



Thursday, 4 November 1971,
at 10.55 a.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Cornelius C. CREMIN (Ireland).

Request for a hearing

1. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that he had received a letter from the Reverend Edgar Lockwood stating that he had served as an observer on the International Commission of Jurists during August and September at the trial in Pietermaritzburg of Dean G. A. French-Beytagh and 13 other alleged terrorists, and asking the Committee to grant him a hearing in connexion with that trial.

2. Mr. TEYMOUR (Egypt) strongly supported the request for the hearing. He noted that the Reverend Lockwood intended to discuss the trial of 13 non-white alleged terrorists, many of whom had been subjected to torture and to brutal treatment.

3. Like many other representatives, he had been highly impressed with the films shown to members of the Committee and regretted that they had been given so little publicity. He suggested that they should be given further publicity and that representatives of all Member States should have an opportunity to view them.

4. Mr. VARGA (Hungary) said that his delegation supported the Reverend Lockwood's request for a hearing, as well as the Egyptian representative's suggestion that the films on *apartheid* should be given wider publicity.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to the request for a hearing.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEMS 37 AND 12

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/8403, A/8422 and Corr.1, A/8467, A/8468, A/SPC/145):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1);
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/8467, A/8468);
- (c) Report of the Economic and Social Council (chapter XVII (section C)) (A/8403)

6. Mr. JAISEY (Ghana) said that those who were determined to see the eradication of *apartheid* looked on the United Nations as the main instrument by which the Government of the Republic of South Africa would eventually be persuaded to abandon that evil doctrine and

to restore the inalienable rights of the black and Coloured population. That was why the Committee continued to discuss the subject year after year, adopting resolutions and making recommendations to the General Assembly, despite the more rigorous enforcement of the policies of *apartheid* and the fact that hopes for peaceful, progressive change were wearing thin.

7. Instead of heeding the appeals of the United Nations, the South African Government had embarked on a campaign to justify *apartheid* and demonstrate that its policy was for the benefit of all races. However, the South African Government seemed unable to hide its true intentions. In that regard, he cited a passage from a booklet published by the South African Government for the benefit of visitors to the Republic which stated that the policy of *apartheid* was basic to South African politics and government, providing for the separate political development of the various peoples that made up South Africa's multinational population. According to the booklet, the policy envisaged a number of self-governing politically independent Bantu nations alongside and in co-operative association with the white nations—a South African commonwealth or community of nations.

8. The word "nation" required closer examination. The South African Government regarded the 3.5 million whites of European stock in the country as constituting one nation in their own right, irrespective of whether they were of German, British, Dutch, French or Italian origin. But the 15 million blacks, all of whom were of the Bantu stock, were viewed as constituting different "nations" according to their tribal grouping. That was very strange logic indeed. If the different European nationalities, each of which had its own language and cultural characteristics, could form one nation simply because they were white and of European stock, then why could not the Zulus, Xhosas, Sothos, Swazis, Tswanas and others, all of whom were also of one stock, constitute one nation as well? The real reason was that the South African Government wanted to divide the Africans, the better to rule them. The 15 million Africans were too numerous and therefore had to be split up and set one against the other so that they could be weakened and rendered more amenable to suppression.

9. The populations of most African countries, which were artificial creations of imperialism and colonialism, were made up of different tribes, each having its own language or dialect and slight variations in customs just like the South African tribes, yet they lived together and took pride in their nationality. They had tribal problems, like those between the Welsh, the Scots and the English in the United Kingdom and between the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium. But the South African Government chose to capitalize on minor differences among the Bantu tribes and

create nations out of them, confining each tribal group to its “homeland”, or Bantustan. According to Prime Minister Vorster, South Africa was multinational and not multi-racial, and the problem was not racial tolerance, but how to ensure that the different nations of South Africa should coexist happily.

10. The key element in the South African Government's international defence of *apartheid* was that the Bantustans were intended to offer each tribal group self-determination leading to eventual independence, and a framework in which to preserve its own culture and form its own economic base. But were the cultures of those tribal groups really so irreconcilable? In all likelihood, the similarities between them were more pronounced than the differences. In any case, the modern tendency everywhere was towards acculturation as a result of industrialization and urbanization. The South African Government therefore had no valid case for keeping the tribal groups in South Africa apart and giving to each the artificial name of a “nation”.

