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TWENTIETH SESSION

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## SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 482nd MEETING



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*Chairman:* Mr. Carlet R. AUGUSTE (Haiti).

### AGENDA ITEM 101

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects (continued)\* (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2, L.121, L.122):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/5915 and Add.1, A/5916 and Add.1, A/5972, A/6026);
- (b) The authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations (A/5966/Rev.2)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the new draft resolution on the authorization and financing of future peace-keeping operations (A/SPC/L.121), sponsored by the eight delegations which had previously submitted draft resolution A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2, and to the fifteen-Power draft resolution on the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/SPC/L.122).

2. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) said that, though his delegation and the other sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2 believed that the latter should be considered in full by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations in its future work and should therefore be retained as a document of the Special Political Committee, they would now like delegations to vote on a new text (A/SPC/L.121) which, like the earlier text, contained a preambular paragraph reasserting the right of the General Assembly to recommend the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation when the Security Council was unable to take prompt and effective action for the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. In the operative part of the new draft, the sponsors had taken into account as far as possible the views expressed in the preceding discussion. For instance, as a number of representatives had suggested, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping

Operations was requested in operative paragraph 1 to take account of the written comments of Member States on the guide-lines prepared by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly (A/5915/Add.1, annex II), and of the view expressed during the current discussion. Further, in operative paragraph 2, the Special Committee was invited to consider some of the major issues raised during the discussion. The distinction between peace-keeping operations and enforcement measures, mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) was basic to any solution of the problem; and in paragraph 2 (b), on the authorization of peace-keeping operations, the sponsors had incorporated a suggestion made by the Peruvian representative (463rd meeting) that the establishment of a good offices committee might be a useful step if a deadlock arose in the Security Council. In paragraph 2 (c) the Special Committee was invited to consider the means of implementing resolutions on peace-keeping, since many aspects of that question—such as the composition of forces, their control, and the provision of stand-by forces—had been raised in the preceding discussion; and in paragraph 2 (d) it was asked to study the financing of peace-keeping operations, and particularly two aspects of the matter to which delegations had referred again and again—first, the preparation of a special scale for the equitable sharing of costs and secondly, the proposal for establishing a permanent peace fund.

4. In accordance with paragraph 3, the Special Committee would be reporting to the next session of the General Assembly; and paragraph 4 contained some interim proposals for financing peace-keeping operations which would be applicable until a final and comprehensive arrangement had been adopted. The interim proposals were the same as those contained in the earlier text (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2), but the introductory part of paragraph 4 had been reworded to bring out clearly the provisional character of the arrangement, which in no way precluded the adoption of other agreed arrangements or the inclusion of certain peace-keeping missions in the regular budget. The sponsors were particularly anxious that the Committee should endorse the proposal contained in that paragraph, in order to provide the General Assembly with a ready-made scale and method of apportioning expenditure if an emergency should arise before some more satisfactory and more comprehensive arrangement for the financing of peace-keeping operations had been adopted.

5. Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria) said that the authorization and financing of peace-keeping operations was one aspect of the most important function of the United Nations as defined in Article 1 of the Charter. The difference of opinion on the methods to be fol-

\*Resumed from the 468th meeting.

lowed in the maintenance of international peace and security had brought about the most serious crisis the Organization had ever faced; and, though the Organization was now conducting its business normally again, no final solution to the crisis would be possible until the controversy on peace-keeping operations had been settled. All Member States should, therefore, continue their efforts to reach agreement on ways and means of enabling the United Nations actively to discharge its most important responsibility.

6. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, on which his country was represented, had helped to clarify the different views on the constitutional difficulties arising from the fact that the Charter did not contain any specific provisions relating to peace-keeping operations; and it had also prepared the ground for the General Assembly's discussions on the matter, by agreeing unanimously on broad guide-lines and principles for future peace-keeping operations. But much work still remained to be done; and as it was unlikely that the Special Political Committee could reach agreement at the present session on the future procedure to be followed in peace-keeping matters, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations should be asked to continue its consideration of that extremely complex matter.

