

**United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1694th
MEETING**

*Wednesday, 19 November 1969,
at 3 p.m.*

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Agenda items 29, 104, 30 and 31:

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*)

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (*continued*):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;

(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons;

(c) Report of the Secretary-General

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*)

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General;

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General;

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General 1

Organization of work 15

Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7639, A/7681 and A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989)

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (*continued*) (A/C.1/988, A/C.1/989, A/C.1/991):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/7741-DC/232);

(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655);

(c) Report of the Secretary-General (A/7575)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1)

Page

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2);

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568 and A/7743)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal): May I first of all extend our warmest congratulations to the delegation of the United States and, through it, to the Government and people of the United States, in particular to the brave astronauts, scientists and workers who are associated with its space programme, on the most successful precision landing of Apollo 12 on the moon early this morning. We are all proud of this spectacular achievement. My delegation is confident that this second visit to the moon, while extending further the frontiers of human knowledge and hope, will help to bring nations here on earth closer to each other.

2. Nepal was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Our eagerness in this matter was prompted by our genuine desire to see the Treaty come into force as soon as possible, so that the nuclear Powers could start fulfilling the obligations it imposes. Needless to say, we are very disappointed that the Treaty still remains a dead letter, unable to muster the meagre ratifications required to bring it into force and we fail to detect any signs that the Treaty will enter into force in the foreseeable future. This becomes clear when we look at the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its recently concluded session in Geneva [A/7741-DC/232].¹ The report reveals that the Committee devoted a major part of its session to the question of the sea-bed, while ignoring or barely touching upon the more relevant measures relating to article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

3. We had expected, and had every right to expect, that following the non-proliferation Treaty the nuclear Powers and their colleagues on the Committee on Disarmament would go back to Geneva and work untiringly to reach agreement on further measures of nuclear disarmament as called for in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

¹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

4. We had entertained visions of the Geneva negotiators working overtime to iron out the problems holding up agreement on a comprehensive test ban and a cut-off of fissionable material. We had believed that the nuclear Powers fully realized the the non-proliferation Treaty would continue to remain ineffective and inoperative, unless they demonstrated their good faith by attempting to reach agreement on the relevant issues of disarmament, especially a comprehensive test ban.

5. The fact that the non-proliferation Treaty still lacks the requisite number of signatures to bring it into effect, and especially the signatures of those countries whose accession is considered crucial for the effectiveness of the Treaty, indicates clearly that countries would be swayed not by pious platitudes, but by genuine gestures—gestures in the form of true and meaningful steps to nuclear disarmament. And the number one step in this direction is a comprehensive test ban.

6. The almost exclusive preoccupation of the Committee on Disarmament with the item relating to the sea-bed makes us wonder if the two Co-Chairmen consider it to be the most relevant measure relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Do they really believe that the deployment of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed is an actual threat to the existing strategic balance? Or is it true that, by trying to focus attention away from the more substantive issues of nuclear disarmament, they have acknowledged that the Committee on Disarmament is no longer an appropriate forum in which meaningful negotiations can take place.

7. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, now called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, was established by the General Assembly to serve as a negotiating forum way back in 1961. Eight years later it is time for us to review its achievements and failures. In doing so, we find that the three major treaties related to disarmament, that is: the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America were concluded in forums other than the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was also elaborated in tripartite negotiations in Moscow. And even if the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was drafted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it was largely formulated in bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States over a period of nine months, during which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament just marked time. The same situation was repeated during the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, when the Committee had nothing to do for four months, while awaiting the formulation of an agreed text of a draft treaty on the sea-bed by the Co-Chairmen.

8. It is clear that the recent trend towards bilateral negotiations between the Co-Chairmen has eroded the usefulness of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, where the remaining members have been relegated to the role of passive onlookers, and where acquiescence,

rather than negotiation, seems now to be the rule being imposed.

9. This trend is underlined by the strategic arms limitation talks which began only the day before yesterday at Helsinki. Gratifying as it is, it is one more pointer to the fact that the trend of disarmament negotiations has now shifted away from forums such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the realm of bilateral talks, in which hard business-like bargaining can take place. We do not at all disapprove of this trend. Considering the existing political and military realities, this is the only realistic approach. We hope that as those bilateral talks progress other nuclear Powers, including those which do not participate in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at present, will be invited to join and engage in serious collective negotiations.

10. We would therefore suggest that while the Helsinki talks are in progress the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should hold its future sessions in abeyance. There is very little substantive work that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament can do at the present time. In the meantime, we should convene a meeting of the Disarmament Commission, where the vast silent majority not represented in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament can also take part. In this connexion, I would remind the Committee that General Assembly resolution 2456 A (XXIII) does envisage such a conference in 1970.

11. I should like to take this opportunity to issue an appeal to the Soviet Union and the United States that, during the course of the Helsinki talks, they should scrupulously refrain from any action that could disturb the existing strategic balance. If there is any action that could upset this balance, it is the carrying out of nuclear tests related to weapons development. There is a grave danger that continued nuclear testing could result in a strategic breakthrough for one side, which would not only wreck the balance of deterrence, but the arms limitation talks as well. It is therefore essential for the success of the talks that the two Powers concerned should agree to a halt in nuclear testing while the talks are in progress. This agreement could take the form of a prohibition of all tests with a yield of 10 or more kilotons in hard-rock, that is, tests equivalent to seismic magnitude 4.5 or above, coupled with a moratorium on tests below that threshold for the duration of the talks. This would also present an opportunity to put to the test the concept of verification envisaged in Sweden's draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban [*ibid.*, annex C, section 6].

12. The relevance of a test ban to the Helsinki talks leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the question of a comprehensive test ban cannot be left out of the agenda of the talks. As we all know, the development of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, such as the MIRV and the ABM, is directly related to nuclear testing. Without large-scale nuclear tests it would be impossible to develop warheads for strategic offensive and defensive missile systems. Since a comprehensive test ban is no longer a technical issue but a political one, it is best that it should be absorbed into the realm of bilateral talks at Helsinki. Moreover, it is quite clear that progress on a test ban is pretty much linked to progress at the Helsinki talks.

13. In attempting to take away the question of a comprehensive test ban from the Conference on the Committee on Disarmament, I am not underestimating the work done by that Committee in this respect. As a matter of fact, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and especially its non-aligned members, has, over the years, advanced several excellent solutions designed to bridge the technical gaps pertaining to a comprehensive test ban.

14. The Swedish draft treaty is another commendable initiative in the true non-aligned tradition. But I think we all realize that the issue has long ceased to be a technical one. It would therefore be wise if we directed our initiatives towards finding a political solution to the problem. There is no dearth of technical solutions to the problem of drafting a comprehensive test ban. Additional ones would only be filed away with the rest.

15. While still on the subject of the Helsinki talks, may I appeal to the two Powers concerned to keep the Disarmament Commission fully informed of progress at the talks, because one of the items on the agenda of the Conference of the Commission will be the review of the progress of the Helsinki talks. Other items to be considered by the Disarmament Commission should be the question of chemical and biological weapons and the Secretary-General's recommendations in that respect in his report.² Further elaboration of the draft sea-bed treaty [A/7741-DC/232, *annex A*] should also be one of the tasks of the Disarmament Commission.

16. The report on chemical and biological weapons of the consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General should be highly commended for its timeliness and for underlining the evil and horrible nature of those weapons. We heartily support the report and all the recommendations it contains. We are further indebted to the Secretary-General for clarifying the fact that the 1925 Geneva Protocol³ "applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents) which now exist or which may be developed in the future". We have always believed this to be the correct interpretation, and we hope this interpretation is affirmed once and for all.