11. The Bantu “homelands” could never be viable economic entities. Most of them were unsuitable for any industrial or even agricultural development, lacking water and having only limited transport and power. It had often been argued in the Fourth Committee that because certain territories, mostly small islands, were not economically viable, independence would be a disservice rather than a benefit to them. And yet the South African Government expected the Bantustans to become independent one day. Even the land area of the Bantustans was insufficient for the population they were expected to hold. The tribal chiefs had constantly been asking the South African authorities for more land.

12. The Tomlinson Commission had established in 1955 in its report¹ that the “homelands” could support 2,142,000 people at subsistence level; it had further reckoned that they could support a population of 7,000,000 if a comprehensive plan of agricultural improvements was carried out and 1,250,000 new opportunities for employment in non-agricultural fields could be created inside the “homelands” by 1981. Since then, according to available records, while the population had risen to over 7,000,000, fewer than 2,000 new jobs had been provided by Government programmes, and only a fraction of the agricultural plans had been implemented. While it was true that industrialization had provided employment for a further 100,000 Africans, the industries concerned were situated not in the Bantu “homelands”, but in the white areas bordering on them. The South African Government offered tax inducements to employers to establish new factories in certain designated areas near the African “homelands”. Those “border industries” helped to reduce the number of Africans in the white areas by transferring them to the “homelands”, but added nothing to the economy of the latter. Meanwhile, employers could draw on unlimited and cheap supplies of labour, paying African workers less than in the towns because of lower living costs.

13. In planning the Bantustans, the South African Government had no intention of depriving the white economy of

African labour. Cheap labour had been the corner-stone of South Africa's economic history and was also responsible for the exceptionally high returns on foreign investments. Thus, when families were removed to the “homelands”, adult wage-earners were permitted to return to their jobs as immigrants to live in bachelor hostels outside towns. As a result, the settlement camps and townships for deported people in the “homelands” were inhabited mainly by women, children, the old and the infirm, categories described by the South African authorities as “non-productive”.

14. He had emphasized the conditions in and around the Bantustans in order to demonstrate that the South African authorities could not be seriously contemplating self-government and independence for the “homelands”. *Apartheid* was simply the logical conclusion of a “master race” philosophy like that of the Nazis and must therefore be not merely condemned, but eradicated. That would not be an easy matter, for *apartheid* was based on the whites' fear of being swamped by the blacks, who outnumbered them by five to one. Moreover, *apartheid* had become a national philosophy, basic to the politics and Government of South Africa.

15. In the view of his delegation, it was essential to mount a large-scale campaign to counteract the South African Government's campaign in defence of *apartheid*. In that connexion, his delegation endorsed the recommendations made in the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1). The objective should be both to undermine South Africa's public relations effort and to bring to the notice of the general public the evil effects of *apartheid* on its victims. His delegation wished to congratulate the Office of Public Information and the Unit on *Apartheid* on the excellent work they had accomplished in that respect.

16. Some people, including well-known opponents of *apartheid*, seemed to think that simple solutions such as boycotts, sanctions, expulsions and blockades could not be effective. His delegation was of the view that if attempts to ostracize South Africa had not produced the expected result, it was because they had not been fully implemented. South Africa's trading partners and those who violated the arms embargo against that country were largely responsible for the ineffectiveness of such policies. Arguing that business and sport must not be mixed with politics, they continued to do business with South Africa, invest in the country and engage in sports competitions with it. South Africa's reaction to the near-complete boycott in sports should confirm the effectiveness of such simple solutions. His delegation therefore appealed to those nations still doing business with South Africa to terminate such relations with it.

17. In making that appeal, his delegation realized that it was not easy to convince foreign firms to withdraw from businesses they had built up in South Africa over a period of up to 60 years and appreciated the difficulty of withdrawing capital, owing to exchange controls. His delegation was merely asking that there should be no more investments in or trade with South Africa in the future, for other countries offered better markets for investments and were eager to increase their trade. Businesses which would

¹ Union of South Africa, *Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa*, U.G. 61/1955 (Pretoria, Government Printer).

have difficulty in withdrawing from South Africa should help to break down *apartheid*. They could, for instance, work to reduce the startling disparity in wage levels between white and non-white workers in South Africa, as certain British banking institutions were already doing. In addition, they could endeavour to improve employer-employee relations and provide Africans with training for promotion to posts at as high a level as the laws would permit. They could also work for improvements in workers' amenities and supplementary benefits. There was no reason why enlightened management in South Africa should not take an active interest in the general welfare of non-white workers, including housing, transport, medical and welfare services, recreational activities and the education of workers' children.

