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GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION

Official Records

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 780th  
MEETING



Tuesday, 16 November 1971,  
at 3.25 p.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Cornelius C. CREMIN (Ireland).

*Expression of welcome to the delegation of  
the People's Republic of China*

1. The CHAIRMAN welcomed the delegation of the People's Republic of China on behalf of the Special Political Committee. He was confident that it would make a great contribution to the deliberations of the Committee. The efficient functioning of the United Nations required the active, constructive participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the organ entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, which was the main purpose of the United Nations. It was therefore essential that the permanent members of the Council should be able to exert an influence corresponding to the special status conferred on them by the Charter, and with the arrival of the representatives of the People's Republic of China, such a situation now existed.

2. The Special Political Committee was only a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, but the few items entrusted to it were of real importance for the full performance of the Assembly's task. They concerned the destiny of many millions of people in southern Africa, that of over a million refugees in the Middle East and effective collective measures to maintain international peace and security. It was therefore good that the Committee should be able to call upon the counsels of the Government of a people numbering roughly one-fourth of the population of the world and one whose historical experience exceeded that of any other nation.

3. Mr. FU (China) thanked the Chairman for his welcome on behalf of the Committee. The Chinese Government and people had always opposed imperialistic policies of aggression, colonialism and racial discrimination and had supported the just fight of the oppressed peoples to win national liberation and become masters of their own destiny. The Chinese Government would work with all peace-loving nations to safeguard international peace and further human progress. Since his delegation was not yet familiar with the procedures in the United Nations, it hoped for the assistance and co-operation of its colleagues during the following few weeks.

4. Mr. BABAR (Pakistan) welcomed the delegates of the People's Republic of China on behalf of his delegation. Their presence in the United Nations brought great pleasure to all countries and in particular to the smaller nations and the people still suffering under colonial subjugation and racial discrimination. His delegation was confident that the

Committee's ability to fulfil its commitments to those peoples would be further strengthened.

5. China was not only a great neighbour but also a sincere and reliable friend of Pakistan. Its contribution at the Bandung Conference of African and Asian Countries in 1955 had made it clear that the People's Republic of China firmly believed in the five principles of co-existence. Unfortunately, hostile propaganda had tried to justify the injustice done to China in depriving it of its rights in the United Nations. That was an injustice not only to that great nation but also to all nations of the world and those which were victims of racialism and colonialism. Pakistan knew that the revolutionary people of China said what they meant and did what they believed to be right. They had no consideration other than justice, equity and their conscience. They were opposed to any form of exploitation, subjugation and bullying of smaller nations by more powerful States. Although they were the largest nation in the world, they had repeatedly warned the world against big Power chauvinism. Although a great Power, they had not a great Power's complexes and attitudes and did not profess to be a super Power. That sincerity proved beyond any doubt their human approach to world problems. From its own experience, Pakistan could assure the people who talked of realism that in that respect the great people of China were second to none.

AGENDA ITEMS 37 AND 12

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (*concluded*) (A/8403, A/8422 and Corr.1, A/8467, A/8468, A/8515/Rev.1, A/SPC/145, A/SPC/L.213, A/SPC/L.222, A/SPC/L.223, A/SPC/L.224):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1);
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/8467, A/8468);
- (c) Report of the Economic and Social Council (chapter XVII (section C)) (A/8403)

6. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the notes by the Secretary-General on the administrative and financial implications of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.213 and A/SPC/L.222, which had been provided by the Secretariat, in accordance with rule 154 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly (A/SPC/L.224 and A/SPC/L.223, respectively).

7. He recalled that draft resolution A/SPC/L.213 had now been modified by the inclusion in operative paragraph 5 of the amendment submitted by Sierra Leone (A/SPC/L.219) as amended orally at the previous meeting by that representative. The United Republic of Tanzania had asked to be included among the sponsors.

