

United Nations  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-THIRD SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1640th  
MEETING

Friday, 13 December 1968,  
at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Agenda item 25:	Page
The Korean question ( <i>continued</i> ):	
(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;	
(b) Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;	
(c) Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;	
(d) Need to put an end to the discussion in the United Nations on the unification of Korea	1
Agenda items 27 and 96:	
Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament ( <i>continued</i> )	
Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference ( <i>continued</i> )	7
Agenda item 25:	
The Korean question ( <i>continued</i> ):	
(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;	
(b) Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;	
(c) Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;	
(d) Need to put an end to the discussion in the United Nations on the unification of Korea	13

Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).

AGENDA ITEM 25

The Korean question (*continued*):

- (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/7212; A/C.1/966, 967, 968 and Corr.1 (English only), Corr.2, 970, 971, 972, 975; A/C.1/L.453 and Add.1);
- (b) Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/7182 and Add.1-4; A/C.1/966, 967, 968 and Corr.1 (English only), Corr.2, 970, 971, 972, 975, 977, 978; A/C.1/L.455 and Add.1);
- (c) Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations (A/7184 and Add.1-2; A/C.1/966, 967, 968 and Corr.1 (English only), Corr.2, 970, 971, 972, 975, 977, 978, A/C.1/L.454 and Add.1);
- (d) Need to put an end to the discussion in the United Nations on the unification of Korea (A/7227, A/C.1/977, 978)

1. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syria) (*translated from French*): In the history of international relations in our time there have

been few examples where, as in the case of Korea, the divergence between certain words and certain deeds seems to be almost complete. In the first place there is talk about the presence of the United Nations in the South of the country, whereas in fact only foreign troops are present, for the most part American, that hardly differ from occupation troops. To justify this presence reference is made to a resolution of the Security Council, whereas that resolution, not having been approved by one permanent Member, was vitiated from the outset and is therefore completely null and void. These troops, whose presence is thus bereft of any international legal foundation, have been given the task of rehabilitating and unifying Korea, but what they are doing is exactly the opposite.

2. The division of the country is only being made deeper and more lasting by their presence, and rehabilitation is becoming more superficial and remote. The vast expenditure in connexion with the war being fought in Viet-Nam is creating a semblance of prosperity there which is reflected in the availability of currency, but the development of the Korean natural resources, the improvement of the lot of the peasant masses and provision for the country's essential needs are neglected. This aspect of the increase in imports and currency in South Korea is well explained in the *Review of International Trade and Development*, 1967, published by the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>

3. Much is made of the demands of national defence and regional security, while in the field of military operations 50,000 innocent soldiers are sent to the battlefields and inveigled to take part in the massacre of their heroic brother people of Viet-Nam, thus extending the area of conflict, arousing hatred and poisoning relations throughout that region.

4. There is a tendency to refer frequently to collective security, as if the division of Korea could be regarded, even in international legal terms, as an established fact, as if there were really two Korean peoples and not one, and as if that people, like any other people, did not have the right to decide for themselves, thus having full and exclusive jurisdiction over their domestic affairs.

5. When all these arguments have been put forward, arguments whose substance contradicts what they are meant to demonstrate, we find that those matters which are most exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Korean people are openly interfered with and even the kind of Government they must have is prescribed for them. The terms used sound impressive, but are devoid of substance. The demand is made that the system should be democratic, but by that is meant not a deep-seated democratic system expressing the desires, needs and the longings for a new life

<sup>1</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No.: F.68.II.D.4.

of the Korean masses, but imported formulas, based, in effect, on social privilege and the influence of oppressive groups, which are derived from formulas imported from abroad. On such grounds, it is easy to reject out of hand any constructive proposal put forward by the Government of the Korean people and aimed at reconciling views, strengthening ties and healing wounds. Even such preliminary indications of improvement and progress are feared, and in the United Nations there is opposition even to the proposal to hear the views of the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

6. Thus, we are reduced to receiving year after year reports not on unification, but on consolidation of the division, reports not on agreement between the rulers of this great people so ravaged by colonialism, war, occupation and division, but on summit conferences where it is thought advisable to incur further military expenses, to mobilize new contingents of Koreans, who are so much needed for the rehabilitation of the country, and to introduce new strategies for imperialist domination to the detriment of the aspirations and interests of the Korean people. Such is the framework of the action to be imposed upon us.

7. The slightest initiative taken by the countries of Asia, Africa and of the socialist world to find remedies immediately encounters opposition and even slander. Their modest suggestion to invite a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea alongside the representative of the Republic of Korea so that they can hear his views, is immediately subjected to bitter attacks. No epithets have been spared in references to delegations—which after all represent sovereign and equal countries—that have taken such action. Language of this kind is now used at every turn for purposes of attack and obstruction, but unhappily it is the effectiveness and even the prestige of the United Nations which must suffer the consequences.

8. Such was the reception given to the courageous initiative of the Cuban delegation [A/7227] who drew attention to the complete sterility of the yearly debates of the United Nations on this question.

9. This whole artificial situation must be changed. We support draft resolution A/C.1/L.454 and Add.1 because it provides a change, holds out hope of a better climate and represents a serious effort to set in motion at last the process of conciliation and unity.

10. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker on my list I would draw the attention of the Committee to the new draft resolution, A/C.1/L.461, which has just been circulated.

11. With the delegation of Cuba as an additional co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.455 and Add.1, the number of co-sponsors of that draft resolution is now fifteen.

12. Mr. KAPLAN (Canada): By co-sponsoring the draft resolution [A/C.1/L.453 and Add.1] reaffirming the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, the Government of Canada wishes to reiterate its hope that peace and security can be ensured in the area through a peacefully reunified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative

form of government. Events of the past year have pointed up how far we remain from that objective and, if we are to be honest with ourselves, how little tangible effect the annual debates in the United Nations, and the resolutions adopted, have so far had in moving us towards our objective. We must also note, with a sense of regret tinged with discouragement, the steady increase in the number of incidents along the demilitarized zone, and in particular and most serious of all, a raid on 10 January 1968 by North Korean forces on Seoul, the capital city of the Republic of Korea, which apparently had as its object the assassination of President Park. Only a few days later the tension was further heightened as a result of the seizure of the United States naval vessel *Pueblo*, and the dangers inherent in the situation led the Security Council to give the incident its most urgent attention.

13. This is not the occasion for a protracted account of these incidents, nor of their consequences, but each in its own way served to heighten tension and to render less likely the prospect of reunification of this divided country. The months which have followed have seen a further series of incidents both in the demilitarized zone along the cease-fire line, and along the coasts of South Korea, resulting in casualties on both sides. My delegation can only deplore the North Korean provocations which have led to these clashes and which have served to undermine still further the prospects for peace and stability throughout the Korean peninsula.

14. In spite of this deterioration in the general security situation, we have been pleased to take note of the continuing economic development and progress in the Republic of Korea. The report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) makes it plain that the Republic of Korea has continued to make the economic progress which has been evident in recent years. Although it is clear that there are continuing inflationary pressures, the Korean Government has made a serious effort to control them through stabilization policies. The indices of industrial production, particularly in manufacturing, continued to increase strikingly during 1968, providing further evidence of the steady growth in output which has been characteristic of the South Korean economy during the past few years. The continued expansion of foreign trade, the Republic's reduced dependence on foreign grants and the attraction of investments and loans on a commercial basis are further encouraging factors.

15. It would be a source of gratification to my delegation if this picture of economic progress were matched by similar progress towards peaceful reunification, or even by tacit agreement that the two parts of Korea would live together peacefully. As it is, fifteen years after the conclusion of the armistice, we are faced with a record of intransigence—indeed of active hostilities. It must be clear that the essential element in any move towards improvement in this situation is that North Korea should abandon its policy of belligerence.

16. While recognizing the responsibilities of those directly concerned, we believe that the role of the United Nations also bears re-examination. It is regrettable that all we have

managed to do in this Assembly is to hold an annual debate which has fallen into an increasingly stereotyped pattern. The Canadian delegation has wondered for some time whether there were new approaches which could offer greater prospects of progress towards the attainment of the laudable objectives of the United Nations in Korea. In this context, it has occurred to us that automatic annual inscription of an item relating to the UNCURK report does not necessarily make the best possible contribution towards the achievement of these objectives. At the same time we have been conscious of, and indeed have shared, the justifiable concern on the part of the United Nations with developments in the Korean area and with the future prospects of the Republic of Korea.

17. Taking the above-mentioned considerations into account, the Canadian delegation has been particularly pleased to become a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.453 and Add.1 which is now before this Committee. This draft resolution contains certain new elements which should commend themselves to all States Members of the United Nations. In the draft resolution the co-sponsors have recognized the dangers resulting from recent incidents in the Korean area, and the need accordingly for Members of the United Nations to be kept more fully and regularly informed about the situation in the area. It is within this framework that the draft resolution calls upon UNCURK to submit regular reports to the Secretary-General, and requests that the first such report be submitted no later than four months after the adoption of this draft resolution.

18. The co-sponsors have also provided for reaffirmation of United Nations interest in Korea and support for the continuing work of UNCURK, while introducing an element of flexibility in respect of the inscription of the UNCURK item on our agenda. Thus, when the situation in the area requires it, UNCURK will be in a position to make a report, as it has done annually in the past, direct to the General Assembly, and the report in consequence will be placed on the provisional agenda in accordance with rule 13 (b) and (c) of the rules of procedure. Should the situation not require a report to the General Assembly, however, States Members of the United Nations would none the less continue to be apprised of developments through the regular reports of UNCURK to the Secretary-General.

19. The Canadian delegation does not entertain any illusions as to the immediate effect of the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.453 and Add.1 of which Canada is a co-sponsor. Nevertheless, we hope that it will receive wide support because we consider it fitting that the General Assembly should continue to demonstrate its adherence to just principles and reasonable objectives.

20. As for the other draft resolutions placed before this Committee, it should be evident that their purposes stand in stark contradiction to the principles and objectives which draft resolution A/C.1/L.453 and Add.1 is designed to uphold.

21. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker on my list, I would inform the Committee that document A/C.1/978 has just been circulated.

22. Mr. ČERNÍK (Czechoslovakia): During the discussion concerning the invitation of representatives of the two parts of Korea we had the opportunity to explain the position of the Czechoslovak delegation on this aspect, which, in our view, is fundamental for the further consideration of the so-called Korean question appearing again on the agenda of our Committee. We very much regret that again this year it has not been possible to obtain the participation of the two parties. In our opinion, this discriminatory practice does not strengthen the authority of the United Nations; in the past it has led the discussion into a blind alley. Consideration of the Korean problem without the participation of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and to the practice which has been applied for years in our Organization. Having this in mind, we should like to explain again today the position of the Czechoslovak Government concerning the proposals aimed at abolishing the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea as well as withdrawing United States and other foreign troops occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations.

23. The results of the Commission's activities clearly prove that its further existence cannot contribute in the least to a solution of the Korean problem. That question, namely, the unification of Korea, can and must be solved exclusively by the Korean people themselves. The possibilities for achieving that objective have been clearly formulated many times and have been explained in detail by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They were explained once again in its memorandum of 18 July 1968 which was circulated as an official United Nations document and which is at our disposal in document A/C.1/971, of 16 October 1968.

24. The proposals contained in that memorandum constitute convincing proof of the seriousness with which the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea approaches the solution of the problem. The gradual implementation of that realistic programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is likewise ready to consider any other proposals, providing that they proceed from rejection of the concept of external interference in the domestic affairs of the Korean people and are directed towards the unification of Korea by peaceful means on a democratic basis. That is without doubt a constructive approach towards the settlement of the problem, which has for years been discussed here in the United Nations. The Czechoslovak delegation fully supports that position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

25. If Members of the United Nations are truly interested in making progress on this question—and we are convinced that a number of Member States share our view in this respect—then it would be necessary and logical to draw consequences from this situation, which the Korean people rightly considers to be very serious.

26. Frequently during the consideration of the so-called Korean question, it has been pointed out that the activities of the so-called Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the report of which is before us, cannot in the least contribute to the sincere efforts aimed at unifying the country and at normalizing the situation.