17. We also appreciate the efforts of the United Kingdom delegation at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in presenting an excellent and comprehensive draft convention on biological weapons [*ibid.*, *annex C*, *section 20*]. However, we feel that it is more important to achieve agreement on chemical weapons. Moreover, there is a traditional link between biological and chemical weapons dating back to the Geneva Protocol. We do not think that it would be wise to separate the two and to deal only with biological weapons. That would be like an attempt to ban atomic weapons while doing nothing about thermonuclear weapons.

18. For this reason we have to express our reservations on the Canadian draft resolution contained in document

² *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

³ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

ENDC/266 [*ibid.*, *section 31*], which, *inter alia*, commends the United Kingdom draft convention. Regarding the draft resolution sponsored by the group of twelve at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament contained in document ENDC/265 [*ibid.*, *section 30*], we wholeheartedly support it. The draft resolution is in complete harmony with the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report and we commend it for adoption by the General Assembly.

19. I should now like to comment on the joint draft treaty on the sea-bed presented by the Co-Chairmen at Geneva [*ibid.*, *annex A*]. The revised draft treaty has not succeeded in overcoming the objection that it calls for only a partial demilitarization of the sea-bed. Other shortcomings of the draft treaty are: the lack of protection of the rights of coastal States on their continental shelf; the reference to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone⁴ as a method of defining and measuring the width of the exempt coastal zone; the ambiguous nature of article I; and the loop-holes in the verification clause. We hope that those shortcomings will be rectified at the proposed conference of the Disarmament Commission. Nepal, as a land-locked country, is rightly interested in its right of access to the sea and we are opposed in principle to any military move, nuclear or conventional, which might hinder such access.

20. Finally, I should like to express our appreciation of the acceptance by the United States of the IAEA safeguards in relation to a cut-off in the production of fissionable material. The United States concession in dropping its position with respect to adversary inspection should not be dismissed as a gimmick dictated by over-production rather than a concession made in good faith. That action has considerably facilitated the conclusion of a cut-off agreement which, together with a demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons and the extraction of fissionable material for peaceful uses, serves as one of the measures by which nuclear Powers could fulfil their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Similarly, we have also detected a softening of the Soviet position with regard to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. It appears that the Soviet Union is now willing to consider a limited ban. If that is so, it is a welcome development.

21. Those are the preliminary remarks I wished to make at present. If I have not referred to other issues of concern, it is because we hope to deal with them at a later stage.

22. Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I should like to begin by saying how pleased I am to be back here in New York, taking part again in the disarmament debate in the First Committee after an interval of three years. May I say how fortunate we are this year in having you, Sir, as our Chairman to guide our deliberations on the important and very complex subjects on our agenda.

23. I should like now to offer my warm congratulations to the United States delegation on the successful landing on the moon during the night by the two astronauts from Apollo 12. I am sure that we are all grateful to the United States for conducting the operation in such a way that we

⁴ Signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958.

have all been able to share with them in this unique experience. It is an amazing achievement that they have succeeded in making a pin-point landing close to the point of impact of Surveyor 3. I hope that the astronauts will return as safely from the Ocean of Storms as those of Apollo 11 did from the Sea of Tranquillity.

24. Before I come to the substance of our agenda, I have a piece of news to give to the Committee which I hope and believe will be welcome. The United Kingdom will in the near future deposit instruments of ratification of the two additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America establishing the Latin American nuclear-free zone. In ratifying additional Protocol I, we shall in effect be bringing within the nuclear-free zone the Territories for which the United Kingdom is internationally responsible which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty.

25. We are glad to be the first nuclear-weapon State to ratify additional Protocol II and thereby to undertake to respect the nuclear-free zone. We hope that our action will encourage the other nuclear-weapon States to ratify this additional Protocol and we also hope that those Latin American States which have not yet done so will soon take the necessary action to bring the Treaty into force in their own Territories.

26. Now to come to the substance of our debate; before I address myself to any of the documents before the Committee, I should like to comment briefly on the very important development in arms control that has taken place this week. My Government welcomed the decision on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to meet for the strategic arms limitation talks which began at Helsinki on Monday. In itself this marks an important step forward and I am sure we all hope that the two countries will be able to reach agreement in spite of the immense complexity and seriousness of the problems which they have to discuss.

27. I think it is no exaggeration to say that the outcome of these discussions will affect all future disarmament discussions and negotiations, wherever they take place, in this Committee or at Geneva at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; but more than that, they may well determine the quality of the life of most of the nations of the world in the coming years. They may even be the decisive factor in determining whether we can survive this century without a nuclear disaster.

28. It has become fashionable to say that these talks on the limitation of strategic arms must necessarily take place on a bilateral basis, that they are a matter for the two great super-Powers and that there is very little that the rest of us can do but to look on and pray for their success, which we all do. Obviously the prime responsibility does rest with the United States and the Soviet Union and they have recognized this by their agreement to meet this week. But I am sure they also have very much in mind the fact that if the talks should fail repercussions of their failure will spread far beyond the boundaries of the super-Powers.

29. There has been a great deal of public discussion by strategic analysts about the technicalities of the first strike

and the second strike. I do not suggest that this kind of analysis and technical argument is unimportant. Indeed, I think that mutual understanding of strategic problems by both sides is essential to any agreement, but it is important that we should not allow the technical considerations to obscure the broader political and economic importance of controlling this nuclear arms race. The talks themselves are, of course, a natural outcome of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in which the nuclear Powers undertook:

“... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

That is what the non-proliferation Treaty said, and the opening up of the strategic arms limitation talks shows that the two super-Powers are determined to get down to the issues involved in real nuclear disarmament, and in my view this should encourage those countries which have not yet signed the non-proliferation Treaty to do so.

30. It seems to me then that the United States and the Soviet Union now have an opportunity to arrive at agreements which will not only put an end to the ruinously expensive and increasingly dangerous spiral of nuclear weapons technology but also to lay the foundation for measures of disarmament and arms control across the whole spectrum. The alternative to this is sombre enough and obvious enough to need no further comment from me.

31. I should now like to turn to the items on our agenda in this Committee. The first of these is, traditionally and rightly, the question of general and complete disarmament. This must be the ultimate aim of every civilized nation in the world. It is the vision which we must never allow to fade. Whatever else we might achieve can only be a beginning. But it would obviously be perverse to adopt an all-or-nothing approach and to refuse to consider any measures short of universal disarmament. We in Britain are often called pragmatists, and in the field of disarmament and arms control this means quite simply that we are always ready to pursue effective measures of arms control in any area where agreement seems to be possible. We believe that any measure that retards, limits, or, better still, reverses the arms race is of value in itself and also helps to build up a habit of negotiation. Now we are not going to achieve general and complete disarmament tomorrow and we are not going to achieve it next year either, but, while we continue to search for it, it surely makes sense to try to make the world a less precarious and dangerous place to live in.

32. Since I last had the privilege of addressing this Committee we have registered what I take to be one major achievement of this kind, namely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This has already been signed by over 90 countries and ratified by more than 20 and I should here like to appeal to the representatives of countries that have not signed or ratified the Treaty to urge their Governments to take action at once so that we can bring this Treaty into force well before the second anniversary of the date of its opening for signature.

33. In the meantime, even before the Treaty enters into force, preparations are being made to implement some of its articles. I am thinking particularly of articles IV and V, which deal with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the one hand, and on the other, with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and here I should like to express the thanks of my Government to the Secretary-General for the three valuable reports which he has produced for us in connexion with item 31 of our agenda, which deals with the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. I think it is clear from these reports how much work is already being done and planned for the future by IAEA to implement the provisions of article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was encouraging to see that the replies to the Secretary-General's inquiries generally endorsed the view that the Agency is well qualified, both by the terms of its Statute and by its technical expertise, to perform the role under article V of the Treaty of the "appropriate international body" to arrange for the provision of nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes. As a founding member of the Agency, my Government will naturally play a full part in further discussion of the ways and means of implementing articles III, IV and V of this important Treaty.

