

United Nations  
**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-THIRD SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1628th  
MEETING**

Tuesday, 3 December 1968,  
at 10.30 a.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96:	
Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament ( <i>continued</i> )	
Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament ( <i>continued</i> )	
Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament ( <i>continued</i> )	
Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament ( <i>continued</i> )	
Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference ( <i>continued</i> )	1

**Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).**

**AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96**

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.443, L.444 and Add.1-7, L.445 and Add.1, L.446, L.448, L.449)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1-2)**

**Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231)**

**Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament (*continued*) (A/7134, A/7223, A/C.1/974, A/C.1/L.443)**

**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (*continued*) (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277, A/7327, A/7364, A/C.1/976, A/C.1/L.449)**

1. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syria) (*translated from French*): The First Committee is now discussing the greatest problem facing mankind: disarmament in all its aspects. To endeavour to regulate armaments and to set out on the course

of general disarmament in application of Article 11 of the Charter means, especially in this nuclear age of ours, to try to ensure the very survival of mankind. In the achievement of this colossal task, every step forward counts. Any progress, however small, may lead to a number of other and far greater achievements. In the accomplishment of this task, there should be no room for feelings of despair or helplessness. On the contrary, our deep awareness of our great responsibilities should inspire us to efforts to reconcile differences of opinion and remove obstacles.

2. Viewing the matter from this angle, we may congratulate ourselves on the progress already made, thanks to unremitting efforts, with regard to banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the prohibition of launching nuclear weapons into outer space and, lastly, the embodiment of the idea of non-proliferation in a treaty which symbolizes the possibility of agreement and of future attainments. That, of course, is only the beginning. The road is long and difficult, but there is a marked improvement in the psychological climate. The stage where all agreement seemed remote is now behind us. The search for common ground must therefore be intensified so that further progress can be made. With this improvement in the psychological atmosphere, methodical and patient effort can succeed in dispelling mistrust. For mistrust, that mother of fear, must be dispelled before the twin goals of disarmament and security can be attained. The feeling of security and collective security as provided in the United Nations Charter—these two questions must be studied together with related questions.

3. It is therefore greatly to be hoped that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] will not only be signed by all States but will also be quickly ratified and immediately applied. The United Kingdom representative's announcement [*1623rd meeting*] that his country has ratified the Treaty encourages me to believe that other Powers will follow that example.

4. Similarly, the Security Council resolution relating to measures to safeguard non-nuclear-weapon States [*resolution 255 (1968)*] should allay the misgivings of these countries which were so clearly brought out at their recent Conference at Geneva. The more confidence the countries of the third world have in the guarantees offered them by the international community, the greater will be their feeling of security and, consequently, the chances of a *détente*. If this process is to continue, the safeguards must be effective and the organs from which they emanate must give proof of determination. It should not be impossible for the United Nations to bring about these conditions if goodwill and a sincere desire for disarmament leading to security prevail.

5. My small country, because of its geographical situation, has every right to attach the greatest importance to these safeguards. It has seen the development, close to its borders, of an Israeli atomic reactor which, according to public reports—brief reports, however, because of the secrecy surrounding the project—is capable of producing a number of atom bombs. The authorities in charge of this reactor refuse to allow international inspection, the only means of verifying whether peaceful purposes alone are being pursued. Moreover, these authorities have not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the same time, their aggressive and expansionist designs are an open secret. Their continued occupation by force of parts of Arab territories is conclusive evidence of those designs, while the colonization of the occupied territories, their avowed objective, reveals their neo-colonialist plans.

6. Are we not justified then in asking that the safeguards offered to any country which might become the victim of a nuclear aggression should be effective, prompt and not subject to postponement? Once the Treaty has entered into force, the next steps to be taken are clear. The report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee<sup>1</sup> has the merit of proposing a suitable order of priorities. It is quite natural that the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament should be given pride of place. The Eighteen-Nation Committee rendered us the valuable service of beginning negotiations on effective measures for attaining that double purpose. It then devoted its attention to the prohibition of nuclear testing. There is no longer any valid reason to delay transforming the present partial prohibition of testing into a total one. The inspection requirement has been made obsolete by recent advances in the detection of seismic phenomena, as has been brought out by the study group organized at Stockholm by the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research.<sup>2</sup> Negotiations should therefore be begun at once in order to take advantage of the latest scientific advances in monitoring explosions and thereby remove the last obstacle in the way of the total prohibition of nuclear tests.

7. The Eighteen-Nation Committee then discussed the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the USSR.<sup>3</sup> Truly, the USSR Government's Memorandum of 1 July 1968 [A/7134] proceeds from the general to the particular and sets out the measures that must be taken if tangible progress is to be made in stopping the arms race and achieving disarmament. The Memorandum views matters from the right angle in that it mentions increased tension in international relations because of the conflict in Viet-Nam and because "the occupation by Israel of the territories of a number of Arab States which it seized by force continues".

8. An international agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, in the shape of a convention to be concluded at an international conference, immediate negotiations on the cessation of production of nuclear weapons, the reduction of stockpiles and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, measures for limiting and subsequently

reducing the strategic vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons, prohibition of flights by bomber aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond national frontiers, prohibition of underground tests and of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, elimination of foreign military bases, the establishment of nuclear-free zones and the use of the sea-bed and ocean floor for peaceful purposes—all these points, dealt with in the Memorandum, cover the most important problems presented by disarmament.

9. The USSR subsequently submitted a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.443] referring this Memorandum to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament so that the latter may undertake negotiations on these urgent measures and report to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. The Memorandum thus represents a lucid and logical synthesis of the agenda<sup>4</sup> adopted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Consideration of that agenda seems to us an excellent way to attack the very heart of the problem in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, a competent body to which the General Assembly has conferred this very task. It is to be hoped that the first practical measures will be taken to give effect to the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons adopted by the General Assembly at its sixteenth session [resolution 1653 (XVI)]. Each one of the proposals contained in the USSR Memorandum deals with a most important aspect of the disarmament problem, so that in their totality they provide a framework for the beginning or, where appropriate, active continuation of negotiations. Having this clear and logical framework, we should endeavour not to introduce marginal subjects, which at the present stage would not make for progress and would complicate rather than facilitate our work.

