

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records

MEETING

Tuesday, 17 October 1972,  
at 10.55 a.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Hady TOURÉ (Guinea).

## AGENDA ITEM 38

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (*continued*) (A/8666 and Corr.1, A/8670, A/8689, A/8703, paras. 501-519):

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on Apartheid (A/8722 and Add.1, A/8770);
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/8822)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. SIYOLWE (Zambia) thanked the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and in particular Mr. Farah and Mr. Ahmed, for the reports of that Committee. He also wished to thank the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, particularly Mr. Rydbeck, for that Committee's report (A/8822, annex).

2. His country was deeply concerned at the way in which the process of decolonization was being obstructed while colonial and racial aggressiveness in southern Africa and Guinea (Bissau) were being intensified. Through its oppressive and repressive measures against the indigenous peoples of southern Africa and their liberation movements, the Vorster racist régime had not only intensified its policy of *apartheid* in South Africa but had extended it to Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese Territories and Namibia, which it had split up by creating tribal reserves. Of the 11 tribal reserves to be created, three had been established in the north of Namibia, on the borders of Angola and Zambia, for the purpose of preventing any growth in political awareness which might originate in those two countries. The *apartheid* system was applied in determining where Namibian Africans should reside and what kind of jobs they should be given. The education system in Namibia was discriminatory and the books used were designed to promote white supremacy.

3. According to an article in *Die Suidwes Afrikaner*, Mr. Nangutuuala, the leader of the party opposing the Ovamboland Government supported by South Africa, had been held for a week with four of his supporters in the house of the Chief Councillor—the "Prime Minister" of Ovamboland—while his wife was in hospital, so that for a week their children had been left alone at home. The five arrested men had been guilty of signing a declaration which rejected the homeland policy of the Government.

4. The South African Government had sent mercenaries to help the Portuguese Air Force against the freedom fighters in the liberated areas of northern Mozambique. Defoliants had been used to destroy the crops and, according to the *Sunday Times* of London of 9 July 1972, South African mercenaries had carried out bombing operations in those areas in April. Defoliants were still being used in northern Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau).

5. Similar crimes against humanity were being perpetrated in Southern Rhodesia. The laws enacted by the Ian Smith régime were intended to strengthen European domination by administrative and legislative means, to perpetuate European political power, to confer economic benefits on the whites, to curb African political resistance and halt the advance of African nationalism, and to reinforce racial segregation.

6. The application of the policy of *apartheid* had inevitably led to the use of oppressive measures against the blacks who were fighting for self-determination, freedom and dignity. The South African régime had realized that in order to apply a policy of racism numerous discriminatory and repressive laws were needed. Furthermore, various forms of torture had to be used against the Africans.

7. His delegation had always held the view that if the international community, in particular the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France, did not isolate South Africa economically, militarily and politically, by imposing economic sanctions and an arms embargo, the repression of the blacks by the Vorster, Smith and Caetano régimes would grow worse. The armed struggle waged by the liberation movements of southern Africa should be a reason for the NATO countries which were helping the racist régimes to choose between justice and freedom on the one hand and injustice and bloodshed on the other. His delegation urged the United States to play a positive role in southern Africa by stopping its imports of chrome and nickel from Southern Rhodesia and by ending its economic involvement in South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique.

8. In a speech made in the United States Senate after a mission of inquiry in Africa in 1968, Senator E. W. Brooke had pointed out that what impressed Africans most in the attitude of the United States of America was its sins of omission. The Government of the United States had not discouraged American private investment in South Africa, nor had it placed restrictions on trade with South Africa other than the

prohibition of the sale of military equipment. It had not urged the United Kingdom to exert greater pressure on the rebel government of Southern Rhodesia, and it had not tried to prevent its allies from selling military equipment to South Africa. The military aid received by Portugal from the United States had, according to the freedom fighters, been used to kill Africans in Angola and Mozambique. The Senator had further stated that the United States should put an end to its complicity with the southern African régimes, even though that might cause tension in its relations with its European allies. The scale on which freedom was being put down in southern Africa made such oppression a matter of international concern, the more so as, apart from South Africa, none of the territories were sovereign States. If the United States of America was to regain its moral and political credit, the Senator had continued, the first measures it should take should be to break off economic relations with South Africa if the policy of that country did not move towards justice and social equality, reduce its military relations with Portugal if that country did not commit itself to self-determination in Angola and Mozambique, and ban all trade with Southern Rhodesia.