34. I have already quoted in my comments on the strategic arms limitation talks from article VI of the Treaty, which is a signpost on the way to further measures of disarmament, especially of nuclear disarmament. Amongst measures of this kind—measures of nuclear arms control—my Government gives a very high priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. Indeed, it is a party to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water of 1963. We are already specifically pledged to work towards this goal. As I have already hinted earlier, the bilateral talks on arms limitation are already taking place between the two Governments who would be most affected by a prohibition of underground tests; and the representative of Nepal mentioned this a moment ago in his speech.

35. But as the representative of Sweden, in particular, continues with great conviction to point out to us, a comprehensive test ban, like all measures of disarmament and arms control, is a matter of universal concern, and it was in this spirit, it seems to me, that Mrs. Myrdal submitted her working paper which contained suggested provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 6]. My Government intends to pursue this goal tirelessly.

36. For this reason, my delegation will be co-sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1 on the exchange of seismic data, which was introduced by the representative of Canada yesterday [1692nd meeting]. The question of verification is a vital one and it is particularly difficult in the case of a comprehensive test ban, but I think it is safe to say—if it is safe to say anything about this complicated problem—that any verification system which might eventually emerge is bound to have seismological data as an important element in it. Before we consider how to go ahead in this field we shall have to know exactly what seismological data countries will guarantee to make available from their own existing seismic stations. I hope that there will be general agreement that the Secretary-General

should be asked to undertake the task of seeking this information and passing it on to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. A good response to the circular letter proposed in the resolution I have just mentioned and which we are co-sponsoring, would enable us to see just what further seismic data might become available and from that to estimate the improvement it might bring to our ability to detect and identify underground explosions.

37. Most detectable seismic events are, of course, earthquakes; only a few of them are explosions and we have made considerable progress in distinguishing one from the other. Some of my colleagues may recall the working paper on this subject submitted by my delegation at Geneva, which is annexed to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*ibid.*, section 23]. In this we described the results of the research that has taken place in the United Kingdom on the subject in the last four years. These results were presented to the study group organized in 1968 by the Stockholm International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research and they became the principal data on which the group concluded that present existing national systems could, in principle, detect and identify explosions in the northern hemisphere down to a yield of 20-60 kilotons in hard rock. To put this kind of figure in perspective, I would remind you that 20 kilotons is approximately the yield of each of the atomic bombs exploded in the Second World War.

Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

38. Before I leave this subject, I should like to remind the Committee of a proposal made by my delegation last year.⁵ Whatever form a comprehensive test ban treaty may eventually take, we believe that there might well come a point in the negotiations when a phased approach might bring agreement more quickly. Our proposal was that the treaty might provide for quotas of tests on a descending scale, covering a period of four or five years, and ending with what has been called a "nil quota"—that is, ending with a situation when all further tests would be banned absolutely. I still think that in the present circumstances that proposal has lost none of its force.

39. I should now like to consider the measure on which, it seems to me, we are nearest to agreement, and that is the draft treaty designed to prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed [*ibid.*, annex A]. Before examining some of the details of this draft treaty, I should like to pay a tribute to Ambassador Pardo, the representative of Malta. Those of us who have long been associated with this Committee will remember that it was his far-sighted perception that first caused us all to address our minds to the need to reserve for peaceful purposes the almost unexplored environment of the sea-bed and the deep ocean floor. All that we have done since really springs from the initiative which he took some years ago.

40. But the draft treaty which we now have before us was presented jointly to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Co-Chairmen—the representatives of

⁵ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/231, annex 1, section 8.*

the United States and the Soviet Union. As I have already pointed out to my colleagues of the Disarmament Committee at Geneva, my country is an island and the whole of our history has been bound up with the sea; so we have a very great interest in what happens on and under the sea. It is indeed at the very heart of our safety and our survival. Therefore we are particularly anxious that there should be an effective agreement controlling the emplacement of nuclear arms on the sea-bed and, because of this particular national interest, we have studied the successive drafts presented at Geneva with great care.

41. I said in my statement to the Disarmament Committee at Geneva on 21 October that we thought the Co-Chairmen's draft submitted on 7 October was a practical one which, given goodwill on all sides, could lead to an effective measure of arms control. I made some suggestions to the Co-Chairmen in the course of my speech, and I am grateful and encouraged to see that some of the suggestions I made then have been adopted by the Co-Chairmen and incorporated in the revised draft treaty, now before us, which they presented to the Committee shortly before it adjourned on 30 October. I believe this revised text will be much more widely accepted than its predecessor and that its revision brings us an important step nearer to agreement. But I believe—as I think other representatives here believe—that it could be improved still further.

42. First of all, I should like to say something about verification; not because this is first in the order in which the treaty is drafted, but because, at Geneva at any rate—and, as my first impressions lead me to believe, here as well—most of the criticism of this draft is directed towards the question of verification: the article III problem. This problem of verification and inspection is, quite understandably, the central issue in any measure of arms control. This is inevitable, I think, because, quite simply, it is a question of resolving conflicting requirements. On the one hand, the parties to any international agreement—especially an agreement that affects their national security—can reasonably expect some assurance that the other parties to the agreement are fulfilling their part of the bargain. On the other hand, if the parties to any agreement of this kind demand complete certainty on this score, then the probability is that there will be no agreement at all and so we must strike a balance. No one is going to get all he wants; but this is what negotiation is all about and this is what international agreement means.

43. As far as this sea-bed treaty is concerned, it seems to me that the provisions for verification contained in the present treaty, and particularly in article III, are adequate in the present state of technology and in the face of the immense practical difficulties of operating on the sea-bed at all. I mention this factor both as it affects those seeking to inspect installations on the sea-bed and those who might put them there in the first place.

44. Of course, in the not so remote future, operations on the sea-bed may become easier, both for those who want to implant nuclear weapons there—if anybody should want to—and for those who want to observe them if they do. Therefore we might find it both necessary and possible to have a more comprehensive system of control. That is why I think consideration of this point should be one of the

main functions of the review conference, which is provided for in article V of the treaty. I had this in mind when I proposed at Geneva reviewing an earlier draft of this provision and I now suggest that we should add language to article III of the treaty, which would have the effect of giving the review conference a specific mandate to consider whether any additional rights or procedures of verification should be established by an amendment to the treaty.

45. Some Governments represented here do not consider that article III is adequate for the purposes of this treaty—although I have said that I do—and, as this treaty should be as widely acceptable as possible, I think that we should now consider these criticisms. In the first place—if I could just outline two of what seem to be the major criticisms—some concern has been expressed that parties to the treaty have no automatic right, under the present draft, to make a full inspection of suspicious installations on the sea-bed and this concern is compounded by the fact that most countries in any case do not have the ability to carry out such inspections for themselves, even if they had the right to do so. Secondly, there have been some expressions of fear that the right of observation, which is reaffirmed in article III of the draft treaty, will be used as a pretext for interference in legitimate activities on the sea-bed, especially exploitation by coastal States of the economic resources of their continental shelves.

46. To take that last point first—the point about interference with the legitimate rights of States on their continental shelves—I think it is important that, first of all, we should keep our eyes very firmly on our specific objectives in this draft treaty, which are in the field of arms control. But, as those fears seem to be real and as they clearly must be allayed if the treaty is to be acceptable, I suggested at Geneva that we should make specific reference, in article III, to existing rights under the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.⁶ The Co-Chairmen did not take up that suggestion in their revised draft, and I should now like to return to it and urge them to reconsider it. To be specific, I would propose the addition at the end of the first paragraph of article III of the words—and I am quoting now from the suggested language that I should like to see added to that paragraph—“and the rights of coastal States over their continental shelves”. Now whether we make such an amendment or not, the disclaimer clause is, in my view, sufficiently important to be turned into a separate article of the treaty, which, most appropriately, would come just before the existing procedural articles.