8. Mr. COTTON (New Zealand) said that his delegation would support draft resolution A/SPC/L.213, more particularly because it had emphasized the importance of the information programme in its statement in the general debate (769th meeting). He was pleased to see the words "where necessary" in operative paragraph 5, which he understood to mean that national anti-*apartheid* committees would be established only in countries where there was no public opposition to that policy. His Government welcomed the emphasis that the Malaysian representative's statement (777th meeting) introducing the draft resolution had laid on the provision of material by the Office of Public Information for use by the Organization of African Unity in its important task of disseminating information on *apartheid* throughout Africa.

9. Mr. ALVARADO (Venezuela) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution, although it had some reservations on the final part of the penultimate preambular paragraph.

10. Mr. GROOS (Canada) said that his delegation had noted that the Secretary-General, in his statement on the financial implications (A/SPC/L.224) mentioned that an expenditure of \$50,000 would be incurred in excess of the amount provided for in the budget estimates for 1972. The statement did not answer his question at the 777th meeting about the effect of the provisions of the draft resolution on other world-wide work of the Office of Public Information. Although his delegation was in favour of the idea behind the draft resolution, it would have to abstain in the vote for those two reasons.

11. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.213, incorporating an amendment by Sierra Leone (A/SPC/L.219), as revised orally by that country's representative (779th meeting).

*The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 82 votes to 1, with 5 abstentions.*

12. Mr. FU (People's Republic of China) said that his delegation had not participated in the vote because it was not yet familiar with United Nations procedure.

13. Mr. WYBORN (Australia) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution but had reservations on its budgetary implications.

14. Mr. BERNSTRÖM (Sweden), speaking on behalf also of Denmark, Finland and Norway, said that as had already been stated in the Committee, the Governments of the Nordic countries attached special importance to activities to inform world public opinion about *apartheid*. They were therefore very satisfied at the adoption of the draft resolution. In both the Special Political Committee and the Fifth Committee, the Swedish delegation had pointed out that information activities must be consistent with the principle of universality and objectivity. In the absence of guidelines on the important points of principle raised in operative paragraphs 1 and 6 of the draft resolution concerning the division of responsibility between the United Nations and regional organizations, his delegation was not prepared to support the detailed recommendations in those paragraphs. In the Nordic countries the broad-

casting corporations were independent of the Government. His delegation also had doubts as to whether an explicit appeal should be made to the specialized agencies—in operative paragraph 4—to contribute to the anti-*apartheid* campaign, as that might lead to constitutional difficulties in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

15. Mr. CALENDIA (Italy) expressed his delegation's satisfaction at the adoption of the draft resolution, since the information services' contribution to the campaign against *apartheid* had constituted the main point of its statement in the general debate. It had, however, reservations on the financial implications, which should be clarified. It also thought that there should be direct education of the general public in addition to propaganda.

16. Mr. PESMAZOGLU (Greece) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution but must make reservations on operative paragraphs 5 and 6, since it had not been able to obtain instructions on those points from its Government.

17. Mr. GANDA (Sierra Leone) said that his delegation would have voted in favour of the draft resolution, had it been present.

18. Mr. FARAH (Somalia) expressed gratification on behalf of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* for the wide support for the draft resolution. He was however disappointed that a number of countries had found it necessary to abstain on budgetary grounds, especially since South Africa was spending \$20 million to promote its policies abroad, in addition to the several million dollars that were being spent by industrial combines which profited from the exploitation of black labour. Since the international information campaign was the only aspect upon which there was unanimous agreement, he wondered how a Government which found it difficult to finance the campaign proposed that the general public could be informed about the evils of *apartheid*.

19. Mr. SIMUCHIMBA (Zambia) said it was disappointing that the very countries that made money in developing countries should have abstained in the vote on financial grounds.

20. The CHAIRMAN requested delegations to confine their remarks to explanations of votes, since they had had ample opportunity to make statements in the general debate.

21. Mr. KANE (Mauritania) said that his delegation would have voted in favour of the draft resolution, had it been present.

