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GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I feel sure that I am interpreting the feelings of all members of the Committee and of the officers, when I welcome the representatives of the People's Republic of China to the First Committee. It is a great pleasure for me personally, as the representative of a socialist country, to welcome them and for reasons that are very well known and which I do not need, I believe, for the moment to stress.

2. The presence and the participation of the delegation of the People's Republic of China, the true representatives of the Chinese people, in the work of this Committee will I am sure be of great significance to all of us and have a great bearing on our future work, particularly in the light of the importance of the items that we have before us in the Committee. There is no doubt that this will open up new prospects for the solution of problems of peace and security, of disarmament and a number of other problems which are vital to the United Nations and to the life of mankind such as outer space, the peaceful exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and so on.

3. I am convinced that close co-operation will be established in the Committee with the true representatives of the Chinese people and we wish them fruitful and successful work.

4. I give the floor to the representative of China, who wishes to make a statement.

5. Mr. CHEN (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The delegation of the People's Republic of China is participating in the work of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. Yesterday we heard statements of welcome from many delegations and the head of our delegation has expressed our gratitude on behalf of the delegation. Today the delegation of the People's Republic of China has come here to participate in the work of the First Committee, and we thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your statement.

6. As we begin to participate in the work of the United Nations there will be a period of learning for us, so that we

may understand the actual workings of the United Nations. The representative of the People's Republic of China is ready to listen and to note the opinions and viewpoints of other delegations.

7. Mr. ANDERSEN (Denmark): This is the first time I have participated in the work of the United Nations in my present capacity. I am glad to have the opportunity to address this important Committee, an organ for both deliberation and constructive work in the most crucial fields of international co-operation. And may I add that it is indeed reassuring that the conduct of the work of the Committee is in the hands of a highly experienced diplomat, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, Mr. Tarabanov.

8. As the Chairman has already pointed out, this is the first time that the representative of the People's Republic of China has participated in a meeting of this Committee. Yesterday I had the privilege in the plenary meeting of welcoming the delegation of the People's Republic of China. I shall not repeat what I said then, but shall just re-emphasize that the Government of Denmark is gratified that China can now play its proper role in the United Nations.

9. The items on our agenda are concerned with disarmament and they are thus closely related to the over-all question of international peace and security. Therefore, and as this is the first time I have spoken in this Committee, I shall make a few brief observations on some of the great international problems which concern us all.

10. If we take a look at the international situation in general, cautious optimism is justified. Recent moves involving the great Powers could, if followed up in the same vein as they were conceived, serve to eradicate or ease tensions and antagonisms which have subsisted for a very long time.

11. In my part of the world—Europe—important developments are under way.

12. We trust that the conditions which will enable the United Kingdom and three other European countries, one of them Denmark, to join the European Communities will be fulfilled. It is indeed gratifying that after centuries of rivalries, instability, political tensions and sometimes, sad to say, even wars, European countries have united in a co-operation which should preclude any recurrence of that unfortunate state of affairs. We hope that when this broad European co-operation has become a reality Europe will be able to play a dynamic and positive role in the international community at large.

13. Another auspicious development in Europe is to be found in the progress towards a real *détente* between East and West, resulting primarily from the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, from the bilateral treaties concluded between the Federal Republic on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Poland on the other, and from negotiations on the intricate question of Berlin between the four great Powers concerned. If the negotiations now under way between the two States in Germany are likewise successful we may in the not too distant future be

witnessing further favourable developments on the European scene with respect to the normalization of relations between European States, the initiation of multilateral preparations for a conference on European security and co-operation, and perhaps a decrease in the level of military forces and armaments in Europe. Denmark will, within its capacities, contribute to those endeavours.

14. Unfortunately, there are parts of the world which do not enjoy stability and peace. In Viet-Nam fighting is still going on, although we may hope that new developments are under way. It is the firm conviction of the Danish Government that lasting peace in that country cannot be achieved through military means but only through a political solution based upon, and ensuring, the right of the people of Viet-Nam freely to determine their own future. It is the conviction of the new Danish Government that one way to promote a political solution would be to break the political isolation of North Viet-Nam.

15. Events in East Pakistan since March 1971 have created problems which are the concern of the international community in general. Therefore, I wish to commend the Secretary-General on his efforts to ease political tensions and to alleviate the widespread human suffering sustained by the East Pakistan refugees in India and by the population of East Pakistan. However, in spite of some unquestionable results of those efforts, the situation remains very serious indeed.

16. I believe that the Secretary-General pointed to the very core of the matter when, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization,¹ he said that the United Nations for its part must face up to the political and human realities of the situation, and that the basic problem can be solved only through a political solution based on reconciliation and respect for humanitarian principles. It is in this spirit that the Danish Government appeals, as others have done, to the Government of Pakistan for moderation and restraint with a view to bringing an end to violence in East Pakistan. Only a political settlement based on respect for human rights and on the freely expressed will of the people can solve the problems of East Pakistan.

17. As for the situation in the Middle East, we regret that for a very long time no discernible progress has been registered in the efforts to achieve a peaceful solution. No effort should be spared to bring the political endeavours out of the present deadlock, with a view to a just and lasting peace established in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of November 1967 and on the basis of the provisions and principles of that resolution.

18. I think it will readily be admitted that these various problems serve to demonstrate the vital importance of continued and determined efforts in the disarmament field—efforts in which we must all do our share, it being generally recognized, of course, that the greater the Power, the greater the responsibility. In this connexion, let me express the deep satisfaction of the Danish Government that the People's Republic of China has now taken its

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

rightful place in the United Nations. We have already welcomed the representatives of the People's Republic of China among us. Their presence will give our Organization greater relevance in dealing with the manifold problems before us, and in the particular field of disarmament the participation of all nuclear Powers in international negotiations is of course of vital importance.

19. In regard to the specific problems of disarmament, the first item on the agenda is that of general and complete disarmament. That is the ultimate goal and we should never lose sight of it. At the same time, we must accept that there are no prospects of reaching that goal in the foreseeable future. Energetic efforts must therefore be made with a view to further limited arrangements on the road towards the real objective, that of general and complete disarmament. Many such efforts have indeed been made, but it should not be concealed that the results achieved so far have been limited and slow in coming. We hope to see a change for the better in this trend and that results will be forthcoming speedily in the next few years. The present international situation would suggest that there is a realistic basis for a more fruitful development in the disarmament field than in the past.

20. The political and military dangers posed by the arms race and the enormous waste of resources caused by it are the primary factors to substantiate the claim that all countries, and in particular those which, because of their size, resources and military capabilities, are the most powerful, should make a genuine effort to promote developments in the disarmament field.

21. The Secretary-General's thought-provoking report on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security [A/8469 and Add.1] is a pertinent document in this respect.

22. I now wish to refer to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union. For obvious reasons, the two Powers have not been particularly communicative with respect to the substantial course of their deliberations. However, considering the weapons technology and capacity now at the disposal of these two Powers, and encouraged by the few public announcements they have made, we must be entitled to hope and expect that they will soon be able to present to the world some agreement which will serve as a first step to curb the strategic arms race.

23. The recently concluded agreements on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union and on measures to improve United States-Soviet Union direct-communications links give us further reason to believe that a general understanding on the major issues involved in SALT is developing and may lead to further achievements in the near future.

24. Turning once more to the multilateral deliberations on disarmament, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is of course the most important body for translating the efforts and thoughts of members of the international community into practical action. That the results achieved

so far have been limited does not detract from the merit of dedicated members of that Committee; it simply reflects certain hard facts of life.

25. However, it is indispensable that all Governments members of the international community should assume their fair share of the responsibility for disarmament and in order to do so they must, of course, have the opportunity to take part in the efforts to promote disarmament. Such opportunities are offered by the regular sessions of the General Assembly, and it is right that the United Nations should be at the centre of disarmament efforts.

26. The Soviet Union has now proposed that the General Assembly, during its present session, decide that a world disarmament conference be convened. We believe that such a conference, if—and I want to stress this—if properly prepared and arranged, may serve a number of useful purposes. It would emphasize, at the time of a likely momentum for positive international developments, that the responsibility for disarmament is indivisible. It would enable the participants to pool their ideas and policies in a setting where they could devote their interests exclusively to disarmament and from that exercise new and fruitful ideas and initiatives might well emerge.

27. With respect to the practical problems connected with the convening of a world disarmament conference, I wish to make one observation, namely, that such a conference should take place within the framework of the United Nations. As I have already said, it is incumbent upon the United Nations, both for its own sake and for the sake of the subject matter, to be in the focus of disarmament.

