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CONTENTS

Agenda item 36:

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued):

(a) *Reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa;*

(b) *Reports of the Secretary-General. 1*

Chairman: Mr. Carlet R. AUGUSTE (Haiti).

AGENDA ITEM 36

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued):

(a) Reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5692, A/5707, A/5825 and Add.1, A/5932, A/5957);

(b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/5850 and Add.1, A/6025 and Add.1)

1. Mr. O'HARA (United States of America) recalled his brief statement of United States views on the policy of racial discrimination of the Republic of South Africa at the 1571st meeting of the Fourth Committee. He wished, however, to make his Government's position in the matter quite clear once again, to examine the action undertaken by the international community to persuade South Africa to renounce its inhuman policy, and to recall the efforts which the United States had made to convince the South African Government that the United States would not support it in that policy. The last time the Security Council had discussed the question, Adlai Stevenson had eloquently stressed the dangers inherent in the policy of apartheid, "racist in its origins, arrogant in its implementation" (1133rd meeting); he had said that that policy contravened the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that it contained all the elements of a racial conflict liable seriously to impede progress on the African continent and throughout the world. Similarly, Mr. Goldberg the new Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, had said in the General Assembly (1334th meeting) displaying his repugnance for the current policy of South Africa, that, for his country, equality should not be treated as a mere principle, but must be put into practice. The United States sought to eliminate discrimination not only within its own borders but also in the rest of the world.

2. The United States delegation was appalled to observe that, at a time when most countries were endeavouring to ensure the exercise of human rights, the South African Government was doing its best to abolish them. Apartheid was an immoral, destructive and dangerous doctrine and, as he had said in the Fourth Committee (1571st meeting), the United States, "which had been the first to break the bonds of colonialism, would be the last to accept any political or economic system which left the majority of the population at the mercy of a minority".

3. The members of the Committee were perfectly familiar with the history of United Nations discussions of the question of apartheid. The South African Government had not only disregarded United Nations action in favour of a peaceful process, but it had also adopted fresh measures of discrimination each year. Despite the opposition of the indigenous population, repressive measures had become so numerous that the non-whites had been shorn of all legal means of obtaining redress for injuries sustained or vindicating their rights.

4. With regard to the action taken by the United Nations to remedy the situation, he recalled that the Security Council, in its last resolution (191 (1964)) on the subject, had condemned apartheid but had nevertheless sought to achieve agreement by normal methods. The Council had urgently appealed to the Government of the Republic of South Africa to abolish its discriminatory legislation and to liberate all persons imprisoned for having opposed the policy of apartheid. It had also invited the Government of the Republic of South Africa to consult with all the people of South Africa with a view to deciding the future of the country. That appeal had remained without effect. Instead of taking the reasonable action requested by the Council to solve the question, the South African Government had claimed that the Council was interfering in matters pertaining to the domestic jurisdiction of a Member State. The Security Council, under the same resolution, had established a committee of experts to undertake a technical and practical study and report to the Council on the feasibility, effectiveness and implications of measures which could be taken by the Council under the Charter. The United States had participated fully in that committee's work, not because it had thought that the situation in South Africa at the time constituted a threat to international peace and security under the Charter, but because it had considered, like the other members of the Council, that it would be very useful to be in possession of a detailed study of the question. The United States delegation still believed that the situation in South Africa, deplorable as it was, did not constitute in the existing situation a threat to international peace

and security. It would be noted that, although the committee of experts had considered that the imposition of sanctions would create serious problems, it had nevertheless pointed out that there were vulnerable areas in the South African economy, in which sanctions could be made effective. The United States delegation believed that all the Members of the United Nations, including the South African Government, should look carefully into the conclusions of that study.

5. Under the same resolution, the Security Council had also invited the Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate United Nations specialized agencies, to establish an educational and training programme abroad for South Africans. The Secretary-General had acted on that recommendation and, in response to his appeal for funds, the United States had contributed \$75,000. The United States Government and American institutions had also made substantial contributions to the education of South Africans. In view of the importance of education for the future development of Africa, and realizing the magnitude of the task, the United States would favourably examine the Secretary-General's report and recommendations on the subject.

