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Chairman: Mr. Humberto LOPEZ VILLAMIL
(Honduras).

AGENDA ITEM 35

The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/6688, A/6818 and Corr.1):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/6864 and Add.1);
(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/6825, A/6873 and Corr.1)

1. Mr. ALLIMADI (Uganda) paid a tribute to the work of the members of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Committee of Twenty-Four.^{1/} His delegation also welcomed the report of the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa (A/6818 and Corr.1), held at Kitwe, Zambia, from 25 July to 4 August 1967, and the statements made at the 552nd meeting by Mr. Farah and Mr. Khakri, Rapporteur and Acting Chairman respectively of the Special Committee, and by the Reverend Canon L. John Collins, the President of the International Defence and Aid Fund.

2. Seven years after the General Assembly had adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, it must, unhappily, be noted that the régimes in South Africa, South West Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia had entirely ignored that Declaration. It was difficult to consider the question of apartheid except in the general context of colonialism and racism in southern Africa. As the representative of Guinea had observed at the International Seminar, apartheid and colonialism were inextricably interlinked. Apartheid was merely a new name for colonialism, although some aspects of it were far more cruel since it combined many

forms of colonialism. The representatives of South Africa's trading partners had frequently compared apartheid to nazism. The reason why those countries, which had fought against nazism, were reluctant to turn against apartheid was simple. They were applying a double standard according to whether or not their interests were immediately threatened. The South African leaders themselves had avoided two errors committed by Hitler: they had limited the scope of apartheid, which was applied only to the non-white population of southern Africa, and they had done everything possible to attract foreign investment to their country, whose resources were inexhaustible. There was thus a fundamental difference between nazism and apartheid where the economic interests of the Western Powers were concerned. Nevertheless, of late, apartheid had assumed greater proportions and become the instrument of an expansionist policy threatening Zambia with the use of force. His delegation unreservedly condemned South Africa's attempt to export apartheid.

3. The situation in South Africa was deteriorating more and more rapidly and approaching its final phase—bloodshed and massacre. Yet there was still time to prevent disaster. The question was not whether apartheid should be brought to an end—all Members of the United Nations were agreed on that score—but of finding the means to eradicate it once and for all. It was obvious that apartheid would not destroy itself and that persuasion alone could not induce South Africa to renounce its evil system. What was needed were resolutions backed by enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. In that connexion, his delegation was bewildered by the attitude of South Africa's trading partners, which frequently proclaimed themselves the friends of Africa but were actually determined to sabotage the efforts of the United Nations to solve the problem. Those countries were concerned only to maintain the status quo and even to foster South Africa's territorial aggrandizement and to stabilize the present entente between the régimes in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination.

4. For the peoples of Africa, there was a direct relationship between the failure of the United Nations to take positive measures against colonialism in southern Africa and the intransigence of the local régimes. The South African Government openly declared that neither persuasion nor peaceful means would induce it to abandon its policies. It was therefore puzzling, to say the least, that the Western Powers should continue to argue that persuasion would bring results. The strategy of South Africa's trading partners in holding back the offensive of African,

^{1/} Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Asian and Latin American countries was simple: whenever such countries submitted a draft resolution calling for practical action against South Africa, its friends voted against or abstained, advancing the excuse that the draft resolution was motivated by "emotional" factors and was not "realistic". Yet they themselves proposed no practical or "realistic" measures. It must thus be concluded that those States merely used convenient arguments to block any attempt to settle the problem of apartheid. It was sufficient to recall how the Western States had sabotaged the efforts of the African, Asian and Latin American countries during the fifth special session on South West Africa early in 1967, and the refusal of the Western Powers and South Africa's principal trading partners to participate in the work of the Special Committee. Of the nineteen Member States approached by the President of the General Assembly, only the Soviet Union had agreed to participate in the work of the Special Committee as enlarged under General Assembly resolution 2054 A (XX). The United States, the United Kingdom and France had simply stated that they did not regard the situation in South Africa as a threat to international peace and security. Moreover, trade between South Africa and its western allies was increasing—no mere coincidence, but a coherent plan of action. It really appeared that, for the Western States, a threat to peace and security meant a threat against their own interests and those of the white population.

5. The brutal acts committed under the system of apartheid, and the support of that system by South Africa's principal trading partners, were exercises in self-destruction. The African peoples still under the colonial yoke would ultimately triumph, at whatever cost. No alliance, no bomb and no blackmail could prevent the African peoples from achieving independence. It was therefore in the interest of all countries to settle the problem of South Africa peacefully, before a catastrophe occurred.

