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**Chairman:** Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).

**AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96**

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.443)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231)**

**Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231)**

**Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament (*continued*) (A/7134, A/7223, A/C.1/L.443)**

**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (*continued*) (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277 and Corr.1, A/7327)**

1. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal): The First Committee is taking up consideration of disarmament items in the wake of three happy events this year. I refer to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], the proposed bilateral

talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, and the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

2. The Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States highlighted the legitimate concern of the non-nuclear Powers with regard to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We believe that the purpose of the Conference was well served and a degree of consensus among the non-nuclear Powers was evident in the form of specific recommendations contained in the final document of the Conference. The result of the Conference also clearly demonstrated the inherent difficulty and futility of attempting to solve the question of security assurances in a world composed of States of different political configurations.

3. We have opposed the concept of the so-called positive guarantees, believing that negative guarantees by nuclear Powers involving a pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and against each other would be the best solution to the problem of security.

4. We shall support all efforts to establish an *ad hoc* committee to ensure the continuation of the work undertaken at the Conference. The *ad hoc* committee should pursue the result of the Conference, in co-operation with all States, nuclear as well as non-nuclear, and should co-ordinate the work of international agencies in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We shall also support all initiatives aimed at focusing attention on the banning and eliminating of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

5. The announced agreement between the United States and the USSR to conduct bilateral talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive and defensive missile systems is a welcome development. We are particularly heartened because as far back as 1966 we ourselves urged the super-Powers to halt their plans to deploy anti-ballistic-missile ABM systems, pointing out the unstabilizing effect that such a deployment would have. Much to our regret, both the United States and the USSR went ahead with their plans, and either already have, or are irrevocably engaged in the process of deploying, mini-ABM systems. Although these systems are not geared against each other's first strike, but against a third nuclear Power, they could easily be expanded into full-fledged systems geared to the respective first strikes of the two super-Powers. We hope that the super-Powers will reach an accommodation that will obviate the need for a full-scale deployment of this extremely costly system, whose frightening implications are only just beginning to be realized. We are glad to know that the bilateral talks would also embrace strategic offensive vehicles. It should be pointed out, however, that, with the

miniaturization of nuclear warheads, the distinction between strategic offensive weapons and conventional offensive weapons tends to be blurred. As the United States and the USSR are both making every effort to develop smaller but more powerful nuclear warheads, it will be possible for them in the future to launch nuclear warheads with conventional delivery vehicles, since an ordinary aircraft could carry the bomb just as easily as strategic bombers. However, the solution is not so much to include conventional delivery weapons in the proposed ban on offensive vehicles as to put a stop to the further miniaturization of nuclear warheads.

6. In their bilateral talks, the two super-Powers should therefore also explore the possibility of coming to an agreement to halt further miniaturization and sophistication of nuclear warheads. This, of course, leads us to the question of an underground test ban, because if an underground test ban were achieved it would by itself make the sophistication of nuclear weapons impossible. But this is not the only reason why we have been clamouring for an underground test ban, although it is an important one.

7. An underground test ban would also put a stop to the deployment of ABM systems, bring about a cut-off in the production of fissile materials, and facilitate the attainment of several other partial measures. I would not be over-exaggerating if I said that the solution of most partial measures advocated by the United States and the Soviet Union is in some way linked to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. We have been cautioned by the nuclear Powers not to insist upon fixing a rigid order of priorities concerning partial measures. Notwithstanding their admonition, if we insist that a comprehensive test ban must be the first measure to follow the non-proliferation Treaty, it is because we feel that a point has been reached where we can no longer, with moral justification, refer to an underground test ban as a partial measure, although technically it might be so. For when conclusion of other partial measures is so crucially linked with the conclusion of an underground test ban, the latter, in our opinion, becomes a measure of such vital importance that it cannot be relegated to a minor role and lumped together with other partial measures. We submit that the mantle relinquished by non-proliferation as the most vital partial measure should now fall on a comprehensive test ban and the pride of place among partial measures retained for so long by non-proliferation, should be given to an underground test ban. The longer an underground test ban is postponed, the harder will it become for countries morally to justify their continued support for and adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty, and even to the partial test ban treaty.

8. Reverting to the subject of the proposed talks between the United States and the USSR concerning elimination of strategic delivery vehicles, I am sure all of us would like to receive clarification as to the extent of reductions that might be envisaged. The Soviet Union has in the past, as well as more recently in its memorandum of 1 July 1968, proposed [A/7134, par. 9] as an independent collateral measure, the reduction of the whole arsenal of strategic delivery vehicles to an absolute minimum, leaving temporarily only a strictly limited number of delivery vehicles for deterrence.

9. The United States has in the past consistently opposed this proposal, which is popularly known as “the Gromyko proposal”, and to the best of our knowledge continues to oppose it. We should therefore like to know if the bilateral talks will be conducted on the basis of the Gromyko proposal, that is on the basis of destroying all but a minimal number of delivery vehicles, or on the basis of a percentage reduction over a number of years—an approach favoured by the United States—or whether a new *modus vivendi* will be found with some kind of a fusion of these two different approaches.

10. I should now like to make some observations on the Soviet memorandum of 1 July 1968. All measures contained in the memorandum, except that of the sea-bed, had been previously proposed by the Soviet Union at one time or another. We have supported these measures before and are pleased to reiterate our support again. However, the memorandum overlooks a very important measure which, in our opinion, stands only second in importance to an underground test ban. I am referring to the cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, and the transfer of such stocks to peaceful uses. It could be argued that the Soviet proposal for the cessation of production of nuclear weapons, and the reduction of such stockpiles, could be construed as also embracing the question of a cut-off. However, to link the question of a cut-off with the far more strategically significant measure of reduction and destruction of nuclear stockpiles would not be realistic. The latter measure can only be dealt with in the context of general and complete disarmament and cannot be concluded without the participation of China and France, the other two nuclear Powers, for certainly the other three nuclear Powers would not want to destroy their stockpiles if China and France continue to retain theirs. Some day when China's ostracism has ended and France decides to participate in disarmament talks, it might be possible to consider the proposal for the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and reduction of their stockpiles in the context of general and complete disarmament.

11. In the meantime, commendable as it might be, the measure is wholly unrealistic in the prevailing international situation and should not be linked to a cut-off. The cut-off is perhaps the most uncomplicated measure to accomplish, as it raises no special problem of control. The United States has already demonstrated in 1966 a new inspection technique involving the use of “safing tapes” to monitor shut down nuclear reactors in an unobtrusive manner. We were told that the system was highly sensitive and could detect the unauthorized production of even a minuscule fraction of the plutonium required for a single low-yield bomb. However, the safing technique is designed only for plutonium-producing reactors and then only to ensure that a shut-down reactor is in fact not operating. Thus the safing technique could not by itself be adequate for the control of a cut-off agreement. It would have to be supplemented by some other form of control of a less unobtrusive nature. In this respect, we are indeed fortunate because, in the control provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty we already have a tailor-made mechanism for a cut-off agreement. We agree with the United States that the control aspect of a cut-off could be dealt with by having the nuclear Powers accept IAEA safeguards, similar to those assumed by the non-

nuclear Powers under the non-proliferation Treaty. In this connexion, I wish to recall what Ambassador Adrian Fisher said in a statement before United Nations diplomats invited to visit the shut-down reactor in Hanford, Washington on 16 November 1966. He said:

“The United States does believe that in the context of the cut-off agreement, the nuclear Powers should be prepared to accept the same degree of verification that we have proposed for non-nuclear-weapon Powers as appropriate for safeguarding a non-proliferation agreement.”