47. I think that it might also be useful for the present article V of the draft to include a specific injunction to take into account the progress that has been made in international co-operation in exploring and exploiting the resources of the sea-bed. As we have already made clear in this Committee when it was considering agenda item 32, my Government attaches very great importance to the work of the Sea-Bed Committee in fostering international co-operation on the peaceful uses of the sea-bed, which is, of course, directly relevant and complementary to the work that we are trying to accomplish in elaborating this treaty.

48. I should like to stress that these are only some suggestions for ways in which the present draft treaty might

⁶ Signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958.

be improved to meet the legitimate concerns of States that share the general aims of the drafters of the treaty and would like to become parties to it. But I can well understand that some representatives in this Committee might wish to see the verification procedures themselves clarified as the representative of Canada indicated yesterday [1694th meeting], and I should like to make it clear that, as far as my Government is concerned, if anyone can suggest improved verification procedures we, for our part, would welcome them.

49. Turning briefly to article I of the treaty, I have some points to make which are perhaps not of very great substance but which would, in my view, improve the present draft. In the first place, the definition of the area to which the treaty would apply by reference to the maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone seems to us unnecessarily complicated. We should prefer to say explicitly that the treaty would apply outside a 12-mile coastal zone measured from base-lines drawn in accordance with the convention. That change would have the further advantage of avoiding the implication in paragraph 2 of the article of the existence of a world-wide contiguous zone made up of the zones adjacent to the territorial seas of all individual coastal States; and I think that it would help to clear up what, in my view, is an obscurity in the present draft. I also think that the expressions "objects with nuclear weapons" and "other types of weapons of mass destruction" are unnecessarily obscure. Presumably, "other types of weapons of mass destruction" means chemical and biological weapons and I think it would be better to say so explicitly. We have already expressed at Geneva our assumption that, on another aspect of this matter, the language of article I is not intended to ban conventional weapons as such, but is intended—and this is important, I think—to ban installations and other facilities that could have a dual purpose, that is to say, that could be used in conjunction with either conventional or nuclear weapons. We should welcome the inclusion of some more precise language on those points.

50. I should now like to turn a few moments to the question of chemical and biological warfare, in which my Government is particularly interested. That subject had been very little discussed at Geneva until we raised it in July 1968 and it is encouraging to notice since then the wide revival of interest in what I think has been a neglected field of arms control. There has been a good deal of attention focused on the nature and effect of chemical and biological weapons in the valuable report prepared by the Secretary-General,⁷ with the assistance of scientific experts from 14 countries; and I should like, on behalf of my Government, to congratulate the Secretary-General as well as his consultant experts, on this excellent and valuable piece of work.

51. On 10 July, one week after the Secretary-General's report appeared, the United Kingdom delegation at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament proposed a draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods

of warfare [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 19] and, on 26 August we presented a revised draft that took into account comments made in the committee at Geneva [ibid., section 20].

52. As the preamble to our draft convention makes clear, our point of departure is the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. We attach very great importance to that Protocol, which is a pioneer achievement in arms control; and, in parenthesis, I might perhaps take this opportunity to urge once again, as does the Secretary-General in the foreword to his report, that all countries that are not yet parties to that Protocol should accede to it without delay. In drafting our text we have taken great care to ensure that it in no way detracts from the existing obligations of parties to the Geneva Protocol. We have taken that initiative in the conviction that it is time to go further, and I am very pleased to note that this view now seems to be widely shared, especially by the Soviet Union and the other sponsors of the draft convention on chemical and bacteriological weapons presented to the Assembly recently [A/7655].

53. Before I refer to that draft convention I should like, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, to explain briefly the main provisions of our draft convention and draft Security Council resolution: this has already been done at Geneva but I think it might be useful in this Committee. Article I has a dual function: first of all it provides a definition; it says exactly what we mean by biological warfare; it prohibits recourse to biological warfare in any circumstances. It is made clear in this article and emphasized even more strongly in a separate article later, article VI, that nothing in this draft convention in any way derogates from the obligations assumed by parties to the Geneva Protocol. In practice, our convention would abolish the rights reserved by many parties to the Geneva Protocol to use the prohibited weapons in reprisal or against those who are not parties to the Protocol. There is an important link between this renunciation of the right of reprisal and article II of our draft convention which prohibits the production and possession of biological agents in quantities that are not justified for peaceful purposes or of equipment to facilitate their use in war. Perhaps I should make clear here that the words we have used in article II "prophylactic or other peaceful purposes" would allow the production of vaccines to protect one's own population against biological attacks. That is to say, the convention is designed to permit passive defensive measures against biological warfare but not biological counter-attacks. These two articles—articles I and II—must be looked at together: the renunciation by one country of the right and ability to retaliate depends on the confidence that biological methods of warfare will not be used against it.

54. The next two articles—III and IV—are designed to increase this confidence. Article III of our draft convention and the accompanying draft Security Council resolution contain provision for investigation of complaints. A system of continuous verification in the biological field analogous to the kind of safeguards which we seek in the nuclear field is in my view not possible; but we do regard it as important that some mechanism for prompt investigation of com-

⁷ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

plaints should be provided in order to reassure parties to the treaty and deter any would-be violator.

55. We have treated separately in paragraph 1 of the article the case of complaints by a party that biological methods of warfare have already been used against it. In such a case immediate action would be essential and the complaining party would clearly be willing to provide access and facilities for investigation; there does not seem to be very much difficulty there. We therefore propose that the Secretary-General should have standing authority to carry out such investigations immediately and to make the preliminary arrangements to enable him to do so. So our convention would provide an effective deterrent against the use of biological agents which does not at present exist.

56. In cases where a party is suspected of possessing or manufacturing biological weapons in contravention of the treaty, investigation would not be so easy, since the facilities for investigation would in this case have to be provided by countries which even if they were innocent, might well be reluctant to allow this kind of investigation to go on. It could not be an automatic investigation and the complaint would have to be considered first by the Security Council. The action to be taken on reports of investigations would in both cases be matters for the Security Council, which would declare in advance its readiness to give them urgent consideration. To complement these provisions, each party would undertake in article IV of the draft convention to provide or support assistance to other parties which might become victims of biological warfare.

57. Finally, I should like to emphasize article V of our convention which would bind parties to continue negotiations in good faith on effective measures to strengthen the existing constraints on chemical methods of warfare. I mention this particularly because of the comments that have been made on the fact that our convention deals only with biological weapons and I want to emphasize the fact that we support the objectives set for us by the Secretary-General in the foreword to his report that we should "reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons"; this seems to me to be a very clear mandate. There remains the question, a very important, practical question, of how we can best set about reaching this goal.

58. This brings me to the reasons why we thought it best to deal with biological warfare first. The reasons are essentially practical: although biological weapons are potentially more destructive than chemical weapons, they are still at early stage of development; they are quite unproven and their effects are quite unpredictable. This being so, we think they can be eliminated at once, in one single blow. Full-scale verification would not be required and a complaints procedure of the kind provided for in our draft convention would be a sufficient deterrent against infringement of the obligations that parties to the convention would undertake.

59. As the Secretary-General's report says, chemical weapons and biological weapons do differ in certain important respects, and these are set out very clearly in his report.

What this amounts to in practice is that chemical weapons have a wide range of tactical uses and are essentially battlefield weapons. That is how they have always been used in the past. But biological weapons are totally unsuitable for this kind of tactical battlefield use, partly because of the incubation period before they take effect and partly because of their great unpredictability. If these weapons are ever used at all they would not be used as precise battlefield weapons, they would be used indiscriminately against the civilian population as a weapon of mass destruction.