The activities of the Commission interfere in the internal affairs of that State and constitute a violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

27. The Commission is not an impartial and objective organ, as it is often presented here. If it were such an organ, it would also have to take a stand on the presence of United States and other foreign troops in South Korea. The presence of those troops undoubtedly constitutes one of the main obstacles preventing the peaceful unification of the country. For those reasons, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic associates itself with those countries which have proposed that an item on the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea be included in the agenda of the current session. We take the position, which was also expressed in the explanatory memorandum, to the effect that it is necessary to give the Korean people the opportunity to decide on its internal affairs without any interference from outside. From that point of view, the strivings of the Korean people have been supported by all peace-loving and progressive forces.

28. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, conscious that the unification of the country can be attained exclusively by peaceful means and by the Korean people itself, is of the opinion that the so-called Korean question should not be discussed further in the United Nations. Therefore, a new item entitled "Need to put an end to the discussion in the United Nations on the unification of Korea" has been included in our agenda upon the initiative of the Cuban delegation.

29. In our opinion, that is the logical consequence of the long-term strivings by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and those countries which defend and support its position. The Czechoslovak delegation fully supports that proposal. The reiteration of all positions and their constant justification, which we have witnessed, cannot in the least help to solve the problem. On the contrary, such debates can only weaken and undermine the prestige and authority of the United Nations.

30. The unification of the country can be achieved peacefully only by the Korean people themselves and by means which are clearly outlined in the memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

31. The General Assembly can best contribute to the settlement of this problem by dissolving UNCURK, by deciding on the withdrawal of all foreign forces occupying Korea under the flag of the United Nations and by putting an end to the discussion in the United Nations of the unification of Korea. Such measures would be instrumental in the solution of the problem, that is, the unification of Korea, and would lead to the strengthening of peace and security in that part of the world.

32. For the aforementioned reasons, the Czechoslovak delegation supports draft resolutions A/C.1/L.454 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.455 and Add.1 and A/C.1/L.461. We are convinced that a majority of Member States will recognize the realistic character of those draft resolutions and will support the proposed measures.

33. Mr. ALARCON QUESADA (Cuba) (*translated from Spanish*): Once again the First Committee is taking up various problems relating to Korea, and doing so, as it has done for these many years, in the absence of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, one of the parties directly concerned. My delegation wishes first and foremost to place on record its protest against the discussion of the item in these circumstances. The absence of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a violation of the sovereign rights of that country, and in addition it creates in this Committee a situation which is altogether unsuited to any debate on the problems relating to Korea.

34. This year we have witnessed other anomalies in connexion with the examination of the problems relating to the Korean situation. As representatives are aware, the Committee has been prevented by means of a series of procedural manoeuvres from taking up these problems in a logical and pertinent manner. An eloquent instance of this is the way in which agenda item 25: "The Korean question", brackets together several items dealing with problems distinct in themselves and in some ways mutually exclusive.

35. It is quite clear that in this question of Korea a twofold object is being pursued, one imposed on the Organization from the very outset. On the one hand, the Organization is called upon to discuss the so-called Korean question, and on the other, every possible effort is made to ensure that the discussion becomes more and more absurd and futile all the time. The purpose of this double manoeuvre could not be more patent. There is no idea here of solving any problem relating to the Korean peninsula; the purpose is simply to require a yearly debate which serves to perpetuate the colonial occupation of South Korea and to pursue the policy of aggression by American imperialism against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The colonial subjugation of the whole of Korea is an age-old dream of American imperialism. The aggressive war of 1950 was an important link in that strategic chain. With the co-operation of various puppet régimes, the United States succeeded in having the United Nations act as an instrument of aggression against the people of Korea. The latter, under the able direction of the Korean Labour Party and of Comrade Kim Il Sung, frustrated the imperialist aggression of 1950 and succeeded in maintaining the independence and sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, an impregnable bastion of socialism in Asia and a shining example for the entire Korean people in the struggle for the unification of its homeland in independence.

36. During the last few years, the policy of aggression against Korea has been intensified, and incidents have occurred time after time along the Demarcation Line, on the coasts of Korea and throughout the entire peninsula. It is easy to gain some idea of how armed provocation along the Demarcation Line has been increasing, particularly over the past two years, from the fact that acts of armed provocation—violations of the armistice agreements by American troops against the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the date of the signing of the agreements to 5 September 1968—have reached the impressive total of 61,085. This figure includes 743

violations of the air space of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1,045 incursions from the sea, 68 armed attacks along the Demarcation Line, 140 bombardments of the territory, and 1,981 attacks with firearms. These incidents have increased considerably in number since September 1966, when Mr. Lyndon Johnson visited the territory of South Korea. Between that date and the present, incidents have reached the figure of 17,703, far more, relatively speaking, than the rate of violations recorded since the signing of the armistice.

37. As is well known, in the month of January 1968, units of the coastal defence forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea seized the United States vessel *Pueblo*, and since then, likewise, acts of armed provocation by the Americans against the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been stepped up, the number of violations of the armistice in a matter of a year reaching the figure of 6,670.

38. One may well wonder what are the reasons behind the heightening of the tension in Korea and the increasing number of incidents and fresh provocations by the troops stationed in South Korea against the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

39. The true reason why the American imperialists and their puppets are gradually stepping up this policy of provocation and aggression is to be found in the steadily mounting efforts of the South Korean people to get rid of the puppet gang implanted by American bayonets and to achieve the unification of the Korean nation in independence. Over the last few years the struggle of the South Korean people for their independence and the unification of the country in independence has been snowballing. The revolt has now spread to a large segment of the intellectual and student population, who are fighting more and more resolutely for their right to live in a free, unified and independent land of their own.

40. In August 1968 there was a wholesale clampdown in the territory of South Korea on large university and intellectual sectors accused of setting up a series of organizations to fight for the unification of their homeland in independence. For the crime of fighting for the unification of their country, 158 patriots distinguished in various intellectual and teaching fields in the southern part of Korea were arrested.

41. The American representatives and those who play their game in this Committee talk of alleged aggressive activities carried on from the north of Korea against the régime established in the south. They talk of infiltrations and acts of provocation, trying to depict the struggle of the south Korean people for the independence and unity of their country as if it were an export product from abroad. It would be interesting to ask them how they explain the rise of those organizations in the south under the direction of well-known university professors from various South Korean universities and embracing broad sectors of the intelligentsia in the south, persons well known in the South Korean region and resident there ever since Korea became artificially divided. These people were accused by the puppet régime of setting up the "Unified Revolutionary Party", the leading figure in which, according to the organs

of repression in South Korea, is Mr. Kim Chong Te, of the University of Tong Kuk, Seoul, and with him Professors Kim Zin Rak and Ri Mun Kui, both of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of the University of Seoul. According to information given by the South Korean special police themselves, this organization included a number of former deputies of the National Assembly of South Korea, some officers in the puppet régime's army, and many professional persons, writers, doctors and civil servants. Several intellectual and teaching organizations have been charged with taking part in the activities of the Unified Revolutionary Party, e.g. the Association for the Study of the New Culture, the Society of Young Literati, the Union of Buddhist Youth, the Dong Jak Association, the Chong Mek Association, the Institute for the Study of Nationalism, the Young Christians' Economic Association, the Kyong U Association, and the Jak Sa Zu Chom Association.

42. All these groups of South Korean literati, professionals and intellectuals are alleged according to the version put out by the Americans and their friends to have infiltrated the university centres of the south from the northern territory. The fact is that American imperialism and the régime set up by it in Seoul show ever-increasing signs of desperation in the face of what is an inevitable and entirely legitimate movement of the population of South Korea.

43. If the representatives of the puppet régime come here to laud the foreign occupation of their land and to beg the United Nations to continue to violate the sovereign rights of the Korean people, there is no reason why that people should condone such subservience, or why it should not persist in fighting to vindicate its full rights.

44. The northern part of the territory, occupied by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, certainly provides an example heartening to the revolutionary struggle in the south. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under the leadership of the Labour Party of Korea and Comrade Kim Il Sung, has achieved considerable success in fashioning a new life for the northern Korean people. It was there that the most thoroughgoing agrarian reforms of our time on the Asian continent were carried out, eliminating the last traces of feudal exploitation. The territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has also witnessed other radical changes which have transformed the country, traditionally backward and dependent, into what is today an industrial-agricultural country, developed, and engaged in eliminating the poverty, hunger and unemployment that had traditionally decimated the people of Korea. In the territory of the north, education has been extended to the broad masses, and science and technology are in the throes of development.

45. Today the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an example to all the peoples of the third world of what a people can accomplish if it sets out resolutely to assert its right to independent development. It should be pointed out that all the triumphs of the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been won in a country devastated by the war of imperialist aggression, a country that for twenty years has been dogged by the constant aggressiveness of American imperialism and its persistent policy of provocation, aggression and sabotage of every kind. The achievements of the Democratic People's



Republic of Korea also give a strong fillip to the struggle of the South Korean masses, ground under the heel of the foreign occupation forces, for the right to the unification of their country in independence.

46. The United Nations has been used since 1950 as the tool of aggression against the people of Korea. Every year a policy is revived that is manifestly at variance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Here, on the pretext of discussing the unification of Korea, the artificial division of the country is perpetuated. Under the mask of defending the competence and authority of the United Nations, the Organization is made to intervene in the domestic affairs of the people of Korea, thus trampling under foot the principles of the Charter.

47. This procedure which the General Assembly has been forced to follow for these many years is becoming more and more of a scandal, and many Member States today appreciate the danger and the unlawfulness of such procedures. What stands out in particular is the arbitrariness and absurdity of pretending to discuss the unification of Korea here, while at the same time preventing the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from taking part in the discussion of the problem.

48. It seems to my delegation that the time is ripe for this Committee to try to find a new approach, to take a positive attitude towards the problems of the Korean peninsula. We firmly believe that this is in the best interests of the Organization and that it is becoming more and more important with every day that passes.

49. The discussions in the course of this year make it clear, incidentally, that today many delegations are trying to see the Korean problem in a different light, resisting the pressure exerted by the United States and endeavouring to find a solution compatible with the principles of the Charter and the right of the Korean people to self-determination and independence.

50. In accordance with these views, my delegation requested the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of this session of the General Assembly, entitled "Need to put an end to the discussion in the United Nations on the unification of Korea".

51. We base the need to discuss this question on several factors. First of all, nobody can deny that the unification of a country artificially divided is essentially a problem which concerns its people. No one can be unaware that the Charter of this Organization expressly prohibits any interference in affairs coming within the national jurisdiction of States, and does not require its Members to submit such affairs to the General Assembly.

52. Secondly, the Korean question has a long history in this Organization, as likewise no one can be unaware. It is clear that nothing positive has been achieved in these twenty years of discussion in the First Committee on the unification of Korea, and that the procedure followed in discussing the problem—the well-known exclusion of one of the parties directly interested in the unification of Korea—is no contribution to its solution; on the contrary, it raises new obstacles each year and further complicates the possible solution of the problem.

53. My delegation, after consulting with other representatives, has submitted a draft resolution, distributed under symbol A/C.1/L.461, which I now beg to introduce. It embodies the criteria in virtue of which we requested the inclusion of this new item. The draft resolution is presented jointly by the delegations of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

54. The text of the draft, which representatives already have in front of them, is crystal clear. The first paragraph states a fact that is common knowledge. It reads:

*"Noting that the Korean question has been discussed at each session of the General Assembly for twenty years but that Korea is still not unified."*

55. The second preambular paragraph points out that this discussion in the United Nations is ineffectual and has complicated the settlement of the Korean problem and created new obstacles to its solution. I do not think anyone can refute this, after the experience of twenty years of futile discussions on the problem of the unification of Korea, arranged in haste usually towards the end of the session and in the absence of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is well known that these discussions have been creating a growing sense of pessimism, not to say distaste, among most of the delegations, because they realize that no positive result can emerge from such a debate.

56. The third preambular paragraph states that the unification of Korea is an internal affair of the Korean nation itself and that no foreign forces should intervene in it. All delegations that respect the principles of self-determination of peoples and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States must agree with us that this paragraph is perfectly valid.

57. The fourth preambular paragraph recalls the provision of Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, which expressly lays down the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States.

