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*Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).*

**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31**

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7639, A/7681 and A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989)**

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**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):**

**(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2);**

**(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);**

**(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568 and A/7743)**

**GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)**

1. Mr. PETERSEN (Denmark): I think we have to admit that, from a general point of view, 1969 until recently was a year of stagnation in the field of disarmament. And if there had not been in the nick of time a change of wind, we would have had every reason to take a profoundly pessimistic view of developments. However, in the last few days and weeks, we have witnessed events which may have a decisive impact on future trends in the cause of disarmament.

2. I am thinking of President Nixon's statement yesterday—to which I shall refer later—and the talks which the Soviet Union and the United States began in Helsinki last week on the limitation of strategic arms. The Government of Denmark considers those talks to be of crucial importance. Developments in arms technology are characterized by a sharp acceleration and if they were allowed to continue unabated we would see a further escalation of the arms race, resulting in mounting costs and reduced security.

3. We trust that both super-Powers, in recognizing the seriousness of the situation, are aware of the responsibilities which rest upon them. We see the talks that have now been initiated as proof that the great Powers are prepared to live up to their commitment under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". The strategic arms limitations talks may contribute to the accomplishment of this goal, and a successful outcome of the talks in Helsinki might be conducive to positive results in other areas. I am thinking, in particular, of a treaty on a complete test ban, for which the need is more acute than ever.

4. My Government is fully aware that the talks in Helsinki are going to be very difficult, and I think that the General Assembly should keep that fact in mind in its deliberations

and refrain from making detailed recommendations which, however well meant they might be, could hamper the strategic arms limitation talks. The great Powers should now be allowed to proceed undisturbed with their work. However, let me stress most emphatically that the strategic arms limitation talks are not a matter of concern to the great Powers alone as they serve the interests of and involve responsibilities towards the entire world community.

5. Almost seventeen months have now passed since the non-proliferation Treaty was opened for signature. Denmark was among the first States to sign and ratify the treaty. Unfortunately, a very limited number of States have followed suit thus far. On the other hand, it is gratifying to note that several of the States whose adherence is important are now taking steps to sign and ratify the Treaty. In this connexion we welcomed the announcement the day before yesterday of the ratification by the United States and the Soviet Union.

6. I shall now make some comments on the efforts which are being made to reach agreement on a complete test ban treaty. It is a matter for grave concern that test explosions up to and over one megaton continue to take place at the rate of more than forty per year. The difficulty remains that of finding a solution to the problem of verification. The ideas which Canada has presented to the Committee on Disarmament about exchanges of seismic data and which have now materialized in draft resolution A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3 represent a first step in the right direction, and my Government is glad to be a co-sponsor of it. We believe, however, that the time must now have come for the Committee on Disarmament to focus its attention on the substance of the matter, and we consider it appropriate that that Committee, as suggested by its non-aligned members in draft resolution A/C.1/L.486, should submit a special report on the matter before the next General Assembly session. Pending the signature of a complete test ban treaty, we should consider that quantitative and qualitative restrictions could be imposed. I favour the United Kingdom idea of rationing the test explosions with a view to their complete elimination. Another possibility would be to prohibit test explosions above the level at which verification by national means is feasible today. Finally, there would be the possibility of combining such quantitative and qualitative restrictions; an idea which I would recommend that the Committee on Disarmament take up for further consideration.

7. There is yet another field of disarmament in which, as I see it, recent developments give grounds for some optimism. I am thinking of the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The General Assembly has before it the most copious and comprehensive documentation thus far compiled about these terrible weapons—the report of the Secretary-General,<sup>1</sup> the report of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232]<sup>2</sup> and the papers submitted by Governments—and I think that this material offers good opportunities for real progress in this field within a foreseeable future.

<sup>1</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

<sup>2</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

8. I shall not go into detail about the terrifying potential destructive capabilities of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. These sinister aspects have already been made abundantly clear to us in the Secretary-General's report, and several preceding speakers have reminded us of them. Let me just emphasize that the Government of Denmark considers it of vital importance that the international community take effective steps at an early date to remove the threat that mankind will become the victim of attacks by chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. It is, I think, premature to discuss in detail how this problem should be tackled, but, as I see it, certain main lines are conspicuous already.

9. As recommended in the Secretary-General's report, we must make a renewed appeal to all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.<sup>3</sup> That instrument is so essential and of such fundamental importance and has already been adhered to by such a large number of States, formally or non-formally, that we must ensure that its possibilities are exploited to the greatest possible extent.

10. On the other hand, the Protocol is inadequate, particularly because it confines itself to "use in war". Therefore my Government subscribes to the idea behind the proposals emanating from the United Kingdom [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 20] and from the socialist countries [A/7655] as introduced the other day by the representative of Poland [1693rd meeting], according to which the ban should be extended to include manufacture, stockpiling and destruction of existing stocks.

11. Hence, the task before us must be to work out, as a complement to the Geneva Protocol, a treaty text which could be universally accepted. In the Danish view, such a treaty should ban the manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and order the destruction of existing stocks.

12. In addition, the treaty should provide for effective control so that no false feeling of security would arise. I am fully aware that it will be extremely difficult, if only for technical reasons, to solve the problem of verification. On the other hand, there seems to be a particularly great need for effective control with regard to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons because these weapons can be produced at relatively low cost and because they are easy to conceal. I recommend most strongly that this question too be taken up for renewed and thorough study.

13. In addition to the thought-provoking ideas and proposals to which I have just referred, I have studied the aforementioned British proposal to conclude an agreement on bacteriological weapons as a first step. My feeling is that it would be advisable to try to solve this problem, which is apparently the easier of the two, first and separately, if it turns out that it will become a protracted affair to find a satisfactory solution to the over-all problem. This does not mean, of course, that we should forget chemical weapons.

14. I have, also with the greatest interest, read President Nixon's announcement yesterday that the United States

<sup>3</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

administration will submit to the Senate, for its advice and consent to ratification, the Geneva Protocol of 1925. President Nixon further stated that the defence authorities had been asked to make recommendations as to the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. My delegation welcomes that statement, which we regard as a significant step towards further progress in this field.

15. May I conclude my observations on this matter by expressing my appreciation of the efforts which have been made to provide the point of departure, thanks to which we are now better prepared to solve one of the most crucial problems of mankind. And may I express the hope that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will base its continued deliberations on all the material which has been provided, and that the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly will be able to take concrete measures.

16. The Government of Denmark has noted with satisfaction that the two Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, have agreed to submit a draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed [*A/7741-DC/232, annex A*]. As we see it, the presentation of the draft treaty, besides providing yet another proof of the constructive work which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is able to accomplish, holds out hope for a further improvement of the international climate.

17. As my delegation had the opportunity to state in the course of the debate [*1683rd meeting*] on the utilization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes, Denmark supports the view that the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be regarded as the common heritage of mankind and exploited for the benefit of mankind as a whole. In logical consequence of this, we subscribe also to the view that the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction must not be used for military purposes. The crux of the matter is, however, that we are faced with the situation that some States already possess the technological and financial capabilities of extending the arms race to the sea-bed, and that an increasing number of States will acquire such capabilities in the future. Common-sense tells us, therefore, that we must now, before it is too late, try to prevent such unproductive and hazardous developments from being set in motion.

18. Without going into detail about the draft treaty, I should like to mention a few points which are not entirely acceptable to my Government.