10. In this connexion, the draft resolution submitted by Denmark and other countries is no doubt inspired by the best intentions, but it comes at a time when a global approach is being taken. The measures proposed in it will be taken automatically if disarmament agreements are reached. The Indian representative has given us a detailed analysis of the substance of this text, for which we are most grateful. I would ask the Danish delegation not to press its draft resolution, lest it should create division at a time when unity is essential.

11. My delegation might be asked why it attaches so much importance to negotiations, when these are bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers. The reason is, to begin with, that the mere fact of engaging in negotiations indicates a certain *détente* and demonstrates that a simple examination of the wishes, fears and interests of each party is a better proceeding than an exchange of threats and escalation of terror; secondly, that the super-Powers themselves thus become increasingly aware of the futility of continuing a nuclear arms race which, far from offering any additional guarantee of security, imposes an intolerable burden on their budgets and, in the last analysis, on their citizens. It is becoming clearer every day that the so-called strategic balance is fictitious. The super-Powers are now concentrating on second strike weapons—on organizing possible resistance on the part of those surviving the mass destruction of the first strike. The existing nuclear stock-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, document DC/231, annex I, section 6.

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 96, document A/6834.

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, paragraph 17.

piles are capable of leaving the earth in ruins and making life impossible for any who might survive.

12. Because of these facts, the nuclear Powers are obliged to use other means of settling their disputes. If they come to agree on a basis of peace and justice, the international climate will so greatly improve that the misgivings, suspicions and fears of the other nuclear Powers, which are not yet taking part in the negotiations, will also be greatly allayed.

13. This, then, may be the path to the twin goals of *détente* and universality. These trends should therefore be encouraged for the benefit of all. In this connexion, I can think of nothing more eloquent and more expressive than the words of Mrs. Myrdal, Minister of State of Sweden, to whom I must pay a tribute for her dedication to this noble cause. At one point in her statement, Mrs. Myrdal exclaimed: "But what is the remedy?" I shall now quote her answer, in concluding my delegation's first speech in the general debate:

"But what is the remedy? It could certainly not be for the rest of the world's nations to retreat into a group of their own, negotiating just with each other. From where would they derive the power to change the situation? To form a kind of protest group seems to us to be a rather defeatist reaction. On the contrary, what is called for when we note this major trend in world history towards a power concentration on the part of the great—and I believe everybody reads these signs on the wall—what is needed, is more than ever a constructive dialogue with untiring attempts to establish true international co-operation between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. We must get them to agree, through truly integrated efforts, to international arrangements in order that mankind as a whole may share the benefits of progress." [1609th meeting, paragraph 75.]

14. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand): After the Second World War, it was the common hope of mankind that the United Nations would establish a framework of international order in which armaments would no longer be the arbiters of power. The goal of peace and security was the very core and substance of the Charter to which we all subscribed.

15. Twenty-three years ago, there were powerful incentives for progress. The tragic waste and destruction of the Second World War were still fresh in our minds; and the development of atomic weapons left no doubt about the consequences which would flow from renewed conflict on a similar scale. The incentives are even greater today. For the weapons themselves and the means of their delivery have reached a degree of deadly perfection which, in 1945, could scarcely have been envisaged; and they are possessed not by one but by five major Powers.

16. Yet throughout this time—almost the life-span of a generation—there are precious few events which can be counted as progress towards disarmament. It took sixteen years—until 1961—for the major Powers to agree even on the principles which should guide disarmament negotiations. Since then, it is true, some important steps have been taken. A Treaty involving a partial ban on the testing of

nuclear weapons<sup>5</sup> has been signed; agreement has been reached to prevent outer space from becoming yet another sphere of military rivalry;<sup>6</sup> and a Treaty has been drawn up—though it has yet to win full acceptance and enter into force—to discourage the acquisition of nuclear weapons by still further States.<sup>7</sup>

17. I do not discount the importance of these agreements. They have each been welcomed by the majority of Governments, including my own. Although they have not involved disarmament as such—for no single conventional weapon has been destroyed, no nuclear device dismantled—they have been concerned with questions directly relevant to disarmament. Cumulatively, they may help to establish a pattern of co-operation which could lead to progress in more intractable disarmament issues. And yet, as the only concrete results from twenty-three years of negotiations, they are a depressingly meagre return.

18. It is not my intention to delve at length into the reasons for this paucity of achievement. They have been the subject of minute analysis in every disarmament debate held in this Committee over the years. One central fact, however, does emerge. As the Prime Minister of New Zealand stated during the general debate on 14 October:

"... if there is one area of international relations in which progress depends entirely on trust, that surely is disarmament. ..." [1694th plenary meeting, para. 67.]

But in all our discussions of disarmament since the Second World War, it has been precisely this essential ingredient that has been lacking.

19. Perhaps at no time more than the present has this absence of trust been more keenly felt or the reasons for it more starkly apparent. How can we assess the prospects for disarmament against the background of recent events in Eastern Europe? Certainly we cannot, as some would have us do, treat them as of no relevance; for, if disarmament depends on trust, the quality of the pledges of a major military Power is of crucial importance. We simply cannot afford to be deceived by words that are belied by deeds.

20. The tragic events of August 1968 continue to unfold: we cannot regard them merely as some passing aberration in the conduct of a great Power towards a small and friendly neighbour. They cannot but affect the whole context in which the search for disarmament must continue to be pursued. When he addressed this Committee on 22 November, my Australian colleague described the present situation in the following terms:

"It is, then, a matter of finding our way back painfully to at least that degree of trust and confidence which existed three months ago. That way back will depend upon deeds rather than words, upon actions and developments which we all watch with anxiety. The main impediment to the recreation of confidence would be

<sup>5</sup> Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

<sup>6</sup> Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

<sup>7</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).

other acts or threats which would affect our judgement about the possibility of peaceful co-operation." [1616th meeting, para. 81.]

I commend these words to the thoughtful attention of this Committee, and in particular to one group of its members.

21. General and complete disarmament is and must remain the objective; but the events to which I have referred have made it unmistakably clear that there can be no easy road to its attainment. We can move gradually towards that goal only as we succeed in establishing greater respect for international law and for the Charter of this Organization. Only then will nations feel sufficiently confident of their security to begin to abandon the legitimate means of their defence.