7. As to the immediate future, he shared the concern of the sponsors of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2, and A/SPC/L.121, and well understood the intentions underlying the proposals contained therein. But, as differences of opinion on the matter still existed, it might perhaps be better to consider an interim solution acceptable to all Member States. That suggestion should not be interpreted as indicating that, in his delegation's view, the establishment of future peace-keeping operations should be decided exclusively by the permanent members of the Security Council, and that the smaller nations should abandon their efforts to devise a solution to the problem. On the contrary, all Members should bring their influence to bear to preserve the United Nations as an effective instrument for maintaining peace and security.

8. No generally agreed definition of peace-keeping operations had yet been produced; but, in his delegation's view, such operations were essentially voluntary, and not mandatory, in character. They should be undertaken only at the request, or at least with the consent, of the country or countries mainly concerned. All the peace-keeping operations undertaken in the past had fallen within that definition. His own country had supported them by providing personnel or contingents, and by making regular financial contributions. Further, the Austrian Parliament had recently passed a law authorizing his Government to provide not only medical and police contingents for United Nations peace-keeping operations, but also military units if requested.

9. On the constitutional aspect of the matter he pointed out that, while under Article 24, paragraph 1 of the Charter primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security was conferred upon the Security Council, Articles 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 35 referred to the General Assembly's responsibility in

the same field; and the very reference to the Security Council's primary responsibility in Article 24 implied that the General Assembly had a secondary or subsidiary competence, though there was of course no doubt of the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. As the Charter conferred responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on the Security Council and the General Assembly, the functions to be performed by the two bodies should undoubtedly be complementary. The question of the General Assembly's competence was highly complex, but it was clear from Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Charter that the General Assembly did have authority to make recommendations on peace-keeping operations; and such recommendations, supported by the required two-thirds majority, would of course have a great moral impact on members of the Security Council and on the Organization's membership as a whole. The main point in dispute was the exact nature of the recommendations which the General Assembly was authorized to make; and the interpretations given to some of the terms used in that connexion in the Charter—particularly the word "action" in Article 11, paragraph 2—differed considerably. As that issue could only be solved by adopting a completely new approach based on common sense and the desire to ensure the effectiveness of the United Nations in future emergency cases, it was extremely important for the General Assembly to extend the mandate of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, so that the latter could continue its work on the basis of the unanimous agreement already achieved on certain principles and the specific proposals made in the Special Political Committee's discussions; and he supported the Irish delegation's proposal to that effect.

10. On the financial aspect of the matter, his delegation still believed that collective financial responsibility for United Nations peace-keeping operations was most closely in keeping with the purposes and objectives defined in the Charter, and that that arrangement should therefore be maintained as far as possible. If it were not feasible to apportion the expenses among the whole membership under the terms of Article 17, other methods could be used. Though voluntary contributions had enabled the United Nations to fulfil its peace-keeping task in the past, the voluntary contribution system had considerable shortcomings and could not be regarded as satisfactory; and he supported the Irish delegation's proposal that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations should be requested to give further consideration to the question of financing peace-keeping operations as well, on the basis—if possible—of some generally acceptable guide-lines suggested by the Special Political Committee. In any solution finally decided upon, due attention should be given to the economic and financial capacity of the developing countries.

11. The role of the Secretary-General in peace-keeping operations was particularly important since, once a peace-keeping operation had been decided upon, the Secretary-General would unavoidably be faced with decisions which he alone—within the limits of his powers—could take. The Austrian delegation did not wish to see the authority and prerogatives of

the major United Nations bodies impaired in any way, but it did believe that the Secretary-General should have adequate authority for the proper conduct of peace-keeping operations.

12. Lastly, he expressed the hope that wider use would be made of peaceful means of settling disputes before United Nations peace-keeping operations were initiated.

13. Mr. CHANG (China) said that peace-keeping operations were a new development not covered by the Charter. The late Dag Hammarskjöld had described them as preventive diplomacy to keep conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences, with the overall objective of avoiding an extension or achieving a reduction of the area into which the bloc conflicts penetrated. That definition did not cover all peace-keeping operations, which took many different forms. They had, however, certain common features: they were conducted with the consent of the parties to a dispute; they were essentially non-coercive in character and involved no enforcement action against any State; lastly, they were usually no more than a holding action to give the parties time to negotiate a political settlement.