58. The fifth preambular paragraph notes that the United Nations lacks the moral authority to participate in the solution of the Korean question inasmuch as its flag was used in the war of aggression against Korea in 1950 and has been used also since then at Panmunjom for the provocative and aggressive manoeuvres of the American troops against the northern part of Korea; in other words, because of American pressure, at a given moment the United Nations became a belligerent in Korea and decided to adopt a hostile attitude towards its people. So long as this attitude persists, the Organization is obviously morally disqualified as a would-be mediator in the Korean conflict from trying to find a solution.

59. The next preambular paragraph points out another obvious fact, namely that the ineffectual discussion of this question affects the prestige of the United Nations. It would be difficult to argue that going through the mere motions of discussing an issue for twenty years without finding any solution, and doing so in such a way as to make

it obvious beforehand that no result whatever can be achieved is not prejudicial and damaging to the prestige of the Organization.

60. The final preambular paragraph expresses the conviction that the Korean people can achieve the peaceful unification of their country by their own means. This statement is in fact borne out by history. For thousands of years the Korean nation has existed as an independent entity; hence the Korean people are conscious of their existence as an individual nation, a State distinct from the rest of the world; and it is therefore evident that they have preserved and still preserve their desire to see the reconstruction and unification of a country divided in a merely artificial and arbitrary manner by reason of imperialist policy over the last few years.

61. Finally, the one and only operative paragraph calls for a decision not to discuss the Korean question any longer in the United Nations.

62. In presenting this draft resolution, my delegation trusts that the representatives of Member States participating in our work will welcome it and give serious thought to its proposals, taking into account the principles of the United Nations Charter, the paramount principle of the right of peoples to self-determination and national independence, and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States.

63. The question of Korea has been discussed too long in this Organization without anything being done to contribute effectively to solving the problem of the artificial division of the country. Nor can the United Nations hope to accomplish anything while it persists in being a belligerent party in the issue and continues to be used by American imperialism in its policy of intervention and aggression against the Korean people; while it continues to lend its flag to the foreign troops occupying South Korea; and while it holds its annual debate on the problem of the unification of Korea in the absence of the legitimate representatives of the Korean people, in a mere petrified repetition each year of an absurd and sterile debate that does not help to alleviate tensions in the area, but on the contrary adds further complications and tensions in Korea with every day that passes.

64. My delegation trusts that the representatives of States jealous of their own independence and advocates of the independence and self-determination of peoples will be able to support this draft resolution [A/C.1/L.461], which could be a first step towards a necessary and long-overdue rectification incumbent on the Organization in respect of Korea.

#### AGENDA ITEMS 27 AND 96

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)\* (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.449/Rev.1)**

**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (continued)\* (A/7224 and**

**Add.1, A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2, A/7327, A/7364, A/C.1/976, A/C.1/L.449/Rev.1, L.450-452, A/C.1/L.456, A/C.1/L.458-460, A/C.1/L.462)**

65. The CHAIRMAN: Following our decision of this morning, we will now take up for a short while items relating to disarmament, and more precisely items 27 and 96. In this connexion members will have noticed that in the *Journal* for today we have not included item 29, "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament" which had been included in the Agenda on the basis of General Assembly resolution 2344 (XXII). In view of the fact that draft resolution A/C.1/L.488/Rev.2, which we adopted on 10 December [1635th meeting], recalled resolution 2344 (XXII), it is my understanding that we can consider item 29 as covered by that resolution. Members of the Committee will have noticed further that the following new draft resolutions have been circulated: (a) one contained in document A/C.1/L.458 which is sponsored by twelve countries; (b) one sponsored by twenty-six countries and contained in document A/C.1/L.459; (c) one contained in provisional document A/C.1/L.460 which is co-sponsored by twenty-three countries, including Iran; (d) one contained in document A/C.1/L.462, and co-sponsored by twelve countries.

66. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): In paragraph 63 of my statement in the 1610th meeting of the First Committee on 18 November 1968 on item 96 of the agenda, namely, "Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference", I pointed out that only the General Assembly can ensure that the work of the Conference is continued, its decisions are implemented and its conclusions do not remain interred in its final document. I referred to consultations that were held among a number of delegations representative of all regional groups, with a view to the formulation of a draft resolution which could command the widest possible support of all Member States, nuclear as well as non-nuclear.

67. Speaking at the 1609th meeting of this Committee on 18 November 1968, the representative of Italy expressed an opinion shared by many other delegations regarding the necessity for continuing the work undertaken by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in accordance with resolution N and with the declaration of the Conference [see A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 17 (v)]. He suggested the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on peaceful uses of nuclear energy to follow up the implementation of the conclusions of the Conference by the various organs and agencies concerned and to consider that further steps should be taken for an early solution of the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

68. It became clear in the consultations that there was a division of opinion on the question of establishing a new committee. Several Member States, in particular the nuclear-weapon Powers, were in favour of carrying forward the work of the Conference in the existing bodies and ensuring its continuity through the First Committee of the General Assembly.

\* Resumed from the 1635th meeting.

69. In order to bridge the differences, the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Pakistan and Yugoslavia accepted the view that continuity of the work of the Conference should be ensured through existing bodies and that the Disarmament Commission should be entrusted with the task. But no agreement could be reached with the delegations of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan and the Netherlands on the terms of reference to be given to the Disarmament Commission even though a compromise formula was evolved in regard to the timing of convening the Disarmament Commission.

70. It was at this stage that draft resolution A/C.1/L.450 was tabled by its six co-sponsors followed by the submission of draft resolution A/C.1/L.451 on behalf of the other six delegations.

71. The representative of Finland, who presented draft resolution A/C.1/L.450 at the 1632nd meeting, has, with great lucidity and ability, explained its purport and intent—namely, to carry forward the significant effort of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in a manner that would ensure the constructive co-operation of all nations, and in particular, of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

72. The representatives of Italy and Brazil explained draft resolution A/C.1/L.451 at the 1630th meeting of this Committee, showing why it was essential to ensure the continuity of the work of the Conference through, to quote the representative of Italy, “a unitary process, capable of studying these problems and helping to move towards their solution in a single context” [1630th meeting, para. 97].

73. As the representative of Brazil further explained, draft resolution A/C.1/L.451 already incorporated many suggestions made by several Member States, and reflected many concessions which its six co-sponsors had to make to adjust their decisions to the opinions and objections of other States [*ibid.*, para. 113].

74. As a result of further consultations among the co-sponsors of the two draft resolutions, I am happy to say that it has been possible to reach complete agreement on the remaining differences and on the text of a new draft resolution which embodies the vital elements of both the earlier drafts. This draft resolution, document A/C.1/L.458, I now have the honour to present to the First Committee on behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands and Pakistan.

75. My colleagues in this Committee will, I hope, understand if I express a certain feeling of gratification that another agreement has been reached, another compromise evolved, in that series of accommodations which constitutes the history of the efforts symbolized by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

76. This result has been made possible because of your patient leadership and wise guidance and the goodwill and constructive co-operation of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.450. At the same time I should be doing injustice to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.451 if I do not pay a tribute to their readiness to make so many difficult concessions in order to obtain the broadest

possible support for the implementation of the decisions of the Conference.

77. The Committee will, of course, have noticed the striking similarities between resolutions A/C.1/L.450 and 451, indeed of the existence of a number of identical provisions in them. These elements have now been incorporated in draft resolution A/C.1/L.458 now before us. I would invite the attention of this Committee to certain provisions of the present text.

78. Its preambular paragraphs are based on the corresponding paragraphs of the two earlier drafts. The language of operative paragraph 1 endorsing the Declaration of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was common to both drafts, and so also, except for differences in placing, was that of operative paragraphs 6, 8, 9 and 10. The same can be said of operative paragraph 3 except for minor drafting variations. Operative paragraph 2 is identical to operative section A, paragraph 2, of the draft contained in document A/C.1/L.450, which takes note of the resolutions adopted by the Conference. Operative paragraph 4 is also virtually the same as operative section A, paragraph 4, of A/C.1/L.450. As regards operative paragraph 5, it is a modified version of operative section I, paragraph 4, of the draft contained in document A/C.1/L.451.

79. I now come to operative paragraph 7 of the present draft. It will be seen that operative section B, paragraph 2, of the draft contained in document A/C.1/L.450 requests the Secretary-General to place the question of the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, including the question of convening a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, on the provisional agenda of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. On the other hand, operative section II, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the draft contained in document A/C.1/L.451 would decide to convene the Disarmament Commission, either in 1969 or before March 1970, according to the preference of Member States to be ascertained by the Secretary-General, to consider what new measures could be taken in the field of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, as well as in the field of security assurances and also to consider further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among all States with special regard to the needs of the developing countries.

80. It is evident that there was a difference involved here in regard to the terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission which has now been resolved by the formulation of operative paragraph 7 of the present draft resolution [A/C.1/L.458]. In accordance with this provision, it will be for the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly to consider the question of implementation, taking into account the reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the International Atomic Energy Agency, of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, including:

(a) The question of convening early in 1970 a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to consider disarmament and the related question of the security of nations, and



(b) the question of further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with particular regard to the special needs and interests of the developing countries.

81. Let me now briefly explain, if I may, to those of our colleagues who were not active participants in the private discussions, the thinking behind the two sub-sections of operative paragraph 7.

82. The link between the problem of disarmament and that of the assurance of the security of States is not a matter of controversy. Speaking at the 1624th meeting of this Committee on 28 November, the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Roschin, stated:

“The Soviet Union, which attaches great importance to matters of security, shares the legitimate desire of States to protect their peoples from danger, and above all, from nuclear attack or threat of nuclear attack. The importance of this problem must not be minimized, just as attempts to obstruct and frustrate the solution of this problem cannot be recognized as right or justified. The need to ensure security should not be juxtaposed to, or made to oppose, a solution of disarmament problems. There can be no doubt that security and disarmament are so closely interconnected that they form an indivisible whole. . . . This is the criterion that should be applied in evaluating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This Treaty, as it stands, enhances the security of all States. Serving as it does to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world and preclude the appearance of additional States possessing nuclear weapons, the non-proliferation Treaty safeguards the security of States.” [1624th meeting, paras. 14 and 15.]

83. These are words which hardly anyone in this Committee would be reluctant to endorse. When we, therefore, try to provide that at the appropriate time the option of convening the Disarmament Commission might be exercised in order to give an opportunity to all Member States of the United Nations to consider the problem of disarmament and the related question of the security of nations, we are not propounding any doctrine or asserting any viewpoint which in any way cuts across the affirmations made by the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves in regard to the question of security.

84. We entirely agree that the stoppage of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the prerequisites of ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Who can contest that, as the representative of the Soviet Union said in the same statement, “if new nuclear Powers were to appear, the security of all countries would be substantially lessened” [ibid., para. 17]?

85. Equally, who can dispute the fact that the problem of security, even in the nuclear context, is inextricably linked, in the light of the non-proliferation Treaty<sup>2</sup> and Security Council resolution 255 (1968) on security assurances, to the problem of non-proliferation and that it needs to be constantly reviewed? Who can doubt that the adequacy or otherwise of any measure taken to assure security needs to be examined and re-examined in the light of realities and of

the actual attitudes adopted by States towards that measure?

86. In this context, the Pakistan delegation notes with gratification the statement of the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, at the 1611th meeting of this Committee on 19 November, that:

“The effort to strengthen world security must be pursued unceasingly in existing bodies in the United Nations, where all Members bear a responsibility. Let us therefore resolve to do so, bearing in mind the views expressed and suggestions made at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. We will do our part in that effort.” [1611th meeting, para. 74.]

The representative of the United States also observed in the same intervention:

“Nevertheless, we believe that the United Nations remains the best hope for achieving security on a universal basis, for any attempt to erect separate universal security guarantees alongside the United Nations framework would be subject to the same factors which have inhibited the further development of the United Nations security system itself. Furthermore, if such a universal security structure were created, even partly outside and in apparent competition with the United Nations, it would lack the legal framework provided by the United Nations Charter—a legal framework which protects the sovereign equality and general interests of all Member States. If that approach were pursued, it could only weaken the United Nations, and the world would in the end be less, rather than more, secure.” [Ibid., para. 67.]

The Pakistan delegation generally agrees with these observations. Our concept of security against the nuclear threat is also one that is envisaged within the essential framework of the Charter of the United Nations.

