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GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. SHARIF (Indonesia) Each of the seven items relating to disarmament which are now under our consideration in this Committee is no doubt of the utmost importance in our over-all efforts to achieve our common goals under the Charter.

2. The question of disarmament in the United Nations is as old as the Charter itself. With the cruelties, horrors and destruction of the war which was still raging at the time, the founders of the United Nations gave expression to their resolute will to preserve future generations from the scourge of war by stipulating in Articles 11, 26 and 47 of the Charter that active efforts should be made to establish a system for the regulation of armaments and for disarmament.

3. Under Article 11 the Assembly is to "...consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments ...".

4. Article 26 enjoins the Security Council to be "responsible for formulating ... plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments".

5. Article 47 states that the Military Staff Committee is "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament".

6. The good intentions of the authors of the Charter have not been implemented, however. We have never received or discussed a plan emanating from the Security Council for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments or disarmament as envisaged in Article 26. Neither were there any reports known to have been

received from the Military Staff Committee on the regulation of armaments or possible disarmament. The only activities of which we are aware in this all-important assignment under the Charter are, apparently, no more than our annual routine discussions in this Committee on the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, even though we are still far from the consideration of "principles governing disarmament" and the establishment of a system for "the regulation of armaments", as stated in Article 11, and from the question of general and complete disarmament under strict international control, which our initial assignment has developed into, for some reason or other.

7. During the debates on the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security at the end of last month, my delegation had occasion at the 1807th meeting to emphasize the need to intensify our efforts in the field of disarmament, together with development and decolonization, in order to strengthen the United Nations and to achieve thereby our common growth under the Charter in strengthening international security. I explained the shortcomings of our efforts towards disarmament as compared to our achievements concerning development and decolonization.

8. We have a programme for the Second United Nations Development Decade, with the Economic and Social Council and its Committee for Review and Appraisal as the machinery for its implementation. We have been able to develop our national struggle for independence into a regional policy of the African and Asian countries "to bring colonialism to an end in all its forms and manifestations", according to the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Nations in 1955, and since the adoption of resolution 1514 (XV) decolonization has been made the official policy of the United Nations. During the twenty-fifth anniversary session last year we adopted, in resolution 2621 (XXV), a programme of action for decolonization and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is the accepted machinery for its implementation.

9. Although both the organization and work of the two existing organs can still be improved in order to achieve the best possible results, we are more or less assured of proper implementation of the Declaration and the programme on development and decolonization. The same cannot indeed be said of disarmament since, in this field, 26 years after the establishment of the United Nations, we have neither a programme nor machinery of equal standing.

10. For a good many years the problem of establishing adequate machinery has bedevilled the United Nations. By its first resolution in 1946 the General Assembly established the 12-nation Atomic Energy Commission, testifying to its preoccupation with the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A Commission on Conventional Armaments was established in 1947 to complement the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. In 1952, in a further step towards reorganization, the Assembly dissolved both these Commissions and merged their functions in a single Disarmament Commission. Dissatisfaction with the membership of the Disarmament Commission prompted the expansion of its

membership in 1958, first to 25, and later to encompass all Member States. In 1959, on the initiative of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, a Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament came into being, which met for the first time in 1960, but failed to continue its functions. By the grace of the two super-Powers, on the basis of the United States-Soviet Union joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of 20 September 1961,¹ the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was set up three months later. This Committee met for the first time in Geneva in 1962, and in 1970 its membership was increased and became the present Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, consisting nominally of 26 members, with France absent and another permanent member of the Security Council, China, excluded from membership.

11. These organizational manoeuvres and shufflings were symptomatic of the inability of nations, especially the great military Powers, to put aside their mutual suspicions and competitive approaches to disarmament which obstructed progress. The disarmament negotiations in the period from 1945 to 1962 owed their failure to the incipient hostilities of the cold war and the general political atmosphere of the times which, in the 1960s, was epitomized by the conflicting positions on Chinese representation in the United Nations.

12. During the past years my delegation has proposed improvements in our work. Last year I mentioned three ways that are open to us in order to accelerate our task: first, we can plan a world disarmament conference; secondly, we can reactivate the Disarmament Commission established by resolution 1252 (XIII) of 4 December 1958 — consisting of all Member States which can include in their respective delegations military and other technical experts, as well as political representatives, the Commission can organize its work through working groups and sub-committees so as to accelerate the completion of the disarmament programmes; thirdly, we can transform the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and elevate its status from the present negotiating Committee to a full-fledged new Disarmament Commission replacing the now defunct Commission.

13. The present number and composition of the membership seem to meet with the satisfaction of all Member States. The members of the new Disarmament Commission, however, should be elected for a fixed term of office in accordance with the representative character of all major organs of the United Nations. We believe that new members may bring a new atmosphere and new ideas for discussion.

14. It is in the context of our efforts to accelerate our work in this field of disarmament that my delegation also supports and welcomes the initiative of the Soviet Union in proposing a conference of all nuclear Powers, which initiative was followed subsequently by a proposal to hold a world disarmament conference that is now under discussion in the General Assembly. We must improve the organization of our work in order to attain better results. We should not work by piecemeal methods, but should attach to our task

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/8479.

on disarmament the seriousness which, under the Charter, is commensurate with the importance which we attach to that question, instead of inserting it in bits between the general political and security items on our agenda.

15. In its statement on 18 November at the 1989th plenary meeting of the Assembly, my delegation gave emphasis not only to the necessity of preparing a programme on disarmament—which we still do not have—but, in the first instance, also to the organizational preparatory work to be done. We hold the view that these preparations should be centred within the United Nations. But we are also mindful of the fact that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament already exists and is functioning, and in the overriding interests of expedition one could, therefore, countenance the situation in which the Committee could begin preparations with the least delay. In such a case the possibility of enlarging the membership of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may well be considered in order to reflect more fully political reality and regional representation in the Assembly.

16. Recognizing the lack of fundamental progress towards controlling the practice of stockpiling and perfecting armaments, we can draw our conclusions from past experience, realizing that whatever we would have wished, negotiations in the working groups or committees on disarmament depend so much on the political situation, notably between the two super-Powers, the major Powers and the nuclear States. The constellation of political circumstance seems to render the chances of success greater now than ever before.

17. Ever since we have heard both in this Committee and elsewhere statements on “the new era of negotiations”, during the past two years we have observed notable progress. Although two years ago our debate on disarmament in this Committee coincided with the commencement of the first session of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki, it was only last week that reports informed us of the arrival of Ambassador Smith and Ambassador Semyonov in Vienna for the sixth round of those talks. Their programme was announced earlier in a joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union of 20 May 1971, which stated that both had agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement on the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles and to work thereafter, together with the conclusion of an agreement to limit antiballistic missiles, towards an agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. After the conclusion of agreements on averting nuclear incidents and measures to reduce the threat of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union and on improving the “hot line” communications by satellite on 30 September 1971, my delegation feels strengthened in its hope and highly appreciates the commendable efforts of those two super-Powers in this field. We wish them all success.

18. The political situation in Europe has also cleared up this year. After the agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Poland on the other, conditions have been created under which the call for a mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe, and for a general conference on

European security and co-operation, may meet a receptive response.

19. Further, my delegation highly appreciates the individual efforts of States, including the visits of heads of State or Government and prominent political leaders, in order to strengthen mutual understanding and confidence, as in fact the question is not so much of disarmament, of limitation of armaments itself, it is rather how to diminish and if possible to dissipate the distrust and suspicion among nations, and in particular among the two opposing parties. Much as they think, however, of the importance of their own interests, my delegation believes that it is also incumbent upon them to consider the presence of others in this world not aligned to any of their political groupings.

20. Disarmament is not the exclusive headache—I would not term it a privilege or prerogative—of the major Powers, but a matter of concern to the entire international community, since all stand to lose in the event of a nuclear war.

21. On the other hand we note with deep regret that the questions of the Middle East and the situations in South-East Asia and in southern Africa remain unsolved. Although they are all political in nature, they could easily be understood—and for that reason also they are worth pondering for a solution—in the context of the larger issue of the supply of conventional weapons to newly independent countries against rebellion from within or aggression from without, or to colonial countries and peoples against adamant colonial oppression, which I had occasion to explain in this Committee.

22. To be sure, one serious issue that has also stood in the way of our work on disarmament has this year been solved. I refer obviously to the seating of the representatives of the People's Republic of China in our midst and its participation in our work. With the People's Republic of China in its rightful place, both in the Assembly and in the Security Council, we may expect full participation of all five permanent members of the Security Council in our joint responsibility to help develop the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments and disarmament, as a means of maintaining international peace and security under the Charter. Although we are realistic enough to realize that the road to success is still a long way off, we may indeed look forward to progress in our disarmament talks in the time to come.

23. Before presenting my comments on the report of the Committee on Disarmament in document A/8457, may I be permitted to express first my delegation's appreciation to the members of the Conference for having laboured in all seriousness on behalf of all of us on the all-important questions relating to disarmament. The report with all the individual working papers as documents is comprehensive indeed. We would also like to thank Ambassador Bush of the United States and Ambassador Roschin of the Soviet Union for having introduced the report in brief but clear language at the 1827th meeting last week.

24. Unfortunately, the request of my delegation for the past three years to be allowed as observers to the sessions of the Committee on Disarmament has not been heeded, so

that our present discussion in the First Committee does constitute indeed the only opportunity for my country to speak on those subjects. And what is worse for our proceedings, since this report of the Committee on Disarmament is only presented in the course of the session—the report is dated 6 October 1971—the departments concerned in my country have not had an opportunity to go over it thoroughly.

