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MEETING



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NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Cornelius C. CREMIN (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEMS 37 AND 12

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (*continued*) (A/8403, A/8422 and Corr.1, A/8467, A/8468, A/SPC/145, A/SPC/146, A/SPC/L.206, A/SPC/L.207):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1);
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/8467, A/8468);
- (c) Report of the Economic and Social Council (chapter XVII (section C)) (A/8403)

1. Mr. JACOVIDES (Cyprus) said that, despite the commendable efforts made by the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and the Secretary-General, little progress had been made in promoting United Nations objectives with regard to South Africa. Some comfort could, however, be derived from the growing recognition of the inhumanity of *apartheid* and the increasing sympathy for the oppressed people of South Africa on the part of youth organizations, churches and trade unions in many parts of the world, especially in countries maintaining relations with the South African Government. Inside South Africa itself there had been signs of opposition to the inequities of *apartheid* and the repressive measures with which it was enforced—opposition not only by the oppressed African majority but also, to a limited extent, by churches and universities.

2. Those encouraging developments, which could, at least in part, be credited to the activities of the United Nations, could not, however, offset the negative developments which left little room for hope for substantial improvement in the foreseeable future. The Government of South Africa continued its intransigent adherence to its inhuman policies. It had enacted further discriminatory legislation, persecuted an ever-increasing number of persons and continued to defy the United Nations and world public opinion. Both economically and militarily the South African Government had continued to improve its position to such an extent that it could with impunity persist in its illegal occupation of Namibia, assist the racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia and also co-operate with the Government of Portugal in carrying out colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique. Particularly condemnable was the forced movement of the African population into Bantustans, which constituted a flagrant violation of the human rights of those involved and was prejudicial to the territorial integrity of the State and the unity of the people.

3. Such forced and artificial situations contained within them the seeds of future conflict and inherent dangers for

the people involved and for peace both within the State and at the international level. To any objective observer there could be no doubt that the racism practised by the Government of South Africa constituted a gross violation of human rights and inexorably led to violent confrontation, with grave consequences for international peace and security in the area. In that respect it was deplorable that a number of States, making a dubious distinction between arms for external defence and those for internal security, had contributed to strengthening the South African Government and thus encouraged it in its defiant attitude towards the United Nations and its neighbours, as evidenced by the action it had recently taken against Zambia. The decision-makers in the capitals involved should not forget that, although economic and military considerations might be realities which were difficult to ignore, they ought not to outweigh the dictates of conscience.

4. It might have been hoped that, in its own long-term interests, the South African Government would have reconsidered its attitude, but no such change of heart was evident or could realistically be expected, and the international community would thus have no choice but to intensify its efforts to find a solution by diplomatic, economic and other measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Only a rededication by all States, individually and collectively, to determined and co-ordinated action could lead to an improvement in the situation in South Africa and such a rededication was a duty incumbent upon all those who sincerely believed in the principles of the Charter and wished to see them implemented in all cases.

5. Faithful to the principle of racial and ethnic equality everywhere, his Government had consistently supported, by word and deed, all the United Nations initiatives aimed at remedying the situation resulting from the policy of *apartheid*. Having signed the Lusaka Declaration made by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in September 1970 and having also subscribed to the communiqué of 1 October 1971, issued by the Ministerial Consultative Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries, his Government stood ready to do its share in remedying the situation. It firmly supported the basic United Nations objective of bringing about a solution in South Africa through majority rule and protecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the inhabitants of the country as a whole, on the basis of equality and without artificial distinctions based on race, colour or creed. As to the specific ways in which those objectives could be brought about, his country was prepared, as it had shown in the past, to sponsor appropriate resolutions, including a recommendation that the Security Council should urgently consider the situation in South Africa and

southern Africa as a whole, with a view to the adoption of effective measures, including measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

6. He hoped that the Committee would adopt draft resolution A/SPC/L.206, of which his country was a co-sponsor.

7. Mr. JONCKHEER (Netherlands) said it was not surprising that the United Nations should concern itself with the widespread problem of racial discrimination since the very existence of the Organization and the wording of its Charter had at its roots the refusal of the peoples of the world to accept the policies of States based on the superiority of one part of the human race over another. That principle was embodied not only in the Charter but also in several international Conventions and United Nations resolutions. His delegation wished to approach the problem of *apartheid* against that general background so that it might be seen in its proper perspective. His Government had consistently rejected all forms of racial discrimination, including *apartheid*, both in principle and as a matter of practical policy. It should be rejected because it constituted a grave and systematic violation of human rights. The Government of South Africa had never been left in doubt as to the views of his Government and people on the matter. However, it was still difficult to devise means of convincing the Government of South Africa that its policy of *apartheid* was at variance with the letter and spirit of the Charter and that it should therefore be abandoned. Whatever action the United Nations contemplated should be in full conformity with the Charter in order to be effective and the limitations under the provisions of the Charter should be recognized, in particular as they applied to the responsibilities of the Security Council and the powers of the General Assembly.

