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Chairman: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37  
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Economic and social consequences of the armaments race  
and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and  
security

World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special  
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(A/8990 and Add.1, A/9033, A/9041, A/9228)

General and complete disarmament: report of the Confer-  
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Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear  
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(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on  
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Implementation of General Assembly resolution  
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A/9209)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report  
of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9029)

1. Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (*inter-  
pretation from Russian*): Two years have elapsed since the  
question of the convening of a World Disarmament Confer-  
ence was included upon the agenda of the General  
Assembly.

2. At the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly,  
resolution 2833 (XXVI) was adopted, approving the idea of  
convening a World Disarmament Conference and calling  
upon States to express their views on the concrete  
questions which would have to be resolved in the course of  
preparing for this Conference.

3. In resolution 2930 (XXVII) the General Assembly, at  
its twenty-seventh session, appealed to States to exert  
efforts in the future also to create the necessary conditions  
for convening the World Disarmament Conference, and  
decided to establish a Special Committee.

4. Both resolutions reflect the broad support which the  
overwhelming majority of States Members of the United  
Nations accorded to the idea of convening a World  
Disarmament Conference, an idea which was also reflected  
in the general debate at this session of the General  
Assembly. The German Democratic Republic believes that  
the convening of a World Disarmament Conference meets  
the aspirations of the peoples of the world to ensure peace.

5. The Foreign Minister of the German Democratic  
Republic stated in the general debate that the time is ripe  
for a world disarmament conference. Such a conference  
could thoroughly discuss international problems and  
negotiate agreements which promote the basic and primary  
goal—general and concrete disarmament—and provide for  
effective partial measures of arms limitation.

6. In the statements of participants to the Fourth Confer-  
ence of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned  
Countries, held this year at Algiers, we also find a broad  
response to the initiative of the Soviet Union with regard to  
the convening of a World Disarmament Conference. Many  
intergovernmental and non-governmental international  
organizations, trade union organizations and international  
associations of scientists gave warm support to this idea.

7. We can therefore confidently assert that the idea of holding a World Conference on disarmament—and by holding this, taking a step forward—opens up new prospects and provides an impetus to the efforts already undertaken towards disarmament on a multilateral, regional and bilateral basis, and has now assumed considerable momentum which it derives from the well-known success which has been achieved in the course of the international process of the easing of tension and in the struggle for the ensuring of peace.

8. The end of the war against the Viet-Nameese people was a great success for the cause of peace.

9. The agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic armaments and the prevention of nuclear war [see A/9293] are clear signs of the easing of tension between States of the two world systems with opposed political and economic structures.

10. The process of reducing political tension has been particularly vividly expressed in Europe, where a whole series of treaties has been signed, based upon the actual facts of the day as, for example, the frontiers which at present exist in Europe.

11. Considerable opportunities for improving the political climate are afforded by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The successful holding of preparatory consultations and the first stage of this Conference have created favourable conditions for holding the present second stage of the European Conference. Another important result of the easing of tension in Europe and other parts of the world to which the German Democratic Republic made an important contribution is the fact that the German Democratic Republic, as a sovereign State, is now occupying its lawful place among the Members of the United Nations.

12. The desire to ensure peace and general and complete disarmament under strict international control is the first priority task of the foreign policy of our State. That policy is based upon the sound, solid foundation of the political and economic structure of our country which has no classes or strata of population deriving any advantage whatsoever from the arms race.

13. We therefore fully agree with the position of those States which are calling for a continuation of the easing of tension and for supplementing and strengthening it by disarmament measures.

14. Tremendous arsenals of armaments have been accumulated with monstrous destructive force which in the case of a world military conflict threaten the very existence of human life on this planet. The very arms race alone contains within itself the constant danger of an exacerbation of political tension.

15. We are all very well aware of the economic and social consequences of the arms race, as mentioned in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General. Resolving the important economic and social world problems depends to an ever growing extent on whether or not it will be possible

to free the peoples of the world from the burden of armaments.

16. Therefore the time has come to do more than merely describe those phenomena and to get down to the practical changes required. In our view, the representatives of the developing countries are fully entitled to link their support for the World Disarmament Conference with the hope that, as a result of the concluding of the arms race, great resources will be released which will also be able to be used to solve the urgent development problems of those countries.

17. The proposal to reduce the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent, and to use part of the funds thus made available to assist developing countries, shows what concrete opportunities there are even today.

18. In the discussion, objection was raised to convening the World Disarmament Conference on the grounds that the creation of this forum would not serve a useful purpose until the existing differences on the subject had been resolved. We cannot agree with such a view.

19. Of course, we are all aware of the differences of view that have hitherto impeded the achievement of notable progress in the field of disarmament. But I would urge representatives to remember that, in the past, several world conferences have been held to solve important problems—for example, in the field of international law and the preservation of the environment, with regard to which completely divergent positions were held or quite serious political differences existed. The results of those conferences made, however, in most cases, a positive contribution. It was proposed to hold other world conferences, even though positions on substantive issues were divergent; sometimes the initiators did not even express their ideas on the tasks facing these conferences. The problems which will be discussed at the world disarmament conference are by no means less important than those that will be discussed at the proposed conference. On the contrary, the Conference in which the representatives of all States, great and small—regardless of whether or not they possess nuclear weapons or whether they have a highly developed military and economic potential—will take part on an equal footing, is an appropriate forum for discussion of the fundamental problems of disarmament which, more than other questions, affects the vital interests of all peoples. Can it be said that the preparations for holding such a conference offer little chance for bringing positions closer together?

20. In the course of the general debate at this session, the practically unanimous view was expressed that the strengthening of peace and international security is the major task of the United Nations. The holding of a world disarmament conference seeks precisely to serve that end.

21. Even now there is a sufficient basis for consensus on the most important questions. There is unanimity about the general purpose for which it should aim, that is, general and complete disarmament; that aim can be served by the working out and implementing of appropriate partial measures. There is also a unanimous view that the banning of nuclear and chemical weapons is of the highest im-

portance. The demand for the cessation of all nuclear testing is something that is also widely acknowledged. At its twenty-seventh session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2936 (XXVII), testifying to the broad approval enjoyed by the banning of the use of force and of nuclear weapons. The principle whereby it is possible to achieve progress in the field of disarmament only when all States are guaranteed equal conditions for their security can serve as a point of departure for the achievement of positive results at the conference.

22. In our view, a sure basis for the successful holding of the conference lies in the fact that it has been possible to conclude a number of agreements in the field of disarmament that are of world-wide importance. In the field of disarmament, we are not standing around with empty hands, as is sometimes asserted: a ban has been imposed on the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; a ban has been placed on the location of the means of mass destruction in outer space, on celestial bodies and on the sea-bed and the ocean floor; and as a result of the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [*resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex*] it has become possible to eliminate one of the most dangerous forms of weapons of mass destruction. The German Democratic Republic supported the attainment of these measures and associated itself with these conventions. We do not want to exaggerate the importance of these conventions that have been signed. But we do believe that they are a step forward, and we consider that they provide a new incentive for larger steps to be taken in the field of disarmament.

23. Some of these conventions were concluded in much more difficult international conditions than exist today. The fact that it was possible to conclude these conventions shows that there is an opportunity to take practical steps of a universal character in the field of disarmament. Although they were unable to put an end to the arms race, they were able, none the less, in certain important areas to impose limitations on it. Without these conventions the present situation would have been much worse.

24. A basis for a successful world disarmament conference is also represented by the efforts undertaken on a bilateral and regional basis in the field of disarmament.

25. Several representatives have, in their statements, already stressed the significance of the talks on the reduction of troops and armaments in Central Europe, which began today in Vienna. Those talks are a logical consequence of the easing of tension in Europe and they directly affect the national interests of the German Democratic Republic which, together with allied States, has for many years now been striving to achieve the reduction of armaments in central Europe, and the results of these talks, in terms of their positive consequences, will not be confined to central Europe. In the field of disarmament, there is also a very close interdependence between regional and world-wide problems.

26. Measures for the easing of military tension that have been implemented in the area where the armed forces of

the most powerful military coalitions are directly facing each other will have a positive effect on the process of the easing of world military tension and disarmament.

27. We have not lost sight of those problems the solution of which must still be undertaken. But the instructions given to the Special Committee—as laid down in resolution 2930 (XXVII)—surely constitute a favourable point of departure for the achievement of further progress.

