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MEETING**



Tuesday, 9 November 1971,  
at 10.50 a.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Cornelius C. CREMIN (Ireland).

**AGENDA ITEMS 37 AND 12**

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (*continued*) (A/8403, A/8422 and Corr.1, A/8467, A/8468, A/SPC/145, A/SPC/L.206, A/SPC/L.207):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1);
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/8467, A/8468);
- (c) Report of the Economic and Social Council (chapter XVII (section C)) (A/8403)

1. Mr. MAHJOUBI (Morocco) said that after 25 years of consideration in the United Nations, the policies of *apartheid* continued to be practised in South Africa. That country continued to defy the United Nations by intensifying the legal, economic and social measures which blocked the development of its oppressed peoples in their struggle for freedom and justice. The international community had tried various approaches with a view to ending the reign of terror, inequality and injustice in South Africa. It had at first addressed itself to the conscience of the South African white minority, calling for the abandonment of the policies which stifled the voice of the non-white population. However, the South African authorities had turned a deaf ear to those appeals and, during the past year, had adopted new legislative measures providing for the deportation of "non-productive" Africans to arid reserves.

2. The United Nations has subsequently attempted to approach the problem through the economic isolation of South Africa, calling on all States to institute a total embargo on trade with that country. Despite that effort, the South African economy had actually been strengthened, and South Africa was in fact becoming a major source of capital for its sister régimes in southern Africa, investing heavily in the economies of Angola and Mozambique and thus strengthening Portugal's colonial grasp on the region. Attempts to impose a total arms embargo on South Africa had been equally ineffectual. With the aid provided by certain States, South Africa had built up a modern armaments industry and had increased its military strength to the point where it was now the greatest military Power in Africa.

3. The United Nations had finally tried to bring about the political and diplomatic isolation of South Africa. Yet that country had succeeded in broadening its relations with the rest of the world and strengthening its co-operative ties with many countries. During the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, the South African Prime Minister had had the audacity to visit African

and European capitals, diversifying and reinforcing ties with many States.

4. What possibilities for action were left open to the international community? A dialogue between the South African white minority and the oppressed non-white majority, as proposed by the African States, would, in his delegation's view, never be successful. Such a dialogue should be conducted between equals in a healthy and democratic atmosphere. That could happen only if South Africa was willing to create appropriate conditions within the country. It must prove to the international community that it was prepared to abandon its discriminatory measures and restore the fundamental rights of the non-white population.

5. It was essential for the international community to apply all possible types of measures in a concerted manner in order to undermine *apartheid* both from the outside and from within. It was of course necessary to strengthen existing measures adopted by the United Nations to secure compliance by the Powers that continued to co-operate with South Africa, but it was no less important to deal with *apartheid* from inside South Africa itself by providing direct assistance to the peoples oppressed by the *apartheid* system. The international community must provide moral and psychological support to South African universities, religious and other humanitarian organizations and individuals opposed to *apartheid*, for such efforts could succeed in mobilizing the masses of the population and change the arrogant attitude of the South African Government. In that connexion, the mandate of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa should be revised so that the Fund could provide new forms of assistance to the victims of *apartheid*, including education and training for young people and for refugees who had been forced to leave South Africa. By concentrating its efforts in that way, the international community could make a start in bringing about the ultimate elimination of *apartheid*.

6. Miss DINCER (Turkey) requested the representative of India to transmit to his Government and people her delegation's feelings of grief and sympathy on the disastrous cyclone which had recently struck his country.

7. From the first, her delegation had strongly opposed and condemned the policy of *apartheid*. By virtue of its historical background, traditions and culture, her country had always been opposed to racial, religious and all other forms of discrimination. Her Government maintained no diplomatic, consular, economic or cultural relations of any sort with the Government of South Africa. Her delegation had always supported United Nations resolutions calling on South Africa to put an end to *apartheid*, demanding the full implementation of the arms embargo imposed by the

Security Council, providing economic, social and humanitarian assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle against *apartheid* and urging wider dissemination of information on the dangers of *apartheid* and international efforts for its elimination.