6. Finally, the Security Council had repeated its appeal to all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms, munitions of all types, military vehicles and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and munitions of war in South Africa. Nevertheless, South Africa continued to receive large quantities of modern arms. In that respect, he wished to deny the untrue reports to which reference had been made to the effect that the United States had contributed to the strengthening of South Africa's military power. The United States had strictly observed the embargo on all arms and military equipment for the South African Government. Indeed, it had extended that embargo to cover items normally used for civilian purposes, but easily convertible for military purposes; the loss of profits resulting from the embargo amounted to at least \$115 million in less than two years. His Government estimated that an additional \$285 million of orders which normally would have been placed in the United States had been placed elsewhere during the same period. The Committee might look into the means of persuading all Member States to comply with the letter and the spirit of the Security Council resolutions, recommending an embargo on all arms shipments to South Africa.

7. The United States was prepared to take part in any efforts made under the Charter to remedy the disastrous effects of apartheid and the secure the observance of the principles of the Charter, the observance, in other words, of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

8. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the crimes committed in the name of apartheid constituted an increasing threat to the freedom and independence of the African peoples and to international peace and security. He stressed the connexion between the policy of South Africa and the recent events that had resulted from the crimes of the Portuguese colonialists and the Southern Rhodesian

racists, of which the Security Council had been informed. As some members of the Committee had pointed out, there was obvious collusion among those countries, which sought to take repressive measures against the indigenous African population. The United Nations was thus faced with a grave international situation requiring an immediate solution.

9. The situation had deteriorated since the General Assembly had begun to study the question of apartheid. Many facts set out in the report of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5957) and cited by its Chairman as well as information from other sources, made it quite clear that the existing situation was intolerable. A great deal had already been said about the serious consequences of the Verwoerd policy, affecting nearly 14 million Africans and persons of Indian and Pakistan origin. The South African racists nevertheless persisted in their policy of hatred, which perpetuated colonial servitude. The Government of South Africa had established a system of legislation based on fascist principles to ensure the domination of a racial minority. It was sufficient to recall that during the very year a series of new Draconian laws had been applied with a view to depriving Africans living in the reserves of every right to security, liberty of movement and employment. Thus the country had been transformed into an immense concentration camp, characterized by poverty, migration, forced labour, unemployment and hunger and also by the highest mortality rate of the whole world. Such were the results of apartheid which had re-established slavery in the middle of the twentieth century and allowed the shameless exploitation of the indigenous African population by the colonialists and foreign monopolies. Twenty years after the condemnation of the fascist criminals at Nuremberg the South African racists were following in their footsteps and had defied all progressive peoples.

10. One might still be astonished at hearing certain representatives proclaim their indignation and at the same time declare before the Committee that the monstrous crimes that had led to apartheid did not represent a threat to peace and international security within the meaning of the Charter. The Soviet delegation proposed to return to that subject later and demonstrate the hypocrisy of such declarations, the sole purpose of which was to tie the hands of the United Nations and prevent it from taking effective measures to put an end to crimes of that nature. The world community demanded that a genuine effort should be made to compel Verwoerd to put an end to the intolerable situation which existed in South Africa.

11. The resolutions adopted by the Security Council during the last three years had called upon the Pretoria Government to stop its practices of racial discrimination and its unlawful measures of repression and terror against the Africans and persons of Indian and Pakistani origin. Those resolutions emphasized that the South African policy of apartheid was incompatible with the principles laid down in the Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and also with the obligations of a

State Member of the United Nations. The question of racial discrimination was examined every year by the General Assembly and by a number of bodies constituted by the United Nations for that purpose. Verwoerd, however, did nothing to change his policy and the Pretoria Government continued to defy the opinion of the peoples and Governments and the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. What was the position of that Government with regard to the United Nations at the time when the latter was considering the issue in question? Why did not the representatives of that country come forward and reply to the accusations made against them? Their absence showed that they were conscious of the responsibility they had incurred before the peoples, which had given proof of their growing indignation at such a system of slavery and serfdom.

