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**SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 699th  
MEETING**



Wednesday, 14 October 1970,  
at 10.55 a.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Abdul Samad GHAUS  
(Afghanistan).

**AGENDA ITEM 34**

**The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/8022, A/8109, A/8117, A/SPC/L.181)**

1. Mr. FAKHREDDINE (Sudan) said that, on reading the conclusions and recommendations in chapter III of the report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/8022), he had been struck by the negative reaction of South Africa and its allies to almost every action by the United Nations. The general conclusion of the Special Committee's report thus seemed a negative one. That did not, however, imply any criticism by his delegation of the report which, in its opinion, clearly revealed the utter futility of United Nations action thus far to combat *apartheid*. South Africa had responded to United Nations appeals by intensifying its repression against Africans. The report had indicated in paragraph 105 that South Africa had not only continued to persecute the opponents of its policies, but had pursued the widest and severest application of the measures of racial segregation, thus heightening racial bitterness and the danger of violent conflict. As mentioned in paragraph 108, there had been a "phenomenal growth" of South Africa's military power; many Member States had increased their trade with South Africa, and foreign capital had continued to flow to that country in abundance.

2. Clearly, United Nations resolutions had had little effect. His delegation did not consider that any further United Nations action could influence the situation; if such action were possible, however, it should not consist of harsher condemnation or further exhortation. In that connexion, his country's sponsorship of draft resolution A/SPC/L.182/Rev.1, adopted at the 696th meeting, calling on all States to take immediate steps to implement fully the provisions of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) had been prompted more by a spirit of solidarity than a feeling of conviction.

3. As to the suggestion of the representative of Mexico (693rd meeting) regarding the possibility of excluding South Africa from the United Nations, on the grounds that it owed no allegiance to the Organization and pursued policies contrary to the Charter, his delegation had no doubt that such action would be a well-deserved punishment for that country's defiance. Many representatives

shared that view; perhaps there would be some concerted effort in that direction. To those who might question the wisdom of such a move and plead that the lines of communication with South Africa should be kept open, it should be clear that no real lines of communication existed between the Organization and the South African Government. The *apartheid* régime would persist in its policies despite any United Nations action, including the threat of suspension or suspension itself. Despite such limitations, however, those who believed in the dignity and fundamental rights of man would welcome such a development: since South Africa had trampled on the Charter it should be suspended from membership.

4. The view had frequently been expressed that, by pursuing its policy of repression, South Africa was being short-sighted and neglectful of its long-term interests, since it was sowing the seeds of a racial conflict whose outcome would not favour white South Africans. That argument was, however, based on false assumptions. The South African Government realized that a racial conflict was not unavoidable, and had been taking steps to avert its occurrence. Even inside South Africa, behind the race factor there lay the calculated exploitation by a cohesive and powerful minority of an amorphous and disunited labour force. With unassailable logic and due regard to their long-term interests—as well as short-term advantage—the racists had instituted the system of *apartheid*. They had also allied themselves with similar self-seeking capitalist systems abroad, first in Europe and now increasingly in Asia and Africa.

5. The defence correspondent of *The Times* of London, Mr. Charles Douglas Home, had written on 10 October 1969 that it was hard to avoid the suspicion that the Conservative Party was mortgaged to the obviously partisan attitude of those people who had investments in South Africa. He had gone on to say that it was unfortunate that Tory policy seemed to reflect so unalterably the views of firms with such obviously vested interests. The United Kingdom Conservative Party need not have been singled out since, as shown by the records of the Security Council, the Labour Party, too, had consistently acted in a way that would not jeopardize the interests of British investors in South Africa.

6. On the question of the arms embargo, it was significant that the Soviet Union had been the only one of the four great Powers to have supported the embargo without reservation and to have discharged its responsibility fully. The report of the Special Committee had stated in paragraph 37 that France had honoured the arms embargo more in the breach than in the observance and by its actions had encouraged other European States to break the embargo.

7. Imperialist States, with their long history of exploitation of Africa and their present extension of colonialism by other means, were the natural allies of South Africa, which epitomized capitalist exploitation.

8. The fact that the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France had failed to give full support to the embargo and had maintained economic relations with South Africa had not been due to a failure of conscience; nor should it be assumed that the essence of the problem was racial. The explanation seemed to lie more in the inexorable power of capitalist economics to which certain Governments were beholden.