28. During the current year, the significant result of the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been the achievement of an agreement on a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A]. I would emphasize the last words, "on their destruction", because they show that this is an agreement on real disarmament, the first since the Second World War. It is an agreement limited in scope, but we certainly welcome it both because of the abhorrent nature of its subject matter, and because it represents a real disarmament measure.

29. The Government of Denmark would sincerely have hoped, as would many others, that agreement had been achieved not only with respect to biological and toxin weapons, but also with respect to chemical weapons in general. It is, however, an inescapable fact that the problems of control and verification in relation to chemical weapons are highly complicated, and they must of course be solved in a manner which is satisfactory to the *bona fide* security interests of all countries concerned. It will serve no useful purpose, indeed it could easily be counterproductive, to press for a comprehensive agreement, of which the control and verification clauses would be insufficient. In saying this, I certainly do not mean to imply that efforts to reach an agreement on chemical weapons could or should by any means be slackened. On the contrary, they should, in accordance with the draft convention on biological and toxin weapons, be pursued energetically and without any delay.

30. For a long time there has been no tangible progress towards a complete test ban through a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. The world is made apprehensive by the continuing nuclear arms tests, and is becoming weary of the seemingly endless delays in reaching agreement on a complete test ban. It would seem as if the technical aspects of the matter have by now been dealt with to such an extent and in such detail that bridging the gap in the question of verification is mainly a political matter. In view of this, and on the reasonable assumption that little or no real benefit is to be derived from further nuclear weapon tests, it would not be unreasonable to express the hope and, indeed, the conviction that the coming year will produce results in this field. Agreement on a complete test ban would contribute to *détente* in general; it would bolster the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]; and at the same time it would be an encouraging sign to the non-nuclear States, which have assumed specific obligations and restraints, that the nuclear Powers are prepared themselves to accept perceptible limitations on their activities in the nuclear weapons field.

31. In the meantime, Denmark would be prepared to support imaginative proposals of a limited character, provided they are transitional in the sense that they will bring us closer to a complete test ban, while in no way hampering progress towards that goal. One constructive measure would be for all countries which have worked on the problems of seismological detection to present the information available, in particular about the present stage of technology and about prospects for the immediate future, so that the international community as a whole could take stock of the situation.

32. Leaving aside the weapons of mass destruction, I shall not fail finally to touch upon another problem, the implications of which in our opinion need careful consideration. I refer to the conventional arms race, a problem to which my country, as you know, devotes great interest. There can be no doubt that a reduction and limitation, on proper terms, of conventional armaments would be highly beneficial to the international community as a whole. It would divert considerable resources to more useful purposes, and it could serve to ease tensions and to strengthen international security.

33. It is unfortunate, therefore, that there has so far been no progress in this field. We have, however, noted with great satisfaction that the question has recently been elaborated upon in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in this Committee. My Government shares the hope expressed by the United States representative that the subject be pursued in order to develop a better understanding of what might be practical. One possible way could be through regional approaches to conventional arms control as suggested in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by Sweden and others. The mutual balance force reduction exercise now under way in Europe could be a first practical example.

34. We welcome these pronouncements in the Conference as a recognition of the importance of the conventional arms problem. They are but a very modest lead. However, they point in the right direction and, when a development in this

field can be set in motion, my country will certainly contribute its full share in an effort to promote such endeavours. These would have to be based on a recognition of the interrelationship of the security of all countries and on a global consensus that there is an urgent need to check the conventional arms race and that for reasons of both equity and realism this can only be done on terms that are not discriminatory against, and do not prejudice, the security interests of any country.

35. I hope that my remarks have left you with a clear impression of the crucial importance which Denmark attaches to the problems of disarmament and related international problems. Any country in the world which brings about progress through concrete measures in the field of disarmament is acting in the service and in the true interest of all mankind.

36. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Mr. Andersen, for the statement he has just made to the First Committee. It was a privilege for the Committee to hear the views of his country expressed by him in this debate on general and complete disarmament.

37. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): This second United Nations General Assembly session of the Disarmament Decade comes at the end of a year which has undoubtedly witnessed some encouraging developments in the field of arms control and disarmament. Yet it must be admitted that, surveying the picture as a whole, the extent of progress reflected in this year's report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8457], which is before us on the agenda for our consideration, seems woefully inadequate in contrast with the known facts about the spiralling arms race, although the Committee in Geneva has undoubtedly proved its usefulness as a negotiating body.

38. Among the encouraging developments since the First Committee last met, I should like to mention four which, in our view, could augur well for progress in developing effective arms control and disarmament. Of primary and, indeed, historic importance is the decision by the General Assembly to seat representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China, to whose representatives the Canadian delegation extends a cordial welcome, and with whom we look forward to co-operating closely on disarmament matters.

39. Canada has been among those members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which have called repeatedly for the participation in disarmament negotiations of the Governments of all nuclear Powers, which at present happen to coincide with the permanent membership of the Security Council, recognizing as we do that progress in stemming or stopping the nuclear arms race must depend, in the first instance, upon the effective co-operation of the principal military Powers of the world. To some extent, the way has now been opened for such progress, and our long-standing task of really doing something effective in stemming or stopping the nuclear arms race, including putting an end to nuclear testing, can be tackled with renewed vigour.

40. A second encouraging development has been the completion of work in the Conference on another agree-

ment in the expanding system of international agreements to control the proliferation of new weapons, or of old weapons into new fields. Indeed, the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*ibid.*, annex A] represents the first measure of real disarmament yet concluded by the Committee on Disarmament and as such will, we hope, set a precedent for similar measures dealing with other weapons of mass destruction.

41. Although not yet brought to fruition, the continuing negotiations on limitations on strategic arms (SALT) also offer new grounds for hope. Canada welcomed the agreement reached by the United States and the Soviet Union last May, which defined the areas in which efforts would be concentrated during succeeding months, and views with satisfaction the two formal agreements on subsidiary issues concluded recently by those two Governments. An increasingly concerned world will be following the current session of SALT in Vienna in the expectation that reports may be forthcoming about more substantive agreements being concluded in the coming months.

42. The fourth area of encouragement in this admittedly non-comprehensive survey of arms control and disarmament is that of negotiations to reduce the confrontation of armed forces in Europe. The response by the Soviet Union last summer to NATO initiatives regarding a mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe appears to have opened the way for real progress towards effective arms control and eventually, we hope, disarmament measures, in an area of the world where international tensions in the past have brought on two world wars.

43. Despite these hopeful signs, however, there has been a singular and discouraging lack of progress in two basic aspects of the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and the existence of seemingly intractable problems in these areas tends to overshadow the limited progress which has proved possible. First, the best efforts of this body, of the Conference and of other international organizations in the field of arms control and disarmament have yet to reduce the massive expenditures channelled into the arms race. Realization of the futility of this competition in arms, which contributes nothing to world stability or to increased deterrence, is coupled with a growing recognition of the resultant waste of human and economic resources so sorely needed elsewhere. The report on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race prepared by the Secretary-General in response to General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV) [A/8469 and Add.1] demonstrates even more forcefully the necessity of imposing effective controls on all facets of the ever-broadening race to acquire more sophisticated and larger arsenals of weapons, both conventional and those of mass destruction.

44. Even more discouraging, particularly for those involved in direct negotiations to impose controls on the arms race, is the virtually unabated continuation of atmospheric nuclear testing by the non-parties to the partial test ban Treaty² and of underground nuclear testing by the parties

to that agreement. In resolution 2663 (XXV) last year the General Assembly recognized that the problem of nuclear testing required the highest priority attention and called upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to exert all possible efforts in this area, submitting a special report on their negotiations. This special report, included as Part III of the report of the Conference, demonstrates to those who read it that many members of the Committee on Disarmament devoted considerable attention to this issue during the 1971 sessions of the Committee, but it also makes clear that, because political and technical difficulties remain to be overcome, substantive progress was minimal. The continuation of nuclear arms tests has been described as the outward and visible sign of the expanding arms race in the field of nuclear weapons; it is the fuel which adds momentum to that race, and until it is possible to impose further restrictions and, hopefully, to ban such nuclear testing completely, the arms race will continue.

45. The Canadian delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the past year has devoted special attention to the problems involved in banning all nuclear tests. In our opening statement to the Committee on Disarmament on 25 February 1971, we urged that the Committee "explore the possibilities of a consensus on the various ways and means of achieving the objective of putting a stop or a limit to nuclear tests". [CCD/PV.496, para. 45.]