60. We have considered our definition of biological weapons with very great care to ensure that it distinguishes biological weapons unequivocally from chemical weapons and in view of the controversy that sprung up about this I consulted Sir Solly Zuckerman, who took a leading part in drafting the Secretary-General's report. He pointed out to me that even if it becomes possible one day to create what we should now call biological agents from inorganic matter, for example by synthesizing viruses, the essential distinction between chemical and biological agents will still remain. Biological agents depend for their effect on their ability to reproduce themselves in the target and that is something no chemical weapon will ever be able to do. Moreover, once biological agents have infected an organism they can spread from one organism to another by an infective process and this too is something that no chemical weapon will ever be able to do. So there is no prospect of the definition of biological methods of warfare given in our draft convention becoming obsolete even in the light of further scientific discoveries.

61. These are some of the reasons which led us in the first place to a phased approach to the problem of chemical and biological weapons. As I have already suggested, an alternative comprehensive approach has been proposed by the Soviet Union and its allies during the present session of this Assembly in their draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and on the destruction of such weapons [A/7655]. My delegation has read this draft convention with very great interest and I should like to make one or two preliminary comments, even if only to demonstrate the kind of problems we face in this field.

62. I think that the draft would for instance be improved if it were to say exactly what is meant by the term "chemical and bacteriological weapons"—it is important to ensure that new international instruments mean the same thing to all the parties.

63. We also notice that the draft convention as it is now worded prohibits only the production and possession of "chemical and biological weapons". It does not prohibit the production and possession of the agents themselves or even of component parts of the weapon. There may be a serious loop-hole here, because the weapons could be put together very quickly from the stockpiles of components, especially by countries already possessing this kind of weapon.

64. We also wonder whether the Soviet draft convention does enough to deter would-be violators and to reassure other parties. The undertaking in article VI "to consult and co-operate in solving any problems" may be adequate on

the sea-bed where each country is free to observe the activities of others; it would, I think, carry far less conviction in the present draft when it is applied to the activities of a State within its own national territory. The victims of an attack with chemical and biological weapons are offered no assurances in the present draft that their complaints will be investigated impartially or that any other party to the treaty will assist them.

65. These are just some of the points in the draft which we will have to look at very carefully, more carefully than we can hope to do in the few remaining weeks of this session of the Assembly. I should like, therefore, to express the hope that the Assembly will agree to remit both our draft convention and the Soviet draft convention to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for urgent study and ask for a full report on the whole subject for next year's session of the General Assembly. Our main concern is that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should get down to a really effective study of this problem without further delay and that it should be able to report next year that real progress has been made towards the aim to which this Assembly committed itself in 1966, namely, the elimination of chemical and biological weapons from national arsenals. I have outlined our approach to this problem. We have seen the approach of the Soviet Union and its allies. Only further detailed discussion will show which of these possible approaches is most likely to lead to general agreement. Let me assure everyone in this Committee that the British Government is as anxious as any other Government to eliminate chemical weapons, as well as biological weapons and so the United Kingdom delegation at Geneva will be ready to tackle this problem in whichever way is preferred by the majority of this Committee. We shall make our full contribution towards finding a solution which everybody in the United Nations can accept.

66. I have covered very briefly the major issues with which this Committee must deal during its present session. I shall hope to deal with some of them in more detail at later meetings. In the meantime, I need hardly stress how important it is that we should make real progress in at least some of the fields to which I have referred this afternoon. As I said earlier, I think that general and complete disarmament, although it remains the aim of my Government and, I suppose, the aim of the other Governments represented around this table, is not likely to be achieved for many years. There is, however, no reason why we should not persist in our efforts to make the world a less perilous place to live in, if not for us, at least for our children and their children. It is, I believe, a monstrous outrage that, in a world in which millions are without food and clothing and shelter, something like 7 per cent of the whole of the world's resources is still devoted to the production of weapons and the maintenance of military establishments. The statesman who, by his vision and compassion, makes the first step towards righting this terrible wrong will find a unique place in history. Where and when he might appear is difficult to say, but it is up to us to provide a framework within which he can act. With the partial nuclear test ban Treaty of 1963 and the non-proliferation Treaty we have already taken some first hesitant steps. I hope that before we leave New York this year we shall have taken at least one more.

67. The CHAIRMAN: I have received a request from the representative of Mexico to be given the floor before I call on the next speaker in view of the announcement made by Lord Chalfont with reference to the ratification of the Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. If the representative of Finland and the members of the Committee have no objection, I shall give the floor to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico.

68. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall be extremely brief. I was very pleased to hear the announcement made at the outset of his statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, that his Government has decided shortly to ratify the two Additional Protocols of the Tlatelolco Treaty. I wish to express to him, and I would request him to transmit to his Government, the deepest appreciation of the Mexican Government—which, as is known, is the depositary Government of these instruments—for this additional gesture of co-operation which will doubtless contribute to the greater effectiveness of the Treaty.

69. We consider it natural that the United Kingdom should be the first to ratify the Protocols since, as it will be recalled, it was also the first to sign them. We hope that the other nuclear weapon Powers and the other States to whose signatures Additional Protocol I is open will in the very near future follow this encouraging example.

70. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): International efforts to bring nuclear armaments under effective control and thus reduce the danger of a nuclear war have been directed so far primarily to limiting the scope of the use of nuclear weapons and preventing their further spread. In the past 10 years Antarctica has been demilitarized, the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under the sea has been banned, outer space has been declared off-limits for nuclear weapons, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America has come into force, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been completed. Now a draft treaty to prohibit the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed is before us [A/7741-DC/232, annex A]. Each of these measures has its intrinsic value as a practical step towards making the world more secure from the devastation of nuclear war. Each has considerable political value in reflecting a growing willingness on the part of the leading nuclear Powers to work together to prevent war and in promoting greater mutual understanding and confidence between them. Yet none of the measures agreed upon so far has touched the core of the threat posed by nuclear armaments. Although it is common knowledge that the existing volume of nuclear weapons is more than enough to annihilate the whole human race, nothing has been done to halt the production of such weapons or to prevent the further development of new and more sophisticated weapons systems, such as defensive anti-ballistic missiles and multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles.

71. The continuance of the nuclear arms race, far from adding to the security of any nation, is threatening to introduce a dangerous element of uncertainty into the existing nuclear arms balance with incalculable risks to

world peace. There are indeed compelling reasons for the leading nuclear Powers to make good without further delay their undertaking "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date", as provided in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Accordingly, the opening of the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States at Helsinki last Monday on strategic arms limitation has been greeted with profound relief throughout the world. We in Finland are proud to have been chosen as the neutral meeting ground for the two Powers.

72. The Foreign Minister of Finland, Dr. Ahti Karjalainen, in his welcoming remarks to the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States, said that by starting the discussions "the two Powers which are in control of the major part of the nuclear arsenals of the world have acknowledged their supreme responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". He continued: "Even as we realize the complexity of the task, we believe that the starting of the discussions between the two leading Powers is an encouraging sign of their willingness to advance in the field of disarmament and thus to continue along the road of arms control in the spirit of the treaties on a partial test ban and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There can be no doubt that the outcome of these talks will largely determine not only the prospect of further progress in the field of disarmament and arms control but also the future trend of international relations as a whole."

73. To say that no quick results can be hoped for from the talks on the limitation of strategic armaments is to state the obvious. But one might go further and say that in view of the dynamic nature of technology and other factors involved, no once-and-for-all solution in this field can realistically be expected and that the United States-Soviet strategic dialogue now in progress must become a continuous process of exchanging views and information and building mutual confidence. In this sense the talks in themselves constitute an arms control measure of vital importance to the preservation of peace.

74. It is in this context that I now wish to make some comments on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232, *annex A*]. My delegation, like many others, would have preferred to see a more comprehensive treaty emerging from the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The question of verification in particular should be carefully studied bearing in mind the fact that the treaty touches upon the rights and security of all coastal States. We know from past experience, however, that progress in the field of arms control can only be made step by step. Every measure in the right direction must thus be welcomed. The present draft treaty carries forward the momentum of negotiation and agreement between the two leading nuclear powers, and if it paves the way for additional measures to demilitarize the sea-bed, its significance will increase with the years.

