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CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Agenda item 33:</i>	
<i>Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (continued)</i>	105

Chairman: Mr. Max JAKOBSON (Finland).

AGENDA ITEM 33

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (continued) (A/6414)

1. Mr. TRUDEAU (Canada) said that in dealing with the item before the Committee, members should bear constantly in mind the fact that the primary purpose of the United Nations was to maintain international peace and security. The Organization's capacity to keep the peace was of particular importance to the smaller States, and reliable security arrangements should be worked out in which they could participate politically and financially. They made up the majority of the membership, and their financial contributions, however limited, were essential in keeping alive the concept of collective security.

2. It was in that broad context that his delegation approached the item. The latest report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/6414) was no doubt disappointing to many delegations, not merely because that body had failed to reach any agreed solutions on fundamental issues but because it had not even been able to come to grips with those issues. Several delegations, including his own, had tried to suggest subjects for examination, acting in a spirit of conciliation and in a desire to meet the views of other delegations and make some progress. Those efforts had not been fruitful, but in view of the basic importance of the issues involved they should be renewed in the Special Political Committee in the same conciliatory spirit.

3. In his statement to the General Assembly (1413rd plenary meeting), the Chairman of the Canadian delegation had noted that there were differing opinions on the nature and value of United Nations peace-keeping activities and that the limitations imposed by the minority view, particularly the position of some of the great Powers, on the principle of collective financial responsibility might have to be accepted. The Canadian delegation's approach was both positive and realistic, and its observations might be grouped under three principal headings.

4. The first was the question of financing peace-keeping operations. Canada still adhered to the principle of collective financial responsibility, which was the logical complement of collective security. In view, however, of the crisis to which the dispute over that matter had led, his delegation felt that for the time being it would have to be agreed that the application of mandatory apportionment of the costs of a major peace-keeping operation would be possible only in cases where the Security Council, including its permanent members, so decided. In such cases it would then be the responsibility of the General Assembly, under the Charter, to determine how the decision should be implemented. If, on the other hand, mandatory apportionment was not possible, other methods might be used. The immediate question was what the General Assembly could do at its present session with respect to the financing of peace-keeping operations. His delegation believed that it could lay down guidelines for the financing of a particular peace-keeping operation involving heavy expenditure in the event that apportionment was decided upon. Thus the Assembly could place on record its view that in such circumstances certain considerations should be taken into account and provision made to ease the burden on the developing countries. In making those observations, he wished it to be clearly understood that his delegation's position with regard to financing was based on a desire to ensure that the Security Council and the General Assembly could work in harmony.

5. Preparations for peace-keeping constituted a second area in which some progress might be made without prejudice to the differing views of Member States. Indeed, that was an area in which Members could take action individually. For example, it would be helpful if the General Assembly called on Members to inform the Secretary-General of the kinds of military or civilian forces or services they might be able to provide in response to a request for their participation in a peace-keeping operation, on the understanding that they would in each instance reserve the right to decide whether they wished to participate. Assuming that Members would be willing to furnish such information, the next question would be how the Security Council itself could improve the capacity of the United Nations to maintain peace and security. His delegation, while recognizing the primary responsibility of the Council in that respect, thought it would be entirely in order for the General Assembly to make recommendations to the Council. The Chairman of his delegation had stated in the General Assembly that something should be done now in response to the Secretary-General's 1964 proposal for a study of means of improving preparations for peace-keeping and that it was per-

haps time for the Security Council to re-examine the possibility of negotiating agreements with Member States for the provision of armed forces, assistance and facilities. A study of the kind suggested by the Secretary-General could be undertaken without prejudice to any Member's position on the results of the study or the use to which it might be put; and that exercise itself might be helpful in clarifying the existing situation.

6. It was of course for the Security Council to decide what it wished to do in regard to agreements for the provision of armed forces, but there could surely be no objection to the Assembly's placing on record its view that a re-examination of the possibilities envisaged in Article 43 of the Charter would be useful. A number of delegations had expressed interest in that idea over the past few years and they might welcome the extra incentive which would be provided by General Assembly approval.

