Security Council and the General Assembly, which had adopted various resolutions requesting the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and the return of all refugees to their homes. Those resolutions provided the framework within which the constitutional and other aspects of the problem of Cyprus could be solved in a manner acceptable to both communities and respectful of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. It was also expected that, in December, the Security Council, when considering the Secretary-General's report for the preceding six-month period, and having been notified of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 5 November 1974—calling upon all parties to co-operate with UNFICYP, which might be strengthened if necessary—would assist in the process and that UNFICYP would continue to play an essential role in the light of the situation as it had developed.

74. He would refrain from making any comments on the Cyprus situation lest it should be thought that he wished to give rise to polemics. It was sufficient to say that developments in Cyprus had put to the test the strength and limitations of UNFICYP as a peace-keeping force in conditions substantially different from those in which it had been set up. He paid a tribute to the memory of those members of the United Nations peace-keeping forces who had lost their lives while serving the cause of peace in Cyprus and elsewhere.

75. Mr. KANIARU (Kenya) said that it was regrettable that, as its report showed, the Special Committee had made no progress in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3091 (XXVIII). It was not surprising, therefore, that draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1 took no note of progress made. Furthermore, paragraph 6 of the report of the Working Group of the Special Committee stated that no provision of the texts should be referred to as having been agreed upon, which seemed to indicate that the limited progress made the previous year had vanished.

76. Although the Security Council was the body with general authority over the peace-keeping forces, the day-to-day activities of the force were the responsibility of the Secretary-General and the cost of operations should be shared by all the Members of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The establishment of UNEF had demonstrated that, when faced with a common and serious task, the members of the Security Council were capable of forgetting their differences and adopting effective measures. Consequently, it had been demonstrated that the differences between Members of the United Nations did not constitute an obstacle, given the necessary goodwill on all sides. The experience gained from the operations of UNEF should therefore be translated into guidelines without any concern about adopting precedents since, in any event, the guidelines could always be reviewed whenever necessary. One aspect of UNEF should not be perpetuated. That aspect was the exclusion of the permanent members from providing units for the Force, since such a practice was discriminatory and contrary to the spirit of the Charter. In that respect, he supported all that had been said by the representative of Finland concerning the question of reimbursement.

77. In his view, the situation called for the establishment of permanent machinery to deal with any eventuality which might threaten international peace and security. The existing arrangements had undoubtedly been useful, as had been emphasized by the representative of Cyprus, but their nature left much to be desired. For those reasons, his delegation would support draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1 and expressed the hope that the Special Committee would fulfil its mandate during the following year.

78. Mr. STUBBS (Peru) said that the Special Committee's report (A/9827) was encouraging in that it set out, although only in provisional form, some guidelines for the peace-keeping operations proposed by the Working Group. It was very difficult to establish universal guidelines on the subject since the factors involved might not be the same in all cases.

79. During the preceding year, Peru had not hesitated to provide the contingent requested for UNEF, although it had had no clear guidelines on the operation to go by, and it continued to perform that honourable task. The contribution of the developing countries to the Force represented a real sacrifice on their part.

80. His delegation hoped that efforts to agree on guidelines would continue so that, whenever it became necessary to establish a peace-keeping force, such a force could be formed in full knowledge of the conditions governing its operations. Accordingly, his delegation had co-sponsored draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1 and hoped that the Committee would adopt it.

81. Mr. LAHIRI (India) said that during the previous year, the United Nations had been faced with a heavy peace-keeping task. In October 1973, the Security Council had established UNEF to supervise the disengagement zone between Egypt and Israel; in May 1974, it had established UNDOF to perform similar functions in the disengagement zone between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. More recently, UNFICYP had been considerably augmented. That such demands had been met was evidence of the general sense of responsibility of the Members of the United Nations who, in crisis situations, had been able to arrive at compromise solutions.

82. At the same time, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had continued its efforts to reach agreement on guidelines for operations of the type in question. That task was extremely difficult, as was shown by the alternative formulas proposed in the Special Committee's report (A/9827, annex, appendix), which reflected sharply divergent positions.

83. Since each specific situation had its unique character, if the guidelines under consideration were to be useful, it must be borne in mind that they would need to be open to constant readjustment. Furthermore, they should be firmly based on the Charter of the United Nations.

84. The UNEF mandate of 27 October 1973 laid down that the Force "must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council", requested the Secretary-General to refer to the Council for its decision "all matters which may affect the nature or continued effective functioning of the Force" and, very importantly, the Force was established for a specified period, the continuation of which was dependent on a decision to that effect by the Security Council. His delegation felt that that periodic reaffirmation by the Council should become a norm for the future. Another important principle which had received explicit recognition was that of equitable geographical distribution. The general support which that principle had received—subject to the equally important principle of acceptability to the host country—underlined its importance in securing broad and continuing support for peace-keeping operations.

85. UNEF experience had also demonstrated the usefulness of the involvement of members of the Security Council and of contributors to the Force in the conduct of peace-keeping operations. In the current operation, that involvement had taken the form of informal consultations

which had provided the Secretary-General with continuing guidance on the conduct of the operation and had provided members of the Security Council with complete information on the operation. It had been suggested that the Security Council's control over the conduct of the operation could be exercised by a subsidiary organ established under Article 29 of the Charter. His delegation had no objection in principle to the establishment of such an organ when necessary. If such a subsidiary organ performed some of the functions of the Security Council, the functions would have to be determined on each occasion by the Security Council and the composition, in that case, would have to be the same as that of the Council. However, he felt that such an organ could play a more general advisory role, for example as an institutionalized forum for consultations between the Secretary-General, the members of the Council and the contributors to the Force—consultations which currently took place informally—or as a democratic link between the Security Council and non-members, on whose behalf the Council acted in discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

86. There were differences of opinion as to the role of the Secretary-General in peace-keeping operations; his role could not be more than that laid down in the Charter. He had no automatic responsibilities to discharge in the variety

of options for peace keeping available to the Security Council; however, when a United Nations peace-keeping force was established, the Secretary-General would administer it by virtue of the responsibilities conferred upon him under Article 97 of the Charter. Any additional functions entrusted to him by the Council under Article 98 would have to be determined specifically in each case.

87. His delegation shared the view that the financing of peace-keeping operations should be considered as an expenditure of the United Nations, to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. Naturally, the apportionment of such expenditure should be based, *inter alia*, on considerations of equity and justice; the ideas put forward the previous year during the debate on the financing of UNEF would provide guidance for the future.

88. His delegation preferred to leave until the following year the more detailed examination of the draft formulas contained in the report. He supported draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1 and hoped that a greater spirit of flexibility and compromise would prevail in the Working Group the following year, in particular among the permanent members of the Security Council represented.

*The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.*

## 935th meeting

Tuesday, 19 November 1974, at 3.20 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.935

### AGENDA ITEM 39

**Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (continued) (A/9827, A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1)**

1. Mrs. GJERTSEN (Norway) said that her Government attached great importance to the item under discussion; for that reason it had taken part in the peace-keeping efforts by contributing forces and making voluntary contributions and would continue to support all efforts aimed at strengthening the United Nations peace-keeping machinery.

2. The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which showed that given the necessary determination and political will, differing points of view could be reconciled, would have a considerable impact on the work of the Special Committee. In that respect, although the draft articles which the Special Committee had presented (A/9827, annex, appendix) were provisional, they demonstrated a more flexible and pragmatic approach to the problem and represented definite progress toward achieving agreed guidelines. She therefore supported the recommendation by the Special Committee that the man-

date be renewed so that it might submit such guidelines to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

3. Her delegation wished to stress the importance of training the staff which might be called upon to serve in conflict areas. One of the basic prerequisites for the effective functioning of United Nations peace-keeping operations was that forces should be properly prepared. Similarly, so as to avoid in the future the financial problems of the past, the Special Committee should pay attention to that aspect of operations. For its part, her Government maintained its traditional attitude regarding the principle of collective financial responsibility.

4. Mr. ZEJMO (Poland) said that in the prevailing situation in the world, the maintenance of international peace and security was a very complicated task. That explained the importance of the United Nations peace-keeping operations. His Government had consistently contributed to those operations, had provided an army unit for UNEF and also taken part in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). In so doing, his Government had acted on the understanding that peace-keeping operations should become an integral part of the efforts to strengthen the role and efficacy of the United Nations and achieve the



main purpose of the Organization, namely to promote the peaceful settlement of conflicts.

5. His Government considered peace-keeping operations as an extremely difficult issue which directly affected the sovereignty and security of States. Therefore, while it was not surprised that the Special Committee had encountered difficulties, it regretted that in the almost 10 years of its existence, the Special Committee had not been able to fulfil the task of preparing agreed guidelines for peace-keeping operations in conformity with the Charter. It was his impression that the unfortunate situation was mostly due to the pattern of thinking of certain Powers, which could not adjust to the new circumstances of the rapidly changing world.

6. His delegation had carefully studied draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1. Although it was far from satisfactory, it was generally acceptable and for that reason his delegation was a sponsor of it. His delegation supported those delegations which requested the Special Committee to renew its efforts to submit agreed guidelines to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

7. As to the report of the Special Committee (A/9827), he wished to stress the following principles. Firstly, the guidelines should be elaborated in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. Secondly, the Security Council should be the only organ empowered to authorize peace-keeping operations and to control such operations. To that end, it should have a subsidiary body to be established under Article 29 of the Charter. The composition of that body should be based on the principle of equitable geographical representation in order to eliminate any bias in operational management. Thirdly, the role played by the Secretary-General and United Nations organs should fall within the framework of the provisions of the Charter and should be in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Security Council.

8. His Government had welcomed with satisfaction the Security Council's decisions on equitable geographical representation in the composition of United Nations peace-keeping forces, since that principle assured the continuing support of all Member States. At the same time, and to promote the efficiency of such forces, all units should enjoy freedom of movement irrespective of nationality. It therefore considered it essential to change the current situation in the Middle East in regard to four contingents, including the Polish contingent, and it hoped that the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council would undertake negotiations on the matter. As to the financing of the peace-keeping forces, his delegation confirmed its position which would be fully expressed in the Fifth Committee.

9. The peace-keeping operations in the Middle East were a good example which might help the Special Committee. He wished to reiterate, however, that the experience gained should not automatically be applied to current and future peace-keeping operations. The Special Committee should seek urgently to resolve the remaining obstacles and establish principles, guidelines, institutions and methods to govern peace-keeping operations for submission to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

10. Mr. HANSEN (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the peace-keeping operations were one of the most effective instruments available to the United Nations in preventing or resolving conflicts. It was therefore natural that his country—which had consistently pursued a policy of peace and conciliation—should have shown a strong interest in such operations and supported them financially even before it became a member of the United Nations. Both in the case of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and in that of UNEF and UNDOF, his Government was the third largest contributor, after two of the permanent members of the Security Council.

11. His delegation believed that agreed guidelines could increase the efficiency of peace-keeping operations even further. Although it was true that there would always be an element of improvisation in such operations, the guidelines would considerably reduce that element, thereby ensuring that the operations would proceed in a more orderly and more rapid manner. Thanks to the progress of the Special Committee, the Special Political Committee had before it for the first time draft formulas for a set of guidelines. As the contradictory formulas indicated, the central problem remained the definition of the respective roles of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. There were two schools of thought in that respect. One held that the Security Council not only had over-all authority over the direction and control of operations, but also over the day-to-day management of such operations. According to the other school, operational management should remain with the Secretary-General, as that would be the only way of ensuring a prompt and flexible mechanism which was indispensable for the efficiency of operations.

12. His delegation supported the second opinion but, at the same time, felt that it should be possible to reconcile the differences. In fact, those who advocated the second solution did not deny that the political purpose of any peace-keeping operation was determined solely and exclusively by the Security Council. Therefore, it was only a matter of deciding whether it was necessary for the Security Council to take charge of operational management. He believed that the exercise of policy control by the Security Council could be achieved in other ways. For example, in the memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation at the preceding session<sup>1</sup> the possibility had been suggested that, in the case where a member of the Security Council wished to challenge any operational initiative during the operation itself, that member could demand a meeting of the Council; in that way, it would be guaranteed that operations could be carried out only with the full support of the Council and its permanent members. Therefore, it was a matter of operational management by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council, rather than by the Council as such. Moreover, it was clear that the Secretary-General would always try to act in such a manner that he could be sure of the full confidence of the Council, and UNEF's experience showed that he would keep in close touch with the Council.

13. With regard to the draft formulas for article 4 on the establishment of a subsidiary organ of the Security Council

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 44, document A/9144.

under Article 29 of the Charter, his delegation agreed with the suggestion to provide in the guidelines for the possibility of establishing such an organ, which should have a consultative function. Its membership should be drawn from the contributing countries, the host countries, and the countries which provided facilities and were major financial contributors. That would also solve the problem of letting those groups of countries share in the process of information and consultation.

14. The formulation of a guideline for the composition of United Nations forces presented another problem as yet unresolved. It had two aspects: one was the procedure to be followed in selecting troop contingents and his delegation preferred that proposed in the second draft formula for article 10. The other aspect, which was the key issue, concerned the criteria to be applied by the Security Council and the Secretary-General in selecting contingents. An essential criterion, accepted by all, was the principle of equitable geographical representation; additional criteria, such as the impartiality of the troop-contributing countries and the competence of the contingents, should, however, be taken into account.

15. Finally, with regard to financing, which was dealt with in article 11, the language had been taken from the guidelines of UNEF,<sup>2</sup> which had been approved by the Security Council and accepted by the General Assembly. By those decisions it had been accepted that the financing of peace-keeping operations was the collective responsibility of all Member States. That was a major breakthrough which should be maintained; in any event, the Security Council could obviously recommend other methods of financing in individual cases, although that would be an exception. His delegation therefore considered the draft articles to be a good basis for the Special Committee's future work; it was in favour of extending its mandate and had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1.

16. Mr. VRAILAS (Greece) said that, as the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated in the General Assembly (2239th plenary meeting), for any peace-keeping operation to be successful it should be based on the following conditions: the contingents responsible for the operation should be strong and efficient; no national military force should be allowed to attack or hamper the contingents responsible for the operation when they were carrying out their mandate, and a system of international sanctions should be laid down for such cases; the peace-keeping forces should not be prevented in any way from implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions.

17. Those conditions were not incompatible with the concept of any peace-keeping operation undertaken by the United Nations. The absence of provisions concerning the application of sanctions in the case of deliberate attack or hampering by a national military force affected the efficiency of such an operation and the collective responsibility of the United Nations, since the contributing countries would be unwilling to send their forces to areas where

serious conflicts could occur. Lastly, the responsibility of a national force which attacked or hampered a peace-keeping operation would be more obvious if it was realized that such operations were carried out after prior acceptance by the parties concerned and presupposed the co-operation of all Member States in carrying out the mandate of the Security Council.

18. His delegation also considered that, since the operations were collective, it was logical that they should be supported by all Member States and that the principle of equitable geographical representation should apply to the participation in such operations and their control. The application of those two principles would emphasize the collective nature of such operations and the fact that peace was the responsibility of all. They should, however, be applied with a certain flexibility. With regard to financing, his delegation considered that the decisions of the Security Council on UNEF and UNDOF were precedents which could serve as a basis for the consideration of that question. The principle of equitable geographical representation should always be applied in order to ensure the highest possible level of efficiency, competence and integrity.

19. His delegation was among those who wished agreed guidelines for peace-keeping operations to be established as soon as possible. It supported draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1 and called upon the Special Committee and its Working Group to intensify their efforts to attain that end.

20. Mr. KARASEK (Austria) said that, after many years in which there had been little progress, it was, as other speakers had said, the first time that the General Assembly could review more substantive results, although admittedly fundamental differences on major issues still remained.

21. The progress lay primarily in the new approach adopted by the Special Committee, which seemed to be successful. The practical experience gained through the establishment of UNEF and UNDOF and their effective functioning had undoubtedly facilitated the formulation of the draft articles contained in the report of the Special Committee (A/9827, annex, appendix). The attempt to set up general guidelines for peace-keeping activities was the essence of the new approach and an improvement over previous endeavours. The existence of such guidelines was important in order to minimize improvisation and ensure maximum efficiency and economy; on the other hand, general guidelines were flexible enough to allow their adaptation to changing circumstances.

22. His delegation's position with regard to the basic question and in particular the delimitation of responsibilities between the Security Council and the Secretary-General was oriented towards a pragmatic approach. Recent experience had led to a significant conclusion. In the past, the question whether the Security Council or the Secretary-General should control peace-keeping operations had been put in absolute and sometimes mutually exclusive terms and, seen in that light, it still constituted an obstacle to the adoption of agreed guidelines. Had that question been put the same way the preceding year, UNEF might never have been established; however, for the first time and despite theoretical differences, the Security Council had agreed on guidelines for such an operation, including its

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1973*, document S/11052/Rev.1.

financing. That fact and the subsequent activities of the Force might lead to the conclusion that the respective responsibilities of the Security Council and the Secretary-General should not conflict and should be exercised on the basis of a permanent consultation process which ensured political control by the Security Council as well as maximum efficiency of the operational management by the Secretary-General. That was one of the most essential aspects of the mandate of UNEF.

23. The system devised by the Security Council a year earlier seemed to have produced good results and could be considered a model for the work of the Special Committee. The same could be said of the operation in Cyprus. That had demonstrated the importance of one aspect which should be more adequately reflected in the draft formulas: the question of respect of the parties concerned for the status and safety of the personnel of the peace-keeping troops. Bitter experience in that respect had led the Security Council to emphasize that point in its resolution 359 (1974). As a troop contributor, Austria attached the utmost importance to the safety of those troops; the Secretary-General should make the necessary decisions regarding the operational aspect; with regard to the political aspect, the consent of the parties concerned implied the assumption of their responsibility for the status and safety of those forces.

24. As to the formulas discussed in the Working Group, his delegation could agree to the formulation contained in article 1, paragraph 2, which exactly reflected what had been successfully done by the Security Council in the establishment of UNEF and UNDOF. With regard to article 4, he did not see the necessity to establish a subsidiary organ of the Security Council in accordance with Article 29 of the Charter; the creation of such a body might be left to the discretion of the Council, if it considered it advisable.

25. The provisions of article 5 were in principle appropriate, especially the participation of troop-contributing States in an advisory capacity. His delegation agreed in principle with the provisions contained in article 6, paragraph 1, and considered that the formulation of the other two paragraphs was too vague. For article 7, it supported the formulation in paragraph 1.

26. His delegation preferred a formulation for article 8 according to which the force commander was appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Security Council. Article 9 was of particular importance and the essential conditions were adequately described in paragraph 1. The importance of the first two conditions—the full confidence and backing of the Security Council and the full co-operation of the parties concerned—had been shown by the recent experience in the Middle East and Cyprus; his delegation thought that the basic criterion was the principle of the greatest efficiency.

27. With regard to financing, which was covered by article 11, his delegation subscribed to the method of financing laid down in Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter and felt strongly that collective financial responsibility was one of the key elements of United Nations activities in that field and that financing through voluntary contributions was

unjust and inefficient, as demonstrated by the current financial situation of UNFICYP.

28. He felt sure that smaller countries were willing to collaborate in peace-keeping operations. At the same time he considered that it should be the concern of the international community to maintain and strengthen that willingness and not to create conditions which would place an unbearable material and political burden on smaller countries.

29. His delegation was optimistic as to the future activities of the Special Committee. Accordingly, it unreservedly supported the renewal of its mandate and had sponsored the draft resolution under consideration.

*Mr. Martínez (Venezuela), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

30. Mr. OHTAKA (Japan) said that the establishment and functioning of UNEF and UNDOF had enriched United Nations experience in peace-keeping operations during the current highly important year.

31. He noted that members of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations held different views on the important issues under consideration. Nevertheless, members of the Special Committee and, in particular, permanent members of the Security Council should not place undue emphasis on those differences and, on the contrary, should adopt more flexible attitudes. The Special Political Committee should continue the procedure it had adopted. It should avoid, at least for the time being, detailed consideration of such questions as the terms of reference of the relevant organs of the United Nations in relation to peace-keeping operations and endeavour to achieve the broadest possible agreement.

32. His delegation considered that it would be useful and necessary to establish general guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations. The lack of such guidelines led to improvisation in emergency situations. It further considered that the mandate of the Special Committee should be renewed and that the Committee and the Working Group should endeavour to extend the scope of agreement and adopt a practical approach in the formulation of guidelines, taking account of the valuable experience acquired in the operations currently under way. It might also be useful to obtain the comments of the Secretary-General, of the members of his staff engaged in those operations and those of States which were not members of the Working Group but which had supplied contingents. The Special Committee and the Working Group, while fully respecting the primary role of the Security Council in peace-keeping operations, should endeavour to establish a mechanism whereby various countries could play their respective roles in a positive and harmonious manner. As a member of both bodies, his delegation would do its best to contribute to the success of the work of the Committee.

33. Mr. SEGEL (United States of America) recalled that at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly (2124th plenary meeting) the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Henry Kissinger, had noted that the time had come to agree on peace-keeping guidelines so that the Organization

could act swiftly, confidently, and effectively in future crises. Since that time, the United Nations had had to deal urgently with two crises, in the Middle East and in Cyprus. Those events affected the work of the Special Committee and underlined the necessity to reach agreement on guidelines for the conduct of future peace-keeping operations under the authority of the Security Council.

34. One of the fundamental questions before the Committee was the degree of generality or detail to be reflected in such guidelines. His Government maintained the belief that the ability of the Security Council to operate flexibly in times of crisis enhanced its capability to meet the particular problems of individual operations. The establishment and functioning of UNEF in the Middle East and of UNFICYP, in its modified form, demonstrated that detailed peace-keeping guidelines, agreed in advance, were not required to mount a successful peace-keeping operation.

35. Clearly, the central purpose of agreed guidelines would be to define the division of responsibilities between the principal United Nations organs involved in peace keeping, especially the Security Council, as well as the Secretary-General. If peace-keeping operations were to be launched promptly and managed effectively, it was essential that general responsibilities be appropriately delineated. However, it was also essential to provide for the practical and efficient solution of rapidly changing daily operational problems. The Security Council had primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security; it was responsible for authorizing peace-keeping operations and bore ultimate responsibility for the direction of each operation. His delegation believed that in exercising that general responsibility the Security Council should act in accordance with the formula proposed in paragraph 2 of article 1 of the draft guidelines. In order to accommodate the views of those who wished to give broader immediate responsibilities to the Security Council, his country would accept inclusion among the responsibilities of the Security Council of approval of the nomination of the peace-keeping force commander and the composition of that force. In both cases, the Secretary-General would naturally make the initial recommendations.

36. Once the operation was under way, the Security Council might best exercise its continuing responsibilities by such measures as requiring regular reports from the Secretary-General on the conduct of the operation and periodically reviewing the work of the peace-keeping force. Where necessary, it might also establish an advisory or consultative committee, perhaps under Article 29 of the Charter, to assist in its work. However, within the over-all mandate established by the Security Council, the Secretary-General should be assured sufficient discretion to enable him, and the force commander responsible to him, to direct effectively the activities of the force without day-to-day intervention by the Security Council. The Secretary-General should have the power to take decisions on administrative and logistical questions, since his primary concern was to see that operations authorized by the Security Council were properly and efficiently managed.

37. While due regard should be paid to achieving adequate geographical representation in the composition of the force, his delegation considered that appropriate attention should

be paid to the organization of a force capable of successfully accomplishing its mission. Thus, in the composition of the force, account should be taken of the nature of the dispute, of where the force would serve and of the views of the host countries. The Security Council and the Secretary-General should therefore maintain sufficient freedom of action concerning the selection and composition of the force to ensure the highest possible professional standards.

38. The guidelines might include provisions enabling the Secretary-General to make stand-by arrangements for future peace-keeping operations, including model agreements with host countries and troop contributors, a continuing inventory of the troops, facilities and services offered by Member States and a roster of potential commanders.

39. It could not be denied that differences, some fundamental but others less so, still existed concerning the nature and scope of the guidelines. His country believed that the work under way to reconcile those differences was significant and that an agreed set of general principles could be developed by the Committee. Problems could continue to be solved by *ad hoc* Security Council resolutions as they arose, as had been done to date, in the hope that later agreement would further improve the guidelines.

40. Miss DEFENSOR (Philippines) noted that the draft guidelines prepared by the Working Group concerned peace-keeping operations under the authority of the Security Council. While the Security Council had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, United Nations practice recognized the residual responsibility of the General Assembly in that regard under the Charter. Her delegation hoped that similar guidelines would be drafted for peace-keeping operations under the authority of the General Assembly when the Security Council was prevented by a veto from exercising its primary responsibilities in an urgent case.

41. Referring to the draft formulas she endorsed the proposal that the Secretary-General should be the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations peace-keeping operations as provided for in article 6, paragraph 1 (a) to (c), of the draft guidelines. It went without saying that the United Nations peace-keeping forces should enjoy the full confidence and backing of the Security Council and should be conducted in conformity with the mandate and the political consensus of the Council. She agreed that the United Nations forces would have to function as integrated and efficient military units, pursuant to article 9. It was also important that the force commander should be given the necessary authority over all elements of the operation, as provided in article 8. She supported the principle of equitable geographical representation and the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, as provided in article 10, paragraph 2.

42. Her delegation noted that the draft formulas were tentative and preliminary and it reserved the right to submit more detailed comments when the Special Committee had completed the draft guidelines. Her delegation therefore endorsed the recommendation in paragraph 6 of the report to the effect that the General Assembly should renew the mandate of the Special Committee.



43. The establishment of UNEF, UNDOF and UNFICYP reflected the new importance of United Nations peace-keeping operations in a changing political climate in which they had become stabilizing elements in many troubled areas. In that regard, her delegation endorsed the statement made by the Secretary-General at the 63rd meeting of the Special Committee on 1 February 1974<sup>3</sup> to the effect that the events of October 1973 had provided the most convincing proof of the importance of United Nations peace-keeping operations.

44. Her Government had always supported United Nations peace-keeping operations and hoped to continue to do so in the light of the principles of the Charter. It took pride in the fact that it had extended moral and financial support for all the United Nations peace-keeping operations, in addition to contributing ground forces to the United Nations operation in Korea and an air contingent in the Congo. The latest Philippine contribution to UNEF and UNDOF had been in the amount of \$10,821 each for a six-month period between 25 October 1973 and 24 April 1974. The Philippine Government had recently made a voluntary contribution to UNFICYP in the amount of \$2,000 for the six-month period from June to December 1974. Furthermore, it had made a voluntary contribution of \$5,000 for humanitarian assistance to the two Cypriot communities.

45. Her Government supported the principle of collective financial responsibility on the basis of the categories enumerated in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII), on the financing of UNEF, because that financial scheme represented a just and equitable arrangement and a contribution to the maximum efficiency of peace-keeping operations.

46. For all those reasons, her delegation endorsed draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1. The need for the United Nations to act readily and effectively in crisis situations could not be over-emphasized. She was confident that the Special Committee would intensify its efforts to complete the guidelines on peace-keeping operations in conformity with the Charter.

47. Mr. JOEWONO (Indonesia) said that, as a nation which had both contributed contingents to the United Nations peace-keeping forces and, on one occasion, requested the dispatch of such a force, Indonesia had acquired experience which might be valuable to members of the Committee in discussing such an important item. In 1962, at the request of Indonesia and the Netherlands, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1752 (XVII), the Secretary-General had established the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority to supervise the transfer of the administration of West Irian to the Indonesian Government.<sup>4</sup> In addition, Indonesia had supplied troops for the United Nations peace-keeping forces in the Congo, in Gaza and for UNEF in the Middle East, as well as for the regional peace-keeping operation in Viet-Nam.

48. As one of the sponsors of the text adopted as Security Council resolution 340 (1973), his delegation was gratified that, during the current year, the discussion by the Committee of the important item of peace-keeping operations could be held in an atmosphere of greater optimism. The report of the Special Committee proposed draft formulas for guidelines which, although not definitive, represented a promising step forward and were the result of a greater amount of co-operation among members. The draft formulas reflected the experience of UNEF and UNDOF in the Middle East. It must also be recognized that they could not be applied automatically at all times and in all circumstances and that the administrative machinery and agreed procedures for peace keeping required strengthening.

49. His delegation also considered it gratifying that the draft formulas reflected a certain measure of consensus with regard to authorization and control of the operations. Although a solution had not yet been found to the problem of the respective roles of the Secretary-General and the Security Council, the mandate of UNEF provided an example of a pragmatic solution to those differences. The operations would be authorized by the Security Council and the Secretary-General would be responsible for the operational management and functioning of the force under the authority of the Council. His delegation also welcomed the adoption of the principle of equitable geographical distribution in the composition of forces. The same principle should apply in the selection of commanding officers. That would provide a concrete manifestation of the impartiality which was so important to the success of peace-keeping operations of all kinds, ensure a broad basis of support and participation, and provide an opportunity for a growing number of Member States to obtain first-hand experience of the problems of peace keeping.

50. His delegation agreed that the operations should be financed by all Member States, without excluding other means recommended by the Council. It would also be advisable to persuade the parties involved in a conflict to bear a substantial percentage of the expenses. The experience of Indonesia and the Netherlands concerning West Irian in which both nations had contributed to the costs of the peace-keeping mission, might serve as a model for that type of financing.

51. In view of the substantial progress achieved by the Special Committee during the current year, his delegation supported the renewal of its mandate.

52. Mr. TSUKUR (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that nearly 30 years of United Nations history had showed that peace keeping had been and continued to be its principal mission. Nations judged the United Nations by the way in which it achieved that objective, as laid down in the Charter, which reflected the desire to ensure that force would be used only when necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, an agreement on principles to govern such operations would fill a need. It went without saying that the organization of such operations must be based solely and exclusively on the Charter. In accordance with the Charter, responsibility for peace-keeping operations was vested in the Security Council.

53. The Ukrainian delegation, like others, had studied the example provided by UNEF and had reached the conclu-

<sup>3</sup> See A/AC.121/SR.63.

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 89, document A/5170.

sion that only the Security Council could direct and put an end to that type of operation. Also, the composition of forces on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical distribution contributed to the effectiveness of operations and provided a guarantee that they would not be unilateral in nature or go beyond their mandate under the Charter, as had occurred in the past.

54. The experience of UNEF showed that much remained to be done. In that regard, although the Security Council obviously could not concern itself with every detail, under Article 29 of the Charter, it could establish a subsidiary organ or utilize the Military Staff Committee for that purpose. The absence of such an organ had led to some negative results, as had already been mentioned by the representative of the Soviet Union at the preceding meeting. That would not have been the case if those operations had been carried out in strict compliance with the Charter.

55. In his opinion, the Special Committee had done constructive work, and the central role to be played by the Security Council in the matter was becoming increasingly clear. Nevertheless, the fact that the Special Committee had not completed its work had caused much time to be lost, since the Organization had not been prepared to act with the necessary speed. It was quite clear that the Security Council should be in a position to launch an operation immediately and that an agreement should be concluded with respect to Article 43 of the Charter. It was essential to have permanent machinery, either the Military Staff Committee or a new committee established under Article 29 of the Charter. For all those reasons, he would support the recommendation for the extension of the Committee's mandate.

56. Mr. MELHUISE (Australia) said that the report of the Special Committee showed that some progress had been made, but such progress after so long was not very satisfactory. The establishment of UNEF and UNDOF had yielded two lessons of fundamental importance. First, the Security Council had found in the case of UNEF, that it should not decide every detail of the operation of the Force, but that it should lay down clear policy and broad guidelines. It would be useful if the Special Committee likewise achieved agreement on general principles, leaving such detail as was required to be determined on an *ad hoc* basis by the Security Council, taking account of all relevant factors of a given situation.

57. Secondly, the Security Council had found that the effectiveness of the Force was initially affected by the extent of the political consensus among the permanent members with regard to the Force's operations. His delegation shared many of the conclusions reached by other members of the Committee on the subject. In its opinion, the main benefit which had been derived from the creation of UNEF and UNDOF was the emergence of the political will to reach practical compromises on the matters which had divided the Special Committee for years. He hoped that that will would be maintained so that the Special Committee could make substantial progress in the matter.

58. Mr. ABBAS (Pakistan) said it was regrettable that the progress made by the Special Committee during the

previous year had not borne out the first optimistic hopes. That remark should not be taken to mean that his delegation was not appreciative of the progress made by the Special Committee; on the contrary, it believed that pragmatic solutions had been found, as exemplified by UNEF and UNDOF, and by the fact that the Working Group of the Special Committee had been able to formulate draft articles of agreed guidelines, which he regarded as a necessary stage in preparing single texts. His delegation therefore thanked the Special Committee and its Chairman and supported the suggestion that the Committee's mandate should be extended.

59. Pakistan had an abiding interest in all aspects of the conduct of peace-keeping operations; in that connexion, he pointed out that a United Nations Observer Mission was stationed along the Kashmir cease-fire line and its presence continued to be essential. In any event, his delegation was conscious of the political overtones of the subjects, which involved the interplay of the major Powers' interests.

60. In his delegation's opinion, the ultimate authority relating to peace-keeping operations rested with the Security Council, but the Council could delegate certain functions to the Secretary-General, who would naturally be guided by its directives. Similarly, the composition of the United Nations forces should be determined through consultations with the parties concerned, and care should be taken to ensure that the forces did not become a factor for interference in the political situation.

61. His delegation associated itself with the concern expressed by some members concerning the lack of preparations and of agreed procedures which had often delayed operations when time had been of the essence. Furthermore, the fact that the *ad hoc* approach had worked in the past did not mean that things could not go wrong in future. He therefore associated himself with the appeal that more attention should be given to the central aspect of the operations. Moreover, although peace-keeping operations had performed a useful function, his delegation believed it essential for the Organization to bear in mind that they were no substitute for efforts to solve the basic causes of conflicts.

62. Mr. MAROOFI (Afghanistan) said that the Special Committee had been established in 1965 to review the whole question of peace-keeping operations, and to work out a satisfactory system for carrying out such operations and overcoming the financial difficulties involved. It could be said that the Special Committee had performed the task entrusted to it.

63. His delegation had carefully studied the report of the Special Committee and, as one of its members, had closely followed the reports submitted to it by the Working Group. It believed that the over-all approach which the Special Committee had adopted in working out the draft formulas was an important breakthrough in peace-keeping matters and provided a constructive basis for further work. In view of the inherent difficulty of its work, the Special Committee should be commended for such modest progress as it had made so far. Nevertheless, further concerted efforts should be made to overcome the differences of opinion and to reach a satisfactory solution that would be in strict

conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter. To that end, agreement among the major Powers was indispensable.

64. As a member of the Special Committee, his delegation would make its views fully known when the matter was taken up in the Committee the following year. His delegation supported the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1) providing for the extension of the mandate of the Special Committee and the Working Group for a further year and extended its appreciation to the officers of the Special Committee for the excellent report they had submitted for the Committee's consideration.

65. Mr. SCALABRE (France) said that although his delegation had already stated its position on the report of the Special Committee and its support for draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1, it wished, after hearing the preceding speakers, to draw attention to the principles underlying his delegation's basic views on peace-keeping operations.

66. The Charter had established the absolute and exclusive primacy of the Security Council in the matter. As his Government pointed out to the Secretary-General in a communication sent to him<sup>5</sup> in reply to a questionnaire requesting the views of States on the subject, his Government considered that the Security Council not only decided on the launching of a peace-keeping operation but determined and controlled its execution and financing. In practice, that would not prevent the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council, from playing an important role, which, in the case of the current operations in the Middle East, Mr. Waldheim had performed with all the skill and ability for which he was deservedly known. Under his authority, the other officials taking part in the operations had fulfilled their difficult task with intelligence and dedication. A tribute should be paid to the Commander and the officers and men of the forces.

67. Nevertheless, his delegation did not consider that the Middle East operation could be taken as a model above criticism, or that the procedures which had been followed should automatically become the general rule. That led him to refer to the financing of peace-keeping operations.

