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**CONTENTS**

*Page*

Invitation aspects of the consideration of item 25, The Korean question: consideration of all relevant proposals related to the invitation aspects, such as those contained in documents A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, L.423 and L.424 (continued) . . . . .	1
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**Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).**

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Galindo Pohl, (El Salvador) Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

*Invitation aspects of the consideration of item 25, The Korean question: consideration of all relevant proposals related to the invitation aspects, such as those contained in documents A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, L.423 and L.424 (continued)*

1. Mr. RABETAFIKA (Madagascar) (*translated from French*): Now that we are taking up the question of an invitation to be extended to the Republic of Korea and to the North Korean authorities to take part in our debate on the Korean question, we may give the impression that we take pleasure in repeating what we said before, reiterating the same arguments, and drawing from our respective views conclusions we know in advance.

2. Nevertheless, my delegation feels that those who speak of routine and automatic decisions fail to do justice to what emerges from our debates: namely, that a simple procedural question cannot be decided without some reference to substance.

3. My delegation will endeavour to deal solely with procedure and refer to the substance as little as possible, in order to spare the Committee unnecessary repetition and to allow it to come to as rapid and impartial a decision as it can.

4. It is obvious that it would be to the Committee's advantage to hear the greatest possible number of views, whether contradictory or concurring. It is also obvious that if we are to maintain a fair balance in our deliberations we must not allow ourselves to be guided by our prejudices or by rigid ideas that would allow of no compromise, in case a compromise should appear necessary and desirable.

5. Lastly, it is obvious that, in the matter at hand, we shall hear all the Korean interested parties so that we might know to what extent United Nations action in Korea has served its purpose.

6. For these reasons, my delegation feels that the question of invitation should not even arise, seeing that we all recognize that the least we can do for the United Nations is to preserve its moral authority, concert our efforts for the attainment of its general and particular objectives, and respect the legality and legitimacy of decisions taken in a given context.

7. For eighteen years, we have been saying and repeating that the United Nations, under the Charter, is fully and legitimately entitled to lend its good offices in seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. As we all know, this right is derived from Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter, and it is the view of my delegation that the authority conferred on the United Nations by that provision to deal with the Korean question cannot be challenged without challenging the very principles underlying our conceptions of peace, justice, law and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

8. There is a situation in Korea which, in the view of one of the interested parties, constitutes "an urgent question from both the national viewpoint of the Korean people and the viewpoint of peace in Asia and in the world". It is therefore natural that the United Nations should deem it a duty to consider this situation and to see how it can be brought back to normal, in line with the objectives defined eighteen years ago and, of course, by peaceful means.

9. If we were to say that the United Nations has no authority to seek a settlement of the Korean question, although we recognize that the division of that country, with all its consequences, is far from helping to maintain stability and peace in that region, in the Far East and even in the world, we would be depriving our Organization of one of its principal functions. To challenge the authority of the United Nations in a purely political matter amounts to an attempt to bring about the failure of a concerted action taken by the United Nations by virtue of that authority. Such a step would be fraught with peril both for the future of our Organization and for the universal respect of the purposes to which we have freely assented.

10. The competence of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question has been established by the jurisprudence of so qualified an organ as the Security Council, which in its resolution 83 (1950) has implicitly recognized the obligation of the United Nations to maintain peace and security in that region. The form of such action, which can also be described as "good offices", has been defined for this particular aspect of the problem by General Assembly resolutions, the first of which dates back to its fifth session [resolution 376 (V)]. This competence has since been reaffirmed, and the United Nations continues to be legally

represented in Korea "in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea".

11. It could be argued that the authority and competence of the United Nations are governed by circumstance and that, since the situation is no longer what it was eighteen years ago, a review should be made in the light of such principles of the Charter as State sovereignty and self-determination.

12. Be that as it may, my delegation thinks that the United Nations retains full authority and competence with regard to the Korean question so long as it has not attained the goals it has set—a unified, independent and democratic Korea with a representative form of government being constituted by peaceful means and international peace and security in the region being fully restored.

13. I have dwelt at some length on the authority and competence of the United Nations and on its objectives in Korea because by delegation is aware that the invitation to be sent to the two interested parties must take these elements into account.

14. As I have said, my delegation would like to hear both parties in order to find out to what extent those objectives have been reached. Moreover, as we support United Nations action in the matter, we want the authority and competence legally conferred upon it to be respected, for the objectives have been set by virtue of that authority and competence and it is only if we recognize them that we can estimate the progress made in co-operation with the two interested parties.

15. In this respect, we should like to put both parties on the same footing and have them assume the same obligations, so that we may be assured that United Nations action in Korea will be accepted without cavil both in the North and in the South and so that its results will not be interpreted differently in the two parts of Korea, for that would only delay the final settlement we desire—the peaceful and democratic unification of the country with full respect for its people's sovereign choice.

16. We read in the Memorandum from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, dated 18 October 1968 [see A/C.1/972]:

"The Government of the Republic of Korea, adhering to the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, has long accepted unequivocally the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question."

17. My delegation also notes that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea stated on 11 October 1968 that the Republic of Korea

"has whole-heartedly co-operated with the United Nations in the achievement of the above-mentioned objectives" [see A/C.1/968 and Corr. 2].

18. Furthermore, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which, if I may remind the Committee, is the representative of our Organi-

zation under resolution 376 (V), has stated in its annual report to the Secretary-General that its efforts to carry out the objectives of the United Nations in Korea "have been limited by the continued refusal of the North Korean authorities to recognize the authority and competence of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question" [A/7212, paragraph 5].

19. This is borne out by the remarks in the Memorandum of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 25 July 1968 [see A/C.1/970], to the effect that the United Nations has no right or authority to intervene in the Korean question.

20. These are the facts; it is for us to draw the conclusions. We all sincerely desire that the United Nations should lose none of its authority. We all recognize that its competence rests on decisions and resolutions, and if these were constantly challenged, our work would be meaningless and our principles and objectives worthless. Lastly, we have a right to expect all interested parties to take the same attitude towards our Organization and its goals in any particular action, if that action is to proceed with due respect for the commitments we have assumed under the Charter.