25. We still maintain that the Committee on Disarmament should not be an exclusive group appointed by the two opposing super-Powers, but that Governments which desire to be represented by observers in the Conference may do so, and that its membership—even if it were to remain composed of States within the three main political groupings—be formed of members duly elected in accordance with the principle of adequate geographical representation, as in all major United Nations committees or working groups.

26. On the report itself, my delegation believes that the main tangible result of the work of the Conference at this session is the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.

27. My delegation appreciates very much indeed the spirit of co-operation in the Conference which has ultimately led to the presentation of the draft convention by 12 members of the Committee on Disarmament for finalization by the Assembly as proposed by the 35-Power draft resolution A/C.1/L.579. My delegation is aware of the long, painstaking negotiations behind each of the articles of the draft convention.

28. While on the one hand we welcome the result of joint hard work in the spirit of co-operation and accommodation of give and take as a step forward towards the completion of our joint task, my delegation at the same time cannot but express its disappointment that the present draft convention does not cover chemical as well as biological weapons, which we have always hoped for, that is, as a supplement consistent with the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva in 1925;² this was expressed last year in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2662 (XXV), of which Indonesia was one of the sponsors:

“Both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States.”

In terms of expectations, my delegation therefore regards the present draft convention, having omitted the chemical weapons intentionally, as a half measure, although we agree that half a measure is indeed better than nothing. My delegation has gladly noted in the seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs of the draft convention references to the “urgency of eliminating . . . such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriolo-

gical (biological) agents”, and the recognition that the present “agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first . . . step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons”. These references are further strengthened in article IX, stating:

“Each State party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction.”

29. My delegation believes that the substance of the joint memorandum of 12 non-aligned countries members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, dated 28 September 1971 [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 33], emphasizing the immense importance and urgency of reaching agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons, presents a helpful point of departure for future negotiations on the subject. In accordance with its previous position, my delegation has now already joined those countries in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.581 to the same effect.

30. Apart from the issue of the chemical weapons, my delegation is quite satisfied with the explanation that inclusion of an explicit repetition on the prohibition of the use of bacteriological weapons in the convention may weaken the Protocol of 1925. Our present draft is to strengthen the said Protocol by supplementing it with provisions on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons and on their destruction.

31. My delegation is also satisfied with the stipulations in article II stating that:

“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control . . .”.

32. In its implementation much depends no doubt on the verification and handling of complaints in article VI of the draft convention, which gives the Security Council the supervisory role to observe compliance with the provisions of the convention. Under the present circumstances, there seems to be no other organ which can conceivably be given that role, since our present system of security under the Charter is indeed only based on the unanimous decision of the five permanent members of the Security Council; so that whether there will be effective verification or indecision depends primarily on the major Powers.

33. Thus, having found the Security Council in a state of indecision quite a number of times, my delegation is not very happy with article VII which does not provide for adequate cover, indemnity or assistance to the victim in the absence of a decision by the Security Council. Neither are

² League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

there included any sanctions for violations of the convention, as my delegation has had occasion to propose.

34. Representing a developing country, my delegation further welcomes the provisions of article X stating that States parties to the convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. As a country adhering to the all-States formula in the spirit of universality of peace, my delegation further is satisfied with article XIV stating that “this Convention shall be open to all States for signature”.

35. On the destruction of chemical and biological means of warfare, my delegation is very much impressed further by the working paper CCD/324 of Sweden [*ibid.*, sect. 7], and hopes that in appropriate implementation of the convention these methods will be taken into consideration.

36. These are the preliminary observations of my delegation on the draft convention on bacteriological weapons. Since, as I said earlier, Indonesia is not a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and since that Committee does not allow observers, this draft convention having been made available to States Members only after the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was circulated in the course of this session, my Government has not been given sufficient time to study the matter thoroughly. My delegation is still awaiting instructions and comments, while continuing its studies and further consultations.

37. On the question of effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, my delegation has noted a plain record of what has been emphasized by the delegations concerned in paragraphs 13 to 29 of the report of the Conference. While my delegation would no doubt not find it difficult to agree in principle to “early agreement on significant measures to restrain and turn back the nuclear arms race” as proposed by the Soviet Union in paragraph 16, or “an undertaking by nuclear weapon States not to use nuclear weapons as a means for launching an attack” as suggested by Czechoslovakia in paragraph 22, or to the Japanese proposal “that fissionable material for use in weapons should be transferred to peaceful purposes” in paragraph 25, and others, my delegation, as a non-member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, is indeed at a loss to know what action was taken ultimately by that Committee on those comments, suggestions or proposals, and what purpose it serves by merely mentioning those records.

38. In our efforts towards an early suspension of nuclear tests, my delegation last year supported resolution 2663 (XXV) which in part B “*Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments” and in part A:

“*Urges* Governments to consider and, wherever possible, to implement methods of improving their capability to contribute high-quality seismic data with assured international availability, . . . and invites those Govern-

ments that are in a position to do so to consider lending their assistance in the improvement of world-wide seismological capabilities in order to facilitate, through the assured international availability of seismic data, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.”

39. We put on record last year the 73 tests that were conducted from January 1969 to June 1970 according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), that is, at an average of one test in a week. The 1969 records stated also that no less than 245 tests were conducted after the partial test ban treaty³ came into force in 1963. The biggest acts of defiance occurred when, as we were about to begin the commemorative twenty-fifth anniversary session here at the United Nations on 14 October 1970, the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China saw fit to conduct nuclear explosions.

40. On recent tests, the Government and people of Indonesia—and I am sure also all peoples in the Pacific area—are most grateful that France has heeded the appeals from many Governments and peoples and put off its intended tests in August this year on the island of Mururoa. The United States did not do so, and went ahead with the underground tests at Amchitka Island in the face of strong protests from Governments and peoples around the Pacific. Only on Thursday of last week, the People's Republic of China is reported to have conducted a nuclear explosion in the air, in the north-western part of the country.

41. Whatever the challenge, we have to continue our untiring efforts to bring a halt to all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. Besides resolution 2663 (XXV) referred to above, last year also, on the eve of the Helsinki Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), my delegation supported the suggestion by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, that the United States and the Soviet Union, at the resumption of the talks, take the new opportunity of convincing the anxiously waiting world that a sincere change of course is forthcoming, by halting for the duration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to begin with, all testing of nuclear weapons, testing of strategic missiles and by aiming specifically at preventing development or testing of new nuclear missile systems, offensive or defensive. The talks in Helsinki passed without taking notice of our suggestion.

42. With the sixth round of SALT in Vienna, we renew the suggestion, and hope in all sincerity that the two delegations consider seriously the possibility of such a declaration, as this will no doubt strengthen the hopes of mankind and the confidence of all in the good faith and sincerity of the major nuclear Powers.

43. We should not be side-tracked in our efforts since our first resolution, 1252 (XVIII), was adopted by the Assembly in 1958, even if our progress is painfully slow. We have adopted numerous resolutions since then, and we should be directed now by the preamble of the test ban Treaty of 1963, which states that negotiations will continue “to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear

³ The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

weapons for all time". It is regrettable indeed that eight years after the coming into force of that Treaty, the outlook for a comprehensive test ban seems still to be dark.

44. A study of paragraphs 79-92 of the report reveals that the only major obstacle is the question of verification. Paragraph 88 states clearly that the Soviet Union is ready to sign an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapons tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection. The United States position is that adequate verification should include provisions for on-site inspections.

45. Of this year's efforts concerning a solution are mentioned, *inter alia*, a proposal by Egypt on some form of verification by challenge and recourse to the Security Council, a proposal by Sweden and Canada on verification by a developed system of international seismic data, or by the setting of the size and number of tests in their respective testing programmes as proposed by Canada, and the threshold approach in combination with a voluntary moratorium on explosions beneath the threshold as a possible solution to fall back upon, as proposed by the Netherlands.

46. Considering those possibilities, and bearing in mind again the consensus of scientists in the Pugwash Conference on Peace and International Co-operation, stating that "the problem of extending the Moscow Treaty to underground testing is essentially political, and that technical problems of verification are not the stumbling block", my delegation cannot but accept the belief that the solution lies indeed in the political will of the nuclear Powers, and in the spirit of "the era of negotiations", *détente* and SALT, we hope that some compromise formula could soon be agreed upon.

47. In order to strengthen the reliability and credibility of the control system, my delegation last year supported resolution 2663 (XXV) which is based on resolution 2604 (XXIV), which we also supported, on the exchange of seismic data. My delegation has studied paragraphs 118-125 of the report of the Conference, relating to the discussion on international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data, and is particularly pleased with the response to Canada's working paper [*ibid.*, sect. 9] recommending that, pending the achievement of the total ban on nuclear testing, consideration be given to measures to help develop seismological identification techniques and facilities which could contribute to the effective verification of a comprehensive test ban. We believe that progress in seismological detection and identification can reach the point where confidence would be established that a faithful observance of a comprehensive test ban treaty could be verifiable.

48. With regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] my delegation has not much to add to what it said last year. Indonesia signed the Treaty on 2 March 1970 in the conviction that it would serve as an important step towards effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

49. Together with the other non-aligned countries, it is the consistent policy of the Government of Indonesia to

support all efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty and to direct all endeavours towards the exclusively peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The Indonesian Government is already a party to the partial test ban Treaty of 1963 and it has always supported draft proposals to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

50. There is no doubt that the non-proliferation Treaty will be effective only if all countries, nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, become parties to that Treaty.

