



Tuesday, 13 October 1970,
at 10.55 a.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Abdul Samad GHAUS
(Afghanistan).

AGENDA ITEM 34

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/8022, A/8109, A/8117, A/SPC/L.181)

1. The CHAIRMAN called attention to two new documents submitted to the Committee: the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa (A/8109), to which was annexed the report of the Committee of Trustees of the Trust Fund, and the report of the Secretary-General (A/8117), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2547 A (XXIV), on the question of enlarging the scope of the Trust Fund.

2. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria), speaking as Acting Chairman of the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, introduced the reports of the Secretary-General and the Committee of Trustees. The Trust Fund had been established in 1966, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2054 B (XX), to provide assistance and relief to persons persecuted under *apartheid* laws in South Africa and their families, as well as to refugees from South Africa. Supported by voluntary contributions, it made grants to organizations engaged in assisting victims of *apartheid*. The Committee of Trustees was composed of persons nominated by Chile, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan and Sweden. In that connexion, he wished to pay tribute to the contribution to its work made by Mr. Sverker Åström of Sweden, who had been Chairman of the Committee of Trustees from the Fund's inception until recently.

3. During the past year, contributions to the Trust Fund since its inception and the total amount of grants made had exceeded \$1 million. Those contributions and grants represented the international condemnation of the ruthless actions of the South African Government against opponents of *apartheid*, as well as the world-wide sympathy for its victims and their families.

4. During the years of the Trust Fund's existence, repression in South Africa had intensified. Members were well aware of the infamous Terrorism Act enacted in 1967 and the detention, torture and imprisonment of numerous South Africans and Namibians under the Act. In one recent case, a large number of persons, including many trade unionists, journalists and teen-age students, as well as Mrs. Winnie Mandela, the wife of the leader of the African National Congress of South Africa, who was serving a life

sentence on Robben Island, had been detained under the Terrorism Act in May and June 1969. After languishing in solitary confinement without access to their families or lawyers and after being brutally tortured by the police during interrogation, they had finally been brought to trial at the end of 1969 on such charges as attempting to provide relief to needy families of political prisoners. When the case had been dismissed in February 1970, the police had rearrested the defendants in court and again detained them in solitary confinement. After mass protests by lawyers, professors and students both in South Africa and abroad, the Government had again charged nineteen of them in June 1970, together with another prisoner, Mr. Benjamin Ramotse, who had been in detention without any public knowledge for two years, apparently after being kidnapped from Botswana by Rhodesians and handed over to the South African police. Meanwhile, one of the three prisoners who had not been charged had been admitted to a mental hospital as a consequence of torture. Within the past few days, the courts had again acquitted the nineteen accused, but had sentenced Mr. Ramotse to fifteen years in prison. The Government had immediately proceeded arbitrarily to issue banning orders against those who had been acquitted, prohibiting them from attending meetings and subjecting them to other restrictions. Mrs. Mandela herself had been placed under house arrest every night and on weekends and was thus unable even to visit her husband at the Robben Island gaol. It was in situations of that nature that the Trust Fund endeavoured to help organizations to provide a minimum of relief to the victims of such inhuman treatment.

5. The Committee of Trustees had taken every possible precaution to see that the grants from the Fund were used only for the humanitarian purposes for which the Fund had been established. If the Committee of Trustees had not given more detailed information in its report, it was only because of the very difficult conditions under which the organizations concerned were obliged to function. The Trustees, however, would be pleased to provide any additional information which donor Governments desired.

6. Even the million dollars in contributions which the Fund had received since its inception in 1966 was insufficient to meet even a fraction of the minimum needs. Contributions had not kept pace with increasing demands, and there was no reserve for emergencies. Indeed, the Fund's current balance was hardly adequate to meet two urgent requests which were under consideration by the Committee of Trustees. He therefore appealed urgently to all members for increased contributions, especially during 1971, the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. He directed a special appeal to France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, which had made no contributions since 1967, and

to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which had made only two contributions, to consider offering annual contributions to show their continued support for the Fund. In addition, he urged the developing countries to contribute regularly, even in token amounts.

7. In conclusion, he drew attention to another report of the Secretary-General (A/8117) on the question of enlarging the scope of the Trust Fund. The Trustees would have great misgivings about the expansion of the scope of the Fund unless additional contributions were forthcoming, since such an expansion would otherwise lead to a reduction in assistance to South Africans. Although the Secretary-General's report had been placed before the Third Committee in connexion with another agenda item, the Committee of Trustees felt that it would be desirable to consider all matters relating to the Trust Fund in the Special Political Committee, and he therefore requested members to take note of the document.