46. Here I would emphasize that the Canadian delegation shares, I believe, the preference of all non-nuclear countries for the stopping of all nuclear tests in all environments, including those conducted underground, without further delay. This desire on the part of the Canadian Government found its strongest expression in a resolution of the Canadian House of Commons adopted in virtual unanimity on 15 October 1971, which said in part: "calls on all nuclear Powers to cease all testing of nuclear devices". In introducing this resolution in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada pointed out that the world was becoming weary of the endless delays that were postponing a complete test ban and he urged renewed efforts to arrive at effective control of nuclear weapons.

47. The decision by the Government of Canada to reiterate a call for a total ban on the testing of nuclear devices was taken in full recognition that progress towards a complete ban would depend, in the first instance, on an improvement in international relations, especially among the super-Powers. It also took into account the necessity of accepting the fact that, in the world as it now exists, the balance of nuclear deterrence remains the foundation of the uneasy equilibrium which has averted major international conflict for more than 25 years. Canada also continues to urge that the most constructive approach in seeking a comprehensive ban is to study ways to narrow the existing differences of opinion on the means of providing effective assurance that all countries would comply with any comprehensive ban. We continue to believe that the potential role of seismological data exchange on an assured basis, as a contribution to verification, warrants further study and Canadian scientists have devoted additional attention to this issue during the past year. While, as these studies have demonstrated, the problem of verification

² Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

remains unresolved and while we continue to believe that the achievement of a total ban must await an acceptable solution of this problem, the problem has been scaled down to more manageable proportions. It remains for the major nuclear Powers now to take steps to bridge the remaining gap.

48. It is the firm belief of the Canadian delegation that the time has now arrived for a concerted effort to bring virtually unrestrained testing of nuclear weapons to a halt. Two specific conditions, which have been reached only now, reinforce this belief. The extensive effort which has gone into developing and assessing the capabilities for seismological detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions appears to have defined more clearly the extent of risk involved in using such means. Governments are now in a position to determine with more assurance what are the requirements for an effective verification system for a ban on testing. The second condition is the attainment of approximate strategic parity between the two major testing Powers. It is surely for these Powers then to decide whether mutual deterrence has now reached the point where efforts to upset the current strategic balance of an unrestrained testing situation might not involve greater danger of destabilization than the consequences of a few undetected low-yield evasions of any underground test ban.

49. The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, speaking to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 7 September 1971, pointed out that we could no longer delay a determined effort to reach a total ban on underground nuclear testing. We believe that the time has come when serious negotiations on this issue must be reinitiated, and we believe that the nuclear testing Powers bear a special responsibility in this regard. In addition to the proposals regarding a comprehensive test ban already before the Committee on Disarmament, fruitful discussions can be initiated only if the nuclear Powers put forward specific suggestions regarding such a treaty. Other steps are also possible. The Secretary of State of Canada went on to say that pending the achievement of an actual treaty:

"We believe that . . . all Members of the United Nations would wish to appeal to those Governments which are conducting nuclear tests to put restraints on the size as well as the numbers of tests they are now carrying out, and to announce such restraints . . . a simple concept that does not involve any complications." [CCD/PV.536, para. 48.]

This still remains the Canadian position.

50. Committee members will no doubt have noted that the Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization, after commenting that he considered a test ban the most important measure that could be taken to halt the nuclear arms race, went on to suggest that:

"a number of temporary transitional measures could be undertaken immediately to limit and reduce the magnitude and number of underground nuclear tests, and to phase them out, pending the achievement of a com-

prehensive agreement. Such transitional measures can certainly help to reduce the dangers and risks inherent in continued testing, while negotiations proceed urgently for the complete cessation of all tests except those that are permitted for peaceful purposes."³

51. Mounting public concern about the dangers of a continuing nuclear arms race demands from this session of the General Assembly, in our view, a special and major effort to point the way for progress towards ridding the world of the growing threat of a nuclear holocaust. Further delay could only exacerbate the tensions and fears on which the nuclear arms race has thrived. The fact that unrestrained atmospheric testing continues in Asia and in the Pacific, the startling growth in the size of the underground tests represented by the recent tests both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, and the figures published in the annual report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) demonstrating that the rate of nuclear testing has actually increased, all call the attention of the Assembly forcefully to this all-important testing issue. In this context the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly must not be satisfied with mere exhortations to the testing Powers to take the concerns of the world into account. We would hope that a concerned Assembly will bring forward a firm and precise resolution which would be sufficiently realistic to permit the expectation of some concrete results and which would adequately reflect the views of a world weary of delay, thus drawing to the attention of all testing Powers the necessity for early and effective action. The Canadian delegation stands ready to co-operate with other concerned delegations in developing such a resolution and in sponsoring it for approval by the General Assembly.

52. Turning to the second major issue which has involved the attention and efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the past session, I should like to comment briefly on progress achieved towards the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. In this area progress has been more encouraging.

53. Measures to reinforce and to supplement the Geneva Protocol⁴ have been under active consideration in the Committee on Disarmament since the delegation of the United Kingdom, on 10 July 1969, submitted a draft treaty to ban the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. Discussions during the succeeding months appeared to indicate that there was some measure of agreement that the problem of verification of any ban on chemical or biological weapons would require particular attention, but views differed on how to attack the general issues. At its last session, the General Assembly clarified this by adopting resolution 2662 (XXV) which took note of the proposals already before the Committee on Disarmament and called upon it to continue its consideration of the problem while commending the basic approach contained in a joint memorandum submitted on 25 August 1970 by

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 194.

⁴ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

the 12 non-aligned countries members of the Committee.⁵ This memorandum stressed the urgency of reaching agreement, suggested that both chemical and biological weapons "should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling" and recommended that verification, which remains the basic issue, should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures.

54. During its 1971 session, the Committee on Disarmament was in fact guided by this basic approach. However, when it became obvious that issues of substance, and particularly differences of views regarding possible verification measures, made agreement on a chemical weapons ban considerably more difficult than on a biological weapons ban, the Committee channelled its detailed negotiations towards completing a biological weapons ban treaty. At the same time, however, efforts continued towards resolving the verification issues as, for example, when the Committee on Disarmament met in an informal session with experts present on 7 July to focus attention on this particular issue of verification in the field of chemical weapons.

55. On 5 August agreed and parallel drafts of a biological weapons treaty were tabled in the Committee on Disarmament and from then until the session concluded on 30 September members directed their attention to negotiating improvements in these drafts. The 5 August drafts, which owed much to the proposals originally put forward by the delegation of the United Kingdom, in Canada's view required improvement or strengthening in four specific areas. These included the treatment of possible use of biological weapons, particularly stemming from reservations which many countries had attached to their ratification of the Geneva Protocol, the verification procedures which we wished to see as precise and adequate as possible, the definition of the term "toxins", which could be the basis for misunderstanding, and the desirability of ensuring that all nations possessing stockpiles of weapons to be prohibited in the convention should take action under article II within a reasonable time and inform other parties to the convention of such action, namely about destruction of their stockpiles.

56. On 28 September, the Co-Chairmen, together with 11 other members of the Committee on Disarmament, tabled a revised draft attached as annex A to that Committee's report, which is before us. At the outset I wish to reiterate that this draft bears the full support of the Canadian Government and that we consider it represents a carefully balanced and negotiated compromise which should prove generally acceptable to all Members of the General Assembly. Specifically, the Canadian delegation was happy to note that in preparing a final draft, the Co-Chairmen had taken fully into account the four concerns originally expressed by Canada, and that as it now stands the convention appears to reflect the views of virtually all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We would hope that this session of the General Assembly could commend the convention and that it will be opened for signature in the near future.

57. In the meantime, negotiations continue on a convention to ban the development, production and stockpiling of

chemical weapons. Article IX of the draft convention before us binds each party "to continue negotiations in good faith . . . on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction". Canada takes this commitment very seriously and proposes to co-operate fully with other members of the Conference in attempting to resolve the issues which have delayed so far the completion of such a treaty.

58. In the process of negotiation for the draft treaty before us now, the Canadian delegation provided the Conference, on 24 March 1970, with a declaration of Canadian policy and intentions with respect to chemical and biological warfare. This we did in the belief not that it could in any effective way substitute for a binding international convention, but that it could assist in the development of a consensus upon which further negotiations might be based. In that statement on the Canadian position, tear gas and other riot- and crowd-control agents were excluded from Canada's commitment not to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use any chemical weapons in warfare. This matter has in the meantime been given the most careful study by the Canadian authorities, and they have concluded that, as a contribution to further progress towards international agreement on the elimination of chemical warfare, Canada's reservations with regard to the use of these agents in war should be waived. Accordingly, I should like to read the following statement of Canada's position:

"The Government of Canada intends to contribute fully to the efforts of the United Nations and of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the possibility of chemical and biological warfare. Canada intends to participate actively in negotiations towards agreements which would supplement and strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925 by prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. Practical progress need not wait until the conclusion of these negotiations. The Protocol can be strengthened significantly through unilateral declarations of policy and intentions on the issues involved. For this purpose, the Government of Canada wishes to make known its attitude towards chemical and biological warfare.