28. The efforts undertaken last year in the Committee to comply with these instructions were not, in our view, useless.

29. I would venture to state that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic regards as most meritorious the efforts of Mr. Hoveyda and other members of the Special Committee in the performance of the task entrusted to them.

30. Now, what should be done in the future? My delegation believes that resolution 2930 (XXVII) was a step in the right direction. The views and proposals of all States on the holding of a World Disarmament Conference should serve as the basis for the concrete preparations for that Conference. It goes without saying that the views and proposals of all the five nuclear Powers—Powers which are the permanent members of the Security Council—are of particular interest, therefore they should become members of the Special Committee. If one or several of the nuclear Powers finds it impossible at the present time to associate itself directly with membership of the Special Committee we must find ways and means of seeing to it that the work of the Special Committee is not paralysed as a consequence; that the opportunity is left open for co-operation between the Special Committee and those States; and that those States have an opportunity of joining the Committee at a later stage.

31. In the discussions in this Committee views have been expressed about the possibility of establishing an organ to prepare for the World Disarmament Conference without the participation of any nuclear Power. In the view of my delegation that is not a constructive idea. If we were to adopt it, it would mean barring the way to solving these problems.

32. However, my delegation does not object to a certain enlargement of the membership of the Committee if in such enlargement account is taken of an equitable geographical and political representation. In our view, the States members of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to be members of the Committee.

33. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic expresses the hope that at this session of the General Assembly it will be possible, on the basis of an appropriate resolution, to create conditions for the normal functioning of the Committee in the performance of the tasks entrusted to it, and in that way to achieve progress in preparing for the World Disarmament Conference.

34. The German Democratic Republic is ready to give support in any form to the work of the Special Committee.

35. We need to strengthen, by disarmament measures, the progress achieved in the process of the easing of political tensions so that the peoples of the world can enjoy more fully the fruits of that process.

36. With regard to other items on the agenda concerning disarmament, the German Democratic Republic reserves the right to express its views also.

37. Mr. HAINWORTH (United Kingdom): Last year, on 27 October 1972, the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Right Honourable Joseph Godber, spoke in this Committee about the prospects that were then opening up for improving the political climate and perhaps subsequently for assisting the achievement of measures of disarmament [*1877th meeting*]. Since this Assembly started a setback, rather than an improvement, has been uppermost in our minds. Nevertheless it is important not to forget that in the year intervening since the last Assembly there has been a definite movement towards further relaxation of tension, even though the progress has not been as great as some of us would have wished. We simply cannot expect suspicions and entrenched views to disappear overnight and, as the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, said in the General Assembly at the 2128th plenary meeting this year, "détente must be real and not an illusion".

38. At least a start has been made and in Europe there appears to be a chance that a better atmosphere may be emerging. In this context I am glad to welcome the presence here for the first time, as active participants in our disarmament debate, of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Now we must see whether, with this new atmosphere, the idea of détente can, in the two forums of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Conference on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions which opens this very day in Vienna, be translated into practical measures of benefit to all.

39. However, even though in Europe and elsewhere there are hopeful signs, we have all too recently been reminded how fragile the appearance of peace can be. That should lead us not to despair but to greater efforts. We must seek to remove the causes of conflict and to give increasing effectiveness to our machinery for peace-keeping, for conciliation and for the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means. Once we have done that basic groundwork—and it will I am afraid take much patience and perseverance—then it will be possible to talk about sweeping plans for reducing expenditures on arms and disbanding troops.

40. Even in Europe, despite all the talk of détente, it is unfortunately a fact that the military expenditure of certain countries has during recent years continued to increase significantly, and that at a time when the Western democracies, almost without exception, have been engaged in reducing their already low military expenditures. What is needed is not protestations of good faith but the evidence of constructive action taken. What will count are matching, balanced cuts in the money, manpower and materials devoted to military purposes, and not words and speeches. It is my hope that when the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna get down to substance, a move may be made in that direction.

41. For the time being I have nothing to add to what Sir Alec Douglas-Home has already said about the proposal on the reduction of military budgets except to say in passing that I have been rather surprised to hear so much about it in this Committee already, as I had understood that it was the express wish of its sponsors that the item should be discussed not here but in plenary meetings.

42. If the events of the past month have reminded us all too clearly that the limits of progress towards peace are sharply defined, nevertheless we can take comfort from the fact that, bitter though the several conflicts of the past few years have been, there has been no recourse to nuclear war, with all the terrifying horror that that would entail for combatants and others over an immense area. For that we should be thankful. But this is not an argument for complacency, although the fact is due, I believe, in no small part to the effective measures negotiated in Geneva during the past decade, principally the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,<sup>1</sup> now 10 years old, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] which in March 1975 will have been in force for five years.

43. In turning now to say a few words about those two treaties, I should like to start by recalling that on 5 August of this year the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth issued a declaration in Ottawa reaffirming their unfailing support for the partial test-ban Treaty and their concern to ensure its universal observance. The declaration went on to say that the Heads of Government: "... seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances, appealed to all Powers, and in particular the nuclear Powers, to take up as an urgent task the negotiation of a new agreement to bring about the total cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments." This seems to me an appeal that this Committee would do well to endorse and readdress to all those concerned, for this year the world's headlines have been much occupied with the question of nuclear weapons testing. Today I should like to recall the views which my Government has often expressed regarding the need to stop all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere—as well, of course, as in outer space and under water—and to repeat the hope of the British Government that all States without exception will without further delay adhere to and abide by the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963.

44. My delegation also wishes to affirm that an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty and the cessation of all nuclear test explosions for weapons purposes in all environments and by all countries remain the objective of our efforts in this field. I believe this aim is very widely shared in the Committee and accordingly my delegation sees considerable merit in the idea—which is being discussed in the corridors—of trying this year to submit a single draft resolution on nuclear weapons testing capable of attracting the broadest possible support, including that of the nuclear-weapon States, whose support is essential if the resolution is to be effective.

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

45. In Geneva this year, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament devoted nearly a week to informal meetings on the subject of verifying the prohibition of underground testing. The meetings had the benefit of much advice from a large number of experts from more countries than ever before, and, as previous speakers have commented, those meetings were very productive. The striking advances in the science of seismology over the last few years were clearly brought out. So too were some of the inherent limitations of seismology as a tool for identifying nuclear explosions at a low level.

46. Some delegations, however, went on to draw the conclusion that the seismological art had reached such a stage that, either now or in the near future, it would not be practicable for a State, subsequent to a treaty ban on underground testing, to risk clandestine testing, and that if it were tempted to do so it could get away with only a very few, small and insignificant tests. I am afraid my delegation cannot agree with such conclusions. The fact is that the evidence suggests both that it would in practice be possible to carry out low-yield tests below a certain detection threshold and that such tests could not be dismissed as militarily insignificant. I am sorry to have to put it so bluntly, but it is the case that, by definition, only nuclear-weapon States have experience in this field. It is equally a matter of fact that their experience does show that clandestine nuclear testing is possible, and, moreover, that a very few tests, or even a single low-level test, could result in significant improvements in weapons design. For example, a State possessing past design knowledge and utilizing computer calculations might improve nuclear weapons by increasing their yield, reducing their weight, carrying out adaptation to other delivery systems, reducing radioactivity, improving safety, improving reliability and reducing costs. Such improvements might be made through a series of tests, possibly carried out at long intervals. Nor can one rule out the possibility that a single test might contribute to an important weapons system development and therefore, in the context of a test ban treaty, change or destroy the balance of stability.

47. Those remarks are not meant to imply that we should abandon the search for the comprehensive test ban. Quite the contrary. The British Government is continuing to devote money and manpower to research in this field and will continue to participate actively in the discussions in Geneva. Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize that in our negotiations we must temper our idealism with an awareness of realities. In other words, we must be sure that a negotiated end to all nuclear weapons testing is based on the understanding that any cessation of tests should take place in the context of a properly negotiated international agreement which makes provision for a system of verification in which all could feel the necessary confidence.

