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**SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 487th
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AGENDA ITEM 101

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects (continued) (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2, L.121/Rev.1, L.122 and Add.1):

(a) Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/5915 and Add.1, A/5916 and Add.1, A/5972, A/6026);

(b) The authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations (A/5966/Rev.2)

1. Mr. MENDOUGA (Cameroon) agreed that the so-called financial crisis of the United Nations was an essentially political issue. The basic fact to which the Organization owed its very existence was the will and determination of the peoples of the United Nations, as expressed in the words of the Charter, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law could be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. Those aims enshrined in the Preamble of the Charter constituted, in his view, the invisible components of peace which the Organization must promote and maintain.

2. As the representative of Cameroon had said in the General Assembly on 8 October 1965 (1354th plenary meeting), it was not only the peace which the rich countries tended to identify with their own security

and the absence of armed conflict but also genuine peace in which human beings could fulfil their destiny.

3. His delegation firmly believed that the general will of the Members of the United Nations had done more for peace than any other factor and that collective measures had been more efficacious than the build-up of military power pursued by some members of the Security Council. Therefore, if the United Nations was to continue to promote and effectively maintain international peace and security a more important role should be accorded to the general will which was more clearly reflected in the General Assembly than in the Security Council. He had nothing but admiration for the authors of the Charter who had realized that it would not be possible for all Member States to co-operate effectively in the areas of human rights and social and economic progress if the majority of those Members were excluded from the necessary powers of initiative in preventing armed conflict and threats to or breaches of the peace.

4. Of course, many changes had taken place since 1945 and some people were saying that the old structures were no longer in line with the aspirations of the present-day world. His delegation considered that the necessary changes should be made and that there should be a more dynamic approach to the relationship between the world of today and the structure of the United Nations.

5. His Government had defined its position regarding the capacity of the different States to contribute to international security, not only in financial terms, but also in terms of military power. As was stated in document A/6026, annex I, the Government of Cameroon recognized the principle of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace as laid down in Article 24, paragraph 1 of the Charter. It considered, however, that the pre-eminence which the Charter affirmed had its justification in the consent of the other States and not in the material standing, exceptional as it might be, of the members of the Council.

6. Nevertheless, the capacity to contribute was not the only important factor in the peace-keeping machinery. The world was no longer bipolar as before. A new force had arisen between the Eastern and Western Powers—the moral force of the non-aligned countries—and it was not represented on the Security Council.

7. Some States feared that the General Assembly's residual powers might be harmful to their interests. They therefore took the view that all initiative must originate in the Security Council where they had the power to block proposed measures. But in view of the determination of the non-aligned countries in

general and Cameroon in particular to take their stand according to the aspirations of their peoples, those were groundless fears.

8. Other Members thought that the recent increase in the number of the non-permanent members of the Security Council was a solution, but the increase did not eliminate the veto power, which was the main obstacle. It was unfair to allow the system of world security and the vital interests of the majority of Member States to rest entirely on the strength of a small group of nations. In the past, the conditions necessary for its efficient and rapid implementation of peace-keeping objectives had not been fulfilled and there had been a complete lack of objectivity in the analysis of particular situations. Thus, in regard to the problems of apartheid, although the Heads of State of the African countries considered the situation in South Africa as a threat to world peace, it was feared that the Security Council, because of the personal interests of its members, would dissent from that view.

9. Therefore, while his delegation recognized the Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it considered that the principle of collective responsibility required that the General Assembly must be able to act when the Security Council was unable to do so. That was the most desirable, realistic and effective way of safeguarding the purposes and the interests of the United Nations.

10. Once that political decision was reached, the financial problems and all other related questions must be settled in a spirit of co-operation. He wished the capacity to contribute of all Members as well as the special responsibility of the members of the Security Council to be taken into account. Cameroon's position in the matter was set forth in document A/6026, annex I which stated that "the Cameroonian Government takes the view that future peace-keeping operations should be decided upon after pertinent analysis of their financial implications and of the various political complications to which they might give rise".

11. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1, his delegation had very strong reservations about establishing certain precedents on principles which did not seem to have unanimous support in the Committee. It therefore would prefer to see the Irish draft resolution referred to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and the latter's mandate extended.