87. The co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.458 have been influenced, most of all, by the consideration that this question can be solved best in an atmosphere of receptivity and co-operation. It is their hope that the consultations which have taken place between the co-sponsors of the two earlier drafts will allay any doubts and misapprehensions that might have existed regarding the identity of our objectives. It is indeed impossible for me to overstate the spirit of mutual accommodation which permeated these consultations. As a result, we are able to recommend a course of action which, we firmly believe, deserves the unanimous approval of the Assembly.

88. We hope that draft resolution A/C.1/L.458 will finally lay the ghost that was conjured up by reports of conflicts of political aims between the respective co-sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.450 and A/C.1/L.451. If there was any difference between them it was a difference not about ends, but about the methods to be followed for achieving those ends.

89. It is not stretching a point if the proposal is made now that the question of implementation of the results of the Conference should include the question of convening early in 1970 a meeting of the Disarmament Commission. Nor is it unreasonable that the Commission, if convened, should address itself to the problem of security relating to

<sup>2</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).

disarmament, including non-armament and non-proliferation.

90. Enough has been said in this debate about the desirability of reconvening the Disarmament Commission. Let me give the assurance, if any assurance is required, that there is no desire that the Disarmament Commission, if it is convened, should weaken the positive results which have been achieved in the field of disarmament by way of the conclusions of the non-proliferation treaty or any other. Where the subject of the convening of the Commission is to be considered is in the context of the entire disarmament effort.

91. The other principal question on which the discussions have been most constructive is that mentioned in paragraph 7(b) of the operative part of the present draft resolution relating to further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with particular regard to the special needs and interests of the developing countries. Since this was a subject which was considered extensively at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the implementation of the results of the Conference has a direct bearing upon it. The Conference made concrete proposals relating to exchange of information, technical assistance and training, capital assistance and the supply of fissionable material. Some of these proposals will be studied by the international bodies concerned and will no doubt gain further substance from the contents of the report contemplated in paragraph 8 of the operative part of the present draft resolution on the possible contribution of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries.

92. It is the aim of draft resolution A/C.1/L.458 that the whole range of the issues in this field should be considered at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. There might be differences of emphasis or differences about modalities, but there is no question that further international co-operation in the utilization of nuclear energy for economic development, particularly of the developing countries of the world, is assuming an increased urgency. As the representative of the United States, speaking at the 1611th meeting of this Committee, said:

“In the field of peaceful uses, we all share certain practical objectives. We all want to see how the general obligations and safeguards of the non-proliferation Treaty can facilitate co-operation in realistic programmes for reactors, kilowatts, isotopes and the energy for large-scale excavations and for tapping raw materials beneath the earth’s crust.” [*Ibid.*, para. 27.]

93. Finally, I should like to draw attention to an important addition to operative paragraph 5 of the present draft resolution. This concerns the implementation of resolution J of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [see A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 17 (iv)] to which all of them attach the greatest importance. Differences between the respective co-sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.450 and L.451 have been resolved by paragraph 5 without prejudice to the policy-making and legislative responsibilities of the governing bodies of the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

94. With these explanations, it is now my privilege to commend the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.458 to this Committee for unanimous approval. By adopting this resolution, we shall march unitedly towards the objective sought by us all. The objective is also that of actualizing benefits of any measure of disarmament or non-armament for the largest number of countries. A successful strategy of disarmament requires that the problem should be grappled with not only in some forums by only a few States, but, without overlapping of effort or conflict of aims, that it should be attacked by all the Member States of the United Nations at least in those areas where it is of close and immediate concern to them.

95. May I now turn to the other draft resolution which has been circulated as document A/C.1/L.462. On behalf of the delegations of Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands and Pakistan, I have the honour to introduce this draft resolution.

96. In introducing this draft resolution, I am conscious that it expresses the universal desire of the membership of the United Nations that an arms race between the two super-Powers—which cannot but be open-ended, prohibitively costly and, in the ultimate analysis, largely futile—be promptly arrested. The unlimited development of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles poses the danger of the escalation of the strategic nuclear arms race to new levels which will be uncontrollable. If this race is not prevented, it will doom all efforts towards arms reduction from the already formidable existing levels.

97. It was this awareness which prompted the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to adopt its resolution [*ibid.*, para. 17 (III)] at the instance of the Pakistan delegation, urging the Governments of the USSR and the United States to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. In making this recommendation, the participants in the Conference showed their concern with issues of universal peace and expressed their conviction that such discussions could represent the beginning of negotiations among all nuclear-weapon Powers with a view to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

98. The present draft resolution [A/C.1/L.462] seeks that the unanimous recommendation previously made by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should now be made by the General Assembly.

99. We have noted that the agreement between the super-Powers to hold these bilateral discussions has been mentioned in one of the preambular paragraphs of resolution A/C.1/L.448/Rev.2, already adopted by the Committee. The approval of the present draft resolution, however, would not in any way affect that particular provision of the other resolution. In draft resolution A/C.1/L.462 we are not merely noting or welcoming the agreement between the USSR and the United States to enter into bilateral discussions; we are urging them, as did the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, to act upon it at an early date.

100. As the Committee considers the draft resolution, it will no doubt be feeling encouraged at the latest reports which indicate bright prospects for the commencement of these discussions in the near future. But, however welcome, those reports do not diminish the necessity of adopting the draft resolution. In making this recommendation, with the confident expectation that it will evoke a positive response, the General Assembly will only be emphasizing the special and immediate responsibility of the two super-Powers to prevent such an acceleration of the arms race as will be beyond the ingenuity of man to reverse.

101. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): It is a privilege for me, on behalf of the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.450, to support the new draft resolution A/C.1/L.458, which has just been introduced by the representative of Pakistan. It gives us great satisfaction that this draft resolution—the outcome of prolonged consultations between the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.450 and A/C.1/L.451 themselves, as well as with other delegations—was presented to this Committee by the representative of the country which took the initiative for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. In view of the lucid and eloquent explanation by Mr. Shahi, it would be presumptuous to take up the time of the Committee by elaborating unduly on the text of the document before us.

102. Together with the other sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.458, we feel that it does adequately reflect the importance that we attach to the many constructive proposals contained in the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Those proposals deal with important matters of arms control and disarmament, the security of nations and the harnessing of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only.

103. I think it is fair to say that the initial differences about the best procedures did not obscure the fact that, from the outset, there was a wide agreement on the need for the implementation of those recommendations and for appropriate action by the international bodies and Governments concerned. As the representative of Italy, Mr. Farace, pointed out in his intervention on 5 December:

“The two events—the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty, and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States—are, in our view, two landmarks in the history of the community of nations, in that, for the first time, they attempted in a global manner to cope with the problems of the nuclear age: disarmament, security for all nations, economic development for all, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” [1630th meeting, para. 94.]

104. As regards the implementation of the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, I concur whole-heartedly with Mr. Shahi that the differences that became apparent were not differences about the ends, but about the methods of achieving certain objectives.

105. The sponsors of the present draft resolution believe that it offers, on balance, a realistic appraisal of the best ways and means to ensure an effective follow-up of the work undertaken by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

106. In the first place, the draft resolution endorses the Declaration of the Conference. Secondly, a basic premise, on which I think we all agree and which is implicit in the specific measures we propose, is that progress in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be ensured only by active co-operation between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Thirdly, it is felt that the available machinery of the United Nations family—including, in this context, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—must be allowed a reasonable time to become fully engaged in implementing the various proposals of the Conference. The co-sponsors, therefore, propose that the results achieved be examined ten months from now at the next session of the General Assembly. By then the Assembly should be in a position to judge them on their merits and set a course for further action, as may be appropriate. For that purpose, we suggest that the question of the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States be placed on the provisional agenda of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

107. Consequently, the Secretary-General is requested to submit for consideration at that session a comprehensive report on the action taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency in particular, as well as by the specialized agencies and other international bodies.

108. On the basis of that information and of the report of the group of experts, referred to in paragraph 8 of the draft resolution, the question of further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be fully discussed, with due regard to the special needs of the developing areas of the world.

109. Bearing in mind the availability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission at any time under its established procedure, the sponsors now make the specific recommendation to place the question of convening early in 1970 a meeting of that body on the provisional agenda of the next session of the General Assembly. Thus, a special emphasis is put on matters of disarmament which are, by their nature, closely interrelated with security problems.

110. I wish to voice the deep satisfaction of the six delegations which co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.450 in presenting draft resolution A/C.1/L.458 jointly with six other sponsors, including Mexico. We recognize with gratitude that the valuable advice and encouragement given by many other delegations, representing different areas, has been a strong incentive for the participants directly involved in the consultations to spare no effort to reach the common agreement that was clearly desired by a very large majority of the Committee.

111. I think I am not amiss in saying that the numerous informal discussions during the past weeks have been a stimulating experience for all concerned. We deeply appreciate the spirit of goodwill and the respect for the other side's views which prevailed during those consultations and ensured their successful conclusion.

112. Our sincere thanks go to all representatives who have contributed towards the present result, as partners in a common endeavour. While refraining from naming them

individually, I deem it proper to make an exception for you, Mr. Chairman, and to mention with gratitude the active part you have taken personally, in spite of the many burdens of your high office, in the later and decisive stages of our deliberations.

113. In conclusion, I join the previous speaker in expressing the hope that this Committee will give favourable consideration to draft resolution A/C.1/L.458 and endorse it unanimously.

114. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): I have the honour to submit to the Committee the two draft resolutions appearing in documents A/C.1/L.459 and A/C.1/L.460, respectively.

115. The first of them [A/C.1/L.459] is sponsored by twenty-six delegations from three continents: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, the Netherlands, Panama, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

116. Its purpose, as its text indicates, is to have the General Assembly reiterate the recommendation contained in resolution B of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7277, para. 17] concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and especially, the urgent appeal to the nuclear-weapon Powers "to comply fully with paragraph 4 of resolution 2286 (XXII)" adopted without a single dissenting vote by the Assembly itself more than a year ago, on 5 December 1967. It will be recalled that the paragraph "invites Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify" Additional Protocol II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or Treaty of Tlatelolco, "as soon [as] possible".

117. The second and third preambular paragraphs of our draft [A/C.1/L.459] set forth the main reasons why we feel it highly desirable for the Assembly to give its approval to the resolution we are now proposing.

118. The former underlines a point on which we are sure there is general agreement, namely "that the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons, on the initiative of the States situated within each zone concerned, is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass destruction and to promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament".

119. The latter preambular paragraph draws attention to a patent and incontrovertible fact, namely that "the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for signature on 14 February 1967, has already established a nuclear-weapon-free zone comprising territories densely populated by man".

120. The second of the draft resolutions [A/C.1/L.460] is sponsored by the following twenty-three delegations, again from Latin America, Asia and Europe: Austria, Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

121. As in the previous instance, the ideas set out concisely in the preamble to the draft indicate quite clearly the reasons why it seems to us highly advisable for the Assembly to adopt a resolution such as we are proposing. It is undeniable and axiomatic, especially in the light of the technical documents prepared for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at the request of the United Nations Secretary-General, and more particularly those prepared by Dr. Theo Ginsburg, Professor at the Federal Polytechnic College in Zurich,<sup>3</sup> and Dr. Ulf Ericsson, a member of the Swedish National Defence Research Institute,<sup>4</sup> that the utilization of explosive nuclear devices for peaceful purposes is bound to become extraordinarily important.

122. This again is something that calls for no proof, since as the records of the 1577th meeting of the First Committee show, the representatives of the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—the United States and the Soviet Union—explicitly stated on 31 May of this year that it would be convenient, as we stated in the third preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.460:

"... to initiate promptly the preparatory work for the determination of what appropriate principles and international procedures could be adopted in order that the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions might be made available, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."

123. In the light of the foregoing, we consider it essential that the solemn statements by the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be complied with and that in keeping with them, a start should be made on the preparatory work, which as was said at the time could be begun "before the Treaty [*on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*] comes into force" and with "the broadest possible participation of non-nuclear-weapon States" [1577th meeting, para. 155].