8. His Government questioned the wisdom of isolating South Africa completely in the cultural, economic and diplomatic fields, not only because it would be tremendously difficult to do so but also because, if it was isolated, the South African Government might take an even harder stand rather than abandon its present policies. The isolation of South Africa would in a way make the world guilty of the same error as the one which lay at the root of *apartheid*. That antiquated philosophy could not indefinitely resist the strong pressures of world opinion and any effort to impose isolation should therefore be regarded as outdated in the present-day world. In addition, isolation was at variance with the very concept of the United Nations and complete isolation would exclude further effective international measures designed to combat *apartheid*.

9. His Government strongly believed that dialogue with South Africa would be conducive to effecting a change of attitude; South African public opinion should be convinced by a continuous dialogue that the policy of *apartheid*—irrespective of its international consequences—was a threat to the internal peace and security of South Africa itself. Dialogue could assume various forms. It could take place in contacts between churches and youth organizations, *inter alia*. It should also take place in the Committee and his delegation wondered why South Africa, while on the one hand asserting its willingness to start a dialogue, on the other hand shunned opportunities to give concrete form

to that willingness. As long as South Africa believed it was in its interest to ignore the debate on *apartheid* in the Committee, no dialogue was possible there. He hoped that the South African delegation would participate in the work of the Committee and refute any statement it believed untrue or unjustified. His Government would like to hear from the delegation of South Africa why it did not consider the policy of *apartheid* contrary to the provisions of the Charter and the established principles of international law, what concrete ideas and suggestions it had for establishing a dialogue and what its reaction was to the view that, if it was to be effective, a dialogue should take place on all levels, with whites and non-whites participating on an equal basis. By indicating its willingness to reply to those questions, the delegation of South Africa would show that it was prepared to take at least an initial step on the path of dialogue and progress.

10. Mr. KANOUTE (Mali) said that, as early as 1946, when the world had only just rid itself of nazism, it had already been confronted with the methods of government of a régime which based its political ideology not on the normal democratic principles for which millions of men had just sacrificed their lives, but on the political and philosophic concept of racial segregation. The adoption of the United Nations Charter had made the peoples of the world believe that racial hatred had at last been eliminated. In a state of post-victory euphoria, they had not paid enough attention to the cancer of *apartheid* to seek an immediate remedy for it. Like all neglected diseases, it had taken hold and had spread beyond the frontiers of South Africa to Southern Rhodesia and Namibia.

11. When it had assumed power after the non-democratic elections of 1948, the Nationalist Party of South Africa, directed by militant fascist whites who had not concealed their support for the Axis Powers, had declared in its statutes that it considered itself appointed by Providence to defend the European race and was in favour of the separation of Europeans and non-Europeans in the political, residential and, as far as possible, the industrial fields. *Apartheid* was considered necessary to guarantee the maintenance of the purity of the white race. That inhuman policy, originally only the creed of the Nationalist Party, had now become governmental policy, based on discriminatory laws and the institution of reserves, where non-Europeans were segregated in conditions reminiscent of Nazi concentration camps.

12. The primary consequence of those iniquitous measures was the disruption of the family. On their ancestral land, where the white colonist had brought them racial hatred, three quarters of the population were maintained in slavery, uprooted from their homes and confined to barren, inhospitable lands, in a state of constant terror. The repressive laws were directed indiscriminately against the non-whites and the white opponents of *apartheid*. As the Secretary of the South African Garment Workers Trade Union had written, there was no one in South Africa who did not hate and was not hated.

13. Recent events, including the murder in prison of the young Indian school-teacher Ahmed Timol and the sentencing to five years' imprisonment of the Dean of Johannesburg, had brought to the attention of the inter-

national community the tragedy of daily life in that part of Africa. Those recent reminders were necessary in order that the international community should recognize its responsibility towards those millions of men deprived of their elementary rights, for whom life meant only violence, terror, prison and perpetual slavery. The films recently shown to the Committee had borne further witness to the horrors of *apartheid*.

14. The United Nations must fulfil the hopes aroused by its establishment. Its actions during the past 25 years had been crowned with total failure. The Pretoria Government had remained indifferent to the numerous resolutions adopted by both the General Assembly and the Security Council. That defiance was due to the political, economic and military support of certain Powers, even those with special responsibilities in the United Nations. The Pretoria régime was an increasingly grave threat to international peace and security. As the representative of Mali had said in the First Committee (1818th meeting) on the subject of international security, peace was of interest to all men, white, black or yellow.

15. In order to sow dissension among the African States and to overcome its isolation on that continent, the South African Government had recently put forward the idea of so-called dialogues. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali had said before the General Assembly (1441st plenary meeting), the Pretoria régime should first of all hold dialogues among its own inhabitants, before suggesting dialogue with other countries. Mali's position on the question was therefore clear. It was regrettable that South African States should have fallen into such an obvious trap.