68. The principle of the absolute primacy of the Security Council was no impediment to having the cost of a given operation borne by all Member States in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter. However, the Security Council was empowered to decide to use another method of financing. To hold otherwise would mean that the General Assembly, which had the financial power in the matter, would be able to stop an operation by refusing to approve the necessary appropriations, which would be contrary to the provisions of the Charter, in particular those of Chapter VII. Furthermore, the Security Council was responsible for controlling the use of the finance decided on. In connexion with the renewal of the mandate of UNEF, France had expressed its concern at the fact that the approved appropriations had been exceeded. His delegation had strong views on that subject; it agreed with the views expressed by the USSR representative (934th meeting) concerning the need for greater control in financial matters and held that the Security Council should ensure that financial equilibrium was maintained. With respect to both that question and others, it would be most useful to have an organ of the kind envisaged in Article 29 of the Charter.

69. With regard to the other essential prerogatives and responsibilities of the Security Council, his delegation felt that the most satisfactory list was that contained in the first variant of article 1 of the draft formulas before the Committee, including the items shown within brackets. The exclusive and non-transferable nature of those responsibilities in no way prevented the Security Council, in exercising them, from making use of studies and suggestions by the Secretary-General. Furthermore the Secretary-General directed all peace-keeping operations under the authority of the Security Council and adopted the practical decisions required for their execution. Above that level, and in accordance with the Charter, supreme authority rested with the Security Council, without any restriction on its competence.

70. He reaffirmed his delegation's confidence in the Special Committee and its decision to continue to co-operate in that Committee's work so that it would finally be possible to abandon improvised arrangements which jeopardized the success of peace-keeping operations and to achieve, in a broad spirit of understanding, the successful outcome which was already in sight.

<sup>5</sup> See A/AC.121/L.15/Add.2.

*The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.*

## 936th meeting

Wednesday, 20 November 1974, at 11 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.936

### AGENDA ITEM 39

**Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (concluded) (A/9827, A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1)**

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that Gabon, Indonesia and Nepal had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1.

2. Mr. ROSU (Romania) said that the question of peace-keeping operations was rightly one of the current concerns of the United Nations, because it concerned the accomplishment of a fundamental aim proclaimed in the Charter. His delegation wished to stress that peace-keeping operations should be an activity to the success of which all Member States should be able to contribute. Past attempts to keep certain fundamental United Nations activities within restricted limits and spheres, the lack of general consultation and information among the Member States and efforts to transfer certain powers of decision to levels outside the direction and control of the representative bodies had all created grounds for suspicion, which had harmed the effectiveness of the United Nations. Similar trends had also been noted in the past in the establishment and implementation of peace-keeping operations. In order to avoid such situations in the future, the elaboration of guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations should take account of the right of each Member State to participate, in conditions of equality, in the adoption and implementation of decisions and action stemming from those guidelines.

3. Most delegations had stressed that the recent peace-keeping operations in the Middle East had provided an impetus to the work of the Committee, and his delegation shared the general view regarding the importance of solutions and guidelines adopted at the time of the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the need to consider those experiences. However, it noted that the establishment of those operations had not resolved all questions of principle, and that solutions still had to be found for a number of important problems. It also noted that the acceptance of certain guidelines and solutions had been due to the particular circumstances prevailing at the time and to the individual characteristics of the situations in question. For that reason, his delegation did not believe that those solutions could be considered as constituting a precedent or as being generally valid for all future operations. It was therefore necessary, proceeding by a selective assimilation of generally valid elements, to try to elaborate and adopt a set of rules which would be acceptable for all future operations. Those rules should essentially make possible

and facilitate the implementation of peace-keeping operations as expeditiously, effectively and inexpensively as possible.

4. With regard to the question of the financing of peace-keeping operations, his delegation believed that the attempt to interpret the provisions of the Charter with a view to laying down a single method of meeting the costs of peace-keeping operations was unlikely to result in a smooth and successful operation. It felt that it was neither timely nor possible to establish, as a guideline, one method of financing which would be valid for all situations and, accordingly, it could not agree that the solutions adopted with regard to UNEF, including those concerning financing, should be applied to other situations or future situations. One solution might be for the competent organs of the United Nations to establish the methods to be used in order to meet costs in the light of the special features of each case, and the other solution might be to enumerate all the possible methods, specifying that the competent organs of the United Nations might select one or more methods in the light of the special features of each specific case.

5. It should also be stressed that peace-keeping operations carried out thus far had been undertaken with the agreement and co-operation of the parties concerned. Since they were conceived as exceptional measures of a temporary and limited nature, peace-keeping operations could not in themselves solve the questions in dispute and, consequently, should not be considered as a substitute for the individual efforts of all parties concerned to eliminate the sources of the conflicts. For that reason, his delegation believed that the guidelines should reflect the obligation of the parties in conflict to co-operate with a view to the smooth running of the operations and to make every effort to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict, as a matter of urgency.

6. The report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/9827) indicated that it had made some progress, and his delegation favoured the renewal of its mandate in order to enable it to complete its task in time for the next session of the General Assembly. Accordingly, his delegation would support the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1) submitted on the item.

7. Mr. TÜZEL (Turkey) said that a number of very important developments during the preceding year had given a new direction and fresh impetus to the United Nations role in peace-keeping. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the report of the Special Committee reflected both that trend and the concern of the international community with regard to the future of peace-keeping operations. The annex to its report showed that considerable progress had been made towards defining an agreed set of guidelines, and the draft proposals would



doubtless serve as a useful basis for its future work. His delegation hoped that it would be possible to produce a complete and agreed text of guidelines by the next session of the General Assembly.

8. His delegation believed that the Security Council should have authority over peace-keeping operations. Needless to say, while engaging in and supervising such activities, the Council should have sufficient latitude to determine the appropriate course of action to deal with different cases and circumstances; accordingly, the guidelines should be sufficiently general and flexible.

9. Peace-keeping operations were usually conducted within a framework of very complex relations between the United Nations and the various bodies concerned. Any course of action envisaged by the Security Council should therefore have the approval of all parties concerned, otherwise the peace-keeping function of the United Nations would be in jeopardy. The impartiality of the peace-keeping force and of the various national contingents was of the utmost importance. His delegation supported the view that the force should be recruited on the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation. The security and safety of peace-keeping forces was a matter of deep concern for all members of the international community, including the parties to any given conflict. It was also imperative that the Security Council and the Secretary-General ensured that the units of the peace-keeping force acted strictly within their mandate. Any national contingent which was to take part in an operation should be very well trained and briefed to carry out its duties in the special circumstances, including the political circumstances, in its area of deployment. His delegation fully subscribed to the comments made by the Austrian delegation at the 935th meeting.

10. He wished to express his delegation's appreciation to the Special Committee for its excellent work. It wholeheartedly supported the renewal of the mandate of the Special Committee and would vote for the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1) submitted on the item.

11. Mr. SIDASH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the important question of peace-keeping operations was linked with the practical implementation of the relevant provisions of the Charter concerning the maintenance of peace and the security of peoples.

12. His delegation was pleased to note that the positive processes which were taking place in the world and which were aimed at imparting an irreversible character to the progress made with regard to détente also required an extension of the United Nations role as the centre for achieving agreed action by States in the interests of universal peace and security. In that connexion, he pointed out that under the Charter, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace was vested in the Security Council. He noted with satisfaction that fewer delegations now based their position on the question of the organization and conduct of peace-keeping operations on premises inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter. The sorry experience of the past had undoubtedly forced many delegations to adopt a more serious attitude towards such an important United Nations activity and to recognize that such operations must be carried out entirely under the

guidance of the Security Council. It should be noted, however, that some circles were still trying to defend positions that were incompatible with the provisions of the Charter.

13. The very composition of the Security Council, which represented all groups of States, and its special role and responsibility under the Charter, established firm bases for working out agreed guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations. The Special Committee had so far been unable to fulfil its task of establishing such guidelines, but it was to be noted that the Working Group had made progress during the current year regarding United Nations peace-keeping operations under the authority of the Security Council. Further progress in that field would substantially help to increase the United Nations effectiveness in fulfilling its basic task, which was the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security.

14. His delegation firmly believed that the carrying out of peace-keeping operations, their approval, selection of contingents, determination of expenditure and the continuing and practical direction of such operations were all matters which fell within the exclusive competence of the Security Council. There should be no discrimination whatever with regard to geographical groups of States in respect of such matters as the selection of troops and the practical direction of the operations.

15. His delegation agreed with the view expressed in the Committee that the two latest United Nations operations in the Middle East—UNEF and UNDOF—had shown that some progress had been made with respect to the carrying out of peace-keeping operations. It was known that the composition of UNEF and UNDOF had been determined by a decision of the Security Council and that the members of the Council had consulted amongst themselves with respect to questions relating to the use of those forces. However, much remained to be done to increase the role of the Security Council in the practical guidance of such operations and to remove their remaining short-comings.

16. In that connexion, he drew attention to the statement made by his delegation at the 1799th meeting of the Security Council during its consideration of the extension of the mandate of UNEF in October 1974 to the effect that it was the Security Council which should determine the composition and number of United Nations troops and the over-all expenditure for their support facilities and that the significant increase in the over-all expenditure for the two preceding periods had been unjustified.

17. Experience indicated the importance of elaborating agreements in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter between the Security Council and the countries providing troops. It was also important to make use of all of the provisions of the Charter for the day-to-day direction of the operations. Accordingly, the Security Council could establish a subsidiary organ in accordance with Article 29 or use the Military Staff Committee for that purpose.

18. He said that the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations reflected the positive work done by the Committee. The greatest possible efforts should be made to reach agreement in that important field. His

delegation supported the proposal that the Special Political Committee should recommend that the General Assembly renew the mandate of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.

19. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia) reaffirmed the special importance her Government attached to the role played by the United Nations in peace keeping. She reviewed Tunisia's outstanding diplomatic and military support to the Congo operation and said that it had confirmed her Government's view that small countries could acquire experience and competence, guarantee impartiality, and make, in any collective enterprise, contributions out of all proportion to their size, the number of their inhabitants, and the stage of their development. Her country shared the concern of the international community at any breach of the peace, since peace was indivisible. From the beginning, her Government had pronounced itself in favour of strengthening the machinery for the maintenance of peace by the United Nations. Recent events in the Middle East and Cyprus had constituted a dramatic reminder of the urgent need for the United Nations to have at its disposal forces which would allow it to act rapidly when circumstances so required. The action undertaken by the United Nations had shown that it was possible to achieve a political consensus in the Security Council and that it was imperative to establish guidelines for peace-keeping operations in order to give the Security Council effective and uncontested instruments with which to undertake collective action on equitable bases. Thus, in view of Tunisia's traditional position in the field of peace keeping, the new political situation in 1974 and the experience gained in recent operations, her delegation favoured an extension of the Special Committee's mandate. In its view, the draft guidelines contained in the report (A/9827, annex, appendix), although preliminary, marked progress towards a definitive formula. Her delegation therefore urged the Special Committee and its Working Group to redouble their efforts with a view to achieving a broader agreement. It felt that the Working Group offered a framework within which existing differences and diversions could be reduced and areas of agreement could be broadened and confirmed. Her delegation supported the draft resolution before the Committee.

20. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) said that it was generally recognized that the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations played a significant role in the framework of its general efforts to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the Charter. It was regrettable that almost 10 years had elapsed since the establishment of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and that no arrangement had yet been reached which could guarantee smooth, speedy and efficient peace-keeping operations when the need arose. Admittedly, the problems were great and complex. Over 10,000 military personnel from 25 countries were in United Nations service. The extreme complexity of the problems involved were reflected in the annual reports presented to the Committee by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, of which Denmark was a member. The current report of the Special Committee deserved special attention and very careful consideration because of the important developments in the field of peace keeping during the period in question. Those developments had all placed the work of the Special Committee in a new perspective.

21. In his introduction to the report on the work of the Organization (A/9601/Add.1) the Secretary-General had stressed, in connexion with the establishment of the second UNEF in the Middle East, that the long-standing controversy over the command and control of the peace-keeping operations had fortunately not prevented the United Nations from responding rapidly to the call for urgent action. His delegation was inclined to share the Secretary-General's view that the establishment of the force could be seen as a pragmatic advance in reconciling the divergent views among Members of the Organization on peace-keeping operations, but it should be remembered that the circumstances accompanying that particular situation had been conducive to speedy action and that there was no assurance that future situations would be equally favourable. While his delegation recognized the value of a pragmatic approach and the possibility of a certain degree of improvisation, it nevertheless believed in the need for broad guidelines for peace-keeping operations agreed well in advance and for careful advance planning of such operations. In that connexion, the letter dated 12 November 1973 from the representative of the Nordic countries to the Secretary-General<sup>1</sup> indicated the co-ordinated efforts which could be made to overcome the problems which a heterogeneous United Nations force might encounter during the early stages of a peace-keeping mission.

22. Although the draft formulas for guidelines submitted by the Special Committee were only tentative and preliminary in character, his delegation agreed that they represented a step forward towards agreed guidelines. It also felt that further progress might be achieved if the mandate of the Special Committee was renewed. For those reasons, his delegation was prepared to support the draft resolution before the Committee (A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1).

23. Mr. UPADHYAY (Nepal) said that his delegation considered the item of cardinal importance. In view of the complexity of the problem, it must be given thorough consideration and the slow progress made by the Special Committee was understandable. The draft articles of guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations represented definite progress.

24. Since the central task of the United Nations was the maintenance of international peace and security and the Organization was considered by many countries to be a political instrument for the preservation of the independence and security of States, its capacity to act in time of need should be strengthened.

25. The Charter had placed primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security on the Security Council and had imposed grave responsibilities on its permanent members. Its failure to take effective action because of disagreement among the permanent members had eroded its prestige and that of the United Nations. However, the current greater understanding among the great Powers held out hope for the future.

26. His delegation was giving thorough consideration to the draft formulas before the Committee and was not yet in

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes, agenda item 44, document A/SPC/165.

a position to make any comment. It was happy that, when drafting those guidelines, the Special Committee had taken into consideration the organization and working of UNEF.

27. Owing to its profound faith in the Charter, his delegation had always been in favour of enhancing the effectiveness of the Security Council in peace-keeping operations. However, whenever the Security Council had lacked initiative, the General Assembly had provided guidance which had helped it to take action to maintain the peace. The General Assembly must therefore be in a position effectively to play the role arising out of Article 10 of the Charter. If the United Nations failed to maintain peace, it would push the weaker States into the arms of the stronger, thus providing a powder keg for another, possibly nuclear, Armageddon. The peace-keeping capability of the United Nations must be enhanced, so that Member States would resort to it rather than to the old "balance of power" system. The atmosphere of détente between the two super-Powers was also bound to be reflected in such matters.

28. The 1965 consensus on voluntary contributions to finance peace-keeping operations<sup>2</sup> had been a temporary improvisation designed to solve the immediate problems. If peace-keeping operations were to be the collective responsibility of all Member States, those States must contribute towards their financing on the basis of the equitable principle of the capacity to pay. His delegation favoured the creation of a peace-keeping fund which would facilitate prompt action and strongly supported the formula of assessment which would generate in all Member States a sense of participation in the United Nations peace-keeping operations.

29. His delegation also supported the extension of the mandate of the Special Committee and hoped that it would benefit from the various suggestions and proposals made during the discussion in the Special Political Committee.

30. Mr. FRAZÃO (Brazil) said that the United Nations role in peace-keeping matters was universally recognized as one of the central pillars on which the Organization was based. The future of the Organization depended on the effectiveness of the system established to maintain international peace and security. In that connexion, he referred to the statement in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations concerning the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force should not be used, save in the common interest. However, peace-keeping operations constituted a *praeter legem* development of the Charter, which had not provided the necessary institutional framework for it, a framework which should logically have been included in Chapter VI and Chapter VII, the latter relating exclusively to enforcement measures envisaged at various levels and, in particular, to the use of armed force.

31. The experience of the preceding few decades had shown that although the definition of the framework within which the role of the United Nations in the matter

of peace-keeping operations should be carried out had been the subject of much controversy, the principle of its action in that field had not been challenged by the majority of Member States. The United Nations had had to intervene, through the force of events, on several occasions in order to ensure the maintenance of peace in several areas of the world. While such action had sometimes been carried out in difficult political circumstances and on an *ad hoc* basis, the fact remained that the majority of Member States had always been aware of the need to establish agreed guidelines related to the launching and carrying out of those operations.

32. In practice, even the *ad hoc* approach which had made it possible to carry out a large number of peace-keeping operations had never been unanimously accepted. It had sometimes led to the virtual paralysis of the Organization and to the accumulation of substantial budgetary deficits as a result of the refusal of some Member States to finance such operations. It was in order to meet that situation that the General Assembly had established the Special Committee, whose principal task had always been to try to impart a greater institutional character to peace-keeping operations. Until quite recently, that Committee had studied the question primarily from the standpoint of what might be called *ad hoc* pragmatism, to the detriment of an institutional and integrated approach that would seek to establish general principles. His delegation had been one of those which had supported that systematic solution. However, since the previous year, a number of new developments had occurred, namely the relative rapprochement of the position of principle of the two major Powers and the launching of a peace operation which had marshalled for the first time the consensus of the members of the Security Council. As a result of those developments, the study of the question had taken a turn more propitious for the establishment of general guidelines.

33. The full significance of the draft formulas submitted to the Committee in the report of the Special Committee was to be found in the adoption of a new methodology for the study of the question. For the first time, the establishment of "scenarios" and models for action had been abandoned, as had attempts to solve general problems at the level of specific cases. It was therefore not so important that the alternative formulas proposed as guidelines for peace-keeping operations seemed to be non-exhaustive and even contradictory. The fact was that they opened the door for a genuine consensus in the matter.

34. However, one must not be lulled by spurious optimism. The problems underlying the traditional difficulty of establishing guidelines in that field continued to exist and the persistent lack of well-defined standards and practices in respect of peace-keeping operations had already profoundly impaired the prestige and credibility of the Organization.

35. The examples of previous operations merely served to strengthen the view that it was essential to abandon the *ad hoc* pragmatic approach and to set out to define a body of doctrine and a set of measures for questions relating to peace keeping and international security. That new approach could be called pragmatic idealism. It was idealist in so far as it presupposed ideal objectives and reflected

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, Annex No. 21, document A/5916, para. 2.

primarily the ideals and principles on which the Charter was based. It was pragmatic in so far as it would have to take into consideration in order to be effective not only the political realities of the modern world but also the recent experiences of peace-keeping operations, in particular those in the Middle East. Such a pragmatic approach should nevertheless be tempered by the ideal objective which the Organization was pursuing. There could be no question of reducing the establishment of the general guidelines to a mere reproduction of arrangements applicable to specific cases. It would be inconceivable to wish to preserve, through the establishment of such guidelines, the international order in its current state, with all its unequal distribution of political, military, economic and technological power.

36. His Government's position on the establishment of agreed guidelines was well known and had been set forth at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly and in the Special Committee. The draft articles submitted represented a set of preliminary drafts which was not necessarily exhaustive. In that connexion, his delegation considered that no provision of those texts should be referred to as having been agreed upon, as stated in paragraph 6 of the report of the Working Group (A/9827, annex). In the future the Working Group should study those questions which had not been sufficiently considered during the current year, in particular the problem that might arise where the exercise of the right of veto might paralyse the Council at the moment of the launching of a peace-keeping operation. It might be appropriate to consider the residual competence of the General Assembly in the matter. In that connexion, he noted that Article 10 of the Charter conferred on the General Assembly a competence of a general nature. The very "constitutional" balance of the Charter depended on Article 10 and that factor should be taken into account in the elaboration of guidelines for peace-keeping operations.

37. The Working Group should also make a more detailed study of methods of financing such operations. His delegation based its position in that regard on the general principle of collective financial responsibility. Other important guidelines which should also be studied in greater detail and from the standpoint of pragmatic idealism concerned the definition of the responsibilities to be exercised by the Security Council, the possible establishment of a subsidiary organ under Article 29 of the Charter, the role, functions and responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the field commander, the essential conditions to be met by peace-keeping operations and the framework of agreements to be concluded with the host countries. Those and other fundamental questions should be examined from the new standpoint to which he had referred earlier.

38. With regard to the current political context in which negotiations concerning peace-keeping operations were being held, he stressed the need to bring the practice of such operations closer to the ideals of the United Nations. The failure of such operations could only undermine the credibility of the United Nations and threaten the very survival of the Organization.

39. However, those operations, which were of an emergency nature, must not be substituted for the efforts which

should be made on a medium- and long-term basis with a view to securing a just and lasting peace wherever United Nations troops might be called to serve as soldiers without enemies.

40. Mr. CORCORAN (Ireland) said that, in view of the pre-eminent position given in the Charter to the maintenance of international peace and security and the effectiveness of peace-keeping operations in achieving that purpose, it was logical that the General Assembly should devote serious attention to all aspects of that question. General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX), which had established the Special Committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the whole question, had specifically referred to the financial aspect of its task. Ireland's continued interest in peace-keeping, demonstrated not only by statements in the Committee but also by its contribution of troops to many operations prompted it to ask whether the Special Committee had fulfilled the mandate entrusted to it. Regrettably, it had been unable either to carry out its comprehensive review or to devote particular attention to the financial aspects of such operations. That lack of progress was due to fundamental differences between Governments on the various issues. His delegation welcomed the progress made in elaborating draft articles for agreed guidelines for peace-keeping operations, but considered it premature to comment on them in detail in their present tentative form. However, since his delegation had always attached particular importance to the financing of those operations, it welcomed draft article 11, with the omission of the words included between square brackets. The decision that the costs of UNEF should be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter was also welcome.

41. Even with the Organization's long experience in peace-keeping operations, there was no guarantee that the existing improvised system of reacting to emergency situations would continue to be effective. It was still important that the rules and principles developed through experience should be set out in a scheme of clear reliable guidelines to enable the United Nations to act in emergency situations requiring immediate action. The draft guidelines produced by the Working Group could provide a basis for further work in the coming year. His delegation supported the renewal of the Special Committee's mandate and hoped that it would work with renewed vigour so that it could report real progress and achievement by the tenth anniversary of its establishment.

42. Mr. LEITE DE FARIA (Portugal) said that his delegation agreed with the comments made by previous speakers concerning the importance of peace-keeping operations. That was all the more significant in view of the fact that the former colonialist and Fascist régime in his country had either regarded peace-keeping operations with distrust or pretended to ignore them. His delegation was happy to note that during the current year the Special Committee and the Working Group had been able to present a number of alternative draft formulas for articles of agreed guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations. Needless to say, his delegation considered that the mandate of the Special Committee should be renewed. In his delegation's view, agreed guidelines for carrying out peace-keeping operations in conformity with the Charter of the United



Nations would enhance the effectiveness of such operations in the future. His delegation fully supported draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1 and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.

43. Mr. JOB (Yugoslavia) said that as a member of the Special Committee, his delegation had already had an opportunity to give its views on the question under consideration. His country's constant interest and active role in the entire question of peace-keeping operations had been demonstrated in a number of ways, namely by the specific action it had taken, together with others, in establishing the first UNEF, through the General Assembly, and the second UNEF, through the Security Council; by its provision of contingents for many peace-keeping operations, and its voluntary contribution towards the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); by its position in the movement of non-aligned countries whose conferences had adopted specific resolutions aimed at strengthening the United Nations peace-keeping role; and lastly by its membership in the Special Committee.

44. Referring to recent developments, he said that his country was all the more concerned with the question under consideration, since the most important current peace-keeping operations, namely UNFICYP, the second UNEF and UNDOF were being carried out in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean region, the latter being an area with which his country was intimately connected. His country's peace and security were directly affected by developments in that region and it was therefore quite aware of the significant role that could be played by peace-keeping operations in helping to prevent the outbreak of war.

45. Any peace-keeping operation must be part of the political peace-making process if it was not to become a helpless witness to disaster. The existence of a peace-keeping operation must never lull the world into false security and make it overlook indications of further possibilities of war. Any peace-keeping operation must therefore be accompanied by strenuous efforts to reach a peace settlement. For instance, the enlargement of UNFICYP must not prevent full implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which had been adopted unanimously. Similarly, the existence of UNEF and UNDOF must contribute to the achievement of an effective peace settlement in the Middle East, the basic conditions for which were Israel's withdrawal from all the territories occupied in and since 1967 and its recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

46. The successful launching of important peace-keeping operations during the preceding two years and the use of the "standby" UNFICYP in October 1973, proved the adaptability of the United Nations and its ability to act in times of need when the political will to do so existed. His delegation welcomed the way in which, by sending the second UNEF, the United Nations had broken the deadlock which was threatening its image and enabled the Security Council to perform its function under the Charter in the light of the shared obligations of all its members. It was also important that the General Assembly, the only vital organ of the United Nations in which all Member States were democratically represented, had also been able to play its

essential role where necessary. In that operation, fundamental principles had been agreed on, which must be applied in all future peace-keeping operations. The composition of the force must be based on equitable geographical distribution, no discrimination must be made in selecting the countries which should participate and no veto concerning the countries selected could be tolerated, the United Nations force must be treated as an integral whole by the host country, with no discrimination between the contingents, due account must be taken of the legitimate interests and rights of the host country and there must be no violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State which was the victim of aggression and occupation.

47. His delegation noted with satisfaction that some of that experience had been used to reach further agreement on the guidelines, and that every year, the discussion in the Special Political Committee showed increased flexibility in approach.

48. It should be noted that complete agreement had not been reached even on the title of working document No. 2 of the Working Group (A/9827, annex, appendix). His delegation had therefore proposed the inclusion, in paragraph 6 of the Special Committee's report, of the reference to the progress made by the Working Group regarding the United Nations peace-keeping operations under the authority of the Security Council. The subject-matter of the report was not limited and the title of that working document and the corresponding foot-note did not refer to the Special Committee's full mandate. His delegation would have preferred a more precise statement in the operative part of draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1 along the lines of the fourth preambular paragraph, but could support the draft resolution as a whole because of the reference to paragraph 6 of the Special Committee's report made in operative paragraph 1. As a member of the Special Committee, his delegation supported the renewal of its mandate and that of the Working Group.

49. Mr. ARNELLO (Chile) said that the different opinions concerning the responsibility for directing the peace-keeping operations, the selection of contingents and the financing of the operations expressed during the discussion on the item could greatly influence the efficiency of those operations. The discussion should not be considered exhaustive and it was essential to agree on principles which would lead to the establishment of definite guidelines that would not change with the will of the participants. Although realistic and pragmatic criteria must eventually be established for United Nations peace-keeping work, the achievements of current and past improvisation must not be underestimated because without it the Organization would have been unable to further the cause of peace. The fact that the preparatory discussion had not led to conflict was a positive element in the work involved in the drafting of general guidelines which would establish the principle of good faith among current and future members of the Security Council and countries participating in the operations. The differences of opinion evident in the discussion of those important matters explained why the Special Committee had been unable to fulfil its mandate. The adoption of the draft resolution would be an expression of confidence in that Committee and of appreciation of its

work on the draft formulas and would enable it to continue its review of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Chile had always supported those operations and would continue to do so by contributing to their financing and by sending troop contingents when asked to do so, as it had done from the beginning by sending members of its armed forces on every occasion whenever requested.

50. Many delegations had clearly expressed their views on the different questions and made proposals which could be analysed by the Special Committee. In view of the wide support for its work, its mandate should be renewed in order to enable it to draft guidelines for efficient and impartial peace-keeping operations. The influential countries must subordinate their interests to the spirit which

should animate that as well as other activities of the Organization.

51. The CHAIRMAN announced that he had been informed that the adoption of the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1) would not entail any additional financial expenditures for the United Nations so long as the Special Committee continued to work with the services it had enjoyed so far. In view of the broad sponsorship and wide support shown for the draft resolution during the discussion, it would seem that the Committee wished to adopt it without a vote.

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.310 and Corr.1 was adopted.*

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*

## 937th meeting

Friday, 22 November 1974, at 11 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.937

### AGENDA ITEM 37

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)\*** (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804 and Corr.1, A/9806 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/9848-S/11555, A/9849, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299, A/SPC/L.304):

(a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;

(b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The CHAIRMAN said that, in view of the subject-matter of the only draft resolution (A/SPC/L.304) on the question so far submitted to the Committee, he took it that the Committee wished to adopt it without a vote.

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.304 was adopted.*

\* Resumed from the 926th meeting.

2. Mr. TALEB-BENDIAB (Algeria) announced that the non-aligned countries would submit further draft resolutions before the Committee's next meeting.

3. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines), speaking on behalf of the Special Committee of *Apartheid*, informed the Committee that the Government of Mexico had closed its honorary consulate in South Africa as of 1 March 1974 and commended that Government on its action.

4. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to document A/9849, containing the text of a letter from the Chairman of the Special Committee to the Secretary-General and a statement on recent developments concerning *apartheid* in South Africa, which had been distributed since the last meeting on the item.

*The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.*

## 938th meeting

Tuesday, 26 November 1974, at 3.40 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.938

### *Tribute to the memory of U Thant, former Secretary-General of the United Nations*

1. The CHAIRMAN, speaking on his own behalf and on behalf of the members of the Committee, expressed his

deep sorrow at the death of U Thant, third Secretary-General of the United Nations. He felt sure that the members of the Committee would wish to have their condolences conveyed to the family of the deceased. For 10 very difficult years in the life of the United Nations, the

former Secretary-General had laboured in the service of peace and the aims of the Charter with dedication, integrity, wisdom and courage and had gained the respect and confidence of all Governments of Member States.

*On the proposal of the Chairman, the members of the Committee observed a minute of silence.*

2. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria) said that his delegation fully endorsed the tribute to the memory of U Thant. As Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* he commended the interest and understanding which the former Secretary-General had always shown for the oppressed peoples of Africa, who remembered his endeavours with gratitude.

3. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt), Miss PARRIS (Jamaica), Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) and Mr. ABDEL RAHIM (Sudan), on behalf of their delegations, endorsed the tribute to the memory of U Thant.

4. U MYINT LWIN (Burma) expressed his appreciation for the tribute to U Thant and said that the condolences would be transmitted to the Burmese Government and to the family of the deceased.

#### AGENDA ITEM 37

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)** (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254, A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651, A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/9781, A/9803, A/9804 and Corr.1, A/9806 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/9848-S/11555, A/9849, A/SPC/167 and Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299, A/SPC/L.311-315):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

5. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the Committee to four draft resolutions which had been circulated (A/SPC/L.311-314).

6. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) said that his delegation regarded participation in the struggle against the scourge of racism as a duty and an honour. For that reason it had sponsored the four draft resolutions contained in the documents referred to by the Chairman.

7. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt), on behalf of the sponsors, introduced draft resolution A/SPC/L.311, concerning the arms embargo against South Africa. The General Assembly's decision to deny the South African delegation the right to participate in its work would be a landmark in the annals of the United Nations and serve as evidence of the conscience of mankind.

8. The preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution under consideration outlined the gravity of the current situation in South Africa and the recent accelerated increase in the military power of the South African régime. Those events were a source of concern to the international community as the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had clearly brought out in its report (A/9622 and Corr.1). To prevent that situation from deteriorating further, it was essential that the arms embargo against South Africa be

fully implemented. The sponsors of the draft resolution were deeply distressed that that embargo, which the Security Council had decreed more than a decade previously and which both the Council and the General Assembly had reaffirmed on numerous occasions, was still not fully effective. In view of the gravity of the current situation, it was imperative to request the Security Council urgently to resume consideration of the question of racial conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa with a view to adopting measures under Chapter VII of the Charter in order to ensure the complete cessation by all States of the supply of any type of military equipment to South Africa as well as any military co-operation with that country, in accordance with the provisions of the operative paragraph of the draft resolution. The sponsors hoped that that draft resolution would receive the full support of the Committee.

9. Miss PARRIS (Jamaica), on behalf of the sponsors, introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.312 concerning the release of political prisoners, said that the representative of Egypt had already emphasized the gravity of the current situation in South Africa.

10. The theme of the draft resolution reflected one of the purposes and principles of the Charter, namely recourse to negotiation and mediation to correct any situation which might give rise to international friction, the continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The current situation in South Africa constituted such a threat, as the Security Council had recognized in resolution 134 (1960).

11. Ten years previously, the Security Council had appealed to the South African régime to grant an immediate amnesty to all persons detained because of their opposition to its racial policies. At the previous session, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 3055 (XXVIII) with one negative vote, that of South Africa, and 2 abstentions, those of Paraguay and the former régime in Portugal, condemning the failure of South Africa to comply with the repeated request for the release of all persons imprisoned, interned or otherwise restricted for their opposition to *apartheid*. Recently, the situation had deteriorated and repression had increased.

12. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.312 stated more clearly than previous resolutions had done that the release of the leaders of the oppressed people in South Africa and other opponents of *apartheid* was a prerequisite for the achievement of a peaceful solution. She pointed out that the term "people of South Africa as a whole" in operative paragraph 1 (c) was intended as a deterrent to the white minority's fraudulent policy of setting up the Bantustans as an expression of self-determination. The appeals in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 were self-explanatory. Her delegation commended the draft resolution to the Committee for its unanimous support.

13. Mr. PAVIĆEVIĆ (Yugoslavia), on behalf of the sponsors, introduced draft resolution A/SPC/L.313 concerning the programme of work of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*. The basic purpose of the draft resolution was to strengthen United Nations efforts for concerted action against *apartheid* through the adoption of concrete meas-

ures by Governments, governmental and non-governmental organizations and specialized agencies with a view to increasing the pressure of world public opinion against the crime of *apartheid*.

14. The measures envisaged in the draft resolution were a logical continuation of the successful activities of the Special Committee. Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 clearly spelt out the concrete efforts which that Committee should undertake. Such activity should be considered in close connexion with the implementation of all the measures so far adopted by the United Nations as well as those to be adopted at the current session of the General Assembly.

15. Operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 contained provisions for the promotion of official activities and international campaigns against *apartheid*. Operative paragraph 8 recommended that sufficient funds be made available for the expansion of the various activities of the Unit on *Apartheid*. Under operative paragraph 12 the membership of the Special Committee would be expanded. In view of the more resolute attitude of the international community against *apartheid*, operative paragraph 11 proposed that the Special Committee should henceforth be called "Special Committee against *Apartheid*".

16. On behalf of the sponsors, his delegation appealed for adoption of draft resolution A/SPC/L.313 which fully reflected the debate in the Committee and included all the recommendations made in the report of the Special Committee as well as those made by numerous representatives.

17. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) introduced draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 concerning the prevailing situation in South Africa and said that the draft was the logical continuation of the discussions held during the current session in the Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council and was part of a strong action by the international community designed to put an end to the South African régime's policy of *apartheid*. In the draft resolution, its sponsors were trying to reflect the concern that the General Assembly must show about the increasingly dangerous developments in South Africa as a result of the economic, military and other support that the South African régime continued to receive from some Powers. They also proposed practical measures to help put an end to *apartheid* and to create the conditions required for the African people to exercise their rights. Therefore, the preamble of the draft resolution recalled General Assembly resolutions on the Government of South Africa's *apartheid* policy and in particular the decisions it had adopted at the current session concerning the representation of South Africa. They expressed their deep concern over the prevailing situation in South Africa, noted that the collaboration of certain States and economic interests impeded efforts to eradicate *apartheid* and expressed concern that three Powers—permanent

members of the Security Council—namely, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, by the use of the veto, had prevented the Security Council from taking effective action against the South African *apartheid* régime.

18. Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution strongly condemned the South African régime for its policies and practices of *apartheid* which were a crime against humanity. Operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 made reference to three actual cases of persistent collaboration with the South African régime. After reading out operative paragraphs 9 to 13, he said that the draft resolution put forward a consistent programme of action and that its adoption by the General Assembly would facilitate the adoption of effective measures to apply the principles reaffirmed by the Assembly year after year. The General Assembly, which in the current session had adopted major decisions concerning South Africa, should adopt draft resolution A/SPC/L.314, which reflected principles and proposals repeatedly put forward by the non-aligned countries and affirmed by the principles of the Charter. He was sure that the draft resolution would find broad support.

19. Mr. DABLAN (Jordan) pointed out that his country was not listed as a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.312 in the Arabic version.

20. Mr. ABDEL RAHIM (Sudan) said that, as a member of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and in reaffirmation of his delegation's position expressed at the 913th meeting of the Committee, he would support all four draft resolutions before the Committee. His delegation had become a sponsor of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.311, A/SPC/L.312 and A/SPC/L.313, but was not a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.314, although he would vote for it. The reason for his attitude was that at the current stage of the struggle against *apartheid*, the draft resolution should have been much more forceful, taking into account that the General Assembly had rightly and properly excluded South Africa from its work and that the report of the Special Committee had clearly demonstrated the support which certain countries continued to give South Africa in violation of previous General Assembly resolutions.

21. He reserved the right to discuss the draft resolutions at a later stage.

22. Mr. YEDRA (Cuba) said that in the sixth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/SPC/L.314, in the Spanish text, the word "*las*" before "*relaciones*" should be replaced by the word "*sus*".

23. Mr. TALEB-BENDIAB (Algeria) said the correction made by the representative of Cuba also applied to the French version of the draft resolution.

*The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.*



## 939th meeting

Wednesday, 27 November 1974, at 11.10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.939

### AGENDA ITEM 37

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa  
(continued) (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254,  
A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651,  
A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780,  
A/9781, A/9803, A/9804 and Corr.1, A/9806 and Corr.1  
and Add.1, A/9848-S/11555, A/9849, A/SPC/167 and  
Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299, A/SPC/L.311-315):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the Committee to document A/SPC/L.315, the note by the Secretary-General, submitted in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, on the adminis-

trative and financial implications of draft resolution A/SPC/L.313. He had been assured that the other draft resolutions before the Committee entailed no financial implications.

2. The Committee would vote on those draft resolutions at the following meeting.

3. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) pointed out that in operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.313, the symbol under which the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had been issued had been omitted; he requested that it should be added at the end of the paragraph.

*The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.*

## 940th meeting

Thursday, 28 November 1974, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.940

### AGENDA ITEM 37

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa  
(concluded) (A/9580, A/9586-S/11237, A/9591-S/11254,  
A/9594-S/11271, A/9597, A/9622 and Corr.1, A/9651,  
A/9653-S/11328, A/9664-S/11383, A/9774, A/9780, A/  
9781, A/9803, A/9804 and Corr.1, A/9806 and Corr.1  
and Add.1, A/9848-S/11555, A/9849, A/SPC/167 and  
Corr.1, A/SPC/169, A/SPC/L.299, A/SPC/L.311-315):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The CHAIRMAN invited any delegations wishing to do so to speak in explanation of their vote before the vote.

2. Mr. YANG Ming-liang (China) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the four draft resolutions before the Committee (A/SPC/L.311-314) because they condemned the South African colonialist authorities for their policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination, condemned imperialist support for the South African authorities, and called for an arms embargo against the South African authorities, for vigorous support to Azania's national liberation movement and for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners.

3. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.312, however, he reiterated that in order to resist the Fascist régime of the

minority white racists in South Africa, the Azanian people were fully entitled to wage all forms of struggle including armed struggle to eradicate *apartheid* and the colonialist system. No unrealistic hopes should be placed on the South African racist régime.

4. The legal authorities of his country had yet to study the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* referred to in draft resolution A/SPC/L.314; his delegation therefore reserved the right to make comments on certain of its provisions at an appropriate time.

5. Miss PARRIS (Jamaica) said that her delegation was unhesitatingly prepared to support and sponsor draft resolutions A/SPC/L.311, A/SPC/L.312 and A/SPC/L.313. Although it would support draft resolution A/SPC/L.314, a certain lack of balance in the wording of its operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 prevented her delegation from becoming a sponsor.

6. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia) said that although her delegation fully supported the aims of draft resolution A/SPC/L.314, it did not find the wording of the text fully satisfactory and was therefore unable to become a sponsor.

7. The CHAIRMAN announced that he would put the four draft resolutions before the Committee to the vote in the order of their submission.

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.311*

*At the request of the representative of Nigeria, a vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Israel, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland.

*Against:* United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Italy, Japan, Malawi, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany (Federal Republic of).

*The draft resolution was adopted by 100 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions.<sup>1</sup>*

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.312*

*At the request of the representative of the United States of America, a separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.*

*Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 97 votes to 1, with 7 abstentions.*

*At the request of the representative of Somalia, a roll-call vote was taken on the draft resolution as a whole.*

*The representative of France, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar,

Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Malawi, United States of America, Uruguay.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 111 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.*

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.313*

*At the request of the representative of Nigeria, a vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Madagascar, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Malawi, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of

<sup>1</sup> The delegations of Guinea-Bissau, Saudi Arabia and Congo later informed the Secretariat that, had they been present during the voting, they would have voted for the draft resolution.

America, Uruguay, Belgium, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Israel, Italy.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 106 votes to none, with 10 abstentions.*

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.314*

*At the request of the representative of Nigeria, the vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Iran, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia.

*Against:* Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic of).

*Abstaining:* Japan, Lesotho, Malawi, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Uruguay, Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Iceland.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 90 votes to 13, with 15 abstentions.*

8. Mr. MELHUISH (Australia) said that although his delegation had supported draft resolution A/SPC/L.313, it had reservations about some of the measures referred to in operative paragraph 4. It fully accepted the obligations to use links with South Africa as a means for promoting change; however, it considered that the termination of all connexions with South Africa needed further careful study.

9. The Australian Government's total condemnation of the *apartheid* policies and laws of the Government of South Africa and of that Government's defiance of United Nations demands in respect of Namibia and Rhodesia had been made absolutely clear on repeated occasions, and most recently in the Security Council on 30 October 1974, when Australia had voted in favour of the resolution calling for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. His Government considered that there was an urgent need for the South African Government to abolish *apartheid* and to

implement programmes that ensured justice and respect for human rights and included measures to extend political and economic power to the black and Coloured majority. Accordingly, it was in favour of bringing pressure to bear on South Africa both inside the United Nations, in ways provided for under the Charter, and outside, by co-operation between countries having relations with South Africa. Consequently, his country would have liked to support a resolution strongly condemning *apartheid*. It was disappointed, therefore, that it had been unable to vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 because of the wording of certain provisions. With regard to the second preambular paragraph, he recalled that his delegation had not supported the decision to exclude South Africa from participation in the General Assembly proceedings. It continued to have reservations about resorting to force and consequently did not support operative paragraph 2. Operative paragraph 4 condemned all collaboration with the South African Government; his delegation presumed that the intent of the paragraph was to condemn economic collaboration encouraging *apartheid* and, if so, would have preferred clearer language. Concerning operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, his delegation considered that it would be preferable if the draft resolution—and, indeed, the Special Committee on *Apartheid*—concentrated on South Africa's external relations as a whole, rather than singling out a few specific countries. With regard to operative paragraph 8, while South Africa remained a Member of the United Nations, Australia could not support the total exclusion of South Africa from all United Nations activities; consideration should be given to particular circumstances and to the rules of the international organizations concerned. Operative paragraph 9 (a) caused legal difficulties for his delegation. Furthermore as he had mentioned earlier, Australia had reservations about the desirability of a blanket prohibition on contacts with South Africa, as called for in paragraph 9 (c). With regard to paragraph 9 (f), it considered that particular care must be taken with regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency; the dangers inherent in the exclusion of South Africa from nuclear research arrangements were obvious.

10. Mr. MORETON (United Kingdom) said that his Government's attitude towards *apartheid* had been made abundantly clear in recent statements in the United Nations and in the United Kingdom itself. Soon after the current Administration had taken office, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs had stated in Parliament his Government's fundamental opposition to the system of *apartheid* in South Africa and had pledged that it would give no help or co-operation to the South African Government which could be used for internal oppression or the enforcement of *apartheid*.

11. His delegation had consequently been happy to support the draft resolution on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa (A/SPC/L.304), and had given its full support to the objectives set out in the draft resolution on the release of political prisoners (A/SPC/L.312). It was significant that an earlier version of that draft had been entitled "Peaceful solution of the situation in South Africa". However, his delegation interpreted operative paragraph 1 (a) as referring to non-criminal acts arising from opposition to *apartheid*. With regard to the question of the provision of assistance and the reference to liberation

movements in operative paragraph 2, his delegation's position had already been made clear on a previous occasion.

12. His delegation regretted that it had not been able to support the remaining draft resolutions. It had hoped and had expected to support the draft resolutions on the arms embargo against South Africa (A/SPC/L.311) and the programme of work of the Special Committee (A/SPC/L.313), but unfortunately, the original outlines of both had been revised during recent consultations.

13. His delegation would have supported an appeal to all States which had not yet done so to cease immediately all sales of arms and military equipment to South Africa and to refrain from any assistance in building up South Africa's military and security forces. Earlier in the year, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs had given an assurance that the United Kingdom would continue to follow the policy of embargoing the sale of arms to South Africa in accordance with its international obligations. What action the Security Council decided on would, of course, be for the members of the Security Council itself to decide. His delegation did not, however, regard action under Chapter VII of the Charter as either warranted or appropriate, and consequently, it had been unable to support draft resolution A/SPC/L.311.

14. Similarly, his delegation would have supported a draft resolution on the lines of General Assembly resolution 3151 B (XXVIII), and it regretted the fact that the delegations which had drafted resolution A/SPC/L.313 had thought it necessary to introduce additional elements, such as those in operative paragraphs 3 and 4, on which his delegation had important reservations.

15. His Government had been honoured to welcome the Chairman of the Special Committee to London in June 1974. It had valued those consultations and had looked forward to supporting the draft resolution authorizing the Committee's work programme for 1975. Unfortunately, because of the introduction of extraneous elements unconnected with the authorization of the programme, his delegation had not been able to do so.

16. Although his delegation supported the evident intentions of those who had sponsored draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 concerning the situation in South Africa, it was unable to accept considerable portions of the detailed proposals. In consequence, it would have been dishonest to do anything but vote against the draft resolution.

17. His delegation's reasons for taking the action it did in the Security Council had already been explained. However, a number of delegations had criticized the visit by ships of the Royal Navy to Simonstown and the Nigerian representative had seemed to suggest that the visit had in some way encouraged the South African Government in its racial policies. His delegation did not believe that to be so. The naval visits to which attention had been drawn were of a routine operational character, and would not otherwise have been authorized. It might not have been noticed that naval visits planned earlier in the year, for which there had been no operational reasons, had been cancelled; that action had occasioned no comment though it had exemplified United Kingdom policy on the issues.

18. The visits which had been criticized had entailed calls at Simonstown to take on essential supplies and undergo maintenance on passage to or from the Far East under routine group deployment plans. Special joint exercises had not been held with the South African Navy. The normal weapon training, for which facilities were available under the Simonstown Agreement, could by no stretch of the imagination be said to have any relevance whatever to the enforcement of *apartheid*; nor, in the view of his Government, could the operation of the Simonstown Agreement. Although his Government did not share the Special Committee's views on the relevance of the Simonstown Agreement to internal repression in South Africa, the importance of the Agreement was being considered along with other defence commitments and interests in the current British defence review.

19. His delegation did not agree with the view expressed by some that condemnation of *apartheid* by countries which continued to have commercial and other links with South Africa was hypocritical, and it would not be deterred by that argument from expressing its sincere and unreserved condemnation of a system which it deplored and which it desired to see changed.

20. The best way to persuade the South African Government to abandon its misguided policies was, as members of the Committee were well aware, a matter on which opinions differed. His delegation sincerely believed that violence or economic or other sanctions were not the shortest or best road to the goal for which all were striving and would therefore not support such proposals.

21. Some delegations recognized that countries which maintained relations with South Africa had special opportunity and responsibility to exert pressure. His Government did not shirk that responsibility and it continued to make the contributions it regarded as most useful and most effective in the international effort to improve the situation in South Africa.

22. Mr. HANSEN (Federal Republic of Germany) reaffirmed that the Government and people of his country resolutely opposed any violation of human rights, of which racial discrimination and, more especially, the policies of *apartheid* were particularly condemnable instances. His delegation therefore regretted all the more that it had not been able to support all the draft resolutions before the Committee and had even been obliged to cast a negative vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.314, although it fully subscribed to its strong condemnation of South Africa. However, a number of preambular and operative paragraphs conflicted with some of the basic principles determining his Government's foreign policy in general and towards South Africa in particular. His Government did not believe that its economic relations with South Africa impeded efforts for the eradication of *apartheid* and encouraged the South African régime to persist in its inhuman policies, and that the activities of its corporations enhanced *apartheid* and encouraged the exploitation of African workers. His Government could not prohibit all contacts with South Africa because such action would be impossible under his country's Constitution. Neither could it subscribe to the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South



Africa "by all available means", since that wording could be construed to infer that the United Nations sanctioned the use of weapons. His delegation also had difficulties with the second preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 8, as well as the practice of singling out individual countries.

23. His delegation would have liked to vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.313, but had not been able to do so, mainly because of operative paragraphs 4 (b) and (e).

24. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.311, his delegation wished to stress that the Federal Republic of Germany scrupulously applied Security Council resolutions and did not supply arms or military equipment to South Africa. It would therefore have liked to vote in favour of that draft resolution but had been unable to do so in view of the references to Chapter VII of the Charter and its belief that a total arms embargo could be feasible and effective without invoking Chapter VII.

25. His delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.312 concerning the release of political prisoners. It had abstained in the separate vote on operative paragraph 2 since it believed that the assistance to be provided to liberation movements should permit them to attain equality by peaceful means.

26. His delegation had been one of the sponsors of the draft resolution on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa (A/SPC/L.304). His country had recently contributed a substantial sum to the Fund and hoped to do the same in the following year, subject to parliamentary approval.

27. Mr. RENS (Belgium) said that his delegation had remained silent in the discussion on the item because it had nothing to add to its previous statements condemning *apartheid* as inadmissible and reprehensible.

28. While all delegations appeared to view the situation in South Africa in the same way, there was a difference of opinion regarding the action to be taken. The Belgian Government, for its part, could not endorse some of the measures agreed upon at the current session simply because they might complicate the problem rather than facilitate a solution.

29. It was highly regrettable that the Committee had been required to vote on such important draft resolutions at very short notice. His delegation had not received the texts until 26 November, while the Belgian Government had been apprised of their contents only the day before. If more time had elapsed, allowing for consultations, his delegation might have voted differently on one of the draft resolutions.

30. His delegation had abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.311, even though Belgium had spontaneously decided to end its deliveries of arms to South Africa in the wake of Security Council resolutions adopted in 1963 and 1969. It was strictly adhering to that policy, which prohibited, *inter alia*, the granting to South Africa of arms-manufacturing licences. However, his delegation believed that every country should take its own decision in the matter and, furthermore, it doubted whether action under Chapter VII of the Charter was justified.

31. His delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.312 and might have become a sponsor had it been able to hold consultations with a view to introducing certain stylistic changes.

32. It had abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.313 because of serious reservations concerning some of the provisions, including operative paragraph 4 (e). His Government adhered to the view that *apartheid* could not be ended by isolating South Africa; rather it was through contacts of the kind referred to in operative paragraph 4 (e) that South Africa could be induced to change its policies.

33. His delegation had voted against draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 because it found the contents unreasonable.

34. Mr. DE LATAILLADE (France) said that his country's position on *apartheid* had been known for many years and had been defined in even clearer terms at the current session. France believed that a system which measured fundamental freedoms according to the colour of the skin was *per se* inadmissible and reprehensible. He did not hesitate to say so once again because reaffirmation of a principle as essential as that of human dignity certainly bore repetition. Moreover, the international community's censure of a system as morally odious and intellectually absurd as *apartheid* would, he believed, one day be heeded.

35. His delegation had willingly, at the 937th meeting, joined in the adoption of draft resolution A/SPC/L.304. His Government had for several years been contributing voluntarily to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa in the amount of \$30,000.

36. His delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.312. It supported most of the preambular paragraphs, and particularly the second and the fifth. However, it had a reservation concerning operative paragraph 2. France's position regarding the liberation movements in South Africa had been outlined at the beginning of the session when the Committee had considered the question of inviting representatives from the liberation movements to attend its deliberations as observers. Suffice it to say that France's assistance was essentially humanitarian and was destined for persons who suffered because of their opposition to *apartheid*.

37. Despite the fact that the French authorities had welcomed the frank exchange of views in the summer with the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, his delegation had abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.313 because it included a number of questionable assertions. Furthermore, it did not find the proposed programme of action entirely acceptable.

38. His delegation was sympathetic to the aims underlying draft resolution A/SPC/L.311 and would have voted in favour of a text that sought the same objective in a different way. During the discussion on the item a few weeks earlier, the subject of arms sales to South Africa had been raised several times, and he would therefore explain France's position in that regard. On 30 May 1974, in a message to Parliament, the President of the Republic had stated that France would strengthen and accentuate the liberal mission of its diplomacy by supporting the cause of

freedom and the right of peoples to self-determination everywhere, and that it would abstain from any sale of arms which was in breach of such a mission. Subject to contractual obligations, France had brought its arms sales policy into line with the President's statement. However, the task assigned to the Security Council by the draft resolution unmistakably went beyond a simple arms embargo in that it involved possible action under Chapter VII of the Charter. That interpretation of the situation was not one which his delegation could endorse in the current circumstances, and it had therefore abstained on the draft resolution.

39. It had voted against draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 because both the preamble and the operative part contained statements and recommendations that it could not accept. It had already explained in the Security Council that France's veto in no way implied lack of censure of the policy of South Africa; on the contrary, it was in order to air grievances and bring pressure to bear on South Africa that France had been unwilling to exclude the Pretoria régime. Furthermore, his delegation had considered that the General Assembly's vote on the representation of South Africa went beyond political censure of the South African Government and might have serious legal consequences for the application of the rules governing the Assembly's activities. Despite its sympathy for the South African people, his delegation could not support operative paragraph 2. Nor did it believe that the interests of the South African people were served by the excessive provisions of operative paragraph 4.

40. During the preceding two sessions of the General Assembly, his delegation had abstained on the omnibus draft resolution concerning the situation in South Africa. At the current session the draft resolution went too far, and his delegation had been forced to vote against it despite its great concern about the situation in South Africa.

41. Mr. TALLARIGO (Italy) recalled that his delegation had already stated that the Italian Government's condemnation of *apartheid* was firm, final and fully shared by all sectors of Italian public opinion. Italy favoured any action which, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, would eventually lead to equality among all citizens of any colour in South Africa. Moreover, Italy adhered firmly to that principle with such concrete and practical measures as refraining from the sale of arms to South Africa in pursuance of Security Council resolutions.

42. His delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.312. In its view, assistance given to liberation movements, as stressed in operative paragraph 2, should be of such a kind as to allow them to achieve their aims within the framework of the Charter.

43. His delegation had been obliged to abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.311. The decision had been a cause for regret, since Italy prided itself on its full compliance with Security Council resolutions which, in point of fact, adversely affected the interests of Italian manufacturers and the country's balance of trade. It did not believe that the draft resolution in question was the proper place for an appeal to the Security Council and for a reference to Chapter VII of the Charter. The Committee

should have been allowed to vote simply for or against the arms embargo to South Africa.

44. His delegation had also abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.313. While it fully appreciated the efforts of the Special Committee and shared its objectives, it felt that advice given to the Special Committee should now narrow the scope of its programme with such precise guidelines. The Special Committee and its Chairman should be trusted to find the best way of achieving their major objective of fighting *apartheid*. Moreover, the draft resolution contained elements which, in the view of his delegation, were not pertinent to its objectives. His delegation regretted that the wording used at the preceding session, which his country had been able to support, had not been reproduced at the current session.

45. His delegation believed that draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 included a number of provisions which seemed directed not so much against the *apartheid* régime of South Africa as against other Members of the United Nations which, while being committed to the common struggle against *apartheid* held other views as to how the struggle itself should or could be carried out. Other provisions requested intervention by Governments in fields where, in view of their internal structure, they had no power to intervene.

46. Mr. THAPA (Nepal) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.314, although it had reservations on the fifth preambular paragraph and on operative paragraph 8. Its position on the substantive issue raised in paragraph 8 had been explained in his delegation's statement in the General Assembly.

47. Mr. HARRISON (Canada) said that the policy of *apartheid* was abhorrent to Canada, which could not condone the denial of full and equal social, economic, political and cultural rights to the majority of a country's people. As his delegation had frequently stated, the best way of effecting change in South Africa was by bringing home to its Government and population the universal rejection of its policies and practices by the international community.

48. The Canadian Government, conscious of the need to promote the realization of the rights of the peoples of South Africa, firmly supported all humanitarian programmes for the African peoples of that country. In accordance with its policy of advocating positive and pragmatic measures to bring about change in South Africa, it had supported the draft resolution on the programme of work of the Special Committee (A/SPC/L.313) despite its reservations regarding operative paragraphs 4 (b), (c) and (e).

49. Canada had been maintaining a strict and effective arms embargo against South Africa in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. It had abstained on the draft resolution on that subject (A/SPC/L.311) only because the text included a reference to Chapter VII of the Charter, thus presupposing a threat to international peace and security which his Government did not believe existed.

50. In accordance with its advocacy of peaceful change in South Africa, Canada could not accept language calling for the use of violence or the cessation of trade in peaceful goods. For that reason it had expressed reservations about the terminology of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and about the use of the expression "crime against humanity", which had a special meaning in international law. His delegation had been unable to support the draft resolution on the situation in South Africa (A/SPC/L.314) precisely because it contained expressions of that kind.

51. Mr. ARVESEN (Norway) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.311, although it had reservations on the wording of the last preambular paragraph and of the operative part. As it had stated on several occasions, it considered it the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council to determine when and to what extent mandatory measures should be undertaken under Chapter VII of the Charter. Norway had always strongly opposed *apartheid* and supported constructive efforts by the United Nations to bring about peaceful change in that country, but a number of paragraphs in draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 requested States Members of the United Nations to adopt measures which they were unable to adopt for legal and other reasons. His delegation strongly objected to the second and fifth preambular paragraphs and to operative paragraph 8 of that draft resolution. It had on many occasions made its position clear on the question of the expulsion or suspension of a Member State from the United Nations or the specialized agencies. It had always upheld the principle of universality of membership and would continue to do so. For those reasons alone, his delegation had felt obliged to vote against draft resolution A/SPC/L.314.

52. Mr. MUHONEN (Finland) said that, as everyone knew, the policy of *apartheid* was abhorrent to his Government and people, who were strongly opposed to the methods used by the South African Government to uphold its inhuman and aggressive policies in defiance of United Nations resolutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter. The United Nations must do its utmost to put an end to the system of *apartheid*, and Finland, as always, would assist it to achieve that end by peaceful means.

53. His delegation was in agreement with most of the recommendations made in the draft resolutions that the Committee had just adopted. It had, however, reservations on certain paragraphs, some of which concerned the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations. He emphasized two points in particular. First, his delegation had doubts about the advisability of discontinuing all forms of contact with South Africa, for it did not believe that the total exclusion of that country from the international community was a fruitful way to counteract *apartheid* and the policies of the South African Government. Secondly, in order to be effective, sanctions must be mandatory and implemented loyally by all Member States, but mandatory sanctions could be imposed by the Security Council alone. Should the Security Council decide to impose economic sanctions against South Africa, Finland would of course apply them scrupulously. It had been with those considerations in mind that his delegation had voted on the draft resolutions just adopted.

54. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution on the arms embargo against South Africa (A/SPC/L.311) but it felt bound to point out that under the Charter, it was only the Security Council which could impose sanctions and decide on their nature; it therefore construed the latter part of the operative paragraph in the light of that understanding.

55. His delegation had also voted in favour of the draft resolution on the programme of work of the Special Committee (A/SPC/L.313) but it wished to make clear that it had done so on the understanding that the steps proposed in operative paragraphs 4 (b), (c) and (e) were to be taken by the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and not by Governments. If the Danish Government were to endorse such steps, it would assume joint responsibility for provisions which could not be implemented in Denmark for constitutional reasons or which could be taken only by the Security Council. He had voted against the draft resolution on the situation in South Africa (A/SPC/L.314) because the second preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 8 were unacceptable to his delegation. His Government was no friend of *apartheid*, and its negative vote must be interpreted as reflecting its attachment to the principle of universality.

56. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that his delegation had abstained on the draft resolution on the programme of work of the Special Committee (A/SPC/L.313) and had voted against that on the situation in South Africa (A/SPC/L.314). Its negative vote had been motivated by the fact that draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 singled out Israel and it was obvious that that had not been done on any objective and factual grounds but as part of the usual Arab political and propaganda warfare against Israel. The whole world knew that for centuries the Jewish people had been the victims of racial persecution and discrimination; any form of racial discrimination must therefore be abhorrent to it.

57. Mr. CRAFOORD (Sweden) said that, although his delegation had some doubts about the wording of the operative paragraph of the draft resolution on the arms embargo against South Africa (A/SPC/L.311), it had voted for it. His delegation did not interpret that text as giving detailed instructions to the Security Council but rather as recommending a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, an embargo which his country had always wished to see imposed. His delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution on the programme of work of the Special Committee (A/SPC/L.313) on the understanding that that text, especially operative paragraph 4 thereof—on which his delegation might have certain reservations—referred only to possible subjects for information activities to be carried out by the Special Committee. His delegation also supported many of the recommendations in draft resolution A/SPC/L.314, on the situation in South Africa, but it had reservations about the second preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 8, which conflicted with Sweden's traditional stand on the principle of universality and had therefore been obliged to vote against the draft resolution. That vote must not be interpreted as reflecting any indifference to the situation in South Africa; as was well known, Sweden abhorred and unequivocally condemned the racist policy of the South African régime.

58. Mr. ARNAUD (Argentina) said that, in accordance with his country's condemnation of the policy of *apartheid* and all forms of racial discrimination, his delegation had voted in favour of all four draft resolutions, including draft resolution A/SPC/L.314, on some of the wording of which it had reservations, although it fully shared the spirit which had inspired it.

59. Mr. LINDENBERG SETTE (Brazil) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 as a whole, although it would have abstained on operative paragraph 8 had it been voted on separately because it considered measures to exclude or expel a Member State to be counterproductive.

60. Mr. EHSASSI (Iran) said that his delegation had consistently held *apartheid* to be inhuman, abhorrent and contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It had voted in favour of all four draft resolutions, although it had some reservations on certain parts of draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 and would have abstained had a separate vote been taken on those parts.

61. Mr. NOGUCHI (Japan) said that his delegation, whose firm opposition to the policies of *apartheid* were well known, had voted in favour of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.312 and A/SPC/L.313 even though the latter contained some paragraphs with which it had some difficulties, because it had always respected the work of the Special Committee as the central body for international efforts to combat the policy of *apartheid*. Although it was in full agreement with the underlying spirit of draft resolution A/SPC/L.314, it had abstained on it because it could not agree with several of its paragraphs. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.311, Japan was strictly enforcing the arms embargo against South Africa and favoured a Security Council study of more effective ways to ensure compliance, without the slightest exception, of its resolutions on that embargo. It could not, however, agree that it was proper or helpful for the General Assembly to request the Security Council specifically to take measures under Chapter VII of the Charter and had therefore been obliged to abstain on the draft resolution.

62. Ms. WHITE (United States of America) said that her delegation had voted against draft resolution A/SPC/L.311 because, as it had often said, it believed that such sanctions would not be effective. The United States had instituted an arms embargo against South Africa even before the United Nations had done so and continued to forbid the sale of military equipment to that country. It had had no military or naval collaboration with South Africa for over a decade and had no intention of engaging in such collaboration in the future. Her delegation had abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.312. It had requested a separate vote on operative paragraph 2 and had voted against that paragraph, because of its reference to material assistance to the liberation movements. It had voted against draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 because, among other objections, the United States continued to oppose the recommendation made in operative paragraph 8 that South Africa should be excluded from participation in international organizations. As the head of the United States delegation had stated in the recent Security Council debate, it considered that South

Africa should continue to be exposed to expressions of abhorrence of *apartheid* in the United Nations and other organizations. It agreed with those delegations which had voted in favour of the draft resolutions on the need to eliminate *apartheid*, but disagreed with them on some of the means by which that end should be achieved.

63. Mr. BOERTIEN (Netherlands) said that though his delegation had not been able to support all the draft resolutions that had just been adopted, its votes must not be taken as indicating a departure from its traditional rejection of the policy of *apartheid*. Although it had been able to vote for the draft resolution on the release of political prisoners (A/SPC/L.312), it had not been able to vote for operative paragraph 2 because it interpreted the expression "liberation movements" to mean movements against *apartheid*. The Netherlands assisted South African nationals who had become victims of the policy of *apartheid*, through the appropriate channels, such as the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, but it wished to dissociate itself from direct material support for those movements because that might be regarded as direct intervention in the internal affairs of South Africa. Supporting such movements was essentially quite a different matter from supporting liberation movements that were resisting colonial rule.

64. His delegation had abstained on the draft resolution on the arms embargo against South Africa (A/SPC/L.311), mainly because the operative paragraph of that draft resolution enjoined the General Assembly to take action that would encroach on the functions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. It had also abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.313, on the programme of work of the Special Committee, because it could not endorse operative paragraphs 3 (a), 4 (b) or 4 (e). It had voted against the draft resolution on the situation in South Africa (A/SPC/L.314) because the Netherlands Government found the fourth, fifth, sixth and ninth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraphs 4, 5, 8, 9 (c) and 11 unacceptable.

65. Mr. MNCINA (Swaziland) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 even though it had reservations on operative paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 owing to its country's geographical position.

66. Mr. ARNELLO (Chile) said that his country was ideologically, culturally and historically opposed to any form of racial discrimination. It therefore supported all legitimate actions which would lead to a just solution of a case of such serious racial discrimination as that in South Africa. It could not, however, agree that any means were justified in order to attain those ends. His delegation had therefore voted in favour of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.311, A/SPC/L.312 and A/SPC/L.313 despite certain reservations, but had been obliged to abstain on draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 because the action provided for therein might prejudice rather than favour its objectives and because some of its provisions appeared to contradict the other draft resolutions adopted at the current meeting. For example, some of the action called for might prejudice the result of the request in the operative part of draft resolution



A/SPC/L.311 that the Security Council should resume consideration of the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of its Government. In draft resolution A/SPC/L.312, the General Assembly called upon the South African Government to adopt certain measures, which it was unlikely to do if it was excluded from the Organization. His delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.311 on the understanding that, under the Charter, it was for the Security Council alone to determine what intervention should be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter and the nature of the sanctions to be applied. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.312, it should be understood that the reference in operative paragraph 1 (a) to acts arising from opposition to *apartheid* only covered legitimate acts and that the reference to laws and regulations in paragraph 1 (b) referred solely to laws connected with *apartheid*. Any other interpretation would in fact be unjustified intervention in the internal affairs of a State. His delegation also had reservations on operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.313 for reasons similar to those which had led it to abstain on draft resolution A/SPC/L.314.

67. Mr. WORDSWORTH (Liberia) regretted that he had been absent at the time of the votes on draft resolutions A/SPC/L.311 and A/SPC/L.312, for which he would have voted had he been present. His delegation's votes reaffirmed its numerous past statements on the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa.

68. Mr. CORCORAN (Ireland) said that his delegation's position had been made clear on many occasions; it had therefore voted in favour of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.311, A/SPC/L.312 and A/SPC/L.313, despite its reservations on some of the paragraphs. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.311, his delegation considered that any measures under Chapter VII of the Charter were a matter for the Security Council alone. It interpreted operative paragraph 1 (a) of draft resolution A/SPC/L.312 in the light of its Government's commitment to change through peaceful means, and it believed that the assistance to liberation movements referred to in operative paragraph 2 should be oriented to help the black population of South Africa. It had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.313 in spite of a number of recommendations which its Government would find difficult to accept. For instance, operative paragraph 4 (b) strayed close to the questions of sanctions, a matter with which the Security Council alone could deal. Neither did his delegation agree with paragraph 4 (e), which advocated ending all contacts with the racist régime. His delegation had found itself unable to support draft resolution A/SPC/L.314 which contained a number of paragraphs quite unacceptable to his Government.

69. Mr. NIACADIE (Ivory Coast) said that his delegation had voted in favour of all four draft resolutions, although it had reservations on the fourth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 5 and 8 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.314.

70. Mr. LENNKH (Austria) said that, with regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.311, his delegation considered that measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, which were the gravest sanctions against a Member State foreseen in the Charter, apart from suspension and exclusion, were the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council. It had, however, voted in favour of that draft resolution in order clearly to express its opposition to the policy of *apartheid*. For the same reason, it had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.313, although it was unable to approve certain measures set forth in its operative paragraphs.

71. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the delegation of Chad, which had been prevented by unforeseen circumstances from being present at the time of the votes on draft resolutions A/SPC/L.311, A/SPC/L.312 and A/SPC/L.313, would have voted in favour of those draft resolutions had it been present.

72. Mr. MACKI (Oman) said that his delegation would also have voted in favour of all the draft resolutions had it been present, because of its firm belief in the rights of the people of South Africa to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

73. Mr. OLUMILUA (Nigeria) said that, while the condemnation of the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa indicated by the adoption of the four draft resolutions was particularly gratifying to his delegation, the majority by which they had been adopted fell far short of what was required in order to eradicate the practice and policy of *apartheid*. For over a quarter of a century, Member States had been stating their opposition to that policy and expressing lofty ideals about self-determination and human rights. The reason why those words were not translated into action was no doubt a lack of sincerity on the part of Member States. He appealed once more to all States Members of the United Nations to use any influence they had to bring pressure to bear on the Government of South Africa in order to make it abandon its detestable policy, which it would eventually be obliged to do by the inexorable march of events.

74. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had concluded its consideration of agenda item 37 on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*

## 941st meeting

Friday, 29 November 1974, at 4.20 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.941

### AGENDA ITEM 38

**United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/9582, A/9613, A/9740, A/9789, A/9815 and Corr.1, A/SPC/172):**

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Sir John RENNIE (Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), after congratulating the Chairman on his election, expressed his pleasure that the examination of his report would be presided over by the representative of one of the most generous and most understanding contributors to UNRWA's programmes.

2. The circumstances surrounding the presentation of the report on the Agency's activities from 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1974 (A/9613) were significantly different from those in other years. At the current session, for the first time since 1947, the political dimension to which he had referred in his introduction to the preceding year's report had been recognized and given prominence in a debate in the General Assembly. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which represented the Palestinians, and therefore the Palestine refugees in general, had participated in that debate and two resolutions which affected the Palestine refugees had been adopted. He hoped, therefore, that the Committee would feel able to concentrate attention on the very serious financial problem confronting the Agency in the provision of services to the refugees.

3. While the form of the report remained much as in previous years, in accordance with a suggestion by the UNRWA Advisory Commission during its examination of the report for 1972-1973,<sup>1</sup> he had transposed parts of some sections so as to provide a more coherent sequence and avoid duplication.

4. As he had said in his letter of transmittal to the President of the General Assembly, the report sought to give some account of the problems encountered during the year ending 30 June 1974 and, to the extent it impinged directly on them, of the economic and political environment in which operations had been carried on.