22. Acceptance of these realities does, we believe, point the way that must be travelled in disarmament negotiations in the immediate future. The essential task is to concentrate on attainable objectives. First among these, in my delegation's view, is the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty covering the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments. It is a sad but accurate reflection of our times that the will to bridge even the small remaining gap over the verification of a cessation of underground weapons tests is still lacking. My Government has noted with satisfaction that in the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament it has placed this question high on the provisional agenda<sup>8</sup> for its next meetings. During the present year, serious and constructive proposals have been made—I refer particularly to the documents bearing on this subject which are in annex I of that report—which promise to give new impetus to the search for a solution of the remaining problems of verification. New Zealand, which has extensive experience and knowledge of earthquakes, stands ready to co-operate in any exchange of seismological data which might assist to this end.

23. To my delegation it is a matter of profound concern that even while the vast majority of States represented here are urging the need to transform the partial test ban Treaty into a comprehensive ban, two countries have continued to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. We therefore welcome the recent announcement that France has abandoned its plans to hold further tests next year. We would much have preferred it had this decision reflected recognition by the French Government of the widespread opposition to any atmospheric testing. Nevertheless, in my own country and throughout the South Pacific, where these tests have naturally given rise to particular anxiety, there will be relief that no further tests will take place during 1969; and there will be hope that this suspension will be replaced by a firm decision not to resume testing in the future. We hope, too, that Communist China will discontinue its testing programme, although regrettably we see no present prospect that the Peking Government will be moved to do so. To countries which, like New Zealand, form part of the Asia/Pacific region, Communist China's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capacity have a most ominous significance.

24. Many representatives who have preceded me have described a comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests as a logical corollary of the agreement reached on the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I join them in this. During the resumed twenty-second session, my delegation explained in detail its attitude towards the non-proliferation Treaty. We did not then, nor do we now, regard it as a perfect instrument. But it did, in our view, meet three important tests: if it were universally accepted it would bar the acquisition of nuclear weapons by further States; it could open the way to additional concrete measures of disarmament; and it would not inhibit—it would indeed encourage—the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

25. As was recognized at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in Geneva and as several speakers have underlined in this debate, the security guarantees associated with the non-proliferation Treaty raise questions of fundamental importance. My delegation does not doubt that the guarantees offered go, in present circumstances, as far as could have been expected; but they clearly fall short of being the sort of guarantees in which Governments can place sole reliance. Some countries, like my own, have the added assurance provided by our participation in collective security arrangements. But what is the position of a country which lacks this protection or which belongs to a military alliance which does not respect the sovereignty and independence of its members? As we understand it, such a country must be actually attacked with nuclear weapons or specifically threatened with their use before the assurances given in Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 can be invoked. Yet it is surely clear that a nuclear Power determined to impose its will on such a country has no need to use, or threaten to use, its nuclear armoury. Its very possession of nuclear weapons is threat enough against its non-nuclear victim.

26. It is easier to describe the problem than to propose its remedy; but let us not dismiss it as a mere hypothesis. Each of us, particularly in the light of recent developments, can readily think of situations where this problem can take real and concrete form.

27. Inevitably, any attempt to resolve dilemmas of this kind takes us back to the whole question of collective security; the whole problem of ensuring the integrity and independence of every State, regardless of its size, strength or political alignment; the whole business of this Organization's role in peace-keeping. In short, it takes us right back to the Charter and respect for its principles. Ultimately, this is the only framework within which peace and security can effectively be guaranteed.

28. There is a third problem of immediate relevance to the current state of disarmament negotiations which my delegation would link closely with the comprehensive test-ban treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This is the question of the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. There is, we believe, a particular interrelationship among these three issues; and progress in one should greatly strengthen the possibility of progress in the others.

<sup>8</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 17.

29. In the past, we have found that there have been occasions when a particular coincidence of great Power interests has given new impetus to negotiations in the disarmament field. The statements of United States and Soviet representatives in the current debate suggest that such a community of interest may be emerging in relation to nuclear weapons delivery systems and the means of defence against them. I therefore join my Canadian colleague and others who have spoken in urging the earliest possible beginning to the proposed bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

30. We have, I believe, reason to be grateful to the representative of Malta who in 1965 focused our attention on the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons; and to the United Kingdom delegation which this year presented a working paper<sup>9</sup> on this question to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. My delegation will support the draft resolution in document A/C.I./L.444 and Add.1-6, which requests the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a concise report on the subject. We would, indeed, regard an independent and objective report as an essential basis for further consideration here, and perhaps in other forums also, of a subject so shrouded in secrecy and uncertainty. A report which had the same standing and objectivity as the 1967 report on the possible use of nuclear weapons<sup>10</sup> would represent an important contribution to our understanding of the real nature of the menace these weapons could pose.

31. Finally, let me say a word about the organizational aspects of our consideration of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. My delegation continues to believe that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, rather than the General Assembly, is the most useful forum for detailed and constructive disarmament negotiations. That its progress has been slow is not, it seems to us, a consequence of its restricted membership, although it would clearly be a more effective body if all of the nuclear Powers were actively associated with it. It reflects rather the objective realities of the international environment in which disarmament negotiations must inevitably be pursued. Whatever its limitations, it does provide a forum in which the two major nuclear Powers can work together in the presence, and with the assistance, of a representative group of the Members of this Organization.

32. In short, it does not seem to my delegation that we should look to any supposed inadequacy in the existing machinery of disarmament negotiations as the reason for failure to make more rapid progress. Similarly, I doubt whether the problems of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be any more easily resolved by the creation of a new body to deal with them. It is not, in either case, a lack of appropriate forums for discussion which inhibits progress. The obstacles are of a much more fundamental kind, and it is time we faced them squarely.

33. Mr. RUDA (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): In the course of his statement in the general debate at the

current session, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina pointed out that the international situation as it is today raises two categories of questions. The first, in his view, reflects situations that generate grave international tension. The second includes problems varied in nature, the solution of which calls for a genuine joint undertaking designed to lay the permanent foundations of co-operation among States [*1697th meeting, para. 125*].

34. This second category undoubtedly includes the problems of disarmament, whose effect on the shape of things to come in international society is obvious. That is why my country attaches the utmost importance to the items we are dealing with in this Committee.

35. At the current session we have before us two basic documents which have to be discussed and on which certain decisions will have to be taken. The first is the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>11</sup> as submitted regularly to the General Assembly. The second is the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held recently at Geneva [*A/7277*]. This brings before the First Committee certain matters of such importance as to warrant priority treatment in our deliberations.