22. Mr. BANGO BANGO (Zaire) said that he had voted in favour of the draft resolution because it would give the international community the opportunity to appreciate the dangers of *apartheid*. However, it was often the case that the statement on financial implications mentioned only the production of information in the English language. Information should also be supplied in the other working languages of the United Nations.

23. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider draft resolution A/SPC/L.222.

24. Mr. FARAH (Somalia) announced that the delegations of Hungary, the Libyan Arab Republic and Singapore had asked that their countries should be included among the sponsors.

25. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2671 D (XXV), the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had contacted representatives of the trade union movement on the possibility of holding an international conference of trade unions in 1972 for promoting action against *apartheid*. The results of its efforts could be found in document A/8515/Rev.1. As a result of its inquiries, the Special Committee considered that it would not be possible to hold such a conference in 1972. However, since the proposal had been received enthusiastically by the trade unions in general, draft resolution A/SPC/L.222 recommended that the Special Committee should send a mission to hold consultative meetings, if possible, with the workers' representatives in Geneva in February and June 1972. It was hoped that as a result the Special Committee would be able to make a firm recommendation to the General Assembly on the possibility of holding such a conference in 1973. In view of the important part the trade union movement could play in the campaign against *apartheid*, he hoped that the Special Committee would be allowed to continue its efforts in that respect.

26. Mr. VON STEDINGK (International Labour Organisation), speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that when the matter had been discussed at a meeting of the Special Committee the previous week, he had not been aware of the new ideas put forward in the draft resolution and had therefore been unable to inform the Director General of the ILO and seek instructions. He had since been able to do so. Everyone must realize that the ILO as such could not enter into commitments on behalf of the workers' group, which enjoyed complete autonomy within the Organisation's tripartite structure. The Director General would however be willing to convey the request contained in the draft resolution, once it was adopted by the General Assembly, to that group. The ILO would also provide normal secretariat services for any meetings between members of the group and representatives of the Special Committee.

27. He realized that if the United Nations did not bear the expenses of participants from the trade union movement, it would be necessary to take advantage of the presence of worker representatives in Geneva during the forthcoming sessions of the ILO Governing Body and of the International Labour Conference. However everyone would understand that such special consultations could not be held within the framework of the normal business of the Governing Body or of the Conference but would have to be arranged on an *ad hoc* basis, in agreement with the workers' groups concerned.

28. Mr. COTTON (New Zealand) said that his delegation would support the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.222). However, it had reservations on operative paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) and (c). His Government firmly believed in the right of everyone to leave any country at any time, as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, New Zealand, although itself a country of immigrants, had made clear its opposition to *apartheid* and in no way encouraged emigration to South Africa.

29. The CHAIRMAN announced that the delegations of Guinea, Mauritania, Mongolia, the People's Republic of the Congo and Tanzania had asked that their countries should be included among sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.222.

*The vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Zaire, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chile, People's Republic of China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, People's Republic of the Congo, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Malawi, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 92 votes to none with 10 abstentions.*

30. Mr. LISAETH (Norway) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution because it agreed with the general tenor of the text. With regard to operative paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) and (c), he wished to point out that the Norwegian trade unions were totally independent, but, in view of their attitude to *apartheid*, he was confident that the resolution would be favourably received by them.

31. Mr. OHTAKA (Japan) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution because it supported its spirit and purposes. However, it had reservations as to the legal implications. Under the domestic laws of his country the Government could in no way control trade unions, which were free to act as they wished. However, he was confident that the principles contained in the draft resolution would serve as a useful guideline to them.

32. Mr. BERNSTRÖM (Sweden) said that it was essential to enlist the help of the international trade union movement. However, the Swedish trade union movement was independent and received no political guidance from the Government. His delegation therefore had reservations with regard to operative paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) and (c).

33. Mr. BAHOLLI (Albania) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, although it did not expect it to have very favourable results, in view of the attitude of certain organizations.