5. He drew attention to the scale of the services provided to the registered refugees and to the complexity of the operations the Agency carried out in Lebanon, the Syrian

Arab Republic, Jordan and the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. For 1975, estimated expenditure would be well over \$100 million; staff employed numbered 15,000, 99 per cent of them Palestinians on local terms of service. There were 270,000 children in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools, and education accounted for nearly half the budget—and would account for more than half, were it not for the inflation of expenditure on basic rations by the high cost of flour and other essential commodities. The Palestine refugee problem was no ordinary refugee problem; UNRWA's operations were no ordinary relief operation; nor were those operations a series of projects terminable at short notice without great consequence. Much of the programmes consisted of continuing services—education and preventive medicine—of a quasi-governmental nature which were essential to the refugees, which had become part of the social and economic fabric of the host countries and which, in the continued absence of a political solution, were an important element of stability in the whole region.

6. In paragraph 2 of the report he had referred to "the effects of institutionalization over a quarter of a century" on the Agency, having in mind principally the problem of staff relations, to which paragraph 19 and much of section D were devoted. It was fair to say that staff management now demanded greater attention throughout the whole of the United Nations family of organizations, but it was of special importance in UNRWA because of the large number of local staff—over 15,000—the economic and social environment of the area in which they worked and UNRWA's chronic financial weakness. There was also an apparent ambiguity in the position of the Palestinian staff that aggravated any grievances they had. The local employees of UNRWA were United Nations employees but with a difference: they were almost all, with very few exceptions, Palestine refugees; preference was given to them in recruitment, and in fixing their conditions of service, regard had always been had to the conditions of comparable staff employed by the local Governments rather than, as with the employees of other United Nations organizations, to the conditions of service offered by the local "best employers". Furthermore, because of its temporary status, UNRWA had been unable to provide the same superannuation benefits as were enjoyed by government employees or, for some occupations, to continue to match government salaries at all levels and at all times, though in many important respects and for many occupations the comparison with the local Governments was not unfavourable to UNRWA.

7. Paragraph 6 of his note on revised budget estimates for 1974 and 1975 (A/SPC/172), referred to outstanding demands by local staff for improvements in their conditions of service. He felt bound to mention those demands because they would normally be brought to the notice of a governing body and because UNRWA's budget was not

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 13.

examined by the Fifth Committee. In so far as they could be quantified, their annual costs appeared to double the deficit, and they would involve also non-recurrent costs on a similar scale, some immediately and others when the Agency ceased operation. Some of the demands were clearly unacceptable on financial grounds; others were more modest and merited sympathetic consideration, if adequate income could be found to meet them. First priority had had to be given, however, to periodic, and more and more frequent, increases in remuneration to compensate staff for continued increases in the cost of living. In the budget for 1975 an additional \$9.4 million was provided for that purpose, and it might well prove insufficient. If the cost of international staff could be accepted as a charge on the regular budget of the United Nations, a measure which was justified on grounds both of principle and of expediency, the funds released in the UNRWA budget could be used to satisfy some of the most urgent demands of local staff. The cost in 1975 would be \$3.2 million including the actuarial cost of retroactivity in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund for some staff whose full service had not been validated. He hoped that the Committee would give sympathetic consideration to that course.

8. Paragraph 23 of the Commissioner-General's report referred to supply problems resulting from the disruption of shipping caused by the war of October 1973. Some further disruption had resulted from the fighting in Cyprus, as Cypriot ports were occasionally used for the transshipment of supplies destined for the occupied territories. Much more serious, however, had been the persistent uncertainty about the delivery of supplies caused by shortages and high prices of commodities. An example was the sugar component in the basic ration, which was provided by a contribution in kind from the European Economic Community. Owing to the world shortage of sugar, no offers had been received in response to recent calls for tenders by the Community, the sugar ration had been temporarily cut by half and the continuing shortage and scarcity prices had put maintenance of any sugar ration at all after the end of the year in jeopardy. With regard to flour, most of the Agency's requirements had formerly been received as contributions in kind; that was no longer the case, and purchases at prices four times or more higher than three years earlier represented a heavy drain on cash resources. Colleagues with long experience of UNRWA had said that the supply problems of the preceding 12 months had been worse than at any time they could remember.

9. Paragraph 2 of the report, which dealt with the extension of the Agency's mandate, contained a reference to the desirability of a review of the Agency's constitution, structure and programmes in order to ensure its ability to respond to the requirements of a changing situation. It was clear from the report that UNRWA must continue, but some thought should be given to the future, both because developments might require contingency planning of a more fundamental kind than UNRWA could carry out itself, burdened as it continually was with operational and financial problems, and because of apprehension that its growth in size and complexity was outstripping administrative and managerial resources. He was concerned with both the present and the future. Since the report had been written, there had been important political developments, but it was impossible as yet to foresee how they would

affect the Agency's role and work. It might therefore be too early to set in train any formal review, but he would like to feel free to consult the Secretary-General about the possibility of assistance with a preliminary, internal review, until such time as the General Assembly might decide to undertake a more far-reaching reassessment and reorientation. In any event, as far as the present was concerned, some strengthening of the Agency's administration was urgently necessary.

10. Dominating all those considerations, however, was the question of whether the Agency could survive financially through 1975. Consequently, the implications of the revised estimates of expenditure contained in document A/SPC/172 called for special comment.

11. The Agency's income had always been uncertain, and that uncertainty had been aggravated by currency fluctuations; expenditure also was currently uncertain because of high rates of inflation and soaring commodity prices which could not be accurately forecast. Those developments had further complicated finances that were already complicated by such important factors as the role played in estimating and accounting by contributions in kind, part of which could be carried forward from one year to another. There had been some recent recovery of the United States dollar against local Arab currencies from its lowest point, but that had been reached after the figures for the budget in the report had been established. Since the writing of the report, the Israeli pound had been devalued, but there had been an immediate rise in the cost of living and no significant beneficial effect on the Agency's finances could be expected.

12. He pointed out that the revised budget estimates for 1974 included two items of non-recurrent costs relating to major reconstruction or repair. The first, amounting to \$483,000, was for shelters and other installations, mainly in Nabatieh camp, damaged in the Israeli raids in southern Lebanon. Paragraph 16 of the report gave a figure of \$435,000 for that work, but a closer estimate had increased the amount slightly. The Committee would note that the Agency had been unable, for lack of funds, to include provision for roofs of concrete, as desired by the refugees, in place of asbestos sheeting. The second item was for the repair of the temporary huts erected to replace tents in the emergency camps in East Jordan for displaced refugees and other persons. It had become clear that the repairs could no longer be delayed, and the total cost was estimated at \$330,000, of which about \$50,000 would be spent during the current year. If the return of those displaced in 1967 had been in sight, much of that expenditure could be avoided.

13. There were three aspects to the financial problem that should be noted, all of them most disturbing. In the first place, the deficit was of an order of magnitude never before experienced; secondly, there was a periodic shortage of cash resulting from the inadequate working capital which, in the following month, might leave the Agency with insufficient cash to meet expenditure; thirdly, as paragraph 243 of the report related, the Agency had substantial unfunded liabilities which it might or might not be able to meet, depending on the circumstances in which the need to meet them arose.

14. Assuming that payment of outstanding contributions could be obtained in time to avert the threatened cash crisis for December, the Agency would immediately be faced with the necessity of planning for early reductions in services unless sufficient assurances of income had been obtained by then. With a deficit of \$45 million, or even half that amount, it would not be possible to carry on for several months in the absence of such assurances.

15. The effect of reductions on the scale required to eliminate a deficit of \$45 million would be devastating. The distribution of basic rations would have to be restricted to what could be provided from donations in kind and by running down the flour inventory, i.e. by further reducing the assets from which the liabilities referred to in paragraph 243 of the report might have to be met. That would be equivalent to a cut in the distribution of flour of more than 50 per cent, thus affecting the size of the ration or the number of beneficiaries, or both. The preparatory, i.e. pre-secondary, cycle of education would have to be terminated after 30 April 1975, and the necessary arrangements would have to be made well in advance. The elementary cycle of education would have to be terminated at the end of the 1974-1975 school year. In other words, the whole of the system of general education would disappear in the course of 1975, leaving 270,000 children without education and thousands of Palestinian teachers without employment. And it must be borne in mind that the Palestine refugees firmly believed the education of their children to be the most important service rendered to them by the United Nations.

16. Teacher training would also be terminated after 30 June 1975 and there would be consequential and supplementary cuts in all other services. Even if income were to reach the level of \$80 million, the education system would not survive intact, since the termination of the preparatory cycle after 30 April 1975 would still be forced on the Agency for lack of funds, in addition to the reduction of rations and other cuts.

17. That was certainly an appalling prospect, since it would make a mockery of the recognition of the rights of the Palestine refugees and of any extension of the Agency's mandate to care for them in the meantime. It might be said that it would never happen, that UNRWA had always managed to survive somehow or other, and that therefore no special action was required, that it would be sufficient to issue an appeal and to leave everything to the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, or the Secretary-General or the Commissioner-General. Certainly, for his part, as the Commissioner-General, he felt compelled to inform the Committee that such an assumption in the current year would be imprudent. On the basis of the discussions held with the Working Group, he believed that that Group fully shared his concern. The deficit was of extraordinary magnitude, and the ordinary measures would not suffice to wipe it out.

18. Paragraph 47 of the report stated that it was extremely doubtful whether traditional methods and sources of financing could adequately deal with a crisis of such magnitude. To the Working Group he had expressed the view that unco-ordinated voluntary efforts were no longer sufficient, meaning that those who had a special interest in

maintaining UNRWA's programmes for the Palestine refugees ought to concert their efforts if they wished to see the financial problem solved.

19. Finally, now that there was wide and explicit recognition in the United Nations that the problem of the refugees was an aspect of a larger political problem, he would like to express the hope that there would no longer be any inhibition against contributing, and contributing generously, through UNRWA, to the cost of services to the Palestine refugees. The humanitarian problem, the interim problem, could not be treated as if it did not exist. Only UNRWA could provide the valuable services which it provided, and UNRWA was the agency designated by the General Assembly to do so. Failure to maintain those services would be harmful to the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in addition to which it would constitute a grave disservice to the Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA who constituted such an important part of the people of Palestine.

20. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway), Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, introducing the Working Group's report (A/9815 and Corr.1), said that the Working Group had been established four years earlier in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2656 (XXV) and was composed of the following nine Member States: France, Ghana, Japan, Lebanon, Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

21. By its resolution 3090 (XXVIII), the General Assembly had requested the Working Group to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of UNRWA for a further period of one year. The current report of the Working Group was divided into four main chapters. The first—the introduction—contained only a brief factual description of what had taken place during the consideration of the item in the Special Political Committee and the General Assembly at the twenty-eighth session, as well as an outline of the terms of reference of the Working Group.

22. Chapter II of the report summarized the activities of the Working Group during 1974 and the results of UNRWA's fund-raising activities for the year. A special contribution of \$4.2 million from the United States for an emergency programme towards the cost of elementary education and an additional contribution of \$7.9 million from the European Economic Community to meet the cost of the preparatory cycle of the education programme should permit UNRWA to maintain its services unchanged throughout 1974. Nevertheless, as far as the threatened deficit for 1974 was concerned, there was little or no margin of safety. He drew the Committee's attention to paragraph 17 of the report of the Working Group which stated that UNRWA's fiscal prospects looked even more bleak for 1975 than they had done a year before for 1974 and that extraordinary efforts by all concerned would be required to enable the Agency to continue its operations through the coming year at their current level.

23. Chapter III of the report examined UNRWA's financial situation. He read out paragraph 21 of the report which indicated the magnitude of the financial problems that the



Agency would be faced with in 1975. Moreover, the revised budget estimates for 1975 (see A/SPC/172) and the statement that had just been made by the Commissioner-General showed that the financial outlook for 1975 was even more gloomy than had been anticipated when the report of the Working Group was being prepared.

24. Against those rather dismal financial prospects, the Working Group had formulated its concluding remarks which were set out in chapter IV of the report. In its first conclusion, the Working Group reiterated its assumption that until there was a just and lasting settlement of the problem of the Palestine refugees, UNRWA's services in the form of relief assistance, health care and education must be maintained at least at their current minimal level. The second conclusion, which appeared in paragraph 23, stated that UNRWA's financial prospects for 1975 were indeed more bleak and alarming than ever before, and that extraordinary efforts would be required to enable the Agency to continue its operations through the coming year. Furthermore, in its third conclusion, the Working Group expressed the opinion that any reductions in the services rendered by the Agency could have serious implications and would be most regrettable.

25. The provision of relief assistance, health services and educational facilities to the Palestine refugees was a common responsibility for all States Members of the United Nations. If UNRWA's precarious financial position was to be improved without any reductions in the Agency's services, it was imperative for Member States to be willing to follow up their verbal and political support with generous contributions. It was thus essential that Governments which had not contributed in the past or had contributed inadequately should be willing to reconsider seriously their position and contribute generously to the common effort.

26. Mr. MAHMOOD (Pakistan) said that the report of the Commissioner-General and the report of the Working Group provided very valuable information but the statements by the Commissioner-General and the Rapporteur of the Working Group had clarified the main points in the reports. Those statements contained extremely useful information; he proposed that they should be reproduced *in extenso*.

27. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there were no objections, he would take it that the Committee, in accordance with its authorization from the General Assembly, had accepted the proposal of the representative of Pakistan.

*It was so decided.<sup>2</sup>*

28. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan) said that, as in the previous year, the central issue in 1975 was still the same: how to restore to the people of Palestine, unjustly uprooted from their homes and homelands, their legitimate right to live in dignity in their own homeland.

29. The debate that had taken place recently in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine had placed

the issue in its proper perspective. The General Assembly had dealt with the roots of the problem and with prospects for the future based on the recognition of Palestinian rights including repatriation and self-determination. No lasting and just solution could ignore the need to redress the injustices inflicted upon the Palestinian people. But the Committee was dealing with immediate problems; he would restrict his discussion to the question of humanitarian assistance to the Palestine refugees.

30. The Commissioner-General's report was an objective portrayal of the situation of the refugees and of the efforts of the Agency to meet its obligations under extremely difficult conditions. He expressed his Government's gratitude to the Working Group for all its efforts to raise funds for the Agency which was in a situation of almost chronic deficit.

31. Although his Government appreciated the reasons which had impelled the Commissioner-General to request the review of the Agency's constitution, structure and programmes, it felt that no review could be truly radical. UNRWA's original mandate had been to give relief to refugees until such relief became unnecessary, not to devise political solutions—a task that had been assigned to other bodies. He did not see any basic alteration in the situation nor did he believe that there would be any change, at least in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, the original mandate of ensuring the subsistence of the refugees would remain as important as it had ever been. He therefore supported the proposal to extend the Agency's mandate for a further period of three years. He also endorsed the proposal to renew the mandate of the Working Group, because it answered a vital need since UNRWA, having received the annual blessings of the General Assembly, was left without a governing body to which it could turn during the rest of the year.

32. As to the Agency's financial situation, he reminded the Committee that in almost every country of the world budgets showed an increase of 10 to 15 per cent a year to reflect broader services, increasing populations and other important developments. In the case of the Palestine refugees all that was being attempted was to continue providing minimal assistance which had been accepted policy during the previous 25 years. The inevitable consequence of any deficit would therefore be reduced aid to the refugees. Fortunately, it had proved possible to resolve the situation in 1974 thanks to contributions from the European Economic Community, the United States and the Palestine Higher Council which had donated \$435,000 towards rebuilding the roofs of almost half the shelters in refugee camps in Lebanon which had been destroyed or damaged by Israeli bombardments. Altogether, expenditures for 1974 had been estimated at \$86 million.

33. It was probable that in 1975 the Agency would be faced with a much greater problem, for the estimated budget for 1975 was \$108.9 million against an estimated income of only \$69.7 million. That meant an estimated deficit of \$39.2 million which, it would seem, had increased since the publication of the report. It had to be remembered that the new estimates did not reflect any increase in *per capita* assistance or in the number of refugees entitled

<sup>2</sup> The full text of the statements is also contained in document A/SPC/PV.941.

to receive assistance—a number that accounted for only half of the 1,583,646 refugees.

34. Those enormous figures reflected only the problem of galloping inflation that was ravaging the whole world. In such a situation, it had to be asked how much reduction could be made in a ration that had stood constant at around \$5 a month. The international community had a moral responsibility to ensure the survival of the Palestine refugees in their prolonged exile until General Assembly resolution 194 (III), adopted in 1948, which provided for the return of the refugees to their homes, could be implemented.

35. His country understood better than anyone the gravity of the problem, because it had taken in thousands of refugees. Moreover, since the 1967 war, his Government had assumed the responsibility of maintaining tens of thousands of displaced persons from the West Bank and from Gaza. He expressed his Government's gratitude for the assistance it had received from the Agency, particularly in distributing aid. Although his Government considered that the provision of assistance to refugees was a sacred duty, and did not expect recognition from anyone, he reminded the Committee that in 1974 assistance provided by his Government to the refugees had amounted to some \$21.5 million, which showed how much a small country could do if it was sufficiently concerned. The figure put Jordan amongst the top five contributors of assistance to the displaced persons. But there were limits to what a host country could do; there was a clear need for more assistance from the international community which had helped to create the existing situation.

36. He fully understood the difficulties being encountered by the Agency as a result of inflation. He supported the Commissioner-General's decision to approve cost-of-living increases to local staff, because it would have been inconceivable to do otherwise in an area where inflation ranged from 11 per cent in the Syrian Arab Republic to 47 per cent in occupied Gaza and the West Bank, not to mention the 43 per cent devaluation recently announced by the Israeli authorities. He also approved the additional increase with effect from 1 July 1974 which the Commissioner-General foresaw as inevitable. The increase was completely justified, because the success of the Agency had depended on the selfless dedication of its staff; it would be a great loss if those people were driven to seek employment elsewhere out of pure economic necessity. He therefore felt that the situation of those employees would be more stable if the UNRWA budget became part of the regular budget of the United Nations.

37. He was disturbed to learn, from the report of the Commissioner-General, that since the occupation of 1967 and on the pretext of constructing roads, 11,473 rooms had been demolished. However, what was happening to the refugee camps outside the occupied territories was even worse, since they were being bombed continuously by the Israeli authorities, particularly those in Lebanon. The victims of those indiscriminate attacks by Israel were women and children, who were the only permanent residents in the camps. He appreciated that refugee camps were not, properly speaking, United Nations camps, but wondered whether the United Nations could remain silent in the face of such killings in cold blood.

38. In view of what he had said, he believed that the United Nations should do everything possible to safeguard the defenceless refugees from the military attacks by Israel. He also felt that the right of the persons displaced as a result of the 1967 war to return to their homes must be reaffirmed and that, in the meantime, those persons should be entitled to receive international assistance. He also believed that such activities must be based on the unequivocal recognition of the right of the Palestine refugees to return to their homeland. In order that justice might be restored in the Middle East, the reality of the Palestine problem must be taken into account. The Special Political Committee must undertake certain practical tasks, which were necessary and urgent, but must not lose sight of the fact that its ultimate goal was to establish peace and justice in the Middle East.

39. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) expressed his delegation's profound appreciation of the efforts deployed by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA. He was confident that the Agency would overcome its difficulties, pledged to it the full support of his delegation and felt that its mandate should be renewed.

40. His delegation, as a member of the Working Group, was gratified by the spirit of co-operation which had prevailed during its deliberations and believed that its mandate should be renewed. It also expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General for the appeals he had made for additional contributions to the Agency.

41. He welcomed the observer of PLO, and said that it was not possible to deal with the question of UNRWA without making some reference to the tragedy of the Palestine people. They had been uprooted from their land by the Zionists, in one of the most outrageous acts of the century. In resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they had been displaced and uprooted, and called for their return. When Israel was made to accept and implement that resolution, the problem of UNRWA and its financial difficulties would disappear. When justice was given to the Palestinians, they would cease to live in exile and to be considered as refugees.

42. He quoted paragraphs 64, 65 and 66 of the report of the Commissioner-General which referred to the loss of life and material destruction caused in the refugee camps of Lebanon by the air and sea raids by the Israeli forces. In addition to the deaths and suffering which must be deplored, the cost of repairing the dwellings damaged by those attacks increased the heavy financial burden of UNRWA.

43. He felt that, unless they were halted, the attempts by Israel to exterminate the Palestinians could lead only to disastrous consequences. The United Nations could not remain an indifferent spectator and, while efforts were being made to raise more funds to assist the Palestinian refugees, efforts must also be made to prevent their annihilation.

44. Reports indicated that the miserable and inhuman although it understood the dilemma in which the Commis-

Although at the beginning of 1974 there were reasons for some optimism, the deficit anticipated for 1975 gave grounds for fearing that it would be the worst period in the entire history of UNRWA and that, unless a solution was found, as a matter of urgency, for its financial situation, the Agency would very soon be forced to prune its services drastically. In view of the very serious consequences which might ensue, his delegation was opposed to any reduction, although it understood the dilemma in which the Commissioner-General found himself. How could the anticipated deficit be covered? There were two possibilities.

45. Reaffirming its statement at the twenty-seventh session before the Committee (833rd meeting), his delegation believed that the most effective way of overcoming the financial difficulties of UNRWA would be to incorporate its budget in the regular budget of the United Nations, pending the just solution of the problem of the Palestine refugees.

46. An alternative solution would be to continue the existing system of voluntary contributions which, as had been seen, was precarious and vulnerable. If that solution was adopted, those who thus far had not contributed would have to be urged to do so and those who had done so would have to be urged to increase their contributions; moreover, at least for the present, the United Nations should incorporate in its regular budget the salaries of the international staff of UNRWA, as it did with the salaries of the international staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

47. Recalling the words spoken in the Committee by U Thant during the twenty-third session (612th meeting), he emphasized that, when the activities and difficulties of UNRWA were being considered, it should be kept in mind that the agony of the Palestinian refugees could not be brought to an end until a genuine solution had been found for their problem, in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

48. Mr. KAMARUDDIN (Malaysia) expressed his delegation's gratitude for the work carried out by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and commended his report, as well as that submitted by the Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA. He expressed appreciation of the assistance given to the work of the Agency by various United Nations bodies, other agencies and individuals.

49. It was commendable that, in spite of the many difficulties with which UNRWA had to contend, it had been able to maintain its relief programme for the refugees, particularly in regard to health, education and improving the amenities of the camps.

50. His delegation was deeply concerned over the critical financial situation of the Agency and the gloomy outlook reflected in the Commissioner-General's note on revised budget estimates for 1974 and 1975, but felt that, nevertheless, a solution would have to be found, as any curtailment in the services of the Agency would have deplorable consequences. In view of the plight of the Palestinians living in the refugee camps, the international community had an obligation to do its utmost to improve that situation.

51. In his report, the Commissioner-General had noted that the current mandate of UNRWA would end on 30 June 1975 and that the General Assembly would have to decide, during its current session, whether it would extend that mandate once again. He had suggested that, when the General Assembly dealt with that matter it would not be too early to set in motion a review of the Agency's constitution, structure and programmes and had stressed the need for more positive guidance from the General Assembly and the firm assurance of much greater financial support, if the Agency was to play a constructive role. Those were all basic problems which deserved the most careful consideration.

52. Nevertheless, his delegation felt that the United Nations must look beyond the question of the very existence of UNRWA and seek a lasting political solution to the problem of the Palestine refugees. UNRWA had come into being as a temporary solution; because of the intransigence of Israel, it continued to be necessary almost 25 years later. That country had refused to comply with the resolutions reaffirming the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes, had added hundreds of thousands of people to the refugee population by its illegal occupation of Arab territories and had compounded their sufferings by repeated military raids on camps in neighbouring countries.

53. His delegation reaffirmed its conviction that the crux of the Middle East problem was the plight of the Palestine refugees and that there could be no peace in that region as long as that problem was not solved. Consequently, it was essential that the inalienable rights of the Palestine people must be restored to them, including the right to return to their homes and property. The realization of that goal was the key to the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

54. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, categorically rejected the malicious allegations made against Israel by the Libyan representative. He would, in due course, take the floor to answer those and other allegations of the same nature.

*The meeting rose at 6 p.m.*

## 942nd meeting

Monday, 2 December 1974, at 11.10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.942

### AGENDA ITEM 38

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/9582, A/9613, A/9740, A/9789, A/9815 and Corr.1, A/SPC/172):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt) recalled that there was no problem which had concerned the United Nations for as long as that of Palestine and its refugees. More than a million Palestinians had been expelled, dispersed and expropriated; they had once enjoyed all their national rights, but had become refugees, waiting in camps to receive charity from the international community. A quarter of a century before, the international community had imagined that it could solve the problem by establishing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; at that time, it had considered that the best way of solving the human problem, and at the same time the political problem, of the refugees.

2. Since its establishment, the Agency had made praiseworthy efforts, but was confronted with increasingly serious and complex problems because of the economic difficulties of the wealthy countries and the fact that new refugees were continually entering the camps. The services rendered to the refugees were deteriorating, not improving, and were completely unavailable to almost half of the refugees. The Agency's financial crisis had become a persistent problem and threatened 1.5 million refugees. That situation arose from the efforts made to camouflage the political aspects of the matter and focus solely on its humanitarian aspects, which had created a vicious circle, as was shown by many United Nations documents and reports and as the Commissioner-General had pointed out in paragraph 1 of his report (A/9613).

3. His delegation paid a tribute to the efforts made by the Agency in difficult financial circumstances and a confused political climate. It also wished to stress the importance of the Commissioner-General's report, which set out facts whose accuracy Israel had been unable to refute. Lastly, it was glad that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had authorized the parties involved to have access to documents which could help the Palestinians to assert their legal rights over the property of which they had been dispossessed.

4. His delegation had always stressed that the problem was primarily political. That had become even more true since

the 1973 war, despite the fact that that war had modified the situation considerably, and despite positive developments such as the reaffirmation of the existence of the Palestinian people and the recognition of the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to represent that people. Resolution 3236 (XXIX), adopted by the General Assembly on 22 November 1974, had been a turning point in the evolution of the Palestinian question; it pointed the way towards a permanent and equitable solution of that problem. It should be remembered that until the political problem had been solved in accordance with justice and law, there would be no lasting peace in the Near East and the situation in that strategic region would continue to endanger international peace and security.

5. The Committee was currently concerned with the humanitarian aspects of the problem. His delegation believed in the legal and moral principle that it was for the party which inflicted a wrong, and that party alone, to redress that wrong. In view of the responsibility which the international community bore for the plight of the Palestine refugees, his delegation considered that the Agency's mandate should be renewed and that the services it provided should be improved. But it believed—and that belief was confirmed by the Agency's current deficit—that the voluntary contributions system was inadequate to enable the Agency to perform its functions.

6. Egypt had spared no effort. It had contributed about \$5.5 million to the Agency since its establishment, which was much more than Israel had contributed. To that sum should be added the much greater value of the services Egypt had rendered and continued to render to the refugees present in its territory.

7. Nevertheless, the Israeli authorities had not hesitated to blow up the buildings of the Agency and, as if to revenge themselves for their defeat, were persistently attacking the refugee camps, subjecting them to violence and frightening or expelling their inhabitants. The raids launched against those camps by Israel in May 1974 had caused damage evaluated at \$1 million.

8. Moreover, despite the many relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, Israel continued to deny the immense majority of refugees the right to return to their country, and sought to deceive the international community by giving grossly inflated figures for the number of refugees who had been authorized to return.

9. Egypt could not but scorn the ridiculous pretext consistently invoked by Israel to justify its actions, namely concern for its security. Did Israel occupy territory, attack camps, destroy, kidnap, torture and imprison in order to ensure its security? He wondered what the world would be



like if every State had the same conception of its security as the Zionist State. How could even Israel believe what it stated?

10. Egypt was as determined to win the battle of peace as it had been to win the war. It continued to believe that peace could not be achieved without the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The latest General Assembly resolution on the matter constituted a step towards a genuine settlement of the Palestinian problem, but all the other resolutions must likewise be applied, particularly those calling for the return of all displaced persons and the termination of measures affecting the demographic structure of the occupied Arab territories.

11. His delegation considered that in the general interest the Agency must continue to perform the tasks assigned to it and that its mandate should be renewed. However, it was high time for PLO, which was already playing an effective role in aiding the refugees, to participate more extensively in the Agency's work. He took that opportunity to welcome the PLO representative.

12. In view of the Agency's continuing financial crisis, the Working Group on its financing should likewise continue its work, and part of the expenses of the Agency, namely the salaries of its staff, should be charged to the United Nations budget, as was the case for other international agencies. Lastly, the services provided by the Agency should be improved.

13. Egypt, which was particularly concerned about the plight of the refugees, sincerely hoped that that tragic situation could be brought to an end. Those familiar with the long history of Egyptian civilization knew that it had always been founded on peace, and that its ideal had always been to construct, and not to destroy, invade or occupy. He hoped that the world would hear that message.

14. Mr. LAXÉN (Finland) expressed the hope that the discussion on the question of Palestine in the General Assembly, in which PLO had participated, had enhanced possibilities for a peaceful settlement that took the rights of the Palestinians into account.

15. Since its establishment in 1949 the Agency had assumed the main burden of providing relief for the essential needs of the Palestine refugees. It could also take satisfaction in the contribution it had made in the economic, social and educational fields. Unfortunately, as the needs of the refugees had increased, the Agency's possibilities had decreased. The Commissioner-General and the Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Financing of the Agency had both drawn attention, at the 941st meeting, to the Agency's alarming financial situation. The Agency's deficit would probably amount to \$45 million in 1975 and there would be a cash crisis at the beginning of that year. His delegation shared the concern expressed by the Commissioner-General in his report and considered that any reduction in the services rendered by the Agency would be regrettable and could have serious implications.

16. His delegation wished to join those which had called on all Member States to consider making substantial

contributions to the Agency. It hoped that contributors would make an additional effort and that non-contributors would decide to participate in the financing of the Agency. At the forthcoming pledging conference, Finland would announce the contribution it intended to make available to the Agency at the beginning of 1975.

17. His delegation wished to thank the Commissioner-General and the Working Group for their useful and well-prepared reports. It appreciated the dedication with which the Commissioner-General and his staff had carried out their task and commended the work of the Working Group on the Financing of the Agency.

18. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic) said that the question under consideration was not an ordinary problem and that its continuing existence was incompatible with general morality, the spirit and the letter of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The question had been on the agenda of the United Nations for over a quarter of a century, but it could be said that despite the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly the Organization had been unable to give practical expression to the spirit and the letter of the Charter. Any solution must, however, be based on respect for justice and the Charter.

19. The question of the Palestine refugees constituted a heavy responsibility for the United Nations. If the Organization's debates were to be fruitful, its Members must not ignore the facts on the pretext that the problem was a long-standing one. It was clear from the long hours of discussion which the General Assembly had devoted to the question that the problem could not be solved without attacking its causes. Despite praiseworthy efforts, UNRWA could not solve that problem single-handed. The financial difficulties to which the Commissioner-General drew attention in his report showed clearly that no progress had been made and that the situation could not be allowed to continue. In establishing the Agency, the General Assembly had intended to provide a temporary remedy for the situation, without prejudice to the search for a solution which would eliminate its root causes.

20. The aim was not to provide relief for a people stricken by a natural disaster, but to assist a people whose only crime was to be the owner of land coveted by the Zionists. The latter had been able to carry out their plot against the Palestinian people only with the complicity of international colonialism. The adoption of General Assembly resolution 181 B (II) of 29 November 1947, on the partition of Palestine, which was so contrary to the spirit of the United Nations, had only been possible because of the absence of most of the nations which were currently Members of the United Nations. That resolution in no way constituted a legal basis, but because of that resolution an entire people was now dispersed in the Agency's camps, various host countries and its own homeland, where its children lived as aliens.

21. United Nations responsibility was not limited to giving material assistance to part of the Palestinian people. The United Nations must take action to ensure that the Charter became an everyday reality for all peoples, including the Palestinian people. Who could make the world respect the

Charter if not the Members of the United Nations? And yet some Member States, which had contributed to the dispersion of the Palestinian people, were today opposed to a lasting and just solution of the problem, which could have no other basis than the right of the Palestinian people to return to its homeland; the Charter recognized that as a right of all peoples, and the General Assembly had repeatedly reaffirmed it with respect to the Palestinian people.

22. While the United Nations was powerless to enforce its resolutions, Zionism, with the aid of the United States of America, was terrorizing the Palestinian people, refusing to understand that by denying that people's rights it was only prolonging the problem. Israeli terrorism was such that it did not spare even the premises of UNRWA. The reason was that Israel, striking at unarmed women, children and old men, wanted to destroy the lives that held the hope of return to the homeland.

23. In his report, the Commissioner-General had given ample evidence of Israeli terrorism. He had also emphasized the financial difficulties of the Agency. Although the assistance provided by the Agency was inadequate, his delegation favoured the extension of its mandate and particularly supported the Commissioner-General's proposal to include in the regular budget of the United Nations the wages and salaries of the Agency's staff. His delegation wished to take advantage of the opportunity to commend the Commissioner-General and his assistants for their efforts. It believed, furthermore, that the Agency's current financial crisis was a warning and should make everyone realize the threats to its future.

24. If the United Nations, which embodied mankind's hopes for the eventual disappearance of racism and colonialism, showed itself capable of meeting the challenge, it would earn the eternal gratitude of all peoples, particularly the Palestinian people, which asked only to live in peace and security in its homeland.

25. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he would not repeat what he had already said concerning the myth of the expulsion of the refugees from Palestine. The members of the Committee knew the true facts. The Arab Governments had created the refugee problem by attacking Israel as early as 1948. Moreover, many refugees, who had become integrated into the population of the countries in which they lived, despite the efforts of the leaders of the Arab countries to prevent them from doing so, had no need of the charity given them, according to the representative of Egypt, by UNRWA. For 25 years, many Arab leaders had made it clear that they were not interested in the humanitarian aspect of the Palestine problem, which was tantamount to saying that they regarded the Palestinians as mere pawns to manoeuvre with on the political chess-board. That was what the representative of Egypt had said at the current meeting when he had emphasized the political aspect of the question.

26. As for Egypt's contribution to the Agency's budget, it was sufficient to look at table 16 of the Commissioner-General's report to realize how ambiguous were the words of the representative of Egypt. It should be made clear that

the contribution of about \$5.5 million mentioned by that representative constituted the total of all sums contributed by Egypt from 1950 to 1969 and that that country's contribution for 1974 was only \$7,680.

27. His delegation fully supported the principle that those who were responsible should be the ones who paid. In the current case, those responsible were the Arab countries. If they had not spent thousands of millions of dollars to arm themselves against Israel, they would have been able to solve the humanitarian problem of the Palestine refugees and would be able today to contribute to solving the Agency's financial difficulties. His delegation reserved the right to make a more complete statement on that point later.

28. It should also be made clear that Israel did not attack the Agency's camps. However, it was fully justified in attacking the terrorists. If the latter tried to take refuge in or near the camps, the blame must be placed not on Israel but on the Arab Governments which allowed them to do so.

29. With regard to the Gaza Strip camps, he recalled that many Arab Governments had denounced Egypt's poor management during the time when Egypt had held the responsibility for those camps. On that point too, his delegation would comment further at a later time.

30. Egypt, according to its representative, ardently desired peace; Israel had been fully as desirous of peace ever since its establishment, and his delegation hoped that the signs of goodwill expressed in that connexion would be translated into action.

31. With regard to the comments of the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic, he would confine himself to drawing the attention of the Committee members to a statement made by that country's Prime Minister in December 1972 to a Lebanese newspaper, to the effect that the Arab countries had kept the Palestine refugees in their tents in pursuance of a carefully thought-out policy aimed at the Palestinians' return to their country and that if the Arab countries had not done so, Palestine would have been irretrievably lost.

32. That was why, over the preceding few years, the Libyan contribution to UNRWA had been no more than \$600,000 per year, although that sum was greater than the Libyan Arab Republic's previous payments. In contrast, in 1972 that country had given \$5 million to Yasser Arafat as a reward for the murder of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games. Similarly, it was the Libyan Government which, according to an article published in the *Sunday Express* of 5 November 1972, was providing for the maintenance of the assassins of the Prime Minister of Jordan.