16. Since the United Nations had condemned *apartheid* as a crime against humanity, it should fight it with even greater determination and thus make an important contribution to the world-wide efforts to protect and strengthen international security, for the practices of *apartheid* were in fact violations of peace. The frequent incursions by South African regular army troops into Zambian and Tanzanian territory and the illegal presence in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia of South African military bases should make that quite obvious.

17. That belligerent attitude of the South African Government revealed its intentions not only to consolidate *apartheid* in the Republic but also to extend it to Namibia and Southern Rhodesia with the obvious intention of threatening the independence of the African States in the name of "the sacred mission entrusted to it by Providence". The sole aim of the meeting of the authorities of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal at Salisbury in 1971 had been to strengthen the means of action of the "Unholy Alliance" of white minorities in southern Africa against the national liberation movements and any other attempts to challenge the system of *apartheid*. The United Nations would be evading its most elementary duties to the Charter and to the people it represented if it allowed such plans to succeed.

18. It was high time that the allies of those countries realized what a grave threat to international peace and security that *apartheid* constituted. The subtle distinction made between offensive and defensive weapons was un-

justified because the Pretoria racists used the arms delivered to them not only to exterminate the non-white population in South Africa but also to attack neighbouring States. The United Kingdom, France and all the other countries that continued to supply them with arms should respect the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the arms embargo. If it were to heed the appeals of the international community and in particular the OAU, the United Nations would have the necessary authority to fight the decisive battle against *apartheid*. In such concerted action, the United Nations should learn from the failure of the measures previously adopted against South Africa and realize that the only possibility of success was to take action under the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

19. The South African Government's illegal occupation of the international territory of Namibia, despite the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, should be met with greater firmness. If not, the Organization would become the accomplice of the crime of genocide perpetrated in southern Africa. As Miss Barbara J. Rogers had said on behalf of the Friends of Namibia Committee on 8 October 1971 in the Fourth Committee (1922nd meeting), the United Nations was responsible for the death of every freedom-fighter, because that was the direct result of its refusal to face up to its responsibilities. The Special Committee on *Apartheid*, in its report (A/8422 and Corr.1) had provided a striking but objective picture of the tragic living conditions of millions of non-whites in southern Africa. In that connexion, his delegation deplored the attitude of the Western Powers which had refused, despite the intervention of the President of the General Assembly,<sup>1</sup> to become members of that Committee. On the other hand, it wished to pay a tribute to the Scandinavian countries which were generous in the political, diplomatic and financial support they gave to the freedom-fighters.

20. It was impossible, however, to win the fight against *apartheid* without the support of public opinion. His delegation therefore warmly appreciated the increased efforts made by some countries and organizations to arouse world conscience to the evils and dangers of *apartheid* during the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. It welcomed the close, productive co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU in the fight against *apartheid* and racial discrimination. The recent establishment by the OAU of its Assistance Fund for the Struggle against Colonialism and *Apartheid* could not fail to contribute to strengthening that co-operation. The widespread information campaign launched by the United Nations should be strongly supported, in order to counter the insidious propaganda of the supporters of *apartheid*. The pertinent conclusions on *apartheid* contained in the report of 1968 of the Commission on Human Rights<sup>2</sup> should be re-examined. It would also be desirable that the Secretary-General should contact other international organizations and the specialized agencies, in particular IBRD, IMF, FAO and UNESCO, to discuss the ways in which those bodies could contribute to the fight against *apartheid*.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1933rd meeting, para. 67.

<sup>2</sup> Documents E/CN.4/949 and Add.1-4 (mimeographed).

21. His delegation would collaborate fully in seeking suitable means of rapidly putting an end to *apartheid*.

22. Mr. BERNSTROM (Sweden) said that the United Nations had rarely been so unanimous as in its condemnation of South Africa's policy of *apartheid*. Yet as the discussions on the subject entered their third decade, it was understandable that there should be feelings of frustration and even apathy among the Members of the Organization. The continuous, systematic violation by a Member State of the basic principle of the Charter with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms was beginning to erode the Organization's prestige. If oppression in South Africa was allowed to grow unchecked, there might be an eruption of large-scale violence. The debasing and inhuman system of *apartheid* had extended from South Africa and Namibia to Southern Rhodesia, and some of its aspects were noticeable in the Territories under Portuguese rule. Those tragic developments illustrated the ineffectiveness of international action which was undermined by a lack of political will in those nations whose relations with South Africa were of decisive importance.