"1. Canada never has had and does not now possess any biological weapons (or toxins) and does not intend to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons at any time in the future.

"2. Canada does not possess any chemical weapons other than devices of the type used for crowd- and riot-control purposes in many countries. Canada does not intend at any time in the future to use chemical weapons in war, or to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile such weapons for use in warfare unless these weapons should be used against the military forces or the civil population of Canada or its allies. The latter condition is in accordance with the reservations Canada entered at the time of our ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We would consider formally withdrawing our reservations if effective and verifiable agreements to destroy all stockpiles and prevent the development, production and acquisition of chemical weapons can be concluded."

⁵ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 39.*

59. I believe it is quite clear that this statement applies to all chemical and biological agents whether intended for use against persons, animals or plants.

60. In concluding, I wish to pledge the co-operation of the Canadian delegation in helping to work out resolutions which could command wide support and would, therefore, stand the best chance of being followed up with appropriate action.

61. Mr. VAN USSEL (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all discharge a pleasant duty and associate myself with the words of welcome which you addressed at the beginning of this meeting to the representatives of the People's Republic of China. On behalf of my delegation I would also like to submit our cordial congratulations to the representatives of China and express the conviction that the political Committee will, in its work, be able to avail itself of the constructive contribution of this important delegation.

62. Since the Second World War, work on disarmament has fallen into two periods. From 1945 to 1960 debates, dominated by sustained critical tension in Europe, hardly amounted to more than the dialectical confrontation of proposals, plans which were often ambitious but always rejected by the opposing side. No area of possible agreement emerged; no true negotiation could start.

63. The second period, which opened in the 1960s, on the contrary, was that of the progressive reduction of tension in Europe. It saw the birth in the field of disarmament of an international legislation of a new type in the form of treaties, so often mentioned that I do not need to cite them again, which already constitute a valuable asset for mankind. The task of negotiation is thus in hand and, after 10 years, has already borne some fruit. But it is a difficult task and probably the results will be achieved slowly. Work in this field particularly suffered from the fact that two nuclear Powers did not take part in these talks.

64. Today, when international political relations, especially in Europe, are characterized by dynamism and the quest for *détente*, now that the People's Republic of China has just entered our Organization, now that, as the Foreign Minister of Belgium said at the 1950th plenary meeting of the Assembly, "political behaviour is becoming increasingly realistic", are we not on the threshold of a third period in the work of disarmament?

65. No one can yet foresee the nature or the results of these future negotiations. But conditions may soon be met which will make it possible to hope for an acceleration in this work, for more substantial progress at a more sustained rate.

66. A formula which is well known in Europe and which characterized the present stages of the construction of Europe—completion, deepening and expansion—should soon be susceptible of application to our disarmament efforts. Completion first: the negotiating body must continue its task, if possible, without further delay. We know that several treaties could be established in fields where up to now the Committee on Disarmament has as yet been unable to arrive at any conclusion. Next, deepening: new

problems relating either to nuclear disarmament or to the neglected field of conventional weapons should become the object of dialogue and, if possible, of negotiations. Finally, expansion: the often expressed wish to see China and France take part in negotiations should soon be fulfilled. The necessary steps should be taken immediately so as to make possible the participation of all nuclear Powers.

67. It is imperative that the international community take advantage of the increasingly favourable political climate in order to press on with disarmament negotiations bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally.

68. In the latter case, with the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we have an instrument which, for 10 years, has proved its ability to prepare international treaties. We have had added proof this year with the draft relating to biological weapons. And we took as a valuable indication the assurance given by Mr. Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the USSR—and repeated by Mr. Malik in the General Assembly—that a future world disarmament conference would in no way detract from the importance of bodies where negotiations are already taking place.

69. In our view, a corollary of the goal of general and complete disarmament is that efforts at negotiation must be made by all and must be widened to include all fields and all types of weapons.

70. The advantages of an agreement prohibiting the production of biological weapons would certainly be lessened if it were not supplemented by a treaty relating to chemical weapons. By the same token, regional measures and global agreements are but different facets of the same collective effort. And nuclear disarmament, imperative as it may be, would lose some of its significance if one did not at the same time tackle conventional weapons.

71. The report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race [A/8469] states in paragraph 5 of the introduction that "by far the largest part of the total of military expenditures which is devoted to equipment is, however, consumed in the development, production and purchase of conventional weapons . . . This generalization applies as much to the nuclear Powers as to the non-nuclear States."

72. Therefore, the financial burden of armaments comes first of all from conventional weapons. This obliges us to devote some thought to the best way to control, limit and reduce this wide and diversified arsenal through regional means or world agreements. Recently, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, a proposal was made that there should be an exchange of views on conventional weapons. We think that this exchange should take place. It would make it possible better to identify the problems and the possible solutions in a field whose political and technical complexities we would not seek to disguise.

73. Regional disarmament could also, in the future, play a greater part in our work. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, in the general debate in the Assembly, stressed that "the aims of the Charter can be achieved concurrently with the action of the central institutions of the United Nations through agreements and regional organizations

created on the spontaneous initiative of countries grouped in a given zone." [1950th plenary meeting, para. 203.] These words can, of course, apply to regional disarmament agreements, as they cannot be dissociated from the political life of regions which often have their own rules of balance and co-operation.

74. Western Europe, for its part, committed to moving toward *détente* and co-operation, is about to open a serious dialogue on mutual and balanced reduction of forces on the continent. Fourteen Western countries, in October, named a representative whom they entrusted with the task of undertaking exploratory talks with the Governments concerned. It is the wish of our peoples and our Governments that this initiative should bear fruit and pave the way to negotiations whose objectives would be in keeping with those of a conference on European co-operation and security.

75. The example of Europe is remarkable as it proves that in a given region, what was inconceivable yesterday can soon become possible because of an evolution in political thought and situations.

76. The Treaty of Tlatelolco,⁶ as well as the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted in 1964 by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity,⁷ have also pointed to a road to be travelled in the nuclear field.

77. Our appeal for an exchange of views on the limitation of conventional weapons does not make us forget the essential importance of nuclear disarmament whose key-stone remains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII) annex]. This text is much too valuable an asset for us to fail to protect it with energy. Over and above its implementation—which we welcomed some time ago—for this Treaty to become a political reality accepted by all, three conditions have to be met: first, the International Atomic Energy Agency must pursue the remarkable work in which it is engaged in the preparation of agreements on guarantees as well as the international service for peaceful explosions. At a time when the fourth international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, which was held in September in Geneva, has revealed the prospects for the uses of the atom in the service of peace and development, it is important for us to support the activities of the Agency, which guarantees the access of non-nuclear Powers to the benefits of nuclear energy. The second condition for the success of the Treaty is the adherence of all non-nuclear States and negotiation by each one of them of an agreement on guarantees. For our part, we are most happy that EURATOM, to which Belgium is a party, should have been able to undertake talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to concluding such an agreement. Our wish is that the propitious climate existing at present will lead to the speediest possible completion of these talks. Then Belgium will be able to ratify the Treaty which it has already signed. The third condition—the last but not least—for the success

of the Treaty has to do with the nuclear Powers. Without effective measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, the risk will increase of seeing the Treaty remain incomplete or a dead letter. This is why we hope that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) will as soon as possible lead to a first agreement on limitation.

78. Similarly, negotiations for the cessation of nuclear tests should be actively pursued. Of course, the conditions necessary for an agreement have not yet been met. For example, no definition has yet been reached of the bases for an adequate and generally acceptable monitoring system. We reserve our right to express our views on these aspects of the negotiations when this specific item is taken up by our Committee. Our ultimate desire would be to see, as soon as possible, the complete cessation of tests in all environments, with the participation of all nuclear Powers, which have to assume a collective responsibility at a time when the world is showing a healthy awareness of ecological phenomena.

79. This brings me to the end of my general comments, and I should like to reserve our right to return to specific points as they come up for discussion.

80. Belgium will have occasion subsequently to give the various reasons why it is satisfied with the new draft treaty prepared by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating to bacteriological and toxin weapons [A/8457, annex A]. We shall also say that we consider it an imperative duty to try to achieve an agreement on chemical weapons as soon as possible; but we shall probably never reach this objective if we constantly ignore the technical aspects raised by the problem of control.