8. Mr. NGUIAMBA (Cameroon) said that his delegation had studied carefully the report of the Special Committee (A/8022) and had listened with interest to the statements made by the Special Committee's Chairman and Rapporteur. Referring to the summary of the situation in South Africa contained in paragraph 111 of the introduction (A/8001/Add.1) to the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, he wondered how it was possible to speak of having made progress in the implementation of Article 55 of the Charter, as the representative of South Africa had recently done in the General Assembly (1857th plenary meeting). If progress had indeed been made in southern Africa, then the oppressed African peoples of the region were only its casualties.

9. The Boers' irrational hatred of the African dated back to the time of the second colonialization and the battles of the Great Trek. A process of historical determinism had gradually and imperceptibly led that group of pioneers to adopt an ideology which was diametrically opposed to the principles of their faith. While it was not easy to analyse the psychological impetus which had given birth to the doctrine of *apartheid*, the decisive factor would seem to have been the forcible occupation of the African hinterland. The domination of the Boers had been based on force, and their prosperity upon the exploitation of Africans. They had been faced with the problem of justifying their own special privileges and reconciling love for one's neighbour with the exploitation of Africans and had found the answer in the theory of masters and slaves and of the congenital inequality of races which had become the official dogma of the Dutch Reformed Church, to which 83 per cent of the Afrikaners belonged.

10. In that connexion, he wished to commend the World Council of Churches on its decision to contribute a large sum of money to the support of the liberation movements in southern Africa. He hoped that example would be followed and that it would have a theological and psychological effect on the minds of the Afrikaners.

11. But economic factors were as important as psychological ones in explaining the nature of South African society. The colonization of the Cape in the 17th and 18th centuries had been based on an agricultural, slave economy

in which masters and slaves had lived in contact with one another. However, after the slaves had been freed in 1834, a series of rapid political and economic changes had occurred and the keynote of race relations had changed from paternalism to conflict. The policy of segregation had first appeared on a large scale with the establishment of the native reserves of Natal in the 1840s. The system of native reserves had subsequently been consolidated and extended over both rural and urban areas by legislation. During the twentieth century, repressive legislation against both Africans and Indians had proliferated alarmingly, particularly after the new Nationalist Party had taken power in 1948.

12. *Apartheid* in its "ideal" form envisaged total territorial separation of the four main racial groups, namely Africans, whites, Indians and Coloured. Each of those groups would be free to develop in accordance with its own destiny under the supervision of the white Government. That ideal, however, was merely a stratagem to justify *apartheid*. It ignored the traditional resistance of the Zulus and the Hereros to white domination, as well as the fact that the white economy was totally dependent on the existence of a black proletariat. In practice, *apartheid* had become an organized system of white domination and discrimination against Africans, Indians and Coloureds.

13. Such a policy, based on the denial of political and economic rights, segregation in education and cultural life and brutal inhuman repression, was bound to give rise to resistance. Since the end of 1960, the native reserves had become centres of resistance; a transformation was beginning to take place within the African population and the peasants, even more than the urban sub-proletariat, had begun to rise up against white oppression. That situation was predictable, for South Africa had gone too far down the road of white domination to avoid a sweeping social revolution.

14. Many voices had risen in opposition to *apartheid*, but the real problem was finding the means by which to put an end to it. Practically since its establishment, the United Nations had tried in vain to resolve the question. Indeed, by 1968 the General Assembly had adopted 109 resolutions on *apartheid*. In its resolution 2506 B (XXIV), the Assembly had urged all States and organizations to provide increased assistance to the national movement of the oppressed peoples of South Africa and invited all States to desist from collaborating with the Government of South Africa and to take appropriate measures to dissuade its main trading partners from collaborating with it and with companies registered in South Africa. Unfortunately, it was apparent from the report of the Special Committee that those provisions had not been followed by certain Member States and that certain great Powers continued to collaborate with the South African Government in the economic and armaments fields. His delegation had read with great concern, in paragraph 33 of the Special Committee's report, of the tremendous military build-up which had taken place in South Africa during the 1960s. The arms purchased or manufactured by South Africa were used every day against liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique. His delegation therefore rejected the argument that a distinction could be made between arms to be used for external defence and arms for imposing the policy of *apartheid*.