48. I should like to turn now to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, having in mind that a conference to review the operation of the Treaty is due to be held in Geneva in the spring of 1975. The Treaty appears to my Government to have played a valuable role in ensuring that none of the bitter conflicts of recent years have escalated to a level at which nuclear weapons have been used. As I have already said, this is something for which all of us—and I stress, all of us—have cause to be

thankful. The provision in article VIII of the Treaty gives us an opportunity to review the operation of the Treaty and to seek by every means possible to strengthen its effectiveness.

49. Sometimes one hears remarks that appear to suggest that the Treaty was a treaty designed by the nuclear-weapon States for their own especial benefit. This is just not true. The non-proliferation Treaty is, it seems to me, an example of the kind of measure so often referred to with a rhetorical flourish by speakers on disarmament subjects as a treaty demanded by the peoples of the world. Its aim was and is to make a safer world for everyone, whether or not they happen to live in a nuclear-weapon State. Nuclear weapons, if they are ever used, are unlikely to discriminate between the populations of nuclear-weapon States and those of non-nuclear-weapon States. Perhaps the greatest danger of nuclear war today is that States that conceive themselves liable to be involved in conflict will be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons and subsequently feel compelled to use them. It is they and their immediate neighbours who would stand to suffer most. But, equally, there would be a risk that a war involving a small or medium-sized Power armed with nuclear weapons would spill over to affect others and, above all, escalate in a way which could ultimately involve the Powers already having large nuclear weapon stocks. We must also bear in mind that if any other country were to acquire nuclear weapons this might well touch off an arms race of new and extremely dangerous proportions. Indeed, even the suspicion that a traditional rival might be creating a nuclear weapons option could start a chain reaction.

50. The non-proliferation Treaty must be strengthened. What are needed, and needed urgently, are further ratifications and accessions. I am glad to note an encouraging trend. At the beginning of this year Australia ratified the Treaty, and since then some six other countries have also done so. We welcome these decisions and the indications that others who have hitherto hesitated may be reassessing the question. But there are still upwards of a score of States that have signed the Treaty but have not ratified it, and something like as great a number of States have not even signed it. Of course I acknowledge that some of those which have already signed the Treaty have only been waiting to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency. We feel sure that on completion of these negotiations there will soon be new ratifications and accessions. In particular, we have welcomed the signing on 5 April last of the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) under which the non-nuclear-weapon States of the Community will accept the co-ordinated application of EURATOM and Agency safeguards. We confidently expect that these countries will submit to their respective constitutional processes for early ratification not only the agreement, but also the non-proliferation Treaty itself. We hope too that this development will in turn encourage others.

51. The United Kingdom was not a party to the negotiations for the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM. But we have this year had our own task to perform in accordance with our new obligations under the EURATOM Treaty. From 1 January



this year we have been engaged in the implementation of EURATOM safeguards in the United Kingdom. This has been no mean task and has involved adjustment by British nuclear operators to the discipline of new procedures. The whole of Britain's civil nuclear programme has been submitted to that discipline. Regular reports on use, stocks and movements of civil nuclear materials are being submitted and visits by EURATOM inspectors have begun.

52. It is an important facet of the non-proliferation Treaty that it is a Treaty which is verified, and effectively so, in such a way that all States can have genuine confidence that the undertakings accepted by parties are being enforced. This is why a moment or two ago I was able to comment on the Treaty as one that would be particularly applicable in areas of potential conflict.

53. There was, however, a feeling in some countries that the price exacted for the effectiveness of this verification fell somewhat unfairly on certain States. It was for this reason that on 4 December 1967 the British Government made a voluntary offer—an offer not required of us by the terms of the Treaty then under negotiation—that at such time as international safeguards were put into effect in the non-nuclear-weapon States in implementation of the Treaty, we were prepared to offer an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the United Kingdom, subject only to exclusions for national security reasons. We have given evidence of our good faith in this matter by the steps I have already mentioned. But furthermore, we are now shortly to proceed to consultations with a view to associating the International Atomic Energy Agency with safeguards in the United Kingdom, thus looking forward to complete fulfilment of the voluntary offer I have described. It is our earnest hope that these developments, which are designed to ensure that the Treaty does not give rise to commercial discrimination, will facilitate acceptance and ratification of the Treaty by other States.

54. One article in particular of the Treaty was judged of great importance by the non-nuclear-weapon States that helped to negotiate the Treaty. This is article VI, which refers to the undertaking by the parties “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. Progress, some of it even made before the undertaking I have just quoted, has been made towards implementing this undertaking. What is the position? Already we have agreements concerning the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the Antarctic, in outer space and on the moon and, at the opposite extreme, on the sea-bed; and in Geneva further progress has been made towards clearing the obstacles in the way of an effective agreement to ban underground nuclear tests. Even more important perhaps have been the continuing strategic arms limitation talks. These have already produced concrete agreements and a promise of negotiations which will lead to real advance in the quest to check vertical proliferation.

55. Thus, I believe it is in the interests of all the parties that the Conference to review the operation of the non-proliferation Treaty, which is due to be held in 1975, should be a success, and I believe that it is not too early to start thinking about how to ensure this. In Geneva I have already given our view that the legal, or constitutional

position as it were, is that it is for the parties to make the arrangements for the Conference, and that the depositary Powers, as servants of the parties, have the task of setting in hand suitable administrative arrangements for the Conference. Such arrangements, however, should be set in hand only after appropriate consultation with other parties. My delegation has accordingly already begun to talk informally with other parties about how preparations might best be set in motion.

56. Last year much consideration was given in this Committee to trying to establish a mechanism for keeping under review the idea of convening a world disarmament conference. My delegation spoke quite early on this subject and included a favourable reference to ideas advanced at that time by the representative of Argentina. These ideas were subsequently developed by a number of delegations working under the Ambassador of Zambia and finally culminated in resolution 2930 (XXVII). What has, and what has not, happened since then has been most fairly, and may I say wittily, described by Mr. Hoveyda [*1934th meeting*] who so deftly carried out the delicate task entrusted to him by his colleagues on the Special Committee. I should like to take this opportunity to express to him my delegation's appreciation for his labours.

57. On the substance of the matter, for the moment I only wish to reaffirm the views of the British Government as expressed in the report of the Secretary-General of September 1972.<sup>2</sup> In this the United Kingdom recognized the necessity periodically to renew the sense of urgency with which the nations address the problems of disarmament and arms control, and went on to favour the calling of a world disarmament conference provided that such a conference had the general support of the United Nations membership, and in particular of all the nuclear Powers whose active participation would be essential—and provided further that thorough preparatory work showed that a satisfactory basis for such a conference existed. My delegation still subscribes to these views. We are once again prepared to consider proposals designed to take the idea forward on this basis.

58. It is our hope that in the coming year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will have two productive sessions. I have already referred to the subject of a comprehensive test ban and my Government's intention to continue its efforts in this field. Representatives may also have noted from document A/9207 and Corr.1, which includes the United Kingdom reply to the Secretary-General on the question of napalm, that the United Kingdom considers that the Committee on Disarmament might be an appropriate forum for discussion of certain aspects of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons. Certainly it is the view of the British Government that it would be quite wrong to try to graft this major and controversial subject at this very late stage into the text of the two draft protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 which are to be negotiated at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, due to be held in Geneva early next year. The subject matter of the two draft protocols is in itself wide

<sup>2</sup> See A/8817.

ranging and complex; it has already been well debated and taken to a stage where there is reasonable hope that the Conference may be successful. At this point to throw in new and complicated topics that are far from adequately prepared might be to jeopardize the very success of the Conference.

59. Members will realize that this statement of our views was prepared before we had seen the draft of the resolution which is to be found in document A/C.1/L.650. In making this statement of our views now, I mean no discourtesy to the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, who, we have been informed, is to introduce the draft resolution formally during her statement later this morning. In the light of what she then says, my delegation may wish to offer further comment at a later stage in our debate.