36. The Argentine delegation has studied the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with the utmost interest. In contrast with what has become almost a tradition in the work of that Committee, the text of the report reflects a measure of progress which, although it cannot be regarded as embodying substantive agreements, does encourage modest hopes in respect of its future work. The Committee has at least agreed on a programme of work that comprises a series of measures covering important steps towards seeking disarmament.

37. Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the report reveal a noteworthy optimism in regard to the results achieved at the last session and to future prospects.

38. For these reasons, it can be said that as a declaration of future intentions, the document is encouraging. Nevertheless, our experience with previous reports of the Conference must give us pause, and it prompts the remark that we should not confuse a very limited agreement on matters related to work procedures with substantive formulas of agreement in the field of disarmament. On this latter point we hope, and we expect, that the next session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will record progress of real significance enabling us to consider that the road to real disarmament measures has finally been opened up.

39. Along with the report of the Committee on Disarmament, the First Committee has received a Memorandum from the Government of the Soviet Union concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament [*A/7134*]. We have examined the document at great length, and our conclusion is that several of the measures suggested in it are already embodied in the programme of work drawn up by the Committee on

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the Acquisition and further development of these weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1).

<sup>11</sup> See *Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for 1967 and 1968* (DC/231)

Disarmament. But to try to incorporate the rest might jeopardize the agreement already reached on this matter, reopening the debate on a starting-off point restricted in scope but nevertheless achieved only after arduous labour. It is evident, too, that some of the measures mentioned in the memorandum are of a controversial nature such as would hardly facilitate future negotiations.

40. With regard to the questions to be discussed by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I should like to point out that the adoption of parallel measures does not on the face of it rule out the possibility of achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The matters included in the programme of work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee cannot be studied exclusively from the point of view of their greater or lesser feasibility or of technical criteria for determining how to put them into practice. There must also be a genuine will to political action on the part of the great Powers, together with well-defined goals in regard to the structure of the political system likely to emerge from the agreements on disarmament.

41. Clearly, some parallel measures are limited in scope, both in their field of application and in the subjects they cover. A whole series of such measures, valuable enough in themselves, could actually have the effect of freezing the present international situation, with the undesirable consequences that would have for an international system in which power is still a very important factor. If the disarmament negotiations turned out to be based on factors calculated to intensify or aggravate the differences separating the great Powers from other countries not in a similar position, it would tend to create a type of dependency status which quite apart from being unacceptable would be anything but helpful in achieving the international order we all long to see.

42. Furthermore, we must again recall that the real danger of a nuclear holocaust is not the meagre military capacity of the medium-sized or small nations, but basically the huge military stockpiles of the super-Powers.

43. The specific feature of the so-called balance of terror is its precariousness; its existence depends essentially on two haphazard factors: the possibility of miscalculation, and a technological discovery which would upset the delicate balance of power as it now stands. The mere adoption of parallel measures marginal to this situation would not contribute all that might be expected of them by way of ensuring international peace and security, and furthermore they might create a structure of international relations which seems to us of doubtful stability.

44. As we said during the twenty-second session, the "disarmament of the disarmed" [1572nd meeting, para. 93] cannot be the way to meet the aims of this Organization.

45. The representative of Sweden, whose very valuable contribution to the study of disarmament deserves our gratitude, speaking in her characteristically lucid way, referred in her statement in this debate [1608th meeting] to the necessity for not confining ourselves exclusively to non-arming measures, and to the urgency of agreeing on disarmament formulas applicable to the great Powers. Many

speakers who have preceded me have expressed themselves in similar terms.

46. Thus the time has come to embark on this task, particularly if we recall that General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI) which set up the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament recommended that the Committee "as a matter of the utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching . . . agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

47. For these reasons my delegation fully sympathizes with the aims of the draft resolution submitted by the eight non-aligned nations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee [A/C.1/L.448] and will support it.

48. On the basis of the above premises, the Argentine delegation has also carefully examined the four-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/L.446], and we have to express our concern about its wording. It refers to an inquiry into the possibility of establishing registration of all imports and exports of conventional arms, ammunition and implements of war. In my opinion this document lays down a principle of questionable value—compulsory registration of movements of arms, but not of their production. The consequences arising from this principle are negative in the extreme. Countries that have to obtain arms from foreign sources will have to submit their national security needs to international scrutiny. A register of trade in arms means nothing *per se*; it must be related to some purpose. In this instance, clearly what is sought is to provide a basis of reference for determining whether a shipment of arms is or is not excessive. But what is the basis of reference in reaching such a conclusion to be? Obviously, the requirements of national security.

49. Thus, while the arms race among the great Powers goes on with the production of sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, the States with lower levels of industrial capacity are expected to subject themselves to a discipline that undoubtedly introduces further limitations on their sovereignty.

50. It is precisely proposals of this kind that can lead little by little to political imbalances of such magnitude that they could endanger the real objectives of disarmament. My delegation is opposed to the adoption of such a measure for the reasons I have explained. We do not, of course, cast doubt on the good intentions of the sponsors, whose active participation in the disarmament negotiations is patent. But in this particular instance we cannot, unfortunately, go along with them.

51. Paragraph 26 of the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament refers to the proposals made at the last session concerning the desirability that the Secretary-General should prepare a study of the effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. As a result of these negotiations, a large number of delegations have submitted a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1 and 2] requesting a concise report on the subject, following the excellent precedent set by the report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons.<sup>12</sup> My

<sup>12</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No.: S.68.IX.1.



delegation supports the draft and hopes that the report in question will be followed promptly by appropriate measures for eliminating so grave a threat to mankind.

52. In that connexion, we feel that special attention should be paid to the proposals submitted by the United Kingdom, both in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee<sup>13</sup> and in the course of the debates of the First Committee [1609th meeting, para. 52].

53. I should now like to turn to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, whose decisions have been passed on to the General Assembly [A/7277]. The Conference touched upon various problems ultimately linked to the future of the international community, such as programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the end of the nuclear arms race, general and complete disarmament, and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The very nature of these questions indicates the importance of the Conference, and clearly its conclusions will require properly co-ordinated international action to achieve the objectives defined in the resolutions that were adopted.

54. It is not my intention to go into the details of those decisions, which are well known to all the delegations here present. But I think it might be worth while mentioning some of the subjects referred to in them in order to bring out the significance of the Conference.