75. Another question to which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted a considerable part of its deliberations is the continued testing of nuclear

weapons. This question occupies a key position in the whole complex problem of nuclear arms and the nuclear weapons tests which are being carried out are connected with the development of the weapons systems discussed in the Helsinki talks at present. At this date it is only possible to express the hope that the political will to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty will soon emerge from the negotiations now in progress.

76. On the technical aspect of the problem, which concerns the verification of compliance of an eventual test ban treaty, considerable progress has been made in recent years in research and international co-operation for the development of seismological methods for the detection and identification of underground nuclear weapons tests. In this connexion we should like to pay tribute to the Swedish Government for their most valuable initiatives facilitating the identification and clarification of the technical issues involved [*ibid.*, *annex C*, section 6].

77. In its resolution 2455 (XXIII) the General Assembly, recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of an eventual test ban treaty, expressed the hope that States would continue to contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data. During the session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament proposals have been made concerning the improvement of the international exchange of seismic data with a view to facilitating the solution of the problem of verifying a comprehensive test ban. My delegation welcomes these proposals as useful and practicable and has become co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1 which has been presented to the Committee.

78. We would also express the hope that the Powers still conducting underground tests would study in a constructive spirit proposals put forward for an agreement to ban underground tests beginning with the threshold ban of explosions above 4.75 on the seismic scale, which would become progressively lower as technology and instrumentation for the detection and identification of tests continue to improve. At the same time consideration should be given to the question of a moratorium with regard to all underground test explosions.

79. While our discussions on disarmament in recent years have concentrated on the threat posed by the nuclear arms race, the dangers inherent in the continued development of chemical and bacteriological or biological weapons are rightly receiving growing attention. The Secretary-General's report on the subject,⁸ prepared with the assistance of qualified experts and unanimously approved by them, is a pioneering study of outstanding importance. As is stated in the conclusion of the report, "The idea that bacteriological (biological) weapons could deliberately be used to spread disease generates a sense of horror". Were they to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live. In the foreword to his report the Secretary-General has made three proposals in the hope that further action would be taken to deal with the threat presented by the existence of such weapons. A number of other proposals have been

⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 371.

made concerning the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and their effective elimination from existing arsenals. We must now devote increasing attention to these questions. The problems involved, especially those of control, are most complicated and much more information than is now available is needed before effective and practical action can be taken. In the meantime, we wish to add our voice to those who have expressed the hope that States which have not already done so will adhere to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as soon as possible.

80. The facts of power prevailing in the world today place primary responsibility for progress in the field of disarmament on the States which possess nuclear weapons and the absence of two of these States from the present process of negotiation is bound to limit the scope of any results to be achieved. At the same time the experience of past years has proved that the co-operation of all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, is essential in efforts to strengthen international security through disarmament and arms control. We welcome therefore the enlargement of the Disarmament Committee to include 26 members representing different regions of the world and feel confident that the Committee will continue to play, as it has done so far, a significant role in future disarmament negotiations. Finland on her part has for several years closely followed the work of the Committee through special observers and we intend to maintain this practice. Regarding the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which was held in September 1968, my delegation believes that the reports submitted by the Secretary-General at the request of the General Assembly at its last session in resolution 2456 (XXIII) merit serious consideration.

81. In conclusion my delegation wishes to emphasize once again the fundamental importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a corner-stone, as it were, of the vast and complex system which is beginning to evolve for the purpose of keeping nuclear arms under control. The Treaty is an essential element in creating the mutual confidence that is necessary for any genuine disarmament and if it is not brought into force without further delay the prospects of more progress in the field of nuclear arms control will be seriously impaired.

82. Mr. VRATUSA (Yugoslavia). First of all, I should like to express my pleasure at being back in New York and at continuing the deliberations on disarmament under the Chairmanship of my old colleague. I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to impress upon the members of the Bureau the readiness of the Yugoslav delegation to contribute to the success of the work of this Committee.

83. Before turning to the matter under consideration, I should also like to express our deep satisfaction on the occasion of the successful second landing on the moon in the early hours of this morning and to say that this is a further historical step in man's conquest of outer space, which offers enormous and new possibilities for the progress of mankind. The second successful landing on the moon by the United States astronauts as well as the recent launching of several space ships by the Soviet Union is proof of the tremendous scientific, technical and human capabilities of the outer space Powers. We hope that all

these efforts in the exploration and future exploitation of outer space and celestial bodies will be in the interests of peace on earth as well.

84. The Yugoslav delegation would also like to express its firm conviction that only broad international co-operation and common efforts in the conquest of this promising and unlimited area will promote the development of friendly relations among States.

85. The current session of the General Assembly offers once more an opportunity for the examination of the prevailing situation in the field of disarmament, an issue constituting one of the basic elements of security and peace in the world. A useful and detailed analysis of the problem of security in the world was made at the outset of the present session. During that debate, a wide consensus was reached to the effect that there is no stable security in the world, nor can there be any, in the absence of effective processes of disarmament and development, as disarmament and development are inseparably linked with the preservation of international peace and security. Moreover experience shows that it is impossible to have true independence and security among nations in face of the continued accumulation of the most destructive weaponry and the repeated practice of using force in different regions of the world—in particular, against the freedom and independence of other countries—as weapons by virtue of their very existence, represent an invitation to destruction and to imposing the will of the stronger upon the weaker.

86. In order to realize genuine sovereignty, the right to self-determination and equality of all peoples, it is indispensable to eliminate the threat or use of force from international relations and to provide equal opportunity for every nation to independent development. Only by so doing will it be possible to create conditions for the full application of the principles of the Charter in international relations.

87. It is obvious that a special responsibility for the realization of world security and disarmament rests with the nuclear Powers above all. They can contribute decisively towards the initiation of the process of genuine disarmament. Disarmament, however, is a universal problem, one that concerns the whole international community. Therefore all countries and nations should contribute to this end.

88. This premise is known and is generally accepted. There is hardly any need today to stress the importance of having all countries, especially those that are militarily more important and in particular the nuclear Powers to take an active part in the search for the solution of the disarmament problem. It is a fact, however, that the People's Republic of China is not participating in the disarmament efforts and that the seat of France in the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva remains empty. We regret to note that these weaknesses have not as yet been overcome. I should like, therefore, to repeat our hope that France, whose contribution to peace is widely appreciated, will find it possible to take its place in disarmament negotiations. I should also like to stress the urgency of creating conditions which would allow the participation of the People's Republic of China in disarmament negotiations.

89. The arms race, especially the nuclear weapons race, is continuing. The so-called balance of deterrence and the balance of power among the great Powers and military blocs and alliances are frequently offered as the main pillars of peace. However, sad experience has shown that these cannot be pillars of genuine peace and security of all—not even for the nuclear Powers.

90. According to some estimates, over 200 billion dollars are being spent annually on armaments and related destructive activities. On the one hand military expenditure has almost doubled during the sixties. It represents today more than two thirds of the annual national income of all developing countries. On the other, financial transfers from the developed countries for the purpose of assisting the economic development of the developing countries amount to only 5 per cent of the total military expenditures of the present-day world. If only two more per cent of these expenditures were converted to transfers for development finance, we would have reached the target, set 10 years ago, of 1 per cent transfer of gross national product of the developed countries.

Mr. Shahi (Pakistan) resumed the Chair.

91. It is a fact that some results have been achieved in recent years in the limitation of armaments and non-armament. They are reflected in several agreements, such as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. There is currently under discussion a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed [A/7741-DC/232,⁹ annex A]. All this cannot, however, remove the prevailing feeling of uncertainty and fear or stop completely the growing concern of mankind for the future.

92. It looks as though the clear commitments of Governments to disarmament have been fading away. Today much is being said about the need to control arms and to limit armaments, but too little about effective measures for general and complete disarmament under international control.