23. The well-documented report of the Special Committee showed that the *apartheid* doctrine was firmly entrenched and was applied to all fields of human life and activity. It was even assuming a constitutional aspect, as the programme for establishing the so-called Bantu "homelands" was carried forward not only in South Africa itself but also in Namibia. Only recently, the South African representative had stated to the General Assembly (1946th plenary meeting) his country's willingness to negotiate autonomous or even independent status for the Bantustans, in strange contradiction to the Pretoria Government's known dealings with the Transkei. It was unrealistic to talk of independence for areas which were not economically viable. Even if conditions could eventually be improved, the whole programme was still illegal and immoral, a gross violation of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

24. The report also showed how the persecution of the opponents of *apartheid* had hardened, often striking or harassing those, such as religious leaders and doctors, dedicated to assist and comfort the victims.

25. There were, however, a few hopeful signs. There was evidence of growing resistance within South Africa, not only by the black population but also by the white liberal opposition. There was perceptible strain in the business community, which was suffering from a growing scarcity of skilled and semi-skilled labour. The recent decision of the World Council of Churches (see A/8422 and Corr.1, para. 203) to denounce *apartheid* had met with satisfying response from a majority of religious bodies within South Africa. One sector of that country's press was courageously reporting on violations of human rights perpetrated under the policies of *apartheid* and on the opposition to those policies. Those developments and the South African Government's moves to break its growing international isolation were evidence of the impact that a strongly critical world opinion exerted in South Africa.

26. The United Nations had played a far from insignificant role in galvanizing the opposition against *apartheid*, not

only in the international community but even within South Africa itself. It should persevere in its effort, patiently and consistently. The struggle against *apartheid* was a moral issue and it was through sustained moral pressure that South Africa's trend towards open racial conflict might finally be arrested. The United Nations should intensify its action at all levels, diversifying and improving its methods of work and the means used to attain its objective. The Special Committee's report surveyed various approaches, including ideas put forward in 1964 by the Group of Experts established by Security Council resolution 182 (1963). The Swedish delegation supported the Special Committee's recommendation that the General Assembly should restate in a declaration the essential elements of a solution to the problems of *apartheid* (*ibid.*, para. 252). It must also continue to demand full implementation of the arms embargo called for by the Security Council. The Swedish Government noted, with deep concern, how the lack of implementation of that embargo had contributed to the growth of South African military and police power not only in South Africa but also in Namibia, where military bases had been established, and hoped that all Member States would stop shipments of arms to South Africa and other forms of military co-operation with that country.

27. With regard to the General Assembly resolutions calling on Member States to take measures of the kind specifically mentioned in Chapter VII of the Charter, the Swedish Government considered such decisions to be exclusively within the competence of the Security Council. However, far from opposing an appeal to the Security Council to examine such a serious and urgent matter, his Government found it deplorable that the Security Council had for years evaded a full examination of the question of *apartheid*. His reference to the moral impact of the United Nations struggle against *apartheid* showed the importance Sweden attached to the field of information, not only as a means of educating world public opinion, but also of ensuring that the masters of *apartheid* and their victims were aware of developments outside their country. His delegation agreed with most of the Special Committee's recommendations in that respect, such as focusing on youth as a main target for information and enlisting the co-operation of UNESCO and other specialized agencies. The idea that UNESCO, which had long been active in the campaign against *apartheid*, should prepare an "educational kit" on *apartheid* to be made available to schools and other interested institutions seemed useful and practicable. It was clearly desirable, as the Chairman of the Special Committee had suggested, that the information activities of the Unit on *Apartheid* and the Office of Public Information (OPI) be further expanded and the whole information process invigorated and rendered more effective through increased collaboration with non-governmental organizations and information media. The need for preserving the basic principles of universality and objectivity which had always guided the work of the OPI should, however, be borne in mind. Any departure from those principles would jeopardize the esteem in which the United Nations information activities were generally held and thus lessen their effectiveness.

28. His delegation also agreed with the Special Committee that sports organizations could play a useful role in promoting greater general awareness of the problems of

*apartheid*. When drafting the relevant resolution, however, it should be borne in mind that in most countries those organizations were independent of the various national Governments.

29. The ILO had given close consideration to labour conditions in South Africa, thus helping to stimulate both industries and trade unions to divert more attention to what could be achieved through initiatives on their part. His delegation looked forward to receiving the separate report referred to in the Special Committee's report (*ibid.*, para. 67) on the question of an international conference of trade unions to be held in 1972 under the auspices of the United Nations.<sup>3</sup>

30. The surveys of discriminatory practices within South Africa in the fields of labour and education made by those specialized agencies were also providing information media with eloquent details. His delegation noted with satisfaction the Special Committee's suggestion that WHO and FAO should be invited to prepare studies on effects of *apartheid* in their fields of competence (*ibid.*, para. 316), for consideration by the Special Political Committee.

31. He wished to be associated with the appeal for generous contributions to the Trust Fund for Southern Africa that the Chairman of the Committee of Trustees of that Fund had made in the presentation of his annual report (757th meeting). It was the moral obligation of the international community as a whole, and particularly of the more affluent nations, to show unflinching solidarity with the oppressed peoples of South Africa. One effective and uncontroversial way of showing that solidarity was to give ample financial support for United Nations activities aimed at the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of *apartheid* and those who fled from or fought against that twentieth century form of slavery.