19. We would have preferred a more comprehensive ban. Although it might not be advantageous today to emplace on the sea-bed weapons other than those comprised by the draft treaty, technological developments may very well alter that picture. But, seeing that a more comprehensive treaty cannot be formulated today, we note with satisfaction that article V of the draft treaty provides for the convening of a conference to revise the treaty. In my view, it might very well be possible to embody some kind of commitment in the operative part, for instance in the form of the commitment contained in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

20. I should like to make some remarks also about article III of the draft treaty, relating to verification. In my opinion, the provisions of that article are too weak, so weak, in fact, that it is to be feared that the treaty could not create the atmosphere of trust which is of such fundamental importance in matters of disarmament and arms control. I therefore wholeheartedly endorse the observations which the representative of Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff, made about this question in his statement [*1692nd meeting*] in this Committee on 18 November. My delegation shares the view that the provisions relating to verification must be worded in a manner to guarantee, for all contracting parties, the right to undertake verification and, if necessary, to obtain assistance in carrying out verification, possibly from an international organ. Moreover, we find that States should be enabled in certain cases, also with the assistance of others if necessary, to perform close physical inspection. Third, and last, we find that the treaty should contain provisions by which coastal States may be assured of special rights over the continental shelf.

21. As I have already said, my Government welcomes the presentation of the draft treaty. I hope and believe that, thanks to the thorough and conscientious effort which has been put into the preliminary work from so many sides, the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly will succeed in agreeing upon a text which in reasonable measure satisfies all interests and views. If a text is not approved at this session of the General Assembly, we shall run the risk of being overtaken by developments.

22. It is only natural that the disarmament discussions of the last few years should have centred on weapons of mass destruction, but I take this opportunity to warn against the threat posed by conventional weapons.

23. To the vast majority of Member States, it is the stockpiling of conventional weapons which represents the greatest risk, while the enormous financial resources required for that purpose hamper important steps in social and cultural areas. I have noted with interest that other delegations have also raised this aspect during the general debate.

24. In the introduction to his annual report,<sup>4</sup> Secretary-General U Thant states that expenditure on armaments in the last decade has grown from \$120,000 million to nearly \$200,000 million. I fully endorse his view that this development is both startling and depressing.

25. It was with great regret that the Danish delegation last year had to accept the fact that there was extensive opposition in the Assembly to the draft resolution<sup>5</sup> in which we asked the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of Member States on the idea of registration of exports and imports of weapons. My Government is not going to pursue the idea behind the draft resolution at this juncture, but I do want to stress that in no circumstances can we be allowed to forget the conventional weapons.

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-third Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96, document A/7411, para. 5 (d).

26. I should like to say to the developing countries, although it should be superfluous, that the aim of imposing limitations on conventional weapons is not, of course, to deprive them of rights under the United Nations Charter, including the right for self-defence. Large conventional forces are just as heavy a burden for the industrialized countries, and I wish in this connexion to draw special attention to the heavy concentration of military forces which we are witnessing in Europe. The States involved could set others a good example if they committed themselves to achieve, at an early date, a balanced military thinning out in Europe.

27. May I, in this connexion, draw your attention to a book which was published recently by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),<sup>6</sup> entitled the *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968-1969*. SIPRI has here taken an extremely useful initiative, and I hope that the study of the book, which contains a wealth of statistical data, will convince us of the need for more comprehensive knowledge about what is going on in the field of military developments. We need more knowledge and more information about all aspects of international life as a background also for disarmament talks. It is not enough that we limit our endeavours to talking about complex technical questions.

28. If we look at the funds and the efforts devoted to research in general, it seems to my mind strange that so little is done in this respect. Knowing that practically every field of natural science receives increasing funds, it is surprising that so little is done to study the most important problems of all: war and peace, and to clarify the problems relating to conflicts. I am thinking not only of the concrete conflicts which remain unsolved, but also of more general questions such as this one: are there features of human nature that make it natural for us from time to time to go out and kill each other? Is it inextricably bound up with human nature to give rise to aggression and destruction, or is it possible for us to channel our aggressive and destructive urges into fruitful fields?

29. Those challenging questions and other questions are unavoidable as long as we are witnessing bloodshed as a result of unsolved conflicts. They are, in our opinion, of greater urgency than ever before because we are living under the constant threat of the total destruction of mankind. It is our very future that is at stake. We have to give the young generation of today a feeling of confidence and faith in the future of the international community, and that can only be done if we relieve them of their deep fear and anxiety.

30. The United Nations has a dominant role to play in our efforts to meet this demand.

31. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia) (*translated from Russian*): Following a broad and, I would say, constructive discussion of the question concerning the strengthening of international security, our Committee has begun the consideration of another equally important part of its agenda, namely, an examination of problems relating to general and

complete disarmament and, first of all, nuclear disarmament. In other words, we are continuing to deal with the same urgent problem of today's world: that of ensuring a lasting peace and universal security. Moreover, we are considering this question from the standpoint of one of its extremely important aspects, directly related to the ensuring of an effective material guarantee for realization of the vital task of freeing mankind from the threat of a new world war.

32. The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic notes with deep satisfaction that the beginning of the discussion on disarmament questions has coincided with the opening in Helsinki, the capital of Finland, of talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of the strategic arms race. A positive result of these talks would limit the mortally dangerous escalation of the nuclear arms race and would open up new prospects for surmounting the obstacles which continue to paralyze any significant move forward in the field of disarmament, and especially of nuclear disarmament. Such a result would also have a beneficial influence on the normalization of the international situation as a whole. Therefore, when we wish for the success of those talks we express the hope and, at the same time, the insistent demand of the peoples of the world that a decisive turn be taken away from that critical border line beyond which begins the "frenzied" nuclear arms race itself, which could bring an inconceivable catastrophe to mankind.

33. It seems to us that these talks will be an exemplary test of the sincerity and seriousness of the declaration of willingness to enter an era of negotiations and abandon confrontation.

34. Our delegation would like to discuss in some detail the questions relating to the limitation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, that is, thermonuclear weapons and chemical and bacteriological means of waging war.

35. In as much as our general position of principle on these problems is known to the members of this Committee, we shall try to set forth briefly our point of view and ideas on those of their aspects which are attracting the most attention at present.

36. First of all, we should like to state that our delegation shares the view that there is a close link between the problem of a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and the talks now being held on the limitation and slowing down of the strategic nuclear weapons arms race. In fact, underground tests serve to create new, more highly perfected types of nuclear weapons, particularly self-aiming multipurpose war-heads. In other words, these tests are a means of so-called vertical proliferation of this weapon of mass destruction.

37. The problem of the cessation of underground nuclear weapons tests was examined this year more concretely and, I would say, more purposefully in the Committee on Disarmament on the basis of a number of important documents, and particularly of a working paper containing the possible provisions of a treaty on this question<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell; New York, Humanities Press; London, Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.

<sup>7</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

submitted by the delegation of Sweden. [*A/7741-DC/232, annex C, para. 6.*] However, the Committee was unable to work out an agreed text of the treaty, as was insistently recommended by the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in resolution 2456 (XXIII). The main obstacle on the path to agreement in this field was, as in the past, the position of the Western Powers, which insisted on so-called international inspection for the implementation of control over the fulfilment of the treaty. Our delegation, as well as many others, does not share this view and continues to consider that control over the fulfilment of the provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of underground tests could be carried out on the basis of utilization of national means of detection and identification. Over the recent period the discussion of the problem of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests has brought out increasingly well-founded arguments in favour of this position. This shows that talk about the need for so-called international on-site inspection serves as a plausible cover for the negative position of certain Western Powers on this question. Although we believe that for the solution of this problem it suffices to manifest a realistic approach and the necessary political will, nevertheless it seems to us that in view of the pressing need for its urgent solution there must be a persistent search for a generally acceptable path to the achievement of this objective.