9. His delegation considered that any assistance given to the racist minority régime of southern Africa by a State Member of the United Nations was tantamount to supporting *apartheid*. It asked the Committee to condemn unreservedly the racist régime of South Africa and to condemn also the NATO countries for their contribution to *apartheid* in southern Africa and their consequent support of the policy of terrorism used against those peace-loving people.

10. Mr. ZAHAWIE (Iraq) said that the Special Committee's report (A/8722 and Add.1) showed that during the year under review the South African Government had further intensified its policy of *apartheid* and stifled all opposition by increasingly harsh repressive measures. The facts were now well established and the Committee had, over the years, acquired a great deal of documentation on the criminal methods used by the South African régime in applying its odious policies. An urgent inquiry should now be undertaken into the economic, diplomatic and military assistance and collaboration offered by certain States to South Africa, which hampered the efforts of the international community to isolate it.

11. In its report, the Special Committee had rejected the arguments advanced at the twenty-sixth session that an increase in investments in South Africa and in economic co-operation with that country would lead to greater prosperity, as a result of which the policy of *apartheid* would be weakened. In fact, the remarkable economic expansion which had taken place in South Africa over the past 10 years had led only to a further deterioration in the conditions of the South African blacks. A work entitled *The South African Connection*<sup>1</sup> refuted for once and for all the theory of

the defeat of *apartheid* through prosperity. According to *The Manchester Guardian Weekly* of 7 October 1972, the authors of that work pointed out that blacks had been able to obtain better jobs in industrial centres during the last few decades, but that such improvement, far from changing the system, had merely strengthened it. In 1971, according to official statistics, wages of the African miners, compared with those of the whites, were less than in 1966 and far less than in 1911. Even in the processing industries, the ratio between the wages of whites and blacks was 5.8 to 1 in March 1971, as compared with 5.1 to 1 in May 1966. In January 1971 a South African company had agreed to raise the wages of its 1,800 white workers by a considerable amount in order to induce them to place less obstacles in the way of the employment of blacks. The costs thus incurred were far less than the amount saved through the employment of black workers and the increase in production. According to the *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, a similar scheme introduced in 1967 had made it possible to step up production in factories by 25 per cent without increasing the total amount of wages. The conclusion to be drawn from *The South African Connection* was that economic growth would not itself change the system. As indicated in that work, the current Prime Minister of Portugal had said on a previous occasion when speaking of the Portuguese colonies—though his words were equally applicable to South Africa—the reason for that situation was that “the blacks of Africa were to be regarded as productive elements, organized . . . in an economy directed by whites”. According to the article in *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, the development of an economic system of that kind could yield greater profits, but the system would not change; it was merely made stronger and more resistant. During the past decade, the expansion of white South Africa as a result of the inflow of Western capital had merely served to develop the system of exploitation in force.

12. As the parting Chairman of the Special Committee had correctly pointed out (809th meeting), annex II to the Committee's report constituted an indictment of the main trading partners of South Africa listed in that annex. However, the accuracy of that list should be accepted with caution since it appeared to have been compiled from an official South African source and since there was so much secrecy surrounding South Africa's transactions with other States. In any event there was one glaring omission. Paragraph 31 of annex I to the report pointed out that nearly half of Israel's supply of rough stone diamond for the polishing industry originated in South Africa, a value exceeding \$100 million. Furthermore, data from the *Statistical Abstract of Israel* of 1968 showed that as early as 1961 Israel had already become South Africa's chief partner. Thus it was strange that Israel was not mentioned in the list appearing in annex II to the report, and it would be interesting to know the reason why South Africa and Israel were attempting to hide their contacts and co-operation. In an article in *The New York Times* of 30 April 1971, C. L. Sulzberger had noted some of the special ties that had brought about the remarkably