We would welcome a similar statement on the part of the Soviet Union. Acceptance by the nuclear Powers of IAEA safeguards, similar to those accepted by the non-nuclear Powers under the non-proliferation Treaty, coupled with the safing technique, would be adequate to conclude a cut-off agreement.

12. The non-proliferation Treaty prohibits the non-nuclear parties from conducting peaceful nuclear explosions and as a result, several civilian nuclear Powers have decided not to sign the Treaty. In order to induce these Powers to sign the Treaty, we had urged during the debate in the resumed twenty-second session [*1559th meeting, para. 45*] that the question of peaceful nuclear explosions be removed from the non-proliferation Treaty and be dealt with in the context of an underground test ban. We had further suggested that pending an underground test-ban treaty, the non-nuclear Powers should agree to a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions that would be renewable every five years. Our suggestion had the merit of divorcing the question of peaceful nuclear explosions from the non-proliferation Treaty, thus making the Treaty much more acceptable to the civilian nuclear Powers.

13. The moratorium, on the other hand, could have also met the desire of the super-Powers that the non-nuclear Powers be prohibited from conducting peaceful nuclear explosions. Since a *de facto* prohibition would have served the same purpose as a *de jure* ban, our proposal would have constituted a compromise solution worthy of consideration. However, it is too late for that now and, if we really wish the Treaty to become more universal by attracting the signatures of those countries that have not signed it yet, it can only be done in the context of an underground test ban that would prohibit all nuclear explosions and set up a parallel régime to deal with peaceful explosions exempted from the ban.

14. Over the years, several constructive proposals have been put forward by the non-nuclear countries to overcome the inspection issue and to bring about an underground test ban. I would like to recall a few.

15. First, on 16 April 1962, the eight non-aligned members of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submitted a joint memorandum<sup>1</sup> which, *inter alia*, recommended the creation of an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly-qualified scientists, preferably from non-aligned countries, to process and evaluate all available data in order to determine the nature of a suspicious event. The

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. j.

proposal also envisaged that the commission would be invited by the party to the treaty on whose territory a suspicious event had occurred to visit the site of the suspicious event and establish its true nature.

16. Secondly, at the 1965 session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, Sweden proposed<sup>2</sup> the creation of a “detection club” to expand existing voluntary international co-operation in the detection of underground explosions through the exchange of seismic data among seismologically advanced countries.

17. Thirdly, at the same session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the United Arab Republic proposed [*224th meeting*] a threshold treaty banning underground tests of seismic magnitude 4.75 and above, coupled with a moratorium on tests below that magnitude.

18. Fourthly, at the 1966 session of that Committee, Sweden advanced a proposal [*247th meeting*] called “verification by challenge”—a variation of the “inspection by invitation” idea contained in the 1962 non-aligned memorandum referred to above. If I may recall it, the verification by challenge proposal was based on the assumption that a party suspected of having violated an underground test ban would itself be interested in establishing its innocence by voluntarily putting forward clarifying explanations and evidence and/or by invoking the inspection by invitation formula contained in the 1962 non-aligned memorandum. In the event that the suspected party failed to bring forward such clarifying evidences voluntarily, the interested parties themselves would demand an explanation, or challenge the suspected party to issue an invitation for inspection. If this also went unheeded, the aggrieved parties would have the right to withdraw from the Treaty. The usefulness of this proposal lies in the fact that it neither envisages on-site inspection *per se* nor does it reject it. It gets around the sticky problem of verification in an ingenious fashion and, coupled with the detection club, it would serve as an almost fool-proof system to monitor an underground test. I say almost fool-proof, because a completely fool-proof system can never be devised.

19. Fifthly, In June 1966, the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons meeting in Scarborough, Canada, advanced a proposal whereby the nuclear Powers would suspend all underground tests for a trial period during which the verification by challenge system would be tried out. This proposal also came to nought.

20. Sixthly, at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, our delegation put forward [*1460th meeting, paras. 40-42*] a proposal linking the twin concepts of verification by challenge and a threshold treaty. We then proposed the conclusion of a threshold treaty, coupled with a moratorium on tests below the threshold for a trial period to try out the verification by challenge formula. We insisted that the moratorium be left separate from the threshold treaty so that even if the moratorium broke down, the treaty would endure.

21. Seventhly, at the twenty-second session, Canada put forward a proposal to link the detection club proposal with

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. B.

the original Soviet proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations—the so-called “black boxes”—to monitor an underground test ban. The idea to use black boxes in conjunction with the detection club was designed to get the nuclear Powers to provide information derived from the use of black boxes in order to supplement information collected by national monitoring stations and thereby to facilitate verification.

22. I have only listed some of the proposals advanced over the years in the General Assembly, the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and elsewhere.

23. Several equally constructive proposals also exist, but I will refrain from mentioning them for the sake of brevity. The point I am trying to make is that there is no dearth of proposals, any of which, either alone or in conjunction with others, could form a satisfactory basis for the conclusion of an underground test-ban treaty.

24. What is really lacking is the political will on the part of the super-Powers. The latest joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, *inter alia*,<sup>3</sup> views with apprehension the fact that no serious negotiations have taken place on the various proposals put forward in the Committee. It would therefore seem futile for us to devise new proposals when in all probability they might be given the cold shoulder by the super-Powers.

25. If my delegation has refrained from making any new proposals, it is precisely because of the fact that they would be completely ignored. The message is painfully clear to us. No amount of effort on the part of non-nuclear Powers and no amount of compromise proposals will have any effect on the super-Powers. When they decide that an underground test ban is to their benefit, only then will they agree to it. The example of the partial test-ban treaty is still vivid in our memory. For years neither the Soviet Union nor the United States moved from their entrenched positions, and no amount of effort on the part of the non-nuclear Powers made them budge an inch.

26. However, when the time came when it was no longer necessary for them to continue atmospheric tests and probably with an eye on China's impending nuclear test series, they suddenly agreed to conclude the treaty, after making concessions to each other they had vowed they would never make.

27. So it seems we will all have to be patient about an underground test ban and pray fervently that the day soon arrives when the nuclear Powers decide that it is in their interest to conclude such an agreement. In the meantime, there is nothing we can do about it. It is sad, but that is how it is.

28. Referring finally to the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, we are in full agreement with Ambassador Husain of India who said at the 393rd meeting of the Committee that the sum total of that Committee's achievement at its last session was the adoption of the agenda<sup>4</sup> on the further work of the

Committee. If I may say so, even that is not much of an achievement because that agenda is not really an agenda in the true sense of the term; it is merely a cataloguing of various and sundry collateral measures under four very general and broad and sweeping headings without establishing, *inter se*, priorities among the measures.