93. In connexion with the need to increase our efforts in this field, I should like to express our special appreciation to the Secretary-General, U Thant, for his untiring efforts in this area. In the introduction to his annual report to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly,¹⁰ he has suggested that consideration should be given to the designation of a disarmament decade. We believe that this idea should command our full support. The world of today should be in a position to plan and create its own long-term programme in the field of disarmament.

94. In the view of the Yugoslav delegation, a more substantive contribution towards real disarmament, in the

first place nuclear disarmament, must be made soon. Should we fail in this, the prevailing state of affairs, with its attendant elements of instability and imminent danger, would persist and even deteriorate. This is the reason we welcome with particular satisfaction the beginning of the strategic arms limitation talks between the USSR and the United States. We hope that these talks will produce the expected results and so pave the way to the realization of the final aim: general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In addition, we hope that these two Powers will find it useful and feasible to establish a moratorium on further tests and the deployment of new strategic offensive and defensive weapons with the initiation of strategic arms limitation talks. We should like to believe that these talks will not cause any delay in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, in the General Assembly of the United Nations, or in any other effort of the international community in the field of disarmament and security. We expect that these talks will contribute to creating an atmosphere for promoting friendly international co-operation on a larger scale as well.

95. In this connexion, I should like to mention several initiatives that have been taken to enhance European co-operation and security. These developments represent a subject of great interest to Yugoslavia, not only because it is a European country, but also because we are convinced that each step in this direction will lead us in the direction of adopting measures in the field of limiting the arms race in Europe. Action in this direction is needed, because it is a fact that, owing to the existence of military blocs and the division of Europe along this line, the European continent has become a huge arsenal of terrifying armaments and an area of concentration of an impressive number of foreign armed forces. It is obvious that all European States should participate in these endeavours as this problem cannot be the concern of two blocs only. We hope that the settlement of these and other issues affecting Europe will have a favourable impact on the world situation in general and on the solution of a number of other problems of interest to the entire world.

96. At this point, the Yugoslav delegation would like to review briefly the present situation in the field of disarmament and to submit to the Committee its opinions and suggestions on some major issues relating to future work in this field.

97. The problem of halting the arms race on the sea-bed has come to the forefront this year. It is related to the broader efforts to limit the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and its resources, which are the common heritage of mankind, exclusively for peaceful purposes and to the important work of the Committee on the Sea-Bed to elaborate an international régime for the exploration of the sea-bed and ocean floor and its subsoil, including its resources, in the interests of mankind as a whole and taking into account the special needs and interests of developing countries. A joint draft treaty was recently submitted to the General Assembly by the USSR and the United States on this matter. This problem, as we have pointed out on a number of occasions in various bodies, is not of such a nature and substance to demand priority over the solution of other problems of disarmament, although we agree that tomorrow it could be more difficult to reach such an

⁹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

agreement. We would therefore favour a speedier completion of this issue on the understanding that further improvement is desirable and that the priority given to it is an expression of the absence of readiness on the part of some Powers and the inability of the international community to deal with more important and more pressing issues. We hope that the completion of this task will make room for other endeavours of far-reaching importance. The efforts exerted over the years and the experience gained in the field of disarmament have taught us to accept even a course that would enable us to evolve by means of a gradual approach, that is, by progressing from less to more important issues.

98. The Yugoslav delegation both at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and at the Sea-Bed Committee has been advocating complete demilitarization of the sea-bed, because we believe this to be the purpose of our efforts in that particular area. We understand, therefore, that the prevention of the arms race on the sea-bed of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction constitutes only a first step in the direction of an early and complete demilitarization of the sea-bed. We agree with the draft treaty in principle insisting, however, that this treaty should in no way impair the legitimate rights of smaller States and that the treaty's implementation should be controlled effectively. It should not prejudice any international régime which might be agreed upon for the sea-bed and its subsoil. When the question comes up for consideration the Yugoslav delegation will submit concrete proposals in keeping with its understanding of the matter, bearing in mind any suggestions by, and the report of, the Sea-Bed Committee on the work of its current special session.

99. The complex issue of chemical and bacteriological weapons deserves, in the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, the full attention of the General Assembly. The Committee on Disarmament has made certain progress in the consideration of this problem. However, there is still much to be harmonized and further explored. The report and the recommendations of the Secretary-General,¹¹ prepared by a group of outstanding international experts represents, in the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, a solid basis for the attainment of satisfactory solutions. There are two draft conventions before the First Committee which were submitted by the United Kingdom [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 2] and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [A/7655], respectively, and one draft declaration which was presented by 12 countries, one of them being Yugoslavia [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 30]. We feel that the necessary conditions exist for the acceptance and implementation of the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report, namely, to request all States which have not done so to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925; to affirm clearly that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 covers the use in war of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare which today exist, or which may be developed in the future, and to reach an agreed prohibition of the development, manufacturing and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of all States.

¹¹ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

100. The Yugoslav delegation intends to refer to the problem of bacteriological and chemical warfare later in the Committee. At this stage I should just like to point out, however, that we attach great importance to an urgent examination of this problem by the Committee. We believe that this session of the General Assembly will be able to adopt appropriate decisions, at least on some of its aspects, and to submit concrete recommendations to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for its further consideration immediately upon the resumption of its work next year.

101. The General Assembly at its twenty-third session, in its resolution 2455 (XXIII), requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. As is evident from the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, such a treaty has not as yet been agreed upon. There is a draft convention which was submitted by the Swedish delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, [ibid., section 6] which Yugoslavia supports. In this connexion, I should like to stress once again that the nuclear Powers should discontinue, without delay, all nuclear weapon tests and achieve contractual prohibition of underground tests as soon as possible. In order to achieve this a corresponding political will, above all on the part of those who possess such weapons, is indispensable. Every further delay gives rise to many other negative tendencies.

102. The General Assembly at its twenty-second session had already recommended in its resolution 2373 (XXII) an urgent consideration of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, there are no results on this matter either. However, there exists a series of elements which speaks not only of the necessity, but also of the possibility, of effecting the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. A limited prohibition, as the first step, is within the realm of feasibility.

103. The question of denuclearized zones and zones of limited arms, in the view of the Yugoslav delegation, constitutes an area in which it is possible to work out a number of solutions simultaneously, in view of the regional character of such measures, on the understanding that regional agreements represent an integral part of the world system of international security. We greatly appreciate the efforts of the Latin American countries in this field and we sincerely congratulate them on the results achieved so far. However, we regret the fact that we need to state that some nuclear Powers, by their attitude regarding this question, have not encouraged positive developments in this field. In this situation, we feel that the General Assembly should renew its request and make an effort to help encourage initiatives concerning international security.

104. The basic problem in the field of disarmament—general and complete disarmament, under effective international control—in spite of repeated appeals by the General Assembly, has not been a subject of active consideration for years. We are all acquainted with the evolution of this problem; the existing proposals, dating back seven or eight years, and assertions to the effect that this is a difficult issue and that it would be more rational to begin with certain collateral or partial and similar disarma-

ment measures. We have all accepted this step-by-step approach as a necessity, but we realize that even this is not helping towards more substantive progress in general and complete disarmament. The Yugoslav delegation finds the existing situation unsatisfactory. Therefore we should like to see an early consideration of ways and means for a more active treatment of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

105. The non-proliferation Treaty, which was opened for signature more than a year ago, has not yet been ratified by a sufficient number of countries to enter into force. Among others, it has not been ratified by the two super-Powers. As we have emphasized on different occasions, this Treaty constitutes only the first step towards the positive solution of complex and concrete questions, especially in the following three fields: nuclear disarmament, international security and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We share the view of those delegations which believe that new initiatives for increasing the number of signatures of the Treaty, and especially the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, will bring closer the date of an early entry into force of the Treaty.