60. A major topic that undoubtedly will be pursued in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament next year is the question of chemical weapons. The item was much discussed in Geneva in response to the General Assembly's urgings that it be treated as a priority item and much useful work was done. My delegation has already in Geneva voiced its regret that all sides did not contribute equally to the thorough search for new ideas that are needed in this field, but equally my delegation was glad to be able to note an important Japanese initiative [A/9141, annex II, sect. 21]. The appearance of this most concrete suggestion has been widely welcomed and should certainly give a fillip to the negotiations of the Committee on Disarmament on the subject. This proposal is currently being studied carefully in London along with the important Canadian working paper [*ibid.*, sect. 22]... and I can assure the Committee that any other serious contribution to the debate will be equally carefully studied, for we are keenly aware of the undertaking in article IX of the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons that parties should continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

61. Let me conclude by mentioning an area where we have seen progress in the treaty field. I refer, of course, to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America<sup>3</sup> where, as several speakers have already noted, this year has seen the most welcome acceptance of Protocol II by two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, which thus join the United States and the United Kingdom. This is a most encouraging development, both for the Treaty itself—and here let me say in parenthesis that I hope that the remaining nuclear-weapon State will soon sign the Protocol—and also as a most welcome indication that these two States are prepared to join in helping to work out multilateral measures of disarmament.

62. Mr. BADURINA (Yugoslavia) (*interpretation from French*): At the very moment when the general debate on disarmament is taking place in our Committee, the dangerous situation in the Middle East, engendered by the aggressive policy of Israel, has once again strikingly confirmed that the conflicts and crises in different parts of the world do have a nefarious influence on international relations as a whole. The world has become so interdepen-

dent that today no country, including the great Powers, can feel assured and safe if local wars and hotbeds of crisis continue to exist in any part of the world. They are constant sources of mistrust among peoples and States and, as a corollary, they usually tend to intensify the arms race and lead to a cyclic aggravation of a situation which in turn endangers the results obtained after arduous efforts to avoid the confrontations of cold war and to start taking steps along the positive path of international relations.

63. The most recent events, in the course of which a great Power has seen fit to put all its armed forces on alert, again clearly show not only the limited extent of détente but also the need to extend that détente to all parts of the world and ensure that it covers all pending international questions. International peace and security are indivisible. They cannot be stable and lasting unless they apply equally to all peoples and all countries. Only in such circumstances will it be possible to take a positive step forward in the fields of the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament.

64. The problem of constantly increasing military budgets, which at present amount to \$220,000 million per year, causes great concern. The economic and social consequences of such a state of affairs are well known to all. It is almost unimaginable that after the conclusion of a dozen multilateral and bilateral agreements in the field of disarmament the arms race from one year to the other swallows up human, financial and technical resources of increasing magnitude. And all this at a time when a major portion of mankind is unable to meet its most elementary needs.

65. Reasons of security, as well as the needs of economic and social development, particularly in the developing nations, dictate the necessity of putting a speedy end to this dangerous and nefarious trend and of finding adequate solutions that will allow the greatest portion of human and material potential at present used for armed forces to be channelled into development. The non-aligned nations have always insisted that as large a portion as possible of the economies achieved through disarmament be used to meet the needs of development, and particularly those of the developing countries. These countries made this idea very clear in the documents that were adopted at the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries that took place barely two months ago at Algiers. A significant reduction in the military budgets of the great Powers and also of the countries members of military alliances and other large military Powers and the use of the major portion of the resources thus obtained to meet the development needs of the developing nations would at the same time contribute to reducing the gap that separates the developing from the developed nations. By the same token, the Yugoslav delegation regards as significant the initiative of the Government of the Soviet Union in proposing that the question of the reduction of military budgets be examined at the present session of the General Assembly. This, we believe, would allow us not only to tackle the problem as a whole, but also to take the first concrete steps towards the gradual reduction of military budgets, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 283.

66. In the field of disarmament, the commitment of the United Nations is one of the primary activities flowing from its main responsibility, which is to maintain international peace and security. There can be no doubt that our Organization will fulfil its duties in so far as all its Members, and not only the great Powers, contribute to these ends, although we know that the great Powers do have a special responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security and therefore in disarmament too. Since the problems of disarmament affect the vital interests of all peoples and all countries, the solution to these problems must also be posed on a universal basis. No sovereign State can resign itself to being kept on the sidelines of the examination of, and adoption of decisions on, questions so essential to peace, security and development. We believe the United Nations offers the best conditions to ensure the safeguarding of those interests. We can well understand the reasons why negotiations on the limitation of nuclear strategic weapons are taking place on a bilateral basis. We can also understand the reasons why the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty have decided to undertake negotiations for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, negotiations which are beginning today. However, we still feel that these negotiations are of vital interest to the international community as a whole—and the participants in these negotiations have stressed this point themselves—and that it is therefore indispensable that all other countries be kept informed of the progress and the results of these negotiations. The United Nations is the only forum that can ensure that that is done. Therefore, the delegation of Yugoslavia considers that it might be helpful in the course of the present session to reaffirm existing principles and adopt new ones that should govern the negotiations on disarmament in any international forum, for this would result in establishing the necessary links between those forums and the United Nations and also in guaranteeing the interests of all States.

67. What does cause some concern, however, is not only the fact that the United Nations is not included in these negotiations, which are the most important ones taking place on disarmament, but also the fact that the multilateral negotiations taking place under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva are passing through some crises. We believe that we cannot create the necessary conditions for real results in the field of disarmament by merely resorting to procedural and organizational measures. We are deeply convinced that, first and foremost, all this will depend upon the political will and determination of certain Governments to contribute to the just solution of pending international problems, which will in turn create the necessary conditions for the strengthening of confidence among peoples and States and thereby set in motion the entire process of disarmament. Yet we do not mean to underestimate the role that the different organs of the United Nations, or those which work under the auspices of the United Nations, can play in these efforts to set in motion the process of disarmament.

68. The General Assembly resolutions concerning the holding of a world disarmament conference at an appropriate time reflect the general feeling of the international community that it is imperative to make new efforts to stop the arms race and to breathe some new life into the disarmament cause. But these efforts from the very outset

confronted serious obstacles of a partially artificial nature which have to be overcome as soon as possible if we do not want this important action of the United Nations to be buried before it can even produce the first positive results. A number of interesting and useful suggestions have already been made in the Committee concerning ways of overcoming the difficulties on the road to the preparation and convening of the World Disarmament Conference. The realistic and very constructive statement made by the representative of Iran, Mr. Hoveyda [1934th meeting], was of particular interest to us. We are deeply convinced that the basic conditions for the convening of the World Disarmament Conference have almost been achieved and that, if the necessary political will and spirit of co-operation on the part of all parties are brought to bear, a generally acceptable platform can be prepared for that important international forum, which would obviously open up new prospects for the setting in motion of the disarmament process, and particularly nuclear disarmament. We hope that we will be ready in the course of the present session of the General Assembly to adopt a decision that will allow the preparations for the convening of the Conference to be started, and we also trust that all States, including the nuclear Powers, will participate in that Conference—a desire that was also stressed most energetically by the Conference of non-aligned countries at Algiers.

69. The Yugoslav delegation also considers that the meeting of the Disarmament Commission will encourage the efforts that our Organization is making in the disarmament field and will allow the interests of all Member States to be fully expressed. This, in our view, would contribute to the ultimate strengthening of the role and effectiveness of the United Nations. The convening of the Disarmament Commission would be all the more justified and indispensable if the efforts to convene the World Disarmament Conference were not to yield the results expected.

70. With regard to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body linked to the United Nations at the moment, my delegation has already expressed, at the twelfth anniversary of the work of the Committee, in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations, submitted on 14 March 1973 [A/9141, annex II, sect. 4], its disappointment at the lack of progress and the state of stagnation in which the Committee had found itself for the last two years. Similar disappointment was expressed in the statements made by other delegations. The sponsors of the memorandum indicated in addition their grave disquiet at the absence of political will on the part of certain members to achieve an agreement on priority questions before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that the United Nations General Assembly had entrusted to it on a number of occasions, namely the need to suspend all nuclear weapons tests and to prohibit effectively the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to eliminate them from the arsenals of all States. My delegation considers that, despite its flaws, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament can play an important role in the multilateral negotiations on disarmament, provided that it becomes more representative and more democratic in its working methods; otherwise, because of the changing conditions in the world, it should be replaced by another United Nations



organ, that could reflect more adequately the interests of all Member States.