32. Mr. ALVARADO (Venezuela) said that he would not reiterate his country's position regarding *apartheid*, except to note that all racial discrimination was repugnant to the Venezuelan conscience, nor would he consider the summary of the events which had taken place in South Africa over the past year contained in annex II to the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1), which constituted a further page in the tragic history of the policy of *apartheid* and offered additional proof of the arrogant attitude taken by the Government of South Africa. Rather, he would confine himself to commenting on the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee as set forth in chapter III of its report, with which his delegation was generally in agreement.

33. The Special Committee recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of two declarations (*ibid.*, paras. 252 and 292), one on the elimination of *apartheid* and the other against racialism in national and international sport. He recalled that, during the Committee's debate on the question at the twenty-fifth session (697th meeting), his delegation had put forward the idea of preparing a legally binding multilateral instrument on *apartheid*. In that connexion, two delegations had recently submitted a draft

convention to the Third Committee,<sup>4</sup> which was currently considering it under the agenda item relating to the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Having already suggested the idea of a convention, his delegation was now all the more favourably inclined towards a declaration. Either type of instrument would require careful preparation and consideration with a view to securing the greatest possible support. His delegation therefore noted with satisfaction that a draft resolution<sup>5</sup> had been submitted to the Third Committee which would entrust the drafting of the convention to the Commission on Human Rights. The same procedure could be followed in the case of the declaration on the elimination of *apartheid*. While there was no difficulty in adopting both instruments, it would be preferable to choose only one of the two. The declaration against racialism in sports appeared simpler, for it was limited to a specific and less controversial field, and might therefore be drafted and adopted at the current session.

34. He recalled that the Joint Meeting of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of Twenty-Four) and the United Nations Council for Namibia had been requested in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 2671 F (XXV), adopted at the previous session on the recommendation of the Special Political Committee. His delegation had abstained during the separate vote on that paragraph. Without reiterating all the reasons for that abstention, he noted that his delegation had many reservations regarding the appropriateness and the possibilities for success of a meeting of three organs of different types with different terms of reference.

35. As a member of the Committee of Twenty-Four, his country had participated in the Joint Meeting, but, as stated in the report of the Joint Meeting (A/8388, annex, foot-note 1), it had not subscribed to the consensus which had been adopted. His country's reservations had been justified by the manner in which the Joint Meeting had been conducted. Moreover, his delegation had considered that the consensus went beyond the terms of reference of the Joint Meeting. It was therefore logical that his delegation should maintain its reservations regarding the usefulness of continuing such joint meetings in their existing form. The Special Committee on *Apartheid* called for their continuation in 1972 (A/8422 and Corr.1, para. 322(c)), with the participation of specialized agencies, regional organizations, liberation movements and other competent non-governmental organizations. If difficulties had arisen in connexion with the Joint Meeting of the three organs only, even greater problems would be encountered the next year. His delegation wished to make it quite clear that it was not opposed to the idea of joint meetings, which could be beneficial if they were better conceived and organized. Rather, it was concerned at the way in which they were held and the lack of sufficient preparation, which led to unsatisfactory results. It believed that the Special Political Committee should not take

<sup>3</sup> The separate report was subsequently circulated as document A/8515/Rev.1.

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 54, document A/8542, para. 32.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 33.

decisions which would be binding on the Committee of Twenty-Four and on the Council for Namibia, for its mandate in that regard was restricted to the question of *apartheid*, while those bodies fell under the competence of the Fourth Committee.

36. In future, the agenda of joint meetings should at least be carefully prepared, taking account of the character and specific terms of reference of each of the three bodies. Norms for the conduct of the meetings as well as their final purpose, should be clearly established. In that connexion, the Committee could request the Special Committee on *Apartheid* to consider, at its meetings in 1972, all aspects of the co-operation which might be provided by other subsidiary organs of the General Assembly in the struggle against *apartheid*. In addition, the Committee of Twenty-Four and the Council for Namibia could be invited to consider the contribution they might make to the struggle against *apartheid*, under their specific terms of reference. At the twenty-seventh session, the Committee could decide on the basis of the reports received from the three organs, whether a further joint meeting would be appropriate, and, if so, could determine its terms of reference, agenda, rules of procedure and other factors with a view to ensuring a satisfactory result.

37. As for the question of participation by specialized agencies, regional organizations, liberation movements and non-governmental organizations, his delegation believed that they should contribute to the struggle against *apartheid* and considered that the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, by reason of its terms of reference, should sponsor and encourage meetings on *apartheid* and should co-ordinate them as far as possible. On the basis of the results of separate meetings of those agencies, organizations and movements, the Special Committee could prepare a joint plan of action against *apartheid*. However, his delegation did not consider that the large, heterogeneous meeting recommended by the Special Committee would be appropriate, and it strongly doubted that such a meeting could lead to beneficial results.