6. Mr. GORJAN (Yugoslavia) said that the South African Government's policy of apartheid had been dangerously intensified. That minority Government continued to pass "acts", such as the Terrorism Act, designed to deprive the majority of the population of their fundamental rights. Contrary to the statements of its representatives, the South African Government paid not the slightest heed to the very principles of the United Nations Charter. The collaboration between the colonial and reactionary forces was daily increasing and posed a serious threat to peace in Africa. A Government incapable of practising democratic principles in its internal policies was equally incapable of abiding by those same principles in its international relations. The real reason why the racist Governments persisted in their attitude was the growing interest in them, from the economic and financial standpoint, shown by certain highly industrialized countries. By redoubling their trade with, and investments in, South Africa, certain of those countries, which were Members of the United Nations, were flouting the Organization's decisions. Trade with South Africa and the inflow of foreign capital only helped to strengthen the base of the minority Government and to perpetuate the system of apartheid. In gaining a greater foothold in South Africa, foreign

States were displaying aggressiveness towards the independent countries in southern Africa.

7. His delegation fully supported the proposals for intensified activity by the United Nations with regard to apartheid. All States should be alerted to the inherent dangers of the racist régime in South Africa. The recommendations and the final declaration of the International Seminar on Apartheid (A/6818, paras. 123 and 124) should serve as guidelines for practical action. Furthermore, his delegation considered that the Security Council, which had not examined the situation in South Africa since 1964, should again consider that question.

8. Mr. EPANGUE-KOSS (Cameroon) observed that it was almost twenty years since the United Nations had first taken up the question of apartheid; it had been endeavouring ever since to persuade the South African régime to abandon apartheid and racism. He deplored the fact that the Special Political Committee had become a huge graveyard for still unsolved questions and questions which some people would rather leave unsolved.

9. The situation in southern Africa had in recent months become more serious because the South African Government, which was actively supporting the Ian Smith régime, had intervened directly against the Rhodesian nationalists. A South African Minister had gone so far as to say that South African troops would remain in Rhodesia for as long as necessary. It was perfectly clear, therefore, not only that the Republic of South Africa was determined to remain what it was, the cradle of apartheid, but also that it had decided to extend that ignoble policy to other parts of Africa. The United Kingdom, which was largely responsible for the situation in Rhodesia, had stated at the 1567th plenary meeting, through the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that it would not risk any confrontation with South Africa. The result was to encourage the Pretoria régime to persist in the attitude it had maintained for twenty years. The summary execution, of eleven South African nationalists only a short time previously, clearly showed that the Government of South Africa had no respect for the principles on which every civilized society was based.

10. He congratulated the Special Committee on the substantial and valuable work it had done and was doing. He also welcomed with particular satisfaction the conclusions and recommendations of the International Seminar on Apartheid (A/6818, para. 123). He regretted however that the great Powers, which were after all responsible for ensuring the triumph of the purposes and principles defined in the Charter of the United Nations, should have become the first architects of the Organization's failure. Year after year the General Assembly had adopted resolutions which, unanimous though they might have been, had remained a dead letter. On the other hand, the establishment of a United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2054 B (XX) was a heartening development; and resolution 2202 A (XXI), in which the General Assembly deplored the attitude of the main trading partners of South Africa which were encouraging the South African Government to persist in its racial policies,

had the merit of stating specifically that the danger of a violent conflict had been aggravated. Concerted action by the great Powers was the only means of remedying the situation. But, in view of the negative attitude adopted by those Powers and the obvious impossibility of devising a peaceful solution to the problem of apartheid, his delegation believed that efforts should now be made to give the oppressed peoples direct assistance in liberating themselves. To that end, maximum support should be given to movements and parties which were fighting against apartheid in South Africa. In that connexion, he wished to pay a tribute to Chief Albert Luthuli, former President of the African National Congress of South Africa and a Nobel Peace Prize winner. Chief Luthuli, who had died recently, had waged a constant struggle for the establishment of a multi-racial and democratic society in South Africa.