34. Mr. FU (People's Republic of China) said that he had now had the time to study draft resolution A/SPC/L.213 and that his delegation would have liked to have cast an affirmative vote.

35. Mr. BLANC (France) drew attention to the large number of draft resolutions upon which the Committee had voted. He pointed out that the proliferation of texts might lead members to lose sight of the main object of their debate, namely the elimination of *apartheid*. However, the number of draft resolutions had given delegations the opportunity to express their different positions in detail.

36. His delegation was pleased to note that in several cases the sponsors had made an effort to analyse the facts rather than to distribute praise and blame. However, it was regrettable that there had been a tendency of late to revert to useless verbiage which, if anything, helped the cause of *apartheid*.

37. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.214/Rev.1 by which the General Assembly would condemn "the continued and increasing co-operation by certain States . . . as such co-operation encourages the South African Government in the pursuit of its inhuman policies" he pointed out that many more States than those mentioned in the documents circulated had trade relations with South Africa, and some had even increased their exports to South Africa during the past year. However, trade relations had never implied that the seller or the buyer approved of his trading partner's politics. Rejection of South African overtures by the independent African States would not necessarily help the victims of *apartheid*. Furthermore, the General Assembly could not take the place of the Security Council in declaring that a situation constituted a threat to peace, which in his view was not in fact the case.

38. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.208, on the arms embargo, contradicted the decision of the Security Council which, in its resolutions 181 (1963) and 182 (1963) had clearly established a distinction between arms for external defence and arms that could be used to further the South African Government's policy of *apartheid*. His Government would stop the sale of any materials if the buyer attempted to use them for the purpose of aggression against a peaceful State.

39. His delegation had been unable to vote for draft resolution A/SPC/L.210 which would place a burden upon United Nations finances without appreciably adding to the dissemination of information on *apartheid*. Similarly his delegation had abstained from voting on draft resolution A/SPC/L.213, which attempted to transform the United Nations into a semi-journalistic, semi-propaganda institution, losing sight of the fact that it was an association of sovereign States.

40. His delegation had abstained from voting on draft resolution A/SPC/L.222 because it could not associate itself with interference in the internal affairs of Member States. Which of the countries present would allow the United

Nations to decide with whom it should co-operate, or allow an external organization to decide upon its legislation?

41. His delegation had however been able to vote in favour of four draft resolutions. It was not surprising that it had approved the text concerning the Trust Fund (draft resolution A/SPC/L.205/Rev.1), since his country was one of the largest contributors. His delegation hoped that a greater number of States would contribute to the Fund in future, and welcomed the fact that the operation of the Fund had remained both economic and effective. Similarly, his country had contributed \$100,000 of the \$600,000 received by the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa. Although it sometimes hesitated to vote for certain texts it never hesitated to provide resources and assistance when effective action could be taken that would directly benefit the victims of *apartheid*.

42. His delegation agreed with the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.211 that merit should be the only criterion for participation in sporting activities and it entirely supported the Olympic principle of non-discrimination with regard to race, religion or politics. In explanation of his delegation's abstention on the draft resolution he pointed out that, under the terms of that draft, the United Nations would have to approach private individuals or associations, which was contrary to the nature of the Organization. He recommended prudence with regard to sporting events. Silent protest undoubtedly did more to combat racial discrimination than noisy demonstrations. The French rugby team, during a recent tour of South Africa, for instance, had had more effect than the most energetic information campaigns against *apartheid*.

43. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.212 concerning the establishment of Bantustans, his delegation had already, in the case of Namibia, pointed to the dangers of accentuating tribal differences and of population fragmentation.<sup>1</sup> It remained convinced that a process of self-determination used to cover a policy of racial discrimination and to perpetuate inequality was based on false premises; that was the case with Bantustans.

44. Despite certain reservations on the preamble, his delegation had supported draft resolution A/SPC/L.209/Rev.2 which underlined one of the most harmful and profound effects of *apartheid*, namely the deterioration of culture and education. *Apartheid* was abhorrent because, in denying knowledge and conscience to some, it denied them to all.