124. We feel that an appropriate procedure for the initial stage of that preparatory work might be to request the Secretary-General, as stated in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution:

"... to prepare, in consultation with the States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and with the co-operation of the latter and of those specialized agencies that he may consider pertinent, a report on the establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under appropriate international control."

125. Even though the provisions I have just cited are to our way of thinking sufficiently clear and precise, I would like to add a few words regarding their significance and scope so as to avoid any possibility of misinterpretation.

126. The consultation with Member States referred to in operative paragraph 1 could be arranged very easily. As we envisage it, the Secretary-General would proceed in the

<sup>3</sup> A/CONF.35/Doc.2 and Corr.1.

<sup>4</sup> A/CONF.35/Doc.3 and Corr.1.

usual way by sending the draft resolution to the States in question, specifying the deadline by which he should receive their comments if they are to be taken into account in the preparation of the report requested of him.

127. We are confident that the co-operation of the International Atomic Energy Agency would be given gladly and in a broadminded, constructive spirit, since IAEA, although not a specialized agency, does after all belong to what is usually called the "United Nations family"; and moreover, the work to be done is clearly of mutual interest to both the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This co-operation would, of course, be fitted in with the existing arrangements between the Secretariats of the United Nations and the Agency and might take the form, for example, of consultations at whatever level seemed appropriate and the dispatch to New York of such of the Agency's experts as its Director-General thought fit to send.

128. Several important aspects of the international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes whose establishment it is proposed to study, e.g. those relating to the application of safeguards and exclusively technical questions, undoubtedly come within the competence of the International Atomic Energy Agency; that explains why the draft resolution stipulates that the international service is to be established "within the framework" of the Agency. But there are other no less important aspects such as, to mention only one example, the relationship between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the partial prohibition of nuclear tests already in effect as a result of the Treaty of Moscow,<sup>5</sup> and that which we hope will be achieved by means of a treaty likewise designed to prohibit underground nuclear tests for military purposes—matters which it is evident are entirely within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

129. Because of this, and of the need for all States entitled to express their views on the matter—and their number is of course far larger than the number of members of the International Atomic Energy Agency—to be in a position to do so, it is obvious that the appropriate organ to supervise the preparation of the report requested in the draft resolution is the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

130. I hope that the above arguments may be helpful in elucidating the constructive aims—which we feel are entirely in keeping with the letter and the spirit of past resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on related matters—of the two draft resolutions I have mentioned [A/C.1/L.459 and A/C.1/L.460]. We trust they will be adopted, preferably unanimously or at least by as substantial a majority as possible, in the First Committee and the General Assembly.

## AGENDA ITEM 25

### The Korean question (*continued*):

#### (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/7212,

- A/C.1/966, 967, 968 and Corr.1 and 2, 970, 971, 972, 975, A/C.1/L.453 and Add.1);
- (b) Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/7182 and Add.1-4, A/C.1/966, 967, 968 and Corr.1 and 2, 970, 971, 972, 975, 977, 978, A/C.1/L.455 and Add.1);
- (c) Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations (A/7184 and Add.1 and 2, A/C.1/966, 967, 968 and Corr.1 and 2, 970, 971, 972, 975, 977, 978, A/C.1/L.454 and Add.1);
- (d) Need to put an end to the discussion in the United Nations on the unification of Korea (A/7227, A/C.1/977, 978, A/C.1/L.461)

131. The CHAIRMAN: We turn back now to the Korean question, item 25, and resume the general debate.

132. I call on the first speaker on the list, the representative of Romania.

133. Mr. DIACONESCU (Romania) (*translated from French*): It is a well-known fact that the principal aspiration of the peoples of the world today, an aspiration which is asserting itself with overwhelming force on the world scene, is to conquer their right to self-determination in accordance with their own wishes and interests, without foreign interference. This idea runs like a thread through the struggles of peoples for their national affirmation. It is a desideratum which is acquiring an ever broader audience on all continents, mobilizing and exalting the widest circles of world opinion.

134. Experience has shown that strict respect by all States for the right of every people to choose for itself, to choose the path to social and political development which corresponds to its will and aspirations, is an imperious demand of our time, on the attainment of which the improvement of the international situation and the prevention of a further war depend.

135. The inalienable right of every people to decide its fate for itself can be exercised only if, in relations between States and nations, there is strict respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty, equality, non-interference in domestic affairs and reciprocity of benefits. Only if these principles, which are the fundamental standards of international law and of the United Nations Charter, are observed can the spirit of equality and justice in relations among States be ensured. Their consistent promotion and their lasting establishment in international affairs are crucial for the development of mutual trust among States, for closer relations and friendship between peoples and for the development of peaceful co-operation and the maintenance and consolidation of world peace.

136. The United Nations must help actively to ensure that all States respect the fundamental principles of the Charter, recognized by Member States, to bring the international situation back to normal, to bring about a relaxation of tension, to promote co-operation, and to defend international peace and security. This means that the United Nations must itself serve as an example in affirming and consistently applying these principles. It is in this context

<sup>5</sup> Treaty banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed in Moscow, on 5 August 1963.



that my delegation approaches the matters we are now discussing, and it is in that light that we view the solution of these matters.

137. Unfortunately, this question, which has been regularly included on the agenda of the United Nations for more than twenty years—I am referring to the “Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea”—is one of the cases of flagrant violation of unanimously recognized principles of international law that runs counter to the objective processes of contemporary history and consequently jeopardizes the vital interests of peoples and endangers world peace. By its very substance and because of the hostile attitude that certain Member States continue to impose on the United Nations in regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a party directly concerned in the question of Korea, this question has within it three major contradictions.

138. First of all, the sponsors of this item repeatedly affirm in the United Nations that their insistence on the annual debate on the so-called “question of Korea” is dictated by their sincere concern to see Korea reunified on a peaceful and democratic basis. But a brief analysis of developments in South Korea since the Second World War leads to the obvious conclusion that it is not the reunification of Korea that prompts the efforts of the United States and certain other countries to perpetuate here in the United Nations a subject which belongs to a period that has now passed—that of the cold war. In the insistence of certain Powers to resume each year this debate on Korea, we may see their earnest desire to maintain the artificial division of Korea and to continue to use the name and the standard of the United Nations as a shield for the foreign military occupation régime established in South Korea during the early post-war years when the aggression against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was launched and then established finally after, and despite, the Armistice Agreement of 1953.<sup>6</sup>

139. The conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement did in fact open up the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the question of the unification of Korea. Paragraph 60 of the Agreement stipulates that:

“In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.”.

140. But shortly after the signature of the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953, the Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea<sup>7</sup> was concluded, which meant that South Korea would be indefinitely occupied by foreign military forces.

141. To ensure the complete cessation of hostilities in Korea, the Armistice Agreement also forbade the introduction into Korea of military personnel, operational aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, ammunition and other military reinforcing supplies during the cease-fire.

142. Paragraph 13 (c) of the Armistice Agreement stipulated that there should be rotation of the military personnel on a man-for-man basis; and paragraph 13 (d) stipulated that:

“combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type.”

143. Paragraph 13 (c) and (d) provided also that the rotation of military staff and the replacement of arms and war material could be effected only through the ports of entry enumerated in the Armistice Agreement and under the supervision of Inspection Teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

144. As we know, the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams were prevented from carrying out their functions; and in 1956 the Inspection Teams were forcibly expelled from South Korea.

145. In violation of the Armistice Agreement, a large quantity of war material was introduced into South Korea; and in 1956 the South Korean army strength was almost doubled.

146. In June 1957, one year after the expulsion from South Korea of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the United States occupation forces openly announced the unilateral annulment of paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement. It may be noted in this connexion that paragraph 61 of the Armistice Agreement stipulates:

“Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.”

While paragraph 62 clearly stipulates that:

“The articles and paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.”

147. Thus the Armistice Agreement could not possibly be arbitrarily amended or abolished by either side.

148. The unilateral revocation of paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement was followed by intensification of military preparation intended to transform the territory of Korea into a vast foreign military base equipped with the most up-to-date weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons and guided missiles, ultra-modern military aircraft and vessels of various sizes. At the same time, the hostile acts and provocations against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have become more frequent and more dangerous. As the Memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea dated 25 July 1968

<sup>6</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953*, document S/3079, appendix A.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 238 (1956), No. 3363.

emphasizes [see A/C.1/970], the acts of military provocation of various kinds and other violations of the Armistice Agreement perpetrated against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the day the Armistice Agreement was signed to July 1968 amounted to more than 59,800 cases, counting only those in which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea officially protested to the Armistice Commission. The illegal intrusion into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the vessel *Pueblo* in order to carry out espionage against the security of that country was only one of these hostile acts, and one of the more serious ones.

149. Because of these dangerous provocations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the situation in Korea has now become extremely tense and has deteriorated to the point where it is a real threat to the peace and security of the country, of Asia and of the entire world.

150. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always made every effort strictly to observe the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and to transform the Korean Armistice into a lasting peace. If the fair and reasonable proposals of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for a solution of the Korean question by the Korean people themselves, after the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, had been accepted and carried out, the whole of the Korean people would already be enjoying a free life in a sovereign and independent unified State.

151. But, in the present circumstances, it is difficult to claim to be acting in favour of the peaceful and democratic unification of Korea and at the same time to continue to strengthen the occupation of South Korea by foreign troops and to associate the Seoul régime in aggressive actions against the freedom of other peoples on the Asian continent.

152. The participation of the South Korean authorities in the war against the Viet-Nameese people who are waging a just and heroic struggle for their legitimate rights to self-determination, gives them no moral authority whatever to set themselves up as champions of Korean unification.

153. The opposition to extending an invitation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to send its representatives to take part in the discussion of a question which is of the utmost concern to it is further convincing proof of this.

154. The second argument which is put forward in this Committee by the sponsors of the so-called "question of Korea" is the attempt to convince us that the foreign troops in South Korea are United Nations forces.

155. During last year's debate, and in the present discussion, a number of delegations put forward convincing evidence of the complete absence of any connexion between the United Nations and the troops, armament, command or financing of the foreign troops in South Korea. These troops are in South Korea not to represent the United Nations in any way whatsoever, but to pursue a certain national policy, the objective and the presence of which in the region do not accord with the interests of the

Korean people, the interests of peace in the Far East, or the purposes and principles of the United Nations. For these reasons, it is our belief that it is in the basic interests of the United Nations no longer to allow its name and its standard to serve as a cover for United States troops and other foreign troops in South Korea.

156. Lastly, through the debate on the question of Korea, particularly in the absence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and through the so-called United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, attempts are being made to deprive the Korean people of one of the fundamental attributes of their sovereignty, namely, their inalienable right to decide themselves on the problems of their national development, including the question of the unification of their country.

157. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always maintained that the question of national unification is a domestic matter concerning only the Koreans, that the Koreans should settle this matter quite independently without any interference from foreign forces, on a democratic and peaceful basis. Not being empowered to assume responsibilities which can properly be exercised only by States, the aforesaid United Nations Commission has, over the years, been entrusted with the unenviable role of serving as United Nations cover for the troops and military bases imposed on the people of South Korea.

158. For the foregoing reasons the Socialist Republic of Romania is resolutely in favour of the withdrawal from South Korea of all United States and other foreign troops now stationed there as "United Nations forces". The withdrawal of these troops will enable the Korean people freely to express their will. The result would be to remove the main obstacle to a solution of the problem of the unification of Korea.

159. Romania also feels that the interests of the Korean people and of the United Nations itself require that an end be put to the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and also to the discussion of the question of Korea in the United Nations.

160. In conformity with this position, the Romanian delegation is happy to be a sponsor of the three draft resolutions submitted on the three subjects to which I have been referring [A/C.1/L.454 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.455 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.461].

161. The adoption of those draft resolutions and their implementation would open the way to real progress towards the unification of Korea on a democratic basis and through peaceful means.

162. The concern of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as regards the achievement of the unification of Korea is well known. It has always maintained that a unified, democratic central Government must be set up by means of free general elections held in the North and South by the Korean people themselves without any foreign interference, after the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. As we know, there is no foreign army in the northern half of Korea. The general elections

throughout the North and the South must be held in conditions where all political parties, all mass organizations and all individuals in the North and the South of Korea may be able to engage in their political activities and to be free to go to any part of North or South Korea.

163. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has also proposed the reduction of the strength of the army in the North and South of Korea to 100,000 each or to a lower figure, after the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea and that a peace treaty should be concluded stipulating that the two parties would not have recourse to armed force against one another.

164. In the face of opposition to these proposals, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has suggested a series of formulae for a gradual approach to complete unification through a series of intermediate steps, beginning with the solution of all urgent problems at the national level. The proposal to bring into effect the confederation of the North and the South of Korea was one such transitory measure. This confederation would develop political, economic, cultural and social ties and co-operation between the two parts, the North and the South of Korea, while leaving the existing political systems established in North and South Korea as they are for the present.

165. If this proposal too cannot be accepted, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has maintained that at least economic and cultural exchanges should take place and that there should be free movement of persons between the North and the South.

166. As emphasized in the Memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 18 July 1968 [see A/C.1/971], that Government still believes that an international conference of countries concerned could be convened if necessary for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

167. The Romanian delegation is deeply convinced that the adoption this time of a constructive attitude to the questions before us will help to break the deadlock over the problem of the restoration of Korean national unity, a deadlock which has persisted for many years now. The United Nations would thus be making a great contribution to the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Korean people, to the defence of the right of peoples to self-determination, and to peace and security in Asia and everywhere else in the world. At the same time, this would help considerably to strengthen the prestige and authority of the United Nations at a historic moment when its need of such help is so great.

168. The CHAIRMAN: Before giving the floor to the next speaker on my list, I should like to explain to the Committee the situation in which we find ourselves. I should very much like to spare it the inconvenience of a night meeting. I am informed by the Secretariat that we can go on till 6.45 p.m. and after that we would not have interpreters. We still have two speakers on our list. I think we can go on until 6.45 and then again resume at 8.30. If we do not complete the list of speakers, we shall have a few speakers left for Monday morning. Unfortunately we will have to have this meeting tonight in order to give the floor

to some of the speakers on the list. This is the position as I see it and I think we must follow the programme that I have outlined.

169. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation, as is known, objected to the inclusion of the so-called Korean question in the agenda of the present session of the General Assembly. We have always considered the affairs of Korea as internal problems of the Korean people. Consequently it is not for the United Nations to engage in discussions on the problems of the unification of temporarily divided Korea. For this reason my delegation has supported the inclusion in our agenda of the item proposed by the delegation of Cuba, intended to put an end to the annual discussions on Korea. May I say in passing that the decision to consider this proposal along with the issues resulting from the illegal United Nations intervention in the affairs of Korea is both arbitrary and without logic. The situation is even more abnormal, since the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are prevented from participating in our debate.

170. The annual discussions on Korea serve no useful purpose, as the problems discussed here are not within the competence of the United Nations. We are required to debate these issues not in order to serve any United Nations objectives but to further the strategic interests of the United States. Our debates and the decisions that the Assembly takes on Korea provide the necessary cover for the presence of the United States occupation forces in South Korea. These foreign forces in turn serve to prop up an unpopular régime which, willingly and in a most docile manner, consents to any policy that the United States military authorities deem advisable. That policy has been outlined in the statement we have heard from the representative of the United States in this debate. What we are expected to do is to put the seal of the United Nations on such policies and thereby legalize the continued occupation of South Korea by the United States forces fifteen years after the end of the aggressive war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

171. The policy of the United States as practised in Korea is part and parcel of its Asian policy. That policy practically boils down to a refusal to face the realities in Asia. This has been amply demonstrated during this session by the American attitude concerning the representation of China, to quote only one example. We understand that it is not easy to accept the failure of a policy consistently followed for decades. But it is hard for a great Power to admit, when the painful need to revise unrealistic and mistaken policies is so evident, that the remedy is more of the same. When we are told of exponents of United States policies with regard to Korea that their attitude is unchanged—let me add after twenty years of utter failure—we are shocked and justly so. Can these speakers not realize that this argument is the very indictment of their policies? One would surely expect great Powers to learn something from their own mistakes and failures.

172. One would hope that the bankrupt policy of seeking everywhere identification with the oppressive, unpopular régimes on the Asian continent would be revised. The fact that this policy is now bankrupt is recognized by everyone inside and outside the United States. Yet we are told that

what has proved to be a failure should be not only continued but endorsed by the United Nations. We feel that Members of the United Nations which take the trouble to form their own judgement on these matters and do not content themselves with taking the ready-made solution provided by the United States cannot but reject this time-worn, "cold war" approach which that country wants us to endorse.

173. I have already stressed that the role that the United States reserves to the United Nations is something which the Members of the Organization cannot be proud of. It is really humiliating for an Organization composed of 126 Member States to act as a department of the United States. This identification between our Organization and United States political objectives is a remnant of the "cold war", and it is high time to put an end to it. This is what the Cuban proposal wishes to accomplish.

174. But there is another aspect of the utilization of the United Nations by the makers of American foreign policy. The role ascribed to us is not only unworthy of this body, but incapacitates the United Nations. It is not necessary to elaborate on how this American policy has disqualified the United Nations for dealing effectively with the problems of Asia and the Far East. I would go even further and ask: have the leaders of the United States ever considered whether this tendency of theirs really serves, in the long run, the national interests of their country? I feel that it is not for my delegation to give an answer to this question. The experience of recent events is there with the conclusions which those primarily concerned can draw from them.

175. We have heard a great deal in this and in previous discussions about the role which UNCURK is supposed to play with regard to Korea. This role is determined by the endeavour to use the United Nations as an instrument of United States national policy. It is one of the late survivors of similar "cold war" bodies set up to serve as international cover organizations acting against the socialist countries. If anyone has any doubt on that score, a glance at the composition of this body will suffice.

176. In one way or another, its Members are military allies of the United States although we should not forget that even in such circumstances one Asian Member did not sign the report of the Commission. But apart from this, to suppose that these ties allow the Members—even if they wished—to take an unbiased attitude on Korea is nonsense. They are members of UNCURK in order to present to us the American version of their subject matter. This, we have to concede, they have done with industry and care. It is not their fault if the result is something that does not strengthen, but rather weakens the cause which they have set out to serve.

177. What is the subject matter that they deal with? I would merely enumerate some of the chapters as they appear in this document. Under chapter II, "Political development and external relations of the Republic of Korea", we read the following headings: Executive; Legislature; Political parties; Statements on foreign policy; Diplomatic and consular relations; etc. Under chapter III, "Economic development of the Republic of Korea", we read the following headings: Rate of economic growth;

Production trends—Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing and energy; Investment; Government finances; Money supply; Consumer price behaviour, etc., etc. I have read out these headings from the report to show what we are told to consider as matters of concern to the United Nations. This enumeration shows clearly that all these are matters relating to the internal affairs of a State.

178. I wish in this connexion to ask the authors of the report how they think that their report is compatible with Article 2 (7) of the Charter, which expressly prohibits the United Nations from intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. Are the executive, the political parties, the production trends in agriculture and industry, the money supply of a given State, within its domestic jurisdiction or not? Is it the responsibility of the United Nations to deal with them, as the authors of the report contend it is, or is it, as the Charter contends, not the responsibility of the United Nations? When my country stated that the discussion of this matter in the United Nations was an impermissible intervention in the domestic affairs of the Korean nation, we were told that we were denying the competence of the United Nations to act in the Korean question within the terms of the Charter. But are the matters to which I referred, and many others to which I did not, within the competence of this Organization according to the Charter?

179. The conclusion is clear and inescapable. The activities of UNCURK are nothing but a crude violation of the Charter. The mere existence of that body violates the letter and spirit of the Charter. It would be interesting to know if any Member State is prepared to let the United Nations discuss its internal political structure, its economic policies, and so on. It would be equally interesting to know whether any Member State in UNCURK would welcome United Nations inquiries into its electoral processes, sometimes accompanied by gunfire resulting in dozens of deaths. Member States would probably strongly oppose such interference in their domestic affairs, and rightly so. But why do they engage in similar ventures concerning Korea? The answer is simple: those who do so are military allies of the United States and are thus required to serve its strategic interests.

180. The fact that the South Korean régime willingly complied with such a humiliating inspection of its internal affairs speaks more of this régime and its much praised sovereignty than anything we could say. The fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea resolutely refuses to have anything to do with UNCURK is also sufficiently indicative of its sovereignty. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a sovereign socialist country which has become strong in a constant struggle waged for its sovereign existence against systematic attempts at intervention in its internal affairs. The slanders about it which the report of UNCURK contains and the slanders that are spread in this discussion are outworn repetitions of old "cold war" propaganda.

181. Nothing can change the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is one of the leading industrial nations of Asia. It is a proud, independent socialist State which, unlike the South Korean régime, is not relying on a foreign military presence. It is a State which has throughout



the years made a series of proposals to bring the two parts of Korea closer. References have already been made in this discussion to those proposals. To spare the time of the Committee, I do not propose to go into details. It is clear that, if there is no progress in the unification of Korea, it is due to the stubborn resistance of the South Korean régime. That régime has been created and is being maintained to serve the purposes of American policies in the Far East. That is its *raison d'être*, and that presupposes the continued division of Korea.

182. Recently the provocations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, coming from United States military personnel stationed under the cover of the United Nations in South Korea and their South Korean mercenaries, have dangerously increased. Some revealing figures have been quoted in our discussion in this regard. The mission of the spy ship *Pueblo* is a case in point. The United Nations must not underestimate the dangers of this situation. Our Organization has nothing to do with bankrupt, imperialistic policies which cannot but result in the increase of tension in that area. All this makes it imperative that the American and other foreign armed forces now stationed in South Korea under the aegis of the United Nations, but which maintain no connexion with our Organization, should be withdrawn. It is for that reason that my delegation has joined several other socialist, Asian and African Member States in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.454 and Add.1 on the withdrawal of foreign mercenary forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations. The complete lack of official ties of those forces with the United Nations has been amply demonstrated not only during this discussion but also in a document<sup>8</sup> which was submitted by the United States Mission to the United Nations in a so-called report of the United States Military Command in South Korea, using the United Nations merely as a cover to mislead the unsuspecting reader. The biased content and the form of that document clearly reveal that it has nothing to do with the United Nations. The report, signed by a United States Government official, does not mention having received any direction or instruction from the United Nations, the Secretary-General or the General Staff Committee. It is thus just another proof of blatant United States military intervention in the already otherwise tense area of the Far East.

183. In the report of UNCURK and in some of the statements here, repeated accusations have been made to the effect that the resistance struggle of the population of South Korea against the oppressive régime maintained there by the occupation forces of the United States is inspired from the North. Stories about subversive agents sent from the North are spread here to explain the growing resistance of the people of South Korea. We had expected that after similar stories about another Asian country had been exposed as pure fabrication we should be spared their repetition. But apparently the temptation which that theory of outside agents provides to their authors seems to be too strong to be resisted. We can only register our regret that the exponents of similar theories do not properly appreciate the self-defeating nature of their efforts.

<sup>8</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-third Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1968*, document S/8839.

184. Are we really expected to believe that unemployment and oppression do not engender resistance, and that social progress is just a subversive idea which always comes from abroad? We should have thought that similar unsuccessful fables would not be pressed in that Asian country where that theory had once led to tragic consequences. The resistance in South Korea is the product of local conditions of terror, unemployment and oppression. In this connexion, it is not out of place to point out that the abduction of leading South Korean intellectuals from several countries of Western Europe by South Korean secret agents and their subsequent trials ending with death sentences, which resulted in world-wide protest and indignation, did not get into the UNCURK report, which extolled the virtues of that so-called democracy.

185. All this makes it clear that the United Nations must stop its interference in the affairs of the people of Korea. The American draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.453 and Add.1 wishes to continue and even to intensify that division. It seeks to extend the so-called good offices of the United Nations. But who asked for those good offices? The South Korean puppets, yes; but not the Korean people and their legal Government, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Here again we find this strange concept of offering good offices to one side.

186. Certain speakers have attempted to show that they seek the co-operation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But those very same Members voted to prevent its representatives from participating in this discussion. Is this the spirit of co-operation they seek from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea?