15. His delegation had read with equal concern of the constantly prospering trade between South Africa and certain Member States, as well as of the continuing flow of foreign capital into South Africa, which had brought the rate of increase of foreign investment up to 5 per cent annually during the 1960s. He wished to congratulate those who had agreed to withdraw their capital from the insidious Cabora Bassa dam project in Mozambique, which, by increasing considerably the area under irrigation, would strengthen the economies of the "white strongholds", would provide the Transvaal with large amounts of electricity, would enable Portugal to quintuple the number of immigrants to Mozambique and would encourage the white régimes of southern Africa to use the defence of the dam as a pretext for an increased military build-up in the area.

16. South Africa was endeavouring to spread its racial philosophy beyond its national frontiers, to keep the African population in forced labour camps or squalid prisons under Governments which proclaimed the superiority of the white race, to oppose liberation movements by every military means and to fight against everything the independent States of Africa were trying to achieve. The Governments of those countries had always sought to solve the problem in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter. In that spirit, in 1969, they had adopted the Lusaka Manifesto,¹ affirming that their open and active hostility towards the régimes of Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was based on their commitment to the principles of human equality and self-determination. In particular, the Manifesto emphasized that the liberation of Africa did not represent reverse racialism or African imperialism and expressed the desire of the African States to negotiate rather than to resort to physical violence. Again in the same spirit, the non-aligned countries, meeting at Lusaka in September 1970, had solemnly affirmed (see A/SPC/L.181) the need for effective international action to bring an end to *apartheid*, thereby avoiding the turning of southern Africa into a blood-soaked battlefield, with incalculable consequences for international peace and security.

17. His country was pleased to be a member of the delegation accompanying President Kaunda of Zambia on his mission to convince certain Governments to put an end to the sale of arms from their countries to South Africa and also to the assistance those countries were providing in the manufacture of arms in South Africa. It welcomed the decision to hold a seminar in connexion with the International Year to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. It supported the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee and congratulated its members and also the members of the Committee of Trustees of the Trust Fund on their work.

18. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq) said that his delegation shared the feeling of frustration felt by other delegations, by the Special Committee, and by the Secretary-General himself that after twenty-five years of discussion on the subject of *apartheid*, nothing had happened: South Africa continued

to ignore United Nations resolutions. Far from remaining silent, however, his delegation felt compelled to speak out in moral support of the oppressed peoples of South Africa.

19. As pointed out in paragraph 37 of the Special Committee's report (A/8022), the Soviet Union had been the only one of the four major Powers to have fulfilled the pledge they had made with regard to the arms embargo. As a result of co-operation with some Western States, South Africa had been able to increase its economic, financial and military power. Companies were dealing very closely and very profitably with South Africa—companies which in the past had been responsible for the subjugation of many nations.

20. His delegation took the view, contrary to that expressed by one representative at a previous meeting, that there should be no distinction between industrial and commercial co-operation on the one hand and military on the other. Similarly, no distinction could be made between arms for external defence and arms for internal use. It was a pretence to claim that some of the armaments to be supplied to South Africa were for the protection of the Cape sea route. A similar argument had been advanced some years previously in connexion with his own country and the route to India.

21. As stated in paragraph 50 of the Special Committee's report, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross had been unable thus far to obtain authorization to visit prisoners detained under the Terrorism Act. Meanwhile, an attitude on the part of South Africa which reminded him of Israel's refusal to allow United Nations representatives to investigate Israeli atrocities in Arab territories occupied by Israel, the South African Government was being given encouragement not only to pursue its policy within its borders but also to threaten neighbouring countries.

22. Two suggestions had been made as to further action by the Organization. The representative of Mexico (693rd meeting) had put forward the idea of calling for South Africa's suspension from the membership of the Organization under Article 5 of the Charter. Although the idea was a good one, it was hardly practical. Action for suspension depended on the recommendation of the Security Council, but it was well known that three permanent members of the Security Council had abstained on a question which was less drastic, namely Council resolution 282 (1970). If the Security Council had failed to make its arms embargo mandatory, what possibility was there of success on the question of suspension?

23. The other suggestion had been for action under Chapter VII of the Charter. That, however, would require the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Council, which was even less feasible than suspension. Furthermore, action under Chapter VII depended on a threat to the peace, whereas certain major Powers considered that peace was threatened only when their own interests were involved. The people of South Africa were continuing to suffer, because certain Powers wanted to preserve the *status quo*.