51. At the signing of the Treaty, my Government issued a statement stressing the need for safeguards, in connexion with article III, paragraph 3, which should, however, be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful activities. It is therefore the common task of all parties to the Treaty to make the relevant safeguards agreement acceptable to all.

52. Further, we attach great importance to the declaration of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union affirming their intention to seek Security Council action to provide or support immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Of the utmost importance, however, is not the action after a nuclear attack has been committed but the guarantees to prevent such an attack. The Indonesian Government trusts that the nuclear-weapon States will study this matter further and propose effective measures to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The present guarantees consist merely of statements by representatives of three individual nuclear States in one particular session of the Security Council. We trust that it will be possible to work this out in some kind of resolution or declaration of the Security Council which has the support of all nuclear Powers—permanent members of the Council.

53. Those are my delegation's general observations on three items under our consideration. On the four remaining subjects, I reserve the right of my delegation to speak on another occasion.

54. Mr. BENITES (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The outstanding diplomat, and our eminent friend, Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, representative of the Argentine Republic, in the meeting of the First Committee on 11 November, stated the following:

"We have previously criticized the approach to the question of disarmament being limited to the adoption of 'non-armament' measures. In the United Nations, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly of the Organization of American States we have constantly stressed the fact that this trend, if followed, might give rise to an unacceptable international situation since it promoted what we then termed 'the disarmament of the disarmed'." [1827th meeting, para. 83.]

55. Although it is a well-known fact, if we recall, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—the member-

ship later was increased to 26 and the Committee took the name of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—was born and grew as a negotiating organ, then it is understandable that the achievements of that Committee are improbable without the agreement of the two super-Powers, which thus far have acted so comfortably in their understandings and so freely in their misunderstandings. In point of fact, I think everyone will recall that 12 years ago the item of general and complete disarmament was broached for the first time, and after the failure of the 10-nation disarmament committee, and even of the United Nations, it was the two super-Powers that came to an agreement on what points might constitute a programme for general and complete disarmament. That effort took two years, and on 20 December 1961, by General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI) a Committee was created whose membership, but not mandate, was later expanded. The specific terms of reference given to that Committee were those of a negotiating body, but it was made clear that the negotiations should be on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations⁴ which should be borne in mind, with specific stress being laid on paragraph 8 of those principles, which referred to the fact that negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. That mandate, contained in paragraph 2 of part II of the resolution I have just mentioned, did not lead the Committee to fulfil the ambitious goals the General Assembly had in mind when creating it.

56. If we consider the measures so enthusiastically welcomed by a world under the pressure of fear, we find that practically all of them were negotiated outside the Committee, and that the majority of them did not set exact disarmament targets but rather left the door open to the possibility of improving and increasing methods of mass destruction. At least three of the treaties on questions of armaments that we might term basic, signed in the last few years, were neither negotiated nor examined in the Committee on Disarmament, then composed of 18 nations. I refer first to the Antarctic Treaty, which was achieved before that Committee was set up; then the so-called Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; and then the Treaty on outer space,⁵ which was negotiated in the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space under the eminent leadership of the Polish jurist Professor Manfred Lachs, now a member of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, and in 1966 was studied in the First Committee, of which I had the honour of being Chairman. The other important instruments on armaments were also not widely debated in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, nor were many of the useful suggestions made by many countries composing it accepted there. Those documents were prepared and negotiated directly by the Co-Chairmen, who happen to be the representatives of the two super-Powers.

57. Those instruments have been the subject of very harsh discussions. Many countries are still reluctant to sign the

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

⁵ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. They consider it an unjust way of permitting an increase in the nuclear monopoly through vertical proliferation and a way of hindering other countries from becoming nuclear Powers, which might shatter the balance and that monopoly. Although we do not share some of the views expressed against the non-proliferation Treaty, it would appear just and logical that, while stemming horizontal proliferation, measures of a serious and effective nature ought to have been taken to avoid vertical proliferation which has, on the contrary, grown at a breakneck rate. Another unclear point in the Treaty is that it always refers to “explosive nuclear weapons”, which leaves room for doubt whether the use of radiological weapons that might be based on radio-active isotopes of a short half-life but of high destructive capacity is allowed, through ordinary grenades or aerosols, devastating certain zones which, after a time equal to the half-life of the isotope, could then be occupied by the army; in other words, whether the Treaty prohibits only strategic weapons but allows tactical ones.

58. With regard to that Treaty, we must pay tribute to the wise and patient work accomplished in the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is attempting, with increasing success, to extend the system of safeguards of the Agency. This represents a very important advance for the developing countries which, in that way, will be able to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with those articles included in the Treaty on non-proliferation thanks to the efforts of the developing countries, among them the majority of the Latin American countries.

59. With respect to the last instrument which has not yet come into force, that is, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*], again there remains the question of whether, within the 12-mile area where the emplacement of such weapons is permitted, they may be placed there only by the littoral State, or whether they may also be placed there by other States; for this would constitute a grave threat to international security, since it would be tantamount to allowing the creation of nuclear submarine bases in certain areas of the world.

60. We still contend that for the Latin American countries that have signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,⁶ the principle is not applicable, since that Treaty acts as a special law in the light of the general law which is the non-proliferation Treaty.

61. But none of the measures mentioned so far was truly a disarmament measure. In the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament there is included what is indeed a disarmament measure; I refer to the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*A/8457, annex A*].

62. In the important statement made in this Committee by the permanent representative of the United States of

⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

America, Mr. Bush, he referred to the announcement made on 18 October by President Nixon, on the conversion of the former Army Biological Defense Research Center at Fort Detrick, Maryland, into a leading centre for cancer research. He quoted the following words of President Nixon:

"This facility, which once was so top-secret, which was closed not only to Americans"—presumably he meant North Americans—"but, of course, to anybody from foreign lands, now is open to all people in the world. Wherever scientists or doctors may be, whether in Europe, Latin America, Africa or Asia, they can come here." [1827th meeting, para. 13.]

63. Fort Detrick was not the only such centre in the United States, although it was the most important one. In his book entitled *The Silent Weapons*,⁷ Robin Clarke points out that Fort Detrick, situated near Frederick, Maryland, included 1,300 acres of land and employed 700 scientifically trained staff members, and that, in addition to that centre, special consideration should be given to the Pine Bluff Arsenal, in Arkansas, which was working on both chemical and biological weapons; and he added a list of universities and scientific personnel devoting themselves to that same work. In a commentary published in *The New York Times* on 9 November 1969, and written by Mr. Phillip Hartman, Professor of Biology at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, he pointed out the increasing military expenditures devoted to the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and, referring to the book by Seymour Hirsch entitled *Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal*, he stated that there were 3,700 civilian and 1,000 military workers, and that in 1968, the yearly expenditures in research ran above \$330 million. Everything thus seems to prove that bacteriological and biological weapons did indeed exist in the North American arsenals that I have just mentioned and were ready for use. Therefore, a convention prohibiting such weapons can certainly be termed a disarmament measure.

64. We must also note with satisfaction that this year the report of the Committee on Disarmament does contain a specific reference to toxins in its draft convention. Furthermore, in the outstanding report submitted by the Secretary-General entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*,⁸ prepared by a Special Committee of Experts, it was considered that toxins were not biological but chemical weapons, particularly botulinum toxin, even though produced by micro-organisms. The botulinum toxin, produced by an anaerobic agent, a saprophytic spore, is so extremely deadly that, according to the World Health Organization, the lethal dose by ingestion is of one microgram per person.

65. Although we must be gratified at the fact that the Assembly has now had submitted to it, in the report of the Conference, this problem of such extraordinary importance to human life, namely, the prohibition of the use of biological weapons and toxins and their destruction when they cannot be turned to peaceful uses, it must be

recognized that the separation of chemical weapons from biological weapons is an arbitrary one. The two concepts have always been linked and we have always spoken of chemical and biological warfare because so-called chemical warfare, basically speaking, is biological warfare, for it always tends to produce death not through external physical causes, such as destruction by burning, by explosion or by the introduction of projectiles into the human body, but through biological effects. In the case of chemical warfare, organic systems are affected, and the proof of this is the fact that the distinction is made based on the effects of chemical weapons on the various organic systems.

66. The classification of chemical agents acting on man or animals is determined by the systems which suffer their effects. Thus, the respiratory system is affected by phosgene, for example; the circulatory system is affected by cyanogen agents, cyanide products. Another classification involves those that act upon the skin, such as vesicant or blistering agents (mustard gas, for example) or agents that act upon the nervous system, which seem to be the most serious, such as sarin and the so-called BX. Apart from those lethal chemical agents which act on organic systems, there are the so-called incapacitating agents, which have a momentary action and among these special mention was made of lysergic acid (LSD) and the so-called agent BZ.

67. It is true that in addition to the agents that act directly on the organic systems of man and animals there are the so-called defoliating agents which are used in the cruelest type of modern warfare, which makes hunger the slow and dramatic weapon wherewith to devastate entire regions, thus depriving the inhabitants of food.

68. We have always contended when taking part in these debates that both types of lethal agents—the truly biological, those produced by micro-organisms, whether bacteria, rickets or viruses, and those produced chemically and that act upon the organic systems—should be dealt with simultaneously.