187. The solution does not lie in the catch-phrases that we have heard here and that we find in the American draft resolution. That is the way that leads nowhere, as the history of this unfortunate problem convincingly shows. It is not more of the same that is required. It is a change, an end to the intervention in the affairs of Korea that is required. We must leave those affairs to the Koreans themselves, and we have to give them every help and assistance to find solutions to their problems. The proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea show the way towards that end. Such an approach presupposes the dissolution of that cold war organ, the United Nations Commission, et cetera. That is why I invite members of this Committee to vote for the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.455 and Add.1, proposing the dissolution of UNCURK, and the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.461, formally proposing to put an end to these sterile and harmful discussions on Korea.

*Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

188. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): At this session, the General Assembly, in addition to the question of the withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations, on which my delegation has stated its position, is also considering other important questions relating to Korea. The item "Dissolution of the United Nations



Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" is being discussed on the initiative of a large group of African, Asian and socialist countries, and the item entitled "Need to put an end to the discussion in the United Nations on the unification of Korea", on the proposal of the Cuban delegation. My delegation is convinced that the implementation of those proposals would mean a long step towards the peaceful political settlement of the Korean question, and it therefore supports them.

189. These are important questions, directly affecting the vital interests of the Korean people which sincerely desires peace and the reunification of its divided homeland, the southern part of which has been under foreign occupation for fifteen years now. That the foreign forces occupying South Korea are using the flag and other attributes of the United Nations cannot disguise the true facts, which have long been clear to everyone. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is nothing but a tool being used by imperialist Powers for interfering in the affairs of the Korean people, legitimizing and perpetuating the foreign occupation of South Korea, and creating obstacles in the way of the peaceful unification of the country on a democratic basis by the Korean people itself. Is that not the reason for the annual discussion of this Commission's reports at sessions of the General Assembly? What other reason is there? These reports and the annual discussion thereof furnish the basis for attempts, in contravention of the fundamental provisions and principles of the United Nations Charter, to press through unlawful resolutions—which meet the wishes of the United States of America and the accessories to its aggression in Korea—calling for the continuation of United States occupation of South Korea and of the activities of the notorious Commission I have mentioned.

190. Because of these unlawful acts, no progress has been made towards unification and the restoration of peace in Korea, despite more than twenty years of discussions of the so-called "Korean question". On the contrary, new obstacles and difficulties are created to prevent the Korean people from achieving its fondest aspirations, and the situation is again made worse.

191. Discussions of the questions relating to Korea at the preceding and present sessions have demonstrated that a growing number of Member States are becoming aware of the unsavoury role being played by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and of the fact that its existence is not merely one of the principal obstacles to the unification of Korea, but does harm to the United Nations, whose partiality in the matter of South Korea's occupation cannot but reflect on its prestige and authority.

192. Proof of this is offered by even a cursory examination of the reports which the Commission submits to the General Assembly every year.

193. The Commission's most recent contribution—its report to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly—is characteristic of all the years of its activity. In it, as in preceding reports, two elements clearly stand out. The first is that the Commission misrepresents and blackens everything relating to that peace-loving and flourishing socialist

State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the second is that it embellishes, excuses and praises whatever relates to the activities of the Seoul puppet régime and the United States occupation forces.

194. The Commission's partial and hostile attitude towards anything having to do with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea betrays itself at every step, from the fact that in the Commission's report the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is always called "north Korea" to the slanderous attacks on that country's policy which being on the very first pages.

195. Guided by a sincere desire to achieve unity and peace in the land of Korea, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has time and again submitted clearly and unambiguously formulated proposals for a peaceful political settlement in Korea.

196. This consistent policy has been once again confirmed in that Government's Memorandum of 18 July 1968 [A/C.1/971], which states, *inter alia*:

"There is no change, whether in the past or now, in the fundamental stand of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for maintaining peace in Korea and solving to the end the question of the unification of Korea independently on a democratic basis and by peaceful means".

197. As everyone knows, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has proposed and has been consistently pressing for the implementation of a truly pacific and democratic programme for the solution of the Korean problem and attainment of the country's unification.

198. It has also made a number of proposals aimed at settling urgent questions of concern to the entire nation and making gradual progress towards full unification.

199. It has proclaimed its readiness, if necessary, to participate in an international conference of the countries concerned with a view to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and also to consult about any proposals, no matter who may put them forward, if the proposals proceed from the principles of rejecting outside interference and unifying the country independently.

200. These proposals are set forth in detail in that Government's memoranda of 18 and 25 July 1968, circulated here as documents A/C.1/971 and A/C.1/970.

201. It might be thought that anyone who was really desirous of seeing a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the peaceful unification of Korea would welcome these pacific proposals. But that was not the case. That is not how the authors of the Commission's report conceive their task. They feel for some reason that they, members of the Commission—and they are, to be precise, Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey—know better than the Korean people itself how the problem of Korean unification should be solved.

202. Why should they think so? Whence this certainty that they understand Korean affairs better than the Korean

people does? And why, moreover, should they believe that the Korean people will allow them to take part in solving its domestic problems? How did the members of the Commission develop this viewpoint? There is no basis for it either in the United Nations Charter or in the principles governing relations among States.

203. After a few sparse citations from the official statements of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea putting forward a programme for the peaceful unification of Korea without foreign interference, as early as in paragraph 14 of its report the Commission levels the slanderous charge that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea attempts "to undermine the security and well-being of the Republic of Korea and its people" and concludes that the occupation of South Korea by imperialist forces and the activities of the Commission itself must continue. Here is a servility that knows no bounds. Yet this is presented to us as the expression of the views of an impartial organ of the United Nations. These reports are circulated, and we are asked to discuss them, to what end I cannot conceive. Impartiality and a serious approach to the question are thus unblushingly made mock of.

204. As in previous years, the report lavishes praise on the Seoul puppet régime, that enemy of its own people, and says not a word about the suffering and hardship inflicted on the freedom-loving people of South Korea by foreign occupation.

205. It is surely no secret to anyone what the South Korean régime, which the Commission so highly commends, is really like. It came to power as a result of a coup by a military clique, which drowned in blood the protests of the South Korean people, who had previously objected to the equally corrupt clique of Syngman Rhee. The Commission used to sing the praises of the Syngman Rhee régime, and now it tries to represent that of Park Chung Hee as the very epitome of democracy. But it is a matter of common knowledge that the elections held in South Korea, with a view to providing a democratic façade for the military régime, were accompanied by such unbridled acts of terror, forgery, fraud and illegality that they have become a synonym for the very opposite of the free expression of a people's will.

206. There is not one objective, truthful statement in the Commission's report regarding the real character of the dictatorship of South Korean generals, who are the enemies of their own people. Not one word is said about the fact that, with the aid of the occupation forces, the South Korean people are being subjected to neo-colonialist oppression and exploitation. South Korea's economy has become a highly profitable target for foreign capital investment, a source of new riches for the monopolies of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, which in 1966-1967 accounted for 75 to 90 per cent of the entire influx of capital investment. At the same time, even the manipulated data given in the report show that the level of wages, particularly for workers in export industries, is the lowest of all the countries in the region. The Seoul puppet clique, maintained in power by foreign bayonets, acts as the agent of its transoceanic masters and obediently carries out their orders. At Washington's behest, this clique has sent 50,000 South Korean soldiers to shed their blood

in the aggressive war being waged by United States imperialism against the people of Viet-Nam.

207. The whole world is cursing and condemning that dirty war; and the authors of the Commission's report say with Olympian calm that during the period under review, South Korea "maintained the level of its troops in Viet-Nam". The members of the Commission apparently did not have the courage to call a spade a spade.

208. The Seoul puppet clique takes merciless revenge on the South Koreans who engage in a just patriotic struggle for national existence and the peaceful unification of their country. South Korean patriots who protest against the reign of terror of the clique of corrupt traitors and foreign occupation forces and who advocate unification and peace in Korea are persecuted and exterminated. To justify these criminal acts, systematic use is made of the cynical lie—which, strange as it may seem, is also disseminated in the Commission's report—that the patriotic struggle of Koreans in South Korea is an activity engaged in by people "sent from the North". South Korea is drowning in war psychosis, espionage mania, and savage reprisals. Reprisals through the courts have become so common that even the Commission felt obliged to mention them, however briefly, in its latest report.

209. As may be seen from that report, the Commission has become a mouthpiece of the occupation forces and the South Korean military. It has sunk so low as to try to justify the action taken by the puppet régime to expand its punitive organs—the police, the secret police, and the intelligence service—and to make military preparations in South Korea, such as again raising the level of its armed forces and equipping them with the latest United States weapons, creating a large reserve force, building military bases, airfields, launching pads, etc.

210. In this report, the Commission takes pleasure in retelling, in versions supplied by the United States Command, the armed incidents which are provoked nearly every day by the United States military along the Armistice Demarcation Line and in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Commission can find nothing better to do than blindly follow the lead of the United States military and repeat its slanderous fabrications concerning that country, the purpose being to whitewash the true culprits as regards the provocations and the dangerous heightening of tension in Korea.

211. As the Cambodian representative has pointed out, the Commission has gone so far in distorting the facts as to attempt to place the responsibility for that dangerous act of United States provocation—the sending of the spy ship *Pueblo* into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with hostile intent—on the People's Republic itself. Moreover, the Commission presented this version after the whole world had become aware of the true facts and of the documented admissions of the *Pueblo's* Captain concerning the ship's spying activities in the territorial waters of the above-mentioned country.

212. If anyone should be in doubt regarding what the *Pueblo* was doing close to the shores of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, if anyone is not yet aware of

the spying it engaged in, we should be glad to give the members of the First Committee—including United States representatives—a showing of the film of a press conference held by Captain Bucher and members of the *Pueblo's* crew with a large number of foreign correspondents. This film was kindly made available to us by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Viewing films that have a bearing on agenda items is, of course, a widespread practice in the United Nations. Thus, the Fourth Committee at this session saw films relating to the liberation struggle of the peoples of Portuguese colonies, while the Special Political Committee was shown a film on the situation of Palestinian Arab refugees. We would gladly invite the members of the First Committee to see the film of the press conference given by Captain Bucher and members of the *Pueblo's* crew. I am sure we can arrange a time and place for the showing with the Committee's officers. Perhaps even the representatives of the States members of the notorious Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea will then have a better realization of the burden they lay upon their conscience in following the lead of United States propaganda regarding the *Pueblo* incident, how far they depart from the truth, whose interests they reflect in the corresponding passage of the report, and what dangerous purposes are served by the inclusion in United Nations documents of such falsified versions of incidents in the course of which certain Powers create a threat to international peace and security.

213. The Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 25 November 1968 very properly draws attention to these shameful aspects of the Commission's activity. This Memorandum, which has just been issued as an official document of the United Nations [A/C.1/977] and circulated to delegations today, presents the true facts concerning the political and economic situation in South Korea and draws attention to the increase in recent months of armed provocations by United States and South Korean forces against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea along the 38th Parallel and off Korean shores, provocations which threaten to set off another war in the region at any moment. This important document also contains a reaffirmation of the unchanged policy of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to continue to work for the peaceful unification of Korea on a democratic basis by the Korean people itself, without foreign interference.

214. In reading the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, one can hardly avoid the impression that the Commission is playing the unsavoury role of a propaganda organ of the United States Military Command in Korea, so tendentious and biased is its treatment of the facts. With all due respect, that is a role unworthy of a United Nations organ and of the States composing it.

215. Furthermore, in the Commission's report the military preparations of the South Korean régime and the provocative and aggressive acts of United States and South Korean armed forces against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are described in so approving a tone that the Commission, objectively speaking, is acting as an instigator. Its attitude cannot but be described as constituting ap-

proval and incitement of the unbridled acts of United States and South Korean militarists. How long, may I ask, will States Members of the United Nations agree to the Commission, which is formally a United Nations organ, playing a role which is designed to please a certain imperialist Power and its allies in Korean aggression but which is harmful to the Korean people and dangerous for peace in Korea and the Far East, a role which is fundamentally opposed to the purposes and principles of the United Nations? The Commission's activity reflects discredit on the United Nations, prevents the Korean people from doing what it wants to do, and obstructs the establishment of a durable peace in the Far East.

216. As experience has shown, the annual discussion of the Korean question on the basis of the Commission's reports is a senseless pastime; and it is also a harmful one, since the purposes pursued by the Commission have nothing in common with the establishment of peace in the land of Korea.