18. It was well known that South Africa was producing its own arms and was now able to export them. It could not have attained that level without the financial and technical backing of certain Western countries. The only threat to South Africa came from its own African population, which was fighting for its inalienable rights. Therefore, all States should respect the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council, which made no distinction between arms for internal suppression and arms for external defence.

19. The representative of Italy had recommended (762nd meeting) that the African States should engage in dialogue with South Africa. Indeed, dialogue, including negotiations with a view to the elimination of *apartheid*, would be worthy of consideration were it not for the attitude of South Africa. While calling for a dialogue, the South African Government was becoming more repressive in the implementation of its *apartheid* policies, and was even exporting *apartheid* to other areas, like Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, it continued to claim that *apartheid* was a purely internal affair and should not be discussed in any international forum. The OAU had made its position clear on that subject. Its Council of Ministers, at its meeting in June 1971, had declared that there was no basis as yet for a meaningful dialogue with South Africa. If the South African Government seriously desired to enter into such a dialogue, it must take immediate steps to do away with *apartheid*, which was the main point at issue. As soon as it gave an indication of abandoning *apartheid*, it could be sure that the African Governments would be happy to confer with it with a view to thrashing out other areas of disagreement. In that connexion, his country endorsed the position taken by the OAU.

20. In conclusion, his delegation wished to pay tribute to the Special Committee for its excellent work and comprehensive report. He also wished to thank the Secretary-General for his report on *apartheid* (A/8467), and the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa for its invaluable work. In view of the situation in South Africa, the victims of *apartheid* were bound to depend increasingly on the outside world for assistance and encouragement, but victory was bound to come, no matter how long and arduous the road.

21. Mr. KIILU (Kenya) said the United Nations had been concerned with the question of the policies of *apartheid* for more than 20 years. The question had also been discussed

in other international bodies. Nevertheless, the situation in South Africa had gone from bad to worse, and currently the Pretoria régime was more than ever bent on destroying Africans and other members of the non-white population in South Africa. The anxiety and concern about the situation in South Africa felt by Kenya had been strongly expressed in the statement of its Foreign Minister in the general debate on 1 October 1971 (1949th plenary meeting) and also by its Vice-President, who had recently stated that Kenya was strongly bound by the Manifesto on Southern Africa calling for racial equality between peoples who lived on the continent of Africa. The Vice-President had stated, that his people did not hate the white South Africans, but that they hated the policy by which that country was administered.

22. The people of Kenya knew the Boers only too well since hundreds of them had lived in Kenya before independence and had had to leave the country thereafter, because Kenya had no room for advocates of race hatred. It had a multiracial society where all citizens were equal before the law.

23. Black South Africans led a miserable life and were brutalized daily. Those unfortunate enough to be sent to gaol met with inhuman conditions in which 35 or 40 inmates were crowded into a cell 30 feet square in which they were expected to live for 10 or 15 years. If they emerged alive, they were useless to the community because of the mental and physical torture to which they had been subjected. The fascist régime in Pretoria was bent on exterminating the black race. Thousands of children were dying of malnutrition, and many families had been rendered fatherless since heads of families who were in good health were separated from their families to provide cheap labour. The South African régime was totally opposed to freedom of expression, and hundreds of Africans and members of other non-white races were at present languishing in prison for having spoken their minds about the cruelty of the régime. The Anglican Dean of Johannesburg had been convicted, under the infamous Terrorism Act, of having taken part in terrorist activities aimed at overthrowing the South African Government. Many other clergymen had been deported, detained or barred from entering South Africa. Such repression led to the conclusion that the South African régime was desperate and, moreover, afraid of being exposed to the outside world. The Dean and many others like him had been detained and convicted for opposing the heinous practice of racial discrimination.