38. It was reasonable that the Special Committee should be represented in international conferences concerning *apartheid* in 1972, as it had recommended in paragraph 318 of its report. His delegation subscribed to that paragraph in so far as it referred specifically to conferences on *apartheid*. The representation of a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly at a conference or meeting was justified by the fact that the matters dealt with by such an organ constituted the sole or primary subject of the conference.

39. Due consideration must be given to the financial implications of all proposals made. He recalled that the financial implications of one of the proposals made on the same item at the twenty-fifth session had caused difficulties for the Committee and had retarded its work somewhat. That point should always be borne in mind, for the question of financial implications was often viewed simply as a pretext for blocking the adoption of the substantive proposals in question.

40. Mr. MURGAS (Colombia) said that after hearing the expression of various sentiments by different delegations in connexion with the adoption of draft resolution A/SPC/

L.205/Rev.1, it was worth asking how many such resolutions condemning *apartheid* had been adopted. Had the United Nations passed the acid test of history in regard to *apartheid*? He had, at the time, also noticed a feeling of indignation, as if some already desired a war with South Africa. That had brought to mind the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the arms embargo, which were useless and had not been implemented by a number of States, as well as Security Council resolution 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963, which, in making a distinction between arms for internal security and arms for external defence, had permitted the transformation of South Africa into a military Power, within which 3 million armed whites degraded 12 million non-whites without recognizing their civil rights or offering them any social guarantees and trampled on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the corner-stone of the United Nations.

41. The situation was deteriorating. In the past week, the tragic news had been received of the persecution of the Anglican Dean of Johannesburg and others and the death in detention of Mr. Ahmed Timol. Did the current efforts herald the end of *apartheid*? Would the oppressed people of South Africa be granted freedom of speech and movement, the right to health, education, dignity, respect, equitable wages, housing and a basic standard of living? Were all the efforts of a quarter of a century without value in relations between States? What was the reason for the ineffectiveness of the measures adopted, if they reflected the will of the international community?

42. New committees had been established to deal with the problems of Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under colonial domination, while the United Nations was becoming immobilized. Resolutions went unimplemented because they were merely regarded as recommendations by the General Assembly and because there was no force capable of making them effective. A representative of his country had recently stated in the First Committee (1812th meeting) that he considered it necessary to establish a permanent military force under the Security Council to enforce promptly and effectively the authority under Article 24 of the Charter. Such a force should effectively prevent threats, breaches of the peace and armed aggression and, if necessary, could re-establish peace without delay. That reform should of course be accompanied by a clear and appropriate definition of aggression; the task of arriving at such a definition had been entrusted to the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, of which his country was a member, which had not as yet produced satisfactory results. Such a measure was needed in the case of *apartheid*, which, as had often been stated, constituted an aggression against world peace and a flagrant violation of the Charter. Practical measures were required in that connexion, including the revision and up-dating of the Charter.

43. During the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, many international efforts had been made and many measures adopted in connexion with the struggle against *apartheid*. Yet his delegation feared that the years would continue to pass without any real gains for the South African people. War was an uncertain alternative at best. On the other hand the possibility of a direct dialogue on *apartheid* between the



parties concerned had been rejected. The extremely valuable Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 (Manifesto on Southern Africa) had met with indifference and condemnation on the part of South Africa. Thus, the choice was between war, inconceivable for an organization of peace, and dialogue, which seemed impossible in practice.

44. The real fear of the white South Africans was not that they would lose their racial identity, but that they would lose control of the Government and become the object of the revenge of those whom they had oppressed. Indeed, racism was usually overcome through a mingling of the races and through the adoption of legislation for equal rights. His own country had been founded by men of many races and was now bringing forth a new race free from prejudice.

45. The 12 million non-white South Africans could win victory by adopting a racist policy against the whites, but that would be no more just than the existing situation. Dialogue was the only possible alternative; the South African people would have to follow the same multiracial course as other members of the international community. Such a dialogue would have to be broadly based and organized by stages. Priorities would have to be established and premises, including those of the Lusaka Manifesto, would have to be determined. The first stage would involve the South African Government and those Member States which maintained trade and diplomatic relations with it. Later, those parties would meet with the victims of *apartheid* and their leaders. During the third stage, the OAU and anti-*apartheid* organizations would join in the dialogue. Areas of agreement and basic possibilities for peace and understanding would be analysed. The dialogue would have to be initiated by a special body. The dialogue must begin with the Lusaka Manifesto, which set forth the ideals of the South African people and the ways in which they could be achieved. His delegation was convinced that something could be achieved through persuasion and that dialogue could bring the dawn of freedom for the oppressed people of South Africa.