12. The policy of apartheid had long since extended beyond the borders of the South African Republic. The racist régime extended all over South West Africa and the South African mercenaries were taking part in the repression of the national liberation movement in the Congo. The southern areas of the African continent were witnessing the consolidation of the colonialist and racist forces as could be seen from the conspiracy of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. That unholy alliance was playing a considerable part in the plans of the imperialist Governments against the national liberation movement in Africa. The South African and Portuguese colonialists were not content merely to support Southern Rhodesia in the General Assembly; the Verwoerd Government was preparing to give economic assistance to the racists in Southern Rhodesia. A military co-operation was to be added to the political and economic links.

13. It was necessary in the final analysis to understand who was responsible for that policy of apartheid and genocide. The reply to that question was to be found in the report of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5957), namely that the responsibility lay with the principal commercial partners of South Africa, including certain permanent members of the Security Council. The report showed also that the commercial partners of South Africa were at the same time its military and political partners. That meant that they were the *de facto* allies of the South African Government. That alliance was founded upon the military, political and economic interests of the Western Powers and of South Africa in the African continent. The Western Powers needed a supporting base in Africa in order to prevent the national liberation movements and they wanted to suspend a sword of Damocles permanently above that continent in order to safeguard their imperialist interests.

14. The South African army was now the most powerful army in the African continent and it was equipped with rockets, jet aircraft and submarines. The South African military budget and armed forces were constantly increasing and that was obviously quite impossible without the help of the NATO countries. Thanks to such help South Africa was now able to exert the threat of arms over the peaceful population in its own territory and throughout the African continent. When the United Kingdom continued to

deliver jet bombers to the South African air force it was declared that those deliveries took place under agreements already signed some time previously. Nevertheless, such an explanation could not hide the fact that the South African pilots were trained by the British Air Force and that the United Kingdom was selling electronic equipment to South Africa for strategic purposes.

15. The Special Committee noted with some anxiety in its report that the United States and other NATO countries were helping South Africa to establish an aircraft industry in South Africa for military and police purposes. The United States, which was increasing its investments in South Africa, had found nothing better to do than to speak against apartheid in the Committee. The United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Italy and other Western countries, far from reducing the volume of their trade with South Africa and their investments in that country, were on the contrary doing all they could to increase them as much as possible. That situation did not correspond with the statement made in the Committee by the representatives of those countries. Material interests were given priority over morality and the decisions of the General Assembly and Security Council. Foreign monopolies and the racist régime in South Africa were closely bound together by common material interests. Those monopolies were known to all and included: General Motors, Ford Motors, Firestone, Chrysler, Unilever and Rio Tinto Zinc. All those companies had invested in South Africa sums amounting to thousands of millions of dollars. That was the fundamental explanation of the situation in South Africa. It was well known that one of the principal British investors in South Africa had stated that without the policy of apartheid foreign monopolies would not invest such large sums in that country.

16. The co-operation between the Western monopolies and South Africa had acquired the appearance of a defiance since the Western Powers took no heed at all of the decisions of the United Nations to put an end to the assistance to the South African racists. It was thus possible to read in the *Financial Times* of London that the American companies, General Motors and Union Carriage and Wagon had recently received orders from South Africa amounting to £3 million sterling. The same newspaper stated that the Union de Banques Suisses had entered into an agreement with the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa with the view of granting with the help of a consortium of European banks a loan of about £18 million sterling to build steel works in South Africa. In 1964 the volume of trade between West Germany, Japan and Italy with South Africa amounted to \$667 million, the share of Japan having increased since 1959 by 182 per cent, that of Italy by 83 per cent, and that of West Germany by 69 per cent. There was therefore nothing surprising in a statement made that year by the Chairman of an American company at Johannesburg that the efforts to bring about the economic boycott of South Africa did not reflect the opinion of business circles in the United States and that the latter considered South Africa as an important ally and an important economic force of the free world.