45. During the current year, the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, an international seminar had been held in his country, at Nice,<sup>2</sup> uniting research and practical workers who had studied and analysed the evils of intolerance throughout the world. In its attitude to the draft resolutions, his delegation had followed the spirit of those who had met in Nice. It was concerned more with the South African people and

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year*, 1594th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Seminar on the dangers of a recrudescence of intolerance in all its forms and the search for ways of preventing and combating it, held at Nice, 24 August-6 September 1971.

with participating in effective projects than with formulas and useless undertakings. His delegation hoped that in future the Committee as a whole would follow a similar course.

46. Mr. BASSETTE (Belgium) said that when the Committee at the twenty-fifth session (696th meeting) had adopted the draft resolution that became General Assembly resolution 2624 (XXV), his delegation had questioned its compatibility with Article 12 of the United Nations Charter, which protected the jurisdiction of the Security Council. His delegation had voted in favour of that draft resolution, however, in the belief that the Assembly could demand the integral implementation of Security Council resolution 282 (1970).

47. The text of draft resolution A/SPC/L.208 was less flexible. Operative paragraph 2 gave a unilateral interpretation of the Security Council resolutions concerning the embargo. It was for the Security Council, and not the General Assembly, to explain the scope of its resolutions. Operative paragraphs 6 and 7 were no more acceptable, because they implied that the Special Committee on *Apartheid* was responsible for the embargo. His delegation had abstained in the voting on the draft resolution, but not because it had any reservations concerning the embargo itself. As he had said recently in exercising his right of reply (771st meeting), his country scrupulously applied all the provisions of the embargo recommended by the Security Council.

48. His delegation had also abstained from voting on draft resolution A/SPC/L.212/Rev.1 concerning the establishment of Bantustans. It had been unable to vote in favour of that draft in view of reservations on the fourth, fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs. The concept of Bantustans, however abhorrent, did not in his delegation's view constitute a crime against humanity. It encroached upon the territorial integrity and national unity of the population in question, as his delegation had shown by voting in favour of Security Council resolution 301 (1971), of 20 October 1971.

49. His delegation had voted against draft resolution A/SPC/L.214/Rev.1, largely because it could not agree with operative paragraph 4, which condemned co-operation with South Africa in various fields. His country did not think that such co-operation specifically encouraged South Africa to pursue its policy of *apartheid*. As long as General Assembly resolutions had called only for a break in relations with South Africa, his delegation had abstained, but it could not remain indifferent and merely abstain from voting, when the complete condemnation of all relations with South Africa was called for; nor could it accept that the General Assembly should recommend that the Security Council adopt the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, as suggested in operative paragraph 13. His delegation did not question the right of the General Assembly to make recommendations, but the Assembly should not prejudice the result of the Council's consideration of a given situation by recommending that it should take measures which were the prerogative of the Council. His delegation also had reservations on operative paragraphs 3 and 5 which rejected the "outward policy" initiated by South Africa and reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle

of the oppressed people of South Africa "by all means at their disposal".

50. Mr. GRIGG (United States of America) explained that his delegation had abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/SPC/L.213 because of the financial implications involved, although it supported the broad aims of the draft.

51. It had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.222 despite the reservations it had on operative paragraph 3 and on the uncertain financial implications of the resolution.

52. Mr. SIMUCHIMBA (Zambia) said that he agreed with the representative of France that the victims of *apartheid* did not profit from United Nations transactions. They would only do so when they were allowed self-determination. No group of people could have self-determination if their opponents were heavily armed, and South Africa was heavily armed. It could attack any South African State with impunity.

53. South Africa had initiated the idea of a dialogue only in order to export arms to weaker States. Any useful dialogue should be held with those who were close to South Africa. It was a contradiction in terms to advocate self-determination while selling arms to South Africa.

54. He thanked those who had supported the draft resolution: the voting had shown who the real friends of the South African people were. The struggle to make Africa strong would be a long one, but when Africa became strong the situation would be very different.