29. To further compound the confusion, a foot-note has been added<sup>5</sup> reaffirming the recognized right of any delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee to discuss any disarmament subject at any time. We do not therefore understand the purpose of the agenda and why it was considered so important to rush it through at the last minute—and on the very eve of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

30. I would like to remind the Committee that there already exists an established procedure in the Eighteen-Nation Committee under which, concurrently with the elaboration of an agreement on general and complete disarmament in the plenary, the Committee of the Whole is entitled to consider the “various proposals on the implementation of measures aimed at lessening international tension, consolidating confidence among States, and facilitating general and complete disarmament”.<sup>6</sup>

31. Thus it seems to us that this long-standing procedure entitled the Committee of the Whole to consider any and all existing collateral measures, including those catalogued in the agenda. Therefore, the agenda adds nothing to the terms of reference already assigned to the Committee of the Whole by the above-mentioned procedure of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

32. The Co-Chairmen have explained that the question of the agenda was full of political implications and hence they were obliged to sacrifice procedure for political compromise. They have also explained that the omission of an order of priority in the agenda was designed to facilitate the conclusion of whichever measure that first becomes ripe for agreement. They said that as of the moment there did not exist any measure that could be described as being ripe. I am sure most of us here would take issue with that contention and could enumerate several measures that already are and have been ripe for agreement for some time, such as the comprehensive test-ban treaty and the “cut-off”.

33. When the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament reconvenes in the spring, we hope that efforts will be made to set up a realistic order of priority so that that Committee might once again become a forum of meaningful negotiations. If no order of priorities emerges from its next session, the reconvening of the Disarmament Commission, as suggested by Yugoslavia [*1607th meeting*], would appear to be in order. In any case, the convening of periodic meetings of the Disarmament Commission has now become quite necessary, in view of the leisurely pace of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in recent months and in order to put it back on an unmeandering course.

34. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): I should like, Mr. Chairman, first to congratulate you on your election to

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, document DC/231, par. 17.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 18.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, chap. I, para. 2(ii)

the Chair, and to say that under your guidance I am sure the Committee will conduct its business with great efficiency and, I very much hope, make a positive contribution to our work to secure further measures of arms control and disarmament. I share your disappointment, Mr. Chairman, at the slow start of these debates and, despite the enthusiasm with which we embrace resolutions in general terms often with far-reaching implications, at the reluctance of delegates to take the floor and contribute to our deliberations.

35. We must be realistic and recognize that the impetus that I thought we had attained in this Committee last June has not been maintained. In his excellent speech last week the delegate of Canada reminded us [*1607th meeting, para. 51*] of the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk in his statement to the General Assembly on 2 October, when he said:

“My Government is well aware of the blow recent events have dealt to international confidence. But progress in nuclear arms control, to which great-Power co-operation is particularly essential, is not a narrow interest of any one Power or group of Powers, great or small; it is an urgent and overriding interest of the human race in sheer survival.” [*1677th plenary meeting, para. 57*].

36. That is also the position of my Government and we stand ready to take part in meaningful negotiations towards the conclusion of agreements in any field of arms control or disarmament. We have, as those representatives will know who have read the proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, gone further and made constructive and detailed proposals to assist progress in both the nuclear and non-nuclear fields. I will refer to these proposals in a moment.

37. We welcomed the non-proliferation Treaty, not only because of the advance it represents in itself towards international security and the further utilization of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but also because of the commitment it contains in article VI to achieve further measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. We all know that we shall not make significant progress in other matters until the non-proliferation Treaty is completed and brought into force. I suggest, therefore, that this must remain our priority task and that we must seek to recreate the international sense of urgency we had developed to this end earlier in the year.

38. My Secretary of State, Mr. Michael Stewart, in addressing the General Assembly on 14 October, said:

“... The signing of the non-proliferation treaty was an important step forward, but it is a step that will rapidly lose its value if it is not followed by further measures in the disarmament field.

“Our aim is general and complete disarmament. We know by experience that if we are to get there we have to seize hold, one after another, of the steps to disarmament that can practically be taken now”. [*1693rd plenary meeting, paras. 92 and 93*]

39. I suggest that this approach is the answer to the representative of Yugoslavia, who in his interesting speech

[*1607th meeting*] posed the question: What stands in the way of progress? We can only make progress if we identify those steps which can practically be taken now. Then we must do real work to turn the general language of resolutions, often drafted to conceal rather than to reveal the difficulties, into the precise formulation of binding treaties and conventions with the provision of adequate safeguards to assure the participants that their security is not put at risk by their adherence to the Treaty. I thought the representative of Yugoslavia was unduly hard on the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. No member of that Committee, I am sure, would argue that it was perfect, and my colleagues there will confirm that it is not my view and agree that there is room for improvement in our methods of work. But it seems to me that one cannot hope to make progress in the necessary detailed work in a body much bigger than the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I firmly believe that if we can get the non-proliferation Treaty completed we can make substantial progress in Geneva and that we should be allowed to do so.

40. I assure the representative of Yugoslavia that progress is not held up in any way because of lack of facilities for discussion. It seems to me that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, on the one hand, and this Committee, on the other, provide ample opportunities. The basic fact is that progress towards nuclear disarmament can only be made if there is agreement between the nuclear Powers, although I readily concede the right and proper concern of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to exercise all their powers of persuasion to achieve such agreement.

41. For these reasons, his suggestion of setting up another special United Nations body to continue the work of the Conference on Non-Nuclear-Weapon States does not seem to me to be a good idea. We shall not assist our slow and painful progress towards ending the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the proliferation of committees and bodies concerned with this subject matter; and I cannot see how such a body could avoid duplicating work already undertaken by bodies in which nuclear as well as non-nuclear countries are playing their part. For example, as I made clear in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in July [*381st meeting*], in my view IAEA which is a United Nations body reporting directly to the General Assembly, has clearly a major role to play in implementing articles III, IV and V of the non-proliferation Treaty. Nor could I agree to reopen the question of security assurances given by the Soviet Union, the United States and ourselves in conjunction with that Treaty and welcomed so recently by the Security Council [*resolution 255 (1968)*].

42. My Government followed with great interest the proceedings of the recent non-nuclear Conference although it did not seem right that we should, as a nuclear Power without voting rights, seek to participate in the discussions. We have studied with care its resolutions, on which I should like to reserve the right of my Government to intervene later.

43. I turn now to consider some of the possible future measures of disarmament before us, and some of the practical steps we might take now. Inevitably, time requires me to be selective, and I shall seek only to indicate priorities and not to attempt an exhaustive survey.

44. In my view, the most hopeful recent development has been the agreement, announced in July, between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. My Government warmly welcomed this decision and hopes that it will be possible for these negotiations to begin at an early date, and that they will be conducted with maximum intensity in order to reach positive results in the shortest possible time. These bilateral negotiations are fundamental to the progress we all want to make towards real nuclear disarmament, and their successful outcome is of vital concern to us all. The conduct of such negotiations will also be a clear testimony of the desire of the two major nuclear Powers to carry out their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

45. It was felt in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament and to measures to end the nuclear arms race, and I feel that that is a view which will be shared by this Committee. In this connexion, I would give particular priority to the prohibition of underground testing.