12. The CHAIRMAN announced that the general debate on the item was closed and he invited members of the Committee to explain their votes.

13. Mr. STUART (Australia) said that while he appreciated the Irish representative's efforts to make progress with the important question of peace-keeping, he doubted whether draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 offered the best solution for the problem. In his delegation's view, the question would be dealt with more satisfactorily if it was referred to the Special Committee for further study, as was proposed in draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1 without prejudgements that might inhibit current and future discussions in the Security Council. Consequently,

without implying any judgement on the issues involved, his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1 but felt obliged to vote against draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1.

14. Mr. COMAY (Israel) recalled that in the First Committee on 13 October 1950 (362nd meeting) the representative of Israel had summed up his delegation's position thus: first, unanimity and agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council constituted unquestionably the firmest foundation for international peace; secondly, the General Assembly had residual powers but should adopt measures only in cases of emergency and in the last resort; thirdly, any resolutions adopted by the General Assembly must be consistent with the provisions of the Charter; fourthly, stress should be placed on the Charter provisions for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

15. Twenty years earlier, the emphasis had been on collective military action against aggressor Powers. The position today was different. As the representative of Israel had pointed out at the nineteenth session (1296th plenary meeting), there was a new area of international responsibility which fell short of enforcement under Chapter VII but went beyond mere conciliation under Chapter VI of the Charter. The peace-keeping forces under consideration were not fighting forces and they operated only with the consent of the parties directly concerned, including that of the country on whose territory they were stationed. Personnel, matériel and services were contributed on a purely voluntary basis and the size and nature of the operation varied in each case.

16. The need to clarify the authorization, control and financing of such forces was beyond doubt. Nevertheless, for obvious reasons, that should not involve a revision of the Charter. His Government's position in the matter was reflected in the support it had given to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice^{1/} and to resolution 1876 (S-IV) concerning collective financial responsibility for peace-keeping operations.

17. His Government also found acceptable the guidelines contained in paragraph 52 of the report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly to the Special Committee (A/5915/Add.1 annex II). Draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 was, in his view, compatible with those guidelines. He welcomed its emphasis on mandatory assessments rather than voluntary contributions in the financing of peace-keeping but he felt that the system of allocation of expenditure proposed in operative paragraph 2 should be given further consideration by the Special Committee.

18. His delegation had no hesitation in supporting draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1 which requested the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to continue its work and to take into account the views expressed in the debates of the Special Political Committee.

^{1/} Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962; I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 151.

19. Mr. TINE (France) said that the changes made to the original draft resolution (A/SPC/L.121) had done nothing to remove the reservations which his delegation had previously made; on the contrary; they gave rise to further objections. The purpose of the new paragraph 1 was to invite the Special Committee to consider four particular points, whereas the Special Committee, which had been instructed at the nineteenth session (resolution 2066 (XIX)) to undertake "a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects", should be left sole judge of the various angles from which it was to pursue the study it had undertaken at the request of the General Assembly.

20. In addition, the drafting of the four points enumerated in paragraph 1 of the new text would set a direction for the recommendations which the Special Committee would make to the General Assembly. That might give rise to a new difficulty that would jeopardize the progress of the Special Committee's work. For those reasons, his delegation would be obliged to vote against draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1.

21. On the other hand, his delegation considered that draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1 represented a constructive effort and that its terms were clear, precise and objective. Because it was realistic, it would help to consolidate certain points on which there was agreement, and on that ground his delegation wished to commend the members of the Special Committee for submitting a draft resolution capable of making a positive contribution to the work of the Special Political Committee. He considered, however, that operative paragraph 4 was unnecessary and he had some reservations in regard to it, although he supported the draft resolution as a whole.

22. If the draft were approved by all the Committee members, in view of the good effect which a unanimous vote would have on the Special Committee's subsequent work, his delegation would find it regrettable if the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 were to insist on a vote on a text that could only increase the existing differences of opinion.

23. Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN (United States of America) said that his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1, because it contained a number of constructive elements. It would, however, ask for a separate vote on operative paragraph 2, on which it would abstain. Under a law passed by the United States Congress in 1952, United States representatives in the United Nations were not entitled to make any commitment on behalf of their Government requiring the appropriation of funds in excess of 33 1/3 per cent of the United Nations budget; and the provisions of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution would involve a higher percentage.

24. His delegation would also vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1.

25. Mr. DOSUMU-JOHNSON (Liberia) recalled that in a previous statement (438th meeting) he had endeavoured to convince the Committee that the question under consideration primarily concerned the small countries, since the great Powers were able to look after their own interests and did not require United Nations intervention. Everything should therefore

be done to ensure that the United Nations was capable of intervening effectively when small countries called upon it.

26. His delegation had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 with full knowledge that a review of peace-keeping was a process that might take many years. In his delegation's opinion it involved the whole question of disarmament and must consequently be approached piecemeal. The sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 were therefore anxious that there should be some temporary financial arrangement adopted without delay, to deal with any contingency that might occur while the Special Committee was re-examining the question. Voluntary contributions could not be relied upon; experience had shown that countries with sufficient means to make large contributions were often less than generous. Moreover, the emphasis that certain delegations had placed on the respective roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly was merely a smoke-screen to conceal the real issue.

27. His delegation was confident that the great Powers would not abandon the small countries. It was not a question of communism, imperialism or colonialism, but a question of saving the African countries, for example, from having to defend themselves by means of bilateral arrangements. If the great Powers did not adopt both the draft resolutions before the Committee, they would have to admit that they were leaving the small countries to fend for themselves. The Committee must put aside the legal aspects for the moment, and deal with the immediate necessity.

28. Member States should feel assured at the end of the session that if any important event occurred in Rhodesia or any other part of Africa, the United Nations would be in a position to act effectively. The great Powers could not fail to realize that Africa was inadequately represented on the Security Council. Yet even if all thirty-six African countries had seats in the Council, their continent would not in fact be represented because they would not have the veto. Eastern Europe was represented by the Soviet Union, Western Europe by France and the United Kingdom, the Americas by the United States, and Asia by China. Only Africa had no one to protect its interests.

29. He appealed to the practical sense which the great Powers had shown on other occasions. All that was asked of them, to adopt draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1, was that they should meet the small countries half way. Not to adopt that draft as well as A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1 would be to consign the small countries to the dictatorship of the Security Council and sentence them to a place of inferiority in the United Nations.

30. It was unrealistic to maintain that by adopting draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 the Committee would be tying the hands of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations; the only difference would be that the Committee of Thirty-Three would know the Assembly's position on essential points.

31. For all those reasons, he appealed to the great Powers to give their unanimous support to the two draft resolutions.

32. Mr. GALINDO (Colombia) reaffirmed what his delegation had said during the general discussion of

the agenda item (463rd meeting). First, it was convinced that responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security had been conferred by the United Nations on the Security Council in order that it might take prompt and effective action whenever necessary. Nevertheless, the Council's authority, which was derived from a delegation of power, was not exclusive, and it was obvious that in an association of nations, the source of authority was those nations themselves, in other words, the General Assembly. Consequently, if the Council was unable to take prompt and effective action as the Charter required, it was logical that the Assembly should intervene in its stead. The contrary theory would be inconsistent with the very purposes of the Organization and the aspirations of the peoples comprising it, and might lead to an impasse that would be fatal for the United Nations.

33. Secondly, his delegation had stated its opposition to the original draft resolution submitted by Ireland, which had provided that the convening of a special or extraordinary session of the General Assembly would require the approval of 75 per cent of Member States. Such a provision would in fact amount to a sort of collective veto, for the countries associating themselves with any great Power that had used its veto right in the Council would be the arbiters of the situation.

34. Thirdly, his delegation had also said that it was opposed to the provision in the original draft resolution which would exempt a country that had vetoed a given operation from making any contribution to the costs of that operation. Colombia considered that such provisions would encourage the use of the veto and were, moreover, in flagrant contradiction to the terms of Article 43 of the Charter as well as to the fact that the Charter imposed obligations on all signatory States.

35. He noted that, although the provision concerning the three-fourths majority had not been included in draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1, the paragraph concerning the apportionment of expenses remained unchanged.