38. On the basis of the urgency of achieving an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapons tests, our delegation would like to express the hope that the Soviet Union and the United States will seriously consider the proposal of Secretary-General U Thant concerning the cessation of all further work on the creation of new offensive and defensive strategic systems while the talks begun in Helsinki are continued. We believe that essentially this will become one of the most important subjects of discussion at the talks.

39. The declaration for that same period of a moratorium on all types of nuclear weapons tests by the other nuclear Powers would be the best evidence of their sincere interest in eliminating the danger of a nuclear war and would give effective support to the efforts now being undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States. Therefore, our delegation supports the draft resolutions submitted by ten countries, contained in document A/C.1/L.486 which includes, among other measures, an appeal to all nuclear Powers to suspend nuclear weapons tests.

40. In this connexion our delegation wishes to state that the effectiveness and practical results of any measure in the nuclear weapons field will be more complete and decisive only if all nuclear Powers participate in it. Therefore, we support the view that efforts must be undertaken to draw the Chinese People's Republic and France into the negotiations on the problems of limitation of the nuclear arms race and prohibition of nuclear weapons.

41. Turning to other measures in the nuclear weapons field, we stress once again that in the matter of the limitation of the nuclear arms race the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is of great importance. The ratification of this Treaty by three of its nuclear participants creates a hopeful outlook in this direction. However, that process, in our view, is still moving

forward rather slowly. Therefore, it seems to us that the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly should once again address a special appeal to States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify, as soon as possible, this important Treaty which creates favourable conditions for the adoption of new measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

42. Our delegation considers that the General Assembly and, in particular, the Committee on Disarmament should immediately begin the concrete consideration of the proposal of the Soviet Union on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the production of those weapons of mass destruction, and on elimination of their stockpiles.

43. May I be permitted now to turn briefly to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, submitted by the two Co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament [*ibid.*, *annex A*]. We, as well as many members of this Committee, prefer a complete demilitarization of this sector, which would be fully in accordance with the security interests of mankind and the desire of the world community. However, it has not been possible to achieve that this time. We particularly regret this because a complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor would be basically a preventive measure and, with the necessary political will of all the main parties concerned, an agreement on this subject could be reached without any special difficulties.

44. Nevertheless, our delegation attaches great importance to the conclusion of a treaty on the basis of the draft submitted, since its immediate consequence would be the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in this comparatively new and wide field of human activity which, according to some estimates, represents almost 80 per cent of our planet. That is why our delegation has spoken out in the Committee on Disarmament in favour of approval as a whole of the draft treaty submitted by the Co-Chairman. Our delegation would like to explain that this in no way signifies a rejection of the possibilities of further improvement of the text of the draft treaty. We know that many delegations have advanced and continue to put forward proposals for making further changes in the draft. In this connexion we wish to state that, as in the past, our delegation fully supports the proposal submitted by the delegation of Sweden to include in the operative part of the draft a new article [*ibid.*, *annex, para. 36*] providing for a commitment by the States parties to the treaty to continue in good faith negotiations on further measures aimed at complete prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes. A number of proposals have been submitted by the delegations of the United Arab Republic, Canada and other countries, which in our view, deserve serious consideration. It was with these proposals in mind that our delegation stated in the Committee on Disarmament that:

“... due consideration should be given to those proposals which stem from the sovereign rights and security interests of States, even if their implementation at the



present stage would involve certain difficulties from the technical point of view". [CCD/PV.445, para. 15.]

We continue to maintain this position.

45. Our delegation, for its part, has made certain comments aimed at improving the text of the draft and making some of the wording more precise. We shall refer to them when the need arises.

46. Our delegation expresses the hope that the two co-sponsors will, in the time remaining to them, carry on intensive consultation on the final working out of the draft treaty, bearing in mind important comments of principle so as to obtain approval of that new international document at this session of the General Assembly.

47. I should like to touch briefly on questions connected with the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons whose existence represents a growing threat to international peace and the security of peoples.

48. Before setting forth its position on this timely problem, our delegation wishes to express its sincere gratitude to the experts of fourteen countries who, under the guidance of the Secretary-General, prepared an excellent report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use.<sup>8</sup> The conclusions of the experts and the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in this highly authoritative study indicate the course we should follow in our efforts to outlaw chemical and bacteriological weapons. To confirm the foregoing statement, I should like to present here some of the very important conclusions of the experts concerning the nature of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the social and military-political consequences of their use, and also the benefits which mankind would derive from the elimination of this weapon of mass destruction. *Inter alia*, the experts state the following.

(a) Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons occupy a special position because they are the only type of weapons affecting living matter.

(b) No one can predict the long-term effects of an eventual large-scale use of these weapons in war, and how their use would affect the social structure and the environment in which we live.

(c) If any type of chemical or bacteriological (biological) weapon were to be used in war it would pose a serious risk of escalation both in the use of other even more dangerous types of weapons of the same class, and of other types of weapons of mass destruction.

49. The experts further state that the prospects for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and therefore for ensuring peace throughout the world, would improve considerably if the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for military purposes were to cease and

if they were to be completely eliminated from military arsenals. Moreover, they add a point of the most vital importance to the effect that the comprehensive elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons would have no negative influence on the security of any country.

50. On the basis of these and other significant conclusions, the authors of the report recommend, as the first measure necessary to achieve the objective of elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the securing of universal observance of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

51. For that reason, the Secretary-General has requested the General Assembly to again address an appeal to all States to accede to that Protocol.

52. Our Government, as well as those of many other countries, considers that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 has not only stood the test of time, but also played a major role in restraining the Nazi attempts to use this dreadful weapon of mass destruction during the Second World War. It was in order to stress the urgency of realizing universal observance of the Geneva Protocol that the Mongolian delegation in the Committee on Disarmament expressed the view [424th meeting] that the General Assembly might specifically designate 1970, the year of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signature of the Protocol and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, as a commemorative and most appropriate occasion for all States which had not yet done so to accede to this important international instrument. This idea has met with support in the Committee on Disarmament and is reflected in its report submitted for consideration at the present session of the General Assembly.

53. Profiting by the occasion, we wish to express our appreciation to the delegations of the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Sweden and other countries which were so kind as to give their support to the idea of our proposal, both in the Committee on Disarmament and here in the General Assembly [1777th plenary meeting].

54. We are also gratified to note that our modest proposal gives concrete form to the important decision contained in the General Assembly resolution [2499 (XXIV)] concerning the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, which appeals to States:

"... to give urgent consideration to the ratification of, or accession to, a number of multilateral instruments which have been adopted, endorsed or supported by the United Nations ...".

The above-mentioned proposal is now reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/L.488, paragraph 2, which, *inter alia*,

"Urges all States which have not yet done so, to accede to, or ratify the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare in the course of 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth

<sup>8</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24.

anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.”

55. In this connexion, our delegation requests the members of this Committee to support the above-mentioned draft resolution which, together with other important provisions, proposes that the General Assembly approve the report of the experts as an authoritative document on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use.

56. At this point I should like to mention in passing that, judging by the statement of President Nixon on 25 November, the Government of the United States apparently will soon take steps concerning the ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to the strengthening of which we attach exceptionally important significance. We hope that other countries which have not yet acceded to this Protocol will respond positively to this timely call of the General Assembly.