69. I should like to recall that in the mandate of the Committee itself—part II, paragraph 2, of resolution 1722 (XVI) which created the Disarmament Committee—it is stated that negotiations shall be undertaken in that Committee bearing in mind the common ground arrived at by the great Powers and contained in the document jointly submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States, operative paragraph 3 (b) of which specifically mentions weapons of mass destruction, as follows:

"...elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons".

70. I hope that the next step will be negotiation within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on a convention that will complement the one on bacteriological weapons through a careful study leading to the elimination of chemical weapons.

71. For the reasons given, my delegation enthusiastically supports the suggestion submitted by Mexico [A/C.I./L.578] asking for the inclusion of a new article which

⁷ David McKay Company, Inc., New York, 1968.

⁸ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

would appear as article X in the draft convention and which would read in part as follows:

"Pending the agreement referred to in article IX, the States Parties to this Convention undertake to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which because of their degree of toxicity have the highest lethal effects."

72. I apologize if I have spoken at undue length on this subject, but I do consider it to be vital; indeed, it is the very crux of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year; it is the only subject on which an organic document has been submitted in the form of a draft convention. However, I should like briefly to refer to the other aspect of the question of weapons of mass destruction, namely, nuclear weapons.

73. In the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) submitted this year on the subject of nuclear tests, an objective and extremely intelligent observation is made; indeed, we have found that all the observations of that noble Swedish Institute are objective and intelligent. It states that the main motivation underlying the formulation of the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons was not so much the stemming of the arms race for that type of weapon, but rather the urgent need to find measures to avoid increasing the contamination of the atmosphere by nuclear explosions, which has already reached an almost lethal level. In fact, let us recall that in 1962 the world was swept by nuclear terror as a result of the increasing number of nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere and by the high degree of toxicity of the radio-active isotopes produced by such explosions, particularly by fusion bombs, which use atomic or fission bombs as detonators, which devices can inject an enormous amount of highly dangerous isotopes into the atmosphere.

74. For that reason, the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests left the door still open to underground testing. The Moscow Treaty was certainly not a disarmament measure, because through underground explosions the necessary nuclear tests have been carried out for the perfecting of varied nuclear warheads, such as the Poseidon or multiple individually-targetable re-entry vehicle missiles, etc. It is interesting to note that in the SIPRI Yearbook for last year we find that of the total of 823 nuclear explosions, 403 were carried out in the atmosphere, 6 under water, and 414 underground. As far as the two super-Powers are concerned, before the signing of the Treaty the United States had exploded 193 nuclear devices in the atmosphere and 5 under water, and 333 underground after signing the Treaty. According to the same source, the Soviet Union had carried out 161 tests in the atmosphere, 1 under water and 77 underground.

75. The Moscow Treaty, which is incomplete for reasons other than disarmament, must be completed by the total prohibition of nuclear tests. If we honestly want to halt the nuclear arms race, which is man's race towards death and total destruction, we must prohibit all types of explosions.

76. Very briefly, I should like to refer to another subject, that of nuclear-free zones. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is the

only outstanding example of its type in the world today. For a very short time and by coincidence, I was Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and it was of great satisfaction to me that during that time the United States, with great understanding, signed and ratified Protocol II of that Treaty and that the Kingdom of the Netherlands signed Protocol I; I was also able to note the entry of the sister republic of Panama to the Tlatelolco group.

77. I do not wish to tax the patience of our colleagues, for this statement has become excessively long, but I will at a future meeting ask for the floor in order to explain our views regarding the zones of peace, the nuclear-free zones, and the effects of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. I would also urge that more careful note be taken in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of the very valuable suggestion for a comprehensive plan for general and complete disarmament.

78. Mr. SCOTT (New Zealand): No one in this Committee would be prepared to deny that general and complete disarmament is, under the Charter, one of the principal goals of the United Nations. Yet in this, the second year of the Disarmament Decade, it is difficult to believe that we are any nearer this ultimate goal than we were when the United Nations first met 26 years ago.

79. My delegation recognizes and pays every acknowledgment to the hard-won progress that has been made in certain areas. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has, over the years, been able to agree on several arms control measures which have later been endorsed by the Assembly. The sea-bed arms control Treaty,⁹ the outer space Treaty¹⁰ and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] show what can be achieved by negotiations conducted in a spirit of good faith. But at the same time we should not ignore the fact that after 26 years of disarmament negotiations in the United Nations we are only now considering a measure likely to be endorsed by this Committee which would result in the destruction of existing stocks of weapons. I refer of course to the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A], which is now before the First Committee.

80. Apart from this draft convention, our efforts have been largely devoted to keeping pace with the continuing sweep of scientific and technological change which places new and increasingly destructive weapons in our hands faster than we can devise means to control them.

81. In some areas we have been able to contain the effects of these new discoveries. For instance, the draft bacteriological weapons convention, which we are now considering,

⁹ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2626 (XXV), annex).

¹⁰ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

will be beneficial because as well as requiring the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons, it should have the effect of preventing States which do not already possess such weapons from acquiring them. The non-proliferation Treaty has the effect of prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons by States which have, or will eventually acquire, the ability to manufacture them. The Treaty on outer space and the sea-bed arms control Treaty both deal with dangerous eventualities which might occur at some time in the future if these treaties were not in force.

82. We all recognize that these treaties, which are in themselves considerable diplomatic achievements, have had the effect of reducing some of the risks associated with our increasing scientific and technical capability. It would be a mistake on the other hand—and with due credit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—to think that we are containing the effects of such changes in all areas. The non-proliferation Treaty should indeed have the effect of reducing the number of new entrants into the nuclear arms race and is to that extent an excellent product, but the arms race between the existing nuclear Powers continues. Efforts to control it by prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons have been successful only in driving some of the testing underground. In the meantime the increasing frequency of nuclear weapons testing bears witness to the fact that the nuclear arms race continues unabated. If we examine another area, that of conventional weapons, we find that the international community has so far been unable even to begin consideration of the means that might be adopted to stop the proliferation of increasingly destructive types of conventional armaments.

83. In short, although the world community has been able to forestall some of the deleterious effects of the advance of our scientific and technical capacities in the armaments field by negotiating arms control agreements, we have not been successful in eliminating them all. In addition, there is every expectation that the nuclear arms race and the conventional arms race will lead to the development of even more frightful weapons. If we continue our present policy of trying to forestall the worst effects of such developments by negotiating new arms control measures we will have to work very hard to ensure that we do not slip even further away from our goal of general and complete disarmament than we are at present.

84. My delegation feels that under these circumstances there is every reason for the international community to greatly increase its efforts to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In making this suggestion we would wish to draw the Committee's attention to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8457], on the subject of general and complete disarmament, which can best be described as a disappointing document. We would wish to add our voice to those of other delegations which have spoken during this debate advocating accelerated and urgent consideration of this primary problem. We feel that it is time that a serious and sustained effort is made to build on the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations¹¹ submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States of America and endorsed by the Assembly just over 10 years ago.

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.*

85. In making this suggestion my delegation does not wish to denigrate the achievements of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the field of partial arms control measures. Many feel that this path is the only way to general and complete disarmament. But we wish to point out that a series of further partial arms control measures will be needed in the future merely to keep us in sight of the goal of general and complete disarmament and that in such circumstances it would be better to devote some effort to tackling directly the problem of disarmament as a whole.

86. I should like to consider now some of the other individual items before this Committee. The first of these is the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. This draft convention, which is supplementary to the 1925 Geneva Protocol,¹² is an important step forward in outlawing the development, production and stockpiling of both chemical and biological weapons.

87. My delegation does, however, have its reservations about the way in which this convention has been drafted. For instance, the draft convention does not contain any provision banning the use of bacteriological weapons or toxins. We are aware that many countries which are members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have argued against the insertion of such a prohibition on the grounds that it would weaken the Geneva Protocol. However, my delegation finds no very convincing legal argument in that contention. In addition we feel that because this argument has been accepted by the Conference the resulting prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling and use of bacteriological weapons and toxins expressed in the draft convention and the Geneva Protocol taken together might prove weaker than it otherwise would have been. For instance, the definition of "bacteriological methods of warfare" in the Geneva Protocol is not as comprehensive or exact as the definition in the draft convention before us. The prohibition of use could with advantage, therefore, have been repeated. Similarly if bacteriological weapons or toxins were used against a signatory of the draft convention it would be much easier to activate the complaints procedure in articles V and VI of the draft convention if the use of bacteriological weapons and toxins were specifically banned by it. My delegation has noted that the interpretations placed on some sections of the draft convention go a considerable way to meeting the objections of ambiguity and lack of precision which can be levelled against certain sections of it. This process of construction has been valuable. We feel however that it would have been more satisfactory to have such clarifications written into the text rather than to have recourse to unilateral statements.

88. My delegation also has serious doubts about the complaints procedure envisaged in articles V and VI of the draft convention. We would have preferred, with Sweden, to see a procedure which separated the investigation of a complaint from the political decision to be taken on the complaint. We hope the Security Council, in considering

¹² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

any complaints brought under this convention, will not allow political considerations to deflect it from making a fair and impartial investigation.

89. Although my delegation has misgivings about this draft convention, it accepts the fact that the present text is the one which is best able to secure widely based support. New Zealand will therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579, which commends the convention and asks the depositary Governments to open it for signature and ratification at an early date.