24. Turning to chapter III of the Special Committee's report, he said that his delegation supported the Special

¹ Manifesto on Southern Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixth ordinary session; for the text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

Committee's recommendation in paragraph 136 that the specialized agencies should be invited to increase their participation in the campaign against *apartheid*.

25. In connexion with the programme for the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, his delegation was also in full agreement with the final text of the declaration which the Special Committee had submitted—see paragraph 58 of the report—to the Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary for inclusion in the final document or documents of the commemorative session. His delegation also gave its whole-hearted support to the recommendation contained in paragraph 130 that in future *apartheid* should be discussed within the wider context of southern Africa, since racial discrimination was not confined to South Africa, and since that country had been expanding its policies beyond its own borders. In that connexion, the Special Committee's recommendation in paragraph 142 of the report, that its title should be shortened to "Special Committee on *Apartheid*", met with his delegation's approval. In paragraph 111 the Special Committee had expressed the view that the situation in South Africa was sufficiently grave to merit measures of a mandatory character under the Charter. Furthermore, in paragraph 123 it had stated that a comprehensive consideration of the question of *apartheid* should be undertaken as a matter of priority. His delegation fully endorsed those recommendations.

26. Two important points emerged clearly from the Special Committee's report. One was the impotence of the United Nations over the past twenty-five years to deal effectively with *apartheid*. The second was the right of the people of South Africa to achieve their freedom by means of armed struggle. Paragraph 106 clearly stated their conviction that such action was the only means left open; anyone reading the report would reach the same conclusion. Furthermore, General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV) had reaffirmed its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and had urged States to provide increased assistance to the national movement against the policies of *apartheid*.

27. The Secretary-General had stated in paragraph 111 of the introduction (A/8001/Add.1) to his report on the work of the Organization that by suppressing the legitimate opposition to *apartheid*, by resorting to extreme repressive measures, which were clearly in violation of the principles of the rule of law, the Government of South Africa had closed all avenues of peaceful change in the country.

28. Clearly, the only avenue left open was armed struggle. In an editorial in *The Guardian* of 29 September 1970, it had been stated that the World Council of Churches had decided to give non-military aid to some guerrilla groups in southern Africa and that the Council had apparently reached its decision through the feeling that the Church could no longer afford to confine its statements on political issues to broad general platitudes on peace or justice. Declaring that the oppression in southern Africa was being carried out in the name of Christian civilization, the editorial continued by stating that the Council had presumably decided that the non-violent option in southern Africa was closed.

29. Nelson Mandela, the imprisoned leader of the African National Congress, had said that it would be fatal to create the illusion that extreme pressures made it unnecessary to tackle the enemy from within; the corner-stone of the struggle lay inside South Africa.

30. Since the United Nations had failed to deal adequately with *apartheid*, it was for the international community to take action. However, the international community was divided into two categories: on the one hand, the weak, the poor, the oppressed; and on the other, the oppressors, the exploiters, the monopolists, the rich—who had taken their riches from the lands of the poor. Action was needed by the first category—those who upheld the causes of people around the globe. Only when the oppressed peoples united could there be effective action to achieve justice for all. As the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated recently in the General Assembly (1854th plenary meeting), the struggle of the Arab nation for independence, freedom and unity made it a natural ally of all peoples struggling for freedom and progress.

31. It had been reported that morning—and he hoped that the information was false—that South Africa had been quietly working to avoid the boycott and other action recommended by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

32. He suggested two possible courses of action. First, the oppressed people could be supported with arms and material assistance of all kinds, as stated by the Secretary-General. Secondly, it was hoped that the youth of the world, who in their millions had backed the cause of oppressed peoples everywhere, would succeed in their efforts.

33. He appealed to all members to seek ways and means of supporting the people of South Africa.

34. Mr. TIONGSON (Philippines) said that his delegation could not but feel frustrated and concerned over the ineffective resolutions on *apartheid*. Progress had not been achieved, mainly because some Member States had refused to abide by those resolutions. Notwithstanding Security Council resolution 282 (1970), the purpose of which had been to tighten the arms embargo, South Africa had been able to acquire a great amount of military equipment and assistance in the manufacture of weapons, particularly through the help of one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

35. His delegation particularly wished to draw attention to the Special Committee's recommendations made in chapter III, sections D and F, of its report (A/8022) on measures to provide greater assistance to the South African liberation movement and intensify the dissemination of information on *apartheid*. Furthermore, it had recommended in sections B and C that the General Assembly should ask the Security Council to consider urgently the question of *apartheid* and as a matter of priority, to secure full implementation of the arms embargo; to ensure that all Governments terminated all loans and technical assistance that they or their private companies extended to the South African Government or South African companies; to promote moral, political and material assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa.

and their liberation movements; and to encourage States to take the measures recommended by the General Assembly in order to solve the grave situation in southern Africa as a whole.