9. An article published in *The New York Times* of 13 October 1970, entitled "South Africa Breaches Black Nations' United Front", had revealed not only that foreign black dignitaries in transit through South Africa were treated as "honorary whites", but that that distinguished status might even be bestowed on some of the neighbouring black countries. That was, in a way, a welcome development since it revealed the superficial and unreliable nature of an alliance of black nations. The article had also mentioned the white liberal opinion that both the South African Government and its new black friends stood to lose from what appeared to be short-term political opportunism. The importance of such a development was even greater in the effect that it might have on the liberation movement in Africa. African nationalists would yet again be obliged to realize that the success of their struggle depended primarily on their own efforts.

10. Members of the Organization could, however, assist that struggle. His delegation would therefore not dissent from the general conclusion in paragraph 143 of the report that the struggle of the non-white people of South Africa could be successful if Member States took strong and resolute action in support of that struggle.

11. It disagreed, however, with the conclusion that such strong and resolute action concerned the maintenance or severance of diplomatic, consular, economic, commercial and military relations with the racist régime. The United Nations had never acted unanimously in support of any cause, and there was no reason to believe that it would do so now on the occasion of the anniversary celebrations. Some countries would support the national liberation movement in South Africa either within the United Nations or outside it, by providing material and other assistance; others would not.

12. The only United Nations enforcement action which could resolve the problem would be support for the armed resistance of the freedom-fighters in southern Africa. It was regrettable that hitherto there had been no evidence that the Organization would embark on any such action in its twenty-fifth anniversary year.

13. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that the question of *apartheid* had been passed back and forth for many years between the General Assembly and the Security Council, both of which had remained powerless in their search for a solution. Constructive action, provided it was in conformity with the Charter, was long overdue. If it were not taken there would be a revolution in the African continent, since

those who practised *apartheid* and racial discrimination would learn, it seemed, only from bitter experience. They were, however, to be pitied for their beliefs, since they knew no better.

14. The Arab peoples, while not all of the same colour, were all brothers in Arabism and Islam. All men were human beings, no race was superior to another, and anyone could achieve distinction regardless of his colour. It was true that Christianity did not preach discrimination, but unfortunately, that was only in theory. While the peoples of Europe had become Christian, they had not been imbued with the spirit of Christianity. That also applied to South Africa, which was a projection of Europe. Racial barriers had been erected because of fear and suspicion; but fear and suspicion were still prevalent and would not be eradicated by resolutions. Exhaustive and repetitious reports had been prepared on the question, and many clichés had been uttered in the hope that, by dint of repetition, some result might be achieved; but the words fell on deaf ears. Certain countries had increased their trade with South Africa, because they placed their own vested interests above humanitarian considerations.

15. The use of force, however, should be ruled out, since it would achieve nothing but bitterness and ill-feeling. Since the question of *apartheid* was closely connected with that of Namibia, further action should be concentrated on that country. The South African Government had undertaken to grant Namibians self-determination; an attempt should now be made to ascertain when that undertaking would be implemented.

16. In 1966 his delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/L.486)<sup>1</sup> to the General Assembly proposing that one or more Co-Administrators, to be selected from neutral countries, should be appointed to accelerate the process of self-determination in South West Africa. The proposal had not been adopted and instead a Council for Namibia had subsequently been established and there was now talk of appointing a High Commissioner for Namibia. A High Commissioner, however, would not be allowed to go to the Territory and would therefore serve no useful purpose. He suggested that during the current session an effort should be made to communicate with South Africa through its representative in the United Nations and ascertain whether it would accept United Nations observers, or Co-Administrators, who would then be able to work within the Territory. Once Namibia became independent, the process of eliminating *apartheid* would be accelerated, since there might then be prejudice against the white population.

17. He called for a change of attitude among Member States and for constructive action.

18. Mr. TEYMOUR (United Arab Republic) said that despite the fact that a quarter of a century had elapsed since the establishment of the United Nations, whose Charter proclaimed respect for human rights without any discrimination whatsoever, and despite the fact that the problem of *apartheid* and racial discrimination had been under consideration by the United Nations for twenty-two

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1449th meeting.