8. However, in spite of the numerous resolutions adopted with a view to the abolition of *apartheid*, the Government of South Africa continued its defiance of the United Nations and the international community, maintained its illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia, provided military and economic assistance to the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and extended its influence into the Territories of Mozambique and Angola by supporting the colonial policies of the Portuguese Government. Meanwhile, it was reinforcing its repressive measures against the indigenous population of South Africa. *Apartheid*, despite its universal condemnation and the vigorous action undertaken by the United Nations, continued to expand.

9. What the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8422 and Corr.1) revealed left little room for satisfaction. Her delegation deplored the deportation, banning, detention and trial of those who opposed *apartheid* and assisted its victims, as well as the maltreatment of detainees, as described in paragraphs 217 to 223 of the report. The recent conviction of the Anglican Dean of Johannesburg had been a source of particular grief to her delegation. In that connexion, she wished to express her appreciation to the Chairman and members of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* for issuing a communiqué and preparing the text of the draft resolution adopted at the 766th meeting for which Turkey had voted (A/SPC/146).

10. Her delegation was concerned at the increasing military build-up in South Africa and at the increasing collaboration of certain Governments and private enterprises with that country, including the influx of new capital into South Africa from its main trading partners. It was clear that if United Nations resolutions, like those relating to the implementation of the arms embargo, were to be effective, they must be strictly implemented by all States, including the main trading partners of South Africa.

11. The Bantustan scheme, under which non-whites were confined to reserves and deprived of their livelihood, provided no basis for a peaceful, just solution to the problems of South Africa. The films shown to members of the Committee had offered a shocking yet true picture of the level of poverty and the desperate conditions to which the indigenous population of South Africa was subjected in the Bantustans.

12. Although the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination seemed to have fallen short of marking a turning point in the eradication of *apartheid*, certain useful developments had taken place during that period. The United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, which had an extremely important mission to fulfil, had received contributions totalling \$287,518 from 19 Governments. Her country was among those which had contributed a token amount for 1971, and her delegation was pleased to support draft resolution A/SPC/L.207, concerning the Trust Fund.

13. Her delegation considered that the problems of colonialism and *apartheid* in southern Africa were closely linked and must be dealt with in a concerted manner. It had therefore welcomed the Joint Meeting of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of Twenty-Four) and the United Nations Council for Namibia. As a participant, it had supported the consensus adopted by the Joint Meeting (see A/8388, annex). It fully associated itself with the recommendation of the Special Committee (A/8422 and Corr.1, para. 304) that a series of joint meetings should be held in 1972 with the participation of specialized agencies, regional organizations, liberation movements and non-governmental organizations in order to make a thorough study of the problems of southern Africa and formulate a plan for more effective international action to secure the elimination of *apartheid* and colonialism in the area.

14. In her delegation's view, the most significant feature of the International Year had been the increased dissemination of information on the evils of *apartheid* and the intensified international campaign conducted against it by the Unit on *Apartheid* and the Office of Public Information, as well as Governments, mass media and other organizations. As a result of those activities, there was a great awareness of the dangers of *apartheid* among some whites in South Africa, including some prominent intellectuals, and a realization that some adjustments must be made in the direction of reduced discrimination. In the introduction (see A/8401/Add.1 and Corr.1, para. 291) to his annual report, the Secretary-General had referred to the growing recognition of the inhumanity of *apartheid* and the rising sympathy for the oppressed people of South Africa in their struggle to secure their legitimate rights, especially among youth and within churches and trade unions in countries which maintained relations with South Africa.