21. It is for these reasons that my delegation has co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.423; we believe that, in all logic and fairness, it deserves support, for it merely safeguards the interest of the United Nations in the attainment of goals which, if we still adhere to the Charter, we cannot oppose without sacrificing fundamentals to expediency.

22. To repeat, my delegation agrees that both parties should be invited to take part in our debate. We must, however, reaffirm in these invitations certain principles and objectives which are not subject to either interpretation or limitation. To our great regret, draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 fails to take account of the principles on the basis of which the United Nations decided to examine the Korean question or of the goals which it has pursued for eighteen years and which, the situation being what it is, cannot be said to have been attained. Consequently, my delegation cannot vote for that text.

23. Mr. EL-ERIAN (United Arab Republic): I wish to state briefly the position of my delegation as regards the invitation aspect of the consideration of the Korean question. For many years the General Assembly has discussed the Korean question without the participation of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a principal party whose participation is indispensable to the consideration of questions relating to Korea. This constitutes a violation of the regular procedure and established practice of the United Nations. It is a basic and universally recognized principle of adjudication that the parties in a case should be heard and should be given a fair hearing on a basis of equality. It is high time, therefore, that we redressed the injustice committed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and righted the irregular situation which results from its non-participation in the consideration of the Korean question by the General Assembly. It is high time that there was regular and constructive consideration of the question relating to

Korea, and for this it is essential that the voice of the parties to the question be heard, their views expressed, their interests adequately reflected and their rights duly taken into account.

24. The right of the representation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should not be curtailed or subjected to conditions likely to make our invitation to them to join us unacceptable.

25. It is in the light of the above-mentioned considerations—considerations of principle and concern for the smooth and effective transaction of our work—that my delegation has defined its position on the draft resolutions before the Committee. My delegation will therefore support draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 submitted by the delegation of Bulgaria and other delegations, and will oppose draft resolution A/C.1/L.423 submitted by the delegation of Australia and other Powers.

26. Sir Leslie GLASS (United Kingdom): This question of hearing representatives of the Republic of Korea and of North Korea comes before us each year. We are all agreed that it would be useful to have representatives of both take part in our debate. All that is in issue is the basis on which they should be invited. As the distinguished representative of Japan has pointed out, we do not wish to discriminate. We ask both the Republic of Korea and North Korea to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations in the Korean question.

27. The Government of the Republic of Korea has from the beginning co-operated fully with the United Nations and has participated in the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a settlement of the Korean problem.

28. No one doubts that, if the North Korean authorities were similarly willing to co-operate with the United Nations and participate in our work on Korea, hopes for some real progress towards a final settlement would be greatly improved.

29. But it is no good ignoring the facts. The North Koreans consider everything which the United Nations has done in Korea as illegal. They totally reject any right on the part of the United Nations to concern itself with Korea.

30. The situation in Korea is a situation that affects the peace of the world. We cannot accept and we will not accept that the United Nations can simply be warned off from consideration of it. We have had to reject very recently that the United Nations can be so warned off in another context, and we reject that concept in the case of Korea.

31. So long as the North Korean authorities persist in their view that the only proper course for the United Nations is to dissociate itself entirely from the Korean question and to remove its presence from Korea, it is difficult to see what constructive contribution the representatives of North Korea can make to debate in the United Nations. What is required more than anything else is a change of heart on the part of the North Koreans.

32. It is the fervent wish of my delegation that there should be such a change of heart in Pyongyang. We are

ready now and have long been ready to welcome representatives of North Korea coming here in a constructive and co-operative spirit. We have consistently voted for the resolutions which this Committee has adopted in the past expressing the Committee's willingness to invite representatives of North Korea on the basis of their acceptance of the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question. That remains the position of my delegation.

33. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Many delegations, including the USSR delegation, have explained in detail, when the First Committee began its work and was discussing the organization of that work on 18 and 19 October, why it was important and essential to examine the question of inviting Korean representatives well before the Committee began to consider the questions relating to Korea.

34. The First Committee, it will be remembered, very rightly decided that the question of invitation should be discussed separately and well before any consideration of substance. That discussion was a step forward. For the first time, after many years of discussion of the "Korean question" in the United Nations, there was a prospect of bringing about a business-like atmosphere for a serious discussion of an invitation to be extended to Korean representatives, and therefore of a fairer and more realistic consideration of the substance of questions relating to Korea.

35. Until now, impartial discussion of this subject and adoption of correct decisions have been prevented by a deliberately biased approach to the question of inviting representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, an approach which is a direct outgrowth of the spirit of the cold war. This has, year after year, created additional man-made difficulties in the consideration of questions relating to Korea at sessions of the General Assembly. It is the essential reason why, after many long years of such consideration, no advance has been made towards a peaceful political settlement of the Korean problem. When the First Committee again discusses the question of invitation, it must bear that fact in mind.

36. The sooner common sense triumphs and a reasonable approach is taken to the question of inviting Korean representatives, the better it will be for the Korean people both in the north and in the south of that temporarily divided country, and for the cause of peace in the Far East.

37. What ought the First Committee to do on this occasion so that its discussion of the Korean question is not as fruitless as it has been in the past? It must, as representatives of socialist countries and of many Asian and African States have rightly pointed out, decide without further delay to invite simultaneously, without any conditions, the representatives of both Koreas, i.e., a delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a delegation of the South Korean authorities to take part in the discussion of questions relating to Korea. For obvious reasons, the Korean representatives must be allowed adequate time to prepare themselves for the discussion. In the course of a preliminary exchange of views, this approach—which alone is fair, reasonable and in accordance with the

Charter—received relatively broad support in the First Committee. This is hardly surprising, since the course and outcome of our discussion on such important questions at the current session as the questions relating to Korea will largely depend on whether representatives of the Korean people are given an opportunity to take part in the discussion and whether justice towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea triumphs at last in the United Nations.