71. General and complete disarmament is the basic target and the long-range objective of all our efforts—an objective that must be achieved if we wish to establish a just and lasting peace and equal security for all nations. The comprehensive programme of disarmament recommended by General Assembly resolution 2661 C (XXV) contains the general outlines for attaining that objective. May I be allowed at this point to recall paragraph 3 of section II of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which reads as follows:

“The problem of general and complete disarmament should be given intensive treatment, parallel to the negotiations of partial disarmament measures, including measures to prevent and limit armaments and measures to reduce armaments, in order to facilitate further clarification of positions and possibilities, including the revision and updating of the existing draft treaties submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America respectively, or the submission of new proposals.”<sup>4</sup>

72. It is obvious that the other permanent members of the Security Council, as well as all States Members of the United Nations, should be invited to submit plans, proposals and suggestions concerning negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

73. The efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament are very intimately linked to the adoption of partial and collateral disarmament measures.

74. First of all, we would envisage measures covering the total prohibition of the use, development and manufacture of nuclear weapons, as well as the prohibition of all nuclear testing in all environments and in all parts of the world, together with a reduction and simultaneous, gradual elimination of existing nuclear stockpiles, as one of the first effective steps towards nuclear disarmament.

75. Although 10 years have already elapsed since the signing of the Moscow Treaty, no new progress towards a cessation of testing has been made, despite the fact that the signatories of that Treaty assumed the obligation to continue their negotiations in order to assure the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests for all time. Unfortunately, we have to observe that the nuclear Powers have turned a deaf ear to the constant appeals of the General Assembly in its numerous resolutions on a cessation of nuclear testing.

76. The achievement of some progress in the wider field of nuclear disarmament—which has been discussed in various international forums for many years, with draft agreements having already been prepared regarding certain measures—would contribute to the establishment of a balance, both between the nuclear Powers themselves and between them and the non-nuclear weapons States. And what is particularly important is that the global balance would be maintained at a level of decreasing military commitment

that would lead inevitably to the strengthening of confidence among peoples and States and to the enhancing of international security for all peoples and all States. It would also make possible the channelling of nuclear technology, particularly in the energy field, with the use of available fissile material for peaceful undertakings in the interest of general progress, especially in the developing nations.

77. On this matter, I should like to stress again the importance we attach to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as marking a step towards the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons in new regions. We view this as a positive example that can only encourage the efforts made to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world.

78. In his statement before this Committee on 7 November 1972 [1885th meeting], the Yugoslav representative recalled that this year, 1973, marks the fifth anniversary of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. My delegation stressed, on that occasion, the need to carry out a comprehensive examination of the results of that Conference and of the obligations flowing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This would allow us to determine whether the hopes and obligations had been met to the extent that they might be considered to represent partial compensation to the non-nuclear weapon States, particularly the developing nations, for having voluntarily renounced their right to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other installations for nuclear explosions. The Yugoslav delegation considers that such an examination would usefully complete the work of the conference of the parties to the Treaty, which, according to article VIII, should be held five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, that is to say, in 1975.

79. Yugoslavia, with many other countries, attaches great importance to the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the use of which was prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925,<sup>5</sup> but which, unfortunately, have been used on battlefields up to now. The efforts made over a number of years to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for the destruction of existing stocks, have proved fruitless. Even if we admit the premise that it is difficult to set up a system for verifying that dual-purpose chemical agents are used exclusively for peaceful purposes, we cannot justify the fact that the rules of international law contained in the Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use in all armed conflicts of any chemical armaments or means of chemical war have been flouted or not respected entirely. It is all the more difficult to justify the reasons for which certain countries, important from the military standpoint, have not yet ratified the Geneva Protocol. Such a stand, we believe, is not an encouragement to the continuation of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons or of their elimination from the arsenals of all States.

80. The Yugoslav delegation is convinced that on the strength of proposals and suggestions already existing, and

<sup>4</sup> 4 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94, document A/8191.

<sup>5</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV, No. 2138, p. 65).

following the intensive efforts of the General Assembly of the United Nations and of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, there are now sufficient elements to allow the continuation of constructive negotiations for the prompt elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition of all chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. This, we believe, should be one of the priority recommendations of the General Assembly to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

81. The appeal to prohibit and eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, including weapons using chemical agents, has been and continues to be one of the fundamental requirements of the non-aligned nations. The Fourth summit Conference of the non-aligned nations again stressed the urgency of a prohibiting and destroying these weapons. The representatives of the 10 non-aligned nations members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, including my own country, on 26 April 1973 submitted a working document on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction [*ibid.*, sect. 8]. The 10 non-aligned nations wished thus once again to contribute to the search for a way out of the difficulties which have for so long beset the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament owing to the lack of political will on the part of certain States to participate actively, by presenting concrete proposals, in the drafting of a generally acceptable agreement on this burning question. My delegation notes with satisfaction that the working paper commended itself to a number of countries, confirming us in our conviction that the contents of that document can be useful in the preparation of an agreement on the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

82. The question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons is closely linked to that of chemical weapons and chemical means of warfare. At its last session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2932 A (XXVII), of which Yugoslavia was one of the sponsors. Thus, a step was taken toward the prohibition and gradual elimination of napalm and other incendiary weapons. We hope that this year further progress will be achieved towards the prohibition or limitation of the use of such weaponry. My country considers that these measures must, first and foremost, protect the civilian population and civilian objectives, while stressing the application of the principle of reciprocity and the right to reprisals. We believe that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts—which, on the invitation of the Federal Council of Switzerland, is to take place in Geneva from 20 February to 29 March 1974—will encourage further the efforts of the international community to solve this very important and complex question in the field of international humanitarian law.

83. The Yugoslav delegation welcomes and supports the efforts to set up zones of peace and co-operation in different parts of the world. We believe that in these lie one of the main conditions for the gradual reduction and elimination of the military presence of foreign Powers and, thus, the reduction of the danger of mutual confrontation that would be fraught with dangerous consequences to peace and security in the world.

84. One of the important questions on the agenda of our Committee is that of the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. We have studied with great attention and interest the report of the Special Committee on the Indian Ocean [A/9029]. We are convinced that if the provisions of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on this matter are complied with, a great contribution will thereby have been made to the strengthening of international peace and security, not only in the region concerned but all over the world. There can be no doubt that any measure limiting the arms race and any disarmament measure in the region of the Indian Ocean will be an important step forward towards the transformation of that region into a zone of peace and co-operation.

85. Yugoslavia is extremely interested also in the fruitful progress of the Conference on European security and co-operation. The Yugoslav Government is deeply convinced that peace and security in Europe as well as peace and security in general, and particularly in the regions of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, are inseparable and interdependent, but cannot be stable unless they are enjoyed by all peoples and all countries. Therefore, the Yugoslav Government considers that the continuation of armed conflicts and the existence of areas of crisis in any part of the world, particularly in the Mediterranean or the Middle East, constitutes also a latent threat to the peace and security of the peoples and countries of Europe. It is precisely in recent days that we have had drastic proof of the way in which peace and security in Europe are linked most directly to the peace and security of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. For this reason, we are convinced that the countries of Europe can and should, in their own as well as in the general interest, contribute to just solutions being found as promptly as possible to these conflicts and crises.

86. The Yugoslav Government is also convinced that by reducing armed forces and armaments and by taking other measures relating to the limitation of military commitments in Europe, steps must be taken to ensure that the measures are so implemented that no country or group of countries will, at any stage of this process, be placed in an unfavourable position as regards its security, and that the measures adopted in one part of the continent will not upset stability in other areas. The Yugoslav Government also believes that the reduction of armed forces and the limitation of military activities in Europe—where an immense conventional and nuclear potential is concentrated—can exercise a positive influence on the stemming of the arms race and also on the process of disarmament.

87. All this leads us to believe as well that it might be helpful if the problems of disarmament and of international security, which are so interdependent, could be considered in our Committee in a more closely linked manner.

88. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): When this Committee renews its annual debate on disarmament issues, it should have no time for rhetoric. The members know too well the situation that prevails in regard to the arms race and also know each other too well to be swayed by reiterated expressions of good intentions. We have for so long waited to see some action. I for one had hoped to see some measure of disarmament in my time. But this was not to be.

89. If somebody would gainsay this I must beg him to give proofs: where has any purposeful disarmament been carried out during the last decade of intensive disarmament talks? I have in mind a perceptible reduction of armaments—not simply shifts in weapon systems which occur on account of obsolescence. When concluding that there has been no disarmament in the world of reality, I do not overlook, of course, the United States decision to discontinue production of biological weapons and even destroy stocks, often cited as the one concrete action. But can even that decision, laudable but solitary so far, rightly be described as disarmament in the strict sense of the term as meaning really sacrificing something of military significance?