55. With regard to security, resolution A represents a very important step, since it reaffirms certain principles of the Charter which represent the minimum for establishing an international order based upon peace and national security. It is futile to think of substantial progress in this field without the recognition by all States, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, of principles that are essential for peaceful and harmonious co-existence.

56. Unfortunately, no progress was made in the matter of measures to assure security, although the question was the subject of lengthy study by many delegations in the course of the general debate and in Committee I of the Conference. Our position in that matter is well known and has been stated already at the resumed twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly and in the course of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at Geneva. We believe that it is only through balanced disarmament, subject to an effective system of international control, that complete security can be achieved. But it is obvious that until that objective is reached, formulas must be devised that will meet the minimum requirements in that field.

57. Argentina has no need for further assurances of security beyond those offered by the system of regional collective defence authorized in Article 51 of the Charter. Yet we feel that these problems must be tackled with a broad outlook on international security, since a large number of States are not committed to the agreements referred to in Article 51 of the Charter. We likewise believe that so long as there are States that do not feel adequately protected, the problem of measures to assure security cannot be considered as solved once and for all.

58. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States also adopted several resolutions designed to prevent the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament. Of these, resolution D deserves mention because of its importance. It urges the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America "to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles". [Ibid., para. 17.]

59. We trust that a start will be made as soon as possible with these discussions so that the negotiations on disarmament that are due to take place in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament can be broadened to include a new field.

60. Finally, among the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, those relating to programmes of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy deserve special mention.

61. The philosophy inspiring these decisions is probably the most significant achievement of the Conference, since it confirms the principle expressly set forth in the Declaration that the co-operation in question must be on a non-discriminatory basis. As already said, this wide spectrum of decisions will call for concerted international action, which in turn presupposes the continuity of the efforts directed towards their implementation.

62. As the Conference itself did, my delegation will collaborate in any action to find ways and means of ensuring such continuity, provided these are effective and that the meaning and objectives of the resolutions of the Conference are not distorted.

63. These are the views of the Argentine delegation on the items referred to the First Committee for discussion. We hope to play our part in ensuring that the work allocated to us at the present session can be concluded successfully.

64. Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): This Committee has before it two important documents, the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament<sup>14</sup> and the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7277 and Corr.1].

65. While my delegation appreciates the efforts of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and thanks them for their diligence, we are of the view that the report should be recognized as an interim statement. My delegation regrets to say that we are not very enthusiastic about the progress made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The most fruitful work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was contained in its earlier report of last spring; that is the draft of the non-proliferation Treaty. Even there, we are all aware that it was only through strenuous bilateral negotiations outside of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that the non-proliferation Treaty was hammered out. The mandate for such talks was indeed given by the General Assembly, but the fact remains that any real

<sup>13</sup> See *Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, DC/231, annex I, section 7.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., document DC/231.

progress depends on how far agreement between the super-Powers can be achieved.

66. The non-proliferation Treaty has been duly commended by the General Assembly, signed by many member States, ratified by few and can as yet hardly be considered an active force in the field of disarmament. This Treaty should be subjected to further improvements; it should be a first step in a series of other concrete measures in the search for total nuclear disarmament. As long as the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems continues, as long as research and underground tests are continued in order to improve the capability of the delivery systems and the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, the non-proliferation Treaty will have only limited meaning as far as our endeavour to achieve nuclear disarmament is concerned.

67. The Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report of 1968<sup>15</sup> has warned us of the following facts:

First, the stockpiles of nuclear weapons possessed by the great Powers are still increasing;

Second, the development and deployment of anti-missile systems are spurring accelerated changes in offensive missile technology;

Third, the possible military use of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction is causing growing concern; and

Fourth, new biological and chemical weapons are being developed and tested in scientific laboratories.

68. The world must stop the nuclear arms race before its momentum becomes irreversible. In order to reverse the present trend and to start us on the road to the ultimate goal of disarmament, this forward momentum must be halted. The nuclear Powers should be able to agree to a moratorium on the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems as the existing stockpiles have already reached the stage of overkill.

69. The ban on underground nuclear weapon tests will be a very important step towards nuclear disarmament. Indonesia is one of the signatories of the partial test ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in three environments: the atmosphere, outer space and under water. The need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty was set forth in clear terms in resolution 2343 (XXII), in which, *inter alia*, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was requested to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

70. In this connexion the work of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm should be encouraged. The report of the Expert Study Group<sup>16</sup> which was convened on its initiative, and made up of seismologists from various countries, indicated the desirability of international co-operation in seismic detection. This, in turn, could materially contribute to the

establishment of a "detection club" as proposed by Sweden. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1 and 2 therefore deserves our fullest attention.

71. Yet another aspect of the problem of disarmament which opens up the possibility of horrible new instruments of mass destruction is the development of chemical and biological weapons, which the Secretary-General has singled out for special attention. The possibility of utilizing this sort of weapon presents a clear danger; the more so because, in the Secretary-General's assessment, "Almost all countries, including small ones and developing ones, may have access to these weapons, which can be manufactured quite cheaply, quickly and secretly in small laboratories."<sup>17</sup>

72. It is therefore heartening to note that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament agreed<sup>18</sup> to recommend to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General appoint a Group of Experts to study the effects of possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. The Indonesian delegation fully endorses these recommendations and would like to stress the need to disseminate information on this problem for the benefit of the citizens of all nations. In this connexion my delegation welcomes draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-6 and hopes that it will have the unanimous support of this Committee.

73. Collateral measures, such as a declaration by the nuclear weapon States that they will not make use of nuclear weapons, a moratorium on the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and the gradual elimination of present nuclear stockpiles, should also be negotiated. These collateral measures should be considered as so many steps on the road to our goal of total nuclear disarmament. At the same time, renewed efforts should be pursued towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, our ultimate goal, which was referred to in draft resolution A/C.1/L.448. As far as draft resolution A/C.1/L.446 is concerned my delegation has followed with great interest the views put forward by the representative of India and other representatives who expressed similar views. Perhaps the sponsor of the draft resolution might be able to consider not to press for a vote in the light of those views.

74. This Committee also has before it the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. The Conference is regarded by most of us as an important event in the long series of international conferences dealing with arms control. It did not set out to solve the multitude of problems relating to disarmament. Rather it directed its attention to two main and quite specific goals: the elaboration of security guarantees and the methods to realize the potential of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

75. The first of the Conference's tasks was the attempt to suggest measures to strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty at its weakest point, that is the area of security guarantees.