15. Her delegation, which attached great importance to intensified information activities, considered that specialized agencies, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, information media and educational institutions should co-operate with the United Nations in the dissemination of information. It fully supported the recommendations of the Special Committee in the matter. It would welcome the production of more films and audio-visual materials on *apartheid* by the Office of Public Information and supported the suggestion that consideration should be given to the publication of short articles by the Unit on *Apartheid*; the appearance of such articles in the European and American press could be very useful in increasing public awareness. Her delegation also supported the recommendation of the Special Committee regarding the part to be played by UNESCO in the dissemination of information on *apartheid*. It welcomed the Special Committee's co-operation with various non-governmental organizations with a view to promoting the international campaign against *apartheid*. The World Peace Council had played an especially important role in that regard. In addition, her delegation associated itself with the recommendation of the Special Committee contained in paragraph 306 (d) of its report, which would be of great significance for the success of the campaign.

16. Confronted by the intransigence of South Africa, the international community had no alternative but to exert all its efforts to intensify the international campaign against *apartheid* until such time as the Government of South Africa showed a willingness to arrange for consultations between the non-white majority and the white minority which the Security Council's Group of Experts had called for in its 1964 report,<sup>1</sup> or the kind of dialogue referred to in the Lusaka Manifesto (Manifesto on Southern Africa); only the South African people themselves were competent to negotiate the future of South Africa in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, tolerance and trust.

17. It was also important to concentrate on achieving unanimity in the adoption of draft resolutions with a view to ensuring their effectiveness, as the representative of New Zealand had pointed out (769th meeting). The resolutions on *apartheid* adopted by the General Assembly at its current session should receive the greatest possible support, as an expression of the united will of the international community. In that connexion, she noted with satisfaction the understanding and flexibility which had been shown by the sponsors of draft resolutions before the Committee.

18. In conclusion, she expressed her delegation's appreciation of the excellent work done by the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* in preparing the report.

19. Mr. J. VARGA (Hungary) said that the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the statements made in the debate and the United Nations resolutions on *apartheid* all showed the deep concern and indignation which that policy aroused among delegations concerned about international peace and security. To express, as some delegations did, the erroneous view that there was no need for further United Nations resolutions on sanctions against South Africa because those already adopted had had no effect was to abandon the South African peoples suffering under *apartheid*.

20. As one of the three members of the Special Committee that had visited Europe and Africa in 1971, his delegation had seen that during the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, the specialized agencies, anti-*apartheid* movements and other bodies had everywhere organized large-scale anti-*apartheid* manifestations and campaigns which had mobilized various strata of society. In addition to their great contribution to the condemnation of the *apartheid* policy of the racist régime of South Africa, those manifestations had rendered considerable help to the non-white population of South Africa and its national liberation movements.

21. At the same time, however, the notorious main trading partners of South Africa, which supported the racist régime out of economic, political and military considerations, and the most important of which were the United Kingdom and the United States of America, had increased their activities in South Africa, thus further strengthening the régime. His delegation rejected the excuses made by those States that

they had no right to control private investment in South Africa and that for the same reason they were unable to implement the United Nations resolutions on the arms embargo and other sanctions. His country, like several other socialist countries, knew from experience that South Africa's main trading partners would not allow such considerations to prevent them from carrying out an embargo or imposing sanctions if they really wished to do so. They had not hesitated to adopt such measures against Eastern European and other socialist countries after the Second World War. The aim of their refusal to implement the resolutions was to delay and obstruct social evolution and the action of national liberation movements. Fear of losing South Africa as an economic, political and military base was the only reason why its trading partners not only refused to put a stop to their economic, political and military co-operation as required by the spirit of the United Nations resolutions, but also wanted others to maintain relations with South Africa. That was one of the reasons why they advocated a dialogue with it.

22. It was therefore clear why, despite the United Nations resolutions and international pressure, the South African régime was at the current time unwilling to change its policy. It was also clear that the main trading partners—among them more than one permanent member of the Security Council—played a considerable role in preventing a solution to the question, and were thus accomplices in the crimes against humanity that were being committed daily.