33. Mr. EL-HENDAWY (Egypt), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, observed that every delegation knew how much the truth differed from the assertions made by the representative of Israel. The latter claimed that the Arabs were responsible for the problems of the Palestine refugees. In reality, the Arabs had endeavoured above all to safeguard the rights of the Palestinian people in 1947 and 1948.

34. With regard to the income of UNRWA, the representative of Israel had said that Egypt's contribution for 1974 had been only \$7,680. But Egypt was in no way responsible for the problem of the Palestine refugees, and the amounts it had paid to the Agency since its creation exceeded the contribution made by Israel. As for military budgets, it was ludicrous to hear the representative of Israel speak of them, since everyone knew whether it was Israel or Egypt that was responsible.

35. Israel claimed that it did not attack the refugee camps. A look at paragraph 24 of the report of the Commissioner-General would make it clear what the facts were. His delegation had already described Israel's conception of its security and wondered how the world would look if every State held the same conception of its own.

36. Israel seemed to be discovering that Egypt was ready to make peace. But Egypt had been affirming that for seven years, and at the current meeting it had simply repeated what it had said before.

37. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the statement of the Zionist speaker did not deserve any comment, since that speaker had confined himself to mentioning in distorted form some texts he claimed to have found in Arab documents or a statement by the Libyan Head of Government.

38. The Zionists still had not recovered from their surprise at the fact that the Palestinian people had been able to resist all attempts to liquidate it. The Palestinian people had never accepted any soil but its own and was determined to return to its homeland. It had waited long for the implementation of United Nations decisions, and the resolution of its sons was stronger than Zionist terrorism. The Palestinian people was unconquerable; it survived despite the allegations of the Zionists, imperialists and colonialists.

39. The position of the Libyan Arab Republic was sufficiently well known. Having itself struggled against colonialism, it knew what colonialism was and had decided to stand by the peoples fighting for their freedom, for freedom was man's most precious possession and the one most worth fighting for.

40. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, observed that if the statements he had mentioned were untrue, the responsibility was certainly not his; he might have cited many other sources, such as the Middle East News Agency report of 1 February 1974, dateline Cairo, to the effect that Colonel Al-Qadafi, speaking to Egyptian troops to whom he had just been introduced by President Sadat, had said: "With the help of God, the Arab nations will destroy the foundations of Zionism. The struggle between them and us will continue so long as any Jews remain in Palestine." The representative of the Libyan Arab Republic should check that quotation, among others. He would find many statements made by his leaders which were scarcely consistent with the attitude that should be adopted by a State Member of the United Nations towards another Member State.

41. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the Libyan Arab Republic acted out of conviction and had no reason to apologize for that. It stood by the Palestinian people and would continue to support it. The United Nations had, since its establishment, taken the side of liberation movements; thus, by supporting the Palestinian people, the Libyan Arab Republic was simply assuming the moral responsibility incumbent on it under the Charter.

42. The CHAIRMAN recalled that those delegations which wished to participate in the general debate on the question should promptly have their names inscribed on the list and that it was important to submit draft resolutions as early as possible.

*The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.*

## 943rd meeting

Tuesday, 3 December 1974, at 11.10 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.943

### AGENDA ITEM 38

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/9582, A/9613, A/9740, A/9789, A/9815 and Corr.1, A/SPC/172):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the list of speakers would in principle be closed at the end of the current meeting.

2. Mr. BATTISCOMBE (United Kingdom) welcomed the report submitted by the Commissioner-General (A/9613), which was excellent. Unfortunately, the picture he painted of the financial situation facing the Agency in 1975 was extremely sombre. The General Assembly's recognition of the political aspect of the question should not blind people to its humanitarian and social side; the problem of the refugees remained urgent and, until a settlement was achieved, UNRWA's work in assuring the security and

education of the Palestinian refugees would continue to be of great importance both as a humanitarian service and in order to help to achieve some progress towards that eventual settlement.

3. His Government considered it essential that the mandate of UNRWA, which would expire on 30 June 1975, should be renewed and he hoped that the draft resolution to be submitted on the renewal of the mandate would receive the unanimous support of the Committee.

4. But it was no good for the Assembly to renew UNRWA's mandate unless it provided the means for it to do its work. In 1975, UNRWA faced a deficit which might amount to over one third of its budget. Unless further finance was forthcoming, the Agency would be faced early in 1975 with the need to make considerable cutbacks in its services; the hardship which that would cause the refugees could not be over-emphasized. Such cutbacks could also have serious implications for peace and stability in the area and the prospects for negotiations towards a settlement.

5. Since the establishment of the Agency, the United Kingdom had remained the second largest contributor to its finance. In 1974, in addition to its normal contribution, it had contributed further sums through the European Economic Community. Despite the difficult economic situation in which it found itself, it intended to continue its bilateral financial contributions to the Agency and would be announcing an increase in its contribution for 1975. His delegation hoped that other countries would do the same.

6. But the current situation, in which the greater part of the Agency's budget was contributed by a small minority of States, was inadmissible at a time when the costs of the Agency were rising at a rate which far outstripped the capacity of those States to take on the increased burden. His delegation therefore supported the recommendation of the Working Group (see A/9815 and Corr.1) that those Governments which had not contributed in the past or had not contributed as generously as they might have, should reconsider their position and contribute to the common effort which was the responsibility of all Members of the United Nations.

7. His delegation commended the Commissioner-General and his staff on the work they were doing in difficult conditions. UNRWA was contributing towards providing the conditions essential to a settlement in the Middle East; its role had never been more important and his delegation hoped that all those who wanted peace in the area would be prepared to contribute generously to the Agency.

8. Mr. PITARKA (Albania) said that his delegation, which had always actively participated in the discussion of the important question of the Palestine refugees, noted that, far from being solved, it was becoming more acute, despite numerous resolutions. It was clear, both from the report of the Commissioner-General and from the statements by various representatives, that, in addition to the sufferings inherent in their harsh life in the camps, the Palestine refugees were the target of criminal attacks by Zionist terrorists which were resulting in many casualties and great material losses, especially in southern Lebanon. At the same time, Israel was pursuing its work of denationalization in

the occupied territories in order to subject the Palestinians to its domination.

9. Although there could be no solution to the problem without a political settlement, as the Arab and other peace-loving countries had constantly repeated, the United States and other imperialistic countries wished only the humanitarian aspect of the question to be considered.

10. The responsibility for the explosive situation prevailing in the Middle East lay essentially with the Israeli Zionists and with United States imperialism which, in view of the strategic importance of the region and its vast oil resources, supported the Israeli policy of aggression. That was why the United States delegation had been hostile to the wishes of the majority of Member States when the latter had proposed that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) should be invited to participate in the proceedings of the United Nations. In his statement on the question under discussion, the United States representative had once again adopted the same hostile attitude.

11. The policy of aggression and annexation pursued by Israel was also encouraged by the Soviet social-imperialists. While representing themselves as friends of the Arabs in general and of the Palestinian people in particular, they undermined their cause by back-stage manoeuvres with the United States and by permitting an increasing number of their citizens to emigrate to Israel. The policy pursued by the Soviet Union followed the same imperialist and neo-colonialist interests as that of the United States.

12. The responsibility for the explosive situation in the Middle East therefore fell upon the two super-Powers, the United States and the USSR, which maintained a state of permanent tension in the region and tried to divide the Arab peoples in order to realize their hegemonic designs.

13. Nevertheless, the Palestinian people were not discouraged. Albania was convinced that with the experience they had acquired in their struggle and with the assistance of their Arab brothers and of all peace-loving peoples and progressive world public opinion, the Palestinian people, who had seen their courage rewarded by the recent discussions in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine and by the invitation to a Palestinian delegation to participate in that debate, would finally be victorious.

14. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) welcomed the representatives of PLO who had been allowed to participate as observers in the work of the Special Political Committee. He was gratified that, by resolution 3236 (XXIX), adopted on Friday, 22 November 1974, paragraphs 1 and 2 of which he quoted, the General Assembly had recognized the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland and property, as well as their right to self-determination and sovereignty. Thus, the Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA, of whom there were 1,583,646, could unconditionally return to their country and recover their property, the proceeds from which would cover the needs of the Agency many times over. The inventory of that property, which had been prepared by the former Mandatory Government was perfectly well known and existed in the form of microfilms.



15. He paid a tribute to the Commissioner-General for the exemplary humanitarianism he had displayed in providing aid and assistance to the Palestine refugees within the limits of the Agency's budget. However, he wished to point out that only half the refugees benefited from the services of the Agency, which was, in addition, threatened with a deficit. To give an idea of the situation of the refugees, he quoted the second and third sentences of paragraph 21 of the Commissioner-General's report and, to show the tragic situation of those who lived in Lebanon, he quoted the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth sentences of paragraph 24 of the Commissioner-General's report, which made it clear that, not content with having usurped Palestine, the usurper was pursuing and killing Palestinians even in the refugee camps. Even the staff of the Agency was not spared, as was shown by paragraphs 168 and 169 of the Commissioner-General's report, from which he quoted the relevant passages.

16. He paid a tribute to the work of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and observed that the financial difficulties faced by the Agency justified the renewal of the Working Group's mandate. The Working Group's activities had already made it possible to collect additional contributions from the United States and the European Economic Community, and it was thanks to those contributions that the Agency had cut back none of its services and had been able to cope with unexpected expenditures resulting from air attacks, as was explained in paragraph 18 of the report of the Working Group.

17. His delegation therefore invited all delegations to allow the Agency to continue to provide services until the Palestinian refugees were able to return to their homes and property.

18. He congratulated the Chairman, who had been able to combine his knowledge and experience with neutrality, objectivity and patience, and who was an excellent representative of Sweden, a country which was itself a symbol of civilization, progress and genuine democracy and which prosperity had never incited to arrogance.

19. Mr. VRAILAS (Greece) said that the tragic situation faced by the Palestinian people for more than a quarter of a century was one of the main factors in the Middle East problem, since a whole new generation had lived in an atmosphere of bitterness which could not be dispelled unless a remedy was found to the events from which it had suffered. During the current year, the problem had for the first time been considered extensively and constructively. The discussions in the General Assembly on the political aspect of the question of Palestine gave grounds for hope that they would be a first step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace for the benefit of all the peoples in the Middle East. In the meantime, it was the Committee's duty to examine the humanitarian problems of assistance to the Palestine refugees. In the present age of interdependence and co-operation among nations, the existence of those refugees was a matter of concern to the entire international community. It was for that reason that his delegation wished to express its gratitude to the Commissioner-General for his untiring efforts to enable the Agency to continue its humanitarian mission and that Greece had always given the Agency every possible assistance. His

delegation also thanked the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA for its report.

20. Because of the remarkable results achieved by the Agency, his delegation would support the prolongation of its mandate. Like other delegations, it also considered that the mandate of the Working Group should be renewed, since continuing co-operation between the Agency and the Working Group would help to overcome the obstacles which prevented the Agency from fully achieving its objectives.

21. His delegation had been concerned to learn of the financial situation of the Agency and, since it would be regrettable if the services of the Agency were cut back for lack of funds, it endorsed the conclusions of the Working Group. Giving the Agency the means to provide every possible assistance to the refugees was not a simple matter of international charity, but rather a duty towards a population which had to subsist pending the just and equitable solution of the political problems which lay at the root of the current situation. It was a duty of justice and equity: to fulfil that duty was to strengthen the Charter and enhance the role of the United Nations.

22. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, although Lebanon was a sovereign State, it was for all practical purposes a free zone for the activities of terrorist organizations and was currently the centre for Arab terrorism. It was there that the terrorist organizations maintained their headquarters, military bases, training camps, arms depots, communication centres and clandestine facilities. It was from there that murderers had set out to shed the blood of innocent civilians in Europe, Asia, America and Africa, as well as Israel and the areas under its administration. Lebanon was the only Arab State which had allowed other Arab Governments to formulate the conditions under which terrorists might operate in its own territory. Those conditions were summed up in what was known as the Cairo Agreement of 1969, by virtue of which the terrorist organizations were allowed to maintain bases in Lebanese territory. They had thus assumed open control of the refugee camps, transforming them into bases.

23. Israel was duty-bound to defend itself against the continuous acts of aggression committed against it from Lebanese territory. It was indeed regrettable that Lebanese civilians and Palestinian refugees who were not connected with the terrorists were hit by the Israeli forces at the same time as the Palestinian murderers and their installations, but the responsibility for that fell squarely on the Lebanese Government, which knowingly allowed atrocities to be committed against Israelis from its territory. Furthermore, by transforming refugee camps into terrorist bases, the terrorists and the Lebanese Government revealed their callous indifference towards the refugees.

24. Within the framework of defensive measures adopted by Israel to protect its citizens, the Israel Defence Forces had taken action against terrorist bases, and only terrorist bases, as the representative of Bahrain had himself admitted at the current session, when he had said on 11 November at the 2016th meeting of the First Committee that the bombardment of commando camps by Israel had had shocking and permanent consequences.

25. As was confirmed by numerous newspaper articles and even by communiqués from the Wafa agency, the targets attacked by the Israel Defence Forces had always been identified as military installations of the terrorist organizations, and all possible steps had been taken to avoid injury to residents of the refugee camps.

26. However, the terror gangs showed no such consideration for the lives and property of their fellow Arabs. On the contrary, they located their bases in immediate proximity to, and frequently inside, refugee camps, knowing full well that by doing so they endangered the refugees.

27. The Lebanese Government should therefore blame itself for the consequences—including the results of Israel's defensive action—of its acquiescence in the existence of terrorist groups on its soil, from which they carried out the most odious acts of barbarity.

28. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Israel, who spoke only of terrorism, seemed to have forgotten that it was Zionist terrorist organizations which had introduced violence to the Middle East. Furthermore, if Palestinian refugee camps existed in Lebanon, it was not Lebanon which was responsible but the Zionists, who, in violation of international agreements and numerous United Nations resolutions on the question, persisted in denying the refugees the right to return to their country.

29. The murderous raids launched by the Israeli forces against the refugee camps were nothing but terrorism; such tactics were inseparable from Zionism, as they had been 25 years earlier. Now, however, the terrorism was pursued by a State.

30. Israel had understood that, whatever its power, the Palestinians would not relinquish their struggle, and it had decided to attack the Palestinian people itself, in other words the civilian population, and no longer to rest content with reprisals. As evidenced by the statements of prominent Israelis, particularly Mr. Rabin and Mr. Herzog, the mere presence of Palestinians would in future constitute, in the view of Israel, sufficient provocation to justify raids by its forces. Hence, what was now being pursued was an outright policy of extermination, of genocide, directed against the Palestinian people. To speak of military objectives was to mock the Committee. Many articles in the press reported raids that had hit civilians, including women and children, who had had nothing to do with the commandos. Even the Nazis had not dared to perpetrate the atrocities to which the Israelis had stooped in the Palestinian refugee camps.

31. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) welcomed the apt reply which the representative of Lebanon, who was better placed to do so than anyone else, had given to the allegations of the Zionist representative. In any case, the latter had convinced no one. The acts of a desperate youth seeking to draw attention to his people could hardly be compared with the acts of aggression committed against the refugee camps by a State Member of the United Nations with every modern military means at its disposal. That amounted to State terrorism.

32. In addition to the list of press articles quoted by his Lebanese colleague, he wished to mention an article published in the 25 November 1974 issue of *Time* magazine, from which it was clear that terrorism had been introduced into the region not by young Palestinians provoked by the situation prevailing in their country but by Israeli organizations, such as the Irgun and the Stern group, which in 1948 had put pressure on the United Kingdom to induce it to relinquish its mandate and had directed their attacks against the Arab population. It should be pointed out that that article had been published despite the near-total control exercised by the Zionists over United States information media. Mention might also be made of the assassination of Count Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator, and the massacre of the Arab population of Deir Yassin in 1948. Although Hagana, Mr. Ben-Gurion's organization, had not carried out the massacres, it had co-operated at the time with the Irgun and the Stern group.

33. He recalled General de Gaulle's warning to Mr. Ben-Gurion to the effect that occupation inevitably led to resistance and resistance inevitably led to oppression.

34. Mr. AL-SHAKAR (Bahrain) said that the way in which the Israeli representative had quoted the remarks made by the representative of Bahrain in the First Committee showed how Zionism distorted facts. The truth was that the representative of Bahrain, while speaking of napalm bombs, had alluded to those which the Israelis had used in 1967 against the refugee camps and not, as the Israeli representative, quoting an erroneous English verbatim record, had said, against fedayeen camps. The representative of Bahrain had requested the Secretariat to correct the record. Could the representative of Israel deny that the Zionists had used napalm against the refugees in 1967, or had he meant that napalm had been intended to be used against the fedayeen in 1967? If such an interpretation was correct, it was difficult to see how the Israeli delegation could hope to mislead the members of the Committee.

35. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that the representative of Lebanon had said nothing new. There had never been any question of taking the slightest action against the Palestinians; the action had been aimed at terrorists, whether Palestinian or not. Israel deplored the killing or injuring of innocent victims. But the responsibility rested with Lebanon, which was not living up to its international responsibilities and was not helping the Palestinian people by permitting the terrorists to operate from its territory.

36. Mr. N'DIAYE (Senegal), speaking on a point of order, drew attention to two films, "Jerusalem . . . Never" and "They did not exist", the showing of which was announced in the *Journal*.

37. The CHAIRMAN recalled that draft resolutions relating to the question before the Committee must be submitted by the following meeting at the latest. If the draft resolutions were submitted at the next meeting, they could be considered on the following day and could be voted upon during the last meeting scheduled in the Committee's programme of work.

*The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.*

## 944th meeting

Wednesday, 4 December 1974, at 11 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.944

### AGENDA ITEM 38

**United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/9582, A/9613, A/9740, A/9789, A/9815 and Corr.1, A/SPC/172 and Corr.1, A/SPC/L.316-321):**

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey) said that the General Assembly was considering the question of Palestine in its proper perspective as a political problem for the first time in 26 years. The Special Political Committee was thus in a position to consider the purely humanitarian aspects of the problem.

2. The report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA (A/9613) showed that the Agency was faced with an acute cash crisis. The estimated expenditure of the Agency to maintain its services at the minimum level would amount to well over \$100 million with a foreseeable deficit of \$45 million. As a consequence of that grave situation, its educational services would have to be substantially curtailed. In short, UNRWA was on the verge of bankruptcy.

3. The report before the Committee was not the first pessimistic one, but members should not harbour false hopes that the miracles of the past would repeat themselves indefinitely. In any case, there were no moral grounds for making the fate of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians dependent on possible miracles. UNRWA's services were as necessary as ever and could be made even more so by the unpredictable political atmosphere in the region. It was the duty of the international community to find ways and means of tackling the problem. He reiterated the point he had made at the twenty-seventh session (834th meeting) that support was required from Governments which had either not contributed to the Agency in the past or whose contributions had been inadequate. There was still a need for all countries to contribute even if only symbolically.

4. The question of the refugees was closely linked with a general political settlement of the question. Contributions would alleviate the plight of the Palestinians but would not bring lasting peace to the region. By reaffirming the lawful rights of the Palestinian people, the General Assembly had gone directly to the roots of a political problem. He urged members to join their efforts in a common approach to the humanitarian aspect of the same question. Only then could the United Nations be considered to be handling the problem thoroughly and fairly.

5. Mr. MIGLIUOLO (Italy) said that the Commissioner-General of UNRWA had provided the Committee once again with a very objective, clear and constructive report on the Agency's activities. UNRWA's efforts were particularly noteworthy because they had been made in circumstances rendered increasingly difficult by political events and serious financial limitations.

6. His delegation had stated repeatedly that the humanitarian problem of the refugees in the Near East could not be abstracted from the fundamental question of the political rights of the Palestinian people. That view had been confirmed by the recent debate on the question of Palestine in the General Assembly. The political aspects of the problem had assumed a new prominence. His Government acknowledged the importance of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the matter of the national rights of the Palestinian people and felt that the national question must be placed within the framework of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The guidelines for such a settlement should be those laid down by relevant United Nations resolutions. Nevertheless, the results of the discussion had not diminished the awesome magnitude of the humanitarian assistance needed by the Palestinian refugees. Consequently, UNRWA must continue its activities; its mandate must be renewed and the Agency must be adequately financed.

7. The guiding principle in reviewing the Agency's mandate should be the progressive absorption of Palestinian refugees in a national and cultural reality different from that of the camps and shelters. It was vital, at a crucial turning point in the history of the Middle East, to guarantee the continuity of the services provided by the Agency.

8. His Government had always placed a special value on the Agency's educational and training programmes. It was through education and vocational training that the United Nations could give the refugees a sense of purpose, maintain their hopes for a better future, and prepare them to assume the responsibilities of citizenship when the time came for a political settlement. It had therefore noted with deep appreciation the strenuous efforts made by UNRWA and the results achieved in the various fields of education. Chapter I.B. of the report showed that satisfactory health and sanitation services had been provided in all 63 refugee camps, as a result of which over-all living conditions had continued to improve. Despite continuing problems and difficulties, it seemed that co-operation between the host countries and the Agency had improved somewhat.

9. His Government had noted with satisfaction that additional contributions had eliminated the deficit in the 1974 budget. It was concerned, however, at the precarious financial prospects for 1975 and was alarmed by the

forecast of a deficit of \$45 million in a \$109 million budget. The curtailment of the educational services, which were most threatened by inadequate income, could handicap refugee children for the rest of their lives. It was therefore necessary for the international community to make an effort to make the continued existence of those activities less precarious. The alternative was misery, national alienation, and possibly war.

10. Despite its economic difficulties, his country would do its best to support UNRWA's activities by direct contributions and through the European Economic Community. All member States and all regional groups should join in giving financial support to the Agency; the principle of equitable geographical representation was particularly appropriate in that case. The common effort had no political or ideological connotations. It was essentially a humanitarian enterprise that represented admirably the spirit of solidarity that inspired the United Nations.

11. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that although UNRWA had originally been intended to operate for a very short time, it had become an almost permanent fixture on the Middle East scene for one obvious reason: the Arab countries had considered it in their political interest to perpetuate the problem of the refugees and to use them as a weapon in the campaign against Israel. There would have been no Arab refugee problem if the Arab States had not gone to war to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or to bring about its downfall thereafter. Responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem thus rested squarely with Arab Governments and leaders who, in addition to invading the mandated territory of Palestine, had exhorted the Arab population to leave their homes so as not to be in the way of the hoped-for victorious advance of the Arab armies. All those facts were well known and fully documented.

12. The military, political and ethnic convulsions of the twentieth century had turned many millions of people all over the globe into refugees. In all cases but one, remedies had been provided through the compassionate understanding of countries with which the refugees had national, racial or religious affinities and which welcomed them with open arms and absorbed them. Global experience indicated that resettlement was the only practical answer. The relevant section of the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session had stated that local integration in the countries of asylum had been the main solution for refugee problems.<sup>1</sup> His own country's record in the field of the absorption, resettlement and final rehabilitation of refugees was one of which any country could be proud. Israel had progressively absorbed 50,000 refugees previously under UNRWA's care and had entered into a special agreement with the Agency in 1952 to assume responsibility for a further 19,000 people. Many more had been repatriated from beyond the country's borders. They had been integrated into the country's economic life and had become citizens. Almost one in every six Israelis was an Arab.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1*, chap. VII, sect. G, p. 139.

13. Israel had also dealt with the much larger problem of Jewish refugees from Arab countries. Their numbers were about the same or slightly more than the number of Arab refugees from Palestine. They had been absorbed and rehabilitated without international assistance underwritten by the United Nations. Israel had opened her gates to refugee brothers from all parts of the world, while the Arabs had refused to do the same to their Palestinian brethren. Eighty-five per cent of the Palestinian refugees had never left the mandated area of Palestine. What had happened in practice, without the benefit of a treaty, had been an exchange of ethnic communities.

14. At the time UNRWA was established, the General Assembly, in resolution 393 (V) had called for the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East in preparation for the time when international assistance was no longer available and for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in the area. Since then the General Assembly had repeatedly urged Governments to facilitate the reintegration into their economies of refugees living on their soil. If the relevant recommendations made in 1950 and subsequently had been sincerely carried out, the refugees would be productive members of the Arab societies to which they were bound by every link of sentiment, language, culture and national loyalty. It was sad to record that the Arab Governments had denied that salvation to their own kinsmen for the sake of a sterile political controversy.

15. There was no disagreement as to whether the international community should help needy uprooted people on humanitarian grounds. The question was whether the help should concentrate on their rehabilitation or keep them on relief for a long period. After 25 years, the time had come to take a fresh look at the problem and to prepare the way for a constructive settlement in the framework of peace and regional and international co-operation.

16. The Arab Governments, and apparently UNRWA too, had come to assume in practice that the status of refugee was handed down from the original displaced persons to all subsequent generations. Foot-note a to table 1, on page 63 of the report, had been appearing in the report year after year, and spoke volumes. Numerous UNRWA reports had also reflected Arab efforts to prevent the verification of the actual number of refugees and to refuse UNRWA permission to rectify its registration lists by carrying out the necessary field checks. He contrasted the parts of the report describing the situations in Gaza and Lebanon. The absence of any reference to a programme of verification in the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan indicated that no positive changes had taken place there.

17. In order to be able to appreciate what had been done for refugees in the area administered by Israel since 1967, members had to bear in mind what the situation had been in those areas before 1967. Conditions in the Gaza Strip under an Egyptian military régime had come in for sharp criticism even in Arab countries. Under Israel's administration, unemployment had become a thing of the past and Gaza had been experiencing ever-increasing prosperity. When the Palestinian terrorist organizations and certain Arab Governments had realized the magnitude of the improvements that were taking place and that the popula-



tion of Gaza had chosen to participate actively in the development of the Strip, they had launched a campaign to terrorize and subdue anyone who had freely chosen to become a productive member of society. Israel had both legal and moral obligations to protect the Arabs under its administration. As a result of its action in the summer of 1971, when it had constructed access roads through the overcrowded camps, acts of terrorism that had been almost a daily occurrence had become a thing of the past; the process of individual and community development had continued unabated. Every possible care had been taken to avoid undue hardships to the inhabitants. Where arrangements had not proved satisfactory to some of the refugees, a joint survey had been made by the competent Israeli authorities and representatives of UNRWA. The findings of the survey had been followed up, as could be seen from paragraph 14 of the report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 3089 C (XXVIII) (A/9740). In spite of all the difficulties involved, substantial progress had been achieved, as was reflected in paragraphs 71 and 72 of the report of the Commissioner-General; paragraph 70 of the report mentioned other improvements.

18. What he had said with respect to the positive trends and developments in the Gaza Strip also applied to the West Bank, where there was no unemployment. The true situation had been observed by hundreds of thousands of visitors from all spheres of life. That general progress and development obviously benefited the refugees, but specific improvements for their benefit had also been made. The detractors of Israel could not mislead anyone anymore because the truth was known by too many people who had visited the areas, including hundreds of thousands of Arabs from all over the world. In reply to the contention that economic benefits were of no importance and that what mattered were political rights, his delegation had pointed out time and again that the political aspects of the problem would find a solution in the over-all arrangements within the framework of the peace settlement which everyone hoped for. Those who said that the economic situation of the refugees did not matter showed how little they cared for those people; that had been the attitude of the Arab Governments towards the refugees throughout the years.

19. The field of education might be of particular interest in view of certain anti-Israeli, politically inspired and totally unacceptable resolutions recently pushed through by Arab delegations at UNESCO. In addition to UNRWA's commendable educational activities, particularly vocational training, the vocational training centres and workshops built or expanded by Israel had greatly contributed to the advancement of professional training for local youth, including, of course, numerous children of refugees. Israel's education budget for the administered areas had again been increased, as had the number of students, including the children of refugees. The increase in the elementary and preparatory-lower secondary-school population was considerably in excess of the general increase in population. He drew attention to the successes achieved in the Egyptian secondary school-leaving certificate examination mentioned in paragraph 137 of the report of the Commissioner-General. Many of the students registered with Egyptian and Syrian universities had returned to Gaza and Sinai to spend their summer vacations with their families. There had also been other improvements in medical and educational facilities in Gaza.

20. Israel had been doing everything that could be expected from a State which found itself in Israel's position. Its contribution to the UNRWA budget for 1974 was \$625,383; its total budgetary contribution to UNRWA amounted to \$5,015,220.

21. Israel participated in direct contributions to the refugees as shown in table 18 of the report. For the year covered by the report, ending on 30 June 1974, its contributions had amounted to nearly \$8.5 million, an increase of more than half a million dollars over the preceding year. In addition to its contributions to the UNRWA budget and its direct assistance to the refugees, a substantial part of Israel's annual budget for the administered areas was earmarked for the benefit of the refugees, who constituted a large percentage of the population of the areas. As only a small share of that budget was contributed by the local inhabitants, the bulk was borne by Israeli taxpayers.

22. It was understandable that the Commissioner-General should be concerned at the projected deficit of some \$45 million in the Agency's budget. The reasons for that deficit and the other difficulties mentioned in the report were manifold and included inflation and shortage of supplies. However, attention must be drawn to the core of the matter. As the Arab countries had over the years rejected any constructive solution of the refugee problem, thus causing the perpetuation of the Agency, they could not escape the consequences of their attitude and try to have the entire world bear the costs of their political strategy, particularly since the Arab oil-producing countries had been very instrumental in causing bankruptcy and economic ruination in many parts of the world and had been accumulating unprecedented financial surpluses. It would be well if, instead of demanding that an impoverished world should make up for the deficit of an Agency which existed because of Arab attitudes, the Arab countries met the deficit in the UNRWA budget by assigning for that purpose a tiny fraction of 1 per cent of their oil income. However, such a change in the conduct of the Arab countries was too much to expect.

23. Much had been said in the Committee about the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. However, it was essential not to lose sight of the realities in the area. Enmity towards Israel on the part of Arab Governments was reflected not only in the statements of their leaders and in the speeches of their representatives in the United Nations but also in their active political, military and financial support for the terrorist organizations. However, in spite of the security risks involved, Israel had over the years permitted the return of well over 50,000 refugees. In addition, it had granted permits for the return of inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza area. Under that scheme, 3,500 persons had returned between 1 September 1973 and 30 June 1974, bringing the total since 1967 to over 53,000. However, the over-all solution of the problem of those persons would also have to await the hoped-for peace settlement.

24. In that connexion, he referred to the figures mentioned in paragraph 4 of document A/9740, which were substantially smaller, and pointed out that, as indicated in the report, the Secretary-General had qualified the correct-

ness of his figures by stating that they were based on requests for the retransfer of rations and that the Agency would not be aware of the return of any refugees who did not ask for the provision of rations or services. Furthermore, the numbers of persons who were being referred to as having been "displaced" by the 1967 war had been vastly exaggerated, as continued to be the case with respect to the numbers of the original 1948 refugees.

25. Moreover, the open-bridges policy with Jordan had enabled, over the preceding few years, many hundreds of thousands of Arabs from practically all the Arab countries to visit the administered areas and Israel and to see the true situation for themselves. In May 1973, the Government of Israel had expanded that policy and visits from Arab countries, hitherto confined to the summer months, were to be permitted the year round. That policy did not seem to be to the liking of those who opposed any kind of contacts and peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs, although they utilized it for infiltrating terrorist regions. The terrorist organizations also utilized UNRWA camps, set up for humanitarian purposes, as bases for their murderous activities. They had tried to do so in the Gaza camps and when they had been frustrated there, they had concentrated more and more on the refugee camps in Lebanon.

26. He drew attention to paragraph 25 of the Commissioner-General's report, which referred to the fact that Lebanese Government officials and police had not yet returned to the refugee camps from which they had been withdrawn in October 1969, responsibility for the refugee population as a whole, resting in effect, with the Higher Political Committee for Palestinians on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). That was the first time, to the best of his knowledge, that an UNRWA report had admitted what had been known for some time, namely, that the terrorist organizations were given virtually a free hand in the UNRWA refugee camps. It was in, and close to, those camps that the terrorists trained and planned their murderous exploits, and it was from there that they set out to execute them. It was in keeping with the mentality and tactics of the terrorist organizations, which sought their victims among the civilian population of Israel and among defenceless persons abroad, that they likewise looked for protection for themselves close to or among innocent people living in refugee camps. The natural consequence of that situation was that the Government of Israel was constrained to act in defence of its population. Such action was taken against the bases, training camps and other installations of those murder organizations. If innocent people were hurt as a result of such action, that was a matter of regret to his Government. But the responsibility for consequential loss of life and damage in refugee camps fell on the shoulders of the Lebanese Government, which permitted that intolerable situation to persist.

27. Israel would not be deflected from its determination to defend its citizens, and indeed its integrity and independence. The Jewish people had suffered for too long under alien persecution and domination. Zionism, much maligned in the United Nations, was the Jewish people's national liberation movement. It was a natural and indivisible part of the great historical process of the emancipation of nations. What tied the Jews to their land was a unique and unbroken connexion, extending nearly 4,000 years, between the Land

of the Bible, and the People of the Book. No Jew could dwell in the Land of Israel as a stranger or an alien. The contemporary world was one of liberation movements and Zionism was probably the oldest of them.

28. Thus, it could confidently be said that the renaissance of Israel, after centuries of struggle to overcome foreign conquest and exile, was a vindication of fundamental concepts of equality of nations and of self-determination. It was to be hoped that the day was not distant when Arab leaders would come to recognize those concepts and acknowledge those facts. Then they would also realize that they could not claim that only their rights were valid and that equal rights should be denied to the Jewish people in its historic homeland and that the rights of the Arabs should supplant those of the Jews. When that day came, as it must, accommodation between the two peoples would follow and there would be peace at last in the Middle East. A just and lasting solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would also include a just settlement of the refugee problem.

29. Mr. SCHIELE (France) noted that in spite of the concern shown by the host countries and in spite of the increased assistance rendered by the international community, the situation of the refugees had not improved at all. It must also be noted that UNRWA, a body set up in order to meet the most immediate and legitimate needs of the refugees, found itself today in such a financial situation that its very existence was jeopardized. That danger was real and serious.

30. On the one hand, the situation of the refugees continued to be extremely precarious and some services had had to be reduced; furthermore, the refugees who had remained in the territories occupied by Israel faced further trials, whereas others, living in neighbouring countries and in particular in Lebanon, found their security constantly threatened.

31. On the other hand, there had been a disquieting deterioration in the financial situation of the Agency. The fiscal year 1973 had resulted in a deficit of nearly \$4 million and the projected deficit for the current year amounted to \$12.5 million. For the next year, it was estimated that the Agency would be faced with a deficit of over \$44 million, in other words, more than one third of the total budget of the Agency, without any increase in the provision of services. It was clear that those directly responsible for the operations of UNRWA were not involved and, in that connexion, his delegation wished to pay a tribute to the Commissioner-General, the untiring and eloquent advocate of the 1.5 million persons in his charge. What was involved was a more general phenomenon of an unprecedented scope, namely, the substantial rise in the price of food and services, which had also made it necessary to raise the remuneration of the staff in order to take account of the increase in the cost of living.

32. The Agency therefore found itself confronted with a situation which was only too familiar. The fact that costs had increased whereas the level of income had remained unchanged or failed to rise accordingly meant that the budget could be balanced only by reducing the services provided. As such services were already at a minimum level, such a decision could be taken only as a last resort. As the

Commissioner-General had indicated in introducing his report at the 941st meeting, it was the entire educational system that would be jeopardized. However, it was that system which provided for the young persons born in the camps a window opening onto a responsible future. Such a decision would also jeopardize the existence of the Agency itself. Therefore, the solution sought over the preceding few years had been to bring about an increase in receipts.

33. His country was interested in the question for several reasons. It participated in the Advisory Commission of UNRWA and had been a member of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA for four years. It was in the latter body that it had been decided to launch an appeal for funds and to contact regional groups and subgroups, as well as individual Governments. However, the action of the Working Group had not made it possible to restore the financial balance of the Agency. Nevertheless, the fact that regular contacts were maintained with the various Governments and that information was provided to States Members of the United Nations was not without value. His delegation believed that the Commissioner-General appreciated the advice and support given by the Working Group.