11. He hoped that the great Powers would finally recognize their responsibilities and display some willingness to solve the problem of apartheid. If at last they decided to take action, the problem would be quickly solved. It was a tragic absurdity of the present-day world that, at a time when the frontiers of knowledge had been pushed outward to the moon and beyond and when man was liberating fantastic new sources of energy, the very people who had fought nazism in the past were now collaborating in its rebirth and recrudescence because the victims in the present case were not White but Black. All freedom-loving peoples in Africa and throughout the world were on the side of the oppressed peoples of South Africa. There was still time for the great Powers to come to their senses and, faced with the threat of a major racial conflict which might be unleashed in the near future if the necessary steps were not taken at once to become more fully aware of the immense share of responsibility they bore for the sufferings endured by thousands of Africans.

12. Mr. OUATTARA (Upper Volta) said that, in taking up again the agenda item on the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the General Assembly was reaffirming the importance of the problem and stressing the urgent need to arrive at a satisfactory solution. For the twenty-second time, the Secretary-General and the Special Committee had, with praiseworthy realism and objectivity, drawn the distressing picture of one of the most revolting concepts of all time. The negative attitude of Member States which had been consulted on the question of the enlargement of the Special Committee was particularly regrettable. The Secretary-General had stated in the introduction to his annual report for the period 16 June 1966 to 15 June 1967 that the question had not been brought before the Security Council since June 1964 "in view of the absence of the necessary consensus among the Powers concerned on further meaningful measures beyond those adopted in 1963 and 1964, particularly the arms embargo" (see A/6701/Add.1, para. 105). The attitude taken by those Powers was in flagrant contradiction with the idea of the defence of democracy which they were preaching in the United Nations and elsewhere, and represented a complete denial of the principles of the Charter to which they had freely subscribed. Fortunately, the untiring efforts of the Special Com-

mittee, as described in document A/6864 and Add.1, gave grounds for hoping that in the end reason would prevail. Another warning, too, had been issued by the Secretary-General himself.

13. The effectiveness of the United Nations in exercising a significant influence towards a peaceful and just solution to the difficult problems in South Africa would depend essentially on the willingness and ability of the permanent members of the Security Council and the main trading partners of the Republic of South Africa to harmonize their positions and take more effective measures to persuade the South African Government to abandon its present course and seek a solution consistent with the United Nations Charter and the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Progress in that direction was imperative and urgent in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation which might have grave consequences.

14. There were some who held that the situation in southern Africa was not yet explosive, and that it would be enough to encourage the parties concerned to return to respect for elementary human rights and peaceful coexistence. In his delegation's view, the supporters of that theory were gravediggers who were burying the sacred principles of the Charter for the sake of material interests. The participants in the Seminar on Apartheid held at Brasilia in August and September 1966^{2/} had unanimously condemned the policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa and, in the conviction that those policies constituted a threat to international peace and security, had made a pressing appeal to the Security Council for immediate action under Chapter VII of the Charter, since South Africa had for twenty years refused to heed the appeals of reason, and recourse to Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter was the only alternative left. Furthermore, the problem of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa was closely linked with the problem of South West Africa, on which the United Nations was also in permanent conflict with the Republic of South Africa. The question of South West Africa had been considered by the Committee of Twenty-Four in May, June, August and September 1966, by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, by the Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa between January and March 1967, by the Assembly at its fifth special session in April and May 1967 and by the Committee of Twenty-Four in June 1967. That long succession of meetings on the subject spoke of the gravity of the situation and the urgency of finding a remedy for it.

15. Accordingly, he associated himself with those who had stressed the pressing need for a thorough study of the item relating to peace-keeping operations in all their aspects. The Organization must be equipped with the means to enforce its decisions if necessary. It had no alternative but to establish a system of defence which, in circumstances unanimously recognized as a threat to international peace and security, could intervene in the clearly established interests of the parties concerned and of all mankind. Such a degree of unanimity in deploring the situation should be accompanied by the determination to remedy the situation. No more time should be wasted on sterile

^{2/} For the report of the Seminar, see document ST/TAO/HR/27.

discussions. Those who had repeatedly criticized the African delegations for wishing to move too fast should suggest what new methods could now be used to induce the fascists and the anachronistic colonialists of the twentieth century to listen to reason.

16. Mr. KOUASSI (Ivory Coast) observed that the United Nations had been deeply concerned with the problem of apartheid for many years. But the Pretoria régime, which was determined to defy the United Nations, to challenge its authority and gradually bring about its destruction, was daily becoming more arrogant.

17. The question now, as before, was whether the world would reconcile itself to the fact that a handful of South Africans of foreign origin were robbing of their fundamental rights millions of men who still wished to consider them their fellow citizens and who aspired to nothing more than a little freedom and dignity.

18. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, and particularly resolution 2202 A (XXI), operative paragraphs 1 and 2, showed that virtually all Member States were opposed to the inhuman policies of the racist régime in Pretoria. But the fact that it had not been possible to implement those resolutions was a matter of concern to all States which, like the Ivory Coast, regarded the United Nations as the guarantor of justice among men, an instrument of social progress and the guardian of international peace and security.

19. To continue to do nothing might accommodate those who preached the uselessness of the United Nations and hoped for its disappearance, after which the world would be at the mercy of force and brutality. That was why the United Nations must be able to rely on the sincere and complete co-operation of all Member States and especially of the major Powers, whose great history must not be sullied by any immediate materialistic considerations.

20. The conclusions of the Special Committee (A/6864, paras. 66-118) showed that the situation in the South African regions was becoming worse from day to day. Discrimination and repression were being intensified in South Africa, and the African nationalists, sick and tired of passive resistance, were organizing themselves.

21. Prompt and vigorous action by the great Powers was therefore essential to arrest a development which, if ignored, might provoke a general, and even world conflict. The delegation of the Ivory Coast was prepared, as in the past, to support any reasonable and realistic United Nations decision likely to restore peace and justice in the southern part of the African continent.

22. Mr. WOLDE-HANNA (Ethiopia) said that the existence of colonial régimes, being instruments of oppression and terror based on discrimination, magnified the danger of a racial conflict in southern Africa. The native inhabitants were deprived of the enjoyment of their resources and the fruit of their labour, and were excluded from participating in the conduct of their own affairs. South Africa was the instigator of that policy and had elevated apartheid to

the rank of an official philosophy on which the country's economic, social, legal and political institutions were built.

23. Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), apartheid was no longer only a colonial problem but also a human rights problem.

24. With the seizure of power by the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia, the intensification by Portugal of the war in Mozambique and Angola, and the usurpation of the international Territory of South West Africa, the "unholy alliance" of colonialism and racism had created problems of ominous dimensions. The signs were clear that those minority régimes had made an alliance to frustrate United Nations resolutions including those adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.

25. Commenting on that aspect, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia had emphasized in his statement before the General Assembly on 4 October 1967 (1579th plenary meeting) that the unholy alliance of the countries of southern Africa, buttressed by trade with the West and by international finance, and possessing as it did significant military power, was designed to frustrate all United Nations decisions, and that any separate and piecemeal action by the United Nations would be futile and doomed to failure.

26. At a time when the international community was preparing to celebrate the International Year for Human Rights, it was an anomaly that the assault on those rights had increased in southern Africa. That had come about because the international community had contented itself with making declarations and adopting resolutions condemning the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination and had so far taken only limited measures, since the arms embargo decided by the Security Council did not enjoy the support of all the countries members of the Council, and the selective mandatory sanctions had been conceived primarily as a gesture to appease public opinion.

27. On the other hand, developments in South Africa itself during the preceding year were significant: the adoption of the new Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Amendment Act constituted new instruments of oppression in the hands of the Government; foreign trade and investment had increased; the arms embargo had not prevented South Africa from purchasing the weapons it needed, and in that connexion he regretted that the French Government, whose policies of decolonization had earned the admiration of Africa, had made an agreement to supply South Africa with Dauphine-type submarines.

28. In the United Nations the major Powers had taken a position of principle, but they looked the other way when United Nations decisions were nullified in their own countries. The world had the right to demand that they should participate in the fight against apartheid, for if they co-operated, they might help to avert an ominous racial conflict. Their responsibility in that regard could not be too much emphasized.

29. As to what could be done in the coming year to combat apartheid and racial discrimination, the

Government of Ethiopia supported the recommendations and the final declaration of the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa (A/6818, paras. 123 and 124), and particularly the recommendation that the legitimacy of the struggle of the 'victims of apartheid should be recognized by the United Nations. He wished to point out that, long before the United Nations, the Ethiopian Government had set up a fund and established a programme to help victims of apartheid, and South Africans had for some time been granted university scholarships. His Government was, of course, prepared to continue such assistance.

30. In his view, the Security Council should examine the situation in southern Africa as a whole and not look at the problem of apartheid in isolation. In that connexion, he pointed out that his country's Minister for Foreign Affairs had called for concerted action (1579th plenary meeting) by resorting to the mechanism envisaged in the Charter. It was the view of his Government that in the light of the continued intransigence of the Government of South Africa, nothing short of effective economic sanctions would induce that country to change its attitude.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.