23. Those facts were borne out by Mr. Dennis Brutus, an internationally famous expert on *apartheid*, who, in a statement before the Special Committee in March 1970,<sup>2</sup> had said that the strength of the *apartheid* régime was derived from sources outside South Africa. The struggle against the *apartheid* policies of South Africa must be concentrated on two fronts: the economic, political, diplomatic and military isolation of South Africa and the implementation by the main trading partners of past and future resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

24. The so-called "outward-looking" policy of the South African régime was not of recent origin. Its foundations had been laid by the former Prime Minister, Mr. H. Verwoerd, whose successor, Mr. J. B. Vorster, had proclaimed in 1966 that decolonization had left a vacuum in black Africa which South Africa was moving out to fill. The "outward-looking" policy manifested itself in three directions: towards black Africa, Western Europe and Latin America. The intentions behind that threefold trend were: first, to make the racist régime of South Africa the leading Power in black Africa; secondly, to break out of the increasing international isolation and to counterbalance the pressure of the anti-*apartheid* opinion of the United Nations and the African liberation movements; thirdly, to increase the number of Western European supporters of the régime and thus make it difficult for the different international forums to adopt new resolutions on sanctions against South Africa; fourthly, to increase the number of Latin American supporters of the régime and to establish a military alliance in that region; and, fifthly, to strengthen the "Unholy

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964, document S/5658, annex.

<sup>2</sup> See Unit on Apartheid, "Notes and documents", No. 7/70, which contains a condensed version of the statement.

Alliance” with Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, so that the régime could invite outside help to combat the national liberation movements.

25. It was clear that South Africa’s “outward-looking” policy towards the countries of black Africa was a new kind of neo-colonialist policy of aggression and expansion. Under the impact of great international pressure, the South African Government had become less insistent on the “outward-looking” policy and was laying stress on “dialogue”, which was an integral part of the “outward-looking” policy.

26. While stressing the so-called “dialogue”, the South African régime gave no indication of any intention to change its policy of *apartheid* in the foreseeable future. It continued to enforce its oppressive laws in violation of international law and even enacted new ones. The publication of *South Africa: Arms and Apartheid*, issued in 1970 by the International Defence and Aid Fund of London, described the essence of those repressive laws. The actual consequences of those laws, which the South African Prime Minister called humanitarian, were described in the same publication. Over 1 million Africans, 35,000 Coloured, 22,000 Indians and 64 Chinese had been removed from the “white” areas; an average of over 3,000 Africans were prosecuted every day for statutory offences under the pass laws, influx control and related laws; nearly 1,000 people had been subjected to some form of punishment without trial under security legislation; non-whites were banned from meetings and other activities; an undisclosed number of persons had been detained for indefinite periods in gaol and police cells; numerous controls had been imposed over African workers and their employment, denying them access to most jobs, the right to engage in collective bargaining and the right to strike. In a radio message to the nation, the South African Prime Minister had said that no pressure from whatever source or of whatever nature would force the Government to abandon the policy of separate development. The Hungarian delegation therefore shared the opinion expressed at the recent meeting of the OAU that the policy of dialogue was designed to overcome isolation, build a southern African bloc under its hegemony and divide African States.

27. The Government and people of the Hungarian People’s Republic condemned the policy of *apartheid*, the racist régime of South Africa and its supporters and pledged their utmost solidarity with the peoples of South Africa fighting for freedom. They were convinced that their just struggle, supported by the progressive forces of the world, would triumph.

28. His delegation agreed with the recommendations and conclusions contained in the Special Committee’s report (A/8422 and Corr.1) and would spare no effort to promote their realization. It considered it necessary to continue the international isolation of the racist régime of South Africa, to condemn its supporters, who defied the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, to continue the anti-*apartheid* propaganda campaign on the international plane, to support the victims of *apartheid* and the African liberation movements in the spirit of the United Nations resolutions and make further efforts to develop co-operation between United Nations committees concerned with questions of racism.

29. Mr. RAKOTOFIRINGA (Madagascar) expressed the sympathy of the Government and people of Madagascar to the people of India on the recent natural disaster in that country.

30. He had noted during the discussion that there was virtual unanimity on some aspects of the *apartheid* question, but not on others. The Malagasy people, like all freedom-loving peoples, was resolutely committed to the fight against all forms of racial segregation including *apartheid*, and condemned it unequivocally. It had therefore always been particularly interested in the debate on that question both in the Security Council and in the Special Political Committee. In the Security Council, his delegation, with those of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Tunisia, had been invited to participate in the discussions which had led the Council to adopt important resolutions on *apartheid*.