14. Under the Charter, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security lay with the Security Council, whose decisions the Members agreed to accept and carry out. The use of the veto often prevented the Council from taking effective and prompt action. According to Article 51 of the Charter, until the Security Council had acted in the event of an armed attack, Members had the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence and in practice they often had no alternative but to call for help from friendly Powers. However, the only course of action open to countries which were disinclined to ask other Powers for help in the event of an armed attack was to call upon the United Nations.

15. His delegation believed that the General Assembly could authorize peace-keeping operations in the event that the Security Council was unable to act. Although questions relating to such operations should be examined in the first instance by the Security Council, the General Assembly was also responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security and its functions and powers in that respect were clearly defined in Articles 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 35 of the Charter. When the Security Council was unable to act, the General Assembly was in duty bound to fulfil the paramount purpose of the Charter by making appropriate recommendations and even initiating actions to keep the peace, as it had done in the Suez crisis in 1956. Peace-keeping operations initiated by the Assembly did not involve enforcement action within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter. They were not directed against any State and did not call for the application of sanctions: they therefore did not encroach upon the prerogatives of the Security Council in any way.

16. The general view was that if the financing of peace-keeping operations was not covered by special arrangements or voluntary contributions, it should be within the competence of the General Assembly to make assessments under Article 17 of the Charter.

That was in accordance with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the subject.<sup>1/</sup> The principle of collective financial responsibility should not be abandoned because of the opposition of a single Member State. The Chinese delegation supported the principle stated in General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV) that the cost of peace-keeping operations should be apportioned in accordance with the ability to pay. At the same time, it was receptive to the suggestion that a special fund of voluntary contributions should be established to meet the cost of such operations. It was also in broad agreement with the suggestion made in the report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly (A/5915/Add.1, annex II) that various methods of financing might be considered, including special arrangements among the parties involved, voluntary contributions, apportionment to the entire membership of the Organization and any combination of those methods.

17. The new voting procedure for the initiation of peace-keeping operations contained in the original Irish proposal (A/5966/Rev.2) would have made the initiation of such operations far more difficult than under the existing rule. It would thus be a step backwards and would produce the same inoperative factors found in the Security Council. The provision whereby 70 per cent of the cost of a peace-keeping operation would be shared among the permanent members of the Security Council which voted in favour of the operation would be tantamount to rewarding the unco-operative members at the expense of the co-operative members. If the United States was not allowed to vote for an assessment in which its share was more than 33 1/3 per cent, the procedure would be unworkable. Such an arrangement for opting out of an assessment did not apply in the case of other Members of the United Nations and was therefore contrary to the Charter principle of the sovereign equality of all Members. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.121 would not produce the desired result of enabling the Organization to carry out future operations with greater speed and effectiveness.

18. In the existing circumstances, it was difficult if not impossible for the United Nations to enforce the peace under Chapter VII of the Charter. A tiny minority therefore could not be allowed to frustrate the Assembly's peace-keeping efforts in operations involving no enforcement action.

19. Mr. RICHARDSON (Jamaica) said that countries like his—small, militarily weak and bound to no regional alliance—looked to the United Nations as the only sure guarantee of international peace and security. They did not deny that the Security Council bore the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace but, because of the existence of the veto, they did not want the Council to have exclusive power to deal with every threat to international peace. In that body, psychological, political or other considerations often prevailed over the interests of the victims of the act of aggression concerned. It did not seem that changes in the

<sup>1/</sup> Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962; I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 151.

membership of the Council would alter that situation; the unanimity rule remained, which was the antithesis of compromise.

20. The small nations therefore believed that effective recourse to the opinion of the general membership of the Organization should always be available. The General Assembly offered greater security to small States than the Security Council. In the Assembly, where no single Member had a special means of asserting its own will, there was a greater need to compromise and a greater likelihood of decisions being taken which reflected the common interest. Even if recourse to the Assembly produced no more satisfactory results, at least all the potentialities of the United Nations system would have been exhausted.