90. The truth about the present situation is even worse. There has been no manifestation of a real will to take political decisions to proceed in the direction of disarmament. Despite some formal agreements reached, and negotiations going on at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the strategic arms limitation talks or the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the tools for killing ever more men, more rapidly and more cruelly are being piled up and perfected without cessation and, obviously, without any moral inhibition. Our world is a world of wars and violence.

91. While we recognize that countries all over the globe are engulfed in this plight, we must still turn to the two super-Powers and ask them to shoulder the responsibility for initiating a more sensible course; the lesser nuclear weapon Powers should be expected to follow—as should all of us gradually—but could hardly be asked, by others, to take the lead. This responsibility must be squarely laid on the super-Powers because they are leading us in the race-without-reason to devote immense material and human resources for the purposes of destroying fellow men. They are in a singular category because of having so-called overkill capacity—nuclear forces more than enough for unbearably mutilating each other and wiping out a large portion of the world's population.

92. That these two Powers possess surplus capabilities is also evidenced by the fact that they are constantly participating in the build-up of war machines in many parts of the world, most recently keeping up a flow to the two sides of the war in the Middle East, a senseless war, as wars between nations are in our days, when we should know that violence cannot cure ills.

93. Still the super-Powers go on developing more kill capacity. They do not only lead overwhelmingly in military expenditures but they account for some 85 per cent of the expenditure for military research and development work, that is, for innovations, improvements and additions to achieve still more murderous weapons. This obviously is a major factor determining far into the future the nature of the armaments which will be deployed and, alas, probably used in countries around the globe.

94. This is not the time or the place to argue once more the full case about mankind's insane course towards *self-destruction*. But we need to stress it and we need to stress that the international community must find some way to force a stemming of the tide. What are then the most sensible next steps to take at this session of the

General Assembly so that we can go beyond pious resolutions which have proven to be of practically no avail?

95. I want to limit my statement today mainly to two items which at this time would seem to offer possibilities for positive action. One is related to the World Disarmament Conference and the second napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use. I reserve my right to broach, in a later intervention, the more "classical" disarmament issues, including the question of limiting resources for further build-up of armaments.

96. First and foremost, after 12 years of frustrating failures since the hopes were raised by the Zorin-McCloy Agreement,<sup>6</sup> we need to create some more effective mechanism for grappling in depth and detail with disarmament which is not just one but the major political problem of our time. This is the overriding reason why my Government has given strong support to the proposal of calling a World Disarmament Conference. We have also, like some other Governments, particularly the Netherlands, suggested that it is high time to establish the nucleus of a United Nations Disarmament Organization in order to monitor the compliance—or non-compliance—with agreements and, perhaps, even with United Nations recommendations in the disarmament field. We are, however, open to any other suggestions which would make the international machinery for accomplishing disarmament more effective. Here I would like to say that the future role of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which in its present form has proven regrettably unproductive, or its substitution by some new central negotiating body, should be decided in the light of a thoroughgoing general examination, preferably at the World Disarmament Conference or, possibly, in the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations.

97. The Swedish delegation continues to hold that the World Disarmament Conference must fulfil two conditions. It should secure the participation of all major Powers and particularly all nuclear weapon States, and it should be well prepared. We have greatly appreciated the efforts by Mr. Hoveyda, the representative of Iran, to conduct some meaningful exchange of views despite adverse circumstances as to preparations for the Conference. At this session of the General Assembly we should, however, be ready to proceed from informal preliminaries to firm undertakings.

98. Why are most of the nuclear-weapon Powers resisting the holding of a World Disarmament Conference, when the majority of States Members of the United Nations so evidently clamour for it and when nobody can dispute that some such break-through move is indispensable? The present reluctance on the part of the Chinese Government should be overcome by positive efforts. My delegation is convinced that the Chinese Government has singled out what is truly the major of all so-called major problems: the containment of the risks of nuclear war. A World Disarmament Conference could not be expected to restrict itself to minor matters and, by its silence, sanction the present situation where all mankind lives under a nuclear threat,

<sup>6</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

or—to translate it into political terms—under a military and political hegemony of the super-Powers, based on their near-monopoly in nuclear weapons.

99. Recognizing where the interests of the majority of nations lie, the Swedish Government has advised that the Chinese view be taken very seriously. I have in mind the view that the first step should be that the nuclear weapon Powers—all of them—undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor ever to use them against non-nuclear-weapon countries and nuclear-free zones. This Chinese position should be dealt with in a positive and reasonable way.

100. One solution might be that the question of the pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons be inscribed with the highest priority on the agenda of the World Disarmament Conference. To demand, on the other hand, that such pledges be made prior to the Conference is hardly reasonable. Such an approach would also leave the whole wide membership of the United Nations outside the negotiations on this most vital of all issues. Indeed, we believe that the Conference is needed to generate the pressure to obtain these very pledges—from all the nuclear-weapon countries.

101. One of the most conspicuous shortcomings in the world of today is the impossibility of making the major Powers accountable to the international community. In the disarmament field we have, however, introduced a device which might serve this very purpose—although so far only in a partial way—that is, the institution of review conferences to examine the way disarmament treaties are working. The first of such review conferences is due in March 1975. It is to deal with the capital issue of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As that Treaty in its present form has the dual function of endeavouring to stop the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and of guaranteeing, at the same time, monopolies for vertical proliferation, the issue of discrimination will undoubtedly be in the foreground of discussion at the review conference. This is, according to our judgement, a strong reason for having the United Nations, the most representative organ of the whole world community, involved in organizing the conference. In the Treaty itself no organ or party is charged with the duty to organize this conference. If we leave it to the depositary Governments, which are three nuclear weapon Powers, we risk strengthening the discriminatory feature inherent in the non-proliferation Treaty.

102. The political composition of that Conference risks being an unbalanced one. Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty fall into three categories: first, three of the five nuclear weapon Powers; secondly, only four of the many so-called near-nuclear-weapon States—Australia, Canada, the German Democratic Republic and Sweden; and thirdly, some 70 non-nuclear-weapon Powers. It would obviously be desirable to secure the participation of more of the militarily significant and of near-nuclear-weapon countries in order that their voices be heard to help rectify and to reinforce the non-proliferation Treaty.

103. There are certainly many matters to discuss in relation to this Treaty, the most blatant one being, of course, the failure of the nuclear weapon Powers to fulfil

the pledges in article VI to negotiate effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. But it must also be assessed whether the increasing gap of military might and technology between them and all nuclear-free countries, as well as the widening risks of nuclear war caused by new nuclear-weapon developments, would seem to some States to jeopardize their supreme interests.

104. I should now like to turn to a different subject where, on behalf of my Government, I want to enter a specific plea for action; this question also has a link to the theme of conferences. The Swiss Government has convoked a diplomatic conference on the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, to meet in Geneva in February-March 1974, with a probable second session at the same period in 1975. That conference is not to deal with disarmament in the sense of physical elimination of weapons, but it is to deal, *inter alia*, with the related issue of legal restraints in the use of weapons. The draft protocols prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross for submission to the conference contain rules which mark a high level of ambition, particularly because they would provide better protection of civilian populations.

105. Our memories are now painfully clear of the immense suffering brought by modern methods of war and modern weapons. This awareness should help, indeed make it mandatory for Governments to go to the conference with humanitarian ambitions that also match their own long-term interests. Given such a determination, the conference could result in rules which would significantly alleviate the sufferings in the all too numerous armed conflicts which our world community and world organization fail to prevent. By contrast, it would be a tragedy if the opportunity were missed and if Governments were content with minor rules supplementing the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

106. In the general debate at this session, the Swedish Foreign Minister called attention to the important draft rules which would ban area bombardment and attacks upon objects which are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as dams and dikes [*2149th plenary meeting*]. These draft rules will be reviewed in the Sixth Committee under the item concerning human rights in armed conflicts, and I shall not comment upon them here.

107. But, under this item of disarmament in the First Committee, it seems appropriate to consider the best course of action on the question of possible prohibitions or restrictions of use of specific conventional weapons. The Swedish Foreign Minister referred also to this matter when he discussed the draft rules proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross to confirm the general ban on the use of weapons causing unnecessary suffering and on war methods which have indiscriminate effects. Indeed, one group of such weapons, namely, napalm and other incendiary weapons, is the subject of a specific item on our agenda.