31. Many delegations had expressed their disappointment at the lack of significant progress in the solution of the problem of *apartheid* and had hoped that there would at last be dialogue between the white population and the oppressed peoples of South Africa. His delegation endorsed those views. The same feeling of justified impatience moved most delegations to seek means of hastening the end of the sufferings of their oppressed brothers. There were different opinions as to what means to adopt, but solutions could be complementary as well as incompatible. As a next-door neighbour of South Africa, it was in Madagascar’s interest that *apartheid* should be rapidly replaced by a just and equitable multi-racial society. Having made its island into an oasis of many races, the peaceful Malagasy people would not meet hatred with hatred and racism with racism, but advocated dialogue in all circumstances. Violence was destructive and dialogue constructive. Whereas systematically to isolate South Africa could lead it only to harden its policy to the detriment of the oppressed non-whites, dialogue and persuasion led to *détente*. The inhuman régime which the United Nations was trying to overcome was an anachronistic attitude in the modern world.

32. Because it wished to influence the people of South Africa, Madagascar opened its doors to South Africans as to nationals of any other country for human, touristic, and economic contacts which might lead to the understanding and friendship which should be the eventual objective of the fight against *apartheid*. Those relations were only a means and not an end. Madagascar’s one ambition was to create a climate likely to lead the interested parties to start the negotiations which everyone wanted. No one could question its good faith, because it had agreed to give up relations which were vitally important to its economy at a time when the closure of the Suez Canal had placed Madagascar tragically far from its traditional markets. It was therefore all the more disappointed at the evident divergence between the words and deeds of certain countries, which benefited economically from the situation.

33. However, the Malagasy Government did not endorse the view—quoted in the Special Committee’s report (A/8422 and Corr.1, para. 227)—that the objectives of non-racialism might be achieved merely by dialogue and contact with the racist régime rather than by measures adopted by the United Nations.

34. The President of the Malagasy Republic had said on 21 March, the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, that there could be no lasting peace without fraternity and that that fraternity could result, at least in part, from dialogue with those who practised racism. It was not a question of replacing United Nations action but merely of adopting a principle consonant with the spirit and the letter of Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Charter. Many draft resolutions adopted in the Committee included paragraphs which would be easier to implement if the principle of dialogue was not rejected. Consequently, his delegation had had no difficulty in voting for the draft resolution adopted by the Committee at its 766th meeting (A/SPC/146), because it could easily respond to the appeal made to all States in operative paragraph 2 thereof. His delegation was not a voting machine but expressed its vote on all draft resolutions in accordance with its ability to implement them.

35. Under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, the international community was bound to negotiate before resorting to any other means of settling disputes. In the present case, the parties to a dispute, the continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, were to be persuaded to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation and conciliation. It was understandable that all States should not agree on the same course of action because that was a question of individual appreciation, but it was disturbing to find that some States tried to prevent that action simply because they did not subscribe to it. He hoped that did not mean that those who had always been ready to use force were willing to do so once more.

36. His delegation had not opposed the circulation of the verbatim text of statements made in the Committee, despite the financial implications, because experience had shown that man's memory was short. It was therefore necessary that any statement condemning a principle which complied with the letter and spirit of the Charter should be inscribed in the pages of history so that future generations could make their choice with full knowledge of the facts.

37. Mr. FRANCIS (Jamaica) said that his delegation regretted the absence of Mr. Ralph J. Bunche and wanted to pay tribute to him for his tremendous contributions to the work of the United Nations and earnestly wished him improved health and happiness in retirement.