24. His delegation had been shocked by the statement made by the representative of South Africa in the general debate on 30 September 1971 (1946th plenary meeting) in which he had enumerated the "good" done by the régime for the non-white population. He had mentioned the establishment of political institutions in the various nations in South Africa and the progress made towards self-determination and the granting of legislative status to the various "homelands". He had also mentioned discussions between the South African authorities and members of the Representative Council of the Coloured Population Group and the governing bodies of some of the so-called "nations". Actually, the "homelands" could never hope to attain independence in the true sense of the word since the

lands given over to them were of no economic viability. They would always be wholly dependent on South Africa. The granting of "independence" or "nationhood" would in fact intensify the massive resettlement operations in which the South African Government was involved. The uprooting of hundreds of thousands of Africans and their resettlement in the barren "homelands" was an essential part of the *apartheid* policy. When the resettlement operation was complete, white South Africans, who constituted less than one fifth of the total population of South Africa, would be in possession of 87.3 per cent of the area of the country. The area earmarked for the white population contained all the valuable mineral resources, industries and commercial undertakings in South Africa whereas the area set aside for the Bantu "homelands" was almost entirely underdeveloped.

25. The "discussions" referred to by the South African representative were spurious since, in actual fact, the Pretoria régime had forced itself upon a number of hand-picked African representatives to whom it issued orders. On 25 August 1971 the gallant and respected Chief of Zululand, Dr. Gatsha Buthelezi had called for a national multiracial conference to discuss the country's political and racial future. He had been sharply rebuffed by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, who had said that the ruling Nationalist Party knew precisely what path to take for the future and that a conference was therefore unnecessary. The South African Government was for the time being eager for a dialogue with the independent African States. The Kenyan Government could not agree to engage in a dialogue with the Vorster régime until that régime had entered into a genuine dialogue with the oppressed Africans in South Africa. The Kenyan Government could not be tricked or pressed into embarking on a sellout policy.

26. Not content with suppressing the Africans in South Africa, the South African racist régime was spreading its tentacles towards Rhodesia. It had given material and moral support to the rebellious Smith clique which, but for the support it had received from South Africa and Portugal, would have proved less successful.

27. His Government was emphatically opposed to the sale of arms to the South African régime by the United Kingdom or any other Power. It found it abhorrent that a Government which subscribed to the principles of human rights could decide to sell South Africa arms intended for the elimination of the non-white races, and unreservedly condemned the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France for doing so. Because of its arsenal of weapons, the South African Government had been able to threaten to attack any African country giving refuge to freedom-fighters. Recently the racist régime of South Africa had violated the territorial and air space of Zambia on the pretext that certain Namibians who had attacked some installations in the Caprivi Strip had come from Zambia. In its usual manner the Security Council had adopted a mild resolution blaming South Africa. However, condemnatory resolutions seemed to have no effect on the racist régime of South Africa. The situation in South Africa was explosive. Millions of South Africans were living in intolerable conditions and there was every danger of a bloodbath of unprecedented dimensions.

It was time for the Committee to take concrete decisions with a view to arresting the trend in that direction.

28. His Government believed in action rather than rhetoric. Before independence, the colonial régime in Kenya had been engaged in healthy trade with the Pretoria régime, amounting to £ 2 million annually. However, after independence, the Kenyan Government had banned all trade with South Africa and Portugal. That step had incurred a great monetary loss but had been regarded as a necessary sacrifice on behalf of the fight against *apartheid*. In compliance with resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and by the OAU, the Kenyan Government had ordered an immediate closure of the South African Consulate in Nairobi and had withdrawn the landing and flying rights previously enjoyed by South African Airways in Kenya. His delegation appealed to countries which had not taken measures against the Pretoria régime to do so without delay. Countries failing to break off diplomatic and economic relations with the Pretoria régime, in violation of Assembly resolutions, should be condemned for helping to fortify and perpetuate the evil doctrine of *apartheid*.

29. Commenting on the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1) he said that it factually and dramatically revealed the worsening situation in South Africa. The Chairman, Rapporteur and other members of the Special Committee deserved special praise for the devotion with which they had worked. He noted with regret that certain Western countries had refused to serve on the Special Committee, and his delegation was shocked by the intransigence of South Africa's main trading partners, who continued to trade with that country despite the protests of the international community. It appealed to those countries to reconsider their position. It was heartening to note in the report that trade unions were beginning to understand the important role they could play in shaping public opinion with regard to the evils of *apartheid*. It was also encouraging that certain non-governmental organizations were actively engaged in combating *apartheid*.