<sup>1</sup> By R. First, J. Steele and C. Gurney (London, Temple Smith, 1972).

close, if little known, collaboration between Israel and South Africa: both States, established in 1948, found themselves isolated in the United Nations, but did not regard that as a final judgement of history; South Africa felt that Israel, like itself, was an outpost of the West. Prime Minister Vorster had said that Israel was today faced with an *apartheid* problem: its Arab inhabitants. In a sense, both South Africa and Israel had been built by pioneers—the term “colonizer” would have been more appropriate—originating abroad and settling in partially inhabited areas; finally Mr. Vorster had said that South Africa viewed Israel’s position and problems with understanding and sympathy because, like South Africa, that country had to deal with terrorist infiltration across its borders and had enemies bent on its destruction.

13. A South African Jew and an ardent opponent of *apartheid*, Mr. E. S. Sachs, in an advertisement published in *The Times* of London on 2 March 1971 and addressed to all Jews in Israel and the world, had brought out deeper similarities between “the rulers of Tel Aviv and the openly fascist Government of Pretoria”: the policies of both Governments constituted a threat to world peace and to the very existence of the people whose interests they were supposed to safeguard; an overwhelming majority of the countries of the world abhorred the policies of the two Governments; the reactionary Jews and the racist Afrikaners claimed to be “God’s chosen” and believed that they had only to quote the Old Testament and to recall the tragedies of which their peoples had been victims in the past in order to justify their misdeeds against other peoples; both Israel and South Africa employed the most brutal methods against people fighting for liberation; both treated the United Nations with contempt and repeatedly defied its resolutions. In that connexion, Mr. Sachs could have mentioned that neither of those countries had acceded to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. As Mr. Sachs had noted, the world was entitled to expect humane conduct from people who themselves had suffered oppression; yet, today, the police and soldiers of Israel and South Africa were hunting and killing Arab and African freedom fighters whom they labelled terrorists.

14. Among foreign critics of South African policy, there were, admittedly, many Jews. On the other hand, the South African Zionist Federation and the South African Jewish Board of Deputies were actively working to deflect criticism of South Africa abroad by other Jewish bodies; the South African Board of Jewish Deputies had even gone so far as to counsel Jewish organizations abroad to refrain from commenting on South African problems. It was thus that Jewish non-governmental organizations having consultative status with the United Nations had declined to participate in the discussions on *apartheid* at the United Nations. Once again the answer was to be found in the community of interests binding the Afrikaners and the Zionists. According to Edwin S. Munger, author of *Jews and the National Party*, Jewish wealth formed one of the mainstays of the South African economy. On the other hand, in their book *The Jews in South Africa*, Gustav

Saren and Louis Hotz affirmed that the Zionist movement had received greater financial and political support on a *per capita* basis from the South African Jewish community than from any other nation in the world.

15. That community of interests also found expression in military co-operation, although in that field information was even more difficult to come by. In paragraph 193, the Special Committee’s report (A/8722 and Add.1) mentioned the purchase by South Africa of guided missiles and other offensive weapons. Yet, according to an article in *The New York Times* of 7 November 1971 dealing with Israel’s new occupation as an arms exporter, a sea-to-sea missile, already operational in the Israeli Navy, had been sold to some foreign countries. It was also worth noting that South Africa was now manufacturing, under licence, the sub-machine gun Uzi, an Israeli invention, a weapon far more effective in the suppression of black Africans than all the aircraft and submarines acquired by South Africa. Paragraphs 254 and 257 of annex I to the report referred to arms exports by South Africa, which had declined to disclose their destination. Significantly, two liberation organizations in the Portuguese colonies, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), had stated that they had captured Israeli-made weapons from Portuguese troops. Luis Cabral, of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), had furthermore stated that Israeli-trained groups had tried to infiltrate his movement.