38. He expressed sincere gratitude to the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa for the work it had done in helping to orient the Organization towards the objectives of peace, progress and justice. His delegation agreed with the recommendation made by the Committee of Trustees of the Fund in its report (A/8468, annex) and would support an appropriate draft resolution on the matter. His Government would continue to support the Trust Fund to the extent that its resources permitted and urged all Member States to do likewise. There was much work to be done and the Trust Fund was only one of the many methods whereby some of the principles constantly expressed in the United Nations with regard to *apartheid* could be realized. *Apartheid* would not die a natural death but would have to be consciously extinguished.

39. His delegation wished to congratulate the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and its Chairman for the well-documented report they had produced. He noted with regret that the Special Committee had so far been unable to benefit from the participation of the group of Western European and other States. That was unfortunate because as a group those States had the closest contact with and understanding of the people who formed the minority Government of South Africa. The participation of all regional groups was especially important if the problem was to be solved, and his delegation reminded those who made unfavourable comments about the way the item was being handled that they had the means of making a contribution to eliminating *apartheid* by participating in the work of the Special Committee.

40. He hoped that the statement made by the Chairman of the Special Committee at the 758th meeting would arouse in each Member the desire to move forward in the search for a lasting solution to the problem. Although the representatives of sovereign States had the responsibility of defending their own national interests, within the framework of the United Nations national objectives should be pursued in the context of strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. It was particularly significant that no State except South Africa had failed to pronounce itself against *apartheid*. The problem now was to reach agreement on action to eliminate that violation of the Charter. Unfortunately the resolutions which had so far been adopted had not been implemented and had been called unenforceable and irresponsible. His delegation rejected that contention and felt that the "unenforceable" nature of the resolutions was due to the continued lack of co-operation on the part of those known to be most able to enforce them.

41. His delegation agreed with the Special Committee (see A/8422 and Corr.1, para. 78) that Security Council resolutions 181 (1963) and 182 (1963) made no exception for the continued supply of arms to South Africa under existing agreements. In addition, the intent of those resolutions had been further clarified by Security Council resolution 282 (1970) and also by General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV), which reaffirmed that, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter should prevail. That resolution was also a clear reminder to those concerned of their solemn obligation under Article 103 of the Charter. He also drew attention to its Chapter I, Article 2, paragraph 5, and said that the violators of the arms embargo included some of the very architects of the Charter, Member States who should most readily give meaning to it and to the objectives of the United Nations.

42. His delegation appealed to Member States to apply a common principle to the question of *apartheid*. In the interests of the survival of the United Nations, the will of the majority must be supported. He reminded South Africa's main trading partners that their capital and trade helped to perpetuate the existence of the horrors of the *apartheid* system. Any Government which directly or indirectly supported the South African Government was in fact subscribing to genocide in South Africa. The world's

peoples had joined forces to put an end to genocide during the Second World War and they should do likewise in the case of southern Africa. It was depressing that each year saw an increase in South Africa's trade with its main trading partners since that was one of the factors which tended to perpetuate the unsatisfactory state of affairs in southern Africa. The consequences of that support were clearly seen in the events outlined in annex II to the report of the Special Committee. His delegation rejected the feeble arguments advanced by South Africa's main trading partners and the violators of the arms embargo. Their dangerous rationalizations had so far made it impossible to attain some of the United Nations most fundamental objectives.

43. His delegation would continue to support the work of the Special Committee since its efforts helped to publicize the evils of *apartheid* and focus attention on the heinous effects of that system on the peoples of South Africa. Although most of the hardships were felt by the African population, some consequences of the Government's action could not but have serious repercussions for the privileged white minority. For example, the decisions of Australia, New Zealand and France not to receive athletes from South Africa were arousing public opinion in that country. His delegation was particularly grateful for the contribution made by the OAU and would continue to support in the United Nations its efforts to publicize the evils of *apartheid*. He recalled that Jamaica had been one of the sponsors of the draft that became General Assembly resolution 2671 C (XXV) and recommended that the most serious consideration should be given to the proposal made in the report (*ibid.*, para. 278) of the Special Committee that the OAU should receive support in publicizing the evils of *apartheid* and the work of the United Nations. His delegation believed that the most significant results in the struggle against *apartheid* had been achieved through those media which sought to inform and educate the public and felt that the United Nations should intensify its efforts along those lines. For that reason, it also supported the statements made by the Chairman of the Special Committee (758th meeting) with regard to the role of the Office of Public Information. It also supported the suggestion that UNESCO should prepare an "educational kit" on *apartheid* (see A/8422 and Corr.1, para. 280), and felt that such a programme could be very useful.