36. As to the question arising from the fact that there were two draft resolutions before the Committee, his delegation considered that the two texts were not contradictory but rather complementary. It would therefore vote in favour of both texts, but requested that sub-paragraph 2 (a) (iii) of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 should be put to the vote separately.

37. Mr. HEREDIA BONETTI (Dominican Republic) said that his Government, which was a provisional one, wished to reserve for the authorities which would succeed it in managing the country the final decision as to the country's position on the question before the Committee. Accordingly, his delegation would rather vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1. His Government would nevertheless consider all the proposals which had been submitted.

38. Mr. PASHA (Pakistan) said that there were still basic differences of opinion among Member States with regard to the role of the United Nations and the scope and nature of the functions of the Security Council and the General Assembly in the matter of

peace-keeping. However, there seemed to be virtually a consensus in the Committee that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations should urgently resume the study which it had had to interrupt. His delegation would therefore vote for draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1.

39. His delegation felt that it would be advisable to refer the proposals contained in draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 to the Special Committee for more detailed examination. It therefore hoped that the co-sponsors would not press for a vote on the resolution.

40. The CHAIRMAN noted that draft resolution A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2 had been withdrawn by its sponsors. A request had been made for a priority vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1. In the absence of any objection, the request would be considered to have been accepted by the Committee.

It was so decided.

Draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1 was adopted by 88 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.

41. Mr. DOSUMU-JOHNSON (Liberia) said that, while he appreciated the Pakistan representative's motives in asking the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 not to press for a vote on it, his delegation felt that it was time for Member States to take a stand on the question. The small countries which had sponsored the draft resolution wished to put the matter in a clear light and would therefore press for a vote.

42. Mr. HILMY (United Arab Republic) said that some of the fundamental aspects of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 were unacceptable to his delegation. A question of such importance as the one before the Committee could not be decided by a vote. His delegation therefore appealed to the sponsors not to press for a vote on their draft.

43. Mr. STUART (Australia) said that he joined in that appeal. It would not be desirable for the General Assembly to take a definite position at the present stage on the issues involved in peace-keeping.

44. Mr. SANGHO (Mali) said he agreed that the question called for very serious study; since the Committee had decided to request the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to continue its work, it was preferable that draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 should not be put to the vote.

45. Mr. KANO (Nigeria) said that, in view of the importance of achieving unanimity in the Committee, he associated himself with the request made by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Australia and Mali.

46. Mr. GARCIA DEL SOLAR (Argentina) said that he would also request the sponsors of the draft resolution not to press for a vote.

47. Mr. ASTROM (Sweden) said that any vote on the substance of the question had to be approached in the light of the objectives which the Committee was seeking to achieve. Those objectives were, first of all, to facilitate the work of the Special Committee and, secondly, to create a climate in which all the aspects of the consensus in the General Assembly on 1 September 1965 (1331st plenary meeting) could be

carried out. The Committee should take those objectives into consideration before taking a vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1.

48. The debate to which the proposals originally put forward by the Irish delegation had given rise would be extremely useful for the Special Committee. If draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 was put to the vote, however, his delegation would find itself in a difficult position. If it was compelled to vote against the draft resolution as a whole, that would not mean that it disagreed with any given paragraph; its vote should be considered solely in the light of the observations he had just made.