38. A large group of delegations of African, Asian and socialist countries was guided by these very considerations when it submitted to the First Committee the seventeen-Power draft resolution [*A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3*]; my delegation has the honour to be of their number. Under this draft resolution, the General Assembly would invite simultaneously and without condition representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to take part, without the right to vote, in the discussion of questions relating to Korea.

39. My delegation is firmly convinced that this course is in the interests of the entire Korean people; it advocated this course in the past, and it strongly does so now.

40. Such a decision is dictated not only by considerations of common sense, realism and justice, important as these are in the examination of any international question. It is also fully in accordance with established practice and tradition of United Nations organs when considering questions in which the parties concerned are not Members of the United Nations. This practice is based on the principles and provisions of the Charter, the rules of procedure of the Security Council and the humane traditions of the United Nations. The Charter states explicitly in Article 32 that any State which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.

41. The United Nations Charter and the rules of procedure I mentioned start from the premise that States which are parties to a dispute must be represented if important international questions are to be examined fairly and impartially, whether or not these States are Members of the United Nations. In this connexion I would draw special attention to the fact that the Charter does not set any conditions for extending an invitation to States to take part in the discussion on a dispute in which they are interested parties. This principle as laid down in the Charter is general, indeed, universal in scope. It is fully applicable to the present case, when questions are to be discussed which are of great importance for international peace and security.

42. As we all know, it is a matter of frequent practice for United Nations organs to invite not only representatives of States but even private persons and representatives of various organizations and political parties to take part in a discussion; for example, when the struggle against colonialism and racism is discussed. More than that, during this very session the Sixth Committee adopted a special decision [*1089th meeting*] to invite the representative of Switzerland—a State which is not a Member of the United Nations—to take part in the discussion of the question of special missions, because the question is of special interest to Switzerland.

43. Whether at its current session the General Assembly will take a correct and just decision on the question of inviting representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea depends wholly on the representatives of States Members of the United Nations who are present at this meeting. Objectively speaking, all the bases for such a decision—legal, Charter, political and, lastly, humane—are now present.

44. It is a matter of common knowledge that, year after year, the socialist countries and a large group of Asian and African States have been advocating a just decision of this question, which would be to invite simultaneously representatives of both parts of temporarily divided Korea without any discrimination or prior conditions. This group represents a large number of Member States, many of which know from experience what injustices and discriminatory practices colonialism and imperialism are guilty of. The sponsors of the seventeen-Power resolution on inviting the representatives of both Koreas without any condition would like to believe that at this session, too, these delegations will be consistent with themselves and will vote for a just decision of the question of invitation.

45. However, at this session, too, the delegations of some countries have been attempting for the nth time to impose on the Committee a decision to invite only representatives of South Korea—a decision which would discriminate against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That is the purpose of the draft resolution on the question submitted by a group of Western and pro-Western Powers headed by the United States. This text makes the invitation of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea subject to conditions and requirements which are discriminatory and contrary both to the Charter and to United Nations practice. The purpose of such preliminary conditions is to make it impossible for representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to come to the United Nations and take part in the discussion. No country which holds dear its sovereignty, its honour and its national dignity can accept such discriminatory and illegal conditions. I have no doubt that if such conditions were proposed to the twelve sponsors of this draft resolution [*A/C.1/L.423*], not one would accept them.

46. In this connexion, I cannot fail to note a rather peculiar element in the United States position. In certain circumstances, the United States finds it possible to maintain political contacts with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. United States officials meet with officials of that country and conduct negotiations with them on matters of common interest. In such cases, the United States finds it possible to hold talks and negotiate with official representatives of the Korean side without setting any conditions or preliminary requirements. Essentially, the discussion of various questions here, in the General Assembly and the First Committee, is a special form of negotiation. Why then do the United States and its allies propose various ridiculous conditions for the participation of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in such negotiations where the United Nations is concerned?

47. A number of Western and pro-Western delegations have been misrepresenting the position of the Government

of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with regard to the United Nations. In this connexion, we once again draw the attention of members to the statement by Mr. Pak Sung Chul, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in a letter dated 24 September 1968 addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations [A/C.1/966]. This letter states clearly and explicitly:

"The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always respected and respects the Charter and objectives of the United Nations."

48. Furthermore, is not the very fact that this Government has expressed its readiness to send its representatives to the General Assembly and to our Committee and to expound its views and positions before the 126 States Members of the United Nations evidence of such respect?

49. That same letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs also contains the following straightforward statement:

"... if it wants to hear the will of the Korean people, the United Nations must invite the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the discussion of the Korean question. By so doing, it must see that the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the genuine representative of the Korean people, is heard by the representatives of various countries and the peoples of the world."

50. Unfortunately, we have had to revert to this question time and again and explain what should need no explanation. We have had to do so because the course of action proposed by the United States and its allies and co-participants in the aggression in Korea—Australia, New Zealand, and certain other co-sponsors of the draft resolution I have mentioned—has proved itself to be wrong and incapable of leading to good results. Why then are they again urging the First Committee and the General Assembly to take this same fallacious course? There can be only one explanation: the United States and its allies in the military aggression in Korea are continuing their bankrupt policy of trying to prevent a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a peace-loving socialist State in the north of Korea, from telling delegations to the General Assembly the truth about the situation in the land of Korea and about the position and policy of his Government with regard to the unification and restoration of peace in Korea. The United States, whose troops are occupying the southern part of Korea and which for over twenty years has pursued a policy of interference in the affairs of the Korean people, is afraid to allow the true voice of the Korean people to be heard and resorts to every means at its command to stop their genuine representatives from making a statement in the United Nations. Consequently, the discriminatory conditions proposed for the participation of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the discussion of the Korean question are to be regarded as nothing other than a further attempt to obstruct a normal, business-like and impartial consideration in the United Nations of questions relating to Korea and the adoptions of resolutions which would be in the interests of the Korean people and of peace in the Far East. That is the essential meaning of the vicious policy of those who are opposed to inviting the Korean representatives to

come here. That is the old policy of maintaining the division of Korea and perpetuating the foreign occupation of the southern part of the country by what is hypocritically and fictitiously termed "United Nations forces". This is an ancient policy and one of evil fame; it is the imperialist doctrine of "divide and conquer".