17. Thus the imperialist Powers were bound to South Africa by common ideological, military, political and economic interests. It was for that reason that the Western countries were constantly attempting to transform the discussions about apartheid into pure logomachy and to delay any decisions which the United Nations should take if that Organization desired to remain faithful to the purposes and principles of the Charter. When the Western Powers actively upheld the establishment of the Committee of Experts, the Soviet delegation had emphasized that procrastination of any kind was useless and that on the contrary it was necessary to take the measures provided in the Charter in order to expel the fascist forces from South Africa. The work and the conclusions of that Committee proved that the Soviet delegation had been quite right in speaking in the Security Council that a "complementary examination" could only serve the interests of those who wished to delay the solution of the issue. The efforts made by the Ivory Coast, Morocco, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to put the work of the Committee of Experts on a practical level were impeded by the opposition of the Western Powers which preferred "to study" in the Committee such problems as "the climate and geographical conditions of South Africa". Thanks to those tactics, the Western Powers had endeavoured to keep the Committee of Experts from applying effective sanctions. They attempted above all to defend their own interests as the principal commercial partners of South Africa. As a consequence of that attitude the conclusion of the Committee of Experts was such as to cause doubts in the Security Council with regard to the necessity of applying sanctions against the Verwoerd Government. Those conclusions did not correspond to the reality of the situation and States Members of the United Nations should take care that any fresh efforts to solve the question of apartheid should not be diverted from their true purpose by a series of inquiries and examinations which had nothing to do with the question. Those facts showed that the Western Powers were trying to put obstacles in the way of adopting effective sanctions against South Africa. Those who formerly were clearly opposed to the application of economic sanctions now desired, in order to delay a solution of the matter, to spread the belief that it was necessary to subject the situation to a more detailed examination.

18. The United States representative contended that the only reasonable way to settle the question was to employ "normal methods", i.e., co-operation and consultation, and that the situation in South Africa did not threaten international peace and security. It was also argued that the question had not yet been discussed fully enough for final action to be taken. However, the United Nations had been studying the problem for eighteen years, and it must surely be realized by now that it was futile to attempt to put an end to apartheid by those methods. It was argued that the embargo on arms shipments to the Republic of South Africa provided a partial solution to the problem and that it was impossible to take other measures at present. What was not mentioned, however, was that South Africa already had arms in sufficient quantities, which had been delivered to it by the NATO countries, and that arms could also

be manufactured in South Africa itself. Surely those who were advancing that argument did not think they could deceive the peoples of the entire world. They should not forget that the General Assembly and the Security Council had adopted many decisions which were still awaiting implementation. Moreover, the Organization of African Unity and the second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo in October 1964, had adopted important decisions concerning sanctions to be applied against the South African régime, and those decisions reflected the views of an overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations. For example, the Cairo Declaration, which had won approval from many other States as well, called upon all States to refrain from trading with South Africa, to halt exports of arms and military equipment, and to sever diplomatic, consular and other relations with South Africa.

19. His delegation strongly supported the recommendations made by the Special Committee in its report (A/5957), which showed that a majority of States Members of the United Nations were convinced of the need to take urgent, effective action against the South African racists. Thus, it was not a question of whether or not economic, political or other sanctions should be applied against South Africa, for many countries were already doing so. What was needed now was unanimous support for a series of measures which would prevent the Verwoerd régime from continuing its apartheid policies. All Member States should subject South Africa to a boycott and economic sanctions in order to make its economic isolation complete. For that purpose, it was essential that the Special Political Committee, and then the General Assembly, should ask the Security Council to consider the question of economic sanctions and call upon all States Members of the United Nations to apply them. It was the duty of the United Nations to defend the right of the indigenous inhabitants of South Africa to throw off the yoke placed on them by a racist minority.