49. He joined in urging the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 to withdraw the resolution.

50. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) said that he would agree to have the Irish draft resolution (A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1) referred to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations provided that the latter was told where the Special Political Committee stood on two important issues. Some speakers had contended that the General Assembly had no right to take peace-keeping measures unless it was authorized to do so by all five permanent members of the Security Council. At the moment, there were several situations which might call for a peace-keeping operation. His delegation, for its part, was not prepared to agree that the General Assembly should concede to one or more of the five permanent members of the Security Council the right to decide, not only whether a peace-keeping operation should be undertaken, but also the manner in which it should be financed. A number of representatives also objected to the proposals for giving a permanent member which did not vote for a peace-keeping operation the right not to join in financing it, i.e. the right to opt out. However, those proposals did not give the permanent members of the Council any rights in addition to those they already had with the consent of the General Assembly. The Charter gave the permanent members of the Council the right to veto a proposal to undertake a peace-keeping operation. In fact, however, they had exercised a financial veto on peace-keeping operations which they had first permitted to get under way. In his view, the United Nations had dishonoured itself when it had abandoned the Congo because of its inability to collect a few million dollars. There must be mandatory assessments for peace-keeping operations, so that when a small nation appealed to the Organization and the latter agreed to provide help, it would have the financial means of keeping its word. Moreover, if mandatory assessments for peace-keeping could not be restored, similar assessments for other purposes would be endangered. That was what the United States representative had said; the United States had a logical case, but logic sometimes led to disaster. The Organization could not prosper if it had to depend on voluntary contributions by its Members; if mandatory assessments for peace-keeping were not re-imposed, all such assessments would end. The Committee had only to recall what had come of voluntary contributions in the case of Cyprus and of the contributions which States had been asked to make in order to pay past debts for peace-keeping operations.

51. Another type of veto was also making its appearance. Not only did certain members of the Security

Council have a veto in the Council and claim the right to exercise a financial veto once an operation had been initiated, but they now said that if anything they did not like was discussed or voted on, they would not pay their past debts.

52. He fully appreciated the point of view of the five permanent members of the Security Council and had no desire to undermine their authority. He would recall, in that connexion, that it was his delegation which had proposed that the permanent members should have a monopoly of nuclear weapons. Ireland would merely like to see those members live up to the Charter and join together in order to take the lead in keeping the peace. A permanent member of the Security Council would have the right to opt out only in cases where it did not vote for an operation. The Soviet representative had stated (465th meeting) that that was not an original idea and that a similar proposal had been made in 1964. However, he had never heard of any proposal with regard to financing under which a permanent member of the Security Council would be permitted to opt out whenever it wished and assume no further responsibility. The proposal contained in draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1, on the contrary, imposed additional responsibility on any permanent member of the Council which voted for a peace-keeping operation.

53. The future of the United Nations and the future of the world depended on reasonable co-operation and the working out of a reasonable arrangement among the five permanent members of the Security Council. He felt that the United Nations Charter provided a foundation on which peoples could base their efforts to keep the peace and develop the world economy. However, that would call for co-operation among the five permanent members of the Security Council and, then, among all the other Members of the United Nations.

54. He appreciated all that had been said about his delegation. However, Member States owed his delegation no thanks, for it had merely done as much as it could to enable the United Nations to carry out its task.

55. His delegation regretted that, in the present instance, it had to insist on obtaining the opinion of the Committee on draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 and later, it hoped, the opinion of the General Assembly on the issues raised in the resolution. The main issue was whether the members of the Committee felt that the Assembly had the right to recommend a peace-keeping operation when the Security Council failed to agree on giving assistance to a country. By answering that question, Member States would be showing the world that they were prepared to defend the peace.

56. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he wished to stress that the United Nations practice with regard to the application of rule 132 of the rules of procedure was that, after the adoption of a proposal, a decision not to vote on a second proposal did not constitute an expression of opinion on the substance of the second proposal. That rule served to introduce an element of calm into the tense atmosphere in which the debates were often conducted.

57. It was unfortunate that the appeals of a number of representatives to the Irish delegation had been in vain. Many other countries, including the Soviet Union,

seemed willing to join in that appeal to Ireland and the other sponsors not to press for a vote on their joint draft resolution.

58. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1, which had just been adopted, and in particular its operative paragraph 1, already covered every aspect of future peace-keeping operations, including their financial implications. It had furthermore been decided to transmit to the Special Committee the records of the debates during the present session on the question of peace-keeping operations. What need, then, was there to sow dissension and destroy the near-unanimity that had just been achieved in the Committee? Why was it necessary to impose upon the Special Committee certain directives which, instead of enabling it to go calmly ahead with its work, would create an atmosphere of uncertainty and discord at the very beginning? In the opinion of the USSR delegation, the best procedure would be to transmit to the Special Committee the full text of the statement by the Irish Minister for External Affairs together with all records of the debate on the question of peace-keeping.