36. The United Nations could not remain insensible to the injustices and affronts borne by the non-white population of South Africa. Despite the many resolutions calling upon the South African Government to renounce its policies of *apartheid*, that régime had adopted an attitude of defiance and had stepped up its repressive measures.

37. His delegation had noted with deep regret the general conclusion in paragraph 143 of the Special Committee's report that the lack of progress was attributable to two main factors, namely, the intransigence of the Government of South Africa, coupled with the unco-operative attitude of those States which continued to maintain diplomatic, consular, economic, commercial and military relations with the racist régime.

38. He wished to reiterate his delegation's opposition to all forms of racial discrimination and its repudiation of the inhuman policy of *apartheid*.

39. As a member of the Special Committee, his delegation wished to express its appreciation to the Chairman and Rapporteur of that Committee for their patience and perseverance in carrying out their task.

40. Mr. MARTABIT (Chile) referred to the large number of committees, declarations and resolutions which had dealt with the question of *apartheid*, building up over the years a clear picture of the problem. Many members of the Special Political Committee had already outlined the situation in detail; instead of following suit, his delegation would deal with the problem directly and try to find without delay the effective solution which all peoples of the world awaited. Little needed to be said but much needed to be done in the face of the growing problem of *apartheid* in South Africa. His country—a small one, but having long traditions of democracy, respect for the individual and enthusiastic acceptance of the obligations imposed by the Charter—could no longer tolerate a situation where a group of powerful countries continued to flout the Organization. It was deplorable that economic power, ambition and force could prevail over reason and the rule of law, and could continue to support the despicable *apartheid* system in South Africa, where man was exploited by means of a sophisticated form of slavery which had not the slightest respect for fundamental human rights, and where justice was a luxury and depended on the colour of the skin. It was even more deplorable that the benefits were reaped not only by a few within the frontiers of South Africa, but also by a few beyond them who were even more anxious to support that State, despite the condemnation frequently expressed by the Organization.

41. His delegation was considering which measures might be the most suitable, and was keenly interested in the concrete solutions proposed by other delegations. It would support those measures which it felt were the most effective and just. He therefore appealed to the Committee members in the hope that a way might be found to enable them to fulfil a moral duty which they shared with all peoples of the world.

42. Mr. GANAO (People's Republic of the Congo) said that his delegation felt that everything that could be said on *apartheid* had been said, not only at the current session but at previous ones, and that there remained little to add. The system of *apartheid*, with its tortures and summary executions, was a reality recognized by all. Another reality had been the adoption of many resolutions, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. Those resolutions had in no way hindered South Africa from continuing with its policies of *apartheid*, and his delegation believed that their effect had, in fact, been to encourage South Africa to pursue those policies. The ineffectiveness of the General Assembly resolutions could be ascribed to the fact that they had not been implemented by those who alone could implement them effectively. If the United Nations really intended to help those who opposed the policies of *apartheid* in South Africa the evil must be attacked at its roots. The United Kingdom, France, the United States of America and certain other Powers were continuing to collaborate with the Government of South Africa and in so doing were strengthening its position. If there was a genuine desire to help the liberation movements in South Africa, the Governments of those countries must be approached and asked if they were or were not against *apartheid*.

43. His delegation was convinced that *apartheid* was a temporary phenomenon, which would ultimately be resolved because the populations in South Africa could not be subjugated by force of arms indefinitely. His delegation felt that serious consideration should be given to the problem of what would happen in South Africa after the end of *apartheid*. If the problem of the relations between the different inhabitants in that part of Africa were not given careful consideration, and a suitable solution was not found, it might well be that the interests of certain inhabitants would be disregarded.

44. Mr. DUGONJIĆ (Yugoslavia) said his delegation felt that although there was no need to analyse the substance of the problem of *apartheid* again, the United Nations had a special responsibility, during its commemorative year, to make a detailed examination of the consequences ensuing from the persistence of the policies of *apartheid*. All the attempts of the United Nations to persuade the South African Government to abandon its policies had proved vain and the South African Government had amply demonstrated that persuasion alone would not produce the desired changes.