7. Finally, his delegation had some suggestions to make with regard to the constitutional question of the authorization of peace-keeping operations and the respective responsibilities of the Security Council and the General Assembly in that connexion. The time might be at hand when certain basic elements could be agreed upon. For example, it could surely be recognized that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had served a useful purpose by encouraging a widely representative group of delegations to outline their own particular views.

8. Those views, together with the guidelines suggested in the report by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly in 1965,^{1/} and the comments of a substantial number of Member States both in and outside the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations represented in a broad sense the comprehensive review which that Committee had been asked to undertake. In the light of that review he thought it should be possible, either now or in the near future, for the General Assembly to take the following steps: first, to reaffirm that the primary purpose enunciated in the Charter was to maintain international peace and security; secondly, to express the conviction that all Member States should co-operate to ensure the achievement of that purpose; thirdly, to recognize that the Charter conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and on the General Assembly the right to discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and the right to make recommendations on such questions; fourthly, to recognize that if the Security Council, in the exercise of its primary responsibility, was unable to adopt decisions, the General Assembly might immediately consider the question at issue and make appropriate recommendations; fifthly, to express its belief that the United Nations should be in a position to respond promptly and effectively to the need for duly authorized action to maintain peace and security.

9. Mr. ZORRILLA (Chile) said that the peace-keeping operations in which the United Nations was

at present engaged showed that the Organization was increasingly being called upon to exercise its peace-keeping functions. Yet when controversies involving the vital interests of the great Powers arose the United Nations found itself unable to act. The reason for its paralysis was surely that the other Members had been deprived of the means of contributing to the solution of such controversies even though their lesser political, economic and military strength actually gave them greater freedom of action and they all had the obligation to further the Organization's primary purposes. He recalled in that connexion the statement made by the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 1424th plenary meeting of the General Assembly to the effect that it was the duty of all Member States to place at the disposal of the United Nations the material and human resources required for the implementation of the principles of the Charter and that the small nations, representing a large proportion of the world's population and not having a material stake in certain issues, could make an important contribution to the United Nations and to the cause of peace.

10. When the Committee had discussed the item at the previous session, his delegation had expressed the view (465th meeting) that the General Assembly had the right and the responsibility to discuss all matters relating to international peace and security and to make recommendations thereon, including recommendations for action to maintain peace when the Security Council was prevented from doing so by disagreement among its permanent members. It had also stressed the need to find a satisfactory means of defining the legal basis of future peace-keeping operations and an equitable financing mechanism which would take into account the situation of the less developed nations. Its position with regard to those points remained unchanged.

11. Unfortunately, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations established at the nineteenth session had not been able to report any real progress towards the goal of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to act in defence of peace. It was therefore urgent that delegations should seek new approaches to the problem which would avoid the difficulties encountered in the past. It might be well to defer for the time being the search for a definitive over-all solution, since factors beyond the control of the United Nations, such as the tension prevailing in international relations, made it unlikely that such a solution could be achieved now.

12. What the Committee could do was to identify and systematize those principles on which there was already more or less general agreement. Then at some future date, when the circumstances were more propitious, the problem as a whole could be taken up and the Charter could if necessary be revised to define precisely the respective competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council with regard to peace-keeping operations. His delegation was therefore inclined to favour the adoption of a broad provisional formula.

13. He noted in that connexion that both the new Irish proposal and the proposal which the Canadian delegation was expected to submit contained points

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 21, document A/5915/Add.1, annex II.

that would be useful in approaching certain aspects of the problem. He thought those proposals would be improved by the incorporation of a paragraph stating that they were of a provisional nature and either calling on the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to study the matter in its broader aspects or entrusting that task to another body which would work out a final solution. That idea was, of course, implicit in both proposals, but to state it specifically would remove any doubts that delegations might have.

14. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) expressed regret that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had been unable to fulfil the terms of its mandate. He believed that its lack of success was to be attributed to the fact that the task entrusted to it had been conceived in too general terms, and so had become an exercise in logical controversy rather than a practical effort to solve a specific political problem. Unanimity could not be expected in such matters, and it was necessary to proceed case by case in empirical fashion.