44. The proposed trade union conference mentioned in the report (*ibid.*, paras. 63-67) should be facilitated by Member States and the United Nations. The involvement of labour in the struggle against *apartheid* was very important since labour over the years had by and large been able to instil in industry the social conscience it otherwise lacked. If agreement could be reached on collective action by those organizations, it would enhance considerably the effort to eliminate *apartheid*. Labour movements outside South Africa should be encouraged to adopt appropriate measures to prevent the South African economy from benefiting from the fruits of its exploitation of labour through ruthless application of the policy of *apartheid*. His delegation proposed to support the inclusion of the points he had mentioned in appropriate resolutions, because it considered them both desirable and practical.

45. Mr. TCHOUNGUI (Cameroon) recalled that a United Nations symposium on the evils of racial discrimination and

*apartheid* had been held at Yaoundé in June 1971 as part of the observance of the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. At that time the President of his country had said that the failure of United Nations action was due to the powerful community of interest existing between certain Powers and Portugal and the white minorities of South Africa and Rhodesia. The task facing the international community was that of ensuring that the racist authorities of South Africa should renounce as soon as possible their policy of humiliating, persecuting and exterminating a race.

46. *Apartheid* was not only a moral problem, it was also a political problem, since a minority was trying to perpetuate its domination over a homogeneous racial majority by means of offensive, unrealistic and segregationist legislation. It was also an economic problem, since the white minority used force to appropriate all the riches of the country and imposed an inhuman labour legislation on the African worker. *Apartheid* was a social problem as well: because of the situation to which they were relegated, the infant mortality and illiteracy rates of the black South Africans were the highest on the continent, even though South Africa was considered the richest country in Africa. The policy of separate development was therefore a system for exterminating the majority race. It could not be said that the problem was of no concern to the rest of the world, and other countries should feel guilty and responsible for the complacency which characterized the Organization's approach to *apartheid*. What was at stake was justice, law and human dignity. There was no reason why the countries which had formerly joined forces to combat Nazi Germany should do nothing to combat the atrocities committed daily by the South African authorities. *Apartheid* was a crime against humanity and all the present South African authorities should be declared criminals.

47. The peoples of the world, those of Africa particularly, felt that frustration and dissatisfaction were growing in the world. World peace would be compromised if that state of affairs persisted and led people to believe that the end justified the means. Why were other countries so cautious about punishing South Africa and making it see reason? Was it because it was to serve as a rampart against communist infiltration in Africa, because it best represented the "free world" on that continent? Was it because it was a large consumer and source of capital? The African countries did not need imported ideologies. South Africa's economy prospered only because of the assistance it received from the countries which supported it. Unfortunately, modern society seemed to be dangerously oriented towards materialism. For its part, his Government felt that a durable and respectable human society should be based on moral principles and strict respect for international law.

48. The United Nations had done valuable work in formulating principles in the field of human rights but there remained a large gap between the formulation of those principles and the actual attainment of the desired objectives. That gap was especially important with regard to *apartheid* since the Pretoria authorities were obviously not prepared of their own will to change the bases of their policies. The United Nations resolutions on the matter were not complied with by certain Member States. Although his delegation was aware that the United Nations was not a

supranational organization, it felt that when a State accepted commitments, it should honour them. Moreover, the Charter provided for sanctions against Member States which flouted its principles and hindered its activities. Africa wished to convince the States concerned to honour their commitments and to respect international law and the will of the immense majority of peace-loving peoples. He hoped that appeal to reason would be heeded since the South African economy would be in grave difficulty if the economic and trade boycott imposed by United Nations resolutions was respected by all Member States. Businessmen within South Africa were beginning to recognize that *apartheid* would in the long run hinder the development of the South African economy, and that disproved the argument that the economic and trade boycott would not affect its economy.