81. International co-operation, renunciation of force, reduction of tensions, disarmament measures, are but the different components of one and the same movement towards a world where relations would be based on respect for sovereignty and mutual trust. Belgium considers that the time has come to pursue our efforts with a view to attaining this objective, which is precisely the objective our Organization has set itself.

82. The present session of the General Assembly is important—I would even venture to say that it is more important than the previous ones—because of the problems with which we have to deal.

83. At the beginning I raised a question which is a matter of concern to all of us: are we in the field of disarmament going to enter into a new era of more fruitful negotiations, of more sustained work, of more substantial results? One can only hope that at the end of our work we shall be able to answer this question in the affirmative.

84. Mr. AKWEI (Ghana): May I first tell our colleagues from the People's Republic of China how very happy we are in the delegation of Ghana to see them take their place in our midst to participate in the work of this Committee.

85. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is to be congratulated for producing its report, contained in document A/8457, which my delegation has studied carefully. I should first like to make some remarks of a general nature about this report.

⁶ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

86. I note that the report is dated 6 October 1971, although it was not received until some time after this date. This has been a perennial complaint of small delegations like mine, as well as of delegations which do not serve on the Committee on Disarmament. If we are expected to express in this Committee the considered views of our Governments on important international agreements on disarmament such as the present draft convention on bacteriological weapons included in the report, then the report of the Committee on Disarmament should be submitted in time enough beforehand to enable our Governments to give it serious study and issue appropriate instructions to us. As it is, my Government has not had the time to study this report and I am sure many other delegations are in a similar position. We should not like to believe that the tendency of the super-Powers is to ram through draft international agreements from the Committee on Disarmament to sessions of the General Assembly, without wishing to consider any possible amendments from the General Assembly and its Committees. This was how they organized the adoption of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space [*resolution 2345 (XXII), annex*] in 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] in 1968. The adverse reactions to those methods from this Committee made those Powers give greater consideration to amendments and proposals from the non-aligned members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, a development which we welcome most heartily. But to think that, after consideration of such amendments in the Committee on Disarmament, there is no longer any need to consider any more amendments in the First Committee, or to reconsider old amendments which the majority of us might think beneficial, is to fall into a grave error. It would be wrong to reduce this Committee to the status of a rubber stamp, merely receiving urgent appeals from the great Powers to urge our Governments to ratify agreements sponsored by them. We therefore appeal to the super-Powers to show some accommodation by accepting the possibility that, after all the discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, there is still the possibility, perhaps the necessity, of improving texts submitted by the Geneva Conference in the First Committee if such improvements command the support of the overwhelming majority among us.

87. I have made these remarks in order to make two recommendations: first, that the Committee on Disarmament should organize itself in such a way that it can issue its report before the beginning of every Assembly session so that adequate time is given to Governments to consider it seriously; and secondly, to register my delegation's support in advance for proposals which have been made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or which are likely to be made in this Committee to improve the text of the draft convention on bacteriological (biological) weapons.

88. In this respect, we endorse and support the proposal of several non-aligned members of the Committee on Disarmament to include a clause stipulating that savings from disarmament should be channelled to economic and social development, particularly of developing countries.

89. We do not understand the difficulty in accepting such a proposal. After all, we have accepted it in principle in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*]. We have similarly accepted the principle of it in the Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations [*resolution 2627 (XXV)*] and in the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*]. Unless those Declarations are to remain mere platitudes, we should try to match our words with deeds. The developed countries should therefore not object to the incorporation of this proposal into the draft convention under consideration. Either we are truly stepping out on a new road where we accept the link between disarmament, security and development, or we are not. Such deception cannot be condoned by the developing world.

90. Let me now touch on a matter which the Secretary-General has referred to in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization, about one aspect of the working methods of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The Secretary-General said:

"The institution of the co-chairmanship is rather unique in United Nations practice and indeed very rare on the entire international scene. . . . There appears to be considerable sentiment among the Members of the Conference, however, that its work and achievements might be better promoted if the number of co-chairmen were to be expanded. . . . It would accordingly seem that the addition of a non-aligned co-chairman might provide more balanced leadership and ensure that all points of view were more truly reflected in the guidance given to the Conference . . . a change in the co-chairmanship, such as I am suggesting, might also tend to facilitate the reaching of agreement among the 25 members who participate in the Conference. I would accordingly hope that this idea will be given full consideration."⁸

91. The Ghana delegation fully supports the Secretary-General's suggestion and cannot in fact understand why such a change has not been achieved earlier. Does this practice of exclusive co-chairmanship not lend credence to the widely held belief that the super-Powers have, for reasons of their own, probably sought to control the deliberations of the Conference? The practice of the two co-chairmen holding their own meetings unattended by other members of the Conference is dangerous and not calculated to promote confidence and equal participation in the work of the Conference.

92. My third general comment on the report of the Conference relates to the indexing of the annexes in the contents. It would be very helpful for reference purposes if the titles of all the annexes as well as the pages where these can be found were to be inserted in the contents. As it is now, a lot of time is wasted in tracking down particular annexes.

93. I shall now deal with the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on

⁸ *Ibid.*, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 52.

their destruction [A/8457, annex A]. The Conference is to be congratulated on producing, at long last, a genuine disarmament measure. All the measures we have achieved in the last 25 years can be described as arms limitation or control measures. We hope, therefore, that this long-delayed progress on real disarmament, starting with the draft convention now under consideration, will be pursued resolutely in all fields in order to reach quickly the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

94. It is for this reason that, while congratulating the Conference, we cannot but express our disappointment at its inability to submit a draft convention dealing simultaneously with both chemical and bacteriological weapons. In this respect General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV) was quite specific in stating that "both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together" and in requesting "the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue its consideration of the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare, with a view to prohibiting urgently the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons and to their elimination from the arsenals of all States".

95. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament does not explain why that approach was not adopted, or which members opposed that approach. It merely refers vaguely to the emergence of a consensus in favour of a convention on bacteriological weapons only, while in the world press we have read several comments as to the source of the opposition to a convention dealing with both chemical and bacteriological weapons. Unless such explanations are clearly and honestly stated in the report, confidence in the Conference might well be adversely affected.

96. We note, however, that article IX of the draft convention stipulates that parties to the convention affirm

"the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, [undertake] to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction . . ."

97. The Ghana delegation considers that immediate negotiations towards that end should be undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament and, further, that until such agreement is reached a voluntary good-faith moratorium be accepted by the military Powers concerned on the development, acquisition, stockpiling and use of such weapons. The Ghana delegation equally believes that the link between the present draft convention and the expected one on chemical weapons is not stated strongly and clearly enough in the draft convention under consideration and would therefore support the incorporation in the draft convention of the Mexican proposal [A/C.1/L.578] to that end.

98. There is also the problem of verification of implementation of the draft convention which, in our view, has not been adequately dealt with by the Conference. All we have in the draft convention is provision for consultation and

co-operation in applying the provisions of the convention. What does that mean, and how does it create confidence in the minds of parties to the convention that some other party is not cheating? Thus the whole verification and enforcement of the convention seems to be based on trust and not on supervision by a specific machinery. This is a serious defect of the draft convention and may well cause suspicion which could preclude the honest implementation of its provisions by some parties to it.

99. Indeed, this defect regarding verification may be a direct cause of the inclusion of the "withdrawal right" clause in article XIII of the draft convention—a right that we consider most dangerous. One would have thought that the convention would not envisage the exercise of the right of withdrawal, since its exercise by one party might well spiral an automatic exercise by other parties, thereby jeopardizing the whole effectiveness of the convention. My delegation would have wished that a suitable amendment might have been considered by which, if the right of withdrawal was to be exercised at all, procedures would have been established by which the problem posed by the so-called "extraordinary events" would be promptly and effectively solved; but all that the article stipulates is that the extraordinary events will be reported. For what action? This right of withdrawal, in any case, negates the intent of article I that each party to the convention undertakes "...never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain [such bacteriological weapons]".

100. We consider that the whole approach to the problem of verification and enforcement in this draft convention is inadequate and dangerous, because if it is accepted now it is likely to be incorporated into other disarmament measures that are likely to come before this Assembly in the future. It is therefore important to consider the possibility of improving the verification procedures of the convention at this session. Some good proposals have already been made in that direction, particularly the Swedish proposal in document CCD/322 [A/8457 annex C, sect. 5], with which my delegation is in sympathy. My delegation supports whole-heartedly the principle of consultation and challenge and the need, at some stage, of carrying out on-site inspections. We are aware of the problem surrounding such inspections, but we believe the risks of having none are greater than the risks of having some. In this respect the use of the services of a presumed impartial person, such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, should go a long way towards eliminating any fears of espionage or sabotage.