90. As noted in this draft resolution, the draft convention on bacteriological weapons also represents a first possible step towards the achievement of an agreement banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Although my delegation has not been able to agree with the opinion of certain other delegations that chemical and biological weapons should be considered together, in a rigorous fashion, we feel that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should attempt to reach an agreement on chemical weapons as soon as possible. We have therefore joined in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.580 which refers the question of chemical weapons back to the Conference.

91. In the absence of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, one of our prime objectives should be to ensure that the nuclear Powers take whatever practical measures are necessary to halt the nuclear arms race.

92. The awesome threats to the existence of our civilizations posed by the ever-growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons concern every member of this Committee. My Government is concerned about the corrosive effects of the continuing nuclear arms race on arms control agreements already in force, especially the non-proliferation Treaty to which New Zealand is a party.

93. My Government welcomes the decision to open discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency announced recently by Japan and the non-nuclear-weapons States which are members of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), but it notes that many States which have access to significant nuclear technology have not become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. It considers that the prospects for the eventual success of this arms control measure would be greatly enhanced if the nuclear Powers which are parties to it were able to take firm measures to bring the nuclear arms race under control.

94. The SALT talks, which are now entering their sixth session in Vienna, give rise to some limited expectation that the United States of America and the Soviet Union will shortly be able to reach agreement on the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems and on certain other strategic offensive weapons.

95. Another necessary step in halting the nuclear arms race would be the early conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear testing in all environments. My delegation feels that in this respect the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is most disappointing because

it shows that, although some progress has been made in the field of seismic detection of underground tests, the positions of the major nuclear Powers on the question of verification of a comprehensive test ban are still as far apart as ever.

96. My Government is opposed to all nuclear testing by all States and it considers that the nuclear Powers have a duty to come to an early agreement on a treaty banning nuclear testing. It is a matter of particular concern that eight years after the signing of the Moscow partial test ban Treaty¹³ the Committee on Disarmament, in which all the nuclear Powers parties to that Treaty are represented, has still not been able to agree on the text of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is also a matter for concern that two of these nuclear Powers are continuing to carry out large-scale underground tests.

97. Once again I have to note that two States, the People's Republic of China and France, have this year continued to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. Such actions have been condemned by the world community. The States carrying out these tests are acting in disregard of the principles of the partial test ban Treaty. My Government welcomed the decision of the French Government to curtail its nuclear testing programme in the Pacific during 1971. My Prime Minister stated at the time that he hoped that the 1971 nuclear test series would be the last test series that France would hold in the Pacific area. It is our earnest hope that the countries which continue to test their nuclear weapons in the atmosphere will discontinue these activities. I should like to recall, as our delegation did in the Special Political Committee on 13 October this year, that our Prime Minister has referred to the widespread anxiety caused by nuclear weapons testing and the strain which it throws on relations between the Powers which do so and friendly countries. As we said in the Special Political Committee, what New Zealanders and Pacific Islanders—and the majority of the people of our world—want to hear is that there will be no more nuclear weapons testing, no more nuclear radiation from which no possible benefit flows. We indicated that until an assurance is given on this point, there will be no lessening of New Zealand's opposition to all testing programmes. Nothing less than suspension of atmospheric testing, given the potential hazard to health which it constitutes, would be an adequate response from all the Governments concerned.

98. It is against that background that the New Zealand Government urges most strongly—and especially in view of the fact that there has very recently been another such test—that there should be an end to all atmospheric testing. For this reason, although we could support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585 submitted by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada and other sponsors, in our opinion this text does not go far enough. The Mexican draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.584 goes further and in our view would merit serious consideration. We are not sure, however, that the implication of the last preambular paragraph does not cast aside needlessly the whole question of verification procedures.

¹³ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

99. My delegation welcomes the part of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the establishment of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control.¹⁴ We hope that negotiations on this subject will not be allowed to hold up the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and that any guidelines for the carrying out of such explosions will take full cognizance of the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty and of the partial test ban Treaty.

100. This is the second year of the Disarmament Decade. Consistently with a theme taken up earlier in this statement, which is surely made in common with most countries that have spoken so far, we feel that the time is now ripe to start serious consideration of the trade and stockpiling of conventional arms. The report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race [A/8469 and Add.1] has emphasized the burden which the arms race places on every country. Most of the expenditure referred to in the report is for conventional weapons. While my delegation recognizes that immense problems may be involved in devising means of limiting the conventional arms race, the benefits to be gained by so doing should be clear to all.

101. Mr. RONAN (Ireland): On behalf of the delegation of Ireland, I should like to join with other speakers in extending a cordial welcome to the representatives of the People's Republic of China attending the meetings of the First Committee. Their presence ensures that our discussion can now benefit from the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers which is so essential for worth-while progress in disarmament.

102. The twenty-fifth anniversary last year of the end of the Second World War and of the entry into force of the United Nations Charter can rightly be described as a watershed event in the present century. For 25 years mankind had lived in the shadow of a nuclear holocaust. Five nations in a quest for security, which is the dream of the insecure, had achieved the ultimate in the capacity for violence and become nuclear Powers. The world had spent over \$1,000,000 million dollars on the arms race, producing even more sophisticated and destructive weapons, both nuclear and conventional. But at the same time, other forces were at work to achieve a transition from the moral collapse, the destruction and the unmitigated suffering of world war to the reign of law. The Charter machinery for the maintenance of international peace and security, however imperfect, survived. There was a rededication to substitute positive policies of peace, justice and progress for the mad march to global perdition. Man had not yet lost all control over his own destiny.

103. Disarmament is part of that transition process. Disarmament raises issues of great political complexity in which questions of world peace and security and international organization are interrelated. Progress depends on a successful interplay of these forces. Disarmament cannot be achieved in isolation. It cannot be achieved in a period of rearmament. What we are dealing with, which is the

phenomenon of weaponry and aggression, is a fundamental cause of tension and instability in international relations. We have to consider, as a consequence, what measures should be taken by States in the nuclear age to achieve a world order in which people can live in peace and freedom and in which resources and skills can be used for economic and social progress rather than squandered on the nuclear and conventional arms race.

104. The road to disarmament will be facilitated if the basic causes of international conflicts and tension can be removed. That calls for deeper analysis and greater understanding of the nature of conflict. Peace-making and peace-keeping efforts and machinery need vast improvement. Unswerving continuous efforts must be made in this nuclear age, above all between the nuclear Powers, to agree on measures that will serve the interests of all States. The short-term disarmament objective must be to seek limited pragmatic agreements on specific measures of arms limitation and reduction designed to eliminate the risk of confrontation and to promote the prospects of collective security and the long-term goal of complete and general disarmament. Agreements in one area of arms control will facilitate progress in another and the achievement of political settlements, for instance in Viet-Nam and the Middle East, will both facilitate and benefit from arms control and disarmament agreements.

105. In reply to a letter in 1932 from Albert Einstein in which he inquired whether there was any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war, Sigmund Freud, in a penetrating exposé on war, in which he analysed the basic causes of community and international conflicts, came to the following conclusion:

"How long have we to wait before the rest of men turn pacifist? Impossible to say, and yet perhaps our hope that these two factors—man's cultural disposition and a well-founded dread of the form that future wars will take—may serve to put an end to war in the near future, is not chimerical. But by what ways or byways this will come about, we cannot guess. Meanwhile, we may rest on the assurance that whatever makes for cultural development is working also against war."

106. The forces mentioned by Freud in 1932 began at last to have some effect in the decade of the 1960s which was heralded in, first, by the reverberations of multimegaton thermonuclear blasts in the atmosphere until testing was driven underground through the mechanism of the partial nuclear test ban Treaty of 1963,¹⁵ and secondly, by the spiral of military expenditures. The paradox was that at the same time in 1961, the two super-Powers agreed on a very important joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations¹⁶ which the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI) recommended as a basis for negotiations on general and complete disarmament. The decade also marked the conclusion of a number of arms control treaties of which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] constitutes per-

¹⁴ See International Atomic Energy Agency, *Annual Report, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971* (Vienna, July 1971).

¹⁵ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

haps the most important international agreement achieved in the disarmament field since the nuclear age began. There seemed to be some glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel.

107. It was timely, in order to stimulate further progress, that the General Assembly in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva was requested, while continuing its task, to work out a comprehensive programme which could provide a guideline to chart its future work and negotiations. A number of Governments submitted papers on a comprehensive programme for which the General Assembly expressed appreciation in resolution 2661 C (XXV) and at the same time specifically recommended to the Conference the comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by six delegations, including my own, in document A/8191.¹⁷ During the past year, the Conference as such did not devote any further attention to the subject. For all that, important guidelines for this Disarmament Decade are on record against which progress will be measured.

108. There can be little doubt that real security for all States has been almost in inverse ratio to the growth in military arsenals in the past decade. The squandering of material and human resources in the arms race has cut into living standards, retarded economic and social programmes and even threatened the ecological balance. Yet military expenditure prevails as a priority over sanity in most States, regardless of their social systems. In this context the report of the Secretary-General, prepared with expert assistance, pursuant to resolution 2667 (XXV), on the economic and social consequences of the arms race [A/8469] is a vital addition to the series of disarmament studies requested by the General Assembly over the past decade. The report indicates in a concise way the quantitative and qualitative dimensions, the dangers, and the consequences of the arms race, both nuclear and conventional. Its contents and conclusions deserve to be widely publicized to focus attention on the scale and pattern of world military expenditures. Moreover, the Secretary-General should, in our view, be authorized to keep the trends under periodic review, every three years, as a world service during the Disarmament Decade.