49. So far that boycott had not been enforced, since South Africa's main partners did not want to apply it. They differentiated between products which should be subject to the boycott and those which were essential to South Africa, but the various United Nations resolutions did not make any such distinction. Some said that if the economic sanctions were applied, the black population would be the one to suffer, but it was suffering already. Weapons were sold to South Africa and they were used not to counter a hypothetical communist invasion but to suppress blacks within and outside the country. There was no point in trying to deceive world public opinion by making a distinction between weapons, since Security Council resolution 282 (1970) and General Assembly resolution 2624 (XXV), and previous resolutions, applied to all types of weapons. The distinction between offensive and defensive weapons was very fluid and specious. The only difference was that some were used against blacks within the country and others against the independent States of Africa. Did those who were so worried about the black South Africans and thought that the economic boycott would make them die of hunger and poverty and that heavy arms would protect them from communism also believe that the exclusion of South Africa from world sports competitions would also make blacks die of hunger or would not protect them from communism? These same States which refused to apply the economic boycott and the arms embargo sent their sports figures to South Africa and were hosts to South African teams and athletes, despite the racial discrimination in South African sports. South Africa's isolation in sport had made it see the danger of its policies and it was regrettable that, even in such a minor field, not all States were willing to make South Africa see reason.

50. As to the question of dialogue with South Africa, he stressed that the Pretoria authorities had stated that dialogue was not possible if it involved an attempt to change their racial policies. The South African authorities were constantly saying that they would not yield to any sort of pressure. As South Africa saw it, the proposed dialogue was merely intended to help African leaders rid themselves of prejudices based on inaccurate information by making them more familiar with the policies of *apartheid* and their application. Not only would that dialogue not make African rulers agree fully with South Africa but it would also not make black South Africans

agree with the régime's policies. The Bantustans which had been set up as a means of expelling the blacks from their rich ancestral lands were not as peaceful as the South African Government liked to think. The common misery they lived in made all black South Africans increasingly united against the racist authorities. Black South Africans themselves had reservations about the worth of dialogue, and that was all the more reason for other Africans not to follow a course that was already doomed to failure. Those in favour of *rapprochement* with South Africa should remember the results of the concessions made to Nazi Germany in 1938.

51. His Government thought that the most important task of the United Nations was to bridge the gap between principles and their practical application. If every State strictly implemented the pertinent United Nations resolutions on *apartheid*, there might soon be positive results. He appealed to the good faith of South Africa's economic and military partners who were betraying their international obligations in order to protect their material interests despite possible serious consequences to mankind. The United Nations must use all the means available to it under the Charter to attain its objectives, in particular in Africa. The situation in South Africa was a serious enough threat to peace and security to warrant the use of any means to put an end to it, including force.

52. His country was convinced that actions should take the place of words. It was necessary to act to save humanity from shame and to restore the confidence which all the countries, especially the small countries, had had in the United Nations, a confidence which was gradually diminishing because of the lack of action and the contradictions in the Organization. In accordance with the recommendations of the OAU, it was urgent to help the anti-*apartheid* movement in South Africa and throughout the world. The international community should encourage the resistance which was emerging in South Africa, not only among the blacks, but also among far-seeing white businessmen, professors, students and churchmen.

53. His delegation endorsed the conclusions of the Secretary-General's report (A/8467) and the recommendations made in the report of the Special Committee (A/8422 and Corr.1, chapt. III), in particular that calling for assistance to the OAU in the preparation of radio broadcasts to South Africa (*ibid.*, para. 278), which would encourage and inspire liberal-minded people there.

54. There must be changes in the United Nations to renew hope of a better world and faith in the future and changes in the world in order to revive faith in man and in the essential dignity of the individual. In the modern world, no country could stand alone. The most important problems must be solved at the international level and not merely by the people most directly concerned.

55. He wished to transmit to the Indian representative the condolences of the Government of Cameroon and people on the recent natural disaster in his country.

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*