46. Attempts to get a comprehensive test ban have a long history, and I would pay a tribute to the efforts of Sweden and the work of its Minister, Mrs. Myrdal, and congratulate the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm on its achievement in co-ordinating the work and producing an agreed international report on the present state of the art of seismic test ban verification. The important developments in seismology in recent years are an encouraging factor in our search for a solution to the problems which have so far prevented the conclusion of a treaty. My Government favours the conclusion of a test ban treaty at the earliest possible moment and as soon as terms that are generally acceptable can be agreed.

47. In our view, the real danger of vertical nuclear proliferation lies in the development of more sophisticated weapons systems which a comprehensive test ban treaty would prevent. Quantitative control will achieve little if the weapons that are permitted become more and more costly and sophisticated, and increasingly devastating in their power of destruction.

48. To assist in the production of an agreed comprehensive test ban treaty, I made two proposals at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and these are set out in the working paper I presented at Geneva, and which is before this Committee in the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.<sup>7</sup>

49. The first is a suggestion of a procedure which would provide an ultimate right of on-site inspection, but which is specifically designed to circumscribe this right in such a way as to ensure that it would not be exercised irresponsibly or improperly. As scientific knowledge and the means of detection and identification develop, the need

for and the probability of on-site inspection should diminish. No country adhering to the Treaty would be submitting to any certain or automatic on-site inspection. But the possibility that inspection might take place would play a very large part in establishing confidence in the effectiveness of the treaty.

50. The second proposal is that if there cannot be an early fully effective ban—which I would much prefer—consideration should be given to a phased operation. This would mean starting with an agreed annual quota of underground explosions, reducing over a fixed period of time to zero. Such quotas would put an increasingly powerful brake on the development of new nuclear weapon-systems and would finally bring this dangerous process to a complete halt.

51. I hope that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will give further consideration to these proposals when it reconvenes.

52. At the earliest opportunity after the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty, I proposed in that Committee on 16 July in Geneva at the 381st meeting that the Secretary-General should be asked to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use, and that priority in the non-nuclear field should be accorded to an instrument to ban the production and possession of agents of biological warfare. These proposals were further elaborated in a working paper presented at Geneva, and contained in the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.<sup>8</sup>

53. My task in presenting the case for these proposals today is much easier than it was last July since the arguments have been marshalled with greater cogency than I could do by the Secretary-General in the Introduction to his Annual Report. I quote:

“The question of chemical and biological weapons has been overshadowed by the question of nuclear weapons, which have a destructive power several orders of magnitude greater than that of chemical and biological weapons. Nevertheless, these too are weapons of mass destruction regarded with universal horror. In some respects they may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are required for nuclear weapons.”

And later on, he says:

“During the twenty-three years of the existence of the United Nations, there has never been a thorough discussion in any United Nations organ of the problems posed by chemical and biological weapons, nor has there been a detailed study of them.”<sup>9</sup>

54. The Committee will recall resolution 2162 B (XXI) which called for the full implementation of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, 1925. Let me at once make clear, as I did at Geneva and in the working paper to which I have referred, that my purpose is to supplement and not

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. 7.

<sup>9</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, paras. 30 and 32.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 8.

supersede that Protocol. My Government attaches great importance to it and has no reason to weaken it in any way. On the contrary, we would like to see all States which have not already acceded to it taking this step. Rather less than half the members of this Committee have in fact ratified the Protocol.

55. However, more is needed, and it was in the spirit and within the letter of resolution 2162 B (XXI) that I made my proposals, since the resolution says in its preamble:

“Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has the task of seeking an agreement on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the elimination of all such weapons from national arsenals, as called for in the draft proposals on general and complete disarmament now before the Conference.”

56. I should also say a word about terminology since the Committee may have noted that I speak of chemical and biological weapons. “Chemical” seems to me a more modern and comprehensive term than “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases” and, similarly, “biological”, although I am advised “microbiological” would be more accurate, is to be preferred to “bacteriological”. Indeed, a strict interpretation of “bacteriological” would exclude all diseases caused by, for instance, the viruses and the rickettsiae. Thus, the study would not include the use of smallpox or typhus for military purposes. I feel sure that the Committee will wish our consideration of these matters, and measures to eliminate these horrible means of warfare, to be as comprehensive as possible.

57. I advocated a study of chemical means since it seemed to my Government that an international consensus of scientific opinion was a necessary preliminary to the solution of some of the difficult questions. I urged an immediate consideration within the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of measures to ban biological means of warfare because these are universally and completely regarded with horror and, to this extent, the task of framing a convention is easier although, as my working paper indicates, the difficulties in the field of verification are formidable.

58. However, that Committee decided to ask for a study on both aspects. Conscious of the great value in our work and for public opinion of the previous report on nuclear weapons, I accepted this recommendation on the clear understanding that it was made in earnest of that Committee's desire to proceed with urgency on my proposal on microbiological warfare, and not with the object of procrastination.

59. I hope, therefore, that this Committee and the General Assembly will unanimously endorse the recommendation for a study which should be on as wide a basis as possible, and which should, in the words of the Secretary-General, “explore and weigh the dangers of chemical and biological weapons”.<sup>10</sup>

60. At the same time, and without waiting for the completion of the report, I hope that the Eighteen-Nation

Committee on Disarmament will give further consideration to the arms control aspects of these problems and, particularly, the difficulties of verification.

61. The Secretary-General has pointed out that the first draft resolution on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons was introduced as long ago as 1958. He goes on, in his Introduction, to say:

“Owing to the fact that for a number of years the effort towards disarmament have been concentrated on the issue of non-proliferation, less attention has been given to other important aspects of the disarmament question. Therefore, it will be desirable for the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly to review the situation and take up, with firmness of purpose, those questions which are more urgent and more amenable to early agreement.”<sup>11</sup>

62. This seems to us to be good advice, and my Government will do all in its power to carry it out.

63. The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his kind expressions showing understanding for the task of the Chairman. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Sweden, to whom I give the floor.

64. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Since the Political Committee of the General Assembly last met and deliberated on disarmament matters, less than half a year ago, many changes have occurred in the political situation of the world.

65. Change is, of course, always to be expected. Change is the very stuff of which history is made. But, rarely has history seemed to be in such a hurry as today, and a hurry towards calamity.

66. All our countries have ample opportunity to comment on the direction which change is taking. In our own Parliaments, in other manifestations, and not least in the general debate of the United Nations General Assembly we are at liberty to analyse, evaluate, and even criticize, those decisions and actions of other nations which influence the fate of our nations, of whole regions—yes, which so often tend to stifle man's attempts to organize a peaceful and co-operative world community.

67. In so doing, we now must face the fact that the political climate today is, generally, an unhealthy one. It is paradoxical but true that in this advanced era the world picture should be one of so many open and so brutal hostilities, of so much fear of threatening conflicts, of so much smouldering discontent in our societies.

68. I think we must honestly recognize that such is the world in which we live today—a sick world.

69. But in regard to disarmament, to which our present agenda is confined, we are not forced to conclude that the political climate has deteriorated in equal measure. We may be able to discern some hope of progress. Disarmament might become recognized as a means—perhaps the best

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 32.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 21.

means now available— to retrieve the course to sanity. So let us look forward, not backward.