55. Mr. TEYMOUR (Egypt) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.214/Rev.1, A/SPC/L.213 and A/SPC/L.222, showing, as in the past, that it remained faithful to United Nations principles. He asked those delegations which had abstained why it was considered to be contrary to the Charter to support the struggle of oppressed peoples by all available means and why it should not be considered contrary to the Charter to support South Africa. His delegation was seeking a frank, not a double-faced, policy. Words were not sufficient to condemn *apartheid*, action was needed. Those delegations which contributed only words to the struggle were allowing South Africa to continue to defy the United Nations. They were providing assistance in the form of arms and ammunition, which they knew were consolidating other racist régimes and other ideologies and encouraging aggression.

56. He then quoted Article 10 of the United Nations Charter which stated that the General Assembly could discuss any matters within the scope of the Charter, except as provided in Article 12.

57. Mr. EDREMODA (Nigeria) said that he wished to explain why his delegation supported all the draft resolutions and to reply to points just raised by the representative of France with regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.208. With regard to operative paragraph 6 of that draft, the representative of France had suggested that the General Assembly did not have jurisdiction, whereas the Security Council did. He wished to point out that the Security

Council did not exist in isolation. It could and should act when the General Assembly requested it to do so.

58. He had detected certain undertones of great Power politics in the explanation of vote by the representative of France. It seemed that the great Powers alone felt that they were entitled to determine action on the important issues. If such a concept had ever existed, it was now outmoded. He could see no reason for objections to operative paragraph 6, since it was perfectly in order for the General Assembly to draw the attention of the Security Council to a matter.

59. The delegation of France and others had tried to make a distinction between types of arms. It was not a real distinction and was not supported by military experts. In fact the distinction was an economic and commercial convenience for the continuation of the sale of arms in order to obtain foreign exchange. South Africa was a police State and therefore any supply of arms increased the South African Government's capacity to intensify its oppressive policies. He appealed to those countries that continued to trade with South Africa, and especially to the United Kingdom and France, to reconsider the problem.

60. The overwhelming majority in the voting on draft resolution A/SPC/L.208 constituted an appeal to those who supplied arms to South Africa and he hoped that they would heed that appeal.

61. Mr. OPANGA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that, as his country was a sponsor of all the draft resolutions adopted by the Committee on the question of *apartheid*, his delegation wished to make a few remarks regarding the statements made by certain other delegations in explanation of their votes. It was understandable that some countries should find it difficult to make sudden changes in their economic and trade policies; nevertheless, once the existence of established trading patterns had been recognized, the countries in question could either work to change those patterns over a period of time or simply intensify existing patterns. A number of countries seemed to have adopted the latter course in the case of the arms trade with South Africa. In the view of his delegation, the only way to put an end to the policies of *apartheid* without the risk of war was through the isolation of South Africa, especially where armaments were concerned. He therefore appealed to all nations, and particularly to those countries of Europe and America which continued to export arms to South Africa, to make every effort to isolate South Africa from the world's trade in armaments.

62. He stressed that the distinction drawn by some countries between arms for external defence and arms for internal repression was illusory. Indeed, the South African Government had no external enemies against which to defend itself; its only real enemy was the African people of South Africa, who accounted for 80 per cent of the population. The sale of arms to South Africa could not be viewed as a simple trade transaction, for the arms in question would be used for no other purpose than the slaughter of non-white citizens of that country.

63. Mr. FARAH (Somalia) thanked those delegations that had made useful and constructive contributions to the

Committee's work on the question of *apartheid*. Certain other delegations, however, including those of some of the great Powers, had simply rationalized their own inaction while criticizing the positive steps proposed by others. Indeed, some of the statements made in explanation of votes appeared to have no other purpose than to justify the continued exploitation of the black people of South Africa. He was particularly distressed that the Belgian delegation failed to recognize the creation of Bantustans as a crime against humanity. Was one to draw the conclusion that the massive deportation of civilian populations could be considered a crime against humanity only if the victims had white skin?