51. The United States opposition to an invitation being extended to representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is explained by its desire to conserve its neocolonialist position in Korea, in disregard of the will of that country's people to live in peace in a united fatherland.

52. Regrettably, some delegations of African, Asian and Latin American countries abstained at past sessions when resolutions were adopted on the clear and simple question of inviting representatives of both parts of Korea. By their silence, they, whether deliberately or not, seemed to condone this injustice. I can only hope that these delegations will decide to take a new line on this question and will, during the current debate, assume a position based on justice, common sense, and respect for the Charter. We again appeal to them to give serious and realistic consideration to this question, bearing in mind that it concerns, firstly, the vital interests of the Korean people, and secondly, the cause of peace in the Far East.

53. Naturally, the authors of the draft resolution calling for an invitation of representatives of both parts of Korea count on the sympathy and support of the delegations of those countries, particularly the African and Asian countries, which only recently themselves experienced all the burdens and miseries of colonial and imperialist domination and attained their independence when the Korean problem was already in existence. Most certainly, the authors of this draft resolution also hope that the delegations of those African, Asian and Latin American countries which have so far followed the line set in this matter by the United States and its closest military partners will not do so this time. This is, after all, a question of elementary justice and of compliance with the United Nations Charter in the case of the freedom-loving Korean people, a flagrant attempt on whose rights is being made by its one-time aggressors.

54. We appeal to all these delegations, both those which abstained when decisions were taken on inviting representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and those which followed the ancient obsolescent course in the matter, and urge them once again to ponder the essence of the question. I would only ask: in whose interests are representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea being prevented from taking part in United Nations discussions? Who benefits by the violation of rudimentary notions of justice and impartiality in considering important international questions in the United Nations? Why are representatives of 126 States Members of the United Nations being denied an opportunity to hear a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea when questions relating to Korea are discussed in the United Nations?

55. The question under consideration is invitation of Korean representatives to take part in a United Nations discussion of matters affecting the vital interests of the Korean nation and the cause of peace in the land of Korea



and in the Far East as a whole. It is only from this angle that the question of invitation can properly be viewed.

56. The question of invitation will be settled by a vote. The position taken by each and every one of the delegations present at this meeting will determine the form and content of the decision taken; it will determine whether there will at last be a just decision in accordance with the United Nations Charter, or whether injustice and discrimination will triumph once again.

57. If all delegations and, above all, the majority of the Asian, African and Latin American delegations once more soberly weigh all the facts and grasp the full importance of this question, it may yet happen that a correct, just and reasonable decision will be taken. Such a decision can only be to invite without delay and without condition both representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the South Korean authorities to take part in the discussion of questions relating to Korea at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly.

58. In conclusion, I would draw attention to an unusual and highly remarkable phenomenon which has occurred in the last few days in the Main Committees of the General Assembly.

59. This unusual phenomenon is that United States Senators have been assigned the unenviable and ungrateful task of making statements in the Main Committees containing slanders and false accusations against the socialist countries. Senator Cooper played such a role recently in the Sixth Committee, and I must note that, owing to the efforts of some overly zealous Secretariat officials, his slanderous statement was transformed into a sort of American show.

60. Yesterday, at the meeting of the First Committee [1619th meeting], another Senator, Mr. Symington, made a hostile as well as slanderous statement attacking the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In an attempt to prove an absurdity, to blame the victim for the crime, and to camouflage United States aggression in Korea and its military occupation of South Korea for the past two decades, the Senator struggled valiantly to justify this aggression, intervention and occupation, and for this purpose he delved into ancient history.

61. Vain efforts: the whole world knows full well that Korean troops did not invade United States territory, but that United States troops invaded the territory of Korea; that Korean troops have not been occupying the territory of the United States for nearly twenty years, but the reverse; that Korean aircraft did not bomb the United States, but that United States aircraft subjected Korea to monstrous bombing, precisely as it is doing in Viet-Nam, devastating the land and brutally killing the peaceful country population—children, women and old men.

62. The Korean people will never forget the savage and brutal punishment inflicted on the peaceful inhabitants of that long-suffering country by the troops of General MacArthur, who cynically said that it was a pleasure to him to see the bodies of Koreans killed by United States soldiers.

63. These are the facts of the past, and no rhetorical excursions into the depths of history on the part of Senator Symington can alter them.

64. The United States representative also made entirely unfounded charges against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in connexion with the intensified patriotic struggle of the people of South Korea against the puppet régime of the Seoul clique which is supported by the bayonets of foreign troops. I can only recommend that Senator Symington should read the Memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 18 July 1968 and contained in document A/C.1/971. It categorically denies the absurd allegation that the struggle of the South Korean people against the puppet régime and the foreign occupation troops is really being conducted by emissaries from the North.

65. The Memorandum contains the following clear and truthful statement of the real situation in Korea:

"Being unable to live any longer as they live now under the harsh colonial rule of U.S. imperialism and the South Korean puppet clique, the South Korean people are today waging an active struggle of various forms for the right to existence and for the peaceful unification of the country.

"The struggle of the South Korean people is a righteous, patriotic struggle."

66. This is the true reason for the people's anger and its hatred of the puppet régime, rather than what the United States Senator told us.

67. Because the Senator could find no arguments to defend an unrighteous cause, he was compelled to refer, if only fleetingly, to a matter which bears absolutely no relation to the agenda item on invitation aspects being discussed by the First Committee. He mentioned certain events in Eastern Europe and the measures of self-defence and defence of the socialist confraternity taken by the socialist countries against the threatening forces of imperialism, revanchism and reaction. Why do these measures of self-defence on the part of socialist countries surprise and enervate the Senator and why do they interest him so keenly?

68. After all, we did the same thing in the past, after the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, when the armed forces of the *Entente*, on the instigation and under the leadership of the late Churchill, attacked the young Soviet Republic. It will be remembered that United States troops, too, took an active part in that invasion and intervention, and occupied a considerable part of the territory of Soviet Russia.