34. His country was also interested in the financing problems of the Agency in its capacity as a substantial contributor. It had from the outset been constantly concerned at the fate of the refugees and that concern had led it to provide direct assistance which now amounted to \$1 million, to which must be added substantial contributions in kind. It was also concerned in its capacity as a member of the European Economic Community, which had contributed more than one quarter of the financing of UNRWA in 1974. It was due, in particular, to an exceptional contribution of \$8 million for primary education that the Agency had been able to balance its budget during the current year. His delegation could only be proud of that evidence of solidarity which demonstrated the concern of the members of the European Economic Community for the fate of the Palestinian refugees and for a region of the world which was so close to it and with which it traditionally maintained friendly relations.

35. Referring to the estimated deficit of \$44 million, he said that it would be essential to consolidate existing resources for the future. In addition, it was necessary, without involving the principle of voluntary contributions which should continue to be the basis for the Agency's financing, that further sources of revenue must be provided. In that regard, his delegation drew attention to the statement in paragraph 25 of the report of the Working Group (A/9815 and Corr.1) that it was essential that those Governments which had not contributed in the past and those Governments which had so far contributed inadequately, should now be willing to reconsider seriously their position and contribute generously to the common effort. That appeal was all the more warranted, as all Members were agreed that, in the current circumstances, the Agency's task should be continued and its mandate should therefore be renewed.

36. His delegation called on the entire world community to exert further efforts and, on the basis of the capacity of each member to contribute, to help the peoples who were

victims of a situation for which they were in no way responsible. It was clear that the efforts thus called for could not be a permanent substitute for an over-all political settlement which, bearing in mind all the elements of the problems, should take particular consideration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

37. Mr. NOGUCHI (Japan) said that the current discussion on the item under consideration had a special significance for two reasons. First, the Committee was considering the matter only a few days after the debate in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine, which had focused the attention of the international community on that tragic problem and strengthened the conviction that concerted international efforts were urgently required in order to help to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Secondly, as was clear from the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and the report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, the Agency was facing a deficit of unprecedented size. In spite of the generous contributions pledged by many Member States at the recent Pledging Conference for UNRWA, there was a danger that the Agency would be forced to reduce its services to the refugees.

38. His delegation fully shared the view of the Working Group, expressed in paragraph 22 of its report, that as long as a just and lasting settlement of the problem of the Palestine refugees had not been achieved, UNRWA's services in the form of relief assistance, health care and education must be maintained at their current minimal level. The reduction of services not only would inflict further hardships on the refugees but might render the political situation in the Middle East more difficult. The United Nations must therefore exercise its best efforts to enable the Agency to continue its vital services to the refugees.

39. Throughout its history, UNRWA had mainly relied on voluntary contributions from Member States for financial support. Although some other method might be adopted to meet part of the Agency's budget, his delegation believed that voluntary contributions from Member States were the only practical method for financing the bulk of its expenses. Moreover, the current situation of the UNRWA budget, with 90 per cent of its expenses borne by a group of about 10 countries, was not satisfactory. In his delegation's opinion, UNRWA was performing a vital role and should be the collective responsibility of the United Nations. All Members with the capacity to do so should contribute to its support.

40. It should also be borne in mind that the economic problems facing many Member States had made it difficult for a number of traditional donors to increase their contributions or even to maintain them at current levels. At the same time, many countries which were not among the traditional donors, had acquired the capacity to make much larger financial contributions.

41. His delegation fully supported the Working Group's conclusion in paragraph 25 of its report that it was essential that those Governments which had not contributed in the past and those Governments which had so far contributed inadequately should now be willing to reconsider seriously

their position and contribute generously to the common effort. Some Governments had hesitated in the past to make generous contributions because of political reasons, but it was to be hoped that the recent developments concerning the question of Palestine had made their positions easier and that they would now consider making more substantial contributions.

42. His delegation wished to pay a tribute to the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and his able staff for their selfless efforts. His delegation assured the Commissioner-General of the Japanese Government's continued support in his difficult and extremely important task.

43. His country had participated actively in the work of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and in that of the Advisory Commission of UNRWA. His delegation also paid a tribute to Mr. Olcay, Chairman of the Working Group. Those bodies had played an important role in helping to ensure the financing of UNRWA. If the mandate of the Working Group was renewed, his country would continue to participate actively in its work.

44. With regard to the future activities of the Working Group, his delegation believed that it should study the question of the financing of UNRWA from a wider point of view, taking into account the recent political developments regarding Palestine, instead of merely studying possible ways of meeting the deficit on a short-term basis.

45. In his delegation's opinion, it was essential for the General Assembly to renew the mandate of UNRWA in view of the imperative need to continue its services to the Palestinian refugees. The Assembly should also reaffirm its support for the Agency's work in the clearest terms. Until a political settlement was reached on the question of Palestine, it would be essential for UNRWA to continue its operations and Members must do their utmost to provide the necessary support.

46. Mr. KOTLYARENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that 25 years had elapsed since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 302 (IV), which had established UNRWA, and that over the preceding 25 years, numerous resolutions had been adopted, yet the problem of the Palestinian people had still not been resolved.

47. His delegation shared the view expressed in the Committee concerning the need to eliminate the causes which had led to the problem of the Palestine refugees and which prevented its solution. Any temporary measure would not lead to a solution of that complicated problem but merely prolong its existence. The problem of the Palestine refugees was a political one and could not be solved by the adoption of merely humanitarian and charitable measures. The problem of the Palestine refugees would not be solved in its entirety unless Israeli troops withdrew from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, unless the security and independence of all the countries in the area was guaranteed and unless the legitimate interests of the Arab people of Palestine were met, including its right to self-determination and Statehood. The solution of the question of Palestine was thus intimately bound up with the solution of the entire complex of questions relating to a political settlement in the Middle East.

48. The United Nations had repeatedly recognized the legitimate and inalienable right of the Palestine people to self-determination without outside interference and to national independence and sovereignty. That right had been reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), as had the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes, from which they had been driven by the Israeli occupiers.

49. It was precisely those aggressive actions on the part of Israeli expansionist circles that had caused the tragedy of the Palestinian people, who had been forced for a quarter of a century to live in exile and to lead a miserable life in refugee camps. Moreover, after driving the Palestinians from their ancestral homes, the Israeli militarists would not leave them in peace and the Israelis continually bombed the refugee camps in other countries where the Palestinians had found refuge, trying to frighten them and to force them to abandon their legitimate struggle to free the occupied territories.

50. Specific data regarding the aggressive acts by Israel against the Palestinians were contained in the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to the current session of the General Assembly. In that connexion, he drew attention to the information given in paragraph 64 of the report, which showed that Israel had in no way renounced its annexationist policy and was violating the rules of international law and the decisions of the United Nations.

51. The problem of the Palestine refugees was an integral part of the complex and multifaceted problem of the Middle East and must be resolved. The task of resolving the Middle East problem had been entrusted to the Geneva Peace Conference, in accordance with United Nations resolutions. In that connexion, he drew attention to the joint USSR-United States communiqué signed on 24 November 1974 in Vladivostok, which stressed that the Geneva Conference should play an important role in establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and resume its work as soon as possible. It was clear that all interested parties should participate in the work of the Conference, including PLO, which was the only legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine.

52. The exercise of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine within the framework of a just political settlement was in keeping with the interests of ensuring a lasting peace in the Middle East. A realistic approach to a political solution of the Palestine problem was becoming increasingly urgent. His delegation firmly supported the struggle of the Arab people to liberate the occupied territories, to protect the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine and to ensure the peace and security of all the peoples in the Middle East.

53. Mr. KANOUTÉ (Mali) said that as the Commissioner-General of UNRWA had pointed out in the introduction to his report, the Agency had been set up in 1949 as an undertaking of a limited duration. Unfortunately, because of the intransigent and negative attitude of Israel, of the support given it by certain States Members of the United Nations and the powerlessness of the latter with regard to the question of Palestine, there had been an increasing trend towards the institutionalization and perpetuation of the Agency. Needless to say, that was a solution which



would not help to put an end to the drama being played out in Palestine and the Middle East. Nevertheless, throughout the years, the United Nations had confined itself to renewing the Agency's mandate and to collecting with increasing difficulty the funds needed to provide some degree of assistance to the refugees.

54. He stressed the important role played in the matter by the United Nations and the Organization's heavy responsibility in the search for a just and satisfactory solution to the Palestine problem. His delegation therefore welcomed the developments which had taken place during the current session, including the discussion of the question of Palestine, the statement by Mr. Arafat, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of PLO (2282nd plenary meeting), and the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX). With regard to the problem of Palestine, the Chairman of PLO had said that it involved the cause of a people who had been driven from their own land, uprooted and condemned to live in exile and in refugee camps, and that the Zionist leaders had succeeded in deceiving world opinion by making it believe that the problem was merely one of refugees who needed charity. Mr. Arafat had also said that the Palestinians' attachment to their homeland and their will to return there had never wavered, that their enthusiasm had never been stifled and that nothing could make them renounce their Palestinian identity.

55. In that connexion, he noted that the Commissioner-General himself had stressed in paragraph 8 of his report that the refugees continued to reiterate their desire for repatriation. It was therefore obvious that the solution to the problem of the Palestine refugees was primarily a political one, and that every effort should be made to fulfil the legitimate aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to their homes.

56. Meanwhile, the Agency must continue its unique mission of providing relief for the refugees. His delegation was aware of the many difficulties which had faced the Agency in the past, but was deeply concerned at its current extremely precarious financial situation. Its current difficulties had been created by a number of unfavourable economic factors, such as an increase in the cost of supplies, the devaluation of the United States dollar in terms of local currencies and the rampant inflation prevailing in the regions in which the Agency had its operations. Those difficulties had, moreover, been aggravated by the destruction of the shelters and by the sea and air attacks by Israel which had caused considerable material damage and suffering in the refugee camps. Israel must end such attacks and compensate the Agency for the damage thus caused. Israel must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and must pay compensation for property which had been lost or damaged, as laid down in General Assembly resolution 194 (III), in order to ensure a genuine solution to the refugee problem and a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

57. His delegation supported the renewal of the mandate of the Agency and that of the Working Group, and wished to pay a tribute to the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and all his staff for their work and efforts on behalf of the Palestinian people.

58. Mr. ABDULDJALIL (Indonesia) said that he wished to express the sincere appreciation of his delegation for the work accomplished by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA under very trying circumstances and to the members of the Working Group for their efforts during the year.

59. It had long been recognized that the question of the Palestinian refugees constituted a central element in the wider problems of the Middle East. Thus, the ultimate, just solution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees was an inseparable part of the attainment of a broader political solution to the Middle East situation as a whole.

60. If the Israeli Government were to allow the refugees to return to their homes, that gesture would not only demonstrate a desire to act in conformity with the numerous relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council, but would also be in accordance with the precepts of the Charter and generally recognized basic human rights principles. Failing the adoption of such a humanitarian measure, the Government of Israel ought, at the very least, to refrain from attacking the refugee camps and from destroying the temporary shelters which alone provided homes for the Palestinians. The Commissioner-General had indicated that an amount equal to 10 per cent of the estimated deficit for 1975 would be required to repair the damage done by Israeli raids in south Lebanon.

61. In face of punitive actions by Israel and the growing numbers of refugee families forced to flee their native land, UNRWA had made a broad effort to improve the conditions in which those unfortunate people had to live. By its activities in fields of housing, education, medical care and nutrition, the Agency had done much to prevent an already serious situation from becoming completely desperate and it deserved the thanks of the entire international community.

62. It was most regrettable that the Agency now found itself on the brink of financial disaster. The note by the Commissioner-General (A/SPC/172 and Corr.1) had indicated that the revised estimate of the budget deficit for 1975 stood at \$44.7 million and that cash in hand would be likely to be insufficient to meet the requirements of the Agency for the month of January 1975. An additional area which placed considerable strain upon the Agency's budget was that of staff management; the special nature of the Agency's activities and the manner of recruitment and remuneration of staff had led to a number of staff grievances which might impair the efficiency with which UNRWA was able to carry out its mandate.

63. It was apparent that if the Agency was to maintain its high standard of service, sufficient funding must be assured to permit both adequate planning and continuity of programmes. There were several ways in which those aims could be achieved. In the first place those nations which, thus far, had not found it possible to contribute to the Agency should reconsider their positions, and his delegation wished to appeal to those States which had not yet contributed to the support of UNRWA to do so as soon as possible. There was also a clear need for increased contributions from those countries which had contributed in the past. Those who had done so did not need to be convinced

of the worth of the Agency's operations. There was also the possibility of reducing the activities of the Agency, but such a course of action must surely be distasteful to those who were convinced of the need to support the Agency. For instance, it would be particularly unfortunate if the education programme was curtailed, since it was vital for the future of new generations of refugees. However, if funds were insufficient, UNRWA would inevitably be forced to curtail its work.

64. The report of the Commissioner-General had indicated that steps had already been taken in an effort to reduce expenditures to the lowest level possible consistent with the fulfilment of the Agency's mandate. Additional savings might perhaps be realized from a broader application of the self-help programmes of the type mentioned in the report and from encouraging educated Palestinians voluntarily to instruct the young. Those who received Agency aid towards completing their higher education might be required to participate for a certain period in the work of the Agency in a way appropriate to the type of skills they had acquired with its help.

65. Even if those suggestions proved practicable in the short run, it was clear that the current crisis required a re-evaluation of the mandate of the Agency and its role in the Middle East. The international community had an unquestionable responsibility to the Palestine refugees and if that responsibility was to be fulfilled, it would be necessary to establish a firm financial base for UNRWA.

66. His country wished to avail itself of the opportunity to urge Israel to cease its attacks upon refugee camps and shelters. It also strongly urged that Israel should respect the right of return of the Palestinians. In conclusion, his delegation strongly supported the renewal of the mandate of the Agency and that of the Working Group.

67. Mr. BÁNYÁSZ (Hungary) noted that the socialist countries had long asserted that the question of the Palestine refugees was primarily a political issue. The current session of the General Assembly had recognized that fact by adopting resolution 3236 (XXIX), a resolution of historic significance reaffirming the right of the Palestinian Arabs to national independence and sovereignty and recognizing their political movement, PLO, as their sole legitimate representative. No one could doubt that the representative of PLO should speak out decisively on the question of the Palestinian refugees and that of the refugee problem. His delegation hoped that such a political settlement would take place soon, since it alone could secure a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

68. His delegation wished to express its appreciation to the Commissioner-General and staff of UNRWA, whose work had enhanced the reputation of the United Nations and contributed to shaping a new type of just and peaceful relations in the Middle East. It was most commendable that the Agency was already contemplating its future tasks and, in that connexion, the need for possible reorganization. The co-operation of wider circles, including representatives of PLO, should be enlisted in such an undertaking.

69. His delegation wished to stress that the facilities for the accommodation and education of the Palestine refugees

should be maintained until a settlement was reached. Those facilities, however, must not depend on charity and voluntary contributions from the international community. The blame for the Palestine refugee problem lay solely with the leading circles of Israel which had unleashed a series of wars of aggression and conquest. International law and morality alike demanded that the expenses incurred by the refugee problem should be defrayed by Israel in the first place. It was also in Israel's interest to do so, since Israel could not meet with more goodwill in the future Middle East than she could earn herself by her own actions.

70. The same applied to the attacks on UNRWA refugee camps. There could be no excuse for those attacks which caused immense damage and suffering to their inhabitants. Now or in the future, Israel must pay for the damage incurred.

71. The Hungarian People's Republic had in the past rendered considerable assistance to the cause of the Palestine refugees and would continue to implement that policy in the future.

72. Mr. ISA (Pakistan) said that while the recent momentous debate in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine, culminating in the adoption of resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX), had marked important progress in the efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, the United Nations now had to confront the immediate problem of providing food and shelter as well as health and educational facilities to more than 1.5 million Palestine refugees and displaced persons.

73. Since its inception, UNRWA had been engaged in the humanitarian task of providing the minimal necessities of daily life to those people. It was regrettable that for the eleventh time in the preceding 12 years, the Agency should have run into a deficit. In the preceding year, but for the last-minute contributions by the United States and the European Economic Community, the Agency would have had to cut down its services. Despite the splendid work done by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and his staff as well as the efforts of the Working Group, the outlook for the coming year was extremely bleak. The revised budget estimates in document A/SPC/172 and Corr.1 showed that, given the current level of expected income, the Agency would face a deficit of some \$45 million, and that the working capital at 31 December 1974 amounted to \$6.4 million, sufficient to meet barely two weeks' operations. The severe financial difficulties faced by the Agency were not due to an expansion in the activities of UNRWA. The factors responsible were the rise in the price of supplies, appreciation of local currencies in terms of the United States dollar and the rapid increase in the local cost of living, all of which were beyond the Agency's control.

74. The uprooting of the Palestinians from their homeland and their continued dependence on international charity did not tell the whole story of their miserable existence. They were often subjected to Israeli raids from air, land and sea and the demolition of their houses by the occupying Power continued unabated. Even the personnel of UNRWA had not escaped Israeli harassment, as shown in paragraphs 168 to 170 of the report of the Commissioner-General.

75. The Commissioner-General had drawn attention to the need for a review of the Agency's constitution, structure and programme to meet the changing political situation in the area. His delegation, however, agreed with the Jordanian delegation (see 941st meeting) that no fundamental change had occurred or was imminent which would warrant such a review of UNRWA. In any case, the requirements in food, health, shelter and education would not disappear overnight following a political settlement. The point at issue was not the question of the Agency's mandate, but its continued viability, although the Agency might undertake an internal review of its functions and operations within its existing mandate. The General Assembly must, therefore, not only extend the life of UNRWA but also ensure that it received enough funds to maintain its current minimum subsistence level services. Accordingly, his delegation supported the renewal of the mandate of the Agency and that of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA.

76. In considering the question of the Agency's future and viability, sight must never be lost of the political dimensions of the Palestine question. The way to a just and lasting solution to the problems besetting the Middle East had been shown by the General Assembly in various resolutions including 3236 (XXIX). All efforts of the world community should be directed towards the full implementation of those resolutions.

77. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, recalled that the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had alleged that the aggression and expansion of Israel had been the cause of the Palestine refugee problem and that the Hungarian representative had followed suit in the same vein. The representatives of those countries had not always been of that opinion, however. In the Security Council, in a statement made on 20 May 1948,<sup>2</sup> the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had expressed concern that a number of Palestine's neighbour States had sent their troops into Palestine and on 27 May 1948<sup>3</sup> he had again referred to the unlawful invasion by a number of States of the territory of Palestine, which did not form part of the territory of any of the States whose armed forces had invaded it. As for alleged Israeli expansion, the same representative had said, on 28 May 1948,<sup>4</sup> that he did not know of a single case of the invasion of the territory of another State by Israeli forces, except in self-defence, where they had had to beat off attacks by the armed forces

of other States on Israel territory. Another myth had been repeated by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, that of who should be blamed for the existence of the refugee problem. He wished to recall that on 4 March 1949,<sup>5</sup> the Soviet representative had asked why Israel should be blamed for the existence of that problem. Soviet views might have changed since 1949: facts had not. Israel could not be blamed for the creation and continuation of the Arab refugee problem. As the Soviet representative had indicated at that time, only an end to the war waged by the Arab States against Israel since 1948 and peace could solve the refugee problem.

78. Mr. EL-HENDAWY (Egypt) categorically rejected the comments made by the Israeli representative in connexion with the Gaza Strip, and in that regard drew the attention of the Committee to the reports of the Commissioner-General and the Secretary-General which contradicted those assertions. It should be left to the residents of the Gaza Strip to state whether they felt such "well-being" while their homes were being destroyed, and whether they were better off now than during the time of the Egyptian administration.

79. Mr. KOTLYARENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) felt that the Israeli representative would do well to draw the appropriate conclusions from the statements made at the time by the Ukrainian, the USSR and other delegations. The representative of Israel had attempted to depict the peace-loving nature of the foreign policy of his State, but no verbal acrobatics could alter the fact that it was Israeli troops that had occupied substantial portions of neighbouring Arab States and had expelled hundreds of thousands of Arabs from their homes.

80. Mr. BÁNYÁSZ (Hungary) said that his delegation had stated that Israel could not meet with more goodwill in the future Middle East than she could earn herself by her own action. He wished to add that statements such as that by the Israeli representative could hardly strengthen the goodwill of Member States towards Israel.

81. Mr. DORON (Israel) read out, in connexion with the conditions formerly prevailing in the Gaza Strip, a statement published in a Saudi Arabian newspaper, *el Medina* on 28 November 1966, to the effect the Jews under Hitler's administration were better off than the Arabs in Gaza under the administration of Abdel Nasser.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year*, 297th meeting.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 306th meeting.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 307th meeting.

*The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, *Fourth Year*, 414th meeting.

## 945th meeting

Thursday, 5 December 1974, at 11.10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.945

### AGENDA ITEM 38

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/9582, A/9613, A/9740, A/9789, A/9815 and Corr.1, A/SPC/172 and Corr.1, A/SPC/L.316-321):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the members of the Committee to the five draft resolutions (A/SPC/L.316-320) and to the note by the Secretary-General (A/SPC/L.321) on the administrative and financial implications of draft resolution A/SPC/L.316.

2. Mrs. GJERTSEN (Norway) thanked the Commissioner-General and the staff of UNRWA for the way in which they had carried out their difficult task and also thanked the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA for the efforts it was making.

3. Although UNRWA had been able to continue its refugee services in 1974, the Commissioner-General's report (A/9613) showed that the situation would be very serious in 1975. The Agency had never before had to face the possibility of a deficit of as much as \$45 million. Like the Commissioner-General, her delegation considered that ordinary measures would not suffice and that the traditional methods of financing would probably not be adequate to deal with the situation. If the estimated deficit actually amounted to \$45 million, the Agency would have to reduce its distribution of food rations and close down schools. Her delegation had already stressed how important it considered UNRWA's teaching services to be for the future of the Palestinian people.

4. That situation called for a number of comments. First, the Agency's traditional method of financing could not continue. All States Members of the United Nations, irrespective of their attitude towards the political situation in the region, should contribute to UNRWA's humanitarian work. Second, that obligation applied particularly to countries with an annual *per capita* income of more than \$1,500. In view of the discouraging results of the pledging conference, her delegation urged those countries to reconsider their attitude. Third, her delegation supported the Commissioner-General's suggestion that the cost of the Agency's international staff should be incorporated into the regular budget of the United Nations. Finally, since the suspension of UNRWA's assistance would seriously jeopardize chances of establishing a just and lasting peace in the

region, her delegation was of the opinion that UNRWA's mandate should be extended.

5. Mr. KELANI (Syrian Arab Republic) said he wished to thank the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and the staff of that Agency for the efforts they were making as part of relief operations which had been undertaken in accordance with General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) and which was the most important operation of that kind ever carried out. The establishment of UNRWA had been intended as a temporary measure until General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and, in particular, paragraph 11 of that resolution, which provided for the repatriation of refugees, had been implemented. In other words, the establishment of UNRWA had been made necessary as a result of the injustice to which the Palestinian people had been subjected by Israel.

6. In resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, the General Assembly had recalled that the problem of relief for Palestinian refugees could not be dissociated from the political aspect of the question of Palestine and, in resolution 3240 (XXIX) of 29 November 1974 relating to Israeli practices in the occupied territories, it had recalled that the refugee problem could not be dissociated from the colonialist nature of the Zionist presence in those territories. The various aspects of the question of Palestine must therefore be considered as a whole.

7. It was because of Israel's rejection of any political solution that the General Assembly had had to consider the refugee question for the preceding 26 years. It had already adopted 27 resolutions on that subject and their purpose was to recall paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), in which the United Nations had given the refugees a choice between repatriation, as soon as possible, or compensation. It was because the United Nations had not been able to force one insubordinate Member to respect its resolutions that the tragedy persisted.

8. As a result of world inflation and the devaluation of the United States dollar, the Agency would have an estimated deficit of more than \$44 million in 1975. Moreover, that deficit had been made worse by supplementary expenditures required as a result of the destruction caused by Israel's air, sea and land attacks against the camps. The deficit was so serious that, in 1974, the discontinuance of the upper levels of primary education had been considered. However, thanks to the assistance of the European Economic Community and the United States, UNRWA had been able to continue those education programmes.

9. Because of such a deficit, the international community must ensure the survival of the Palestinian people and compel Israel to allow the refugees to return to their homes. The Palestinians could not always live from the



assistance of foreign countries. The United Nations must not adopt separate—and contradictory—resolutions on the various aspects of the problem, but, rather, consider them together and arrive at a courageous and unambiguous solution.

10. In the meantime, the necessary resources must be found to ensure the continuity of the relief operation. Otherwise, the serious consequences referred to in paragraph 24 of the Working Group's report (A/9815 and Corr.1) would actually occur.

11. Mr. SCHAUFLE (United States of America) said that war and its aftermath, the uncertainties of the search for a peaceful settlement, the internationalization of inflation and shortages of key commodities had presented the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and his staff, to whom his delegation wished once again to pay a tribute, with financial and administrative problems which were more complex than ever.

12. Those were not abstract management and financing problems, but rather human problems, because the resources which were now lacking were the only means of enabling UNRWA to continue its humanitarian task.

13. The Agency faced a financial crisis of unprecedented seriousness. His delegation shared the concern of the speakers who had drawn attention to that situation and had called for action to avert it. The United States intended to do its duty and urged other countries to do the same, despite the difficulties that many of them were facing. Recently, the resources of some countries had increased in considerable proportions and they could now do more than they had felt able to do in the past.

14. The Members of the United Nations had voluntarily committed themselves to the humanitarian principles on which the Charter was based. In view of the humanitarian nature of UNRWA's task, it was quite normal that their contribution to UNRWA's budget should also be voluntary.

15. It was in that spirit that his delegation was introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.317, in which it recalled the demands which the problems of UNRWA and those of the Palestine refugees placed on all members of the international community and proposed to renew UNRWA's mandate for three years, after which it was to be hoped that its task would finally be completed.

16. Mr. BUSSE (Federal Republic of Germany) paid a tribute to the Commissioner-General and his staff, and to the Chairman and members of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA. His Government knew of the suffering of refugees from experience and had always supported the work of the Agency with substantial regular contributions. In 1974, apart from its regular contribution of DM 2 million, it had made available to UNRWA an additional amount of DM 5 million to alleviate the plight of the Palestine refugees. To that must be added a substantial share in the assistance granted by the European Economic Community.

17. With regard to the partial inclusion of the UNRWA budget in the regular budget of the United Nations, his

delegation considered that the Agency's mandate provided expressly for the financing of relief programmes out of voluntary contributions, a principle which applied to all United Nations relief programmes. The United Nations budget was primarily an administrative budget. It would therefore be incompatible with the budgetary principles of the United Nations to include in it the budget of a relief programme or expenditure for single operations. Consideration might at the most be given to including in the United Nations budget the administrative expenses, as in the case of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

18. The Federal Republic's growing budgetary deficit prevented it from increasing its contributions to UNRWA. Since so far its contribution had been among the highest, it should have the right to point out that it was the duty of all States Members of the United Nations to make voluntary contributions to the budget of the Agency within the scope of their possibilities. In that respect, it fully endorsed the conclusions of the report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA.

19. Mr. AL-SHAKAR (Bahrain) welcomed the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had been allowed to participate in the work of the Special Political Committee as an observer in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX). He paid a tribute to all those who had contributed to the work of the Agency and especially to the Commissioner-General and his staff, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Director-General of WHO and the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA.

20. The question of Palestine refugees was only one aspect of a historical and political problem which, as the General Assembly had recently recognized, lay at the root of the Middle East crisis. It was a problem which resulted from the aggression perpetrated by the Zionists against the Palestinian people. Consequently, the services provided by UNRWA to the Palestine refugees could not in any way constitute a solution of the problem, which lay in the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and in particular General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX). The solidarity which the international community had shown with regard to the Palestinian people was not enough to give it back its rights and it must be enabled to recover its land and property.

21. The Commissioner-General's report painted a tragic picture of the living conditions of the Palestine refugees, whose growing difficulties increased the Agency's responsibilities. The services provided by UNRWA did not cover the real needs of the refugees and although the Agency's resources had increased during the preceding financial year, the services provided by it had not improved. His delegation considered that they should be increased and improved in order that the refugees could lead a normal life.

22. His delegation shared the concern of the Commissioner-General at the precarious financial situation of UNRWA, whose activities were threatened by a possible deficit of \$45 million in 1975. The services it provided were indispensable and it was essential that they should not be reduced. The financial situation of the Agency, at a time

when there were real chances of peace in the Middle East, was alarming because the reduction of the services provided to refugees might compromise the efforts made to reach a just and equitable solution of the problem. It would disturb the political situation and lead to insecurity in the region and perhaps throughout the world. His delegation therefore hoped that it would be possible to overcome the Agency's financial difficulties.

23. He considered it his duty to refer to the attacks made by Israel on the Palestine refugee camps, especially in southern Lebanon. Israel wished to liquidate the Palestinian people and drive them from that region, on security pretexts which no one believed. Israel's brutal aggression was turning southern Lebanon into a scene of unparalleled tragedy and, like the oppression of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, was incompatible with the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of international law, in particular the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Those attacks were extremely serious and his delegation considered that they should be regarded as aggression against the international community as a whole.

24. The problem could not be solved by providing essential assistance to the Palestine refugees; after recognizing the Palestinians' right to return home and to decide their own future, they must be given the means to do so, i.e. an end must be put to the Zionist occupation. In the meantime, the efforts of UNRWA and its Commissioner-General were beyond praise.

25. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) welcomed the representative of PLO, which had been allowed to participate in the work of the Special Political Committee as an observer, and expressed his pleasure that justice was at last being done. His delegation joined the other delegations in paying a tribute to the dedication and competence the Commissioner-General and his staff had shown in their difficult work.

26. The manner in which the General Assembly had examined the question of Palestine between 13 and 22 November 1974 (2282nd, 2283rd, 2285th, and 2287th to 2296th plenary meetings) was the one it should have adopted from the first and its decisions had a direct impact on the work of the Special Political Committee, because they justified *a posteriori* those who for years had refused to dissociate the humanitarian aspect of the question of the Palestine refugees from its political aspect. Even though, now that the General Assembly had made its political decision, attention could be focused essentially on the humanitarian aspect, it should never be forgotten that the humanitarian and political and national aspects were all part of one and the same problem. The Committee was dealing, not with a question of the sufferings of victims of a natural disaster, but with the deliberate displacement of a whole people, carried out in accordance with a definite policy. It was impossible to be concerned with the assistance to be given to the Palestinians without considering the objectives and orientation of that assistance, which were linked to the political aspect of the problem. It was also impossible to overlook the duration of that assistance, which depended on political events. The level and scope of that assistance could not be overlooked, nor

could the questions of who was responsible for it. It was impossible to be concerned with the financing of UNRWA without taking into account who was responsible for the existence of the Agency. The means of providing assistance should be in line with the political problem.

27. With regard to the objectives and orientation of the assistance, the United Nations had held from the beginning that the problem could be solved only by enabling the Palestinians to return to their homes or by granting them compensation if they decided to settle elsewhere. Resolution 194 (III) adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 1948 contained provisions to that effect. At the preceding meeting the representative of Israel had attempted to change the meaning of that resolution and of resolution 393 (V) by claiming that the mandate of the Agency was to reintegrate the refugees in the economic life of the Middle East, omitting any reference to the beginning and end of paragraph 4 of the latter resolution, which stated that that reintegration should be effected by repatriation or resettlement. The assistance provided to the refugees by the Agency was no more than a palliative, a temporary measure to enable the refugees to stay alive while waiting to return to their homes or until they decided to settle elsewhere.

28. The duration of the assistance provided by the Agency depended on the situation itself. As long as Israel prevented even a single refugee from returning, the General Assembly would be under a strong obligation to continue to keep the Agency in operation. The level and extent of assistance provided should be sufficient to satisfy the basic needs of the refugees, and the responsibility for that assistance was incumbent upon those who had caused the displacement of the Palestinian refugees, those who were preventing them from returning to their homes and those who were now pursuing them even in their camps, namely, Israel and the States which provided it with the political, financial and military support that enabled it to continue its exclusionist, aggressive and expansionist policy. Responsibility for assistance rested with Israel and the super-Power which enabled Israel to remain Israel. But since Israel was not living up to its responsibilities and since the international community was not compelling it to do so, the international community must provide assistance to the Palestine refugees.

29. There were four possible methods of financing the Agency. The most natural method would be for Israel to contribute to the Agency the revenue it derived from property belonging to the refugees. The Committee had already adopted a proposal to that effect,<sup>1</sup> but in view of the lack of support from Member States, the sponsors had not attempted to secure its adoption in the General Assembly. That method might legitimately be used to finance the entire budget of the Agency and, *a fortiori*, to repair or reconstruct the refugee-camp buildings destroyed by Israeli raids. In fact, such expenses should be met by Israel and not by the international community. A second method would be to include the Agency's entire budget in the United Nations regular budget. Thirdly, it might be decided to include only part of the Agency's expenses in

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 34, document A/7004, para. 9.

the regular United Nations budget. Fourthly, the Agency could continue to rely on voluntary contributions. If, through lack of will or for other reasons, the fourth solution was adopted, the resulting financial burden would certainly have to be more widely shared.

30. Member States could be divided into three categories, namely, those which actively promoted the creation of the political conditions necessary for a genuine solution to the problem but contributed little to the financing of the Agency; those which did very little, or even, on occasion adopted a negative political position, but were financially generous; and, lastly, those who provided neither political nor financial support. He expressed the hope that all States would give additional support to the cause of the refugees in one form or another.

31. The representative of Israel had dared to ask why Kuwait and other rich countries did not make greater contributions to the running costs of the Agency. Despite his reluctance to speak of such matters or to give details of the amount of assistance which his country provided for the refugees, he wished to point out that the total direct assistance which his Government had given to refugees who were not registered with the Agency was estimated by it to be more than double the amount contributed by the largest donor to the Agency's budget.

32. Listening to the representative of Israel at the 944th meeting, he had seen an unreal world in which roles were reversed and the refugees were carefree campers who had left of their own accord, the Arab countries who harboured them were jailers, the United Nations was a trouble-maker and the Israelis were righteous benefactors. In contrast to that sinister fantasy, he cited a passage in Count Bernadotte's last report<sup>2</sup> which recalled the conditions under which the Palestinians had gone into exile.

33. Mr. FOUM (United Republic of Tanzania), speaking on a point of order, proposed that the statement by the representative of Kuwait should be reproduced *in extenso*.

34. The CHAIRMAN said that if there was no objection, he would take it that the members of the Committee agreed that the statement by the representative of Kuwait should be included *in extenso* in the summary record.

*It was so decided.*<sup>3</sup>

35. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, for the first time, a delegation from PLO had participated in the General Assembly debate on the question of Palestine. Under resolution 3236 (XXIX), the Palestinians, who had been refugees and outcasts, had become a people whose right to self-determination and statehood was recognized by the world. Converting those rights to a reality was now an integral part of the settlement of the Middle East problem.

36. His delegation had always emphasized that that problem was primarily political and that no matter what

measures, including humanitarian measures, were adopted with regard to its other aspects, they could never solve the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

37. What had been required and was still required was to put an end to Israel's policy of aggression against the Arab States and peoples, a policy which was manifested in many ways and constituted a threat to world peace. That aggressive policy was also absurd and short-sighted. Zionist propaganda took great pains to create the impression that aggression was necessary in order to ensure the existence of Israel. In fact, that policy was merely adventurist and based on a principle which could only backfire on Israel, namely, denial of the right of neighbouring Arab States and peoples to their existence and sovereignty.