16. The conclusions to be drawn from that secret and highly organized collaboration were that the South African régime, which was the bastion of racism and colonialism in southern Africa, had found its best ally in that other régime which was the bastion of racism and colonialism at the northern end of the African continent. Paragraph 185 of the report again emphasized the links between *apartheid*, racism and colonialism. They all had a common denominator, both in geography and in substance: the basic factors of exploitation and of rule by a small minority bent on preserving its privileged position by force and on driving the masses of the people into submission and subjugation. The similarities between the policies of South Africa and Israel were best reflected in the policy statements made by their respective representatives during the general debate in the Assembly: the call for dialogue, the denunciation of what both States considered to be terrorism and the outright rejection of what they saw as external interference. It was paradoxical that two States well known for their violations of United Nations resolutions and the principles of the Charter, should invoke those same principles in calling for collective action against the victims of the violence and terrorism of the self-same States. Even stranger and more bizarre was the spectacle of the former victims of Nazi Germany closely collaborating with the ardent admirers of nazism. It should be remembered that during the Second World War the current Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. Vorster, had been imprisoned by the British for his pro-Fascist activities.

17. The last part of annex I to the Special Committee's report presented information on recent naval and other military activities in South Africa. According to Sulzberger, the fact that Israel had closed the Suez Canal gave incidental benefits to South Africa and enhanced its strategic position: some 20,000 ships had stopped at Capetown the year before as compared to 8,000 annually before the Canal was blocked.

18. The representative of Ghana had asked at the 813th meeting why South Africa found it so necessary to arm itself when it was not threatened by any external force. That question could best be answered by the account of a Western diplomat stationed in Khartoum and reported by the journalist Peter Mansfield in the June 1972 issue of *Middle East International* of London. That diplomat had told his Sudanese hosts that the only two dynamic and efficient Powers on the African continent—which they were destined to dominate—were South Africa and Israel, conveniently situated at each end, north and south, to counter Arab nationalism and black nationalism.

19. His delegation fully agreed with the recommendations made by the Special Committee in its report. It was especially important to identify all States and parties collaborating with South Africa; but it would also be helpful to have a list of those who had established diplomatic relations with South Africa during the last five years. Recent press reports had named several States as having established diplomatic relations with South Africa or as having strengthened their diplomatic representation in that country: South Africa had established a consulate general in Tel Aviv, and Iran an embassy in South Africa. Investigations of the military build-up in South Africa should pay special attention to nuclear research undertaken in Israel and South Africa with the aid of foreign Powers; both of those countries had now assumed strategic postures and were capable of producing their own weapons. Furthermore the liberation movements should be given the means to recover the freedom and dignity of the people they represented. Finally, the Security Council should take the necessary measures to enforce the principles of the United Nations Charter and the decisions set out in the resolutions of the Organization, resolutions which certain permanent members of the Council and other Western Powers had criticized as being unrealistic. It was those Powers themselves that were being unrealistic by hoping that the United Nations would abdicate its responsibilities under the Charter and that the world would acquiesce in *faits accomplis*. It was hardly realistic to refuse to recognize any distinction between submission to oppression and acceptance of that oppression; nor should it be forgotten that the revolt would be all the more terrible because it had been so long contained. It was high time that South Africa and its collaborators realized that resistance to injustice was a basic attribute of all mankind and not only of the white race, and that no people had been given almighty power eternally to deprive others of their legitimate and inherent rights.

20. Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) said that he did

not wish to reiterate the baneful consequences of *apartheid*, which had already been described many times, nor the position of his country, which had always condemned *apartheid*; nevertheless, his delegation wished to deal with a few individual aspects of the Special Committee's report. He paid tribute to the Special Committee for its energetic work, which had made it into a real focal point in the action which the United Nations had committed the international community to take against *apartheid*.