20. His delegation strongly supported the African countries in urging the Security Council to take action against the South African Government. It endorsed the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee which called upon the Security Council to take decisions requiring all Governments to apply, *inter alia*, economic sanctions against the South African régime. It also felt that the Special Committee should continue its work with a view to making recommendations to the General Assembly and the Security Council for eliminating the policies of apartheid. His delegation urged the Security Council to hold a meeting in an African country in the early part of 1966 for the purpose of considering the question of apartheid in South Africa and adopting specific measures and decisions in that regard. The United Nations should take an unequivocal position in favour of the national liberation of the indigenous inhabitants of South Africa. In defending the peoples which were fighting against colonialism and racism, it would be achieving one of its noblest aims.

Mr. Inglés (Philippines) (Vice-Chairman) took the Chair.

21. Mr. SANGHO (Mali) recalled that, in the introduction to his last report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General observed that "The situation in the Republic of South Africa presents no less dark and disturbing a picture than previously".^{1/} The Pretoria Government was not only persisting in its policies and continuing to disregard the United Nations resolutions but had also adopted an insolent, provocative attitude towards African Governments. As the reports of the Special Committee showed, there were increasing acts of brutal, inhuman repression, banning and house arrest orders, and even executions. The United Nations must therefore take drastic steps as a matter of urgency.

22. Such action was particularly essential because the Government of the Republic of South Africa was increasing its military and police power. One of its spokesmen had stated, for example, that the South African air force was one of the most effective in the world, and it was known that the country's commercial air fleet included a number of aircraft which could be quickly converted into combat aircraft.

23. Moreover, the Government of the Republic of South Africa was co-operating with the colonial Governments of southern Africa. Thus, the situation had grown worse, and the journalist Philippe Ben had gone so far as to state in the newspaper Le Monde that, after the defeat of the progressive forces on the question of Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies, Africans must henceforth rely on their own strength. However, the Africans would not be the only ones to suffer, for some day the Government of the Republic of South Africa might very well turn against some segment of the white population, just as the nazis had done in Europe. Indeed, those who refused to apply against South Africa the economic boycott measures called for by the United Nations were pursuing a policy that was as dangerous as it was reactionary. They failed to see that, in the eyes of all Africans who were aware of the realities of the situation, the position adopted with regard to apartheid could not be dissociated from that adopted towards the peoples of Africa in general.

24. The Pretoria Government's defiance of the entire world was connected with the behaviour of its trading partners, which included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan. The investors of those countries were making large profits out of the blood and sweat of the African inhabitants. As the Special Committee stated in one of its reports, the principal trading partners of the Republic of South Africa had substantially increased their investments in that country since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), thus putting the Republic of South Africa in a better position to withstand economic sanctions; hence, those investments could only encourage South Africa in its policies and aggravate tension in southern Africa.

25. Under those circumstances, it was to be wondered whether the United Kingdom, France and the United States, which were among the founders of the United Nations and were permanent members of the Security

Council, were aware of their heavy responsibility. It might even be wondered whether those countries did not wish to encourage the rebel Government of Southern Rhodesia to establish in that territory a régime similar to the one in power in the Republic of South Africa. The great Powers in question should realize that their attitude was impairing the prestige of the United Nations and that there could be very grave consequences for the Organization and, hence, for the entire world. They should remember the sacrifices which had been necessary in order to crush nazism because action had not been taken when there had still been time. The fact that the Governor representing the Queen herself in Southern Rhodesia might at any time be ejected by that country's rebel Government showed where the United Kingdom's policy of inaction had led.

26. Moreover, the vast movement for national liberation which oppression had brought into being could not be disregarded. If the United Nations failed to discharge its responsibilities, all those who had mistakenly had faith in its principles would join in a struggle against the Government of the Republic of South Africa, and the latter's little band of slave-owners would be swept away in any case. As Mr. Modibo Keita, the President of the Republic of Mali, had stated, until the people of South Africa were liberated and were able to feel at home in their own country, there would be a revolution to be made and it would take place sooner or later.

27. In view of the situation prevailing in the Republic of South Africa, his delegation could not but endorse the recommendations made by the Special Committee in its report (A/5957), particularly those contained in paragraph 155.