69. We did the same thing in 1941-1945 when the peoples of the Soviet Union, shoulder to shoulder with the peoples of other socialist countries, heroically defended their freedom and independence from Nazi aggression with its threat of enslavement.

70. The peoples of the socialist countries successfully defended their freedom on that occasion; they saved Europe and the world from the Hitler plague, and they saved the people of the United States from being enslaved

by the Nazis. We paid a high price for this—the lives of twenty million of the best sons and daughters of our people.

71. I am reminding Senator Symington of these matters so that he may be instructed himself and explain to his colleagues that we, the inhabitants of socialist countries, know how to defend our interests and our freedom. The Senator may call this a “new doctrine”, if he wishes. The point to note, however, is that there have appeared on the scene people who consider it possible to disregard the foreign policy principles of, for example, the late President Kennedy, who repeatedly pointed out that in their foreign policy the Western countries, including the United States, must take account of the vital interests of the socialist countries. I would remind those who forget this that the frontiers of the socialist confraternity hold fast and the foundations of socialism have been firmly laid. There is no power in the world that could change this reality.

72. I may well be told that what I have just said has no bearing on the agenda item concerning invitation aspects which is now under discussion. That is indeed so. But I had to depart from the subject in order to give some explanations to the United States Senator who has been assigned the thankless task of defending an unjust cause. He did his very best to carry out the mission entrusted to him by his class. It is obvious to everyone who heard his statement that his reasoning and his arguments against inviting representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reflect not an international-political or international-legal viewpoint, based on the United Nations Charter and the principle of universality, but a socio-political or, to put it more precisely, a class viewpoint serving the imperialist policy and the interests of big capital.

73. Mr. Symington used his senatorial eloquence to oppose invitation of representatives of socialist Korea—the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—while at the same time he has been fighting to have representatives of capitalistic South Korea, a client of the United States, admitted to meetings of the First Committee.

74. In this connexion, it may not be amiss to mention a fact of which the General Assembly is well aware: United States representatives are straining every nerve to introduce into the United Nations and its organs observers from Western Germany, a country close to the United States both in its socio-political, which is to say its class, structure and in its military-political aspect—in fact, to introduce West Germans into all international organizations and specialized agencies. At the same time, the United States is doing all it can to deny access to the United Nations and its organs and to other international organizations and the specialized agencies to observers from the other German State—the German Democratic Republic, a socialist State. Is this an international-political approach, is it an approach dictated by the United Nations Charter? Certainly not. It is a class approach.

75. Why, then, should the Senator be surprised that the socialist States, which are akin in the socio-political, i.e., the class sense, should take steps to defend their interests and their socialist gains when threatened by the forces of imperialism, reaction and revanchism? I would give the

Senator a piece of friendly advice: not to be surprised or agitated, and to keep calm. The countries of the socialist confraternity—and I would emphasize this once again—have defended, defend, and will defend by every means at their command the socialist gains of their peoples and the achievements of socialism, and attempts to prevent them or to talk to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries from a “position of strength” are hopeless and doomed to failure.

76. Mr. JAZIĆ (Yugoslavia): I should like to state very briefly the position of my delegation regarding the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, which refers to the question of the invitation without condition of the representatives of the two Korean States to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the questions relating to Korea.

77. My delegation is of the opinion that it is essential to invite representatives of both Korean States if we sincerely wish to make headway in the solution of this question which has been on the agenda of the United Nations for the past two decades. This even more so, since the question is one of States comprising the same nation and this nation, like every other nation and State, has the right to decide its own fate without outside interference and the presence of foreign troops. We believe that the invitation should not lay down any conditions for participation, as suggested by the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.423, who are actually asking the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion of the Korean question, provided it first accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations.

78. Only by acting with due concern can we hope to hear both sides and not, as has been the case up to now, only one. It is time for us to act with great prudence and to enable the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the consideration of a question in which it is vitally interested. With this view in mind, my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3.

79. Mr. ALWAN (Iraq): Once again the First Committee embarks upon a debate with a view to arriving at a conclusion whether or not to invite the two Korean parties to the conflict to take part in our deliberations. We feel with all sincerity that the answer to this question does not need the slightest stretch of imagination. Indeed, the issue is of such vital importance because it deals with the fate of a whole nation. Therefore, all our efforts must be mobilized for the sole purpose of the peaceful unification of Korea. Any attempt to force the issue into the realm of cold war will not do justice to the Korean question and will not serve any useful purpose.

80. It has become the expressed principle and rule of conduct in the United Nations that no question can be discussed equitably and effectively without the participation of the interested parties. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 asserts—and rightly so—the indispensability of the participation of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Republic of Korea in the discussions relating to the Korean question. Any argument to the effect that only one party to the dispute

must be heard, would run contrary to the elementary principles of law and justice and flagrantly contradict the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

81. The United Nations, in our view, is the greatest world debating forum and must give the opportunity to any party to a dispute to be heard in full freedom and without prior conditions which would prejudice the issue under consideration. How can anyone expect any fruitful results from the First Committee's debate, which is directly related to the fate of a single nation, if we do not hear both parties to the dispute? The main argument advanced against the participation of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was the refusal of that Government to recognize the competence and authority of the United Nations. The least which can be said about this argument is that it is hardly tenable. If we insist that the jurisdiction and authority of the United Nations be extended to non-member States, then we are bound first to think of the obligations of Member States. Member States have solemnly declared, according to Article 2 (2) of the United Nations Charter that: "All Members . . . shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter".

82. Now what kind of logic or reason is there to demand from non-member States a prior recognition of the authority and competence of the United Nations whilst there are several Member States which have failed to honour their Charter obligations. One may ask: what action has been taken against Member States which have flouted General Assembly and Security Council resolutions? What happened to the tens of resolutions which were adopted on the questions of *apartheid*, Portuguese colonialism, Arab refugees, human rights, Southern Rhodesia and many other issues which have been totally ignored?