109. We would hope too that the practice of commissioning the Secretary-General to prepare expert disarmament studies will be continued. A possible topic for study might be the problems of limiting conventional arms, with some account of past experience. To be mentioned too is the question of a study on napalm and all such incendiary weapons and the effects of their possible use, which is referred to in paragraph 105 of the report of the Secretary-General on respect for human rights in armed conflicts,¹⁸ now on the agenda of the Third Committee. There are, of course, other subjects which come to mind, for example, in the field of nuclear testing.

110. It has been said that the pace of disarmament negotiations is poised between torpor and glacial advance.

Be that as it may, the rate of advance of nuclear technology is anything but glacial. With the ever-increasing installed world nuclear energy capacity and with the amount of fissionable material in use growing annually, the importance and timeliness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons becomes more apparent. This Treaty is the very keystone of nuclear containment. It has been amplified by the recent work of the Safeguards Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The fact that an agreement on a model for safeguards under article III of the Treaty was reached in such a short time is one of the encouraging developments in disarmament negotiations in the past few years. It will be apparent that the complex issues involved in those negotiations, issues which impinged on matters of national security and sovereignty, as well as the equally delicate areas of commercial advantage and discrimination, could well have resulted in bitter controversy and deadlock. The good judgement, tact, co-operation and spirit of compromise present at every stage of the negotiations is sterling proof of the importance that States attach to implementing all the provisions of the Treaty.

111. This is a welcome development. Nevertheless, although the Treaty has been signed by almost 100 non-nuclear-weapon States and ratified by about 70, there are still some important industrially developed States which have neither signed nor ratified the Treaty. Of great significance was the announcement last September that the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the five non-nuclear-weapon States, members of the European Economic Community, were ready to undertake preliminary consultations on a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. We earnestly hope that these negotiations will encourage more States to give active consideration to the ratification of the Treaty.

112. Even if all the non-nuclear-weapon States became parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency, it would not necessarily ensure the success of the Treaty. The nuclear Powers have a vital role to play. Unless there is progress in the field of nuclear disarmament there is a grave danger that the Treaty may wither on the vine. I refer particularly to article VI which requires the parties to pursue negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race. Progress, or the lack of it, is undoubtedly also linked to the fulfilment of the other obligations the Treaty imposes on all the parties to co-operate in the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with due consideration of the needs of the developing areas of the world. The activities of the IAEA in guaranteeing the access of non-nuclear States to the benefits of nuclear energy, including the possibility of a service for peaceful nuclear explosions, are also of crucial importance to the success of the Treaty.

113. There has been growing concern that the framework established for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal, will collapse unless a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests can be negotiated without delay. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament rightly devoted priority attention to this problem during the past year and has included as part III of its general report [A/8457] a useful special report on the subject as requested by the General Assembly

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94.

¹⁸ Documents A/8370 and Add.1.

in resolution 2663 (XXV). The nine-Power joint memorandum in document CCD/354 [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 34] sets out the position clearly and concisely and has our firm support. It is to be deplored that the commitment in the partial test ban Treaty of 1963 to negotiate the end of all nuclear weapon tests for all time remains unfulfilled; that the calls of the General Assembly for universal adherence to the 1963 Treaty and for the suspension of all tests in all environments remain unanswered; and that underground and atmospheric hydrogen bomb blasts continue in defiance of world opinion and at grave peril to the environment.

114. My Government has consistently maintained that progress in seismic detection and identification is reaching the point where there can be confidence that the faithful observance of a comprehensive test ban treaty could be verifiable and certainly, at the minimum, is sufficient to deter a potential violator. There has been extraordinary progress, better than tenfold, in seismic detection methods since 1963. It is reported that world-wide systems could now, or very shortly, detect underground tests as small as two kilotons. All that is required is the political will to achieve international acceptance of the principle of a total test ban. That would reduce the risk of a technological breakthrough and of the further vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would also slow down the nuclear arms race, release funds for development and reinforce the non-proliferation Treaty. Besides, the security interests of all the nuclear Powers will be more enhanced by restricting nuclear weapons rather than by developing more sophisticated warheads and strategic systems.

115. The negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, to which all the nuclear Powers would become parties, is now the single most important measure to be achieved in order to halt the nuclear arms race in this Disarmament Decade. All efforts in the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate on the conclusion of such a treaty in 1972, beginning with the adoption of a clear and unequivocal resolution by this Assembly outlining the principles and objectives. A further immediate step to be recommended is the suggestion of the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report that a number of transitional measures or unilateral restraints could be: "undertaken immediately to limit and reduce the magnitude and number of underground nuclear tests, and to phase them out, pending the achievement of a comprehensive agreement".¹⁹

116. A vital factor in halting the nuclear arms race and moving on to nuclear disarmament is the course of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union, now entering their third year. The overkill capacity achieved by the two super-Powers at astronomical cost but at marginal security obliged them to consider imposing restraints on the proliferation of their strategic weapons. At the same time they see that usable power tends to have a proportionately less effect on the broad course of events with the growth and decentralization of political power centres.

117. For lack of information, our knowledge and understanding of SALT developments is limited, although the

outcome hangs over the world community like the sword of Damocles. It would be reasonable to expect that the United Nations from now on be given fuller information on the basic issues involved and the progress of the discussions. Agreements have been made providing for modernizing the "hot line" between the two capitals by the use of satellites and for lessening the risk of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war, but on the main problems of limiting defensive and offensive strategic systems real progress has been delayed. There is concern that higher quantitative ceilings for anti-ballistic missile systems than at present are aimed at, whereas a zero ceiling treaty should be the objective. No limitation of the offensive multiple individually-targetable re-entry vehicle systems appears to be planned. Unless qualitative as well as quantitative limitations are achieved, the net result will have been to augment the arms race rather than to curb it. It would be another case of "fail-safe", reinforced by misinformation, misjudgement and mistrust and the unchecked evolution of military technology.

118. The two super-Powers have a serious responsibility, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the non-proliferation Treaty, for achieving a cessation of the nuclear arms race. This is in effect the price for progress in other areas of disarmament both among the nuclear-weapon States and on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States. A moratorium on testing as well as on the development of defensive and offensive nuclear weapon systems to help to achieve worth-while SALT agreements would be timely. If progress were achieved in that area, it could open the way for the negotiation of other measures that have been suggested before, such as a verifiable cut-off in the production of fissionable material, the reduction and elimination of nuclear stockpiles, and so on. The practical and psychological effects of such measures of vertical non-proliferation would be very great indeed.

119. Although the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*], which was opened for signature this year, involves action only on the part of the nuclear Powers, it is of some importance in so far as it represents the beginnings of arms-control measures in the ocean environment. The commitment in article V of the Treaty to pursue further measures of disarmament in this sphere will require much more attention if the total demilitarization of an area equivalent to almost two thirds of the earth's surface is to be achieved. In this context the proposal of Ceylon for the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace [*A/8492 and Add.1*] is of considerable interest as it seeks to apply the principle of reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes to one of the major oceans of the world and to exclude all weapons, both nuclear and conventional, from the area.

120. The example of the Treaty of Tlatelolco²⁰ in promoting a nuclear-free zone in Latin America remains an important guideline for other regions. It is gratifying that more countries have become parties to the Treaty or have ratified its two Protocols. The ratification of Additional

¹⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 194.

²⁰ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

Protocol II of the Treaty by all the nuclear Powers would be an essential guarantee of preserving that continent from encroachment or use of nuclear weapons from outside.

121. In the non-nuclear field, the impetus in recent years to eliminate chemical and biological weapons has been maintained. High priority was accorded to the subject by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as a result of which general agreement has been reached on the text of a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A]. This step represents a real disarmament measure in weapons classified as means of mass destruction. Yet it is to be regretted that the draft convention does not cover chemical weapons and is therefore fundamentally limited in scope.

122. The Geneva Protocol of 1925²¹ prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare, but it was designed to deal primarily with the use in war of chemical weapons. The question of bacteriological weapons was included on the wise initiative of the Polish delegation but was subsidiary to the main purpose of the Protocol. At least the principle was established of dealing with the two types of weapons together. The Protocol has endured. An increasing number of States have become parties to it in recent years. It may well attract universal adherence. It must, therefore, be clear that the draft convention negotiated by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should not in any way weaken the principles of the Geneva Protocol or be used as a pretext to postpone chemical disarmament indefinitely. While welcoming the draft convention in so far as it provides for the prohibition and elimination of biological weapons and toxins, my Government attaches great importance to article IX thereof, which will bind the parties to work in good faith for the complete prohibition and elimination of the more dangerous and usable chemical weapons of all kinds.

123. It was some advance that toxins were included in the draft convention. Its effects would be further strengthened by the inclusion of a new article, as proposed by the delegation of Mexico in document A/C.1/L.578, which would, pending the agreement called for in article IX, declare a moratorium on the development, production and stockpiling of the most lethal chemical weapons, such as the horrifying nerve agents. In our view the best guide for future progress on the elimination of all chemical weapons is contained in the joint memorandum of the group of 12 non-aligned countries members of the Conference [A/8457, annex C, sect. 33]. We trust that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will continue to give high priority to the whole problem of chemical methods of warfare and will be guided by the views expressed in that memorandum.