57. The term “comprehensive observance . . . of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol” has another meaning besides that of accession to it by all States. This other significance is reflected in the recommendation of the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report, which urges the General Assembly:

“To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents) which now exist or which may be developed in the future.”

58. As we know, serious attempts are being made to exclude from the prohibitions of the Geneva Protocol the use of tear gases and other harassing agents. Those who hold that position assure us that these agents are humane methods since they do not kill a man, but simply reduce his capacity in the conduct of battle. The experts state, *inter alia*, that:

“ . . . when used in warfare they [*such agents*] would inevitably be employed as an adjunct to other forms of attack, and their over-all effect”.

I stress “their over-all effect”

“might be lethal.”<sup>9</sup>

59. Actually, although nerve-paralyzing gases and other powerful substances kill a man outright, these so-called harassing agents prepare his death. There are reliable reports that as a result of the use by the United States of chemical substances in the barbarous war against the Viet-Nameese people, thousands of children, women and old men have died, and the balance of the flora and fauna of entire areas of South Viet-Nam has been destroyed. These facts are the latest and most convincing proof that there is no justification for excluding harassing agents from the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol.

60. In this connexion our delegation has supported on principle the draft declaration [*A/7741-DC/232, annex C*,

*para. 6*] submitted by Sweden and eleven other States to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, aimed at the objective confirming the above-mentioned recommendation of the Secretary-General.

61. I should like now to turn to the most important recommendation of the Secretary-General where, in the introduction to his report, he urges the General Assembly

“To call upon all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons.”

62. Such a step on the part of the General Assembly would be of immense significance, especially in the light of the present situation, when a dangerous race for chemical and bacteriological weapons of mass destruction is developing.

63. Nine socialist States, including my own country, have submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly a draft convention [*A/7655*] on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their destruction. This initiative on the part of the socialist countries fully reflects the hopes of the peoples of the world for the elimination of this type of weapons of mass destruction.

64. I shall not speak at length here on the timeliness of the problem raised and the enormous importance of the draft convention which has been submitted. The representatives of the Polish People's Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic and other co-sponsors, in speaking on this matter, convincingly demonstrated the urgent need for the immediate conclusion of such a convention and clearly showed the considerable role it would play in strengthening peace and the security of peoples.

65. We should like only to stress once again that the above-mentioned draft convention rests on the principle of a common consideration of chemical and bacteriological means of waging war as a single, organically linked whole, a view which is justified from both a scientific and a political standpoint. The correctness of such an approach is further strengthened by historical experience.

66. It seems to us that it should be particularly emphasized that this draft reflects to the utmost degree all those important proposals and wishes which were expressed by the members of the Committee on Disarmament during the discussion there of the report on chemical and bacteriological weapons and the effects of their possible use. We should like to express our satisfaction that this draft convention on a comprehensive prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of waging war has found wide support among the other members of this Committee, as evidenced, in particular, by the statements of many of the representatives who have spoken in this debate.

67. Our delegation hopes that those countries which are sincerely interested in the removal of the threat of this most inhuman weapon of mass destruction will undertake active measures to work out, as soon as possible, a

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4.

corresponding convention on the basis of the draft submitted by nine countries.

68. A first important step in this direction would be achieved by full support of draft resolution A/C.1/L.487, which proposes that the General Assembly recommend to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that urgent talks be held to reach agreement on the text of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of those weapons.

69. Our delegation calls upon the members of this Committee to unanimously support that draft resolution.

70. Our delegation has set forth in broad outline its position on some of the most urgent problems of disarmament. We hope that during the consideration of the documents submitted we shall have the opportunity of speaking more concretely on these and other aspects of the agenda items before us.

71. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the next speaker may I, with the permission of the Committee, refer to the questions raised by the representative of Brazil at the 1697th meeting on 24 November. In that connexion I should like to make the following statement. The joint draft treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed is formally before the First Committee in annex A to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232]<sup>10</sup> of which this Committee is seized. The joint draft text is not, however, a proposal *per se*, nor is it the subject of any formal proposal yet introduced in the First Committee.

72. Since the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of which the draft treaty is an annex is formally before the Committee, all members of the Committee are free to make comments on the draft treaty. Those comments may contain suggestions or proposals affecting the draft treaty. I also believe that it would be in order for any delegation to submit suggestions or proposals in writing in any appropriate form such as a working paper. For their part, the two authors of the draft treaty should find no impediment in this procedure in taking the suggestions and proposals into account, even in advance of formally presenting their joint draft treaty, in order that the process of negotiation may be initiated without delay.

73. If a draft resolution commending the draft treaty or seeking the approval of the General Assembly for its text is submitted in the Committee formally, the Committee can of course deal with that in accordance with the rules of procedure or, being master of its own procedure, may decide to deal with such a draft resolution in such manner as it deems fit. In this connexion it will be recalled that in the case of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons a draft resolution eventually co-sponsored by forty-eight members was before the Committee and, in keeping with the rules, subject to formal amendment at any time. The draft non-proliferation Treaty which that resolution commended was revised in order to take account of

views expressed in the Committee's debate, and therefore attached to the draft resolution.

74. Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your response to the points I raised. I understand from your words that, although the draft treaty is formally presented to the General Assembly, it is not open—at least at the present time—to formal amendment or, in other words, that no formal amendment can be moved to the draft treaty. I wish to register this fact and to ask you that it be put on the record. However, as it involves an important question of principle which has a bearing on the very function of the Committees of the General Assembly and of the General Assembly itself, I must reserve the right of my delegation to revert later to the examination of a procedural matter which involves a departure from the usual norms of deliberation in the Committees of the General Assembly.

75. Mr. SINN (Sudan): Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it is in order to ask for the statement just delivered by you to be circulated to the members of this Committee.

76. The CHAIRMAN: The statement I have just made will be in the verbatim record which will be available tomorrow morning. However, if it is the desire of the representative of the Sudan that it should be circulated separately, then that will be done.

77. Mr. SINN (Sudan): I do not insist on that.

78. The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We shall now resume consideration of the disarmament items.

79. Mr. SCOTT (New Zealand): At the outset of my intervention I should like, on behalf of the Government and people of New Zealand, to offer our warmest congratulations to the Government and people of the United States on the resounding success of the Apollo 12 space mission. To our mind this second journey to the moon, no less incredible than the first, and the courage of the men who made it, brilliantly reflect the pioneering spirit, the skill and tenacity of purpose of a great people. For the whole of mankind it must stand as a symbol of triumph of the human spirit and of man's unconquerable will from which we may all take heart.

80. As we were reminded recently, it is just over one hundred years since the representatives of the international community met at Saint Petersburg to try to put an end to the all-too-ready willingness of nations to resort to force of arms to settle the inevitable disputes which from time to time arise among them. Since that date history has recorded a whole series of attempts to bring about the same goal, and the record has been one marked by failure. Twice in this century we have endured the horrifying reality of world wars and the bitter years of healing reconstruction and repair that inevitably follow. Few countries in this century have been spared the destruction of lesser conflicts. This long record of failure would seem to offer little hope for the future. Indeed, there are those of a misanthropic turn of mind who, looking to history, deny that general and complete disarmament, as we now describe our total objective, can ever be attained. Yet that is the goal to which all men must aspire unless they are prepared to deny their

<sup>10</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.



humanity. However much we may be tempted to be pessimistic because of the gloomy light from the past, we can take heart from the fact that in the last two decades there has been a growing awareness on the part of all nations that we are close now to the point of no return and that we simply must limit the spread of these armaments which have the capability to destroy us all. One hundred years ago disarmament was considered necessary to secure peace in the world; today it is essential to ensure man's survival.

*Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

81. The threat of a nuclear holocaust has vastly increased the recognition of our danger and the dimensions of the disarmament problem. It has also led to more positive steps to solve it. We now have a partial test ban Treaty;<sup>11</sup> nuclear weapons have been banned from outer space;<sup>12</sup> a treaty has been established to limit the spread of nuclear weapons;<sup>13</sup> thanks to the foresight and co-operative spirit of the countries of Latin America, there has, by the Treaty of Tlatelolco,<sup>14</sup> been established the first nuclear-free zone; and most recently representatives of the two greatest Powers in the world have begun meetings to discuss the possibility of the limitation of their respective nuclear arsenals.

82. New Zealand welcomes the initiative taken by the countries of Latin America; it is a conception that, as time and circumstances allow, we would hope to see emulated elsewhere in the world. Together with all Members of the United Nations we also welcome the decision of the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to enter upon strategic arms limitation talks. We recognize that the negotiations will be lengthy and we hope they will be pursued purposefully and without the distraction of the introduction of extraneous issues. We have been heartened by the evidence offered so far of the positive spirit displayed by both sides in taking up the difficult and burdensome task which lies before them. The opening of the talks in Helsinki can, we believe, well be described as a small step for man in the field of disarmament. We share the hope of all around these tables that their conclusion will prove a giant step for all mankind.

83. I have mentioned some of the steps this Organization has taken towards disarmament. My delegation greatly regrets that there are still those Member States which linger by the wayside. There are still those that continue to ignore the provisions of the test ban Treaty of 1963. By conducting tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere they are acting in opposition to a universal trend, they are failing to respond to the clearly expressed will of the international community, and they are showing little concern for the dangers such activities hold for the rest of the world. Once again we are obliged to address a most urgent plea to these non-signatories to the Treaty that continue to conduct, or

plan to carry out tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. We call on them to desist and to harken to the wishes of the vast majority of mankind.

84. New Zealand has from the beginning been a firm adherent to the principles and purposes of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which we regard as a major advance towards the halting of what has come to be known as the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. As my Prime Minister stated in the course of his address to the General Assembly [1757th plenary meeting], New Zealand deposited its instrument of ratification of that Treaty at Washington in September.

85. In view of the importance which the New Zealand Government attaches to this most valuable international instrument, it has been a matter of concern to us that the reluctance of a number of Governments to ratify the Treaty has so far prevented its coming into force. We were therefore gratified to learn that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany intends to take action on the non-proliferation Treaty in the near future and we were greatly heartened by the announcement made two days ago that the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union have signed their instruments of ratification. It is our most earnest hope that, as a result of this action, those countries which have not yet ratified the non-proliferation Treaty—and we have in mind especially those which already have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons or are on the threshold of achieving that capacity—will follow the example set by the two super-Powers. We hope that they will do so without delay and so help to bring the Treaty into force at the earliest opportunity.

86. The Government of New Zealand has strongly and consistently supported the goal of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty. The prospects for a ban on the underground testing of nuclear weapons which would complement the already existing prohibition of testing of such weapons in the atmosphere have been impeded by what has been felt to be the inadequacy of currently existing techniques of verification. We would agree with the distinguished and experienced representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, that strict verification, preferably by means of on-site inspections by an international agency, is the essential concomitant of any armaments limitation agreement if it is to be effective. We would suggest that it is necessary to review periodically the question whether the risks involved in an agreement, without verification or with only limited verification, are in certain cases less than the risks of failure to achieve any agreement. To our mind the question of a ban on underground testing is such a case. By means of present verification techniques it is possible to determine the occurrence of underground nuclear explosions which register a level greater than 4.75 on the Richter scale. We fully acknowledge that there exist nuclear devices which can be used effectively for military purposes but the explosion of which underground registers less than this level. However, would not the attainment of a ban on underground nuclear tests registering more than 4.75 be a useful step forward towards a more comprehensive ban on underground testing? Is that not particularly so since there appears to be ample evidence to suggest that the rapid advances currently being made in verification techniques would permit this level to be lowered progressively within a

<sup>11</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

<sup>12</sup> Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

<sup>13</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

<sup>14</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

relatively short space of time, even in the absence of agreed on-site inspection?

87. We therefore strongly support the Canadian proposal for the exchange of seismic data [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, sect. 15]. Such an international exchange would make a valuable contribution to the early refinement of verification techniques to which I have just referred. New Zealand, country subject to earthquakes, has considerable experience in the field of seismology and would be prepared to use these resources to make available to the central data processing agency, envisaged in the proposal, such seismic data information as might be necessary to serve the purposes proposed.

88. As the representative of the Netherlands has pointed out [1699th meeting], there is obviously a clear relationship between the establishment of agreed procedures for the international exchange of seismic data information and the final conclusion of a ban on the underground testing of nuclear weapons. In my delegation's view, an agreement on seismic data exchange would establish a most useful basis on which further progress could be made towards this essential goal.

89. If a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty were finally agreed to, it would, of course, need to contain some provision relating to the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. New Zealand at this stage has little interest itself in obtaining access to nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, but it recognizes that there may well be considerable economic potential in the development of peaceful nuclear explosion technology. We believe that as nuclear devices for peaceful use cannot readily be distinguished from nuclear weapons, it is necessary that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be subject to some form of control within a comprehensive test-ban treaty, either under an international agreement or pursuant to the bilateral option recognized in the non-proliferation Treaty.

90. Regarding the proposed draft treaty concerning prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed [A/7741-DC/232, annex A], the New Zealand delegation considers that, while not a measure of disarmament it does represent a useful step in the direction of a comprehensive ban. At this stage of our deliberations, however, we would not wish to offer any detailed or specific comments on its provisions but would like to reserve those for such time as the treaty itself is under discussion. In the meantime we must admit that we share a number of the doubts expressed by other delegations about those provisions of the draft treaty dealing with verification—specifically draft article III.

91. We therefore strongly support the kind of changes proposed by the Canadian delegation which are designed to strengthen those provisions. We hope that some concrete expression in textual form can be given to the comments on that article which have been made in this Committee or in discussions among interested delegations. We do not, incidentally, consider that the same situation exists in the case of this treaty as it does in regard to a ban on underground testing. So far as the latter is concerned, the New Zealand delegation believes, as I indicated earlier, that the balance of advantage lies with securing an agreement,

despite the difficulties that lie in the way of verification. Underground tests are still continuing and are making a direct contribution to the acceleration of the arms race.

92. As far as we understand there has never been, presumably because of the technical difficulties involved, an effort to implant armaments on the deep sea-bed. We hope there is little likelihood that attempts will be made to do so in the near future. Moreover, the fact that so much progress has been made towards the completion of a treaty on sea-bed armaments limitation, and so little towards the attainment of a ban on underground testing, is in itself an argument both for the adoption of a less urgent approach to the former and more urgent attention to the latter. We would, nevertheless, express satisfaction at the submission by the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of the joint draft treaty on the demilitarization of the sea-bed. We believe that it will be appropriate for this Assembly to commend that development, and entrust the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with the task of elaborating and completing the draft treaty by the addition of satisfactory proposals for verification.

