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Chairman: Mr. Eugeniusz KULAGA (Poland).

AGENDA ITEM 34

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/7538 and Add.1 and 2, A/7625, A/7715)

1. Mr. FARAH (Somalia), Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, said that his delegation would like to present its views on *apartheid* against the background of a recent statement by Arnold Toynbee, the historian, in which he had observed, *inter alia*, that the only way of drawing attention to any cause was by resort of violence which was one of the most serious evils in the world today.

2. It was distressing to note that the gap between principle and practice with regard to *apartheid* remained unbridged. In spite of the Security Council's call in 1963, in resolutions 181 (1963) and 182 (1963), for an arms embargo against the Republic of South Africa and the fact that it was only through military strength that the white racist régime was able to keep the black majority in subjection, extend *apartheid* beyond its own borders and intervene against liberation movements in other parts of southern Africa, several Member States continued to supply that régime with large quantities of arms. While it might sound impressive to say that 95 per cent of the United Nations membership was observing the embargo, such statistics were meaningless when it was considered that the remaining 5 per cent consisted of rich industrialized countries which had a tremendous capacity for supplying arms and put profit before principle.

3. An article in the *Cape Times* of 25 April 1969 stated that one of the most heartening things to emerge from Mr. Botha's White Paper on defence was that South Africa was beating the arms ban by buying what it was not building itself from countries with a more realistic attitude than the United Kingdom. The article went on to show in

detail how the close economic co-operation of certain Powers with the South African Government had enabled that Government to move towards independent production of conventional armaments. That co-operation had meanwhile ensured a steady supply of conventional and more sophisticated weapons: France, for example, had supplied helicopters, supersonic jet fighters and submarines and financial support for a ground-to-air missile.

4. Instead of responding to the many United Nations resolutions calling upon Member States to impose economic sanctions on South Africa as a means of forcing that country to abandon its racist policies, South Africa's main trading partners, including three permanent members of the Security Council, had not only continued their economic co-operation with the South African Government but had increased their total investments in the country from \$4,434 million to \$5,313 million; in fact reports showed that that figure had been greatly exceeded in the past three years. According to a study made by Professor Elliot Zupnick of the City University of New York (A/AC.115/L.267), the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan together provided markets for approximately 60 per cent of exports from South Africa and supplied that country with 60 per cent of its imports, while the first three countries mentioned had provided 80 per cent of the increase in foreign investment in South Africa since 1964. It was obvious that no boycott could succeed as long as those four countries withheld their co-operation.

5. South Africa had made special efforts to encourage investment from those countries, firstly because such investment had enabled the white privileged minority of South Africa to reach a standard of living comparable with that of the United States, and secondly because, by involving many States and foreign corporations extensively in its economy, the South African Government had been able to establish a common identity of interests and thereby assure itself of support from trading partners whenever those interests were threatened by action at the international level. Those policies had paid handsome dividends, as had been shown by recent Security Council debates on Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration, when the main trading partners had stated clearly that they could not agree to the imposition of economic sanctions.

6. Those actions were a sad reflection on the authority of the United Nations. Since there had been so little success in the implementation of the Security Council's call for such a limited economic sanction as an arms embargo, it was not surprising that the General Assembly resolutions calling for complete economic sanctions were honoured more in the breach than in the observance.

7. Paragraph 154 of the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee's report (A/7625) involved an important principle. A major feature of the United Nations campaign against *apartheid* had been the appeal to individual States and organizations to boycott firms and institutions which openly co-operated with the South African Government and supported the South African economy. That aspect of the campaign became a mockery if the United Nations and its related organizations were themselves guilty of the actions which they sought to prevent others from committing.

8. The argument that technological developments would ensure an improvement in the wages and training of Africans and that a fast and expanding economy would inevitably make *apartheid* unworkable ignored the fact that the work conditions of Africans were governed by legislation which neither local firms, nor those under foreign control, nor the non-white population, had the power to change. It also ignored the fact that the South African Government had clearly made the choice between logical procedures to support the country's fast-moving economy on the one hand and its policy of subjugation of the non-white population on the other. The South African Government had continued to apply and extend *apartheid* legislation which, unless radical changes were brought about, would ensure a permanent, unskilled black migratory population in the country, while the white immigration from many countries that were Members of the United Nations would, it hoped, provide the skilled labour which the country's industries needed.

9. The argument that foreign co-operation in the expansion of South Africa's economy would eventually bring about an improvement in the conditions of the non-white people of South Africa was therefore a fallacious one, used in an attempt to appease conscience and justify actions which had rightly been condemned by the international community.

10. The Special Committee's recommendation that all States should be requested to prohibit airlines and shipping lines registered in their countries from providing services to and from South Africa had been emphasized (*ibid.*, para. 153, c) because States had not only been allowing South Africa to increase its air services to their countries, but had also been increasing their own air services to South Africa. His delegation did not subscribe to the view that by keeping open the lines of communication between South Africa and countries which condemned *apartheid*, outside influence might weaken the appeal of *apartheid*. Far from having such an effect, the publicity and high-powered advertising which accompanied those exchanges of air services accorded to the South African Government a measure of respect and dignity which could pave the way for wider acceptance and tolerance of the policy of *apartheid*.

11. During the past year, the South African Government and the international airlines of other countries had used their inaugural flights to promote white tourism and business visits to South Africa: a non-white visitor was not allowed into South Africa except as an underprivileged worker. Such promotional flights had included free excursions for many dignitaries and government officials from

countries represented in the Committee and had given a totally one-sided view of the situation, since the black population was prevented from presenting its views to visitors, who were not shown the hard realities of life that faced the underprivileged. So-called private organizations, such as the South African Foundation, had been using that method to win white friends for *apartheid*.