101. We do not consider that invoking the use of the Security Council to investigate complaints of breaches of the convention gives equal protection to the non-permanent members of the Security Council and other Members of the United Nations. The protection of the veto for the permanent members makes this clause a most inequitable, if not an ineffective, procedure.

102. I have already stated my delegation's position on the inclusion of an appropriate clause stipulating that savings from disarmament under the convention should be used for development, and I shall therefore not repeat myself.

103. The draft convention further protects the status of the 1925 Geneva Protocol⁹ in all its aspects. Thus, that protection relates also to the reservations which form an integral part of that Protocol. We consider that none of those reservations should be allowed to subsist and agreement must therefore be reached by which they can be nullified. Perhaps a paragraph could be included in the resolution to be adopted on the subject by which States parties to the convention would renounce those reservations. We do not, however, see such renunciation being generally accepted in the absence of adequate verification procedures to ensure that all parties to the convention would actually destroy their stocks of bacteriological weapons.

104. My delegation believes that the draft convention is the product of a painstaking process of accommodation, but cannot accept that it could not be improved upon. We would hope that all delegations would exert themselves in that direction, so that we would have a good model for other disarmament measures which we anxiously expect to follow. My delegation's attitude to the draft convention will depend upon how far such improvement of the text is made possible.

105. I shall now address myself to the item entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests". The section of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament dealing with this question is most disappointing. Despite several proposals from the non-aligned members of the Conference, no progress seems to have been made on this issue.

106. The whole world knows that there is only one area of the earth today where most of the big nuclear tests still continue—underground. Our objective is to get all the nuclear Powers to stop testing in that area as well as elsewhere. The continued testing underground by the advanced nuclear Powers of bigger and yet bigger nuclear warheads can only be recognized by the outside world as a contemptuous rebuff to the deepest yearnings of mankind. The recent underground testing on Amchitka by the United States of an allegedly 5-megaton warhead, 250 times the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, as well as other similar tests by the Soviet Union, cannot but shock all mankind. What is the justification for continuing those tests, when the super-Powers are known to have many times more over-kill capacity now? Surely they cannot want to blow up the world?

107. The problem still remains the question of verification. The United States still maintains that a number of on-site inspections will be needed to ensure compliance with a comprehensive test ban. The Soviet Union still maintains its adherence to national verification procedures. The compromise Swedish proposal, which my delegation supports, that there is enough instrumental sophistication to detect, nationally, major underground explosions perhaps above the seismological magnitude of 4.75 could be combined with the proposal which seemed to be almost acceptable to the super-Powers in 1963 of some three

on-site inspections a year, to bring the two super-Powers together in considering the banning of all nuclear explosions above the 4.75 magnitude. That could be further strengthened by the exchange of seismological data and a moratorium on all tests by the end of 1972.

108. Thus, until a comprehensive test ban treaty is achieved, such transitional steps as described above can be taken immediately "to limit and reduce the magnitude and number of underground nuclear tests, and to phase them out". The foregoing are the words of the Secretary-General in paragraph 194 of the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization. And he speaks for all of us when, in the same paragraph, he says that "the achievement of a comprehensive test ban" is "the most important measure that can be taken to halt the nuclear arms race". This session of the General Assembly should issue a firm call to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to develop these temporary transitional measures as a matter of priority for immediate acceptance by the nuclear Powers while negotiations continue for a comprehensive test ban treaty. The super-Powers will do well to bear in mind that unless they take the initiative to make comprehensive the present partial nuclear test ban, other nuclear Powers which feel threatened by the continued testing of sophisticated nuclear warheads underground by the super-Powers will not hesitate to test in all environments in order to eliminate the gap in nuclear armaments between them and the super-Powers. My delegation believes that unless steps are taken soon to secure the participation of France and the People's Republic of China in nuclear-weapons negotiations, the whole prospect of nuclear disarmament might deteriorate with tragic consequences to mankind. This is why it is most appropriate to examine closely the new Soviet item of a world disarmament conference, a subject on which my delegation will give its views in the appropriate forum.

109. The item dealing with the economic and social consequences of the armaments race is a most timely one, and the Secretary-General's report on the subject [*A/8469 and Add.1*], prepared with the assistance of consultant experts of high calibre, is one which should be periodically reviewed by the Assembly and given the widest possible dissemination. This is necessary in order, as the Secretary-General himself says in paragraph 193 of the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization to "convince people and their leaders that they must begin to rearrange their national and international priorities and concentrate their resources and energies on the solution of the staggering economic and social problems facing humanity, rather than on the feverish accumulation of the means for destroying life and society on our planet".

110. For the world to have spent \$1,900 thousand million on armaments during the period 1961-1970 and to contemplate spending some \$750 thousand million more than this amount for the period 1970-1980, is nothing short of madness. Particularly is this so when we are faced with the fact that the political and security problems that may well have spiralled this escalation in arms expenditures are no nearer solution today than before, because of such huge expenditures of armaments. Is it not the path of wisdom, therefore, to try other and safer means of solving these political and security problems? The delegation of Ghana therefore unreservedly supports the following four conclu-

⁹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

sions of the panel of experts proclaiming the urgent need for: first, a substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all countries as soon as possible, particularly of those whose military expenditures are highest; secondly, all countries to share in the responsibility of achieving this goal, thirdly, a halt in the arms race so as to bring about an increase in the economic and social development of all countries; and fourthly, a periodic review by the Secretary-General of the facts relating to armaments and their economic and social consequences.

111. On the question of general and complete disarmament, a careful study of the report of the Committee on Disarmament shows clearly how little attention has been given to this subject in preference to collateral measures. What we have been witnessing since 1962 is a virtual retreat from serious measures of general and complete disarmament which, after all, is the real goal of all disarmament efforts. It is particularly revealing that virtually all the initiatives that were taken on this subject were taken by the non-aligned members of the Conference, not the super-Powers. This regrettable trend must be reversed; and we support the proposal of Italy that general and complete disarmament should form the main item on the agenda of the Conference at its next session, and that for this a working group might be established. We would support the idea proposed by many of the non-aligned members of the Conference that such discussion on the subject of general and complete disarmament might be open to all militarily important States, including all nuclear-weapon States.

112. We believe enough material exists to make such a resumption of discussions on general and complete disarmament both possible and useful. The Zorin-McCloy principles of 1961, the USSR and United States draft treaties of 1962, the proposals submitted by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia, and those of Italy, are all worth considering. This subject may well spill over into the item on a world disarmament conference, on which my delegation will state its position formally. Suffice it to say that we consider general and complete disarmament more important than any collateral measures of disarmament. The world must turn its direction now or face incalculable disaster.

113. The question of further demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor is also outstanding on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation supports the view of the Soviet Union and Sweden, that it is urgent to act without delay in this area if the sea-bed and ocean floor are to be secured for peaceful purposes only, for once the arms race in conventional weapons starts there—as developments seem to indicate will soon take place, if it has not already done so—it would be as difficult to stop it there as it has proved to be on earth. Here again there does not seem to have been any negotiation on the issue in the Conference. According to the report of the Conference, only proposals were made by certain delegations. My delegation would like the report to clarify what discussions were held on those proposals and what conclusions, if any, were arrived at by the Conference.

114. My delegation is not impressed by the present rate of progress on this most important problem of disarmament, which has rightly been described as the “question of questions”; until the negotiations in the Committee on

Disarmament are brought face to face with the world at large, we feel that the slow progress will continue and may well prevent any prospect of solution of this wasteful exercise of the arms race. The Secretary-General has stated that we have perhaps only 10 years to solve this problem, after which we may well lose all capacity to solve it. My delegation hopes that this sense of urgency can be translated into the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

115. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Since this is the first time that I have spoken here, and, furthermore, since I have had the privilege of being able to call myself doubly a colleague of yours, as we have worked together both here in the Assembly and in the Geneva Committee, I trust that you will bear with me if I repeat the congratulations addressed to you by other spokesmen for Mexico and if I mention, too, how felicitous we believe the choice of the Assembly to have been when it elected you to preside over the work of this Committee for the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

116. The statement that I am going to deliver will deal exclusively with item 28 of the agenda, namely, the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. At later meetings I shall make known the views of my delegation on a number of other items touching on disarmament which appear on the agenda of the First Committee.

117. May I first of all recall that the fundamental reasons for the unshakable position that we have adopted in this matter could be summarized as follows.

118. First, we consider that the question of the total prohibition of the use of chemical and microbiological weapons is something that has already been definitively settled in resolution 2603 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which the General Assembly declared that the use of such weapons would be contrary to the tenets of generally recognized international law embodied in the Geneva Protocol,¹⁰ and also defined the scope of that prohibition when it stated that it included any chemical and biological means of warfare, without exception.