<sup>15</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A.

<sup>16</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968 document DC/231, annex I, sect. 6.

<sup>17</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 30.

<sup>18</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/231, para. 26.



As has been pointed out by many delegations, simple realism forces us to face the fact that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) does not provide the kind of security guarantee needed in the world in which we live today.

76. If we were living in an atmosphere such as to inspire trust and confidence among nations, then the basic multilateral treaty to which we are all parties, the Charter of the United Nations, would have been sufficient. All of us as Members of the United Nations have solemnly pledged to uphold its provisions. It hardly needs to be said that pledges alone will not bring us any closer to our goal of peace for the world and the whole of mankind if we do not faithfully adhere to them in our international relations and actions.

77. The provisions of the Charter should in fact be sufficient to provide the necessary guarantee from nuclear attack, from any kind of attack for that matter, if such an atmosphere of trust and confidence prevailed in the world. But the reality is, that such an atmosphere does not exist. Therefore, we need further assurances, such as the non-proliferation Treaty. And with the non-proliferation Treaty we again need further assurances, such as Security Council resolution 255 (1968) which in its turn receives further assurances in the form of the declarations of intention made by three nuclear powers, permanent members of the Council. Indonesia has already expressed its views on the non-proliferation Treaty. We think that there are not sufficient guarantees for our safety against nuclear attack, even with Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the declarations of intention subsequently made by the nuclear powers, permanent members of the Security Council. Safety from nuclear attack can of course only be effectively guaranteed by stopping altogether the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and by destroying the existing stockpiles. My delegation realizes that this cannot be achieved overnight but all of us, especially the super-Powers, should work sincerely towards its achievement.

78. It has been suggested that a multilateral conference be convened, to be attended by all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, to try to find ways and means to devise security guarantees that can really be implemented. In the opinion of my delegation such an idea, if expected to yield results, would require the most exacting and careful preparation. And my delegation regrets that it cannot be very optimistic as to its practical outcome in view of the present state of relationship between the super-Powers.

79. As to the second major subject of concern to the participants of the Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, many useful and practical suggestions were put forward for the consideration of this Committee.

80. In this area of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, it has been suggested, among other things, that the benefits to be derived from the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy should not be tied exclusively to the signatory States of the non-proliferation Treaty. At the non-nuclear Conference, my delegation expressed the view, and does so again now, that in the case of access to the benefits of nuclear technology no difference should be made between signatories and non-signatories of the non-proliferation Treaty,

as long as the States concerned are prepared to submit themselves to the necessary safeguards, and that they will not use the facilities so obtained for other than peaceful purposes. To deny the potential of this vast new source of energy for development purposes to those politically unable to ratify the Treaty, would serve the cause neither of peace nor development.

81. Other resolutions relating to programmes for co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in particular relating to economic and scientific advancement of developing countries, as adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, deserve the full support of this Committee.

82. During the discussions in the Conference at Geneva and again in this Committee, several delegations have commented upon the desirability of new machinery for the implementation of the decisions taken within the framework of the non-proliferation Treaty and of the efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. My delegation is of the view that existing machinery should be utilized whenever possible, if necessary readjusted to the new needs, and that no new bodies should be established unless the need for such can be clearly demonstrated.

83. However, the suggestions to reactivate the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to review the status of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament deserve our serious consideration.

84. A great number of resolutions on the question of disarmament have been adopted by the United Nations over the years. It is regrettable that many of these well-intended resolutions cannot as yet be followed up by effective implementation.

85. My delegation recognizes that the implementation of these resolutions requires a favourable international climate. I would like to stress that meaningful progress will only come when the big Powers agree to co-operate in order that such a climate may be created. The non-nuclear Conference adopted resolution D [*see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (III)*] unanimously, and this is a reflection of the strong feeling among the participants that the two super-Powers should enter into early bilateral talks on the "limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles". [*Ibid.*]

86. Such bilateral meetings would also be a very useful prelude to the reconvening of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Resolution C [*ibid.*] was adopted unanimously by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. My delegation is of the opinion that the priority of items to be subject for negotiations at such a resumed session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be as suggested by that resolution of the Conference.

87. In conclusion, my delegation strongly urges that such bilateral talks between the two super-Powers, which will facilitate the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, be undertaken promptly, as we are of the opinion that any real progress towards nuclear disarmament

will depend on how far the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are willing to adjust their national interests to correspond with the interest of the whole world and with mankind's universal desire for peace. Treaties and resolutions, however well intended, will not achieve much as long as their implementation continues to be confronted with conflicting national interests, especially of the super-Powers.

88. Mr. EGUINO (Bolivia) (*translated from Spanish*): In this debate on the disarmament items, the Bolivian delegation would like briefly to express its general views, this time exclusively on item 96 of the Assembly's agenda, the reason being that my country's delegation to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held at Geneva in August and September of this year, in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2153 B (XXI) and 2346 B (XXII), participated actively in that Conference, together with other Latin American countries.

89. Bolivia participated from the outset in the process which led to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,<sup>19</sup> and signed it on 14 February 1967. We also signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 July last as soon as it was open for signature [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annexes*].

90. This immediate background of Bolivia's position in this area stems from my country's interest in collaborating in any effort towards disarmament, the maintenance of peace, and the security of all the States of the world; and it is an unambiguous demonstration of the peace-loving and democratic character of the Bolivian people. Hence we can only appeal to the great Powers to adopt similar principles and purposes so as to guarantee peace and security and offer the other peoples of the world economic and social stability so that they can develop and progress in freedom.

91. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States began its meetings in an atmosphere of justified expectancy and of firm determination to produce genuine, concrete agreements for the common good.

92. The important message sent by the United Nations Secretary-General, the statement by the President of the Conference, and the sound statements made during the debates, brought out clearly the aspects in which the participating States were primarily interested, revealing a striking similarity of opinions and viewpoints on the central themes: the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear disarmament, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—a subject of vast importance for the developing countries.

93. The fact that great nuclear Powers attended the Conference undoubtedly gave it a fillip, since it is they, after all, that hold in their hands most of the effective means of achieving disarmament, peace and international co-operation in that field.