30. The South African racist régime was spending millions of dollars in its propaganda campaign to convince other countries of the sanctity of its *apartheid* policy. Radio South Africa was heard practically everywhere in the world, and there was an urgent need to counteract its propaganda. His delegation therefore suggested that the work of the Sub-Committee on Information of the Special Committee should be substantially intensified. The Sub-Committee might wish to consider the possibility of creating and operating a radio station in Africa for the sole purpose of neutralizing South African propaganda. He was certain that many States, particularly African States would be willing to assist in such an exercise.

31. His delegation endorsed the recommendation contained in paragraph 252 of the Special Committee's report. The adoption by the General Assembly of a declaration on the elimination of *apartheid* would help to counteract the propaganda and manoeuvres of the South African régime and its allies.

32. Mr. ZENKYAVICHUS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, in the determined struggle they were waging against imperialism and for the elimination of

hotbeds of colonialism and racism throughout their continent, the peoples of Africa were supported by all of progressive mankind, which would not accept the shameful policies and practices of racial discrimination and *apartheid*. The whole world's indignation at the wave of new acts of repression against those fighting *apartheid* had been reflected in the draft resolution² the Committee had adopted at its previous meeting. The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa had long been the subject of constant concern and universal condemnation in the United Nations and other international bodies. As a result of the attention the Organization had paid to the problem, numerous important resolutions had been adopted condemning the policies of *apartheid* and indicating ways of putting an end to them. For example, already at its seventeenth session, the Assembly had requested (resolution 1761 (XVII)) that Member States should break off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of South Africa, close their ports to South African vessels, boycott all South African goods and refrain from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa.

33. His delegation had listened with great interest and sympathy to the representatives of African States who had spoken in the Committee and had presented it with a wealth of factual information on the inhuman policies of the South African authorities. In its resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963) and 191 (1964) the Security Council had appealed to all States immediately to put an end to arms sales to South Africa. The United Nations had agreed that policies based on racial discrimination and racial superiority were incompatible with human dignity and had condemned *apartheid* and called it a crime against humanity. Many provisions of the resolutions of the United Nations had been reflected in the decisions of other international bodies and virtually every conference of Asian and African States had condemned the policies of racial discrimination and *apartheid* in their decisions.

34. The statement made on behalf of the OAU during the general debate at the current session (1938th plenary meeting) by Mr. Moktar Ould Daddah, the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, showed how concerned the African countries were about the situation which had resulted on their continent from the policies of the remaining colonialist régimes in southern Africa. During recent months the Security Council had given almost constant attention to a whole range of questions related to the policies of the racist and colonialist régimes of South Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration. The deep concern felt by world public opinion in connexion with the continuing inhuman policies of *apartheid* was well grounded. Those policies were not limited to South Africa but went beyond the borders of that country, which was extending its racist régime to the occupied territory of Namibia and was endeavouring to suppress national liberation movements throughout the African continent.

35. The South African racists were increasing their military strength and using it not only to bolster up the racist practices within the country but also to combat national liberation movements in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia,

to assist the Portuguese colonialists in their struggle against patriotic forces in Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique and Angola and to threaten the sovereignty of independent young African States. That being the case, it was obvious that all States Members of the United Nations were in duty bound to adopt the necessary measures to curb the South African racists. Such measures could be facilitated by the decisions the United Nations had already adopted.

36. However, the United Nations resolutions were being ignored by the South African authorities, who clearly had no intention of listening to the voice of reason and implementing those decisions. South Africa could not have acted so boldly against world public opinion if it had been on its own and had not had direct economic, political and military support from a number of countries, particularly the members of NATO, which were South Africa's main trading partners or the main investors in its economy. The reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and the Unit on *Apartheid* specifically named the countries which gave military and economic support to the racist régime. As the representatives of African countries had noted in their statements, it was that very support which encouraged the South African authorities to persist in the policies of *apartheid* and in the tyrannical oppression of the African population both of South Africa and of the illegally occupied territory of Namibia, and enabled them to disregard the decisions of the United Nations.

37. United Kingdom, United States and other Western monopolies were investing thousands of millions of dollars in the South African economy and were reaping profits in the millions through exploiting and plundering the African population. Recent trade figures showed that the United Kingdom was still the main trading partner of South Africa, closely followed by the United States of America. That policy of the Western countries was a gross violation of the General Assembly resolutions condemning the imperialist monopolies for their co-operation with the racist régime and demanding an end to such co-operation.