70. It might well turn out to be right to say that this session of ours will be particularly forward-looking. We will have dealt, before the session ends, with some rather “futuristic” issues, attempting to prevent international conflicts to arise in the wake of new technologies, which are in the present era just marking their break-through. I am referring to the issues of the sea-bed, of biological and chemical means of warfare, of telecommunication satellites and of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. We are becoming intensely aware that conflicts have to be forestalled now, and interests bent into international co-operation now, lest it be too late. If new institutions and new interest groups are allowed to develop without international guidance and supervision, they may become impossible to change at a later stage when what was but science fiction panoramas yesterday shall have turned into sets of frozen and forbidding realities.

71. We in the Swedish delegation have persistently tried to warn against such misbegotten developments. So much greater must be our satisfaction if this session completes in a positive vein its forward-looking agenda on those scores. I would go further and state, as a definite conviction, that we need now to proceed in one of these fields after another towards international management and international machinery, in order to forestall exploitation by monopolistic concerns and, as the ultimate goal, in order to forestall bitter international conflicts.

72. All these technological innovations are really connected with disarmament, at least in the sense that they all, to a large extent, constitute spin-offs from military research and development work, even if one of them—the telecommunication satellites—does not pertain to our agenda today but to the one concerned with outer space, item 24. They are further—again, all but one, namely the one concerning biological and chemical weapons—characterized as developments pursued only by nuclear-weapon Powers—yes, in practical essence exclusively by the two super-Powers, although they may potentially exert great influence on other nations. Thus, they undoubtedly risk creating what may be called a “power spin-off”, that is, grossly changed power relations in the world. That the super-Powers and they alone, if no international scheme for co-operation intervenes, will have the technical resources for utilizing the new inventions, follows practically automatically from the fact that they are so far advanced in technology in comparison with all other nations. No wilful intentions need to be imputed. The prospect of a monopoly—or, rather of a duopoly—for the super-Powers in regard to satellites, to exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed, to the utilization of nuclear explosives for mining and civil engineering projects on a grandiose scale, is but a corollary to the so-called “technological gap”, which is now before our eyes widening to a gulf.

73. It is absolutely necessary that all countries in the world, their leaders, their peoples, their Press, be acutely aware of this trend towards a tremendous power accumulation on the part of the strongest nations. That power hegemony we have hitherto most clearly come to fear but, also, to try to temper in the military sector, that is, in regard to nuclear weapons.

74. In this context, I feel inclined to give a straightforward reply to the query raised in the thought-provoking speech by the representative of Yugoslavia last Wednesday during this Committee’s 1607th meeting. The reason why the Conference of The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—and the same refers to the whole of the United Nations—is not making much progress towards disarmament is, of course, that since the Moscow Treaty<sup>12</sup> in 1963 the nuclear-weapon Powers have not wanted to agree to any real infringement on their freedom of action to continue the arms race, to produce and deploy nuclear weapons systems and to develop new ones; I would add: to continue an arms race which runs counter to their own best interests.

75. But what is the remedy? It could certainly not be for the rest of the world’s nations to retreat into a group of their own, negotiating just with each other. From where would they derive the power to change the situation? To form a kind of protest group seems to us to be a rather defeatist reaction. On the contrary, what is called for when we note this major trend in world history towards a power concentration on the part of the great—and I believe everybody reads these signs on the wall—, what is needed, is more than ever a constructive dialogue with untrusting attempts to establish true international co-operation between the “haves” and the “have-nots”. We must get them to agree, through truly integrated efforts, to international arrangements in order that mankind as a whole may share the benefits of progress.

76. That same approach can be widened to apply to all disarmament negotiations. We must value the machinery for co-operation which has been evolving since 1961, not only in the United Nations but also in the specific organism set aside for disarmament negotiations in depth, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, because both organs, the deliberating one and the negotiating one, make it possible to keep open a constant dialogue between nuclear-weapon States and others. This is to my mind the decisive rationale for not believing that miracles will be worked through adding new and differently composed machinery. But we certainly must instill greater vigour into our endeavours, calling on all concerned to contribute effectively so that we can edge forward to obtain practical results.

77. I now wish to extend this idea of a dialogue, of a mutual give and take, to the disarmament process itself as we want to see it proceed in the present period.

78. It should then be recalled that the latest achievement for limiting the armaments race will entail considerable contributions by the “have-nots”, and by them alone.

79. The conclusion, after many years of negotiations, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] must be regarded as a major positive event. It is, of course, to be regretted that its implementation is retarded. Only very few ratifications have so far been registered; even those of the main architects and promoters of the Treaty are still

<sup>12</sup> Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480(1963), No. 6964).



missing. Several of the countries which have been listed as key countries in their capacity as potential military-nuclear-weapon Powers have not signed. We urgently hope that these States will soon come forward and, by signing the Treaty, fulfil their duty towards themselves and towards the world community.

80. The overwhelming majority of States have now reached the conclusion that the possession of nuclear weapons, or the option for obtaining a national nuclear arsenal, would not increase the security of any nation that cannot aspire to super-Power rank but, on the contrary, would lead to a position of less security by increasing the dangers of nuclear retaliation and by laying additional very heavy burdens on the national economy.

81. Thanks to the non-proliferation Treaty, and to various measures in the field of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly the international methods of safeguards in this field, for which purpose the special agency, IAEA, stands ready to function and to extend its scope, it is today possible to say that the danger of any further State becoming a nuclear-weapon State has diminished considerably and may eventually disappear as a practical possibility. This amounts to a historical contribution by the non-nuclear-weapon States.

82. On the other hand, the present nuclear-weapon States, probably with the exception of the United Kingdom, continue to increase their nuclear capabilities. This is, of course, particularly true of the super-Powers. So the overriding, most imminent task must be for these Powers to make a concrete contribution towards disarmament. It is their turn to act.

83. During the preparation of the non-proliferation Treaty, we, the non-nuclear-weapon Powers, were demanding "tangible steps" to accompany or follow it. But no steps have so far been taken to accompany the readiness on the part of the majority of us to accept non-nuclearization of our military forces. No steps have been taken to "follow". This is probably one of the reasons for a certain reluctance to sign and to ratify the non-proliferation Treaty.

84. We continue to read about an uninterrupted, and evidently accelerated, development and deployment by the Soviet Union and the United States of new and ever more effective types of nuclear weapons and new and ever more effective delivery systems.

85. Never has the next step in disarmament been so clearly indicated: it must, logically, be the cessation of the new armaments race in regard to strategic missile systems, offensive and defensive. Economically, their development and deployment are disastrous. It is, for mankind as a whole, inconceivable how these countries, great as they are, can continue to pour resources—and enormous amounts of money and of human talent, at that—on programmes for increasing their capacity for mass destruction, particularly since all cost-benefit calculations show that these measures, mutually undertaken, are not assuring any greater national security, but the opposite. At the same time this continuing race plays a dangerous game with international security, upsetting, as it does, the balance prevailing earlier, which

had given us the hope that a plateau of some stability had been achieved.