93. The overriding importance which Members of the United Nations attach—and, in my delegation's view, rightly so—to the problem of nuclear disarmament is reflected both in the number of items relating to it on our agenda and the lengthy deliberations we devote to them. In recent years, however, more and more attention is being devoted to the development of equally terrifying instruments of mass destruction—chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The abhorrence with which such weapons have been viewed by the international community has given rise to a series of attempts to secure total prohibition of their use, most notably by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This has proved to be a useful international instrument, but technological developments over the past two decades, particularly in the field of bacteriological weaponry, have rendered it incomplete in a number of respects. The New Zealand delegation, however, does not share the view expressed by some delegations that, in view of those inadequacies, the Geneva Protocol should be discarded. It continues to provide a basis of international agreement in regard to the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapon agents and we would urge all those Governments which have not yet done so to ratify it. Therefore, it was with great satisfaction that we learned yesterday of the announcement by the President of the United States that he intended to seek Congressional approval for the United States to become a party to the Protocol, and we earnestly hope that other Governments will seek an early opportunity to follow that example. We also warmly welcome Mr. Nixon's decision that the United States should renounce the use of all methods of biological warfare and should restrict its biological research to defensive measures.

94. Disarmament, like politics, demands that we distinguish realistically between what can and what cannot be achieved. It is for that reason that we believe that the Geneva Protocol, which has achieved a wide measure of international acceptance, should not be discarded lightly, particularly when it is clear that there is a wide divergence of views within the international community as to the form and substance of any instrument which might replace it. We would therefore tend to favour the essentially realistic and

pragmatic approach towards the problem of chemical and biological warfare suggested by the representative of the United Kingdom [*ibid.*, sect. 20], with which the United States has now associated itself rather than the all or nothing approach advocated by the Soviet Union and some other delegations [A/7655]. Indeed, my delegation has been a little surprised by the relatively limited interest displayed during our debates in the proposal advanced by the delegation of the United Kingdom. It appears to us to represent a positive and purposeful approach to this urgent and pressing problem and one which deserves the same careful and detailed consideration that has gone into its drafting. The problem of adding to the original substance of the Geneva Protocol obviously needs further discussion. Whatever is done should surely not risk impairing the 1925 Geneva Protocol and should not risk creating confusion or doubt as to the state of international law on this general subject.

95. In that connexion, the report to the Secretary-General of the group of experts established to study the whole question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons<sup>15</sup> would seem to provide a most useful starting point for further discussion in Geneva of the problems associated with the establishment of an effective prohibition on the use and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons. That report is an admirably lucid and objective document which we believe deserves the widest possible circulation. All those responsible for its preparation deserve the highest commendation.

96. As I suggested earlier, the question of nuclear disarmament is, and must be, our major preoccupation. At the same time it would be unwise to forget that we ultimately seek disarmament that is general and complete. That must, of course, include conventional weapons. My delegation has been greatly disturbed by the figures appearing in such publications as those of the Institute of Strategic Studies and in the *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968-1969*<sup>16</sup> issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which point to the massive increase over recent years in the trade in conventional arms. The Secretary-General has also drawn that to public notice. We fully recognize that the Committee in Geneva is already facing a workload of considerable proportions, but it occurs to us that the time may well be very near when it cannot fail to devote attention to the problem presented by the rapid acceleration of the conventional arms race.

97. In the course of my intervention I have touched briefly on the main points in the four items under discussion which are of concern to my delegation. New Zealand is a small country which does not possess nuclear weapons and has neither the intention nor the capability to possess them. It nevertheless shares to the full the concern of all Members of the United Nations who desire, in the words of a distinguished British statesman of the nineteenth century, "to put an end to these bloated armaments", and will continue to support most strongly all efforts, both

within this Organization and elsewhere, which will hasten ultimate attainment of that goal.

98. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): A decade has elapsed since the resolution [1378 (XIV)] for general and complete disarmament was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1959.

99. We are about to enter the decade of the 1970s. At this critical passage from one decade to the other, we should perhaps take a more sober look at the road traversed. What distance have we covered towards the objective of improving international security through disarmament, or reducing the nuclear threat?

100. To all intents and purposes that threat has vastly increased rather than diminished during this decade, notwithstanding laborious efforts in disarmament conferences and committees. True, there have been important agreements to prevent the nuclear arms race from spreading to outer space, under water or to Antarctica, but those are peripheral achievements leaving the core of the problem wholly untouched.

101. The partial test ban Treaty has been a most significant step towards checking the serious danger to human life from the contamination of the environment through atomic radiation. But as a disarmament measure towards halting or limiting the arms race it has been of little value as it did not restrain or lessen the underground nuclear tests, which have since greatly increased in number and effectiveness.

102. While we have thus been slowly moving in the area of disarmament, practically nothing has been done in the past decade to stop or limit the arms race where it is actually being conducted with increasing momentum. It is there that the actual, as distinct from the potential, danger lies.

103. The testing and development of new and more formidable weapons of mass destruction have been accelerated in an ever-escalating arms race. Carried, perhaps inevitably, by the momentum of a sophisticated competition in nuclear weapons perfection, whether towards attaining superiority or towards retaining a balance, the nuclear Powers have been unable in the past decade to make any progress towards arranging between them a halt to this frenetic arms race. Yet all along the reality has been that, independently of any quantitative superiority in nuclear weapons, there is such overkill capacity in each of them as to render wholly unnecessary any increase in nuclear stockpiles for the purpose of averting a war by deterrence.

104. It has been, however, towards qualitative superiority or retention of balance through the development of new weapons that the main thrust of the arms race has been directed. Thus within the last decade, while the disarmament efforts have hardly marked any progress, the arms race has gone spiralling up in tests and in deployment of more perfected weapons, leaping to outstanding heights of expenditure. It is estimated that the world military expenditure has gone up by nearly 30 per cent during the last three years, which is an unprecedented rate of increase and is comparable to that which preceded the outbreak of the First World War. It should be mentioned that in the smaller

<sup>15</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

<sup>16</sup> Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell; New York, Humanities Press; London, Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.

States also there has been a disproportionate increase in military expenditure.

105. Now, the world is faced with the terrifying prospect of the development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) that is, of multiple warhead missiles. As is well known, if a sufficient degree of accuracy is attained in such weapons, a single missile shot could have the capability of destroying not just one but many, and perhaps all, of the land-based missiles of the adversary.

106. Our precarious peace is supposed to be, temporarily at least, resting on a balance of terror, on the assumption that in case of a nuclear attack there is the capability of nuclear retaliation by a second strike, serving as a restraint for such an attack. That has been the reason put forward so far for the policy of a balance of power through competitive nuclear armaments development.

107. But if now by continued testing of MIRVs either side or even both reach the requisite accuracy to destroy by multiple warheads all the land-based missiles of the adversary on a first strike, the possibility of a second or retaliatory strike diminishes to a substantial degree. The chances, therefore, that any crisis might lead to a disaster would be greatly increased. That would perhaps be inevitable in a situation in which each side believed that the way out was by a surprise attack. As a result, the concept of balance of power becomes meaningless, because, by the development of MIRV weapons, a premium is placed on the first striker, and that is a consideration that has to be taken into account.

108. We may now be at the threshold of very grave developments, if MIRV tests continue. As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute *Yearbook* for 1969 points out:

“... once these warheads are operational, a simple ban on their production or deployment would be extremely difficult if not impossible to verify. Multiple warheads could be fitted to existing missiles without changing their appearance; and it would be impossible, by satellite reconnaissance or indeed by simple visual inspection from the ground, to determine how many warheads a missile contained. Any arms control agreement banning deployment of multiple warheads would probably require inspection of the inside of the missile. It is unlikely that either the United States or the Soviet Union would agree to this.”<sup>17</sup>

109. The announcement therefore of the strategic arms limitation talks at Helsinki, between the United States and the Soviet Union, has brought a sense of relief to the peoples of the world and aroused hopes that a determined effort may be under way to stop an arms race that has now become an unprecedented threat because of recent technological developments. The Helsinki talks have perhaps come just in time, before it is too late to prevent a course which might prove irreversible. Meanwhile, if MIRV tests continue and efforts proceed towards the deployment of these

weapons, the very purpose of the Helsinki Conference will be defeated.