38. His country had always supported the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, recognizing that only a just peace could be lasting. Mr. Brezhnev had recently reiterated his country's position in that respect, stating that there could be no lasting peace in the Middle East unless all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 were liberated, unless the Arab people of Palestine exercised their lawful right to statehood and self-determination and unless the independence and security of all the countries parties to the conflict were reliably guaranteed. All that could and should be attained in the context of the Geneva Conference, which should resume its work as soon as possible. Furthermore, as emphasized in the communiqué issued in Moscow on 30 November at the conclusion of the visit by a delegation from PLO led by Yasser Arafat, representatives of the Arab people of Palestine should participate in that Conference on equal terms with the other participants.

39. The Arab people of Palestine had just won a great victory. His delegation now hoped that the draft resolutions which would be adopted by the Committee would not contribute to the perpetuation of the refugee problem but would, on the contrary, accelerate its solution.

40. Mr. CRAFOORD (Sweden) observed that during the current session the debate in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine had helped to clarify the political aspects of the refugee problem. However, the humanitarian needs were more urgent, and the financial situation of the Agency more serious, than ever.

41. His delegation believed that all the members of the international community should do their utmost to avoid any reduction in the activities of the Agency. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.319 was of a purely humanitarian nature and concerned UNRWA emergency assistance to persons displaced by the June 1967 hostilities.

42. Seventeen delegations, to which must be added that of Malaysia, supported the draft, the text of which was nearly identical with that of the preceding session (General Assembly resolution 3089 A (XXVIII)). His delegation hoped that, as had been the case with similar texts in the past, the draft would be adopted unanimously without any need for the Committee to proceed to a vote.

43. Mr. FOUM (United Republic of Tanzania) said that the representative of Kuwait had said all that he himself

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Third Session, Supplement No. 11.

<sup>3</sup> The full text of the statement is also contained in document A/SPC/PV.945.

had wished to say on the question. Nevertheless, he took advantage of the opportunity to say how much his delegation appreciated the efforts of the Commissioner-General and staff of UNRWA to provide the greatest possible aid to the refugees. The fact that the Agency existed reflected the concern of the international community for the fate of the Palestinian people.

44. However, more than international aid was needed. It was clear from the debates in various United Nations bodies that Member States were anxious to ensure respect for the Charter and for the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland. The international community was also concerned at the contempt which Israel showed for United Nations decisions by committing acts of aggression against its neighbours. Those facts demonstrated the need for States Members of the United Nations to support the activities of UNRWA.

45. Israel wished to give the impression that the Palestinian refugees had left their homeland voluntarily. The representative of Kuwait had shown where the truth lay. In that connexion, his delegation wished to draw attention to the work which it had already cited at the 2294th plenary meeting, in which the former President of the American University of Beirut showed clearly that operations such as the massacre of the Arab population of Deir Yassin had been designed solely to drive the Arabs out of Palestine by terror. However, a reading of the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA indicated that Israel, not satisfied with having driven the Palestinians from their homeland, was launching air and sea attacks, spreading death and destruction, against the camps in which they had taken refuge.

46. Consequently, there could be no doubt that the international community's concern should not be limited to the provision of material aid and that the most genuine humanitarian assistance consisted in world-wide political support aimed at ensuring the implementation of the resolutions in which the United Nations had called upon Israel to respect the principles of the Charter and to allow the Palestinian people to enjoy fully its rights as a member of the international community.

47. His delegation therefore had the honour to introduce draft resolution A/SPC/L.320 on behalf of its sponsors, to which Senegal should be added. Concerned at Israel's refusal to authorize the return of the displaced inhabitants to their homes, the sponsors in operative paragraph 1 of the draft deplored that attitude. In paragraph 2 they called once more upon Israel to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants; in paragraph 3 they reiterated the call upon Israel to take effective steps for the return to their camps of refugees from the Gaza Strip and to desist from further removal of refugees. In paragraph 4 they deplored

Israeli military attacks on refugee camps and in paragraph 5 requested the Secretary-General to report on Israel's compliance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the resolution.

48. The sponsors of the draft resolution hoped that the members of the Committee desirous of providing humanitarian aid to the refugees would see that the draft resolution submitted was merely an extension of their humanitarian concern and would give it their support.

49. Mr. LAHIRI (India), introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.316, said it was ironic that UNRWA was facing its worst financial crisis at the very time when the General Assembly had finally started to face the political problem of the Palestinians squarely. The miserable situation of the refugees had not changed, and the only ultimate solution to the problem was to restore the rights of the Palestinian people. Changes in the position of members on the question during the preceding and current sessions of the General Assembly had raised some hopes, but in the meantime it must be borne in mind that the Agency's assistance to the refugees was of vital importance and could not be curtailed further. Yet the Commissioner-General had said that it would be necessary to reduce a number of services if the expected deficit was not met. The Commissioner-General's report stressed the gravity of the crisis which the Agency would have to face in 1975.

50. His delegation wished to stress that India, in spite of its own difficulties, had always supported the Agency. In addition to its contributions to UNRWA, India awarded scholarships to Palestinian refugees each year. His delegation also wished to express its appreciation to the Commissioner-General and his co-workers for their efforts.

51. An extraordinary effort would be required to keep the assistance provided by the Agency from falling below its current level. In that connexion, the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA would play a particularly useful role during the critical year ahead. For that reason, his delegation and the other sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.316, in which the Working Group was requested to continue its efforts, hoped that the draft would be adopted unanimously.

52. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that draft resolution A/SPC/L.318 would be introduced at the afternoon meeting, and, because of the late hour, invited Israel to postpone the exercise of its right of reply until the afternoon meeting.

53. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that he intended to exercise his right of reply at the beginning of the afternoon meeting.

*The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.*



## 946th meeting

Thursday, 5 December 1974, at 3.20 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.946

### AGENDA ITEM 38

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/9582, A/9613, A/9740, A/9789, A/9815 and Corr.1, A/SPC/172 and Corr.1, A/SPC/L.316, A/SPC/L.317, A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1, A/SPC/L.319-321):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway) introduced draft resolution A/SPC/L.318 on behalf of the Scandinavian countries. Everyone knew about the precarious financial situation that would face UNRWA in 1975 and the Commissioner-General had already stated frankly that the effects of the reductions needed to eliminate the anticipated deficit of \$45 million would be shattering. Consequently, the sponsors of the draft resolution had proposed that the expenses for salary and pension costs of international staff in the service of UNRWA should be financed by the regular budget of the United Nations with effect from 1 January 1975. The sponsors were well aware that that would not solve the Agency's financial crisis, but they agreed with the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA that extraordinary efforts would be acquired to enable the Agency to continue its operations during 1975.

2. If adopted, the draft resolution would constitute a proof of the interest of the General Assembly in UNRWA's humanitarian activities. The sponsors had the impression, after consultations with various delegations, that they had the support of the host countries and of many other delegations. A common approach to the issue was essential. Moreover, in order to attain its purpose, the draft resolution should be approved unanimously without being put to a vote.

3. He added that the sponsors had agreed, after consultation, to delete the words "and pension costs" from the second preambular paragraph and the operative paragraph of the draft resolution. They had also decided to add the words "for the duration of UNRWA's mandate" at the end of the operative paragraph.

4. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said he had already explained his country's relations with UNRWA and its approach to the refugee problem. He would therefore confine himself to replying to the allegations against Israel. Firstly, he believed that the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic had contributed nothing to the Committee's debate or to solving the problem and

that the accusations made by the representative of Bahrain were so absurd that they should not be taken seriously. It was interesting, however, to note that neither the representative of Bahrain nor any other Arab speaker had expressed any regret for the death of innocent persons at the hands of Arab terrorists.

5. He agreed with the representative of Kuwait that the assistance should be temporary but did not agree with that representative's attempts to accuse him of distortions. Paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 393 (V) fully confirmed what he had said; the representative of Kuwait had in fact admitted that the central object of that paragraph was reintegration. Resolution 194 (III) was mentioned in that paragraph but that did not detract from its central theme.

6. As for the refugees' option to return, the Arab representatives had not mentioned that resolution 194 (III) did not offer an unconditional choice of either return or compensation. The resolution spoke of those who wished to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours, in other words, with Israel. Peace was therefore an indispensable condition for an approach towards a solution of the problem.

7. As to the allegations by the representative of Kuwait concerning the responsibility for the refugee problem and its continuation—and the financial responsibility devolving therefrom, in the opinion of the representative of Kuwait—the question had already been discussed in the Committee and in other bodies, and he would therefore not go into any details. He simply wished to say that the picture of a picnic that the representative of Kuwait had ironically attributed to Israel was the same image that the Arabs had tried to paint in 1948 when they were asking the Palestine Arabs to leave their homes temporarily until the rapid Arab victory over Israel had been won. To illustrate his point, he quoted a statement by the Secretary of the Arab League published in the New York Lebanese paper *Al Hoda* in June 1951.

8. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the representative of Israel was trying once more to distort all the facts when he said that he agreed with him that paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V) dealt with reintegration. He had spoken of the central provision and not the central object. The representative of Israel had also said that the paragraph mentioned resolution 194 (III), which was not entirely correct, since the paragraph did not simply mention the resolution, but said "without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)", which was much more. Moreover, paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) spoke of those "wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours", which meant not Israel, but the Israelis.

9. Finally, the representative of Israel had dared to say that the Palestine Arabs had been asked to leave their homes in 1948. He defied the representative of Israel to cite one single Arab statement in which the Palestinians were asked to leave their homes. The representative of Israel had used a statement published in a New York paper of 1951 to support his accusations. That paper did not even say what the representative of Israel claimed it had said.

10. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that the list of documents from which he could quote was very long, but he would simply mention the Jordanese paper *Faastin* which had published an article in February 1949 which said that the Arab States were encouraging the Palestinians to leave their homes temporarily so as not to hold up the advance of the Arab invasion armies. In the *Daily Mail* of London of 12 August 1948, Glubb Pasha had written that the Arab civilians were abandoning their homes before the advance of war threatened them. Accordingly to an editorial in the Cairo paper *Akhbar el-Yom* of October 1963, the *mufti* of Jerusalem had appealed to the Palestine Arabs to leave their homes.

11. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), replying to the representative of Israel, said that on page 286 of volume 2 of the Hebrew version of the book of Palmach, the Foreign Minister of Israel himself had told how the Israelis tried to make the Palestine Arabs flee because it was probable that, in the event of an Arab invasion, they would have attacked them from behind. They had therefore spread the rumour that a new Israeli contingent had arrived which was going to burn the villages. The tactic had worked perfectly and Dr. Weizmann, the first President of Israel, had been able to speak of the "miraculous simplification of our tasks" with reference to the flight caused by what Count Bernadotte had described as "the propagation of panic".

12. He reminded the Committee that Theodor Herzl had said in his memoirs that if Zionism wished to attain its objective of having a purely Jewish State, it must try to eliminate the Arabs, preferably by peaceful means, but if not, by recourse to violence.

13. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that, instead of replying to his arguments, the representative of Kuwait was merely quoting the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel in reference to an isolated incident which had taken place later.

14. A memorandum sent in 1952 by the Arab Higher Committee to the Arab League had stated that a number of Arab leaders had declared that they would receive immigrants from Palestine until their country had been freed. Many of the Palestine Arabs had been taken in by their statements, believing in the promises which the Arab countries had made to them. Moreover, on 14 May, the same Secretary-General of the Arab League had announced his intention of launching a war of extermination against Israel.

15. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) said that all his quotations could be checked unlike the unknown memorandum from which the representative of Israel had just quoted.

16. With respect to the reference to the statement by the Secretary-General of the Arab League concerning the entry

of the Arab armies into Palestine, United Nations documents showed that, before a single Arab soldier had entered Palestine, the Jewish State had already attacked the territory which had been allocated to the Arab State of Palestine in the resolution on the partition of Palestine. Only then had the Arabs decided to intervene in order to prevent Israel from occupying the rest of the territory.

17. Mr. DORON (Israel) felt that the debate could go on indefinitely and, for that reason, he would merely make available to those who were interested the relevant records of the Committee.

18. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) said that he was not seeking to convince the representative of Israel, but he was obliged to answer his falsehoods since historical truth must be upheld.

19. Mr. DORON (Israel) could not agree that the representative of Kuwait was the repository of truth.

20. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Congo and Guinea had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.320.

21. Mr. PETNIČKI (Yugoslavia), after expressing his delegation's appreciation of the tireless efforts of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and staff in providing assistance to the people of Palestine who had been displaced from their country, said that the Agency continued to have an important role to play in the new circumstances in which the refugee problem must now be considered, particularly as a result of the recent decision by the General Assembly to treat the question of Palestine as a political problem and to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestine people. His delegation hoped that the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly would be implemented and that efforts for a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem would be continued, on the basis of the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied territories. Until a definite solution was achieved, the assistance offered by UNRWA to the displaced population of Palestine would continue to be indispensable and, for that reason, his delegation supported the proposal that the mandate of UNRWA should be extended for a further period of three years.

22. The Agency must have sufficient financial resources to enable it to continue to assist more than a million and a half refugees and to provide them with medical and educational services. The reports under consideration indicated that the financial situation of UNRWA was gloomy and that an unprecedentedly large deficit was anticipated.

23. His delegation considered that the Committee should approve the report of the Commissioner-General (A/9613), extend the mandate of UNRWA for three years and that of the Working Group until the following year, and appeal to all States to make adequate contributions to the Agency. At the same time, it was convinced that UNRWA, in keeping with its tradition, would do all in its power to maintain and, if possible, improve the services it provided for the Palestine refugees.

24. Mr. AL-ATIYYAH (Iraq) said that the situation of UNRWA would continue to be considered as long as there

were refugees, whose right to return to their homeland had been recognized by the General Assembly.

25. Before the financial problem was considered, the problem as a whole should be outlined. First, the Palestine refugees were victims of zionism, whose obduracy had prevented the relevant United Nations resolutions from being implemented. Second, the problems which confronted UNRWA fell within the competence of the international community and, in particular, the United Nations, which had decided on the partition of Palestine and accepted Israel as one of its Members. Third, the solution did not lie in the assimilation of the Palestine refugees by the Arab countries. They wished to retain their nationality, return to their land and not to continue living as refugees. In that regard, he read out a composition written about children of a refugee camp which demonstrated the intensity of their desire to return to Palestine as reflected in the destruction, by the children, of trees planted by the staff of UNRWA to make the camp more habitable. Although the reaction of the children was illogical, the tragedy which had provoked it was equally illogical. Finally, the Arab countries were providing assistance to the refugees, had taken part in three wars to protect them from a Zionist invasion and received them in their respective territories, where, as was stated in paragraph 8 of the report of the Commissioner-General, they were participating increasingly in the economic life of the community, although they continued to reiterate their desire for repatriation.

26. The crisis confronting UNRWA arose from two basic reasons: the rising costs caused by adverse economic factors, such as inflation and the increased cost of basic rations, for instance, flour; and the cost of reconstructing, or repairing installations, facilities and shelters damaged in Israeli raids. The actions by Israel made the situation of the refugees more tragic still and rendered the work of UNRWA—some of whose staff members had been arrested and detained by the Israeli occupation authorities—more difficult.

27. In the light of everything that had been said, his delegation's position could be summarized in the following manner. Since there had been no change in the Palestine refugee situation, his delegation supported the extension of the mandate of UNRWA and that of the Working Group. The aggressor and those who assisted him must assume primary responsibility for the Palestine refugee situation. Although the United States contributed large sums to UNRWA, it also gave enormous amounts to Israel in arms and money, for example. The activities of UNRWA offered a guarantee of safety in the region. The termination of its services would have disastrous consequences, and therefore they must be maintained, and if possible, improved and extended. It was the duty of the international community and of the United Nations to protect the camps against Israeli incursions. His delegation reaffirmed the right of displaced persons to return to their homes. UNRWA must maintain contacts and hold consultations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

28. In conclusion, he expressed his delegation's appreciation of the work of the Commissioner-General, his staff and the Working Group.

29. Mr. KAMARA (Mauritania) said that the fact that the United Nations had been considering for more than a quarter of a century the item relating to UNRWA showed clearly that the world community was aware of the injustice that had been done to the Palestinian people. It also demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the measures taken up to now by the United Nations to ensure the implementation of the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the specialized agencies.

30. It was true that, as a result of skilful manoeuvres, the tragic problem of Palestine had always been dealt with from a purely humanitarian standpoint. However, it was the inescapable duty of the world community to get to the heart of the problem by fully recognizing the fundamental rights of the Palestinian entity, restoring the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine to the land of their ancestors and recognizing their inalienable right to self-determination.

31. The question of Palestine had always been and continued to be a global problem, and it must be presented and considered as such if there was a sincere desire to find a just and lasting solution. Today, more than ever, the malicious attempts of the Israeli authorities to conceal the true nature of the question were doomed to defeat. World opinion, which had been misled for more than 27 years by endless propaganda, had at last come to realize the tragedy which the Palestinian people was experiencing and the enormity of the injustice that had been committed against it. His delegation was therefore gratified at the General Assembly's adoption of resolution 3210 (XXIX), which, in addition to being an essential measure in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, was an important contribution to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It also gave recognition to the valiant struggle of the Palestinian people, which, through its only legitimate spokesman, PLO—which he welcomed as an observer in the Committee—had made the international community recognize its just cause and, through persuasion, perseverance and the justice of its goals, had won for itself the status of a national entity with which the international community must henceforth reckon. The question of Palestine was central to any search for permanent peace in the Middle East. Anyone who ignored that fact was deliberately turning his back on the truth. The tragedy of the Palestine refugees was turning the entire Middle East into a focus of tension and a permanent threat to international peace and security.

32. He quoted the words of the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, held at Geneva in February 1974, where, referring to the tragedy of the Palestinian people, the President had recalled that the Zionists had driven the greatest part of that people from their land, reduced those who remained to the status of aliens in their own country, blown up whole Arab villages and indiscriminately killed women, children and old people, so that the victims could hardly be expected to wait with folded arms until they were exterminated. The President had also noted that even today, with a long way yet to go before it regained its inalienable national rights,

PLO, the soul of the Palestinian resistance, refused to resort to extreme measures against the enemy. Instead, it was offering all the Jews of Palestine—including the conquerors of yesterday—an opportunity to join with the indigenous people of Palestine in jointly building, on the basis of complete equality of rights, a new democratic, secular State in which all religions could be freely practised.

33. In spite of everything, his delegation endorsed the wishes expressed by a number of preceding speakers and supported the extension of UNRWA's mandate, even though it realized that that would at best be nothing but a temporary stopgap measure. He also wished to express his delegation's concern at the virtually chronic financial difficulties of UNRWA. At the current session once again, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA had expressed his concern (A/9613, para. 47) about the ability of the Agency to continue to provide the refugees with essential services in an effective manner. If the General Assembly wished UNRWA to perform its functions constructively, it must assume its responsibility and maintain the Agency financially.

34. His delegation appealed urgently to the conscience of all, particularly those peoples and Powers which still defended the Zionist cause, to take a fresh look at the question of Palestine and place it in its proper context. Only then would they be fully co-operating with the United Nations and helping to deliver all mankind from oppression and injustice; they would be helping to strengthen and give effect to the noble ideals of the Charter by saving mankind from the scourge of a general war.

35. Mr. PASIARDIS (Cyprus) said he thought it regrettable that during the nearly 26 years in which the Committee had been considering the item relating to the Palestine refugees no substantial progress had been made towards a just and lasting solution of the Palestine problem. It was also regrettable that the repeated United Nations resolutions on the question, which was one of vital importance and of dangerous dimensions, had for the most part remained a dead letter.

36. The increasingly difficult nature of the grave problem posed by the question of Palestine, the extent of the financial crisis which UNRWA was facing, and the increasing need for health and sanitation services and for education indicated the magnitude and seriousness of the whole problem and, at the same time, showed how urgently necessary it was to increase the funds available to the Agency. In view of that fact and of the constructive work which UNRWA had done up to now, his delegation fully supported an extension of the Agency's mandate, firmly believing that the problem of the refugees remained urgent and of great importance.

37. The right to one's country and home was unquestionably one of the fundamental rights of the human person and one which must be respected under all circumstances. The people of Cyprus, which had recently had the bitter experience of usurpation by force of their homes and land, appreciated the tragedy of finding oneself without a home, far from one's own roots and living only with the hope of one day returning to one's home, there to live and to die.

38. In dealing with the existing problems of the Palestine refugees, it must be borne in mind that at the very core of the question was the sense of injustice deeply rooted in the minds and hearts of more than a million a half innocent people who had been uprooted from their ancestral homes. So long as the political problem remained unresolved and nothing was done to implement the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, it was the grave moral obligation and the imperative duty of the world community to do all it could to alleviate the misery and hopelessness of a million and a half people who were the victims of international politics.

39. His country, which had supported the UNRWA programme since gaining its independence and becoming a Member of the United Nations, was among those States which had been contributing every year, in a modest way to the programme. On the present occasion, however, Cyprus was not yet in a position to say whether it could continue to make its contribution to UNRWA's budget. He hoped that the members of the Committee appreciated his country's current weakness and problems.

*Mr. Martinez (Venezuela), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

40. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) said that the sad, tragic plight of the Palestine refugees had bedevilled the United Nations for almost 30 years. His delegation therefore welcomed the resolute action of the General Assembly at the current session in recognizing that the question was not merely a humanitarian one but political as well. The Palestine refugees had been driven from their homeland and deprived of their homes, their property, their culture and their traditions. It was incumbent upon the United Nations and the international community to see to it that they recovered their patrimony.

41. His delegation felt that the people of Palestine were, like all peoples, entitled to the enjoyment of their heritage. The Philippine Government and people supported the Palestinians in their noble struggle to liberate themselves and recover their homeland. His delegation also reaffirmed its support for Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). As testimony of its whole-hearted and unequivocal support for the righteous Palestinian cause, his delegation had joined in sponsoring the text adopted as General Assembly resolution 3210 (XXIX) and had also supported resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX), and it looked forward to the day when PLO would become a full-fledged member of the community of nations.

42. The Commissioner-General of UNRWA, in presenting his report at the 941st meeting, had offered an insight into the character and complexity of the operations which the Agency was carrying out in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan and the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. His delegation appreciated the magnitude of that task and was concerned at the fact that UNRWA was facing a deficit of some \$45 million and that the essential services it was providing to the Palestine refugees might have to be curtailed if the deficit was not met. The warnings sounded in the report of the Commissioner-General (A/9613) and in that of the Working Group (A/9815 and Corr.1) should be heeded. Like the Commis-



sioner-General, his delegation was encouraged by the pledges of delegations that voluntary contributions would be increased, but the crisis was far from over.

43. The Agency deserved the continuing support of the United Nations. His delegation supported the conclusions of the Working Group as stated in paragraph 25 of its report. It also noted with appreciation the fact that organizations in the United Nations system such as UNICEF, UNESCO, UNTSO and WHO had made their own contributions, and it hoped that others would follow their example. At the pledging conference for UNRWA, his Government had responded to the various urgent appeals made to Governments by increasing its voluntary contribution to UNRWA for 1975 in spite of the serious difficulties in which his country found itself as a result of the 22 typhoons which had ravaged it during 1974. The Palestine refugees needed help desperately and without delay, and they could not wait until the world economic situation improved.

44. Until they regained their birthright, the Palestine refugees must rely for aid on the United Nations, acting through UNRWA and various other organizations. His delegation therefore supported the recommendation that UNRWA's mandate should be extended for a further period of three years from 1 July 1975. It also supported continuation of the efforts of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA in accordance with draft resolution A/SPC/L.316, of which his delegation was a sponsor.

45. The Filipino people had had experience in being the victim of indiscriminate attacks during wartime. They had seen men, women and children suffer loss of life and limb as a result of such indiscriminate attacks, and they had risen in collective anger against the enemy in the struggle to save the national honour. It appealed to the party concerned to put an end to the death and destruction.

46. Mr. ROMEU (Spain) said that his delegation had carefully studied the documents relating to item 38 and wished to congratulate the Commissioner-General on his outstanding work.

47. His delegation had observed earlier that it had been favourably impressed by the fact that at the current session the problem of Palestine had reached the appropriate political level, extending beyond the narrow framework of charity to which it had been confined for so many years. However, that did not make it any less necessary to maintain the Agency in operation until the dramatic situation of the refugees had been brought to an end.

48. His delegation, which in 1974 had contributed a substantial sum, placing Spain eleventh in the list of contributor countries, had just announced that in 1975 it would contribute at least an amount identical to its contribution for the previous year, which had been \$1 million.

49. He appealed to all countries to contribute as generously as possible in order to alleviate the serious difficulties facing the Agency, without thereby losing sight of the fact that the problem of the Palestine refugees would be solved only by means of an over-all agreement, covering both

general and political aspects of the whole question of the Middle East.

50. Mr. GHEORGHE (Romania) joined with those delegations that had praised the work carried out by the Commissioner-General and his staff, and also stressed the importance of the activities of the Working Group, which had succeeded in overcoming the financial difficulties that had confronted the Agency. Romania, for its part, continued to make a bilateral contribution to assist the Palestine refugees.

51. In his delegation's view, the Agency had not been established for an indefinite period, nor could it be held that the Palestinians should continue to live off international charity. He therefore considered that the situation should be settled within the context of a political solution, since experience had shown that, if the problem of the Palestine refugees was limited to humanitarian and economic aspects, neither appropriate results nor lasting solutions would be achieved. Consequently, although the Agency was extremely useful, it could not be considered a substitute for a political solution.

52. A lasting solution to the problem would not be reached so long as the Arab population of Palestine had not regained its legitimate rights. In that respect, everything possible must be done to implement the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly for the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, under which all peoples had the right to decide freely their political and economic development.

53. As President Ceaușescu had recently stated, Romania had favoured and continued to favour a political solution of the conflict in the Middle East through peaceful means. It considered that Israel must withdraw its forces from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, that a settlement must be achieved which guaranteed the integrity and sovereignty of all the States of the area and that an appropriate solution must be found to the problem of the Palestinian people on the basis of recognition of their right freely to organize their lives, in accordance with their national interests, including the right to establish an independent State. In that respect, he felt that the recognition of the people of Palestine as a distinct national entity constituted a fundamental change in the situation, opening up new prospects for a just and equitable peace in that area.

54. Romania recognized PLO as the sole representative of the people of Palestine and fully supported them in their just struggle to shape a free and independent life. The solution of the problem of Palestine implied the establishment of new relations—one might say a historic reconciliation—between the Palestinians and the Jews on the basis of the recognition of the right of each people to develop freely and independently.

55. Romania had contributed to efforts to resolve the conflict in the Middle East through intense multilateral activity. In that connexion, he drew attention to President Ceaușescu's meeting with the representatives of PLO and with the leaders of the States of the area. His country considered that the Geneva Conference should be recon-

vened with the participation of all States concerned—including the representatives of PLO—together with other States, particularly those of the Mediterranean region, which could assist in settling the conflict. For those reasons, he hoped that the States Members of the United Nations would act firmly, using all the political and diplomatic resources at their disposal, in order to solve the problem. Romania continued to be ready to support any constructive proposal placed before the Committee.

56. Mr. TAIEB (Morocco) said that, for almost a quarter of a century, the Committee had been debating the item on the Palestine refugees, who continued to suffer in their camps, deprived of their legitimate right to lead a dignified life in their homeland by the blind arrogance of Israel, which refused to respect United Nations resolutions.

57. The problem of the refugees had begun with the expulsion of the inhabitants of Palestine by the unleashing of a war of terror that would go down in the history of the Jewish State as a shameful stigma. Neither the dispersal of the Palestinians nor the denial of their rights had made them lose their national identity; they continued to claim their right of self-determination and national independence in their own homeland. United Nations documents proved that Israel was solely to blame for that tragedy.

58. At the current juncture, the services which UNRWA provided to the Palestine refugees continued to be indispensable, and his delegation thanked the Commissioner-General and the Working Group for their efforts and the host countries for their co-operation. It joined with those delegations that had endorsed the renewal of the Agency's mandate for a period of at least three years; it shared the concern at the frightening deficit in UNRWA's budget for the fiscal year 1975 and joined with them in appealing to all countries to increase their contributions to that humanitarian cause, since the entire international community should shoulder the responsibility for the tragedy of the refugees. Moreover, the refugees should be shielded from the continued Israeli raids on their dwellings and camps.

59. It should be borne in mind that, if the United Nations, through UNRWA, had managed to provide the refugees with some essential services, it had so far failed to restore to them something far more important, namely, the exercise of their inalienable right to return to their homeland, in accordance with United Nations resolutions. The Palestinians, in the words of the Commissioner-General (A/9613, para. 8), continued to "reiterate their desire for repatriation".

60. Mr. ZÍTEK (Czechoslovakia) said that the current debate in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine had revealed to the world the substance of the problem, which was an indivisible part of the complex of questions relating to the Middle East, without whose just solution it was impossible to secure lasting peace for all States and peoples of the region. The deliberations as well as the resolutions, adopted by a large majority, had confirmed the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination within the framework of its own State, including the right of the refugees to return to their homes.

61. A just solution of the question of the Palestine refugees lay in securing the legitimate rights of the Arab

people of Palestine and in putting an end to the occupation of Arab territories by Israel. Czechoslovakia had always supported the struggle of the Arab peoples against the aggressive policy of international imperialism and Zionism and fully supported a decision which would allow the people of Palestine to exercise their rights.

62. His country was aware of the importance of assistance to the Palestine refugees and contributed to it on a bilateral basis. For example, in the preceding year, various Czechoslovak social organizations had provided the people of Palestine with medicine, food, clothing and other essential items worth approximately 500,000 Czechoslovak crowns. That assistance, which it was prepared to continue in the future, had been acknowledged in the letter dated 4 September 1974 from the Chairman of PLO addressed to the representatives of Czechoslovakia. His delegation was aware, however, that the assistance provided by Czechoslovakia as well as by other countries, together with the activities of UNRWA, lessened only to a certain degree the sufferings of the people of Palestine. He therefore wished to stress that only by solving the political problem inherent in the Middle East crisis could the desperate situation of the people of Palestine be brought to an end.

63. His delegation demanded the speedy implementation of the resolutions concerning the Middle East, particularly with regard to the evacuation by Israel of the occupied Arab territories, so that the problem of the Palestine refugees could be justly resolved, since that was the only way to eliminate the wrongdoing committed by Israel against the Arab people of Palestine and to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

64. Mr. MAROOFI (Afghanistan) said that, in the debate in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine, his delegation had reiterated its well-known position with regard to the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people and their return to their ancestral land, Palestine. The political dimension of the Palestine question had been recognized in two General Assembly resolutions (3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX)), the draft texts of which his delegation had co-sponsored. It was his delegation's firm conviction that the problem of the Palestine refugees could be solved only on the basis of the aforementioned resolutions and of the resolution requesting the complete restoration of the just rights of the Palestinian people, their prompt return to Palestine and the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the occupied territories.

65. In order to avoid repetition, his delegation intended to dwell only upon the humanitarian and financial aspects of the question and the difficulties encountered by UNRWA in fulfilling its mandate. He praised the work of the Commissioner-General and his staff and that of the Working Group and its Chairman.

66. Owing to Israeli aggression, thousands of Palestinians had taken refuge in neighbouring Arab countries, where they lived in hardship and misery in refugee camps. The situation was aggravated by Israel's persistent defiance of United Nations resolutions calling for recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and calling upon Israel to take the necessary steps for the immediate return of the displaced Arabs from the Gaza Strip. That attitude

of Israel, as well as its attitude with regard to the Holy City and elsewhere, had increased the number of Arab refugees and had hampered UNRWA's work. His delegation emphasized once more that the primary responsibility for ensuring the welfare of the people in the occupied territories and for safeguarding their human rights lay with Israel, which should also fully co-operate with UNRWA instead of sabotaging its work.

67. His delegation had studied carefully the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and that of the Working Group and had listened attentively to the Commissioner-General's introduction of his report. The functioning of UNRWA was hampered by the scarcity of financial resources, which had recently been aggravated by the increased cost of essential items and which threatened to halt the functioning of the Agency. His delegation was particularly concerned that UNRWA's education programmes might have to be reduced; that would have regrettable repercussions on the young generation, which was the backbone of the future Palestinian nation. However, it was evident that educational activities must take second place when medical and health services were reduced to a point where the health and lives of the refugees were endangered.

68. Since its establishment, UNRWA had been able to meet the basic physical needs of the refugees. Currently, it would seem that not even that could be guaranteed. The wretched conditions facing the Palestinian refugees weighed heavily on the conscience of the international community and it was to be hoped that the international community would ensure UNRWA's ability to continue to provide the necessary services.

69. His delegation supported the extension of UNRWA's mandate for a further three years and subscribed to the idea that the Commissioner-General should be requested to review the programmes and structure of UNRWA, in consultation with the Secretary-General and in the light of the current situation, with a view to devising ways of raising adequate resources for the successful implementation of its programmes. His delegation also supported the renewal of the mandate of the Working Group.

70. Mr. VAZHNIK (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that, although the background to the Palestine problem was well known, he wished to remind the Committee of a number of facts which showed who was responsible for making refugees of millions of people. For example, there was the fact that the Palestinian people were denied their right to self-determination; secondly, between 1967 and 1974, the Israeli army had destroyed more than 19,000 houses in Gaza and on the West Bank and, thirdly, Israel had constantly pursued the Zionist policy of preventing the establishment of an independent Palestinian State.

71. The Byelorussian SSR, which had suffered the horrors of a devastating war in which one in four of its people had died, could not but be struck by the similarity between the barbaric aggression of the Nazis and the actions of the Israeli army. Since Israel owed its existence to the United Nations, it might be assumed that it would comply strictly with the provisions of the Charter and the decisions of the

United Nations. However, Israel had contravened the Charter and had continually violated the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Nevertheless, the Palestinians were fighting with the support of the whole world. In 1974, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, the attitude of the world community towards the problem of Palestine had changed significantly and the future of the Palestinian people had grown brighter. In its resolution 3236 (XXIX), the General Assembly had reaffirmed the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination and the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property and had emphasized that full respect for, and the realization of, those inalienable rights were indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine. It was also very significant that, in its resolution 3237 (XXIX), the General Assembly had granted PLO the right to participate as an observer in the sessions and work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly.

72. The problem of the refugees was a political problem. Israel must withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967 and respect the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. Like all the other socialist countries, the Byelorussian SSR would defend the right to sovereignty of the Palestinian people and asked for safeguards for the security of all the States concerned with the conflict. His delegation considered that the Geneva Conference should be reconvened and fully supported any measure designed to achieve a just and lasting peace.

73. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia) said that her delegation's position with regard to the question under consideration was well known. As the general debate was due to be concluded that afternoon, her delegation would simply endorse the views expressed by previous Arab speakers, to which she had very little to add. Nevertheless, she wished to welcome the representative of PLO, who was following the deliberations of the Committee as an observer, and to pay a tribute to the efforts of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA in the difficult financial situation facing the Agency, and to the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA.

74. At the current session, her delegation would make its position very clear in voting on the various draft resolutions which the Committee had before it.

75. Mr. ARNELLO (Chile) said he believed that now was the time for the Special Political Committee to deal with those aspects of the question under consideration that fell within its competence, namely, the extension of the mandate of UNRWA, the provision of the necessary resources to enable it to carry out its work, as proposed in one of the draft resolutions before the Committee and the charging of the cost of remuneration to the United Nations regular budget.

76. Finding a solution to those problems did not mean that the peoples involved, particularly the Palestinian people, would be denied their rights or that the question was being reduced to one of financing. Nor did it mean that the causes—whether direct or indirect—of the existing situation were being overlooked. The question to be considered under item 38 was simply that of providing

UNRWA with the resources needed to enable it to carry out its work. Whatever the reason given for refusing aid to UNRWA, it was tantamount to refusing aid to the refugees who were the ones who would suffer the consequences at first hand; to reduce the resources was to increase the suffering of the children of Palestine; consequently, the resolutions calling for an extension of the mandate of UNRWA and for direct payment by the United Nations of part of the costs of the Agency deserved the support of all delegations.