21. Effective recourse to the opinion of the general membership could be obtained within the existing provisions of the Charter. As the forum in which the general membership of the Organization took decisions and expressed its will, the Assembly had an authority superior to that of any other organ. The Security Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security was a responsibility delegated for a specific purpose. If the Council failed to act promptly and effectively, the Organization's responsibility for international peace and security did not disappear and the residual responsibility of the general membership automatically came into play. Moreover, only the general membership could pass judgement and decide whether or not the Council had in fact taken prompt and effective action. The only prohibition placed by the Charter on the Assembly's freedom to make recommendations about the maintenance of international peace and security was the provision in Article 12 that the Assembly should not make recommendations with regard to a dispute or situation unless the Council so requested, while the Council was exercising the functions assigned to it in the Charter in respect of that dispute or situation. Under Articles 10 and 11, paragraph 2 the Assembly was entitled to make recommendations not only to the Council but also to Members of the United Nations.

22. A debt of gratitude was owed to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and to the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly for the useful guide-lines they had produced. The Assembly should appeal to all Member States to make the voluntary contributions which had been agreed, on the recommendation of the Special Committee. The deliberations of the Special Committee had not constituted a genuine exchange of ideas and had revealed little evidence of willingness to compromise. The Assembly should therefore invite the Special Committee to continue its work, taking into account the comments made on the guide-lines and the views expressed at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, and to make specific recommendations on some of the broad aspects of the peace-keeping problem.

23. One aspect of the problem seemed to take precedence: the need to agree on the meaning of certain terms. Attempts had been made to define "peace-keeping operations" and "action", as used in Article 42 and other Articles of the Charter, but no agreement had been reached. Once agreement had

been reached on the definitions, the Special Committee could establish working groups to examine individual aspects of the problem.

24. There were two main considerations involved in the question of the authorization and financing of a peace-keeping operation. The first was the need to separate the political and financial elements of a decision to embark on the operation. The method of financing should not be determined on an *ad hoc* basis but should be known beforehand. The second consideration was that the countries with limited economic capacity should be willing to bear a fair share of the cost of the operations for which they voted and should not try to obtain their security at bargain rates. Such countries would not be able to have their say in the initiation of operations unless they were prepared to bear a substantial part of the cost.

25. Considerations such as those had prompted the Jamaican Government to propose the formula for the apportionment of peace-keeping expenditure set out in document A/6026, annex I. That formula had the advantage of certainty; every Member State except the four with the highest economic capacity would know exactly the maximum amount of its assessment in any one year. It was also equitable, because it stated that the amount of payment should be based on a country's economic capacity. By taking as a basis for the special scale the percentages already approved for the regular budget, the formula obviated the need to find a new basis for the apportionment of peace-keeping expenditure. The formula was adaptable, because the scale could easily be revised. Only three elements were essential: annual, instead of *ad hoc*, assessments; the classification of States into groups according to economic capacity and the principle of limiting the assessment for certain States in any one year. The provisions which Governments would make in their annual budgets would be a convenient starting-point for the establishment of a permanent peace fund, such as had been proposed. The Jamaican formula also recognized the undeniable fact that, as peace-keeping expenditure grew, a progressively larger share of the burden would fall on the great economic Powers.

26. Since the Special Committee's conclusions could not be implemented before the twenty-first session of the Assembly, an interim basis of apportionment for peace-keeping expenditure should be adopted at once. One possible method would be to adopt the same basis of assessment as had been used for peace-keeping operations in 1963; the Jamaican formula or the one proposed in draft resolution A/SPC/L.121 were other possibilities. His delegation had many reservations about the latter formula. Once a peace-keeping operation had moved from the Council to the Assembly, there could be no question of any special responsibility on the part of the permanent members of the Council. However, Jamaica would be prepared to agree that the Irish formula should be applied until such time as a comprehensive formula had been found, which presumably would be no later than 31 December 1967.

27. Mr. SHEVCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the position of his delegation was based on the purposes of the United Nations as set

out in Article 1 of the Charter which also called on all Members to fulfil the obligations assumed by them. The Security Council, acting on behalf of all Member States, bore the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the great importance of that responsibility had been recognized when it had been stipulated that decisions of the Security Council required the unanimity of its permanent members. However, a number of States had recently attempted to circumvent the authority of the Security Council in matters relating to the maintenance of peace, and the General Assembly, at the instigation of certain Western States, had taken a number of illegal decisions which went beyond its competence, thereby violating the fundamental principles of the Charter and considerably reducing the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The restoration of that effectiveness was of particular importance at a time when the aggressive policies of certain States had led to an increase in international tension. Brazen intervention in the domestic affairs of other States and infringements of national sovereignty had resulted in friction and even conflicts which were fraught with the greatest dangers. It was the duty of all Members of the United Nations to unite their efforts to maintain peace and prevent further conflict, on the basis of the principles of the Charter.