86. While these developments go on, we listen with intense expectations to repeated statements by the leaders of these two nations, which seem to promise that they are willing to get together in a bilateral exchange of views in order to discuss these very issues of nuclear disarmament and to arrive at effective agreements to stop the irrational competition. An agreed cessation of the strategic arms race, or at least an immediate moratorium, is the counterpart disarmament measure now expected from them.

87. One may add that article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contains, for the nuclear-weapon Powers who have signed that Treaty, binding obligations to show results. I would term this article crucial because the future of mankind may depend upon whether it is implemented, and when. The credibility of the super-Powers in regard to disarmament is now at stake.

88. Nuclear disarmament is and will continue to be the most urgent and important, undertaking in the field of disarmament. Therefore, the next item of priority to be dealt with more directly in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament must be completing the Moscow Treaty of 1963 with the ban on underground nuclear test explosions, to which intimately belongs also the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

89. As is evident from its report to the Assembly,<sup>13</sup> the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee of Disarmament during its short summer session had a valuable discussion on the subject of a comprehensive test ban. I think it is fair to say that there was general agreement among the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that negotiations on a treaty to ban underground tests as well should proceed parallel with the bilateral talks on strategic arms limitation. The General Assembly has for many years recognized that a comprehensive test ban would constitute an effective measure of disarmament. It has, as a matter of fact, given this measure a special priority along with the now concluded item of non-proliferation. The eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee have this year again found it necessary to point out in a special joint memorandum, presented to that Committee, and annexed to its report<sup>14</sup>, the urgent need for renewed efforts to conclude such a treaty. The Assembly also must once again adopt a resolution to this effect, and let the plea be one for final cessation of tests.

90. In such a resolution we think it would be fitting to mention the encouraging development which has taken place during this current year in the field of seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions referred to by several speakers. It is well known that lack of agreement in the field of control has been said to prevent the conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear explosions, but development in regard to seismic detection and

<sup>13</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, annex I, sect. 10.

identification does make it increasingly difficult to point to inadequacies in this field as a reason for holding up an agreement. Certainly, further discussions between scientific experts are welcome and they may be needed for agreements on the modalities of co-operation for control purposes. We believe that the General Assembly should in its resolution on the test ban issue encourage such discussions.

91. In this connexion, I may draw attention to the meetings of an unofficial character which took place in Sweden during the past year between leading members from several countries of the scientific community of seismologists. The meetings were organized by the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm. A full report of the meetings has recently been published and, I think, sent to all Member States of the United Nations. A summary of the report is to be found as an annex to the Eighteen-Nation Committee report<sup>15</sup> and an even more convenient way to learn about it is to read *The New York Times* of Sunday, 17 November 1968.

92. In the report of the group of experts—which, incidentally, comprised scientists from four of the nuclear-weapon Powers—it is unanimously recognized that it is now possible to distinguish large and medium-sized underground explosions from earthquakes. This provides a new situation in test ban control, a situation which should, we think, be utilized for further scientifically based discussions, preferably in a more official context. Political action, however, does not have to wait.

93. I should also mention that the idea of an organized, international, rapid exchange of seismic data between national institutions in this field, the so-called “detection club,” is still being actively pursued by the group of smaller countries which held a first meeting on this subject in May 1966. The lack of active co-operation so far from the major nuclear-weapon Powers has, however, prevented the group from organizing a new meeting with the participation of the nuclear-weapon Powers. The experts in our national institutions stand ready to help, and we think the General Assembly should once again urge all Member countries to let them participate in these efforts to increase the basis for a possible agreement on a set of voluntary measures for monitoring—and I repeat, monitoring nationally—the observance of a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear explosions, thus making the test ban comprehensive within a short time.

94. One of the main objectives of this debate in the First Committee of the General Assembly is, and must always be, to find common expressions for renewed pressure on the nuclear-weapon Powers to engage in nuclear disarmament. As a link in this work, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which took place in Geneva during the month of September this year, might prove to have been very useful. It served to demonstrate, through the debates which took place there and through the resolutions adopted, that on many points a vast majority of States have the same apprehensions and similar ideas. This pressure must continuously be kept up within the General Assembly, which is the authoritative organ for joining our efforts.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. 6.

95. The history of disarmament is largely a history of lost opportunities. Let us all make a pledge here and now that the present important juncture will not write a new chapter in this sad sequence.

96. I said by way of introduction that this session may come to be characterized as quite forward-looking. This prophecy seems to be confirmed by the considerable attention now devoted to two comparatively new disarmament subjects: the preservation of the sea-bed for solely peaceful purposes, and the biological and chemical means of warfare.

97. In regard to the former, I wish to express our satisfaction with the debate in this Committee which has been devoted to item 26 concerning the peaceful uses of the sea-bed. In that debate also several ideas as to the solution of the inherent problem of demilitarizing the sea-bed and the ocean floor have been put forward. That particular aspect of the problem, while in general terms it would enter into the studies by the committee to be set up, should constitute an urgent matter to be pursued specifically within the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It was also so recommended in the report of that Committee which included it in next year's agenda under the heading “Other collateral measures”, and then formulated it as “prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed”. If this undoubtedly very complex matter is treated in the right spirit of compromise and goodwill, I am sure that the international community will be able to come forward with acceptable formulae, both in regard to a specified delimitation of what area should be freed from military installations and in regard to the kind of activities which should be forbidden. This new “last frontier” of human conquest, as it has been called, should be assured from now on to be a frontier, not for hostile confrontations and national ambitions for usurpation, but left unhampered so as to allow for joint international, adventures in the exploration and exploitation of hidden riches.

98. Another of the new lines of disarmament under discussion in this Committee refers to the set of horrifying means of mass destruction of human beings and the human environment, comprised under the label “biological and chemical means of warfare”. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been able to recommend, unanimously, that this Assembly should request the Secretary-General to appoint a group of experts to study these weapons, an initiative which is strongly supported by the Secretary-General, as is evident from the introduction to his annual report to the Assembly.

99. In an intervention in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 20 August 1968 at the 391st meeting, I welcomed on the part of my Government the prospects of setting up such an expert group and of getting ultimately a scientifically based survey of the true nature and effects of biological and chemical weapons [*B and C weapons*]. This would be a report similar to the one on the effects of nuclear weapons which the Assembly received last year<sup>16</sup> and which had, I think, a considerable impact on the consideration leading to the adoption of the non-proliferation Treaty.

<sup>16</sup> *Reports on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.IX.1).

100. But I said in Geneva—and I wish to reiterate it here—that time is short and that we may not be able to afford to neglect other aspects of disarmament possibilities in the field of B and C weapons but must continue such work while we wait for the results of the work of an expert group. We should immediately call for an extended adherence to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use of bacteriological and chemical means of warfare. Beyond that we must begin to tackle I said, “the sequence of problems related to the possibility of prohibiting also the dissemination, production and stockpiling of B and C means of warfare, including the means of their delivery, which may be by aerosol spraying, the use of rats, and so on, and to prescribe their elimination”.<sup>17</sup>

101. We have been stimulated to embrace this bolder concept of future agreements, leading finally to the total elimination of the threats of chemical and biological warfare, by the increasing awareness of how widespread the possibilities are for clandestine manufacturing of these weapons, which is going on, and how easily concealed are the preparations for their use. This awareness, which my country seeks to heighten by publicizing evidence without undue respect for secrecy, will undoubtedly be vastly increased by the scientifically based evidence which an international study such as the one now contemplated would bring to light and by the open discussion which must follow of the horrors which might be wrought by these weapons, invisible as they are, whether in the hands of military establishments or of irresponsible private groups.