124. By far the largest portion of all military expenditure is accounted for by the arms race in conventional weapons. The arms trade has been rising at a rate of 9 per cent

annually since 1950. As an indication of the growing concern at this trend, a number of delegations expressed their views on the question of conventional weapons at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the past year. The publication yesterday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) of a 910-page book entitled *The Arms Trade with the Third World*²² should greatly help to focus attention on the political, economic and military dimensions of the problem and to point to methods of limitation. Perhaps some progress could be achieved on a regional basis such as the suggested mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe. It would certainly be timely for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to devote intensified discussions to the question of conventional arms control from now on.

125. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva has been in existence for almost a decade. It is a negotiating forum. It has produced some treaties. The report it submitted to the General Assembly this year was its most comprehensive one to date. We hope that it will maintain this standard in its future reports. However, the time is ripe to reappraise its organization and methods. It should, of course, include all the nuclear Powers in its membership. With due respect, we cannot but feel that its methods of procedure are far too leisurely and cumbersome. It proceeds by way of general debate, meeting on average about twice a week. More law than jaw is needed. A system of committees to deal with specific questions might be considered. The co-chairmanship of the two super-Powers served a purpose, but, if continued in its present form, may now do more harm than good. All institutions need reform sooner or later.

126. In conclusion, we must stress that time is the key element if things are not to fall apart. There is urgent need for more determined efforts to halt the arms race and achieve some measure of real disarmament. For armaments are a waste of money and life; a shame and a blot on mankind. The nuclear weapon States bear a heavy responsibility. It is their duty to achieve nuclear disarmament. The first priority this coming year must be the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. All States have a duty to maintain international peace and to keep their arms expenditures to the minimum compatible with their essential security needs. The United Nations for its part in this Disarmament Decade should publicize more the facts about the arms race and efforts to achieve disarmament, so that the peoples of the world will be in a better position to understand the problems and to influence solutions.

127. Mr. THEODOROPoulos (Greece): Mr. Chairman, I will try to concentrate only on three general and a few specific observations which are of interest to my delegation.

128. My first observation is this: there seems to be some divergency of views as to the methods by which we proceed here in this Organization and outside of it in the effort towards disarmament. Some seem to regret that the initial approach—that of tackling the disarmament question on a broad front—has been relinquished, and disagree with the present piecemeal approach. Others seem to believe that the

²¹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

²² Almquist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971.

latter approach represents a more realistic attitude and that one should continue along this path. The Assembly is discussing at this moment the question of whether or not to initiate a new period of general and far-ranging discussions on the matter. Obviously it is justifiable to say that the method of limited objectives yields low results at a slow rate and that it therefore cannot keep pace with the armaments race. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the broad front approach has hardly led to any results at all. Our position on this matter is that there exists no inherent incompatibility between the two methods. Any and all methods should be tried, consecutively or simultaneously, in order to achieve results, be they impressive or not. And while efforts towards general and complete disarmament should not relax, or could be stimulated anew, the limited objectives of partial agreements should be pursued in all fields. For that reason we express the hope that the possibility of convening a world disarmament conference will not prejudice the valuable work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and that other talks, initiated bilaterally or otherwise, will be continued and even intensified. We further hope that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will see itself reinforced and its scope and horizon enhanced by the addition to the membership of the United Nations of the representatives of the People's Republic of China.

129. My second point is this: disarmament is the responsibility of all Powers, big or small, nuclear or not. True, a particularly heavy responsibility lies with the nuclear Powers, and I stress all nuclear Powers. That, however, does not make disarmament any less the concern of smaller, non-nuclear States. Ours is a twofold responsibility: on the one side to give a helping hand in any negotiation, regional or general, involving either conventional weapons or possibly non-nuclear arms of mass destruction, such as biological and chemical weapons; on the other side to impress upon the nuclear Powers their obligation to disarm and to prod them towards effective control and dismantling of their atomic arsenal. Our voice, if concerted, cannot fail to reach the ears of the nuclear Powers.

130. A third point of a general nature: disarmament negotiations are not conducted and agreements are not concluded in a vacuum. They are part and parcel of all the other complexities of international life. The strengthening of international security, the advancement of and compliance with the rules of international law, the progressive and satisfactory establishment of a peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations, confidence in the efficiency of Security Council procedures and so on and so forth—all these are factors which carry their weight, directly or indirectly, in any talks about disarmament of any kind and at any level. The contribution of each Power, big or small, towards achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament should not be measured only by its attitude during this item's discussion but more generally by its whole attitude in international life.

131. May I add, as a marginal remark, that the cold war rhetoric of the "holier than thou" type is out of place in this forum and, in any case, is in its simplistic approach totally inadequate for dealing with the serious and complex nature of the problem we are discussing.

132. My country belongs to those which have often known war, which have experienced aggression, which have problems of development and which are therefore, for more than one reason, acutely aware of the need for reducing and stopping the armaments race and all its harmful effects. We therefore welcome the report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race [*A/8469 and Add.1*] and we express our appreciation to all those who made that report possible. I am certain that each one of the distinguished scholars who helped draft the report would be able to write a whole book on the subject, going into a more profound analysis of the topic. What matters as far as the report is concerned is that here we have a document jointly produced by persons of different backgrounds, ideologies, professions and races. They all arrive at one and the same conclusion: that both the economic and the social consequences of the arms race are harmful. It is that consensus that makes this report particularly valuable.

133. The one positive step which we are invited to take this year is to give our blessing to the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*A/8457, annex A*]. Greece is happy to be one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.579 commending the draft convention. We are certainly aware that the text may have some shortcomings, as pointed out by some delegations. We think, nevertheless, that as a whole it is a good text which if signed and ratified as early as possible will represent a positive step forward. May I add that this would be, at last, one instance where political wisdom would have kept abreast with scientific knowledge. World political leadership missed that opportunity at the early stages of the development of atomic and nuclear weapons. Political wisdom was too slow, or scientific research too rapid, to make it possible for the two to keep pace. Therefore we see that today nuclear physics has grown into a tremendous giant, while political machinery to contain its harmful effects remains a dwarf. Let us not repeat the same mistake with bacteriological and chemical weapons. Let us proceed with the present draft convention and then urge countries with chemical weapons capabilities quickly to make the next step towards a similar convention on chemical warfare. My delegation will for that reason also support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.580, which tackles the problem in a more methodical way.

134. I should now like to say a few words on the question of atomic testing. A total ban on atmospheric testing is of course a matter of paramount urgency. Its noxious effects on the environment we live in are established beyond doubt and the international community has already taken steps to contain it. We therefore regret that not all the nuclear Powers have seen fit to comply with the test ban and we, for our part, express the earnest hope that wiser thoughts will prevail and that atmospheric testing will cease altogether by the adherence of all nuclear Powers to the test ban Treaty.²³ That is a matter of high priority. Underground testing is, of course, an equally serious and also a more complex and more technical problem. However, as has been said in this forum before, science seems for the

²³ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

moment to have said its last word on that matter as far as seismic detection and identification is concerned, and it remains now for the Powers concerned to display their political will to arrive at a solution. We seem to have several draft resolutions before us on this subject now, but I do not think this is the moment for me to enter into an evaluation of their relative merits.

135. Finally, I should like to say a few words on the proposal concerning the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace [A/8492 and Add.1]. Greece is in favour of any idea, initiative or proposal aimed at reducing international tension and areas of friction, all the more so when such an initiative originates with the peoples of a certain area of the world. The ideas on this particular subject which were so eloquently developed at the previous meeting by the representative of Ceylon are numerous and certainly merit a more thorough and detailed analysis—in the first place by the Governments directly concerned, but I would say that the unanimous endorsement of those ideas by the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean would be a necessary prerequisite for the success of the endeavour. Greece, as a major seafaring nation, is primarily interested in the maintenance of complete freedom of the international sea-lanes for peaceful navigation, in accordance with the traditional rules of the law of the seas. We trust that the proposal concerning the Indian Ocean contains or implies nothing which might prejudice that position.

136. That is the general outline of Greece's position. My delegation may at a later stage of the debate express its views on specific draft resolutions or amendments that are before the Committee.

AGENDA ITEM 34 (continued)*

Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: report of the Secretary-General (A/8431 and Add.1-5, A/C.1/1015, A/C.1/L.566, 567, 573/Rev.2 and 577)

137. Mr. FRAZÃO (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, with your kind permission, I should like to refer to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.573/Rev.2 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. As this Committee will recall, at the 1827th meeting I had the opportunity of introducing the draft on behalf of its 21 Latin American sponsors.

138. At this stage, my delegation wishes to revert to operative paragraph 2 of the draft, in order candidly to share with the Committee our understanding of the ideas contained therein. Operative paragraph 2 reads as follows:

"Declares that, in view of the close connexion between the strengthening of international security, disarmament and development, appropriate measures must be adopted for the establishment of a system of collective economic security designed to promote the sustained development and expansion of national economies, along with efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control and the strengthening of a political system of collective security."

139. We submit that this paragraph elaborates on an element contained in the Declaration, when it mentions that "appropriate measures must be adopted for the establishment of a system of collective economic security". Indeed, that idea is a corollary of the concept of collective political security, the single most important operative feature of the United Nations Charter.

140. We also submit that it is a historical fact that the political system of collective security we have arrived at has its conceptual roots in the tradition established by the League of Nations Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand pact. Despite the lacunae of the Covenant and the escape clauses of the pact, it is quite clear that both instruments advanced new and positive concepts in the play of world politics and in the domain of international law, such as the condemnation of war, non-recourse to war as an instrument of international policy, the solution of conflicts by peaceful means and the proclamation of the illegality of war as a political instrument.