years, no solution had yet been found. Attempts to achieve a peaceful solution, for example, through the establishment in 1952 of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa (see General Assembly resolution 616 B (VII)), direct consultations between the Secretary-General and the Government of South Africa in 1961,<sup>2</sup> efforts by Member States which maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa, and the declaration made in the Lusaka Manifesto,<sup>3</sup> in 1969, that the Africans preferred to achieve their liberation without physical violence, had all failed. As the Secretary-General had pointed out in paragraph 107 of the introduction (A/8001/Add.1) to his report on the work of the Organization, the South African Government had not only refused to co-operate and rejected the resolutions of the General Assembly, but had proceeded to enact further measures to consolidate racial discrimination and racial segregation as State policies, and by 1962 the General Assembly had come to the conclusion that coercive measures were necessary. That conclusion had been endorsed by OAU and the non-aligned countries at their recent meetings (see A/SPC/L.181). He wondered what action those who had advocated a dialogue between Africa and the Government of South Africa would advise the Africans to take when all roads to a peaceful solution had been closed. The people of South Africa had become convinced that only through armed struggle could they obtain their freedom, and the United Arab Republic would continue to give moral and material assistance to the people of South Africa and to the liberation movement in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2548 (XXIV) and 2506 B (XXIV) and the resolutions of OAU.

19. One major reason for the failure to achieve a peaceful solution to the question of *apartheid* was that some Member States which maintained political and economic relations with South Africa, in particular South Africa's major trading partners, had not implemented the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, including Council resolution 282 (1970). South Africa was still the most important outlet for United Kingdom direct investment overseas, and United States direct investment in South Africa had been growing rapidly. Both countries therefore had an important stake in South Africa and political stability in that country was essential to the protection of their interests. South Africa's major trading partners were the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. Such economic and commercial ties were contrary to General Assembly resolution 2554 (XXIV), in particular its fourth preambular paragraph.

20. Another reason for the failure to achieve a peaceful solution was the military aid and arms supplied to South Africa by its major Western economic partners. The United Kingdom, the United States and other countries had

supplied not only small arms, but also aircraft, submarines and ground-to-air missiles. The United Kingdom Government now intended to expand its arms trade with South Africa, basing its action on the Simonstown Agreement of June 1955, though under Article 103 of the United Nations Charter its obligations under the Charter should prevail. In reply to the argument that a distinction was made between weapons for defence and weapons for domestic use, he would say that any arms supplied to the South African Government would contribute to the suppression of the population. There was no way of ascertaining that aircraft, for instance, would not be used for military purposes; aircraft of the type supplied to South Africa by the United States had been used against the people of Palestine by Zionist terrorists. There was a parallel between the defiant attitudes of South Africa and Israel towards United Nations resolutions; both were encouraged to persist in their defiance by the arms supplies they received and by the refusal of some States to apply sanctions against them. The sole aim of the military build-up in South Africa was the suppression of the population.

21. If an early solution was to be found to the problem of *apartheid*, severe sanctions should be applied against South Africa, and those States which supplied South Africa with arms should be condemned as partners in crime. He questioned the right of the Government of South Africa to represent that country in the United Nations when its policy was to keep the majority under white domination. The philosophy of the South African Government was similar to that of the Zionist leaders in Israel who continued to deprive a whole population of its fundamental rights in an effort to preserve Israel's Jewish character. Both régimes pursued a racist and exclusivist policy involving deportation, eviction, torture and persecution, violated United Nations resolutions, disregarded fundamental human rights and the principle of self-determination and had as their aim the annexation of the territories which they occupied.

22. In agreeing with the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee, his delegation wished to draw the attention of all States to the fact that 1971 had been designated as International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. He appealed to all States to take concerted action against the Government of South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in order to compel South Africa to abide by the Charter. It was essential to act before it was too late.

23. Mr. CAHANA (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, reiterated the appeal he had made to members at the previous meeting not to inject the Arab-Israeli dispute into the Committee's consideration of the question of *apartheid*. The cause of the conflict in the Middle East was the Arab philosophy of exclusivism which allowed no place for another culture. The remarks made by the representative of the United Arab Republic concerning Zionism and the character of the State of Israel were full of distortions. The Arab States could learn much from what had been done in Israel to bridge the differences in culture, background and origins. Justice did not require that there should be yet one more Arab State at the expense of Israel.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961*, document S/4635.

<sup>3</sup> Manifesto on Southern Africa, adopted at the sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity; for the text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

24. Mr. TEYMOUR (United Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the Arab States in the Middle East tolerated all faiths and indeed respected the Jewish faith and had always co-operated with the Jewish

people in their States. For that reason they advocated a secular State where Moslems, Christians and Jews could live together.

*The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.*