46. Some might say that the dialogue had already ended. But the entry of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations, the Paris talks aimed at ending the war in Indo-China, the Jarring mission to the Middle East and the Berlin negotiations showed that the possibility of dialogue was still alive in the world. His delegation wondered why it should be denied in the case of *apartheid* in South Africa. A dialogue on *apartheid* could indeed take place, but it was essential that it should be broadly based.

47. Mr. KALACHINSKY (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that although the question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa had been considered by the United Nations for 25 years, the racists had been able to turn that country into a State marked by flagrant and arbitrary police rule, violence and oppression of the indigenous non-white population. Despite the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations, *apartheid* was becoming stronger and even growing offshoots. In its fight against *apartheid*, the United Nations could be compared to a bird whose wings had been cut off. Those who had cut the wings off were several Western countries, and more particularly their industrial and financial circles which

extracted profits from the suffering of millions of South Africans. The policies and practices of *apartheid* made all the progressive people in the world angry and indignant and the conscience of mankind could not reconcile itself with that monstrous offspring of colonial rule on the African continent, since the South African racists were not only oppressing the people of their own country but were also extending *apartheid* to Namibia and suppressing national liberation movements throughout southern Africa. In carrying out its policies of *apartheid*, the Pretoria Government maintained close relations with the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonialists. It cruelly put down the aspirations of the indigenous African population to enjoy basic human rights, the fruits of its labour and the benefits of civilization, and it had instituted a whole system of punitive measures aimed at the physical annihilation of those who spoke against the oppressors and for freedom.

48. Almost all the speakers in the general debate both in the General Assembly and in the Committee had given examples of the grievous position in which the black population of South Africa found itself. The document entitled "Poverty, *Apartheid* and Economic Growth" (A/AC.115/L.288) by Mr. Sean Gervasi gave convincing proof of the horrors committed by the racist leaders and showed that *apartheid* was, in essence, an "indirect system of forced labour". It also said that Africans made up more than 70 per cent of the South African labour force and that the country's economy could not do without them. Forty per cent of the country's Coloured population had been sent to the so-called "reserves" to live in inhospitable surroundings.

49. The people of his country had had similar experiences under the fascists during the Second World War and were particularly familiar with and sympathetic to the sufferings of the peoples of southern Africa. His people were educated in the spirit of the Leninist ideas of love of freedom, peace and friendship with the workers of all countries, shared the grief and anger of the victims of the policies of *apartheid* and supported the struggle of the patriots against their oppressors. His country strictly complied with the principles of the Charter, implemented all United Nations decisions aimed at curbing the South African racists and stood for the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. In addition, much work was being done among the workers of his country to unmask the racist ideology.

50. A useful supplement to the Committee's other documents and the facts mentioned by various speakers would be the novel entitled "*Episode in the Transvaal*"<sup>6</sup> by the African writer Harry Bloom. The novel showed the hard life and unequal rights of the patriots among the Coloured population of South Africa, and their struggle with their oppressors.

51. A determined struggle should be waged to eliminate *apartheid*. At the 1946th plenary meeting, on 30 September 1971, the representative of South Africa had said that his Government was willing to engage in dialogue with local leaders and to have contacts with various groups of the population. The world, however, knew what such statements were worth. In the short time the Committee

<sup>6</sup> Doubleday (Publisher), Garden City, New York, 1955.

had spent discussing the problem, a whole series of repressive measures had been taken in South Africa. World public opinion could not reconcile itself to that.

52. Afraid of finding itself completely isolated, the South African rulers and their stooges had recently begun to advocate a dialogue with the African States. Some of them had already taken the bait, but the majority of the African countries decisively rejected the idea of a dialogue with the racists who were trying to perpetuate *apartheid*. All should intensify their efforts in the struggle against the racist régime. That was the true course which would eliminate *apartheid*. It called for comprehensive support for the African population struggling against the evils of racism. Such support was provided for by United Nations decisions and involved economic sanctions and embargoes on arms deliveries to South Africa.

53. The will expressed by the majority should also become the will of the Governments of countries maintaining close economic relations with South Africa. Individual Governments had made statements to that effect and had adopted appropriate decisions, but many had unfortunately not done so. A number of those States which said they were in agreement with United Nations decisions continued to trade with South Africa and to sell arms to it. Paragraph 248 of the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1) gave statistical information on South Africa's trade with its 10 main trading partners and showed that South Africa's imports and exports had continued to grow over the last decade. With such an influx of capital, the South African Government had been able to build up its armed forces and establish a military industry of its own. The Pretoria régime could not long exist without political, economic and military support from the capitalist countries.

54. The Council of Ministers of the OAU, at its session in the spring of 1971, had expressed particularly serious concern that individual members of NATO had, in violation of the Security Council embargo on arms deliveries, continued to supply the South African army with the most modern weapons. The Special Committee's report and other sources gave incontrovertible proof of that. The South African racists who received modern weapons from their supporters, and those supporters themselves, tried to prove that the weapons were intended for the external defence of the country and not for the struggle with national liberation movements. That was arrant nonsense. History showed that those who committed crimes in order to suppress freedom always found a pretext to justify their actions. South Africa had become the armed policeman of the whole African continent and the Pretoria régime, desiring to perpetuate *apartheid* and fearing reprisals for the evil acts it committed, had promulgated so many inhuman laws and taken so many repressive measures against its opponents that an unco-ordinated struggle was not enough to deal with it.