12. According to a memorandum of 24 June 1968 from the Anti-*Apartheid* Movement in London (A/AC.115/L.226 and Add.1 and Add.1/Rev.1), the arguments used by the racist authorities were designed to play on the emotions and prejudices of the whites. They consistently sought to show that the two racial groups had equal opportunities to develop in their own areas, and laid great stress on trading ties between South Africa and the country of the visitor. Experience had shown that, despite increases in tourism between South Africa and the rest of the world, there had been a progressive intensification rather than a relaxation of the application of racist laws.

13. It must be presumed that those Members which held the view that it was necessary to continue to hold a dialogue with South Africa and that the situation was not serious enough to warrant forceful action had been trying for the past twenty years to persuade the South African Government, through friendly dialogue, to abandon the ideology of *apartheid*. His delegation failed to see how anyone could still imagine that such a course of action could be successful.

14. There had been no relaxation, for example, in the application of the Group Areas Act of 1950. Hundreds of thousands of Africans had been forcibly removed from their homes to tribal or other areas with which they had had little or no past contact. In Johannesburg alone, 133,000 Africans had been affected by such removals. In answer to a parliamentary question earlier in 1969, the South African Minister of Community Development had disclosed that 59,000 coloured and 36,000 Asian families had been so affected by 30 September 1968. Members of the Committee might find it difficult to imagine the misery and suffering involved unless they had experienced similar situations such as those in nazi Germany or those still prevailing in the Middle East.

15. In the Limehill settlement, where more than 6,000 people had been relocated to an area far smaller than the one they had previously occupied, inadequate sanitation had led to serious outbreaks of typhoid and gastro-enteritis. South Africa's only genuine opposition Member of Parliament, Mrs. Helen Suzman, had declared that the Government had been woefully neglectful of its responsibility to the area and the people who had been moved without planning and with a total disregard for the basic human necessities of life or the inconvenience caused to them.

16. In 1968 police charges had been brought against nearly 593,000 people, or an average of 1,625 a day for contraventions of the pass laws. *The Rand Daily Mail* of 14 March 1969, while describing those figures as appalling, had expressed the belief that even they were on the conservative side and that about 2,500 daily arrests of men, women and teenagers were made. The human suffering involved was incalculable: for hundreds of thousands of Africans it

meant broken families, unemployment, poverty, bewilderment and racial bitterness. The steady corrosion of the political and legal rights of non-whites to ensure the permanence of the system had been so pervasive that it had affected even the rights of the white citizens. Despite the many denunciations by the General Assembly, the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and the Commission on Human Rights of the brutal treatment of opponents of *apartheid*, the South African Government continued its obnoxious course.

17. Over the past year, the South African Government had attempted to extend its policy of racial discrimination and segregation to neighbouring Territories. That development had given rise, as the Secretary-General had observed, to a loss of faith in many quarters in the possibility of peaceful evolution towards a society based on justice and equality, and had consequently increased the danger not only of greater tensions within the whole of southern Africa but of a racial conflagration. That tendency was already evident in the neighbouring Territories of Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola where the Smith régime and that of the Portuguese colonial Government were being sustained through the active and open support of South African money, trade and arms. The racist régime in Southern Rhodesia had been able to withstand economic sanctions largely because of South African and Portuguese collaboration, though that did not mean that other Members of the Organization were guiltless. Liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia had to contend not only with the forces of their oppressors but with those of South Africa as well.

18. The situation in South Africa and the rest of southern Africa clearly showed the alliance of interests, the interrelationship of problems, and the communion between racial discrimination and colonialism and between colonialism and economic exploitation. No one, least of all his delegation, would wish to see the present unfortunate conflict continue or expand. The Africans in the area wanted a peaceful solution, provided it met their just demands and was not delayed. The only alternatives open to the non-white population in present circumstances were to accept the *status quo* and remain permanently enslaved or to resort to force. The international community should provide the third alternative—a peaceful and speedy solution to the problem.

19. Those who advocated the application of more stringent measures against the racist régimes in South Africa,

Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and Namibia did so because all avenues of peaceful settlement had been tried and had failed. During the past twenty years the United Nations had made direct approaches to the Governments concerned, had addressed appeals to them, had arranged for the Secretary-General to discuss the matter with the Pretoria régime, had conducted countless studies and had attempted to find solutions through constructive dialogue within the Organization, all without any response from the white minority régime. It was clear from all the evidence produced before the Committee that all peaceful attempts to change the situation had failed and would continue to fail, and it was not surprising that the African people and their liberation movements had decided that their lot could only be improved by force. The response to appeals for material aid for the South African liberation forces had been disappointing, perhaps because of a misapprehension on the part of Member States of the kind of aid requested. In his delegation's view assistance of the kind indicated in paragraph 149 of the Special Committee's report was the very least that Member States could offer as tangible evidence of their opposition to and rejection of *apartheid*.

20. Referring to paragraph 162 of the report, he said that the time had come for the United Nations to deal with the problem of *apartheid* in conjunction with other political situations in southern Africa. That proposal, first made by the International Seminar on *Apartheid*, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa, held at Kitwe, Zambia, in 1967,¹ had received growing support from many sources, the liberation movements themselves having recognized the need for co-ordinating their efforts in the common fight. The interrelationship of southern African problems had been clearly demonstrated in the United Nations whenever attempts had been made to deal piecemeal with the questions of Namibia, the Territories under Portuguese administration and Southern Rhodesia.

21. The United Nations must assert its authority and reaffirm collectively that the fact that some special interests of certain powerful States were affected did not justify inaction by the Organization. Peace, as the late President Kennedy had observed, was, in the final analysis, basically a matter of human rights.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.

¹ See A/6818 and Corr.1.