102. During the last four or five years our attention has rather exclusively turned to partial measures of disarmament, most of these being in fact “non-armament” rather than “disarmament” measures, that is attempting to stop the world from further proceeding on the road towards self-destruction, but not actually dismantling any of its present capacities to kill and over-kill human beings.

103. Today, I venture to suggest, the time has come for a serious reconsideration of general and complete disarmament, a task which is explicitly mandated to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. This is because we must understand that time is not on our side. We should proceed much more rapidly beyond the freezing and, we hope, the reduction of nuclear capabilities—beyond demands for great Power disarmament—to the stage where the conventional armaments race and the stupendous increase in arms procurement, by many smaller countries as well will be discussed—irrationally costly as weapons are in a hungry world. We must soon come to problems of such real political concern as, for instance, regional agreements aiming at lowering the level of armaments, and thus allowing greater self-sufficiency and less dependence on great Powers for deliveries of arms, at the same time easily implying a status of political dependence.

104. When I venture to suggest that we now take a new look at the plans for a phased approach to general and complete disarmament, I have been encouraged by the fact we already have, through our deliberations on partial measures, covered a not insignificant part of what was to be achieved during the first stage, according to the existing plans for general and complete disarmament.

105. Thus, both plans, presented by the United States<sup>18</sup> and the Soviet Union<sup>19</sup> respectively in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in the spring of 1962, foresaw important disarmament measures in the nuclear field even during this first stage. Several of them have been dealt with or are included in the Eighteen-Nation Committee agenda for next year. It might be possible immediately to single out what remains of such proposals in the plans, and from now on concentrate negotiations on all these nuclear subjects according to a “package” formula.

106. Next, we should make a fresh assessment of the possibilities to proceed to what was planned in regard to conventional armaments, for instance, limitation of certain heavier types of arms or vehicles or of new ones, as well as accounting for defence budgets, elimination of foreign bases, or perhaps, to begin with, desisting from establishing new ones. The composing of some such balanced “packages” also outside the nuclear field would be a stimulating new exercise for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It would also mean a turn towards realism, coming much closer to issues besetting the political anxieties of today.

107. General and complete disarmament is, as I said, not only definitely assigned to that Committee; it is also mentioned on its actual agenda for next year. I have wished to present some ideas as to renewed work on this subject in order to solicit, if possible, the views of other delegations, on the potential merits of such suggestions and on the prospects for a swifter course towards the realization of general and complete disarmament.

108. To conclude, I just wish to sum up in five subjects the action which we are proposing should get priority for work in the disarmament field during the next year.

109. First, the most urgent disarmament measure is to obtain a cessation of the missile race, going upwards and ever upwards. The limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles is, obviously, a matter for negotiation directly between the two super-Powers, but one to be closely watched by all of us.

110. Second, regarding urgent “non-armament” measures, we should decide on arrangements for the B and C means of warfare to be studied by an expert group appointed by the Secretary-General. That leaves, as the next two subjects, the following partial disarmament measures to be dealt with immediately as priorities by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

111. Third, the preservation for peaceful purposes only of what might perhaps be called “the international submarine zone”, as suggested by Mexico [*1598th meeting, para. 83*], a subject which this Committee is about to vote on.

112. Fourth, the comprehensive test ban, on which I hope some resolutions will be introduced. This latter issue is one which the Eighteen-Nation Committee must take up with

<sup>18</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex i, sect. F.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. C.

renewed vigour and resolve within the near future, if this Committee of the United Nations is not to become notorious for false promises.

113. Fifth and finally, now is the right time to examine actively initial steps for real disarmament. For this purpose the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, should be urged to make a realistic programme for the implementation of a first phase of general and complete disarmament by way of certain balanced package formulae both in the field of nuclear weapons and in regard to other military arrangements which are now used to institutionalize violence in the world.

114. History is change, I said. Fate does not deal kindly with those who wait passively, those who refrain from doing what is in their power to do in order to turn history away from disaster.

115. The time element is for us of the utmost concern. There must be no pause in the preparation for further disarmament measures. The ingenuity and the good will of all have to be constantly mobilized to try to find solutions. We must never admit defeat. The peoples of the world will not pardon their leaders if they prove incapable to halt the arms race.

116. Mr. FARACE (Italy): The fact that the Italian delegation takes the floor again is a sign of the interest we attach to the items which are before us in this Committee. The intervention made on 12 November [1606th meeting], was focused on the disarmament issues. I should like now, in turn, to put forward the views of the Italian delegation on the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

117. That item is in our opinion most important and significant. The report of the Conference [A/7277 and Corr.1], together with the resolutions approved in Geneva [ibid., para. 17], mainly devoted to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, deal in fact with an essential problem for the future of mankind.

118. Before examining the report, may I recall that many Governments played a most active role in promoting the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. I should like particularly to pay tribute to the representative of Pakistan, whose Government had the merit to conceive the idea of the Conference and whose Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Husain, presided over the work at Geneva; to the representative of Kenya, Mr. Nabwera, under whose chairmanship the Preparatory Committee performed a very important and essential task; and to the delegates of the other nine countries members of the same Preparatory Committee.

119. Mr. Giuseppe Medici, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic, in his speech before the Conference on 5 September 1968 at the 5th meeting, stressed, among other points, the importance of the implementation of articles IV and V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon [General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXIII), annex]. He said that to this effect it is necessary to pursue the following aims:

“(a) development of nuclear research, of the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all

countries, without discrimination or economic penalization;

(b) full participation for all in the exchange of technical and scientific information for peaceful uses;

(c) free access for non-nuclear-weapon States to the supply of nuclear fuel and equipment as well as nuclear technology for peaceful purposes;

(d) agreements ensuring to non-nuclear-weapon States, signatories to the Treaty, the benefits arising from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions; and

(e) assignment to an appropriate international body, with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States, of responsibilities relating to peaceful explosions.”

120. It seems to us that the resolutions approved by the Conference have usefully moved in that direction. As a matter of fact, the Italian delegation is of the opinion that the work performed and the conclusions reached, by their contents and their merits, should be commended by the General Assembly and that the Conference will attain its aims by ensuring the continuity of its work.

121. Allow me to elaborate on the question of continuity. Its importance is stressed by the fact that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States has devoted to it a specific resolution which has been approved unanimously—resolution N attached to its report [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (V)]. It has been the only document adopted with no abstentions, and that is significant. It is hardly necessary to add that the same concept of continuity has been expressed in the penultimate paragraph of the declaration of the Conference [ibid./].

122. Since, according to a correct interpretation of the conclusions of the Conference, the most important task now facing us is that of ensuring the continuity of the work undertaken, let us see how this goal can be better attained.

123. The Italian delegation shares the view of those who favour the creation of a committee for this purpose, formed by an appropriate number of qualified delegations of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Its membership would have to be wide enough to cover the interests and objectives of the committee itself, though not so wide as to weaken its effectiveness. That is obviously only indicative because the problem would require extensive consultations. The setting up of a committee corresponds to a well-known procedure which the United Nations has, in other cases, resorted to with success.