28. In its memorandum of 10 July 1964,<sup>2/</sup> the Government of the Soviet Union had proposed certain measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security. That constructive proposal, which had been supported by the socialist and certain other countries, was a realistic basis for strengthening the United Nations as an effective instrument for the defence of the peace and security of peoples. Co-operation between States was best achieved by strict adherence to the principles of the Charter, which laid down the foundations for peaceful and good-neighbourly relations between States. However, certain States, under the pretext of increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations in matters relating to the maintenance of peace, had made strenuous efforts to revise, directly or indirectly, the fundamental principles of the Charter.

29. Following such attempts in the Working Group of Twenty-One and the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, the Irish delegation had now put forward a proposal in the Special Political Committee, the aim of which was to achieve a revision of the fundamental provisions of the Charter relating to the powers of the Security Council, by means of changes in the rules of procedure. It was well known that under the Charter the Security Council was the only organ authorized to take action for the maintenance of international peace and security, and that consequently all decisions regarding United Nations armed forces must be taken by that body and no other. The Irish delegation nevertheless proposed, contrary to the clear provisions of the Charter, the inclusion in the General Assembly's rules of procedure of provisions enabling it to undertake so-called

peace-keeping operations, and the establishment of a system for financing such operations. In essence, that proposal was a further attempt to circumvent the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council by transferring those functions to the General Assembly.

30. The Ukrainian delegation considered that proposal to be unconstitutional under the Charter and wholly unacceptable. Amendments to the Charter could not be effected by changing the rules of procedure, and in addition the proposal undermined the principle of agreed action by the great Powers, which was enshrined in the Charter and ensured that any use of United Nations armed forces would not be in the narrow interests of individual countries or a group of States. That could only lead to an increase in international tension and would merely serve the interests of those who wished to use the United Nations in the furtherance of their aggressive aims and the suppression of national liberation movements. The argument that the proposal was in the interests of small countries carried no conviction, since all countries should be concerned to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace among all nations, large and small, and that purpose could be achieved only on the basis of the Charter.

31. The United States proposals, which were similar to the Irish proposal, were equally unacceptable. The United States representative had claimed that by recognizing that the Security Council had certain rights in actions for the maintenance of peace, the United States had made a major concession. However, that was merely an incorrect interpretation of the functions and powers of the main organs of the United Nations with regard to measures for the maintenance of peace and security. It would be a gross violation of the Charter for both the Security Council and the General Assembly to decide questions of United Nations armed actions, as the United States had suggested. Its proposal for the establishment of a financial committee to work out methods of financing such operations also violated the Charter, particularly Article 43.

32. The only explanation for the fact that the United States was now proposing what amounted to a revision of the basic provisions of the Charter appeared to be that the prevailing principle of unanimity between the five permanent members of the Security Council was not to the liking of the United States, since it was thereby prevented from using that body as an obedient instrument to carry out its orders. However, the Special Political Committee must be guided, not by the interests of individual countries or groups of countries, but by the clear provisions of the Charter, which stated that armed force could only be used in the general interests of the Members of the United Nations.

33. As a Member of the United Nations since its inception, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic knew from experience the importance of adherence to the Charter, under which the General Assembly was not authorized to take decisions such as those now proposed by Ireland and the United States, and his delegation firmly rejected those proposals. The

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 21, document A/5721.

present difficulties of the Organization had sprung from violations of the Charter, and the only way to avoid similar difficulties in the future was strict observance of its provisions.

34. In order to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace, the role and authority of the Security Council had first to be strengthened. That body had special and exclusive powers and a realistic voting procedure, and guaranteed that United Nations military operations would not be carried out in the interests of certain States at the expense of others. The imminent increase in the number of Members would give more equitable representation to the developing countries. The General Assembly was able, under Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter, to make appropriate recommendations to the Security Council, and its role should not go beyond that of exerting an influence on the decisions of the Council.