15. His Government supported the principle of collective financial responsibility for the costs of peace-keeping, and it regarded the General Assembly as the only organ of the United Nations empowered to appropriate money for the Organization's expenses, including peace-keeping costs. It held that, with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly's powers were complementary to those of the Security Council; and, finally, it believed that the General Assembly was empowered under the Charter to make the necessary recommendations when the Security Council was for any reason unable to take the prompt and effective action required. That view was probably shared by the vast majority of Members, but no purpose would be served by challenging contrary views or staking the future of the Organization on its acceptance.

16. The United Nations was in serious financial difficulties; loyalty to its broader purposes should be a sufficiently compelling motivation for all to make common cause of the task of rescue.

17. A distinction must be made between peace-keeping and enforcement measures; the former was essentially voluntary, whereas the latter was based on mandatory obligations. If agreements between the Council and Members of the Organization under Article 43 of the Charter were necessary so that the Council would know what strength it could count on in enforcing its decisions, such advance planning was all the more necessary in the looser domain of peace-keeping, where Members were invited to volunteer their help.

18. In the circumstances, the Council would do well to review past experience and take a poll of Members to estimate the future availability of men and services. The study could also serve as a basis for establishing a training programme. At the same time, the Council should inquire whether Members would be prepared to maintain such men and services in a state of readiness and under what conditions they would be willing to contribute them to United Nations peace-keeping forces.

19. It would be evident from his emphasis on the role of the Security Council that he believed the best course was not to equip the General Assembly to act in that domain but to help the Council to do so. That was a role envisaged for the General Assembly in Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter, and a responsibility which it must not evade. At the same time, it would seem appropriate for the Council to seek to associate the General Assembly in the task of study and inquiry to which he had referred. For the same reason, the Council would be well advised to make use of a body of persons with political experience, to whom the advice of the Military Staff Committee would be available.

20. The Secretary-General should also be associated with that work in his political capacity. None of those suggestions seemed to raise constitutional questions; the problem was rather to find the best ways of making the necessary practical arrangements.

21. The studies by the Security Council could also be helpful in determining from which States the forces used in peace-keeping operations should come since that remained an open question, though it seemed to be generally accepted that they should be contributed by Members other than the permanent members of the Council. As to the question of who should bear the heavy costs of peace-keeping operations and on what scale, it seemed to be generally accepted that the scale of assessment applied for ordinary expenses would require modification where peace-keeping costs were concerned. As States were unlikely to agree to shoulder that financial burden without having a voice in the matter, the General Assembly—even disregarding Article 17 of the Charter—would appear to be the appropriate organ for determining how the burden was to be distributed, once the Security Council had determined in a given case what it was. The Assembly might in addition perhaps usefully provide the Security Council with advance indications of its views on the scale of peace-keeping assessments.

22. Just as the Security Council had a responsibility to act promptly and effectively to maintain international peace and security, the Assembly had an equal responsibility to provide prompt and effective financial support for that action. As Dag Hammarskjöld had pointed out in 1960, the Organization had either to face the financial consequences of its own decisions or to change its substantive policies; there was no third alternative. While he had no wish to contribute to the battle of words on the constitutional aspects of the problem, he felt compelled to say that the battle could have been avoided if the Security Council had met its responsibilities and if its members had shown some readiness to waive their individual concerns in the general interest.

23. The world continued to need the United Nations and its peace-keeping operations. Unfortunately, with the mutual distrust of the great and small Powers added to the East-West division there had been a growing atomization of the United Nations which threatened to deprive it of coherence. Speaking as the representative of a small Power, he was bound to mention the general disappointment that the pri-

mary responsibility conferred on the Security Council had not ensured the prompt and effective United Nations action which was the purpose of that delegation of responsibility. It had become customary, when speaking of the primary responsibility of the Security Council, to emphasize its primacy. He would like to see at least equal emphasis laid on the word responsibility.

24. In the spirit of those considerations he had been consulting with other delegations with a view to introducing a draft resolution designed to put the United Nations back on the right track, and he hoped that the proposal they had in mind would command general assent.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.