110. By continued testing in development of MIRVs the situation regarding those weapons would be in flux, liable to change from moment to moment. It is highly questionable whether agreement on the limitation of armaments is at all possible without stopping the development of multiple warhead missiles. It seems to us to be a necessary corollary of the Helsinki talks that, pending their outcome, there should be an agreed halt of MIRV testing, and indeed a moratorium on all aspects of the arms race.

111. We hope, therefore, that earnest consideration may be given by the United States and the Soviet Union to the appeal of the Secretary-General, contained in the introduction to his annual report for 1969, in which he asks that the nuclear Powers stop “all further work on the development of new offensive and defensive strategic systems, whether by agreement or by a unilateral moratorium declared by both sides”.<sup>18</sup>

112. That appeal is as important as it is timely, for the whole success or failure of the Helsinki talks may turn upon the status of MIRV testing. Agreement on the suspension of MIRV tests is, therefore, a compelling necessity if there is going to be any progress towards strategic arms limitation. Once MIRVs are developed there can be no hope of agreement on the limitation of land missiles, considering that neither side would be able to verify the number of warheads on each missile.

113. The cessation of underground tests, which is a long-standing problem of disarmament, is closely linked to the halting of strategic nuclear weapons development and to the relevant moratorium. All the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament acknowledged the importance of the cessation of these tests for the termination of the qualitative nuclear arms race and the deployment of MIRVs. The urgent need for the suspension of underground testing was emphasized and given priority as early as in 1965, in the resolution of the Disarmament Commission and in the General Assembly resolutions of the three consecutive years 1966, 1967 and 1968.

114. Scientific progress in seismic detection and verification has by now reached the stage at which it is possible to distinguish both large and medium-sized explosions from earthquakes. From the technical point of view, therefore, there would hardly seem to be any real difficulty in concluding a treaty prohibiting explosions of those sizes, which are the ones that really matter.

115. What is needed for agreement on such a treaty is the political determination by both sides to desist from further efforts to perfect nuclear weapons, particularly with regard to the reality of the dangers involved in that process. Through an excess in the development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons a point has now been reached when fear of them will no longer act as an element of restraint, but rather as an incentive to attack. It is to be hoped that the Helsinki talks will take a broader and deeper look at the

<sup>17</sup> SIPRI *Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968-1969* (Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell; New York, Humanities Press; London Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.), p. 190.

<sup>18</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 30.



whole problem of disarmament and will open a new period of more imaginative and constructive work towards reaching agreement on all the basic aspects of disarmament.

116. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation of the agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on a draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed [A/7741-DC/232,<sup>19</sup> annex A]. This is an important and timely step, taken with a due sense of urgency, towards preventing the spread of the nuclear arms race to the new and vast frontier of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, now thrown open to exploration and exploitation through the gigantic progress of technology. This agreement has been reached without delay and with a realistic sense of urgency and expedition to which we have not been accustomed. It was a purposeful and therefore brief and effective negotiation yielding results, and we deeply appreciate the speed with which those results were achieved.

117. At the same time, we cannot help but express our regret that it is not a comprehensive treaty, covering conventional weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction. We note, however, in the preamble of the treaty the expression of determination by the parties to continue negotiating, with a view to excluding the arms race from the sea-bed and the ocean floor. We therefore express the hope that this will be done expeditiously and effectively so as to also facilitate the task of the Sea-Bed Committee, considering that the area which is to come under a prospective international régime for the benefit of mankind will have to be completely demilitarized and free of all weapons or their installations. In this respect we are in favour of the amendment proposed by the Swedish delegation at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [ibid., annex C, sect. 36].

118. Consideration should also be given to the aspect of verification with a view to rendering it more meaningful and practically effective. Relevant formulations such as those proposed by the Canadian delegation [ibid., sect. 35] might be considered.

119. However, as I said, we are fully conscious and appreciative of the great merit of this treaty, so swiftly achieved as is necessary in these times of rapid developments.

120. Given the constructive spirit in which the relevant negotiations have been held, we are certain that not only can the present differences be resolved, but that the Assembly can confidently expect speedy progress in the achievement of a comprehensive treaty.

121. My delegation notes with appreciation and welcomes the suggestion of the Secretary-General that the decade beginning in 1970 might be designated as a "Disarmament Decade".<sup>20</sup> It seems to us that this is both propitious and appropriate, falling as it does both on the twenty-fifth

anniversary of the United Nations and on the opening of the Second United Nations Development Decade. The relationship between disarmament and development is so well understood that there is no need to repeat it here.

122. The fact is that the first quarter of a century of the United Nations life has passed not only without any progress towards an enduring peace as envisioned in the Charter, but also without any steps towards halting or even diminishing the arms race. Furthermore, a more disturbing fact is that in the last decade since the unanimous adoption in 1959 of the resolution [1378 (XIV)] on general and complete disarmament, introduced by the Soviet Union, the arms race has rapidly escalated into new and gravely threatening areas of technological development of nuclear weapons. Thus it is imperative that every emphasis be given to achieving arms control and disarmament before technology places the machinery of nuclear weapons beyond human control. It should be remembered that the Secretary-General, in a statement he made a little while ago, emphasized that within the next decade, if nothing is accomplished in this respect, there will be no more possibilities of achieving results.

123. We believe it is the ardent wish of all nations and peoples that the Helsinki talks in their constructive progress may mark the beginning of a fruitful Disarmament Decade. We also note the Secretary-General's suggestion that the General Assembly might undertake to establish a: "specific programme and time-table for dealing with all aspects of the problem of arms control and disarmament".<sup>21</sup>

124. We hope that the Assembly will find it possible to accept this challenge in order to provide assistance and guidance to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and to demonstrate the new sense of urgency which is felt around the world in this matter.

125. Since we have long been concerned with this crucial world problem and have consistently urged that every feasible step be taken to accelerate progress towards an international security and a peaceful world, my delegation is willing to co-operate with other delegations in co-sponsoring a draft resolution which would take note of the proposal of the Secretary-General to declare that the decade of the 1970s be designated a Disarmament Decade.

126. Another aspect of disarmament that calls for effective action is that of chemical and biological weapons. It is inconceivable that in our present stage of civilization, and in a presumably humane world society which is devoting such consistent efforts in the United Nations and through the World Health Organization to help mankind against disease, we are at the same time accumulating and developing enormous quantities of the most virulent microbes for the purposes of using them against the people of other nations, with incalculable and uncontrollable effects on the human environment, life and health. As far back as Homeric times, during the Trojan War, Ilus was condemned and outcast for proposing the use of poison at the points of arrows. Such conduct was considered highly unethical and unworthy of a warrior.

<sup>19</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

<sup>20</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A, paras. 41-46.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., para. 42.



127. My delegation, therefore, welcomes as timely and of the utmost significance the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use.<sup>22</sup> We support in particular the recommendations in the Secretary-General's introduction to that report addressed to the Members of the United Nations. In our view, these recommendations define clearly the work that is before us in this field, and we commend them to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. While we realize that the task is a difficult one, there is much reason for gratification at the fact that this question is being given new and urgent attention.