35. The Charter also made ample provision for specific problems of financing. Article 43 rightly provided that each operation should be financed according to its individual needs, and the operations in Cyprus, West Irian and Yemen were in fact being financed by various methods.

36. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was profoundly and genuinely concerned to strengthen the United Nations by increasing international co-operation, on the basis of strict adherence to, and implementation of, the fundamental principles of the Charter, particularly that of the unanimity of the great Powers in decisions regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. Those Powers had a special responsibility for the maintenance of peace, and adherence to that principle guaranteed the interests of all States Members of the United Nations, both large and small. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic would therefore resist any attempt, however presented, to undermine the basic principles of the Charter.

37. Mr. VINCI (Italy) said that the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations convincingly reflected the active role that body had played in shaping a broad consensus on some important principles and in thus paving the way for the successful functioning of the General Assembly's twentieth session. The political decision taken by the United States concerning the applicability of Article 19 of the Charter had also contributed to the success of the present session. However, many complex problems still remained. The second point of the agenda item rightly indicated the urgent necessity for the United Nations to dispose of the necessary machinery to carry out peace-keeping operations and to make their financing a less hazardous enterprise than at present.

38. The importance that Italy had always attached to the question of peace-keeping operations was shown by its participation in the Working Group of Twenty-One and the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and by its contributions in men, equipment and finance to practically all United Nations peace-keeping operations.

39. The main financial problem had, however, been left unsolved after the crisis of the nineteenth session. In answer to the Special Committee's consensus appeal for voluntary contributions by Member States, the leader of the Italian delegation to the twentieth General Assembly had stated (1338th plenary meeting) that his country was asking its Parliament's authorization for a special contribution of \$1.5 million. He appealed to those countries which had not yet made a contribution to do so, regardless of their position of principle or of any contingent obstacle.

40. The guide-lines in paragraph 52 of the report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly (A/5915/Add.1, annex II) reflected the most important principles which his delegation believed a large majority of Member States were ready to accept in building effective peace-keeping machinery. Those principles were: the primary, but not exclusive, responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace; the competence of the General Assembly to consider any matter and make appropriate recommendations if the Security Council was paralysed by a veto; and the need for financing of peace-keeping operations to be done in conformity with the provisions of the Charter, i.e., through the exclusive authority of the General Assembly which was authorized to assess such expenses. The last-named principle did not, of course, exclude the possibility of special arrangements.

41. The implementation of those principles would give the Secretary-General the means for carrying out his executive task in peace-keeping operations and obviate the need for frequent appeals to Member States for financial help and the consequent uncertainty whether any vital operation could be continued and successfully concluded. The Italian delegation, therefore, welcomed the idea of a peace fund such as had been suggested by several delegations and supported by the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom (1351st plenary meeting). It was surprised that while no one objected to the establishment of development funds for economic and social expansion, some countries disapproved of the creation of a fund for peace. Surely peace should come first, for without it the lot of the under-developed world could not be improved.

42. The opponents of the major principles to which he had just referred could be grouped into two schools of thought. The first was supported mainly by newly independent countries which felt that their interests would be more securely protected by the Security Council where they could count on one permanent Member, and shortly, on an increased number of their own representatives. He found their thinking somewhat illogical and hoped that they would soon come round to the view that they could themselves protect their interests best by recognizing the residual powers of the General Assembly, where they held the majority in the membership. The door appeared to be still open to a satisfactory solution on those lines in view of the Soviet Union's apparent recognition in the Special Committee that all Member States were on an equal footing in matters of peace-keeping and that the General Assembly should reconsider matters if the Security Council was unable to act.



43. The second school, whose arguments were not lacking in logic, persisted in ignoring the principles of collective responsibility and the rule of the majority in peace-keeping and, according to their interpretation of some Articles of the Charter, considered that peace-keeping had been entrusted ultimately to the five permanent members of the Security Council. In his delegation's opinion that position was static, based on a restricted and legalistic interpretation of the Charter and ignored the fact that the United Nations was a living body which in twenty years of life must undergo changes. Such views reflected an outdated picture of the world based on nationalism and particularism, where frontiers were barriers. His country hoped and strove for a world where frontiers should unite rather than divide; where if possible they should disappear, or at least be traced in pencil. Moreover, it considered that the fate of that school of thought was sealed, as outdated ideas had never lived long.