119. Secondly, we believe that the same reasons which in 1925 militated in favour of a joint prohibition being placed on both types of weapons—chemical and biological—still exist today for us, and that we should therefore follow the same path of jointly prohibiting their development, production and stockpiling, as well as their elimination from the arsenals of all States, in accordance with the basic approach suggested and approved by the General Assembly in resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970.

120. Thirdly, regarding means of verification and the requirements which such means should fulfil in order to be termed acceptable, in the light of the impossibility of being 100 per cent certain in the case of chemical and microbiological weapons, we believe that we should consider acceptable any system of verification which offers reasonable safeguards of observance of the provisions of the convention, without claiming to achieve perfection, which

¹⁰ *Idem*.

appears impossible. In order correctly to assess such a system, we would, furthermore, have to take into account not only the intrinsic efficiency of that system, but the very considerable supplementary scope of national means of detection which we all know States to possess—and, particularly, the very few Powers that possess those ghastly weapons of mass destruction.

121. On the basis of these considerations, my delegation remains convinced that without any formal or substantive difficulties for the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction—which, may I say parenthetically, appears in annex A to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8457] and which was submitted to this Committee at the 1827th meeting by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, the principal authors of that draft—the necessary modifications could be worked out so that the convention would apply not only to microbiological and toxin weapons but also to chemical weapons.

122. We are grateful for the improvements that we find in the draft convention over previous drafts, but I think we ought to recall that these improvements are due, to a large extent, to the efforts made by the group of non-aligned countries members of the Committee on Disarmament. We are also fully aware that the draft convention constitutes the first case in which the two super-Powers have come to an agreement on an authentic disarmament measure, although, as we know, it is a document which covers the destruction of weapons which experts had already decided were unusable.

123. It is for this reason that in Geneva we did not oppose, and we shall not oppose here, efforts being made to follow a procedure of successive prohibitions in two different instruments, one of microbiological weapons and the other of chemical weapons. However, as we said in the Committee on Disarmament and as we believe necessary to repeat here, we are convinced that we should endeavour to see that the ties that exist between the convention dealing with microbiological weapons and that which must inevitably supplement it in the near future, namely, the convention on chemical weapons, should be as close and solid as possible and should not be limited to a mere expression of good intentions, of which latter the example of the preamble of the Moscow Treaty¹¹ has made us somewhat sceptical.

124. That was the reason why the Mexican delegation decided to join the 11 non-aligned delegations when on 17 August 1971 they submitted a number of amendments in a working paper [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 23], among which was one that led to article IX of the draft convention expressly stating that “the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons” and also the commitment to “continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction”.

¹¹ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

125. Another result of this presentation was the fact that on 24 August the Mexican delegation submitted a working paper on the same subject [*ibid.*, sect. 28] in Geneva. Since, as we see it, that proposal is still appropriate and pertinent, we have asked that it be circulated to the First Committee as a document which is numbered A/C.1/L.578. The proposal in itself is extremely simple and the text of the new article which we would suggest be added is self-explanatory since it merely reads as follows:

“Pending the agreement referred to in article IX, the States Parties to this Convention undertake to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which because of their degree of toxicity have the highest lethal effects. The agents in question are listed in the Protocol annexed to this Convention.”

Naturally, the inclusion of this article, which would then be numbered X, would call for a resulting renumbering of subsequent articles of the Treaty.

126. We believe that the adoption of the moratorium we have proposed on the specific category of chemical weapons has numerous advantages and we can think of no obstacle. Among the advantages we should cite the fact that if it did not spell the elimination at least it would spell the freezing of a more or less wide group of chemical agents for weapons purposes which, because of their degree of toxicity, are more dangerous and cannot be used for peaceful purposes—such as the so-called neuro-toxic agents. It also has an advantage which cannot be overlooked and that is, that that moratorium would give convincing proof on the part of those Powers that possess chemical weapons of the fact that they are truly ready to ensure that the commitments referred to in article IX will not be merely paper ones but will be implemented as speedily as possible.

127. When I say that I can see no objection to the adoption of that paragraph, I would say that the question of verification, which has been the main argument adduced against the total prohibition of chemical weapons, does not seem appropriate in this case, since a system of control that might be accepted as satisfactory to guarantee the prohibition of all microbiological weapons and of all toxins must obviously also be so to supervise the simple freezing of those chemical and super-toxic agents that have no civilian or peaceful uses. Nor does there appear to be any difficulty in coming to an agreement on an initial list that, however short, would include such agents, since there is ample documentation in the reports on chemical and microbiological weapons by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare such a list, and we might also turn to the reports from the World Health Organization and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). There are, furthermore, very valuable working documents submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the delegation of Japan,¹² the delegation of the Netherlands [*ibid.*, sect. 3] and that of Sweden [*ibid.*, sect. 5].

128. The fact that that initial list which, I must stress, by its selective character could be prepared immediately and

¹² *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 30.

without too much difficulty, would be annexed in a protocol to the convention and not included in the body of the convention itself would allow for later revisions with the assistance of experts until the list could be made as complete as possible, as suggested in the working paper submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the delegation of Italy [*ibid.*, sect. 17].

129. We would venture to hope that the large majority of States—in fact more than 100 in number—that for the first time will be able to consider our proposal, since they did not participate in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, will share the view that I have just outlined. We trust that they will find our views well founded. That specifically was the case for the representative of Ghana, Ambassador Akwei, and may I parenthetically express the appreciation of my delegation for the very valuable support he has given our suggestion. But, I trust that the other delegations in our Committee will find that our views are well founded for, since it has not been possible thus far to achieve a draft convention that will provide for the simultaneous elimination of microbiological and chemical weapons, the international community has the right at least to insist that, in the instrument devoted exclusively to the former, provision be made to cover the latter, whose military value and possibilities of utilization are much greater; that certain acts be performed even though they be so limited as to be merely of a symbolic nature but that nevertheless will lend credibility to the promises that have been given.

130. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement as well as for the congratulations which he addressed to the Chairman.

131. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): As the Chairman of the Asian group of States for the month of November, may I welcome the representatives of China to the First Committee. Now with China's vigorous participation in the work of the United Nations, the road to world peace has become wider, the prospects for complete disarmament are bright and the search for international security flushes with hope. Our heartfelt felicitations are combined with unlimited optimism that China's presence will give our deliberations a strong drive towards achieving the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

132. This year the Committee discusses disarmament in a propitious atmosphere which the world has hardly known before.

133. Early this year the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*] was completed, and more than 80 countries have already signed it. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America¹³ was also signed, and we hope that other major Powers will sign the Treaty, and that those who have already signed it will ratify it.

134. The Soviet Union and the United States agreed last May to give priority to an anti-ballistic missile limitation. This agreement ignited some hope that negotiations on detailed and substantive aspects of anti-ballistic missile limitation would achieve concrete results. In February 1971, President Nixon emphasized the United States' determination to seek a comprehensive agreement rather than a simple ABM limitation. But the policy of compromise, which has been characterizing the stands of the two super-Powers, has brought an agreement from both sides to give priority to ABM limitation.

135. Both the Soviet Union and the United States declared last May in Vienna that they "would concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons". On 30 September this year, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to reduce the danger of nuclear outbreak, by taking measures to improve the direct-communication link between Moscow and Washington.

136. We have before us a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons [*A/8457, annex A*]. In his statement at the 1827th meeting, Mr. Bush said that the draft was in the interest of all mankind; the representative of the Soviet Union said that his delegation would ask the General Assembly to approve the draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and to appeal to all States to sign this most important international agreement at an early date.

137. All these developments which took place during the last few months engender the hope that the world is on the threshold of a decade of disarmament. Achievements which had been dreams in the past have become concrete facts. The credit should go to the compromising spirit of the super-Powers and to the steadfastness and perseverance of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

138. However, there are still major differences between the super-Powers in regard to a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and a convention on prohibition of chemical weapons. The United States insists on establishing an international inspection system to detect any underground test, and to verify the liquidation of chemical weapons. In the view of the Soviet Union, a national system of detection is quite sufficient to verify the test. It is indeed a confusing argument, and we do not know whom we believe.

139. At one time, the United States administration justified underground explosions as being necessary for a "confidence test", and not because of the inability to detect others' explosions. A distinguished scientist, Dr. Herbert York, former Pentagon Research Chief, maintains that the safeguard test was unnecessary and that the test programme in general merely serves to perpetuate an arms race between nations already possessed of more than enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other.