38. The Western countries and their monopolies were also violating other United Nations resolutions, such as those of the Security Council relating to the sale of arms. The Conservative Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for example, was going ahead with its plans to sell yet more military equipment to South Africa. Thus, while the United Nations discussed the matter and adopted resolutions, the South African racists, backed by that assistance, continued to take measures to strengthen their colonial régime in South Africa and Namibia.

39. The South African racists stopped at nothing to strengthen their occupation of Namibia and deceive world public opinion. Surely, their idea of holding a "plebiscite" in Namibia had been conceived for that purpose. Everyone knew what such a plebiscite, supervised by Pretoria, would be worth. The South African Government had also come up with the idea of a so-called "peaceful dialogue", which could only be seen as a manoeuvre by the racists and their allies to divide the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist front of the African countries, to mislead world public opinion and put an end to South Africa's isolation on the African continent. The notorious "dialogue" had been rejected by the African States, both in the OAU and during the general

² Subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 2764 (XXVI).

debate in the General Assembly and in the Spécial Political Committee.

40. The alliance formed in Africa by international imperialism with the Portuguese colonialists and the South African racists was an alliance of reactionaries, the main purpose of which was to combat national liberation movements in order to maintain and strengthen the rule of the imperialist monopolies. It was an alliance of the exploiters against the exploited. Neither the peoples of Africa nor progressive mankind as a whole would ever reconcile themselves to the prospect of perpetual colonialism and racism on the continent of Africa and, in order to maintain and strengthen universal peace and security, the vestiges of colonialism and the evils of racism in Africa would have to be completely eliminated.

41. Faithful to the Leninist ideas of freedom and equality for all peoples, large and small, irrespective of their racial origin, the Soviet people angrily and indignantly rejected the inhuman practices of *apartheid*. Support for the peoples of Africa in their struggle against colonialism, racism and *apartheid* was a basic principle of Soviet foreign policy, and that policy had been reaffirmed at the twenty-fourth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That policy of the USSR reflected the philosophy and lofty goals of the struggle waged by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the freedom of all peoples against imperialism, colonialism, racism, *apartheid* and all forms of oppression of peoples. Communists throughout the world were in the vanguard of the struggle against *apartheid* and racism. As Hitler had done in the past, the racists in South Africa were now using the fight against communism as a pretext for putting down all freedom-fighters. That was so evident that the only ones who could not see it were those who did not want to see it.

42. The current goal of the progressive forces in the world was to put an end to the shameful policies of *apartheid* and to ensure that the imperialist Powers refrained from supporting the racist régime and implemented the United Nations decisions concerning sanctions. The successful solution of that task would facilitate not only the strengthening of fundamental human rights and freedoms but also the maintenance of international peace and security. The Soviet Union strictly implemented the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on *apartheid*. It had not maintained and did not maintain political, economic or any other relations with the racist régime, had not delivered and did not deliver arms or military equipment to it and did not furnish it with any type of assistance. It had always advocated the use of the strongest possible steps to put an end to the policies of racial discrimination and *apartheid*. At the current session the Soviet Union had joined Guinea in submitting to the Third Committee a draft convention on the suppression and punishment of the crime of *apartheid* (A/C.3/L.1871³). His delegation considered that the adoption by the General Assembly of the draft Convention would be a useful contribution to the struggle against the inhuman policies of *apartheid*. The Soviet people had always sympathized with the struggle of colonial and oppressed peoples for freedom and indepen-

dence and considered it its international duty to give all possible assistance to that struggle.

43. His delegation wished to associate itself with other delegations that had expressed sympathy upon the recent catastrophe in India.

44. Mr. ACOSTA (Cuba) pointed out that almost a quarter of a century had passed since the General Assembly had adopted its resolution 44 (I) on the problem of racial discrimination in South Africa. Since that time, the Assembly and Security Council had adopted more than 100 resolutions on *apartheid*, which had been treated with indifference, scorn and defiance by the South African régime and its powerful benefactors. Incessant protests on the part of the international community had done little to help non-white South Africans, who constituted 82 per cent of the population of South Africa. Twenty-five years of diplomatic manoeuvring had been of little avail. The racist minority régime was still enforcing its shameful laws and enacting new provisions to consolidate its criminal policy of "separate development". The non-white population had been subjected to physical and mental torture, imprisonment and the miserable conditions described in paragraph 212 of the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1). Meanwhile, the South African régime had continued to receive economic, technical and military support from the Western Powers, who had found that *apartheid* paid excellent dividends and who did not mind that their profits were tainted with the blood and agony of 15 million Africans.