83. Strange as it may seem, previous voting records on this question show that the same Member States which have ignored and flouted United Nations resolutions deem it fit to vote for a draft resolution demanding from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea a prior recognition of United Nations competence and authority before being heard in this Committee. One may wonder: have these Member States, which have in the past ignored United Nations authority and competence, been excluded from taking part in our discussions, or have they been prevented from voting?

84. In a recent statement made by the Foreign Minister of a small Power Member State regarding a United Nations decision pertaining to his country, at a time when the United Nations membership was 122, he said, "If the General Assembly were to vote by 121 votes to 1, my country would refuse to comply with that decision".

85. The question is asked: how can a small Power flout with contempt the authority and competence of the United Nations? The answer is not far-fetched. It is the same super Power which insists that the representatives of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a non-member State, must not be heard before recognizing United Nations resolutions, that has connived to encourage a certain small Member State to flout United Nations resolutions.

86. May I conclude by saying that in our opinion the greatest insult to the United Nations dignity occurs when Member States deem it fit to ignore its authority and jurisdiction whenever they choose to do so. It seems to us that we have to do everything possible to avoid any double standards or preferential treatment in our actions, which unfortunately have become the standard in United Nations practice.

87. For all these reasons, we will support draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 because it is in line with United Nations purposes and principles; and at the same time we will reject the American draft resolution A/C.1/L.423, because of its discriminatory character and its failure to take into account the principles of justice and equity.

88. Mr. MAVOUNGOU (Congo-Brazzaville) (*translated from French*): Once again, our Committee is called upon to examine the so-called Korean question. Once again, the United States and its henchmen are using delaying tactics and legal contrivances in order to prevent representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from attending our debate on this important matter.

89. At the same time, the emissaries of Seoul, with you know whose blessing, have invaded our premises. Such discrimination is no longer to be tolerated, for to speak of the unification of Korea while refusing admittance to one of the interested parties is surely frivolous, to say the least, and in any case shows a total lack of realism.

90. Yesterday [*1619th meeting*], Senator Symington, the United States representative, outlined for us the history of the Korean affair. If it had been made before the Congress, such a statement would have impressed the sensation-seeking United States electorate much more than it did members of our Committee, who, after all, are perfectly familiar with the circumstances of the case. Moreover, that purely propaganda statement was but a further demonstration of Washington's irrational policy, a policy irrevocably condemned by history and by men of goodwill.

91. My delegation would emphasize that the climate of the cold war, deliberately created to promote a certain cause, is now out of place, because the international realities of 1968 are no longer those of 1950. I would add that in the last two decades the world has undergone a number of changes which have completely transformed the make-up of the United Nations.

92. I am convinced that we shall not begin to solve the problem before us unless we turn our backs on the sterile debates of the last twenty years and approach the problem in a new way.

93. That is why, in my view, to invite both parties to take part in the discussion without the right to vote would be the only fair step to take, a step which would be in conformity with the practice of international relations and would offer the necessary premises for serious negotiation. There is a fundamental and generally recognized principle, which is that the parties concerned must be heard on an equal footing.

94. Some have claimed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursues a policy contrary to the



principles of our Charter, in particular by its refusal to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations. Others have been chanting a somber litany, accusing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of infiltrations and acts of aggression beyond the thirty-eighth parallel. I would say to all these detractors that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always respected the principles set out in the Charter. Moreover, it has stated clearly in its Memorandum of 18 July 1968 [see A/C.1/971] not that it challenged United Nations competence, but rather that it opposed the discussion of the problem by the United Nations on the basis of the so-called report of the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

95. As to the charges brought against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I would say that those who accuse it are the true troublemakers in that part of Asia, the *Pueblo* affair being a striking example. But truth cannot be denied for long. There is a Power bent on world conquest which continues to occupy the southern part of Korea and setting up "made in Washington" Governments with the sole aim of holding on forever to the southern part of the country, Korea being the military bridgehead in the pursuit of big-stick diplomacy and, naturally, in the evolution of what has been termed the global tragedy of the United States in Asia.

96. My delegation believes that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is sincerely desirous of having peace re-established in that temporarily divided country. In pursuing this noble goal, it has made great efforts to achieve the country's unification. It has always held that the peaceful unification of Korea must be brought about by the establishment of a unified Government for all of Korea, composed of representatives of the different strata of the population, by means of free and democratic general elections carried out by the people themselves in the North as in the South, without any foreign interference. It will also be remembered that President Kim Il Sung's Government has submitted a proposal for establishing a confederation of North and South Korea, as a provisional measure, with a view to restoring the temporarily severed national ties. Constantly concerned with reducing prevailing tensions, this Government has even proposed the conclusion of an agreement between North Korea and South Korea providing for the reduction of armed forces and for renunciation of the use of armed force by one part of the country against the other.

97. Naturally, as was to have been expected, none of these specific and serious proposals met with a favourable reception on the part of the Seoul puppets. Consequently, we more than ever need the active participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in our debates. That country's initiatives for peace are praiseworthy and should be encouraged.

98. My delegation has co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, which has the merit of leading us out of the impasse in which we have been marking time for twenty years. No one can really question the timeliness and fairness of this proposal; to refuse it means to want to preserve the *status quo*, or the division of Korea—in brief, the colonization of the southern part of the country.

99. For all these reasons, my delegation will vote for the draft resolution and will categorically reject the draft in document A/C.1/L.423, which is contrary to the true national interests of the Korean people and which is manifestly discriminatory.

100. Mr. BAHIMANGA (Burundi) (*translated from French*): My delegation reserves its right to speak to the substance of the question in due time; for the moment it will only comment on the two draft resolutions on the invitation to be extended to the two interested parties to discuss the Korean question.

101. The Korean question is once again before the Committee. At the present stage of our work, this is a purely procedural question and should therefore not give rise to lengthy debate. Impartiality and fairness both require that when a question of concern to several parties—as is the case with the Korean question—is discussed, those parties must be invited to take part in the discussion and present their arguments, for it is only thus that light can be shed on the matter and satisfactory solutions reached. There can be no doubt that a problem debated in the absence—or, worse still, against the will—of one of the interested parties cannot be properly solved. Yet for years now, sterile debates have been held in the United Nations which, far from solving the problem, have been complicating it still further. What is needed is a change of attitude on the part of members of this Committee; what is needed is a more impartial and hence more effective approach.