21. In particular, he wished to refer to the problem of *apartheid* in sports, especially the participation by South Africa in the Davis Cup tournament. The Chairman and the Rapporteur of the Special Committee and other speakers in the debate had referred to the Argentine Government's position, which was also set out in the report. He wished to state that his Government had been unpleasantly surprised to learn that the Davis Cup Nations Committee had decided to permit South Africa to take part in the tournament again, and moreover, in the Latin American zone. In addition, a member of that Committee, who was an Argentine national, had voted in favour of those two decisions. He wished to state that, as he had pointed out twice in the Special Committee, the Argentine member of the committee appointed by the Davis Cup Nations could in no way be described as a "representative of Argentina": he acted exclusively on an individual and non-official basis, and could thus not engage the responsibility of his Government. Participation by the South African team in the tournament involved a manoeuvre intended to nullify the decision not to permit that country to take part in the preliminary rounds in the European zone. All the more regrettable was the implication that the Latin American countries, or at least their sports organizations, would be less firm in their opposition to *apartheid* than the countries of Europe. For all those reasons, the Government of Argentina, which had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2775 D (XXVI), concerning *apartheid* in sport, had considered it necessary to adopt a perfectly clear position on the matter and, as his delegation had informed the Special Committee on *Apartheid* in a letter dated 19 September 1972, had decided to "take all necessary steps to ensure that the Davis Cup matches involving the participation of representatives from countries which practise that policy of racial discrimination do not take place on Argentine territory" (A/8722/Add.1, para. 9), adding that it felt that there should be no participation in matches held in the South American zone by countries from outside the region. The Argentine Government had thus proved its intention to back up with deeds the votes of the delegation of Argentina in various United Nations bodies.

22. His delegation had also paid particular attention to the section of the Special Committee's report which dealt with information activities, and especially paragraphs 118 to 126, concerning the work of the Subcommittee on Information, and paragraphs 220 to 228, which contained the recommendations and conclusions of the Special Committee relating to the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat. His delegation

was convinced that the United Nations and non-governmental organizations had an important role to play in that field. Moreover, concerted action on the part of the international community, which was one of the objectives of the Organization, required participation by Governments that could only adopt a firm attitude if they felt pressure from public opinion the convictions of which were based on appropriate and adequate information. Current efforts in that field should be continued, but should also be made selective and should be increased in some specific countries.

23. It had been correctly stated that little progress had been achieved in the struggle against *apartheid*. That lack of success should not weaken determination to struggle against that extreme form of racial discrimination; nor should it interrupt action on the part of the international community aimed at a goal which involved the basic principles of respect for human rights.

24. Mr. STUBBS (Peru) said that the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on maltreatment and torture of prisoners in South Africa (A/8770), prepared in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2764 (XXVI), was based on inquiries carried out by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Experts established under resolution 2 (XXIII) of the Commission on Human Rights. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group had stated that maltreatment was systematically inflicted in the prisons on non-whites, especially Africans, held under laws designed to establish or strengthen the policy of *apartheid* (see A/8770, para. 7). On the basis of the reports of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group and the Special Committee, the General Assembly had urged the South African Government to put an end to those inhuman practices and, particularly in its resolutions 2440 (XXIII), 2547 A (XXIV) and 2714 (XXV) had called upon the Government of South Africa to permit a

full and impartial investigation into the deaths of political prisoners and detainees in its gaols. The South African Government had refused to accede to that request, and continued to act in violation of article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which laid down that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". The practice of *apartheid* could therefore be considered a crime, and it justified drastic international action to put an end to all forms of discrimination and, as suggested in the conclusions of the Special Committee's report, to establish unrestricted dialogue between South Africa and the authentic representatives of the people of South Africa, without distinction as to race, colour or religious belief. The position of Peru on the matter was well known: his country had a multiracial society in which all persons were full citizens, and it was firmly opposed to *apartheid* and all forms of discrimination.

25. Mr. ZANDFARD (Iran) said that he wished to make a clarification. The representative of Iraq had just stated that Iran maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa and had established an embassy in that country. Both those allegations were inaccurate, and he wished to inform members of the Committee of the true situation.

26. Mr. ZAHAWIE (Iraq) said that he had made it clear in his statement that the information had been obtained from press articles, in particular an article relating to Iran's foreign policy which had appeared in the *New Middle East Magazine* of London. He was happy to learn that Iran did not maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa, and considered that the incident proved that it would be useful to prepare the list he had suggested.

*The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.*