55. Many representatives had already said that all the active measures open to the international community should be used in that struggle. His delegation considered that, in taking such measures, all States should completely break off diplomatic, consular, trade, financial and other relations with South Africa and should strictly comply with

the arms embargo. They should intensify the moral, legal and material assistance they gave to the opponents and victims of *apartheid* and make wider use of all the mass media to unmask the ideology and practices of the racist régime and to appeal to all progressive forces to intensify the measures they took against that régime in order to eliminate it as quickly as possible. Those measures had been provided for it in a number of previous General Assembly and Security Council decisions and in the recommendations of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and other United Nations bodies. It was essential to implement all those decisions and to strike a crushing blow at the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa.

56. He requested the representative of India to convey to the Indian people his delegation's sympathy in connexion with the catastrophe which had struck that country.

57. Mr. PESMAZOGLU (Greece) said that it was disheartening that no tangible progress was apparently being made towards the abolition of a system which contravened all humanitarian principles. It was disturbing that a phenomenon like *apartheid* could persist in the so-called civilized twentieth century. Although his country did not like to interfere in the internal policy or affairs of another country, it must align itself with those who condemned the policy of *apartheid*. A speaker in the General Assembly had said that racialism was no longer a simple conflict between the white and black races. It was increasingly becoming a world-wide plague, afflicting both under-developed and developed nations and it existed between people of all shades of colour.

58. Although his delegation condemned *apartheid*, as it did any case of racial discrimination, it believed that condemnation was a unilateral action which was seldom creative. Before trying methods which might lead to a point of no return, the machinery and procedure laid down in the Charter should be used. However, there was now a new approach to the problem of *apartheid*—that of dialogue. One representative had said that bridges were better than walls. That might be so if the bridges were carefully and strongly built, but it was too early to evaluate the consequences of that approach.

59. It should be proclaimed throughout the world that *apartheid* was a stigma on the twentieth century. A wider dissemination of the films recently shown to the Committee might do much to achieve the desired results.

60. He supported the statement by the representative of New Zealand (769th meeting) stressing the need for unanimous support for the resolutions adopted by the Committee, in order that they should have the maximum effect.

61. In conformity with the Greek delegation's policy towards *apartheid* and racial discrimination, it and other delegations had introduced a draft resolution in the Third Committee on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and relating to the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.<sup>7</sup> The

<sup>7</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 54, document A/8542, para. 24.



Greek people respected and showed tolerance to all men, regardless of their colour, race or religion. It had shown deep concern for the victims of *apartheid*, and the Church of Greece had contributed through the World Council of Churches.

62. The Greek delegation strongly endorsed the pledge made in the Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2627 (XXV)) to wage a continued and determined struggle against all violations of the rights and fundamental freedoms of human beings by eliminating the basic causes of such violations and promoting universal respect for the dignity of all people without regard to race, colour, sex, language or religion.

63. Mr. BASSETTE (Belgium), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that in its statement at the twenty-fifth session (698th meeting) his delegation had hoped to show once and for all that Belgium scrupulously respected the embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa imposed by the Security Council resolutions. Unfortunately, that hope had been in vain. At the Committee's 760th meeting, the representative of Zambia had accused Belgium, among other countries, of continuing to sell arms to the South African Government. His delegation wished to deny that accusation formally and to point out that Belgium was not mentioned in paragraphs 370 to 379 of annex II to the Special Committee's report, listing the cases of violation of the embargo, or in paragraph 265 of the report itself, which

contained recommendations on the implementation of the embargo. He could only assume that the Zambian representative's misunderstanding was due to a cursory reading of paragraphs 83 to 88 of the report. His delegation had repeatedly stated that as the licence referred to had been granted before the arms embargo, it could not have constituted a violation. It had reiterated that statement in a letter dated 20 October 1971 to the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, which had naturally arrived too late to be mentioned in the report. His delegation wished to reaffirm that since the Security Council resolution on the embargo, Belgium had stopped delivering arms to South Africa, granting that country licences to manufacture arms and providing investment or technical assistance in that respect. Furthermore Belgium did not train any members of the South Africa armed forces.

64. Mr. SIMUCHIMBA (Zambia) expressed his satisfaction that Belgium had now stopped supplying arms to South Africa.

65. The CHAIRMAN said that, with reference to a suggestion by the representatives of Egypt and Hungary at the 767th meeting that greater publicity should be given to the films on *apartheid* shown to the Committee, no special publicity could be given apart from announcing the showing of the films in the *United Nations Journal*.

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*