59. In the light of those considerations, and in accordance with the provisions of rule 132 of the rules of procedure, he proposed that the Committee should discuss whether or not to vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1. He wished to stress once more that a decision by the Committee not to vote on it could not be regarded as a decision on its substance or as a rejection of it. He merely wished the Committee to refrain from voting on a draft resolution on which it was neither reasonable nor necessary to vote at present, and he appealed to all delegations to support the proposal that the Committee did not consider it necessary to put draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 to the vote, since it had just adopted draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1 on the same question. If his proposal were not adopted, the Soviet Union would be obliged to vote against draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1.

60. He asked the Chairman to put that proposal to the vote.

61. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) pointed out that rule 132 of the rules of procedure dealt with the case in which two or more proposals related to the same question. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 and Add.1, which the Committee had just adopted, dealt with a renewal of the Special Committee's terms of reference and called upon those Member States that had not made any voluntary contributions to alleviate the financial difficulties of the Organization. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1, on the other hand, related to what was to happen before the Special Committee reported on the comprehensive arrangement in regard to the financing of peace-keeping. He asked the Committee not to set up a peace-keeping committee to carry out a comprehensive review but to decide what was to be done before the Special Committee reported. Furthermore, draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 would reassert the right of the General Assembly to recommend the establishment of a peace-keeping operation when the Security Council was unable to take action. He accordingly submitted that the two draft resolutions did not relate to the same question and that rule 132 therefore did not apply.

62. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the word "question" in rule 132 could only be understood as referring to an item on the agenda of the General Assembly. If the interpretation that had just been given by the Irish representative were to be accepted as correct, it would lead to the conclusion that the Irish draft resolution had nothing to do with the item on the Special Political Committee's agenda, namely the question of peace-keeping operations.

63. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that rule 132 of the rules of procedure was applicable when the proposals related to the same question, whatever their wording. When there was a difference of opinion as to whether the second draft resolution should be voted on after the first had been adopted, it was for the Committee to decide whether or not the second draft resolution should be put to the vote. The Irish representative's interpretation of rule 132 therefore did not seem to be what the authors of that rule had had in mind. The Chairman proposed that the Soviet representative's proposal should be put to the vote forthwith.

64. Mr. COMAY (Israel) said that his delegation was unable at the present stage of the debate to support draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 and accordingly agreed with those delegations which had appealed to the sponsors of the draft resolution not to press for a vote on it. At the same time, if the sponsors of that draft resolution felt that they must insist on ascertaining the Committee's opinion on their proposal by having it put to the vote in the normal way, the Israel delegation felt that they should not be denied that right. He therefore appealed in his turn to the representative of the Soviet Union not to press for a vote on his proposal. If the representative of the Soviet Union did so, the Israel delegation would have to vote against it, in spite of the fact that it would be unable to support the Irish draft resolution, should that be put to the vote.

65. He proposed that the meeting should be suspended, so that the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1 could consider their position.

66. Mr. VINCI (Italy) said that he had been deeply moved by the statement of the Irish Minister for External Affairs and that the Italian delegation shared many of the purposes and objectives outlined by the Irish representative.

67. In order to maintain the spirit of harmony and co-operation, he proposed that the meeting should be suspended, in accordance with rule 78 of the rules of procedure.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 5.50 p.m. and resumed at 6.40 p.m.

68. Mr. EDWARDSSEN (Norway) reported that the consultations had so far not led to any definite conclusion. But it would be worth while for those consultations to be continued, and to that end he proposed that the Committee should pass on to the next item of business, namely the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, leaving the matter of draft resolution A/SPC/L.121/Rev.1

to be taken up again at the Committee's next meeting.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 36

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (concluded)* (A/SPC/107 and Corr.1, A/SPC/L.119 and Add.1 and 2):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5692, A/5707, A/5825 and Add.1, A/5932, A/5957);
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/5850 and Add.1, A/6025 and Add.1)

At the request of the Nigerian representative, the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.119 and Add.1 and 2 was taken by roll-call.

Cyprus, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana,

Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Cuba.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Portugal.

Draft resolution A/SPC/L.119 and Add.1 and 2 was adopted by 91 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.

*Resumed from the 481st meeting.