28. Decisive action was essential in order to put an end to the inhuman acts, savage repression and crimes which were being committed in the Republic of South Africa. It was clear that, in the present case, persuasion had no effect. A serious threat to the peace did in fact exist in the Republic of South Africa, particularly since the recent developments in Southern Rhodesia. Hence the situation called for the application of the provision of Chapter VII of the Charter. If such measures were to be effective, however, they must be applied universally, as the Secretary-General himself had stated. Their success depended primarily on those States which maintained very close relations with the Republic of South Africa, and it was to be hoped that the countries in question would be able to rise above their immediate commercial interests.

29. Mr. BORSANYI (Hungary) started by saying that those who meant to contribute to the maintenance of peace should above all contribute to the elimination of centres throughout the world from which a conflagration could spread. If the agenda item were approached from that angle, it was clear that the South African Government's policy of apartheid constituted a serious threat to peace.

30. Hungary, which as a member of the Special Committee had striven to ease the task of those working for the elimination of apartheid, perceived that recent events in Southern Rhodesia had further

^{1/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 1A, section IX.

aggravated an already explosive situation. Each year the various organs of the United Nations had adopted numerous resolutions which had proved impossible to implement. As the Special Committee had noted with the utmost concern, the South African Government was further intensifying its policy. It was no longer possible to keep count of the prosecutions brought by it against the opponents of apartheid, who were given very severe sentences; political prisoners, according to the Special Committee's findings, were subjected to every kind of mistreatment and torture; and banishments were the order of the day. Since the beginning of 1963, more than fifty opponents of apartheid had been executed. In fact, the rulers of South Africa themselves acknowledged that the only way to preserve their power was by racial segregation and the subjection of the indigenous population. Thus, according to the South African Digest of 26 March 1964, Mr. Carel de Wet, the South African Ambassador to the United Kingdom had said that his Government would not compromise with regard to what he called the right of his non-African fellow-countrymen to govern those regions of South Africa that they had colonized. Indeed, hardly a day went by, without some such statement from one of the South African leaders.

31. The South African Government had now found a new ally in Southern Rhodesia. The threat posed by that alliance had been pointed out by the representative of the Ivory Coast who, in his speech to the Security Council on 13 November 1965 (1259th meeting), had said that all the conditions for a racial war to break out in the centre of Africa had been created, and that the threat to peace and security was therefore certain.

32. The Government of the Republic of South Africa was able to pursue its policy of apartheid with impunity because it was counting upon its allies. The reports and other documents of the Special Committee showed that the actions of the principal Western Powers were far from agreeing with their words. For instance, on 2 August 1963 (1052nd meeting) the United States representative in the Security Council had stated that his Government expected to bring to an end the sale of all military equipment to the Government of South Africa, but he had hastened to add that the United States of America reserved the right to interpret that policy in the light of what it considered necessary for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

33. Then, too, there had more than once been reports that the United Kingdom Government had decided to place an embargo on all exports of arms to South Africa and that it would give no economic assistance to that country and invest no capital there. Japan, for its part, had stated that it would grant no military or economic assistance to the Republic of South Africa and would invest no capital there. But, so far as those statements were concerned, it was very hard to distinguish between arms for maintaining peace and arms that would help to put apartheid into practice; and the formulas which had been resorted to were merely deceptive pretexts.

34. Moreover, the documents of the Special Committee showed that the principal Western Powers maintained close economic ties with South Africa and on occasion even supplied it with arms. More than

two thirds of South Africa's trade was shared among the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Italy and Southern Rhodesia. There had been no substantial change in that respect, and South Africa's trade with some countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Italy, had actually increased.

35. The magnitude of the aid given to the Republic of South Africa by the Western Powers could be illustrated by a few examples. According to the 5 February 1965 issue of the periodical Southern Africa, published in London, a new plant would initially assemble American light aircraft, including a light aircraft for the police (A/5932, para. 60). That being so, there could be no question of those aircraft serving only to maintain peace. Similarly, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had announced on 25 November 1964 that his Government would allow the shipment of spares, as and when required, for the sixteen "Buccaneer" aircraft already sold by the United Kingdom (*ibid.*, para. 65). After that, it was understandable that Mr. Fouché, the South African Minister of Defence, should have said that South Africa was less isolated than in the past, and that his problems regarding military purchases were becoming easier (*ibid.*, para. 72).