108. I should like to believe that this discussion in the First Committee and the discussion later during this session in the Sixth Committee will mark the beginning of a new phase in our concerted efforts to restrain, if not to eradicate, the scourge of war.



109. It is, of course, the use in recent conflicts of particularly cruel or indiscriminate weapons, like napalm and other incendiary weapons, pellet bombs, high velocity small arms, delayed action weapons and so on, which has aroused the world's conscience to the need for reversal of a development towards more and more inhumane warfare methods affecting both soldiers and civilians. This development of weapons which are actually being used has too long lacked our attention, while we have mainly—but vainly—devoted it to the nuclear weapons, which have not been used. If at the Hague Conferences at the turn of the century conscience and reason led to agreements banning the use of dum-dum bullets and unanchored contact mines, it is high time that we submitted today's versions of those weapons—high velocity ammunition and mines laid by aircraft—to the same scrutiny.

110. The President of the General Assembly, Mr. Benites, was the first during this session of the Assembly to remind us of the "untold sorrow" inflicted by modern weapons, and a former President of the Assembly, Foreign Minister Romulo of the Philippines, in endorsing limitations and restrictions on particularly indiscriminate or cruel weapons, expressed the hope that the forthcoming conference called by the Swiss Government would be successful in that regard. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, referring to the same conference, said that new legal restraints should be imposed on the use of weapons and weapons systems that might cause unnecessary suffering, have indiscriminate effects or lead to ecological dislocations. Several other speakers, for instance, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, without going into details, expressed the view that high priority must now be accorded to restricting the use of indiscriminate weapons and inhumane methods of warfare.

111. The concerns voiced at the highest levels are not isolated expressions. During the conferences of government experts convoked by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1971 and 1972 a large number of those experts presented concrete proposals for prohibitions or restrictions of use of specific weapons. It is appropriate also to recall that the need for such rules to reaffirm and develop the international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts was underlined by the General Assembly in resolutions 2853 (XXVI) in 1971 and resolution 3032 (XXVII) in 1972.

112. Not only have concrete proposals emerged. The factual material which prompted the proposals has become available in systematized and authoritative form. The Secretary-General's report on *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use* was the first such factual compilation to appear last year.<sup>7</sup> This year we have the comments of various Governments on the napalm report [*A/9207 and Corr.1*]. Most of them stress the need for action leading to prohibition or restriction of use. This year we can also take note of a factual report which has been worked out by an international group of experts under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and which deals comprehensively with conventional weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. I think all members of the Committee know that report. In my own country, too,

systematic reports have been produced. A group of military, technical and medical experts have recently, at the request of the Swedish Government, elaborated a detailed report on particularly inhumane conventional weapons, with gruesome pictorial evidence. That report may be of special interest inasmuch as it discusses various alternatives for international rules on prohibitions or restrictions of use of specific weapons and comments on how their implementation might affect national inventories.

113. There exists now a widespread concern about the use of a number of types of conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. There is a wish to discuss rules for the prohibition or restriction of use of such weapons. There have been proposals to that effect at conferences of government experts. There is now a good deal of systematic factual material compiled. What are we to do? Clearly the time has come for action.

114. Already resolution 2932 (XXVII) prompted last year by the napalm report states the conviction of the General Assembly that: "... the widespread use of many weapons and the emergence of new methods of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering or are indiscriminate call urgently for renewed efforts by Governments to seek, through legal means, the prohibition of the use of such weapons and of indiscriminate and cruel methods of warfare and, if possible, through measures of disarmament, the elimination of specific, especially cruel or indiscriminate weapons".

115. Similarly, the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects contains the following in its final remarks:

"The facts compiled in the report in regard to these and other weapons speak for themselves and call for inter-governmental review and action. Such action might be justified particularly in respect of two types of weapon apart from incendiaries, namely, high velocity small arms ammunition and certain fragmentation weapons. The risks involved in their rapid proliferation and use would seem to constitute good reasons for intergovernmental discussions concerning these weapons with a view to possible restrictions upon their operational use or even prohibition."

116. The need for early action in this direction is also stressed in many of the government comments on the Secretary-General's report.

117. In one sense the wish for early action might be thought to be satisfied by a resolution by the General Assembly condemning the use of specific types of weapons and declaring the opinion of the Assembly to be that such weapons fall under the existing general legal prohibitions of weapons. Such action would hardly be effective, however—we know that—and my delegation would not propose it. If instant legislation is not the best method, the same can be said of the opposite method, that is, allowing the question of prohibitory legislation to disappear in the distance. That would be the likely result of referring the whole matter—which in the first instance refers to the use and not to the elimination of weapons—to the Conference of the Commit-

<sup>7</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.1.3.

tee on Disarmament, a body which has its hands full and, at the same time, clearly suffers from near paralysis.

118. A third course of action which has been suggested would be to make use of the readiness of the International Committee of the Red Cross—and I quote from its weapons report “to continue inquiries and, for example, convoke a conference of government experts in order to contribute to the promotion of relevant international humanitarian law.”

119. While this offer is appreciated, as is the considerable work that the International Committee of the Red Cross has performed in preparing two draft protocols, it is submitted that the stage of research and inquiries should be behind us and that the time has come for active inter-governmental discussion. Indeed, as early as 1957 at the New Delhi Conference of the Red Cross, the International Committee of the Red Cross submitted concrete proposals that would have prohibited the use *inter alia* of delayed-action weapons and some incendiary weapons. Since then the International Committee has consulted many experts and their views on the weapons issue have been reported. This year, finally, a comprehensive report on conventional weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects has been published under its auspices. In these circumstances it would not be easy for the Committee to add to the valuable services it has rendered. Nor would a resolution on further research and consultation satisfy the widespread wish for prompt government action.

120. My delegation has come to the conclusion that the most logical and speedy procedure would be that the forthcoming diplomatic conference should consider the issue of the possible prohibition or restriction of the use of specific conventional weapons. The conference will have before it a proposal for the reaffirmation of the general rule prohibiting the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering and means and methods of warfare that may have indiscriminate effects. What could be more natural than adding to this an attempt to draw a list of such weapons? Indeed, this is exactly what happened at the Hague Conferences at the turn of the century, when the conventions against the use of dum-dum bullets and unanchored contact mines were added to the general conventions. Needless to say, success in the endeavours to agree on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain weapons would facilitate consideration of the question of the non-production of the same kind of weapons. In that latter disarmament context, which is traditionally dealt with in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it is evident that the problem of verification poses special difficulties.

121. We are aware that some Governments have had reservations about referring the weapons issue to the diplomatic conference and some of these reservations have been aired here this morning. We firmly believe, however, that the concern that may inspire such reservations could be met. First, while the International Committee of the Red Cross has not formulated any draft proposals, we can certainly rely upon Governments to do so. Indeed, nothing is more likely to induce Governments, in the same manner as their experts have done in the preparatory phase, to prepare themselves than the knowledge that the matter will be taken up. My own Government, for one, is actively

discussing with other Governments a paper that could be offered as one basis of discussion.

122. Secondly, the Conference might have a separate plenary sub-committee to deal with the weapons issue to give it enough time and expertise and to ensure that all parts of the draft protocols prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross are read. If need be, arrangements could be made for further negotiations between the 1974 session and the expected 1975 session. Lastly, rules that might be agreed upon for the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons could be laid down in an instrument separate from the protocols supplementing the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

123. I have purposely not gone into questions of substance relating to the prohibition or restriction of use of specific weapons. It would be tempting to do so, but I shall not prolong this statement by discussing the various weapons or the questions of rules relating, for instance, to reciprocity. There are valid questions of substance which should be considered, but need not be answered here and now. What we need to do now is only to make up our minds about the forum to which these questions are to be sent. This is what draft resolution A/C.1/L.650 and sponsored by Cyprus, Egypt, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia is about. On behalf of the sponsors I have the honour to introduce this draft resolution and recommend it for the sympathetic consideration of all delegations.

124. Mr. HASSAN (Sudan): Reading through document A/9141 which contains the report of the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation has been overwhelmed by a sense of disappointment in the lack of progress on questions relating to disarmament. We are sure that many delegations must have felt the same, and perhaps they might be excused since their Governments and peoples have a real stake in the process of disarmament. It goes without saying that the lack of progress means the stepping up of the existing arms race, both in quality and quantity, the stepping up of military expenditures, the resort to force in international relations, and an increase of tension and insecurity the world over.