44. For those and many other reasons his delegation had welcomed the Irish proposal contained in the joint draft resolution (A/SPC/L.117 and Add.1 and 2), which acknowledged the normal, dynamic evolution of an effective international organization. Moreover, it was the first concrete and complete effort to find a way out of the present deadlock. Concerning some of its proposals, in particular regarding the privileges of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Italy entertained some reservations, but careful study and consideration were warranted. His delegation had not had time to study the new draft resolution (A/SPC/L.121) and might wish to state its position on it later.

45. The time had now come when the Committee must take a decision on its future course of action. The Italian delegation considered that the mandate given to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations should be renewed and that the composition of the Committee should remain unchanged. The inevitable and complex negotiations prior to any change would seriously delay the course of the Committee's activities without any corresponding benefit. If the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations was to be given a further mandate, it should study the various questions and proposals raised by States Members of the United Nations including the draft resolution initiated by the Irish delegation, and it should report back to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. Among the suggestions put forward, those of the Jamaican representative were most interesting and likely to provide a valuable contribution to the problem. Therefore, Italy had decided to become a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.122 which reflected its views on the course of action that should be taken in the immediate future.

46. In conclusion, he reminded the Committee that an admission that the United Nations was unable to unite in the maintenance of peace would be an admission that it had failed in its main task. Recognition of that principle did not in any way diminish the responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council, nor of the greater contributors to all activities of the United Nations. His country was ready to

make what contribution it could to providing the Organization with the capacity to ensure peace in the world. For though modern technology could provide humanity with replacements for almost everything, for peace there was no substitute.

47. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) said that, failing a solution to the problem of peace-keeping operations, the United Nations would not be able to perform the function assigned to it in Article 1 of the Charter. Everyone was aware of the extreme importance of the problem before the Committee, and of the urgent need for establishing a definite procedure which would enable the Organization to discharge to the best of its ability its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace.

48. His own country had always supported the United Nations, and would continue its efforts to preserve the Organization as an effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. It had always responded to appeals for participation in peace-keeping operations, and in spite of the immense sacrifices which it had to make in the course of its economic and social development, Tunisia had made a modest voluntary contribution to enable the Organization to carry out its tasks. The voluntary contribution system was only an interim solution, however, and though it might help to meet the Organization's immediate requirements, it could not in any sense be regarded as a long-term solution.

49. Unfortunately, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had not been able to complete the task entrusted to it under General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX), and additional efforts would therefore have to be made to devise a generally acceptable procedure for establishing peace-keeping operations. The question of the respective responsibilities of the Security Council and the General Assembly was, like the question of financing peace-keeping operations, extremely complex; but apart from the financial and constitutional problems, there were other difficulties to be settled as well. There was, first of all, the difference of opinion between the great Powers; and much patience would be required before a political issue of such magnitude could be resolved. The Special Committee had tried to devise a compromise solution, and further efforts to that end should be made in the light of past experience, the position of the great Powers in the present-day world situation, and the particular policies of States which might render any future peace-keeping operation necessary.

50. He greatly appreciated the Irish delegation's efforts to produce a generally acceptable solution, but could not accept one proposal contained in the eight-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.121). It was surely wrong for payment of 70 per cent of the costs of peace-keeping operations to be assessed only on those permanent members of the Security Council which voted in favour of the operation. An arrangement of that kind would introduce financial, as well as political, considerations into the voting; and it would enable any of the great Powers to avoid paying its share of the cost of a peace-keeping operation,

simply by abstaining when the vote was taken. The smaller countries could not be asked to pay a compulsory contribution, if the great Powers could—if they wished—evade their financial responsibilities altogether. There was no justification for granting privileges of that kind to the permanent members of the Security Council; and the arrangement violated the principle that all States Members should be treated on an equal footing.

51. His delegation earnestly hoped that the many problems connected with the maintenance of international peace and security would be solved as soon as possible, as the smaller countries would never feel safe from exploitation and aggression unless they knew that they could count on effective protection from the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.