77. The CHAIRMAN called upon the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX).

78. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking on a point of order, said that, as the Israeli delegation had pointed out on a number of occasions, and as the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, in particular, had stated at the 2267th plenary meeting of the General Assembly and in his statements during the debate on item 108 (2283rd, 2285th and 2296th plenary meetings), the presence and participation of representatives of the so-called "Palestine Liberation Organization" during the deliberations of any United Nations body was a mockery of the Charter, of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and of the general principles of international law.

79. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon), speaking on a point of order, said that no delegation could publicly reject a General Assembly resolution as the representative of Israel was doing. He did not object to the representative of Israel expressing his reservations, but he did feel that the Chairman should remind that representative that, when speaking on a point of order, he must not refer to the substance of the item under discussion.

80. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates) agreed with the observations of the representative of Lebanon. The representative of PLO had as much right as any other representative to take the floor; no one could question that right. Although he would abide by the Chair's ruling, he none the less felt that, if the representative of Israel wished to express a reservation, he must wait until the representative of PLO had finished his statement.

81. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the representative of PLO was taking the floor under the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX). Furthermore, there was nothing in the rules of procedure to suggest that reservations with regard to the statements of representatives must be expressed after the completion of the statements concerned. He once again gave the floor to the representative of Israel.

82. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that he had indeed been expressing his reservations when he had been so rudely interrupted. As he had been about to say, a superficial reading of the aims and principles of the Charter was sufficient to demonstrate the absurdity of the situation created by resolution 3237 (XXIX). The basis of the avowed aims of PLO was to destroy Israel and to deny its people independence, sovereignty, self-determination and equality with other nations; however, in spite of that situation and in spite of the fact that the criminal nature,

the destructive aims and the murderous activities of PLO were known to all, that resolution had been adopted as a result of the votes of those who would support any proposal by the Arab group.

83. That was further evidence that the United Nations had come to a standstill and that the ideals on which it was founded had become meaningless. Consequently, his delegation wished to object most strenuously to the participation of the representatives of PLO in the work of the Special Political Committee.

84. Mr. HASSAN (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization) expressed his appreciation to Sir John Rennie, Commissioner-General of UNRWA, and his staff for their untiring efforts on behalf of a large segment of the Palestinian people. The report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA was a very important document which depicted the socio-economic and educational situation of a large segment of the Palestinian people. The report showed clearly the existence of an emergency situation which demanded drastic solutions. The alternative would be a dangerous situation that could engulf the refugee camps and spill out into the neighbouring areas. Social turmoil, tensions and strikes would become daily occurrences.

85. More than ever before, the question of Palestine had emerged as a question of a people struggling for the restoration of their national and human rights and the liberation of their homeland. The debate in the General Assembly on that item had indicated very clearly that the overwhelming majority of mankind recognized the true nature of the problem. There was, however, a small automatic minority that insisted on going backwards into history and refusing to see the light.

86. He stressed that the problem of Palestinian refugees had resulted from denial of their basic rights; the Palestinians had been the victims of a foreign invasion whose objective had been to dispossess, uproot and disperse the indigenous population and replace it with aliens from all corners of the globe. The plight of the Palestinian people was the result of a plan conceived, organized and carried out by the Zionist invaders in collaboration with British colonialism; something similar had happened in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

87. Consequently, however important it was for refugees to be fed and sheltered, that was not the point. Nor was it a question of schools and health services, despite their considerable importance for the well-being of the refugees and for the people of Palestine and their aspirations for the future. They were only symptoms of the real problem, namely, the denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people by the Israeli Zionists and imperialists. To a large extent, that had been done with the full knowledge, sanction and approval of the United Nations. It was true that today the United Nations was not the same as it had been 27 years previously, when it had allowed itself to be used by the colonialist imperialist Powers to deprive the Palestinian people of their right to self-determination, thus contributing to the tragedy of the people. Notwithstanding, the United Nations must assume a primary responsibility for rectifying the situation by restoring the rights of the Palestinian people and eradicating the injustice inflicted upon them.



88. An attempt was being made to divide the question of refugees into various categories such as "old" and "new" refugees, displaced inhabitants and displaced refugees and so forth, although the question was basically a simple one. Over the preceding 25 years the United Nations had adopted one resolution after another concerning that aspect of the question of Palestine, but those resolutions had never been implemented; they had simply been gathering dust. What PLO wanted was not the adoption of still-born resolutions whose fate was predetermined. The failure of the United Nations to implement its resolutions pertaining to repatriation and the establishment of the necessary machinery to enable the people of Palestine to exercise their inalienable right to return to their homes had undoubtedly complicated the question.

89. The most recent resolutions adopted by the United Nations on that question, particularly those adopted by the General Assembly on 22 November 1974 (3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX)), indicated that the United Nations was beginning to gain a better understanding of the question of Palestine. That did not mean that the Palestinian people would accept resolutions that expressed their rights as a substitute for the implementation and attainment of those rights. The Palestinian people, like any other people, were struggling to obtain their national rights in their homeland, and they did not want one single inch of territory that did not belong to them. The Palestinian people were a proud people who did not want to remain forever on the charity list of an international organization. All they wanted was to live a normal life in their homeland, to develop and grow free from foreign intervention. The Palestinian people were not mere statistics of UNRWA. Statistics could not reflect the magnitude of the tragedy experienced by the Palestinians.

90. For over 25 years the General Assembly had been repeating that the Palestinians were entitled to return to their homes and property. It was therefore high time for the United Nations to force those responsible for perpetuating that dangerous situation to cease flouting the will of the international community and denying the people of Palestine their inalienable rights, including the right to repatriation.

91. The deficit in UNRWA's budget was important, but PLO had not come to New York just to plead for additional funds. That aspect of the problem remained the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations, which would have to resolve it in whatever manner it deemed fit. It was essential to realize that the difficulties that the Agency was facing today would be encountered tomorrow unless a solution going right to the roots of the problem was adopted and implemented.

92. The United Nations must examine its conscience and seek the cause of its failures. It should not seek, through endless resolutions, to placate those responsible for the tragedy and those who continued to endanger international peace and security. The only course in harmony with the Charter of the United Nations and with international morality and law was to return the Palestinian people to Palestine and Palestine to its people. If that was achieved, the financial crisis of UNRWA would disappear and the

Palestinian people would cease to be a charge of the international community that had created their tragedy and should rightly assume total responsibility for their welfare.

93. One representative had described the liberation movement as no more than a racist and colonialist phenomenon. That was an insult to all liberation movements, none of which would accept that allegation. On the contrary, all liberation movements considered Zionism a reactionary, counterrevolutionary and colonialist manifestation; they were aware that the path they had opted for required sacrifices and strength but they were nevertheless confident of the outcome of the struggle. For them, the Zionist occupation of Palestine was no more than a passing encounter that would leave little or no impact on the over-all history of Palestine. Other conquerors had occupied the territory and in every case had either had to leave or to be integrated and thus Arabized. The current situation would end the same way.

94. The Palestinian refugees did not want to be integrated into the economic and political life of any neighbouring country, nor to be resettled in any place other than their own. That was their right and they had decided to continue to struggle to achieve their aspirations.

95. The Israeli Zionist movement, disrupting the harmonious relations that had existed between members of the same people with different religions, had succeeded in misleading a large segment of innocent Jews, encouraging them to immigrate to Palestine. That was the result of a basic commitment of Zionism to an antiquated principle, namely, that there was a basic dichotomy between Jews and the rest of mankind which made it impossible for any Jew to lead a normal life in his own country. That principle was unacceptable to a large segment of world Jewry.

96. One aspect of UNRWA activities which was of considerable interest to PLO was education for refugees. PLO was looking forward to an early opportunity to discuss education policies that affected the Palestinian people with the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and his staff.

97. In conclusion, he expressed his deep appreciation to all delegations that had welcomed him to the Committee.

98. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia) requested that the important statement by the representative of PLO should be included in full in the summary record of the meeting.

99. The CHAIRMAN said that that would be done.<sup>1</sup>

100. Mr. DABLAN (Jordan) pointed out that the Arabic text of draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1 referred to FAO, while the English text referred to WHO.

101. The CHAIRMAN said that the necessary correction would be made.

*The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup> The full text of the statement is also contained in document A/SPC/PV.946.

## 947th meeting

Friday, 6 December 1974, at 3.35 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Per LIND (Sweden).

A/SPC/SR.947 and Corr.1

### AGENDA ITEM 33

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*concluded*) (A/9582, A/9613, A/9740, A/9789, A/9815 and Corr.1, A/SPC/172 and Corr.1, A/SPC/L.316, A/SPC/L.317, A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1, A/SPC/L.319-322):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The CHAIRMAN referred to the draft resolutions on the item under discussion (A/SPC/L.316, A/SPC/L.317, A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1, A/SPC/L.319 and A/SPC/L.320) which were before the Committee and announced that Denmark had become a sponsor of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.316 and A/SPC/L.319 and that the German Democratic Republic, India, Indonesia, Mali, Uganda and Zambia had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.320.

2. Mr. HERNDL (Secretary of the Committee), speaking on behalf of the Secretary-General, made an additional statement to supplement the note by the Secretary-General (A/SPC/L.322) on the administrative and financial implications of draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1.

3. In accordance with the Secretary-General's interpretation, if draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1 was adopted, the Financial Regulations of the United Nations would have to be applied in respect of the preparation, presentation, approval and administration of the budget for the expenses for salary costs of international staff in the service of UNRWA. Consequently, the funds for those salaries would in future be included in a separate section of the programme budget in which reference would also be made to the other expenses of UNRWA which would continue to be met by extra-budgetary funds and about which fuller information was provided in the report of the Commissioner-General (A/9613). The Secretary-General would submit to the General Assembly, through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, his proposals for the programme budget concerning the international staff of UNRWA, and the funds which the General Assembly decided to allocate for that purpose would be assigned to the Commissioner-General who would administer them on behalf of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General would submit the relevant accounts to the Board of Auditors for verification in accordance with article XII of the Financial Regulations. With regard to the rules contained in the Staff Rules applicable to the staff concerned, the Secretary-General intended to consider that

matter in 1975, in consultation with the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, and to report back to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

4. Mr. DORON (Israel), referring to draft resolution A/SPC/L.320, said that, as on a number of previous occasions, his delegation was obliged to point out the discrepancies between the real facts and the "facts" which were presented on paper. In operative paragraph 4 and the seventh preambular paragraph of the draft resolution under consideration, it was alleged that Israel had attacked refugee camps. He reaffirmed that Israel's actions had been directed solely against bases and other installations of the terrorist organizations.

5. At the 943rd meeting of the Committee, he had quoted from the statement of the representative of Bahrain at the 2016th meeting of the First Committee, on 11 November 1974, a quotation which that representative had denied, saying that he had referred to Israeli attacks on refugee camps and not on commando camps and affirming that there was an error in the English version of the relevant verbatim record and that his delegation had already asked the Secretariat to make the appropriate correction. His own delegation had checked the tapes of the relevant meeting of the First Committee and he asked Mr. Aphek, a member of his delegation, to read out the relevant passages in Arabic.

6. Mr. APHEK (Israel) read out, in Arabic, the relevant passages taken from the tapes of the 943rd meeting of the Special Political Committee and the 2016th meeting of the First Committee. In that second passage, the representative of Bahrain had referred to the bombing of "commando camps" by Israel.

7. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that what had just been read out was a glaring example of the fact that some delegations seemed to think that "anything goes". In the current instance, an Arab delegation had made unjust accusations against an interpreter, had deliberately tried to falsify the official record of one of the Main Committees of the General Assembly, and had made false accusations in the Committee. On the strength of such distortions and similar machinations, an attempt was being made to make the Committee and the General Assembly vote on the draft resolution under consideration and on others.

8. While the Committee was considering various draft resolutions, the Arab terrorist organizations were continuing to attack Israeli civilians. Groups belonging to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were killing Israeli civilians while the General Assembly listened to Yassir Arafat, the head of PLO; the most recent terrorist attack, against the collective farm at Rosh Ha'Nikra, had taken place at almost the same time as one of the representatives of PLO had been permitted to speak in the Committee.

9. He affirmed that no matter how many resolutions were adopted they would not prevent his country from doing everything necessary to protect and defend its citizens against Arab terrorist attacks.

10. Mr. FOUM (United Republic of Tanzania) said that his delegation, which was a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.320, wished to point out that the references made in that draft resolution to Israeli attacks against refugee camps were based on various passages of the report of the Commissioner-General, which had received the approval of those who had participated in the debate. Paragraph 24 of that report, for example, described the loss of life and material damage caused in refugee shelters and UNRWA installations by Israeli raids in May and June 1974. The United Nations should do everything it could to stop those attacks, which were not falsifications or a product of the imagination.

11. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) supported the observations made by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania and observed that the factual basis of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.320 was provided by the reports the Committee had received, including the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of previous resolutions. The wording of those paragraphs did not differ substantially from that of other resolutions. The same was true of paragraph 3. Paragraph 4 was based on various passages of the report of the Commissioner-General, which many delegations had commended. In addition to paragraph 24, mention was made in paragraph 64 of loss of life and material damage caused by Israeli raids on refugee camps.

12. He failed to understand how an attack which was not aimed at a refugee camp could destroy and damage installations and kill persons living in the camp. If the information provided in the report was reliable, it was an inescapable conclusion that Israel had attacked the refugee camps.

13. With reference to operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, it had been said that the Israeli forces had adopted special measures to attack terrorists without attacking refugee camps; that was hard to believe. In support of his view, he drew attention to a series of press releases issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). On 9 October 1973, ICRC had reported that it had urged the belligerents to respect international rules in order to avert civilian casualties. In its press releases of 9, 11, 12, 16 and 17 October, ICRC had indicated that it had received satisfactory replies from Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Egypt. In its press release of 30 October, it had reported that a negative reply had been received from Israel with regard to the protection of civilians which ICRC had requested.

14. In that connexion, he drew attention to a publication produced by the Rabbinate of the Israeli army, in which the author of one article, Lieutenant-Colonel Avraham Avidara, the Rabbi of the Central Command, maintained that, in accordance with the Tosafot—interpretation and commentary on the Babylonian Talmud—the Israeli troops, when attacking an enemy, could—and even should, according to *halakhah*—kill innocent civilians.

15. He was not citing anti-Semitic sources but an Israeli army publication. Accordingly, all the objections that had been made with regard to paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.320 appeared to be groundless. His delegation supported that draft resolution.

16. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the purpose of the meeting was to vote on the draft resolutions and that members who so wished could exercise their right of reply at the end of the meeting.

17. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) said that it was not Israel's intention to speak on the draft resolutions but to use the forum of the Committee to distort the facts. At the preceding meeting the Israeli representative had withdrawn when the observer for PLO had taken the floor. If that was the attitude it adopted in the Committee, one could readily imagine how Israel would treat the Palestinians in Israel. He reserved his right to speak again at the end of the meeting in exercise of the right of reply.

18. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking in explanation of vote before the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1, said that he would support that draft resolution for two reasons. First, he believed that the operative part of the draft resolution represented a step in the right direction. The primary responsibility for the financing of UNRWA should be borne by those who were profiting from the use of the property of the Palestinians. Secondly, he considered it fair that, as the Commissioner-General had stated at the 941st meeting, the expenses for international staff should be charged to the regular budget of the United Nations and the funds thus released should be used to meet the most urgent needs of the local staff.

19. Referring to draft resolution A/SPC/L.317, submitted by the United States of America, which made repeated references to General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, he said that his delegation would support it on the understanding that it was something more than a mere formality and should be interpreted in the light of Count Bernadotte's report, and that, accordingly: repatriation was one of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian refugees; the exercise of that right was also an inalienable right; the concept of free choice involved being able to act in accordance with one's choice since, if that were not the case, there would be no free choice; in returning to their homes the Palestinians should do so with full citizenship rights; as an alternative to repatriation, Palestinians should be entitled to compensation and there should also be some form of compensation for those who did return in recognition of their right of ownership.

20. Mr. AL-ATIYYAH (Iraq), speaking in explanation of vote before the vote, said that his delegation would abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1 because it considered that those who had caused the refugee problem should bear the responsibility for financing the needs of UNRWA. Moreover, the fact that expenses for the salaries of international staff, which otherwise would be met by voluntary contributions, would be financed under the regular budget of the United Nations appeared to be a measure which discriminated between the local staff, the majority of whom were Palestinians, and the international staff. His delegation would have preferred funds to be

allocated to UNRWA to pay both the local staff and the international staff.

21. The CHAIRMAN said that, in accordance with rule 133 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, he would put the draft resolutions to the vote in the order in which they had been submitted. He also drew the Committee's attention to the notes by the Secretary-General (A/SPC/L.321 and A/SPC/L.322) on the administrative and financial implications of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.316 and A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1, respectively.

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.316*

*The draft resolution was adopted without a vote.*

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.317*

*The draft resolution was adopted by 106 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1*

22. Mr. PONGO MAVULU (Zaire) requested a vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1.

23. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway), speaking on behalf of the sponsors, recalled that he had already stated that, in their view, the draft resolution should be adopted without a vote if it was to achieve its purpose. Moreover, as a result of the consultations that had been held, the sponsors had had the impression that all the members of the Committee were agreed that that should be the procedure. Accordingly, he appealed to the representative of Zaire to withdraw his request since, if he insisted that the draft resolution be put to a vote, the sponsors would have to withdraw it.

24. Mr. PONGO MAVULU (Zaire) said that he would not insist on his proposal, but would explain his position after the draft resolution had been put to the vote.

25. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway) thanked the representative of Zaire for his spirit of co-operation.

26. The CHAIRMAN said that, if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Committee decided to adopt the draft resolution without a vote.

*It was so decided.*

*The draft resolution was adopted without a vote.*

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.319*

*The draft resolution was adopted without a vote.*

*Draft resolution A/SPC/L.320*

27. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania and Egypt had requested a roll-call vote.

28. Mr. FOUM (United Republic of Tanzania) said that, if the Committee was prepared to adopt the draft resolution, he would not insist on a roll-call vote.

29. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) felt that it would be appropriate for the Chairman to ask the Committee whether it was prepared to adopt draft resolution A/SPC/L.320 without a vote.

30. The CHAIRMAN said that he had not raised that point because two delegations had requested a roll-call vote. However, if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Committee decided to adopt the draft resolution without a vote.

31. Mr. DORON (Israel) requested a roll-call vote.

*At the request of the representative of Israel, a vote was taken by roll-call on draft resolution A/SPC/L.320.*

*The Dominican Republic, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark.

*Against:* Israel, Nicaragua, United States of America, Bolivia, Costa Rica.

*Abstaining:* El Salvador, Germany (Federal Republic of), Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Belgium, Canada, Chile.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 97 votes to 5, with 15 abstentions.*

32. Mr. MELHUISE (Australia) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.320, but, while it did not question the information provided by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA concerning the casualties resulting from the Israeli attacks on Palestinian refugee camps, it felt that the Commissioner-General was not required to report all the details, especially the circumstances in which the attacks had been launched or in which there had been tragic losses of civilian lives. In any event, it was regrettable—although perhaps inevitable—that the draft resolution reflected only a partial view of the situation.



33. Mr. LECLERCQ (France), speaking in explanation of his vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1, said that his delegation had joined the consensus in order to help UNRWA to overcome its financial difficulties. However, it considered the system of voluntary contributions to be an equitable one, and found it regrettable that the salaries of the UNRWA staff would be financed under the regular budget of the United Nations, since that might give rise to problems in the future. It therefore reiterated its reservations about the advisability of that practice, which it regarded as contrary to the system of voluntary contributions.

34. Mr. DORON (Israel) explained that his delegation had not requested a vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1, although it entertained reservations about it since it felt that the budgets of UNRWA and the United Nations should be kept separate.

35. Mr. COTTON (New Zealand) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.320, although it had reservations about the references in the text to attacks against refugee camps. If a separate vote had been taken on the last preambular paragraph and on operative paragraph 4, his delegation would have abstained because, while those paragraphs contained references to attacks against refugee camps, no mention was made of terrorist attacks against Israeli villages.

36. Mr. RENS (Belgium) said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.320 because, in its view, the last preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 4 made the text unbalanced.

37. Moreover, he had on another occasion already expressed regret at the haste with which members of the Committee had been requested to decide on the various texts. He noted that draft resolution A/SPC/L.320 had been distributed on 4 December, so that there had not been sufficient time to study it thoroughly, submit amendments or consult other delegations. His delegation's abstention did not imply a lack of interest in the activities of UNRWA, as was shown by the fact that it had voted in favour of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.316 and A/SPC/L.317, and also by Belgium's contribution to UNRWA. However, the vote reflected a political compromise which required careful consideration. He therefore felt that, if the Committee continued to adopt such a procedure, the results obtained would be meaningless.

38. Mr. BOERTIEN (Netherlands), speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation had been pleased to be able to vote in favour of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.316, A/SPC/L.317, A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1 and A/SPC/L.319. Concerning draft resolution A/SPC/L.320, his delegation wished to point out that it had always opposed all acts of violence against innocent persons and that that applied to acts committed against the refugee camps as well as to those which originated in them. That balanced criterion was not reflected in the draft resolution in question, and accordingly, his delegation had not been able to vote in favour of it.

39. Mr. VANDERGERT (Sri Lanka), speaking in explanation of his delegation's vote on draft resolution A/SPC/

L.317, said that its affirmative vote on it by no means implied that it agreed that the problem should be dealt with as basically a refugee problem. Although in principle the Palestine refugees should be considered to have the right to return to their homes, the practical circumstances might make it impossible for those wishes to be fulfilled.

40. Paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) laid down two conditions for the return of the refugees to their homes: they must wish to return and they must be prepared to live in peace with their neighbours. In accordance with its declared policy of support for Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which accepted the principle that every State in the Middle East had the right to live within secure boundaries, his delegation felt that there must be no attempt to destroy the State of Israel, and it had clearly expressed that position in its statement on the question of Palestine at the 2295th plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

41. Mr. BUSSE (Federal Republic of Germany), speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation's positive attitude towards the work of UNRWA was reflected in its co-sponsorship of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.316 and A/SPC/L.319. His Government had staunchly supported the work of that Agency and expected to continue to do so. His delegation felt that draft resolution A/SPC/L.320 lacked balance, since it deplored Israeli military activities but did not mention the acts of violence by Palestinians which were organized in and carried out from the territories in which UNRWA operated.

42. Mr. SCHAUFLE (United States of America), speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation had been pleased to join the unanimous expression in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1 and understood that its adoption was in accordance with the wishes of the Commissioner-General and that the funds released as a result of that resolution would be used to improve the remunerations of the local staff. The support of his delegation for that transfer for specific purposes should not be interpreted as endorsing further transfers of other elements of the UNRWA budget to the regular budget of the United Nations.

43. His delegation had voted against draft resolution A/SPC/L.320, since that text did not preserve the careful balance of Security Council resolution 347 (1974), from which part of operative paragraph 4 of the draft in question had been taken and which had condemned all acts of violence, including attacks on refugee camps and raids against Israel. In order to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, acts of violence on both sides must be ended. His country would continue to give its full support to the right of the persons displaced in 1967 to return to their homes.

44. Mr. TALLARIGO (Italy), speaking in explanation of his vote, said his delegation felt that it would be inappropriate to speak at length on the Middle East crisis—on which its position had been clearly set out in the debate in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine—and that the item which the Committee was considering was confined to UNRWA and the situation of the refugees who received assistance from it.

45. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.320, his delegation felt particular concern about the two paragraphs which differed from previous resolutions of the same kind and related to air raids on refugee camps in Lebanon. While it deplored those raids, it wished to place on record the fact that it held the same attitude towards other forms of violence, such as those which guerrilla forces carried out against innocent civilians in Israeli territory.

46. Mr. PONGO MAVULU (Zaire), speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation had associated itself with the consensus in the Committee but wished to point out that continued efforts should be made to eliminate the causes of the refugee problem, for which the international community was responsible and whose definitive solution called for a solution of the underlying political problem.

47. Mr. GUTIERREZ MACIAS (Mexico), speaking in explanation of his vote, said that, although his delegation had not wanted to impede the unanimity on draft resolution A/SPC/L.318/Rev.1, it wished to place on record its reservations regarding the change in the system of financing, which had budgetary implications of some importance.

48. Mr. BATTISCOMBE (United Kingdom), speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.320 because it felt that the draft resolution was one-sided and unbalanced. His delegation deplored all acts of violence, not only those committed by Israel, which alone were mentioned in the draft.

49. Mr. CHAVES (Grenada), speaking in explanation of his vote, said that in associating itself with the unanimous feeling in the Committee, his delegation was following his Government's policy of supporting assistance for the victims of war and violence. It reaffirmed the Grenadian position stated in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine and favoured a peaceful solution of the problem.

50. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Kuwait was trying to appear more innocent than he actually was. The terrorist bases were situated in refugee camps in Lebanon and it was Lebanon that had the means of avoiding attacks against the inhabitants of the camps by expelling terrorists from them.

51. Israel had decided not to adopt the cynical attitude taken by the three Arab countries in declaring that they accepted the appeal by ICRC and yet continuing to allow terrorist attacks.

52. He did not feel that there was any need to discuss rabbinical matters, and he recalled that the Egyptian authorities had issued orders in writing to the effect that Israelis should not be taken prisoner but should be killed even if they were willing to surrender.

53. Mr. AL-SHAKAR (Bahrain), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the Israeli allegations concerning the statements made by the representative of Bahrain in the First Committee showed how Zionism tried to misrepresent the facts. The representative of Bahrain in the First Committee had referred to the Israeli aggression of

1967, in which napalm bombs had been used against refugee camps, not commando camps. There had been a mistake in the English text of the verbatim record, and his delegation had already requested the Secretariat to make the necessary corrections.

54. The important question was whether the Zionists intended to deny that they had used napalm bombs against refugee camps in the 1967 aggression or to claim that they had used such bombs to attack Palestinian commandos.

55. It was nothing new for Israel to falsify the words and statements spoken in the United Nations in order to manipulate them for its own interests. Israel had extensive experience in such manoeuvres, just as it had experience in attacking peaceful Palestinian refugee camps with napalm bombs. Proof was to be found in hundreds of photographs showing the crimes committed by Israel and the slaughter of old people, children and women in those camps. That was the truth, and the attempts of the representative of Israel to juggle words to falsify what the representative of Bahrain had said were intended only to mislead the Committee.

56. His delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolutions which exposed to public opinion the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees. The problem of the Palestinian refugees had arisen primarily because of the Zionists. It was the Zionists who had organized a demonstration opposite the United Nations Headquarters building and had burned a United Nations flag in front of Dayan, as if the United Nations had absolutely no meaning for them. History had shown that unbridled power always disregarded justice. Nazism's lust for power had been the cause of the disintegration of the League of Nations, and now Israel was threatening the very existence of the United Nations by refusing to implement its resolutions.

57. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the draft resolutions adopted that day were eloquent proof of world opinion. When Israel spoke of responsibility, it should remember that the Palestinians were refugees because of Israel. All Palestinians should return to their homes pursuant to the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, and he assured Israel that, when those resolutions were implemented and the Palestinians returned to their homeland, they would do so without arms and with an olive branch.

58. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) said that he wished to make three comments because he did not understand exactly what Israel's position was. Firstly, it had begun by denying the truth of what was stated in operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.320 and had ended by admitting that the attacks had taken place and trying to explain them. Secondly, it had affirmed that the Arab States that had responded positively to ICRC had done so cynically. Perhaps neither Israel's interpretation of the matter nor his own was important, but it was important that ICRC had stated that the response of the Arab countries had been positive and that of Israel negative. Thirdly, Israel had expressed an unwillingness to go into interpretations of rabbinical writings; but he had referred not to theological texts but to a statement by the Rabbi of

the Central Command, who was a lieutenant-colonel in the Israeli Army.

59. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he did not want the representative of Kuwait to misrepresent his words. He explained that Israel did not attack refugee camps. Israel took action against terrorist bases situated within, or in the immediate vicinity of, refugee camps; the responsibility for such action lay with those who allowed terrorists to establish themselves there. Replying to the representative of Bahrain, he said that he would like the Committee to hear the voice of the representative of Bahrain making his statement at the 2016th meeting of the First Committee held on 11 November 1974. He would therefore proceed to play the official recording of that meeting.

60. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic), speaking on a point of order, said that the Special Political Committee should not be made into a theatre for reproducing the debates of other committees of the General Assembly. If reference had to be made to what had happened in other forums of the United Nations, the Committee could do so by referring to the documents. The Special Political Committee was not a court, and neither it nor any other committee of the General Assembly should violate the rules of the Organization. In opposing the play-back of the official recording of the 2016th meeting of the First Committee, he was defending the standards of United Nations procedure established by the General Assembly.

61. Mr. AL-SHAKAR (Bahrain), speaking on a point of order, associated himself with the statement made by the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic and said that he could not accept the manoeuvre being attempted by Israel, which was not in accordance with normal procedures.

62. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and Bahrain had good reason for not wishing to listen to the truth. The Committee had the opportunity to listen to the official recording of the statement made by the representative of Bahrain in the First Committee. Bahrain could not lie and blame the words on others. Talk of "theatre" was inappropriate from the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic, who was trying to convert the Special Political Committee into a children's theatre. The question whether or not Israel had the right to play the official recording of the statement made by the representative of Bahrain in the First Committee was a matter for the Chairman to decide.

63. The CHAIRMAN said that, in his opinion, the Committee should not listen to any recording because that would create a dangerous precedent.

64. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that he accepted the Chairman's decision, which would prevent certain Arab representatives from finding themselves in an embarrassing situation.

65. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic), speaking on a point of order, said that the Chairman had already taken a decision and that there was no need to keep referring to the matter.

66. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that he accepted the Chairman's decision but felt that it was not incorrect to refer to United Nations documents. Accordingly, he would yield to another member of his delegation, who would read out in Arabic the verbatim record [provisional version, p. 111, third paragraph] of the 2016th meeting of the First Committee.

67. Mr. APHEK (Israel) read out the Arabic text of part of the statement of the representative of Bahrain at the 2016th meeting of the First Committee.

68. Mr. EL-HENDAWY (Egypt), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his delegation had never resorted to unknown documents published years before but had always quoted United Nations documents relating to the item under discussion.

69. At a previous meeting of the Committee he had already refuted the lies of the representative of Israel regarding the number of refugees returning to Palestine. Nevertheless, during the current meeting, Israel had again lied in referring to a 1973 communiqué of the Egyptian command. He (the representative of Egypt) did not see that the communiqué had any relation to the murder of innocent refugees. In any case, he did not think it necessary to refute that accusation, as it was sufficient to read the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA.

70. He pointed out that the representative of Kuwait had already replied to the allegations of the representative of Israel regarding the documents of ICRC. It should be borne in mind, as had already been mentioned, that the Committee was examining the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA.

71. Mr. AL-SHAKAR (Bahrain), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he did not wish to engage in futile discussions with the representative of Israel but asked the secretariat to read the Arabic text of the verbatim record of the 2016th meeting of the First Committee, which was an official document of the United Nations.

72. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) remarked that the question of the commando or refugee camps had made the representative of Israel very nervous. It was worth recalling that, years before, Ben-Gurion had stated that Israel had no right whatsoever to bereave any Arab child, even if that would benefit Israel. On another occasion, he had said that if he had been an Arab, he too might have become one of the fedayeen. General Dayan had apparently expressed a similar opinion several years later.

73. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the whole question could have been settled by listening to the recording. He would therefore limit himself to explaining for the benefit of the representative of Egypt that he had spoken not of a communiqué but of a pamphlet published in October 1973.

74. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan) said that more than 1.5 million Palestine refugees had been denied all their rights. In his opinion, the debate on the question of Palestine had been based on certain objective facts: for example, the rights of the Palestinian refugees. Jordan, as a country that had

accepted many refugees, was glad that the Special Political Committee had done something towards mitigating the suffering of the Palestinians. He therefore thanked the sponsors of the draft resolutions.

75. Sir John RENNIE (Commissioner-General, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) thanked all the delegations that had commended the Agency's work. He then proceeded to explain UNRWA's financial prospects for 1975 after the meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to UNRWA. Forty-six Governments had made pledges for a total of \$56.4 million. To that amount should be added the contributions of the European Economic Community, of some Governments which might contribute although they had not taken part in the pledging conference, of other United Nations agencies and of non-governmental organizations. There would also be some miscellaneous income. In spite of all that, a deficit of about \$40 million was still expected. In other words, UNRWA's financial situation was still most alarming, and all that he had said in his introductory statement at the 941st meeting of the Committee was still valid. For example, stocks of flour on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip would be exhausted at the end of February, and those in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan at the end of March, if the normal winter ration of flour was maintained at its current level. A decision must therefore be taken very soon whether to purchase more flour or to reduce the ration at the beginning of the year. However, if there were not sufficient funds to maintain the programmes, the purchase of more flour would involve bigger cuts in other programmes in due course.

76. For all those reasons, he appealed again to the international community, as a matter of urgency, for a concerted effort to avoid the disastrous consequences of a breakdown in UNRWA's programmes.

#### *Completion of the Committee's work*

77. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had completed its work on the 6 items allocated to it and had recommended 14 draft resolutions and 1 decision to the General Assembly.

78. Although the items which had been considered could in a sense be regarded as permanent, there was no doubt that the circumstances in which they had been considered during the current session had differed in various ways from previous years, and the Committee had consequently had to modify its approach.

79. Of all the Main Committees, the Special Political Committee was allocated the smallest number of items and held the fewest meetings. He believed that its potential should be more fully utilized at subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. In that respect, he recalled the relevant recommendations of the Special Committee on the Ration-

alization of the Procedures and Organization of the General Assembly contained in annex V to the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, particularly paragraphs 25 and 30 concerning the rational distribution of agenda items among the Main Committees and the utilization of the potential of those committees to the full. Moreover, with regard to the Special Political Committee in particular, the Special Committee on the Rationalization, reaffirming the major role which must be played by the Special Political Committee, had recommended that the General Assembly should consider transferring one or two items to it with a view to ensuring a better division of work among the Main Committees.<sup>1</sup>

80. He recalled, in particular, paragraph 27 of the memorandum "Organization of the twenty-ninth regular session of the General Assembly, adoption of the agenda and allocation of items",<sup>2</sup> in which the Secretary-General had quoted the Special Committee's aforementioned recommendation and had suggested that the General Committee should consider recommending to the General Assembly the transfer of one or more items to the Special Political Committee. Regrettably, that suggestion of the Secretary-General had not generated specific proposals from any quarter and therefore the General Committee merely took note of the Secretary-General's recommendation.

81. In the Chairman's opinion, it would undoubtedly be in the interest of the General Assembly if the workload of the Main Committees were more evenly distributed. There was a certain imbalance between the items allocated to the First Committee and the Special Political Committee, an imbalance more marked at the current session than ever before. Accordingly, thought should be given to the idea of transferring to the Special Political Committee items of a political nature discussed by the General Assembly in plenary meeting and/or political items of a specialized nature discussed by the First Committee, such as outer space, or even items with a predominantly political character discussed in other Main Committees, such as, for example, items concerning the review of the Charter. The Special Political Committee certainly had the capacity to deal with one or two such items in addition to those traditionally allocated to it.

82. He hoped that members of the Committee would ponder the matter and that at future sessions efforts would be made to allocate the workload more evenly among the Committees, thus permitting the Special Political Committee to fulfil its role more fully in facilitating the work of the Assembly as a whole.

*After an exchange of courtesies, the Chairman declared that the Special Political Committee had completed its work for the twenty-ninth session.*

*The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup> A/520/Rev.12, annex V, para. 34.

<sup>2</sup> A/BUR/182.



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