125. The endeavour of the General Assembly for the past years has been concentrated on the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, but the achievements since disarmament questions were included in the agenda of the Assembly have been limited. The achievements relate only to collateral, partial and control measures; complete disarmament remains a dream to be fulfilled, perhaps in the distant future. The pleas, persuasions and exhortations of the majority of the members of our Organization have yet to be heeded by those who possess weapons of mass destruction.

126. Two questions were entrusted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in order to achieve the drafting of agreements. General Assembly resolution 2934 A (XXVII):

“Calls upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests, taking into

account . . . the pressing need for the early conclusion of such a treaty.”

Resolution 2934 B (XXVII), paragraph 5:

“Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give first priority to its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests . . .”

127. In resolution 2933 (XXVII), paragraph 2, the General Assembly requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, “as a matter of high priority”, to reach “early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction”.

128. It is sad to note that the Committee has made no progress towards beginning serious negotiations on such agreements. There is no doubt that valuable documents by several delegations have been submitted to the Committee, a fact that demonstrates that lack of progress is due largely to lack of political will more than to a lack of adequate means of verifications and guarantees. On the question of banning chemical weapons my delegation considers that the time is ripe for entering the stage of negotiating concrete proposals in order to fulfil the mandate entrusted to the Committee by the General Assembly. Those who hesitate to undertake serious negotiations on the pretext of lack of comprehensive means of verification and guarantees would like the human race to wait for generations so that their conditions might be met and fulfilled.

129. Reading through the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we have noticed also that no progress has been registered in the question of banning nuclear weapon tests. Again, the reason for the lack of tangible results is the insistence on certain methods of verification and guarantees. The General Assembly, in paragraph 2 of resolution 2934 C (XXVII), reaffirmed the conviction that whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban of the nature contemplated in the preamble to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. We concur with the provisions of that paragraph. My delegation is of the opinion that the many proposals on this subject—especially those presented by non-aligned countries, with the support of some developed countries—serve as a good basis for serious negotiations.

130. If we may repeat our stand on nuclear tests, we are in favour of the formulation of a comprehensive test ban treaty, adhered to by all States, which would serve as a basis for complete nuclear disarmament. The benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology should be applied to the well-being of all peoples.

131. We are in favour of nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as South America and the Indian Ocean—and my delegation will make a separate statement on the question of the Indian Ocean—since we believe that the declaration of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes significantly towards disarmament, and, consistent with our previous stand, we call for the dismantling of foreign military bases conceived in the power politics of the big Powers. We have seen

recently how these bases have helped in the aggression carried out against the Arab people.

132. Taking into consideration the negative achievements of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation might even question the usefulness of following the same procedure that we have followed in the past, that is, of sending recommendations of the Assembly to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with its present slow procedures. We are told in the Committee’s report that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the main multilateral deliberating organ for disarmament questions, is stalemated. Our thanks go to the initiative of the developing countries in presenting proposals for its revitalization. Perhaps the Committee has reached the same psychological impasse as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, and if that is not the case, then we are puzzled about how the necessary political will of the big Powers could be generated in order to make its work more meaningful. My delegation hopes that the Committee is not going to be a mere clearing-house for agreements that emerge after the big Powers have satisfied consideration of their national and international strategies.

133. When we argue thus, it is not because my delegation is striving to inject a note of despair into our debate or to lose sight of the fact that agreements on disarmament questions, because of the complex aspects involved, are time-consuming and slow in nature. This should not be an excuse for lack of progress. We are aware of this and we are not oblivious of the achievements scored by the international community in the last two decades. We hail them and we hail the agreements reached by the super-Powers and other States which have led to the relaxation of tension and contributed to the objectives of disarmament. Our request to the big Powers is that the United Nations be closely associated with such initiatives. It is not good that those Powers should bypass the Organization in dealing with questions that affect the peace and security of the whole world.

134. I turn now to make some brief remarks on the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference. My delegation supported resolution 2930 (XXVII) with the view that all States in the world could find an opportunity to participate in and contribute to the disarmament efforts. Our hope has been that such a forum would enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations deliberative machinery and might contribute to the realization of the objective of the Disarmament Decade.

135. It is regrettable that before the preparations for the Conference have got off the ground difficulties relating to the composition and terms of reference of the Special Committee have been encountered—although this was expected.

136. My delegation regards one aspect as of the utmost importance—that is, the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. This is, perhaps, well understood since the Assembly has accorded first priority to disarmament in weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore essential for the success of the Conference to ensure the participation of all nuclear-

weapon States, unless we are seeking to disarm the unarmed.

137. The impasse in the Special Committee could be resolved if the nuclear weapon Powers would apply their goodwill and we, the non-aligned—or rather the developing—countries would do everything possible to ensure their participation. My delegation would not like to go into the details of the different alternatives for overcoming the impasse; they have been amply and excellently set forth by the representative of Mexico at the 1935th meeting. Mr. Hoveyda excellently summarized the situation for us at the 1934th meeting and my delegation is also thankful to him. We are taking a keen interest in the consultations which have started between different groups and we pledge our humble co-operation.

138. Lastly, on the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons my delegation looks with favour on the seven-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/L.650], so ably introduced by the Minister of State of Sweden. Sweden's contribution to international humanitarian law and its positive contribution to the deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament are commendable.

139. Mr. ADALA (Kenya): My delegation has followed with interest the statements made by members of this Committee in the course of the general debate on disarmament questions. For the moment, however, I intend to confine my short statement to comments pertinent to the draft resolution before us, it being understood that my delegation reserves the right to pronounce itself at a later date on any or all of the disarmament items now before us.

140. My delegation is one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.650 on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, which has just been ably introduced by Mrs. Alva Myrdal, Minister of State of Sweden.

141. We have associated ourselves with a draft resolution this year, as we did last year, in conformity with our belief that urgent governmental efforts must be made to seek through legal means the prohibition of the use of new methods of warfare which cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. We fully endorse the views in the sixth preambular paragraph "that prohibitions or restrictions of use of such weapons should be examined without delay"—and my delegation would like to emphasize "without delay". We believe that positive results in this regard are likely to facilitate work on the elimination of the production, stockpiling and proliferation of the weapons in question, which should be the ultimate objective.

142. The mood adopted by my delegation last year when introducing a certain amendment to the draft resolution which was later adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 2932 (XXVII) and which we had the honour to sponsor still stands, and that is the need for urgent and immediate action to bring to a complete halt the produc-

tion, development, stockpiling and use of napalm and other incendiary weapons. This remains our principal objective.

143. However, we note with appreciation the comments submitted by Governments included in the report of the Secretary-General [A/9207 and Corr.1] and the number of wishes expressed that inter-governmental action should be taken with a view to reaching agreement on the prohibition or restriction of the use of these weapons.

144. In the opinion of my delegation, the invitation that this draft resolution, by a decision of the General Assembly, will address to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to consider the question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons as well as specific conventional weapons that may be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering, or to cause indiscriminate effects and to adopt rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons, is most appropriate and well-timed.

145. There could be no better forum for a more sober and meaningful consideration of this urgent and important subject than the proposed diplomatic conference.

146. The attention of my delegation has naturally been drawn to the misgivings expressed by certain members of this Committee as to the wisdom of including in the agenda of the Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law new and complicated topics at this stage. We must submit that we find nothing wrong with this move. We should like to think that contacts and consultations have already been undertaken with the Swiss Federal Council, the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as with the parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

147. It has come to the knowledge of my delegation that objections have been raised to a consideration of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons at the proposed diplomatic conference. We believe, as Mrs. Myrdal has just stated, that the concern which may inspire such reservations can be met.

148. Consequently, my delegation would like to express its thanks to the Swiss Federal Council for its decision to convene such a diplomatic conference under its auspices.

149. Our appreciation also goes to the Government of Sweden and to those others that have continuously exerted efforts in this regard with the aim of accelerating progress towards the total elimination of these cruel and inhuman methods of warfare.

150. With these few remarks my delegation and the other six sponsors of the draft resolution commend it for the sympathetic consideration of this Committee.

*The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.*