102. Only by inviting all the parties concerned and enabling them to state their views can the Committee, in the light of the information thus presented and of the constructive discussion that would follow, study the Korean question to good effect.

103. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 pursues this very goal, in that it would invite both the interested parties, namely, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, to participate unconditionally in the discussion. My delegation will therefore vote for it.

104. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.423, on the other hand, seeks to exclude one of the parties by means of delaying tactics and discriminatory proposals and would therefore erect an obstacle to any proper consideration of the question.

105. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has repeatedly affirmed that it respects the purposes and principles of the Charter. It has been guided by those purposes and principles in its international behaviour and has established friendly and fruitful relations with a number of sovereign States. My country enjoys excellent relations with it.

106. The reason that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea questions the authority of the United Nations to take up the Korean question is that it expects the United Nations to cancel its earlier intervention by dissolving the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and withdrawing the foreign troops which are keeping the country divided under the cover of the United Nations flag.

107. Fairness demands that representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should take part in the discussion of the Korean question. Justice cannot be done to the Korean people if one of the parties is denied the right to present its arguments and reasons for its conduct, for any sovereign State should be allowed to raise objections in the United Nations on any question whatever.

108. My delegation will accordingly vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.423, which would exclude one of the parties by setting unacceptable conditions to it.

109. Mr LEWANDOWSKI (Poland): The Polish delegation wishes to speak in favour of inviting the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of South Korea to participate in the forthcoming debate on the Korean question.

110. My delegation has joined the list of co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, because this draft serves precisely the aim of our present debate—to make progress, to make a first step in the right direction after the long involvement of the United Nations in Korea, an involvement which till now has done nothing good, neither to the people of Korea nor to the United Nations.

111. We shall not speak on the substance of the Korean question now, bearing in mind that a debate on this item will follow soon.

112. We have two draft resolutions before this Committee dealing with the problem of the invitation of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the representatives of the Republic of Korea to participate in the debate on the Korean question.

113. My delegation believes that it would be to the benefit of our discussion to make it absolutely clear that it is a fundamental difference of purposes which inspired those delegations that sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 and those which sponsored the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.423. This is so because, only one draft resolution, the former one sponsored by Bulgaria, Cambodia and other countries, if adopted, would enable representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to appear before this Committee. The other draft sponsored by Australia and eleven other countries is aimed at blocking the doors of the United Nations for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and at maintaining the state of affairs which hardly could be accepted as satisfactory for anybody who really cares for the well-being of the Korean people, and the peace and effectiveness of the United Nations.

114. Many speakers who have spoken before us have promptly dealt with the camouflage used in draft resolution A/C.1/L.423 in the form of an ultimatum addressed to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it "first unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations" before an invitation may be issued to its representatives to exercise the right to explain to us their position on the most vital, national problem of the Korean people. This formula becomes particularly obvious when considered on the canvas of the United Nations flag, with

its name being used for waging a war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the past and is still used by the United States military command in Korea, the same command which arms, trains and inspires the dispatch of selected South Korean troops to Viet-Nam, where they become famous for the cruel crimes committed against the population.

115. Whatever may be the views of different delegations on the roots, history and the future perspectives of the Korean question let us not neglect the facts: until now the United Nations involvement in Korea has not produced any positive result; on the contrary the country is still divided, United States military presence in South Korea is maintained; tension is constantly growing, the United Nations name and its flag are misused. And now this is what the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is being asked by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.423 to accept and confirm.

116. The delegation of Poland is firm in its belief that the participation of the representatives of both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea in the debate, without any conditions attached, is absolutely vital. Some delegations which have spoken during the discussion in the spirit of the cold war found it necessary to depict and interpret the position taken by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on various national and international problems. Some of them have had a long association with Korea from a time long before the United Nations became interested in this question. May I submit that the character of such an association does not make them the best spokesmen for the Korean people.

117. It would be much better and more useful to make it possible for the representatives of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to present its views directly to this Committee. That Government and nobody else is responsible for its country and people, and it is the people of Korea who will decide its future. If the United Nations is really willing to play a positive role in the Korean question, it must listen carefully to the Koreans, otherwise the United Nations will continue to render service to interests alien to the Korean people. The United Nations, in keeping with the Charter, is *par excellence* an instrument for the peaceful solution of international problems, and there is only one way to achieve this—the way of negotiation. And one does not negotiate by excluding one of the most interested parties from participation. Yet that is exactly what has been proposed to this Committee by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.423. Such an approach in practice not only excludes the most interested party but also prevents the United Nations from playing a meaningful and positive role in the Korean question. Ironically, the very same countries as consistently deny the right of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the debate on the most important national problem of Korea at the same time, year after year, insist categorically on keeping the Korean question on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.

118. My delegation fully shares the views expressed by the delegations which have spoken before us in favour of inviting the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in our debate. We have no

intention of involving this Committee in an empty cold-war debate, as seems to be the aim of some Western delegations. We hope that the Committee will pass its judgement on the draft resolutions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the interests of the Korean people—and indeed in accordance with elementary feelings of justice.

119. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I was gratified that when we began to discuss the question of Korea at the beginning of the session my compromise solution to defer going deeply into this question until a later date was adopted by the Committee, and that we had an opportunity to discuss fully the question of the sea-bed and ocean floor and also to delve quite seriously into the debate on disarmament. I was gratified but, I must confess, I was not very hopeful that in the interim period some solution could be found to get us out of the impasse with which we have been confronted ever since this Korean question was first put on the agenda of the various sessions of the General Assembly.