141. Those concepts were developed and expanded in the Preamble and in the Purposes of the Charter, which accorded them world-wide normative force in the furtherance of the cause of peace and security.

142. Although formulated in universal terms, these ideas did not lose, in the inter-war period, any of their distinctive European flavour, in spite of the decisive role played by President Woodrow Wilson with his principles and by American public opinion at the inception of the League of Nations. Not only were these concepts originally imbued with the traditional concept of the concert of Europe; they also had the purpose of meeting the problems of the European scene, which overrode world politics at the time of the League of Nations. Let us keep in mind that, also originally, the aim of political security was to achieve political stability in Europe, and by way of consequence, in the world, while maintaining the territorial redistribution which followed the First World War. Thus, peace and political stability were already equated with the maintenance of the prevailing political *status quo*.

143. Looking back from the vantage point of 1971, we note that, while the search for normalization of the interaction of political forces went on, economic pressures were allowed to run unrestrained by the interests of the international community as a whole, owing to a doctrinal tradition which was predicated upon the smooth working of the world economy through the free play of market forces:

144. Thus—and I believe this to be also historically indisputable—the inter-war period was at first characterized, in lesser or larger measure, by inflationary pressures, growing commercial protectionism and other negative trends, the compounded effects of which finally brought about world-wide economic recession. And there is no doubt that the dismal depression of the 1930s stemmed from the artificial prosperity of the booming 1920s. Perhaps this is why the Keynesian revolution came a little late, more in the guise of an epitaph than as a remedy.

145. No one will deny that the utterly disruptive forces mentioned above, allowed to go unchecked by the lack of

* Resumed from the 1829th meeting.

co-ordination among national economic and financial policies, which, as I pointed out, reflected the prevailing state of the economic thinking and purposes of the times, contributed to nourishing national attitudes and international rivalries that ultimately led to the outbreak of the Second World War.

146. It was only natural that at San Francisco the drafters of the Charter, aiming at the reorganization of the international community after man had become aware of the extent of his destructive power, directed their attention largely to world-wide economic problems germane to political security. Their initial task has, we think, now to be completed.

147. Again we are living in a time when we can perceive generalized symptoms of uneasiness in the world economy; but now these symptoms of uneasiness, and perhaps crisis, are coupled with a growing refusal on the part of developing countries to accept their fate as the first potential victims of a crisis for which they have no responsibility.

148. In fact, are we not already witnessing the rise of economic confrontations amongst the mature economies? In the financial field, is it not true that the institutional framework of the financial machinery established at Bretton Woods needs to be updated? Is it not also true that the inequities of international trade, even though thoroughly diagnosed, have not been corrected? Is it not true that the gap between developed and developing countries, of which we have been speaking for the last 20 years, has not ceased to widen? Finally, is it not true that these critical factors, among others, have contributed significantly to bringing about the pervading insecurity of our time?

149. I have no desire to draw hasty conclusions from historical parallels. Yet it is a fact that we are confronted with a set of events which echo foreboding memories for those of us who witnessed the tragedy of the 1940s.

150. Since the United Nations is the only valid political agency—I repeat, the only valid political agency—of the organized international community, it must not cease to evolve in response to the changing configuration of international life. More specifically, it should accurately reflect the central preoccupations of its membership, a large majority of which, incidentally, belong to the developing world.

151. Up to now, the concepts of peace and security have been thought of as belonging essentially to the political field. That notwithstanding, these concepts, as global concepts, must penetrate all fields of activity and responsibility of the United Nations and gain world-wide dimension. And by that I mean that we should project the same concept of world security into the economic sphere, if we want security to be really political and really global. However useful, the different mechanisms that have so far been created in the United Nations system would have their effectiveness enhanced if adapted and linked to the over-all concept of collective economic security.

152. I would submit that in this era when economic disputes as well as political and military conflicts can no

longer be localized, economic security—and by that I mean economic development, expansion and prosperity—becomes the inseparable correlative of political security. The establishment of world security based on a just and lasting peace would certainly be facilitated if favourable conditions were created for the development of developing countries and for the orderly growth of the economies of the industrialized nations.

153. My purpose is thus to emphasize that the idea of a system of collective economic security is a direct consequence of present trends within the international community. If we accept the concept of the interdependence of political and economic security, we must be prepared to recognize, in full compliance with the principle of the sovereign equality of States, that there should be a better and more effective co-ordination of the interests of all members of the world community at different stages of development, expansion and prosperity.

154. Just like political institutions, international economic life requires a system of adjustment capable of providing an effective means of consultations, reconciliation and peaceful settlement of conflicts.

155. Let me make it clear that I am not proposing stability for stability's sake, for in the dynamics of international life stability means the uncritical maintenance of an unacceptable *status quo*. Rather, I am proposing a mutually supported system where development, expansion and prosperity go together, always keeping in mind the urgency and priority of the problems of development.

156. Therefore it is the considered opinion of my delegation that, along with greater efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control and the strengthening of the political system of collective security, the General Assembly should enrich the concept of collective security with this new economic dimension. This new dimension indeed comprehends a complex of general principles which are part of the common fund of beliefs of present-day international economic relations shared by all Members of the United Nations.

157. I would like to mention some of them by way of example, it being understood that I am not drawing up an exhaustive list. On the contrary, the purpose of my delegation is to offer the General Assembly some material for further study, analysis and conclusions. Among the principles I refer to, I would like to cite first, the right of all States to economic independence, development, growth and prosperity; secondly, the provision for permanent consultation and co-ordination of economic and financial policies, under the auspices of the United Nations, among the developed countries themselves and between those countries and the developing countries, with the objective of preventing crises that may affect the world economy as a whole with even more acute consequences to the developing countries, for which purpose the machinery of the United Nations should be adjusted so that the concept of collective economic security can be implemented; thirdly, the close connexion between the strengthening of international security, disarmament and development, so that an advance in one of these fields may constitute progress in the others, a principle which involves channelling a sub-

stantial part of the resources freed by disarmament measures into aid for development; fourthly, the full rights of all States to regulate the utilization of the factors of production within their territories; fifthly, permanent sovereignty of all States over their natural resources, whether on land or in the ocean area adjacent to their coastlines, and their right freely and fully to explore said resources for the benefit of their populations and in accordance with their own priorities; sixthly, the prohibition of recourse to any form of economic, commercial or financial pressure; and seventhly, the obligation of developed countries to live up to the international commitments they have voluntarily undertaken, to assist the developing countries in bridging the technological gap and in the removal of the obstacles still hampering the expansion of the international trade of those countries.

158. As can be easily surmised from what I have just explained, the idea of collective economic security cannot be construed as a claim or a revindication, but as an international trip-wire to avoid critical situations in the economic sphere. Its acceptance would indicate an awareness of the common interest of all Member States in avoiding economic, commercial or financial crises insofar as those situations disturb economic peace, thus seriously menacing the development of developing countries and the expansion of the industrialized economies.

159. These were the comments my delegation deemed opportune to make before this Committee on a specific point in the context of the strengthening of international security. We trust that this session of the Assembly will see fit to endorse the concept of collective economic security as embodied in draft resolution A/C.1/L.573/Rev.2, thus opening the way for future and more concrete debates on this new avenue for international co-operation and security.

160. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I wish to inform the Committee that the Khmer Republic has joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.577.

161. As members have noted, we have now heard the Brazilian representative on a particular point in the draft resolution submitted by the Latin American group. If I understand correctly, negotiations are now taking place with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, with a view to finding some more constructive and generally acceptable solution than is offered by the various draft resolutions. Perhaps we might plan to vote on the draft resolutions on this question on 30 November, which would allow us to conclude consideration of that item before we vote on the other disarmament items.

162. Secondly, I should like to consult the Committee on whether it feels we can set 29 November as the target date for submission of draft resolutions on the disarmament items. That would allow us then to vote upon them on 1 or 2 December and thereby to take up the other items on the agenda of the First Committee, particularly the question of the sea-bed and ocean floor, since, as you know, we have a very heavy agenda in the plenary.

163. Mr. FRAZÃO (Brazil) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. Chairman, I understand your position, and I know how difficult it is to have committees work effectively; but, with all due respect, I think that the dates you have suggested—30 November and 1 and 2 December—are too close. As you said, we are making a great effort to reach agreement on a text that would be generally acceptable to the Committee. If you were to give us a little more time to bring that effort to fruition, I think that what might be considered a waste of time would none the less be progress, because we would be talking more in private and less in public.

164. Therefore, if you would be kind enough to let those dates remain flexible, my delegation and the sponsors of the Latin American draft resolution would be most grateful to you.

165. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): It was certainly not my intention to propose any step which might put the Committee in a difficult position. I merely wanted to expedite our work on the draft resolutions. I think if we set certain dates it does not mean that we have to abide by them at any price. There are circumstances beyond our control that sometimes oblige delegations to work under pressure. In any event, we must think about starting to vote on the draft resolutions, particularly those on disarmament. I see that some delegations are hesitant about 30 November, but we will have to finish this debate if we want to avoid night meetings. Let us then set 2 December for the vote on the draft resolution on the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. If there is no objection it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

166. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): The second date that I suggested for the presentation of draft resolutions on disarmament questions, namely, 29 November, is only indicative, but I would like us to do everything possible to abide by it.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.