124. We envisage the new body as a United Nations committee on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are firmly convinced that such a committee would not interfere with the work of any existing agency or institution, but rather, by being an important instrument of co-ordination, it would usefully co-operate with those agencies and bring them assistance to attain their goals in the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

125. May I submit now the reasons and the fields of action which in our view commend the setting up of this body:

126. First, the suggested committee would follow up the implementation of the conclusions of the Conference of

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States by various organs and agencies concerned. It is needless to say how important it is that such conclusions receive prompt and adequate action by these agencies.

127. Second, it would make suggestions for a better co-ordination of the activities of the agencies working wholly or partly in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I am referring to IAEA, in Vienna for the most important technical aspects; to the World Bank and to the other financial agencies of the United Nations family for the financing of nuclear energy projects; to the United Nations Development Programme for the allocation of funds for technical assistance; to UNESCO for the educational aspects; to FAO and WHO for the exploitation of nuclear energy to foster agricultural production and to promote the health of mankind.

128. Nuclear energy will soon enter also into the field of UNCTAD and UNIDO, as progress in their respective sectors will rely in an increasing measure on atomic power for the benefit of developing countries. ICAO and IMCO will, as well, deal with nuclear energy, since its use in air and ship transportation may be easily anticipated. I do not need to stress the importance of co-operation in the nuclear energy sector from the regional point of view; the regional Economic Commissions of the United Nations will certainly need assistance in this field. All this shows, in our view, how essential it is to co-ordinate these activities, how important that the General Assembly and the specialized agencies may be assured of the best use of resources available by preventing overlappings, duplications, or, still worse, loopholes. This is in the interest of all of us, nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike.

129. Third, the committee on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as we see it, should and would play a steering role by taking, for instance, the initiative of submitting suggestions to the General Assembly, and through it to all interested agencies.

130. Fourth, the committee would have a significant political role. It may help to secure a quicker and more substantive consideration of certain aspects of peaceful uses of atomic energy which are of particular interest to non-nuclear weapon States. It is the firm view of the Italian delegation that, by so doing, it will be possible to increase the confidence of all countries in the non-proliferation Treaty, thus encouraging, in conformity with our position and expectation, a world-wide signature and ratification of the Treaty. It may also contribute to the confidence in, and the success of, other important international agreements dealing with nuclear disarmament such as the Antarctic Treaty<sup>20</sup> of 1959, the Moscow Treaty of 1963,<sup>21</sup> the Space Treaty<sup>22</sup> and the Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967.<sup>23</sup> In other words, it would be a meeting point where, in the words of the Charter, we could harmonize views and

interests of countries, the implementation of international instruments, the activities of international agencies in that field of nuclear energy, which is bound to have an ever-increasing impact on the life of all peoples and on the future of mankind. The nuclear era, with all its global challenges, requires a world-focused outlook which only the United Nations can provide.

131. Fifth and last, but not least, by ensuring the continuity of the efforts initiated by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States we would be enabled to carry on the discussions of certain suggestions which were made during the Geneva meetings and which are recorded in the minutes and in the documents of the Conference, but for which there was not enough time for an exhaustive debate. Some of these items were mentioned in the speech of the Italian Foreign Minister on 5 September at the 5th meeting and have been recalled in the course of the work of the Conference by the Italian delegation.

132. All these reasons are important enough, in our mind, to justify the setting up of such a special body. Further reasons could be added, but I do not want to abuse your time.

133. May I instead mention some doubts and misunderstandings which these ideas seem to raise, and may I try to clarify and dispel them. The possibility that the new committee may overlap the work of IAEA, is, in the view of the Italian delegation, to be ruled out. We attach, together with all other members, the greatest importance to the existence and role of the Vienna Agency, to which Italy intends to give ever more substantially its support. IAEA, is an agency of a prevailing technical character, while the proposed committee would be a body of quite a different nature, acting in a political framework. IAEA is an operative institution, while the committee would have no operative tasks. IAEA will be busier than ever in carrying out its former and new heavy tasks in specific sectors of nuclear applications, and it could hardly be conceivable that it could co-ordinate also the work of other technical bodies which, as I mentioned before, are bound to be increasingly involved in nuclear development. Finally, IAEA, being in charge of the implementation of some recommendations of the Conference, could not be, at the same time, the implementing body and the body responsible for reviewing such implementation. In this and in the former instance, co-ordination seems necessary, and this function could therefore be usefully carried out by the proposed committee.

134. There is equally no risk of interference between the proposed committee and the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is hardly necessary to mention that that Conference is an irreplaceable body for disarmament negotiations, while the committee would not deal with disarmament, although it could, by promoting international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, contribute in bringing closer to us that climate which would foster the achievement of disarmament goals.

135. But of all arguments the least valid is, as far as we are concerned, the one according to which the course of action we, together with other delegations, are favouring

<sup>20</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

<sup>21</sup> See foot-note 12.

<sup>22</sup> Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

<sup>23</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 91, document A/C.1/946.

would discourage the process of signatures of the non-proliferation Treaty. Quite the contrary. My Government has been one of the staunch supporters of the Treaty and of its aims, has actively taken part in its drafting, and has been one of the co-sponsors of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), of 12 June 1968. In this context, the Italian delegation considers that the setting up of a committee, far from representing an obstacle to the signature of the Treaty which, in the case of Italy, is not in question, would help to ensure the widest support of the Treaty itself and to promote its success by increasing world-wide confidence in this very important international instrument.

136. We are convinced that we are not raising a controversial issue. In suggesting the creation of a new committee of the United Nations, the Italian delegation intends therefore to take a very positive step towards the halt of the nuclear arms race, towards encouraging those who hesitate to sign the Treaty, and towards an effective and more rapid implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty.

137. To conclude, I wish to sum up the reasons which, in our view, would advise under present circumstances and with a wide consensus the creation of a committee for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We trust that through the good will of all of us a satisfactory solution can be found.

138. The setting up of a committee along the lines I have indicated neither requires constitutional changes nor creates the danger of duplication or overlapping with other existing bodies, in the first instance with the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and IAEA. The appointment of a committee of the General Assembly to work in close co-operation with agencies now or later engaged in the various expanding field of the application of

nuclear energy is the best way, in our mind, to meet the following requirements:

(a) To focus the attention of Governments and public opinion, in all the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon countries, on the importance of establishing and promoting a well-organized system of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

(b) To create the basis for balanced opportunities for all nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon countries, in a climate of mutual confidence, and taking into account the special needs of the developing countries;

(c) To strengthen confidence in the non-proliferation Treaty as an instrument of international peace and security;

(d) To strengthen the role and the activities of the existing organizations in their respective fields, and, first of all, that of IAEA;

(e) To keep under consideration and review many of the interesting views expressed in the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

139. Our desire is to move on a ground of sound realism. We are well aware of the difficulties involved in meeting the legitimate needs of the interested countries, and of the necessity to avoid any excessive demands; but we are equally convinced that the realities of our time cannot be ignored as we live in a world of rising expectations and unprecedented opportunities.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*