217. There is in general no reason for the United Nations to deal with the so-called "Korean question", i.e., the question of the unification of Korea. That unification is exclusively an internal matter for the Korean people itself to settle. I would say more: it is a matter which can be settled by the Korean people only if there is no interference from outside, including interference under the cover of the United Nations.

218. If the United Nations really wants to see the peaceful unification of Korea, the only proper course for it to follow is that of strict observance of the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs and respect for the right of the Korean people to decide its own destiny.

219. The "Korean question", i.e., the question of the unification of Korea, will be solved when the United Nations demonstrates its wisdom and summons the strength to withstand the attempts of the United States to continue its occupation of South Korea under the flag of the United Nations and making use of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to justify that occupation.

220. In speaking of the nature of this Commission's activities and the misleading reports it manufactures, I cannot but express surprise at the fact that among the members of this disreputable organ, along with States which are allies of the United States in Korean aggression, are also States which, although perhaps not always consistently, oppose aggression and defend the principles of the Charter in many other cases.

221. My delegation finds it difficult to understand why these States, whose independent and constructive policy on a number of international issues has won them general respect, should take what I can only call a pro-imperialist attitude with regard to the Korean question. My delegation would like to ask them what they are doing in that Commission, whether they are aware of the part they are being made to play, and whether they realize whose interests they really serve by remaining members of the Commission. The question at issue, after all, is the fate of an entire people whose rights are being trampled underfoot

by an imperialist Power; it is peace and security in the Far East.

222. The USSR delegation expresses the hope that the majority of the States Members of the United Nations will evaluate the situation correctly and will have the courage to remove the obstacles in the way of a peaceful unification of Korea in the interests of the Korean people as a whole. One such obstacle is, beyond doubt, the activity of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and another is examination in the United Nations of the question of the unification of Korea—an examination which is carried out against the wishes of the Korean people.

223. There is one way in which the United Nations could make a contribution to the political settlement of the Korean problem and the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East. This way is indicated in the proposals of the socialist, African and Asian countries submitted at the current session. The General Assembly can and must, at this very session, adopt resolutions calling for the withdrawal of United States and other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations, cessation of all foreign interference in the Korean people's affairs, dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and an end to the discussion of the unification of Korea in the United Nations.

224. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I have only one more speaker on my list for this meeting.

225. I would like to inform the Committee that the speakers scheduled for tonight's meeting have been consulted and that most of them are not ready to speak. The Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Vinci, has been consulted about this, and he has asked me to inform the Committee that in his view, bearing this fact in mind, the meeting scheduled for tonight should be cancelled.

226. In addition, the Chairman thinks that the meeting scheduled for Monday, 16 December, should begin at 10 a.m. instead of 10.30 a.m. and that the afternoon meeting will probably have to start half an hour earlier than usual.

227. I hope the Committee agrees with the Chairman and with what I have just said.

*It was so agreed.*

228. Mr. PANYARACHUN (Thailand): In spite of the persistent and tedious efforts of some delegations to rewrite their own version of the historical account of Korea and its association with the United Nations, the First Committee on 27 November adopted, in an impressive manner, a resolution which took into account the views of the Republic of Korea and North Korea in regard to the United Nations and its Charter, and accordingly decided to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion of the Korean question. The Committee, while rightly firm in principle, maintains a flexible and conciliatory attitude in reaffirming its willingness to invite a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea provided it first unequivocally accepts the compe-

tence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter. Two weeks have passed since the adoption of the invitation resolution, and nowhere did we see any indication or hint from North Korea of its intention to conform to the general wishes of the international community. Its intransigent stand and hostile behaviour towards the United Nations remain consistent and unaffected. Hence it has willingly and unilaterally forfeited its right to participate in the debate on the Korean question on the same footing as a representative of the Republic of Korea. The responsibility for its not being here with us therefore rests upon it and it alone.

229. The deliberate absence of the principal patrons of North Korea in the Committee from the beginning of our debate on the morning of 11 December is indeed an extension of North Korea's provocative and disruptive frame of mind.

230. My delegation wishes to extend its most sincere welcome to Mr. Kyu Hah Choi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, to the First Committee. We also welcomed the opportunity to hear his positive and informative statement the other day which, in our view, was an important contribution to our discussion of the Korean question. His remarks have further confirmed the peaceful intent and constructive objectives of his Government. We are gratified to be reassured of his country's continuing support of the United Nations efforts to bring about a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of Government as well as its positive and co-operative attitude towards the United Nations.

231. In my intervention on 26 November [*1621st meeting*] on the invitation aspect of the Korean question, my delegation related the historical circumstances which made the United Nations association with Korea inevitable and the current events which make the present relationship a continuing necessity.

232. I traced back the origin of the United Nations involvement in Korea resulting from the Soviet Union's decision to maintain her occupation forces in the northern half of Korea, followed by her establishing a North Korean régime, which would act as a façade. The United Nations was only brought in after other attempts, including the completed withdrawal of the United States forces from South Korea, to achieve a unified democratic and independent Korea had failed.

233. In accordance with a General Assembly resolution [*resolution 112 (II)*] adopted in 1947, free and impartial elections, supervised by the United Nations Commission, took place in South Korea. No such event was allowed to take place in the northern part of Korea. On the basis of the valid expression of the free will of the Korean people, the Government of the Republic of Korea was declared by the General Assembly to be "the only such Government in Korea". [*See resolution 195 (III), operative para. 2.*]

234. Then came the invasion of South Korea from the North in June 1950. The report of the United Nations Commission sent to the General Assembly makes the following assessment:

"The invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea by the armed forces of the North Korean authorities, which began on 25 June 1950, was an act of aggression initiated without warning and without provocation, in execution of a carefully prepared plan.

"This plan of aggression, it is now clear, was an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities, the object of which was to secure control over the whole of Korea. If control could not be gained by peaceful means, it would be achieved by overthrowing the Republic of Korea, either by undermining it from within or, should that prove ineffective, by resorting to direct aggression. As the methods used for undermining the Republic from within proved unsuccessful, the North Korean authorities launched an invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea."<sup>9</sup>

235. These were the actual words of the Chairman of the United Nations Commission who, incidentally, was Anup Singh of India. The representative of New Zealand had the occasion to remind us recently that the late Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, cast no doubt on the integrity of his representative, nor on the finding which the Commission made under the chairmanship of that representative.

236. This is the background of past events which culminated in the passing of Security Council resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950 which, *inter alia*, determines that there was an armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, notes the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security, and recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in that area.

237. The United Nations forces, because of the aggression committed by North Korea, were sent to Korea in accordance with the United Nations resolutions. They were sent there at the request and with the knowledge of the Government of the Republic of Korea. Unlike a recent event in the other part of the world where the stationing of about 600,000 foreign and ironically allied troops failed to uncover the imaginary person who was supposed to have made the request for assistance, in the present case we have here with us the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea to testify to the fact that his Government's request was made before the action was taken. In addition, he reconfirmed in his statement to the First Committee that the presence of the United Nations forces on the soil of the Republic of Korea is in the best interest of the Korean people and world peace. The greater part of those United Nations forces, having successfully repelled the North Korean aggression, have been withdrawn and the remaining forces continue to be in the Republic of Korea at the request of that Government. The presence of the United Nations remaining forces continues to be welcomed by the Government of the Republic of Korea.

238. These forces will be withdrawn whenever such action is requested by the Republic of Korea or whenever

conditions for a lasting settlement formulated by the General Assembly have been fulfilled.

239. The United Nations, as members of this Committee will recall, played an active role not only in bringing about the establishment of the Republic of Korea but also in organizing successful resistance against aggression from the North in 1950. Furthermore, over the past twenty years the United Nations has been helping the war-torn country to develop into a land where the people can now enjoy life in peace, freedom and abundance. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the survival and growth of the Republic of Korea are intimately associated with the United Nations. We all know of the remarkably fast rate of development that the Republic of Korea has achieved in the past decade. Through its own efforts, the Republic of Korea has deservedly proved to be a model showcase for Asia. Its prestige and international activities have been further enhanced by its progressive and forward-looking policies which are based on the concept of international and regional co-operation.

240. The report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) [A/7212] is before our Committee for consideration. UNCURK, as is known to everyone, was established by General Assembly resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950, to assume the functions previously exercised by the United Nations Commission on Korea. It will be recalled that pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2269 (XXII) of 16 November 1967, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea was given a fresh mandate "to intensify its efforts" to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, namely, "to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area", and "to continue to carry out the tasks previously assigned to it".

241. In response to that General Assembly resolution of 1967, the United Nations Commission reports that on 31 July 1968, it broadcast a message in which it appealed for the co-operation of all Korean leaders in exercising restraint and contributing to an easing of tension between North and South Korea and reaffirmed its readiness to co-operate with all leaders of the Korean people, to assist them in every possible way and to give full consideration to any fresh proposals or new approaches conducive to the achievement of the unification of Korea. While the Republic of Korea promptly issued a statement the next day, reaffirming its respect for the General Assembly resolution and its readiness to co-operate with the Commission in its efforts to attain the objectives of the United Nations, there was no similar response from the North Korean authorities to the Commission's appeal for co-operation. [See A/7212, paras. 23, 24 and 25.]

242. In their usual and typically aggressive language, the North Korean authorities, instead, alleged that UNCURK "puts up the United Nations emblem and acts entirely contrary to the United Nations Charter" [*ibid.*, annex III] and demanded the dissolution of UNCURK as well as reaffirming its rejection of any role by the United Nations in the solution of the Korean question.

<sup>9</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16*, paras. 202 and 203.



243. If the North Koreans really mean it when they say that they want to unify the country peacefully and on a democratic basis, why should they object to the procedures available to them through the United Nations? As long as there is no other satisfactory answer to this question, my delegation is convinced that UNCURK should continue to carry out the tasks assigned to it and that the framework of principle laid down by the General Assembly for the peaceful unification of Korea should remain unchanged.

244. The obstacle to the peaceful unification of Korea is not UNCURK, but the aggressive and destructive attitude and policies of North Korea.

245. Should the present United Nations forces be withdrawn or UNCURK dissolved, as North Korea and some members of this Committee demand, the Republic of Korea would be vulnerable to renewed aggression from North Korea, which continues to maintain its military strength, estimated at some 345,000 men—far beyond the number stipulated in the Armistice Agreement of 1953<sup>10</sup>—and which still pursues its declared aggressive policy by words as well as deeds.

246. Indeed, as late as 25 November 1968, UNCURK reports that between 30 October and 3 November there was clear evidence of acts of intrusion by North Korean armed agents on the eastern coast of the Republic of Korea in order to undermine the security of the Republic of Korea, and expresses its concern that the continuation of such activities, including the sending of a thirty-one man commando unit to make an attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Korea, will hamper the efforts being made to create the peaceful conditions necessary for the establishment of a unified and independent Korea.

<sup>10</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953*, document S/3079, appendix A.

247. For the reasons that I have outlined above, my delegation is convinced that the presence of United Nations forces in the Republic of Korea must be continued and that the work of UNCURK must go on until its objectives have been accomplished. To agree to North Korean demands would be tantamount to relinquishing the primary responsibility of the United Nations to maintain peace and security and to take collective measures for the prevention and elimination of threats to peace in the area.

248. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.453 and Add.1, of which the delegation of Thailand is a co-sponsor together with fourteen others, reflects accurately the current situation in the area which has given rise to much anxiety and concern.

249. We still see the continuing necessity for the maintenance of UNCURK and for the presence of the remaining United Nations forces in the Republic of Korea. Because of a series of serious incidents which have occurred with increasing frequency and intensity in the past two years, and their disturbing implications which may have profound effects on the peace and stability in the area, we believe that Member States should be kept informed on a regular basis—either by means of submission of the reports to the Secretary-General or to the General Assembly, in the light of developments in the area or through UNCURK's own activities. In the event that UNCURK reports direct to the General Assembly, we assume, of course, that the report would be placed on the provisional agenda in accordance with the usual understanding and with rule 13 (b) and (c) of the rules of procedure.

250. My delegation commends draft resolution A/C.1/L.453 and Add.1 for adoption by this Committee.

*The meeting rose at 7.5 p.m.*