36. It was also no secret that many international firms had made massive investments in the Republic of South Africa. The 30 July 1965 issue of the periodical Africa, published in New York, reported that, according to an announcement made by the State Department on 27 July 1965, the United States was not considering a change in its policy with regard to South Africa. According to that periodical, the announcement in question had been made after a meeting between Mr. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State, and a group of directors of American firms who wished him to reassure them that the American Government would not yield to the pressure of liberal groups in the United States. With regard to the size of those investments, the report of the Special Committee (A/5932), published a certain number of figures. According to paragraph 118 of that document, investment plans for the South African automobile industry amounted to nearly \$200 million, most of it provided by foreign companies. According to paragraph 127, Chrysler South Africa (Pty.) Limited had announced a \$35 million manufacturing and development plan. According to paragraph 142, top executives of the Toyo Kogyo Company Limited of Hiroshima, Japan, had come to South Africa in February 1965 to investigate the possibility of establishing a motor component factory in South Africa at a cost of about \$21 million. According to paragraph 168 of the same report, a \$45 million oil refinery established in Durban by the Shell and British Petroleum South African Petroleum Refineries (Pty.) Limited had gone on stream in October 1963, and in paragraph 173 it was stated that the Highveld Development Company, a member of the Anglo-American group, was building a \$140 million iron, steel and vanadium complex at Witbank. It was thus clear that capital investment was going ahead in South Africa, where foreign companies derived large profits from the exploitation of the black population. Thus, according to a pamphlet published in January 1965 by the

Trust Bank of South Africa, American companies dealing with South African industry made profits twice as large as those earned by investments in Western Europe. Finally, to demonstrate the fundamental link that existed between apartheid and the attitude of the Western Powers, it was sufficient to quote the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, who had, according to the South African Digest of 1 May 1964, stated in April of that year that no one would invest in South Africa if investors had the impression that the Whites would lose control over the country.

37. That collusion showed clearly why the efforts of the United Nations had thus far been unsuccessful, and it prompted a very careful study of the report of the Special Committee, especially paragraphs 140 to 149 and the recommendations in part III.

38. In those recommendations the Special Committee clearly indicated that economic sanctions were the only effective means for preventing a tragic conflict, and that a key role fell to South Africa's major trading partners.

39. Apartheid could be combated peacefully only if the Security Council took specific measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, and if all Member States implemented those measures. The double-dealing of South Africa's major trading partners had to be exposed before world opinion. Hungary, for its part, had no dealings whatever with South Africa, and its position had always been quite clear. That position had recently been reaffirmed by the President of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, who had stated on 13 November 1965 that Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence was a challenge to the movement of liberation of African peoples, that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic denounced those

fresh manoeuvres by neo-colonialism and was on the side of the millions of men who were fighting for their independence.

40. He also wished to state that, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1978 (XVIII), his Government had decided to come to the help of families of persons persecuted by the Government of South Africa with a contribution, payable in kind, of 100,000 forints.

41. Mr. ASHKAR (Guinea) said he wished to make a more detailed reply to the various observations to which his statement at the 469th meeting had given rise. In the meantime he wished to dispel a misunderstanding created by those who were responsible for the situation in South Africa. It had been said that a naval blockade was indispensable for the application of economic sanctions. That argument was fallacious. The Security Council had actually adopted decisions relating to sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter; if every State complied with those decisions and refrained from trading with South Africa, there was no need to resort to a blockade. For that matter, the United Kingdom had not called for a blockade in order to apply economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia; but the case would, of course, be different if the United Kingdom were endeavouring to prevent the application of those sanctions.

42. Mr. NORTON de MATOS (Portugal), exercising his right of reply, said that the representative of the Soviet Union had again alleged the existence of an alliance between Portugal and certain countries in Africa. He was, therefore, once again obliged to deny most emphatically the existence of such an alliance.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.