94. At the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, opinions on the important issue of the security of those

States were naturally centred mainly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the question of nuclear disarmament. A variety of comments and criticisms were directed at that instrument, e.g. the fact that it does not commit the nuclear States to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons or at any rate to limit their present stockpiles—though such a commitment is explicit for the non-nuclear-weapon States; that it does not prohibit mutual collaboration in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or require the nuclear Powers to submit peaceful nuclear activities to international safeguards, as in the case of the non-nuclear-weapon countries and that no measures are envisaged for ending the so-called “vertical proliferation”; the danger of what has been called “nuclear feudalism”; emphasis on the need for observance of the stipulations laid down in article VI of the Treaty; views on the scope of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the declaration by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and other matters such as the freeze on the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes, the limitation of production of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, the reduction of existing stockpiles, general agreement on negative and positive guarantees, and many other important issues. All these matters will have to be taken carefully into consideration with a view to the proper development or rounding off of the action already taken along the thorny path to disarmament and the far longer and more arduous road to general and complete disarmament under effective and adequate international control.

95. Bolivia was gratified to see that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States touched on the problem of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, that the Treaty of Tlatelolco loomed large in the debates, being unanimously praised as a historic and epoch-making decision on the part of the Latin American countries, and that the intention of other regions to establish similar denuclearized zones was likewise discussed.

96. Bolivia was equally happy to note that at Geneva special emphasis was placed on the question of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that in this respect there was agreement on the need for ease of access to scientific and technological knowledge relating to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the case of the developing countries.

97. Clearly we are all convinced that the peaceful use of nuclear energy opens up vast prospects for human progress and well-being, and as has been repeatedly pointed out, nuclear energy is destined to become a powerful instrument for economic development, so that international co-operation on the technical and economic levels will obviously be very important. We must also emphasize here the recommendation in resolution I of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States for examination of the basis on which arrangements can be made for the creation of a Special Nuclear Fund for financing nuclear projects in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those in the developing areas of the world.

98. With regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, I would refer to the view expressed by the

<sup>19</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 91 (A/C.1/946).

representative of Bolivia in Committee II of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States on 17 September 1968,<sup>20</sup> when he discussed the use of nuclear energy in mining, the exploitation of gas, oil, energy resources etc., and emphasized, supporting the pertinent part of a working document submitted by the delegation of Mexico [A/C.1/976], the need to establish or perfect an appropriate international observation system, to regulate information to be compulsorily furnished on radio-active fall-out, and to agree on measures to be taken to avoid risks to the population, flora and fauna, and territory of States where such explosions are carried out, and still more, of neighbouring States.

99. In this connexion, my delegation must reiterate expressly Bolivia's concern about the danger, which is not hypothetical, of radiation and radio-active contamination in the event of explosions being carried out near the Bolivian borders. We pointed that out in a statement during the second part of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, stating that if a situation involving such risk were to arise, Bolivia would appeal to the United Nations and its appropriate organs for protection against such a calamity.

100. In conclusion, an examination of the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7277] proves convincingly, without any doubt, the value of what was achieved at the Conference. As the head of the Bolivian delegation stated at Geneva, the achievements are in line with the interests of universal peace and the progress of peoples, especially the developing nations; and he expressed the hope that they would serve those noble ends.

101. Thus the current session of the General Assembly should consider, in accordance with the invitation in resolution N of the Final Document relating to agenda item 15 of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the best ways and means for the implementation of the decisions taken by the Conference and the continuity of the work undertaken.

102. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegations of the Byelorussian SSR, which have taken part in United Nations activities since the inception of the Organization, have, in expressing the will of their people, consistently fought for disarmament and for programmes of general and complete disarmament, opposed the imperialist policy of war and aggression and defended the cause of peace and international security.

103. We have always taken the view that disarmament is possible and essential. We have repeatedly stressed that the difficulties and dangers arising from the continuing arms race increase with every year and that solution of disarmament problems is therefore urgently necessary.

104. In our opinion, the principal task of the United Nations today is to consolidate the results achieved, i.e., ensure the general application of the provisions of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water<sup>21</sup> and the Treaty on the exploration and use of outer space for

peaceful purposes [*resolution 2222 (XXI)*], promote to the best of its ability the early entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII)*], stop up all possible loopholes for the spread of nuclear weapons over the globe, and, having done all that, proceed to further disarmament measures, the final goal being general and complete disarmament and peace and progress on earth.

105. In order to secure a durable peace, further steps must be taken to stop the arms race and put into effect a disarmament programme. The Memorandum of the Government of the USSR of 1 July 1968 [A/7134] concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament draws the attention of States Members of the United Nations to important practical measures to promote peace and disarmament, and it is no accident that it should have met with such a favourable response in the course of this debate.

106. My delegation, which whole-heartedly supports the new and important peace initiative of the Soviet Union, wishes to emphasize that solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament brooks no delay. I note with satisfaction that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has decided to give priority to this problem in forthcoming negotiations.

107. Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is a question which demands concentrated attention, immediate consideration, and prompt solution. The need for promptness stems from the fact that these are the most devastating weapons of mass destruction known to man. The Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons<sup>22</sup> amply demonstrates that this need is a pressing one. The conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would outlaw these weapons and would place an obstacle in the way of those who are dreaming of nuclear arsenals.

108. In 1946—fully twenty-two years ago—the Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission a draft international convention to prohibit the production and employment of nuclear weapons.<sup>23</sup> Even at that early date, the USSR Government raised the question of eliminating nuclear weapons and advocated the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, the draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union was not approved at that time.

109. During the years that followed, the States of the socialist confraternity, together with other peace-loving countries, continued to advocate the prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

110. My delegation wishes to emphasize that this time again it is the Soviet Union, that mighty nuclear Power which stands watch over world peace and the security interests of all socialist countries, which has been the first to appeal to the other nuclear Powers to proceed to negotiations, with the participation of other States, and to give serious consideration to the conclusion of a convention

<sup>20</sup> A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.9 (mimeographed).

<sup>21</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

<sup>22</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IX.1.

<sup>23</sup> *Atomic Energy Commission, Official Records*, No. 2.

prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The USSR Government has declared that it is ready to sign an international agreement to that effect here and now.

111. As we all know, the United Nations has already taken a number of decisions clearing the way for a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. At its sixteenth session it approved a Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons [*resolution 1653 (XVI)*]. At its twenty-first session, it expressed its belief that

“... the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and give further impetus to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament” [*resolution 2164 (XXI)*].