106. I should like to add our belief that, in view of the implementation of its article VI, if applied, the coming into force of the Treaty will stimulate progress in the negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, the essential promotion of international security, as well as ensuring equal opportunities concerning the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. I should like therefore to express once more our hope that there will soon be further progress in this field. In saying this, we mean not only horizontal prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also the obligations assumed by nuclear Powers under the same Treaty regarding the prevention of the so-called vertical spread of nuclear weapons. Only urgent and substantive fulfilment of those obligations could bring about wide acceptance of the non-proliferation Treaty and secure its stability and durability.

107. The Committee also has before it a complex of issues under the item entitled "Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States". Yugoslavia, like many other countries, is keenly interested in all those problems and in the implementation of the results of the world conference. The declaration of the Geneva Conference,¹² which was endorsed by the General Assembly at its twenty-third session in resolution 2456 (XXIII), demands a continuing of the efforts initiated at Geneva. The Conference adopted 14 resolutions requesting a number of concrete measures in the field of international security, as well as in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

108. We are now faced with the question of when and how we can, in greater detail and more specifically, deal with those questions and with the reports prepared at the request of the General Assembly.

109. The past year, which has provided an opportunity for all countries and different international agencies to consider ways of implementing the results of the Conference, shows

that what has been achieved so far does not give reason for satisfaction. The existing possibilities in this particular area are not commensurate with the growing and urgent needs of the contemporary world, particularly of the developing countries. Possibilities, for example, extended by IAEA do not as yet satisfy the needs of the developing countries. The fact that there are not sufficient funds for the implementation of the modest projects already negotiated causes serious concern.

110. As a case in point, I should like to mention that the so-called regular IAEA programme of technical assistance has not exceeded a sum of \$1.3 million yearly during the past 10 years. This is far below the requirements. Actually in 1968 only 27.1 per cent of those requirements were met and only 26.4 per cent in 1969. That covers barely one quarter of the requests. For this reason it is only natural that the situation—or a mere noting of the facts—cannot satisfy us. The Yugoslav delegation feels that it is in the interests of international co-operation, peace in the world and progress, to eliminate the major shortcomings as soon as possible. For all these reasons we shall, during this session also, exert additional efforts towards exploring avenues for the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

111. For us there is no doubt that the General Assembly is the most important organ of the international community for dealing with the problems of disarmament, for formulating guidelines for other bodies acting in this field, and for being a source of inspiration for fresh and comprehensive action. There is no doubt that the extremely limited time left for discussing the disarmament question does not create satisfactory conditions for carrying out the important tasks before us. It is not the first time that the Committee has found itself in this unenviable position.

112. A way out of the situation would perhaps be a different and more effective allocation of issues on the agenda in the future which would allow more time for disarmament, security and related questions. There are other possibilities, also, for using the existing machinery of the United Nations for disarmament more effectively. I have in mind especially the Disarmament Commission, which for the most part has remained idle since its creation. Resolution 2456 (XXIII) adopted at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in connexion with the item "Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States", included a special decision on this issue. It is still valid.

113. In order to be able to discharge its duties in the field of disarmament more successfully, the General Assembly is entitled to expect that various reports and proposals and other material should be prepared in such a form as to facilitate their consideration. In this connexion, I should like to mention that the Yugoslav delegation shares the view of those representatives who urged that the report of the Committee on Disarmament should be more substantive and less an enumeration of events and documents and that it should be submitted to the General Assembly in time. We are fully aware that this is not an easy task, but no effort should be spared to accomplish it. The Yugoslav delegation has already expressed this view in the Committee on Disarmament and we shall continue in that direction.

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2.

114. The report of the Committee on Disarmament on its own activity in 1969 was submitted to the General Assembly when the Assembly was already in session. Such practice causes serious difficulties, especially to delegations representing countries which are not members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We share the view expressed by some delegations that Member States will only be in a position to engage more actively in the work connected with the disarmament problem, and to make their contribution to resolving the complex matters of disarmament after they have been able to study the report in detail.

115. Regarding the future work of the Committee on Disarmament, Yugoslavia—which joined the Committee last August, together with five other countries—is of the opinion that this negotiating body should and could intensify its work and that it must begin without delay the consideration of the substantive disarmament measures on its agenda. We believe that this is possible and that the work of the Committee should be oriented in this direction.

116. In connexion with the intensification of the efforts to find a solution to disarmament problems, there is another fact meriting our attention. I have in mind the scope and organizational set-up of national bodies and institutions concerned with disarmament. If we were to compare the number of people in most countries dealing with armaments—that is, in perfecting warfare skills, war techniques, the resources at their disposal, staffs, ministries, various institutes and institutions—with the situation in the disarmament field then we could easily observe the enormous difference which exists, to the disadvantage of those working on disarmament. Obviously, it is up to each individual country to organize such activities. However, as a consequence of this situation, we do not have enough adequate proposals today for concrete solutions to many problems in the field of disarmament, although we believe that we should have them. I should like to add that those institutions and organs, even if created in major numbers, could not be successful in their efforts without a firm orientation of individual Governments and of the international community towards genuine disarmament.

117. In addition to the examination of general issues concerning disarmament, we shall have the opportunity of considering at this session some specific measures such as the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the prohibition of the underground tests, and so on. The current session of the Assembly should do everything possible to bring about substantive progress in those issues without delay, bearing in mind the exceptional efforts expected of the General Assembly and also the preparations for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

118. The CHAIRMAN: I am sure that I am voicing the feelings of all members of this Committee when I say how much we admire and applaud the stupendous feat of the second team of American astronauts on their lunar expedition, and that our prayers are with them for their safe return to earth. On behalf of the Committee I would request the United States delegation to convey our heartfelt

congratulations to the brave astronauts and their families, as well as to the Government and people of the United States.

119. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I should like to express the appreciation of the United States delegation for the congratulations and the good wishes offered today on the occasion of the second landing of our astronauts on the moon. As one whose only contribution to this great enterprise was to give up some sleep last night and this morning, I would simply acknowledge gratefully the hopes and the prayers of so many, abroad as well as here in the United States, for the successful accomplishment by the astronauts of their important scientific tests, and, as you said, for their safe return among us here on Earth.

Organization of work

120. The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the question of completing the consideration of the item on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. It will be recalled that the Committee concluded the general debate on this item at its 1683rd meeting on 10 November. At the conclusion of the general debate on that item, I stated as follows:

“I had hoped that, following the introduction of the various draft resolutions and amendments thereto, the Committee would be able to proceed to vote on them this afternoon. However, a number of delegations have informed me that they would like to have some more time to undertake informal consultations concerning the various draft resolutions and amendments before they are put to the vote, in order that the widest possible consensus may be reached on each of them, and so that further debate may be dispensed with.” [1683rd meeting, para. 142.]

I went on to state:

“... we shall return to the consideration of the various draft resolutions and amendments on the sea-bed item after the completion of the consideration of the substantive aspects of the question of Korea.

“May I express the hope that the consultations will be concluded in two or three days’ time, so that the Committee may be able to conclude its proceedings on the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor.” [Ibid., paras. 143 and 144.]

121. Before the conclusion of the debate on the substantive aspects of the Korean question, I informally consulted the sponsors of the various draft resolutions and those who had submitted amendments to the draft resolutions on the sea-bed item. I was advised that they were not yet ready to vote on those draft resolutions and, therefore, with the approval of the Committee, we began consideration of the disarmament items.

122. I had hoped that some time this week we would be able to take up the draft resolutions on the sea-bed item,

and it was my intention to devote one meeting tomorrow or on Friday for voting on them. Accordingly, this afternoon I again consulted the sponsors of the various draft resolutions and those who had proposed amendments. During this consultation a suggestion was made that further time should be allowed to complete the informal discussions among the sponsors. In view of this request I propose

that voting on the draft resolutions and amendments concerning the sea-bed item be held on Wednesday, 26 November.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.