45. South Africa's gross national product accounted for 20 per cent of the gross product of Africa; it possessed 92 per cent of Africa's gold deposits and extracted 90 per cent of the coal mined in Africa. Its imports amounted to 30 per cent of Africa's total imports and its exports to 25 per cent of the total for the continent. It produced 70 per cent of the world's gold and 50 per cent of its platinum. It was the world's leading producer of diamonds and asbestos and the second richest country in uranium deposits. Its present régime had created and was supporting and strengthening a monstrous system of separate development designed to facilitate the exploitation of its wealth, which rightfully belonged to its indigenous population.

46. *Apartheid* was a system of imprisonment, torture and murder which had been established so that the South African régime could subject all of southern Africa to its police-state methods and aggressive colonialism. Eleven years ago, its military budget had amounted to \$60 million; today, it was higher than \$443 million. Through the co-operation of the Western Powers, South Africa had not only managed to acquire enormous weapons reserves but had become a producer and even an exporter of arms and military equipment. Each year the same fallacious arguments were repeated in the General Assembly. In a letter dated 27 May 1971,⁴ for example, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations had stated that the sale of American helicopters to South Africa was carefully regulated to insure that such

³ Mimeographed.

⁴ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1971, document S/10212.

sales as did occur did not violate the letter or spirit of the arms embargo. He had claimed that if it were proven that United States helicopters being sold or advertised in South Africa were being adapted for military use, his country would take prompt measures to deal with the situation.

47. Such a statement showed contempt for the United Nations and world public opinion. As the vanquished aggressor in Viet-Nam, the United States of America had long been familiar with ways of repressing and slaughtering the common people of the world. Its cynical attitude was, however, not surprising. The racial injustice rampant in the United States of America was indicative of the ideological ties between the South African régime and the authorities in Washington. In that connexion, he referred to the recent massacres at Attica, in the State of New York, the imprisonment of Miss Angela Davis and the injuries done to Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans living in the United States of America. Yankee imperialism in Puerto Rico showed that the attitude of the United States Government to South Africa could only be that of a permanent ally. Nevertheless, the American protectors of *apartheid* should be reminded that the will of a people ready to fight could not be destroyed by helicopters, aeroplanes or bombs.

48. As for South Africa's policy of dialogue, his delegation felt that there could be no common language between the independent African States and the South African régime. If the South African régime wished to enter into dialogue, it could and should do so with its own oppressed people. The policy of dialogue had an economic base. It was aimed at finding new markets for South Africa, dividing the free African States and thus weakening the anti-*apartheid* movement in South Africa. Moreover, it was hard to envisage the possibility of holding a constructive dialogue with the South African régime so long as it persisted in its illegal occupation of Namibia.

49. The Security Council had recently met to consider the armed aggression perpetrated by the Pretoria régime against the Republic of Zambia, an independent and sovereign State which was a Member of the United Nations and whose people were struggling to emerge from the economic underdevelopment that had resulted from colonial exploitation. Moreover, the United Republic of Tanzania was still threatened by aggression despite the fact that its leaders had solemnly declared that they would never give up defending the sovereignty of Tanzania and would not abandon those who were fighting for their freedom. In that connexion, his delegation wished to reaffirm its support of members of the liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique and Angola. Step by step, they were digging the grave of *apartheid* and colonialism. His delegation was firmly convinced that they would succeed, just as it had always been convinced that the Viet-Nameese people would triumph over the powerful United States aggressors. The powerful nations were being shown that neither arms, nor wealth nor diplomatic pressure would succeed in keeping imperialism alive.

50. At the preceding meeting, his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.205/Rev.1, and it would continue to support resolutions aimed at furthering the struggle against *apartheid*. The past quarter of a century had shown that such resolutions had no real practical value, however, they could serve as a posthumous tribute to those who had died to liberate Africa and as an encouragement to those who were suffering and struggling in South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Guinea (Bissau).

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.