45. At the recent meetings of OAU at Addis Ababa and the non-aligned countries at Lusaka increasing concern had been voiced regarding the South African Government's efforts to consolidate the domination of the white majority in southern Africa (see A/SPC/L.181). An ideological, political, economic and military alliance was developing between South Africa, Portugal and the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. As President Tito had observed, South Africa and its racist and colonial allies constituted the bastion of reactionary forces which threatened the independence of neighbouring African countries and engendered the permanent state of instability in Africa. In view of the negative and dangerous consequences of *apartheid*, and since the Government of South Africa was continuing its flagrant violation of the fundamental principles and pur-

poses of the Charter, his delegation felt that the Special Political Committee should give serious consideration to the proposal by the Mexican representative (693rd meeting) regarding the expulsion of South Africa from the Organization. The report of the Special Committee had clearly indicated the main factors which made it possible for the South African Government to continue its policy. Two of those factors were of particular interest, namely the activities and practices of foreign economic interests operating in southern Africa and the co-operation of certain Western countries with the Government of South Africa. Any change in the policy of South Africa's major trading partners could prove the most effective way of compelling the South African Government to change its attitude. Therefore, those trading partners were primarily responsible for the success or failure of the United Nations to find a solution to the problem of *apartheid*.

46. The question of arms deliveries to South Africa was becoming more serious. Despite the embargo on arms by the Security Council in 1963 and 1964, South Africa had been able to obtain large quantities of arms. Its military potential was being used against the liberation movement and to repress the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the population of South Africa. South Africa's military potential was a grave threat to the independence of other African countries. His delegation, therefore, welcomed Security Council resolution 282 (1970), which called on all States to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa, and it had unreservedly supported and sponsored the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.182/Rev.1) adopted by the Committee at its 696th meeting, calling on all States to take immediate steps to implement fully the provisions of Council resolution 282 (1970). However, it wished to emphasize that the embargo could prove effective only if the Security Council made it mandatory for all countries.

47. The situation in southern Africa was becoming increasingly dangerous and had evoked the concern of the entire international community. In the light of decisions adopted at the meeting of non-aligned countries at Lusaka and the recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee, his delegation felt that in drawing up the text of a general resolution on *apartheid* for adoption during the current session, certain measures should be recommended. First, diplomatic, consular and other relations between South Africa and all the Member States of the United Nations should be broken off. Secondly, there should be an economic boycott of South Africa including the suspension of investments in that country. Thirdly, the Security Council should discuss the problem of *apartheid* and undertake all necessary measures in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Finally, every form of moral, political and material assistance should be

given to the non-white people of South Africa in their struggle to attain their legitimate rights. The success of any international action in respect of southern Africa would depend largely in finding a solution to the problem of providing more effective assistance to national liberation movements, and in that respect the role of the Organization could be highly significant. There had been some progress in isolating South Africa by excluding it from such fields as sport competitions, youth organizations and trade unions.

48. In conclusion, his delegation was convinced that the eradication of *apartheid* would serve the interests of all population groups in South Africa, irrespective of colour, as well as the interests of the international community as a whole.

49. Mr. BASSETTE (Belgium), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, referred to a statement made by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania at the previous meeting. Belgium had always strictly complied with the 1963 and 1964 Security Council resolutions relating to the arms embargo. In addition, it was adhering to Security Council resolution 282 (1970) which called upon all States to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa. In those circumstances, he wished formally to refute the allegation by the Tanzanian representative. The only case of Belgian collaboration in the production of arms in South Africa had taken place before the Security Council had adopted those resolutions and had ended long ago. Moreover, the collaboration had been on a private basis and the Belgian Government was in no way involved. With regard to Belgian investments in South Africa, the accusation was completely unfounded.

50. Mr. CAHANA (Israel) speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it was regrettable that some delegations were seeking to use the discussions for their own political purposes. The representative of Iraq had seen fit to engage in anti-Israel propaganda. The delegation of Israel did not intend to be drawn into a debate on the issues of the Middle East conflict.

51. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq) exercising his right of reply, said that the problems before the Committee should not be divorced from other similar causes. If there were discussions of South Africa's racial discrimination, there should also be discussion about the similar situation in the Middle East. Close relations existed between Israel and South Africa, and it was well known that Israel was importing and polishing diamonds from South Africa, thereby earning many millions of dollars. It was perfectly natural to mention the Palestine question.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.