128. We note the draft declaration brought forward by twelve of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament regarding prohibition of the use of chemical and biological methods of warfare [*A/7741-DC/232, annex C, sect. 30*]. We would urge that this subject become a major focus for the work of that body during the next year, with the hope that, by the time of the twenty-fifth anniversary session of the General Assembly, a treaty prohibiting the manufacture, stockpiling and use of these weapons may be open for signature.

129. In this connexion, it is our pleasant duty to welcome with a sense of gratification and appreciation President Nixon's statement of yesterday on behalf of the United States, renouncing the use of biological agents and weapons and directing the disposal of existing stocks of such weapons. The President's statement in reaffirming the United States renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons extends such renunciation also to incapacitating chemical weapons. We hope that such renunciation of incapacitating chemicals may include the use of tear gas, having regard to the inhuman purposes for which tear gas may be used in warfare. Furthermore, the announcement by President Nixon that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 will be submitted to the Senate for ratification is a welcome and encouraging move in the right direction.

130. The draft treaty submitted by the United Kingdom [*ibid., sect. 20*] on the prohibition of bacteriological agents contains many valuable provisions on control which should be given due consideration and study. We also note the draft resolution on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons submitted by the socialist countries [*A/C.1/L.487*], to which my delegation will also give consideration. I reserve my delegation's position on the said draft resolutions and other draft resolutions presented.

131. Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation has already had an opportunity to deal in detail with the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare which is included in the agenda of our Committee. On this occasion I wish to take up other questions of disarmament. I shall be brief, since my delegation had the occasion to state its position and formulate its proposals regarding the particular issues at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

132. First of all, I should like to join those who, besides pointing to the growing dangers of the continuation of the

arms race and the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, have emphasized in their statements that at present there are also favourable conditions and possibilities for the reduction of the arms race and the danger of a nuclear war, and for progress towards disarmament. Let me refer in this connexion to such recent very important events as the opening of strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States in Helsinki, the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States. We also learned recently of the announcement by the President of the United States of the forthcoming ratification by the United States of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, whose full implementation has long been awaited by all peoples of the world.

133. My delegation shares the opinion of those who think that disarmament talks must concentrate on questions on which the best chances exist for progress and agreement under the given conditions and circumstances. That is borne out also by the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*A/7741-DC/232*],<sup>23</sup> which shows that that Committee has devoted most of its activities this year to the questions of the non-militarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The effectiveness and usefulness of this kind of approach to disarmament problems can be seen from the fact that we have before us a number of significant drafts aimed at the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons or of only biological weapons, as well as a draft treaty submitted by the two Co-Chairmen of the Disarmament Conference, on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid., annex A*].

134. The Hungarian delegation considers it important and urgent to take measures to prevent the sea-bed and the ocean floor from being used for the purposes of the arms race. It thinks that the draft treaty in question, which provides for the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, is a very important step towards the exclusion of that environment from the arms race. The fact that the draft treaty provides for arms limitation rather than for disarmament does not lessen its significance, since it excludes about two-thirds of the total area of the globe from the nuclear arms race and may thus create new and more favourable conditions for the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor in the interests of all mankind.

135. At the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Hungarian delegation pronounced itself in favour of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes, and I emphasized that

“The fact that the Hungarian People's Republic is a land-locked country does not at all minimize my Government's interest in and concern over this problem. The use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor might threaten both the countries having sea-shores and the land-locked countries alike. My country, therefore,

<sup>22</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

<sup>23</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

wishes to be freed from the possible consequences of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor just like any coastal State. On the other hand, in the framework of international co-operation, my country would also like to share the benefits deriving from the exploration and the exploitation of the depths of the oceans" [ENDC/PV.430, para. 60].

136. Consequently, my delegation regards the proposed draft treaty, which is considerably better than the first joint draft was, as a first important step towards the total demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. From this position of principle, the Hungarian delegation considers that it is necessary for the efforts directed towards that aim to be duly stressed in the treaty. It states with satisfaction that article III of the preamble of the draft treaty confirms the determination of States to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to that end.

137. The Hungarian delegation supports the draft treaty submitted by the two Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, sect. 34] and expresses the hope that, as the result of the present debate and consultations, the overwhelming majority of our Committee will be able to agree on a text of the draft. The earliest possible conclusion and entry into force of the treaty would be a considerable contribution to the reduction of the arms race and to the strengthening of international peace and security.

138. The Hungarian delegation is of the opinion that the suspension of underground nuclear-weapon tests is an important and urgent problem which is ripe for solution.

139. After the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and under Water, hope arose in world public opinion for an early agreement on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests conducted underground, and, thereby, for the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. That hope was well-grounded indeed, all the more so as the Treaty contains provisions for attaining a comprehensive test ban.

140. Unhappily, however, that hope has not materialized. Underground nuclear tests are conducted on a large scale and constitute one of the most important factors of the nuclear arms race. It is estimated that since 1963, when the Treaty was concluded, the number of nuclear explosions has been growing rather than decreasing.

141. The reasons for the present situation regarding the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests are well known to the members of this Committee. The insistence of some Western Powers upon on-site inspection at a time when the high degree of technical development makes it impossible to carry out nuclear explosions without detection, leaves doubt as to whether they are really willing to agree on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The Hungarian delegation holds the view that the solution of the problem is a matter of policy decision rather than of inspection methods, and it thinks that the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests can be adequately controlled by national seismological means.

142. I do not intend by this to underestimate the technical aspects of the question, which I think may play a certain part in the solution of the problem.

143. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, an international exchange of seismological data on a voluntary basis may possibly promote the prohibition of underground nuclear tests under national control. When expressing its willingness to co-operate in such an exchange, the Hungarian delegation stresses that this possibility must be given to every State that declares its readiness to take part in that international exchange. Finally, my delegation is of the view that the evaluation of data should be left to the particular States, and that, consequently, there is no need to establish a special international centre for seismological data evaluation.

144. My delegation is considering with due attention the draft resolutions relating to the agenda item entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" and reserves the right to expound its position again, if it deems it necessary, when they are under discussion.

145. In concluding my delegation's remarks concerning the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests, I should like to express our hope that the progress of the strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki between the Soviet Union and the United States will further aid the solution of this question, bringing closer the realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

146. The Hungarian delegation is pleased to learn that on 24 November the Soviet Union and the United States ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It regards that as the most important step taken towards the earliest possible entry into force of that Treaty. I should like to express my hope that the ratification by the Soviet Union and the United States will prompt those States that have not yet done so to sign or ratify the Treaty.

147. The entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons creates favourable conditions for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Being a country poor in power resources, the Hungarian People's Republic, which was among the first to sign and ratify the non-proliferation treaty, is highly interested in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. That is why it follows with attention every action relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to international co-operation in that field.

148. In that connexion, I should like to explain the opinions of my delegation regarding the question of establishing an international service for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. My delegation is of the opinion that the International Atomic Agency, by its statute, structure and experience, is the appropriate organization to be concerned with the utilization for peaceful purposes of nuclear explosions, under article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Consequently, we hold the view that under the given

conditions and circumstances there is no need to establish a special international service.

149. In conclusion, I should like to express our opinion that every realistic means must be employed in the interests of progress in the field of disarmament. Such possibilities are provided not only by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly, but also by bilateral negotiations, the most important of

which are taking place in Helsinki right now, and by multilateral negotiations. We think that concerted efforts are needed to achieve the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. An essential condition of progress in the field of disarmament is that all States take part in the efforts to attain the ultimate goal—general and complete disarmament.

*The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.*