¹³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

140. Another distinguished nuclear physicist, Mr. Ralph E. Lapp, wrote in *The New York Times* on 14 November 1971 that:

“to monitor Soviet tests, the United States has spent more than \$300 million since 1963, and in the past three months huge new seismic stations have been put in operation in Norway, Alaska and Montana. This hide-and-seek technology is an elaborate game which will be of critical importance should the nations of the world attempt to extend the present test treaty to a total ban on all tests, above and below ground.”

141. Needless to say, it is not the insufficiency of national detection systems that has hampered the realization of a treaty banning underground tests, nor is it the implications embedded in an international system of verification, it is indeed the lack of political will.

142. The representative of Mexico in this Committee last year eloquently expressed the dim view of the majority on this endless controversy when he said that there was no single system with which 100 per cent certainty could be obtained; the impossibility of obtaining such certainty in the case of chemical and microbiological weapons should not be an obstacle to the prohibition of their development, as it had never been an obstacle to the conclusion of various multilateral instruments on disarmament measures which are at present in force.

143. It should be noted that under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] the super-Powers promised to pursue “negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the arms race at an early date”. The commitment of the signatories of the Moscow Treaty¹⁴ is clearly stated in the preamble: “seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and in their determination to continue negotiations to this end”.

144. The road towards complete disarmament is an arduous one, unless all nations, especially the super-Powers, cast aside unwarranted fears and suspicion and proceed with determination towards achieving essential security. The Secretary-General wrote in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization “disarmament must remain unattainable and all blueprints remain scraps of paper”¹⁵ if this fear and mutual suspicion is not dispelled.

145. Last year the representative of Romania in this Committee brought the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security to the consideration of the Committee. The representative of Brazil rightly pointed out that if 1 per cent of the world defence budgets was directed to the budget of the United Nations Development Programme, its activities would be increased tenfold, or more, as the expenditure on arms this year is around \$220 thousand million. The report of the Secretary-General on various costs of the arms race [*A/8469 and Add.1*] has emphasized the urgent need for an immediate halt in a mad arms race.

¹⁴ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 44.

146. Some countries, however small they are, still maintain their national security by virtue of might. The arms race in the Middle East reigns supreme. Nations which need the money allotted to arms to eradicate poverty, disease, and ignorance are compelled to divert a huge amount of their national budgets to buy arms and maintain large armies, as their security is at stake. Egypt, Jordan, Syria and all Arab countries, including my own, feel the strain of the huge sums diverted to arms. The plight of our region is the uprooting, dispossession and deprivation of the Palestinian people. Injustice breeds violence, expansion engenders fear, occupation necessitates resistance, and resistance means arms. That is the interminable vicious circle that has befallen the region, and any region where oppression and injustice prevail.

147. The origin of the conflict in our area is simply this: “to be or not to be”, to live in peace based on justice, or to defy the occupation and injustice and drift into a malevolent drama.

148. In this Committee, we should not confine our deliberations to nuclear weapons, test bans, and bacteriological weapons, but we should devote to the causes of the arms race among some nations commensurate attention and careful study. In addition to the Middle East, South-East Asia, colonized territories in Africa, *apartheid*, the Rhodesia of Ian Smith, all these are spots that are plagued by the arms race.

149. Many small nations buy arms to defend themselves against the expansionist designs of a bigger neighbour. They need arms for protection not aggression, simply to deter, not to invade. The insecurity of small nations is an undeniable cause for the arms race among them. The United Nations has a responsibility towards dispelling this sense of insecurity which afflicts the small nations. The major Powers, too, share this responsibility and they must not abrogate it. To live in a world dominated by complete faith among nations, large and small, is not “a cry for the moon”. It is possible when justice, political magnanimity, sacrifice and diplomatic puritanism prevail.

150. Justice is a prerequisite to complete disarmament, while security, tolerance, benevolence, trust, good faith are the indispensable tools to achieve it. Fortunately, all these are the creation of man, indeed, of an accomplished man. Let me conclude by quoting a great philosopher and writer, Allen G. White. He said:

“The greatest want of the world is the want of men—men who will not be bought or sold, men who in their inmost souls are true and honest, men who do not fear to call sin by its right name, men whose conscience is as true to duty as the needle to the pole, men who will stand for the right though the heavens fall!”

AGENDA ITEM 34 (*continued*)

Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: report of the Secretary-General (A/8431 and Add.1-5, A/C.1/1015, A/C.1/L.566, 567, L.573/Rev.2 and 577)

151. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): Before giving the floor to the representative of Zambia,

who wishes to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/L.577 on the question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, I would like to say that four other countries have become sponsors of this new draft resolution of the non-aligned nations. These countries are Barbados, the People's Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Uganda.

152. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): Mr. Chairman, since I am taking the floor in this Committee for the first time, allow me to express the satisfaction of the Zambian delegation on your unanimous election to the high office of Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly. You will agree with me that to be chairman of any Main Committee of the General Assembly is tedious enough, but to be Chairman of the First Committee is even more tedious. However, knowing your immense capabilities and great wisdom as I do, I am confident that you will guide the deliberations of this Committee in a constructive and satisfactory manner. I should also like to congratulate the Vice-Chairman, my friend and colleague, Ambassador Ramphul of Mauritius, who is not only one of our very able African representatives but also a prominent member of the non-aligned group. May I also congratulate Mr. Migliuolo, the alternate representative of Italy, on his election as Rapporteur of the First Committee.

153. It is clear from statements that have been made in this Committee that there is unanimity on the urgent need and importance of strengthening international security. The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security which was adopted during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly [resolution 2734 (XXV)] provides a sound basis for making a positive contribution in this direction. The adoption of this historic Declaration was not an end in itself, but merely a means to an end. We are living in a troubled world where the peace and security of nations has become a matter of paramount importance.

154. Peace is not merely the absence of armed conflict between nations or between peoples, although this is no doubt its main prerequisite. As the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations makes it abundantly clear, peace is a dynamic and positive objective, which has to be achieved by effective compliance with fundamental human rights, by faithful respect for treaties and other commitments and by the promotion of social progress and better standards of living in complete freedom. Peace is not only a collective obligation but an indivisible responsibility—indivisible in the sense that peace cannot be split into its political, economic, social or cultural components, in the vain hope of solving one without tackling the others.

155. I submit if there was a time in the history of man when he found it intolerable to live with the risk of insecurity and war—which indeed is a risk of annihilation—and when he had the means to dispel it and to promote instead the well-being of humanity in every corner of the world, that time is now. The knowledge that there are now five nations which possess nuclear weapons, and the realization that several others are capable of developing them, makes an agreement on disarmament even more urgent. The continued colonial oppression of peoples in

various parts of the world, and particularly in South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), continues to be a serious threat to international peace and security. The deteriorating position of the poorer nations in relation to the richer countries creates an untenable situation where poverty and wealth coexist side by side. As the United Nations enters the second half of the third decade of its existence, great as are all the dangers in the world which it serves, they are no greater than the many opportunities open to us to strengthen international peace and security. These opportunities must be urgently seized by all of us, because in the making and building of peace every kind of positive effort is required.

156. The non-aligned countries which I have the honour to represent feel that, although there have been some positive developments in the world since the adoption of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, a lot more remains to be done. We note with satisfaction that the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China have been fully restored in the United Nations. We also note with a certain amount of satisfaction that some progress has been achieved on a regional basis towards strengthening security and promoting co-operation; there has been an increasing use of the Security Council through the use of new methods available to it under the Charter, such as the appointment of special missions; and there is a growing awareness that the full implementation of the principle of universality increases the effectiveness of the United Nations.

157. Moved by a common desire to seek effective ways of implementing the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, 42 like-minded non-aligned countries have asked me formally to present draft resolution A/C.1/L.577 on this all-important question. Most of the provisions in this draft resolution are self-explanatory and there is no need for further elaboration. But they underline the conviction of the non-aligned countries that we are still a long way from achieving the goals set out by the Declaration. And until and unless some more positive results are achieved in the promotion of co-operation among States, the Declaration that was intended to strengthen international peace and security will be turned into a meaningless document. This phenomenon is adequately reflected in the draft resolution of the non-aligned countries, which we believe provides a sound basis for continuing the good and important work we started last year aimed at achieving international peace and security. The United Nations was born out of trouble and its main function is to face problems and crises. Easy successes and historical miracles are hard to come by, but, given a willingness on the part of Member States, we are more than capable of recording more satisfying successes in the New Year. We are anxious to speed up the work of our Committee, and it is for this reason that the non-aligned countries are ready to enter into immediate negotiations with all interested groups so that we can enable the Committee speedily to adopt a meaningful draft resolution on this all-important question.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.