64. Mr. DIOP (Guinea) paid tribute on behalf of his delegation to all those who had contributed towards the elimination of *apartheid*, which was one of the greatest blights of the twentieth century. His delegation had voted in favour of all the draft resolutions on the question of *apartheid*, but had made no general statement; it was obvious that a matter of such great importance could give rise to much talk, but talk, particularly in support of abstentions and reservations, could serve only to waste both time and money. If professional diplomats were replaced by farmers, workers, university students and other genuine representatives of the peoples of the world, talk would give way to action. However, delegations continued to read out empty and ineffectual statements while *apartheid* flourished.

65. South Africa remained strong because it was able to rely on powerful allies. *Apartheid* would be eliminated only when States decided to place the interests of mankind above their own selfish interests and ended all collusion with the South African Government. His delegation was confident that that would happen in time and that the international community would fulfil its responsibilities. In the meantime, his country would spare no effort in the struggle against *apartheid*, in solidarity with other States committed to peace and justice.

66. Mr. GANDA (Sierra Leone) said that his delegation was distressed by the fact that certain delegations which were busily campaigning for the creation of a post of United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights had failed to support the draft resolution against *apartheid*, which was a clear violation of human rights. While the creation of such a post would undoubtedly increase expenditures, some of those delegations had expressed reservations with regard to the financial implications of certain resolutions on *apartheid*; there appeared to be a lack of consistency between those two positions.

67. Although his delegation had reason to question the sincerity of some of the delegations which had made eloquent statements condemning *apartheid*, it wished to express its gratitude to the Nordic countries in particular, for they had given their full support to most of the draft resolutions on the question of *apartheid*. The statements made by the Nordic delegations, and especially by that of Norway, had shown that the countries of Africa and Asia were not alone in the struggle against that evil policy.

68. Recalling that some delegations had recorded reservations concerning certain measures on the grounds that their

Governments had no authority over private organizations, he expressed the hope that the Governments in question would at least provide those organizations with moral guidance in the matter.

69. Mr. KANOUTÉ (Mali) said that the statement made by the delegation of France in explanation of its votes was intended only to justify France's support of the Pretoria régime and its complicity in the murder of Africans. There really was no excuse for the shipment of arms to South Africa. No valid distinction could be drawn between arms for external defence and arms for internal repression; arms in the hands of South Africans could be used only to threaten the non-white population of that country and endanger the security of neighbouring African States. All arms deliveries to South Africa should be halted immediately.

70. It was understandable that the representative of France should have referred to the French rugby team's visit to South Africa; it should be borne in mind, however, that the team could never have gained entry to South Africa had it not agreed to accept the terms imposed by that country.

71. He assured the Western delegations that had failed to support the draft resolution on *apartheid* that the African States would draw the appropriate conclusions from their conduct.

72. Mr. PAMBOU (People's Republic of the Congo) said that his delegation, which had been among the sponsors of most of the draft resolutions on *apartheid*, believed that the least that countries committed to peace and justice could do was to support such drafts. He recalled that when the question of *apartheid* had first been raised in the United Nations, at the seventh session of the Assembly, most of the African countries had been unable to participate in the debates, for they had still been under the colonial yoke of France, Belgium or the United Kingdom. When they had first called for action to restore the human dignity of the non-white peoples of South Africa, they had been dismissed as "savages" by the Western Powers. Those Powers had hardly changed their tune over the years, for they now characterized African efforts to isolate South Africa as "demagogy". The African States had no illusions regarding the position of the Western Powers on the policy of *apartheid*, which was the direct descendent of the forms of slavery they had introduced as early as the fifteenth century. The well-known principle of "dialogue" with South Africa was simply another effort on their part to maintain their colonial domination over the peoples of Africa.