112. Anxious that this important problem should be solved without delay, the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly at the twenty-second session a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons<sup>24</sup> which was welcomed by all nations, since an international convention of this kind would represent a serious obstacle to those who are eager to make use of nuclear weapons, and would certainly relax international tension.

113. All States have had a full opportunity to study the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Soviet Union and also to appreciate the timeliness of that important proposal. The time has come for all of us to see to it that the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is settled satisfactorily at the earliest possible date. To that end, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be instructed to discuss the draft convention submitted by the USSR and to report on it to the next session of the General Assembly.

114. We are deeply convinced that if Member States, and the United Nations as a whole, made a genuine effort to achieve prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and especially if they succeeded, favourable conditions would be created for the solution of the entire complex of nuclear disarmament problems. It would be easier to hold immediate negotiations, with the participation of all nuclear Powers, on the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and the reduction and elimination of stockpiles, to be followed by the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control; to agree on practical measures with regard to the restriction and subsequent reduction of vehicles for the delivery of strategic weapons; to prohibit forthwith flights by bomber aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond national frontiers; to reach agreement on the cessation of patrols by missile-carrying submarines with nuclear missiles on board in areas where the borders of parties to such an agreement are within range of such missiles; prohibit underground weapon tests with the use of national means of detection to ensure that the prohibition is enforced; and promote the establishment of nuclear-free zones and the adoption of measures for regional disarmament.

<sup>24</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 96, document A/6834.*

115. The conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an additional safeguard of State security and would offer every opportunity for world co-operation in making use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.

116. The USSR proposals on nuclear disarmament contained in the Memorandum in question are imbued with the true spirit of humanism and bear witness to the peace-loving policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist confraternity in their foreign relations. These proposals show once again the USSR's profound awareness of its responsibilities, as a great nuclear Power, before the entire world for the maintenance of international peace and security. They are proof that it has heeded the appeal to all countries, as approved by the United Nations, to pursue negotiations in good faith on further effective measures in the sphere of disarmament.

117. In its Memorandum, the USSR Government raises a number of other important questions, such as the need to eliminate foreign military bases, to use the sea-bed beyond the limits of existing territorial waters exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to examine ways and means of ensuring that all States comply with the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. There is need at the present time to come to the defence of the Protocol, condemn all violations of it, resist all attempts to change its provisions, which have given proof of their effectiveness during the bitter trials of the Second World War, and see to it that the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is complied with by each and every State. My delegation supports the draft resolution submitted by Poland and a number of other countries [*A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-7*], which to this end calls for the preparation of a special report on the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

118. It is also stated in the USSR Memorandum that:

“In recommending the foregoing measures, the Soviet Government draws attention to the need for making every effort to achieve tangible progress in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament” [*A/7134, para. 24*].

Putting these proposals into effect would most certainly help to lessen international tension, eliminate the threat of nuclear war, and strengthen international peace and security.

119. The Government of the Byelorussian SSR strongly supports the important proposals submitted by the Soviet Union and calls on the Governments of all other countries to proceed to put them into effect. I might add that those few representatives who pretend that they have not noticed the USSR proposals or who resort to the old and fallacious argument, “There is nothing new in them”, would do well to study this document with care. They would then find both that it contains new matter and that the old proposals, too, should be acted upon in the interests of mankind.

120. I should now like to comment on issues raised by a number of delegations during the general debate on disarmament.

121. First, a few remarks regarding proposals to establish additional organs and convene conferences and meetings to examine the questions of security, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, control and co-ordination of the activities of existing organs, implementation of the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, etc.

122. These proposals are being made at a time when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has not yet entered into force and had therefore not yet had any beneficial effect. It should be obvious to everyone that security safeguards would be enhanced as more States adhere to the Treaty, as greater weight is given to the Security Council resolution /255 (1968)/ and the declarations of the three nuclear Powers, and as the obligations under article VI of the Treaty to negotiate with a view to further agreements on disarmament are carried out. There can also be no doubt that after the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons comes into effect, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will be able to do better work and we shall all be entitled to demand that it expedite its endeavours and produce greater results. The International Atomic Energy Agency is expanding its work in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Certainly, if all its members see to it, the Agency's activity can and must be substantially improved.

123. Let us all tackle this job, rather than talk about having it done elsewhere, with other participants, and, apparently, in some other way.

124. Proposals of this kind can only be interpreted as attempts on the part of opponents of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to prevent or delay the coming into force of the Treaty and the implementation of other disarmament measures.

125. These attempts also clearly reveal a desire, contrary to the principle of universality, to juxtapose the nuclear Powers to the non-nuclear States, to place the latter in a special position, and to associate with their activities, on a discriminatory political basis, certain States which are not Members of the United Nations. I must note with regret that this idea is supported even by some partisans of United Nations universality, and that in so doing every one of them

professes his dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

126. My delegation fails to see any need to establish new organs or convene conferences and meetings, since it believes that the existing organs and the meetings now being held are more than adequate to enable all Members of the United Nations fully to explain and defend their positions and to reach agreement on all questions, whether it be disarmament, greater security, or co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to reach agreement on all those questions which the peoples expect the United Nations to settle what we need is not new organs but goodwill. No new organ, even if we should establish so many that every Member of the United Nations can have a chairmanship in one of them, would help our cause; it would only use up funds which should be used for purposes of co-operation. Those countries which reject or ignore constructive proposals should make an effort to review their positions; what we need is agreed decisions taking account of the wish of the peoples for peace and for economic and social progress.

127. For these reasons, my delegation is categorically opposed to the establishment of new organs and the convening of meetings and conferences which are not in the general interest, and also to any review of the terms of reference of existing organs.

128. My delegation notes with satisfaction that the view it expressed in the course of the general debate at plenary meetings opposing the Danish proposal concerning registration of the arms trade has been supported by other delegations. It associates itself with the appeals of Saudi Arabia, India, the United Arab Republic and other countries urging the Danish representative to withdraw his unfounded proposal, which could give an added impetus to the arms race and which in no way serves the cause of disarmament.

129. My delegation will comment later on the draft resolutions which have been or still may be submitted. Our position on these texts will be determined by the constant desire of our people, which is soon to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the Byelorussian SSR, for peace, friendship and co-operation among nations.

*The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.*