73. Any breach of the peace in southern Africa was a direct consequence of imperialist policies. The non-white peoples of South Africa had the inalienable right to live their lives in dignity, and therefore the duty to combat all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism. For its part, his country would always stand beside peoples struggling for human dignity.

74. Mr. SANCHEZ-GAVITO (Mexico) assured the representative of Sierra Leone that the African peoples were not alone in the struggle against *apartheid*. While he had no

authority to speak for all the countries of Latin America, he stressed that his own country had always worked for the eradication of *apartheid* and all vestiges of colonialism. His delegation had voted for all the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee on the question of *apartheid*, and he recalled that it had proposed, at the previous session of the General Assembly (713th meeting), that consideration be given to the possibility of suspending South Africa's privileges as a Member of the United Nations.

75. Mr. KANE (Mauritania) advised those African States that believed that a dialogue with South Africa might lead to the elimination of *apartheid* to draw the appropriate lessons from the attitude displayed by certain Western Powers, and particularly by certain members of NATO. It was essential to realize that the evil of *apartheid* was not an aberration, but a conscious policy, and that any dialogue must take place between the Pretoria régime and the African peoples of South Africa itself. In the view of his delegation, *apartheid* would be eradicated only through the use of armed force. United Nations resolutions would prove to be of little use in liberating the oppressed peoples of southern Africa. It was interesting to note in that connexion that those Western Powers which urged Africans to endeavour to convince South Africa that its policies were in error had adopted an equivocal or negative attitude towards the draft resolutions aimed at eliminating *apartheid*. For its part, his delegation was convinced that *apartheid* would eventually be eradicated, whether those Powers took effective action or not.

76. Mr. ORTIZ (Ecuador) stressed that his country, like Mexico, had always stood beside the African peoples in the struggle against *apartheid* and had from the very beginning taken a firm position in favour of the eradication of that policy.

77. In the view of his delegation, the Committee's practical work on the question of *apartheid* had been concluded with the adoption of the various draft resolutions, and he therefore suggested that the Committee should proceed to its consideration of the other difficult problems on its agenda.

78. Mr. GANDA (Sierra Leone) thanked the representatives of Mexico and Ecuador for their expressions of support; in referring to the contribution of the Nordic States, he had not intended any slight to the countries of Latin America. However, he pointed out that many of the countries most strongly criticized by the African delegations for their attitude toward *apartheid* had indeed expressed their opposition to that policy, although only in words.

79. Mr. PAMBOU (People's Republic of the Congo) said that South Africa's policies of *apartheid* were by no means a problem affecting the non-white peoples of Africa alone. Indeed, countries in all areas of the world had provided invaluable assistance to the struggle against *apartheid*. He recalled, however, that one Latin American delegation had been among those which had characterized the hostility of the African countries towards the possibility of dialogue as "demagogic".

80. In the opinion of his delegation, the non-white peoples of South Africa could regain their rights only through the

use of force. He expressed the hope that those who supported them in their struggle would continue to do so by every available means, even though violence could not be ruled out.

81. Mr. HOLDER (Liberia) said that his delegation, which had supported all the draft resolutions on the question of *apartheid*, had noted with regret that the United Kingdom had consistently abstained from voting on them. While all Member States had a responsibility towards the people of South Africa, that of the United Kingdom was particularly great in view of its long-standing association with the area. He therefore appealed to the United Kingdom delegation to contact its Government with a view to securing permission to vote in favour of at least one of the draft resolutions when they came before the General Assembly. He expressed the hope that the United Kingdom Government would take account of the spirit of the draft resolutions

adopted by the Committee in determining its policies with regard to sports, the sale of arms to South Africa and other aspects of the campaign against *apartheid*. He stressed that the eradication of *apartheid* would be a difficult task indeed without the full support of all the peoples of the world. Denunciations of *apartheid* could serve no purpose when they were accompanied by concrete expressions of support for the South African Government.

82. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, in view of the lateness of the hour the Committee should conclude its consideration of *apartheid* and take up the item concerning UNRWA on its agenda at the following meeting.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.*