120. I want to be frank and say outright that we find ourselves today in the same position as that in which we found ourselves in previous sessions. There is a deadlock, and no one can deny it. This question has engrossed me ever since: that either haphazardly or intentionally, the question in the past was placed towards the end of the session. It augured well this year that the General Committee—or the steering committee, as we call it—directed us to give priority to the question of Korea. Of course, the differences between the two major Powers with regard to the way this problem should be attacked and solved became apparent during the debates in the General Committee for no other reason than that there were three items relating to the Korean question and they were lumped under one heading, which appears on all the documents relating to that question. Then, when our good friend from Bulgaria and sixteen other nations submitted their draft resolution [A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3] and some members took exception to its coming under the heading "Organization of work", the rift became wider. If we look at the date, we find that that seventeen-Power draft resolution was dated 7 October 1968. Then we were confronted by another draft resolution [A/C.1/L.423] and it was not strange to see who were its sponsors.

121. One side claimed that the draft resolution in A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 touched upon the substance, and that was the reason for which finally, having reached a deadlock, we saw fit to defer the question until, some of us at least hoped, some solution could be found. But when the resolution of the United States together with other co-sponsors—or I should call it, in order to be fair, the resolution of Australia, as it starts with Australia, and its co-sponsors—was made available to us on 18 October we found that the differences were indeed more frozen than ever between the protagonists of two ideas relating to the solution of this question. When I addressed myself to the subject, I made it clear that I was strictly addressing myself to the procedure. It is sometimes very difficult to draw a line between procedure and substance. However, I strictly observed the rule that I should at that time address myself to the procedure.

122. Having heard my colleagues delve more or less fully into the subject, and having myself tabled a draft resolution

[A/C.1/L.424] which was somewhat ignored in the Committee by some of the representatives, but not so much so outside, I think it became incumbent upon me to explain the reasons as to why I thought that such a resolution as mine should be tabled.

123. Inasmuch as we represent national Member States of the United Nations, I think any one who has served long enough in the United Nations should identify himself with the lofty principles of the Charter to which we should be dedicated, and it is heartening to find that the Soviet Union is represented by someone who has had a long and illustrious service in the United Nations. I have had the privilege of knowing him since 1948 or 1949.

124. On the other hand, the United States also has been represented continuously by such colleagues as have been involved in the United Nations almost since 1949 and 1950 and I think on a continuing basis. Therefore, for the benefit of those who are here and who have not been involved in the United Nations except recently, due to their having been newly elected to membership of the United Nations, I think it my sacred duty as someone belonging to a small Power to make clear the situation as it appears to me and as it should appear to the smaller Powers. Hence this is the *raison d'être* of my draft resolution dated 21 October 1968.

125. What I tried to do in my draft resolution was to state the facts of life as they obtain in the international community, whether they have to do with Asia and in this particular case they have to do with South-East Asia—or any other part of the world for that matter.

126. Let us assume that there were not two great Powers—super Powers—that had emerged from the Second World War. What would have happened in Korea? For a moment, let us assume that. I think there might have been, as in any other country that may be permeated by various ideologies, a scramble for power. Someone would seize power and become dominant, and if he lorded it too much over the people, they might overthrow that person or Government and institute a new Government. It would have been an internal affair. But by the mere fact that in the wake of the Second World War, before the United Nations was founded or came to function, it was agreed that a certain Power would move from the north to the 38th parallel and another super-Power would move from the south up to the 38th parallel, the country was temporarily divided by the famous 38th parallel.

127. After the First World War, no sooner had the war ended—and I was quite a young man then in the twenties—the Allies, without having to name them—they called themselves the Allies, and I am not talking about the Central Powers—no sooner had the war finished than rivalry developed and deepened between the Allies.

128. One would have thought that the Allies would not act on the same pattern after the Second World War, but unfortunately when the pressure was lifted, we finally saw that they became rivals and each one was serving his own interests. Those are the facts of life. Why should it be so? I do not know, but it is so.

129. I remember when I was attending those meetings. You remember, my good friend, Mr. Malik, in 1950, at

Lake Success. Was it Lake Success? Yes. There were accusations and counter-accusations, incriminations and rebuttals. It was alleged that the North encroached on the South. We were not involved. We belong to Asia. What has the Korean question to do with us? We are part of Asia. Some other countries came from thousands of miles away. In fairness to those countries, they do not tell us what to do. Why should we be concerned about Korea? Korea is in Asia. Isn't it in Asia?

130. Of course Asia is bound together by the solidarity of its people, and it should be more so in the future. After all, it is the mother continent. It is the cradle of all the world religions and world civilizations, the ancient ones that nurtured Europe which finally bore the torch of its own culture and civilization.

131. So, of course, we should be concerned with the peoples of Asia, because we are bound together, not geographically, but by having suffered throughout the millennia. Otherwise, there would not have been any religions. Religions come from suffering. Prophets rise as great reformers to guide those who have been scattered by wars and conflicts. So no one should take exception to our being involved.

132. Now from the practical point of view, distances in the world have shrunk. So much so, that what happens in Asia affects everyone of us, whether he is in the old or the new hemisphere, and would also affect us if we were on the moon.

133. Returning to the substance of the question, the core of the subject, the impasse in the Security Council in 1950 led to the conflict, which did not finish until 1954. Korea, I should like to remind members, was not "partitioned", but there were military arrangements that caused a partition. And here the draft resolution of Saudi Arabia states a fact in the first paragraph of the preamble. I challenge anyone to refute any one word of that paragraph. The first paragraph of the preamble states:

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Noting that the partition of Korea arose from the military arrangements made by the two major Powers, namely, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, before the United Nations came into being in 1945 and before it began to function as an international organization,"*

That is a statement of fact. It was before we, regardless of the country to which we belonged—not only those of us who were signatories of the Charter and not only the new Members, many of which became Members after they emerged from under the colonial yoke—knew there were certain military arrangements. Nobody was consulted outside those two Powers. That is covered by the first paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution of Saudi Arabia.

134. What does the second paragraph of the preamble state? I must say that here I made some slight alterations in the text. It states:

*"Taking into account that it was primarily the clash between the strategic interests of the said two Powers . . ."*

Here I should like to say, "of the said two and other Powers" because there was a big Asian Power that was emerging at that time, which was none other than mainland China. It would then read:

*"Taking into account that it was primarily the clash between the strategic interests of the said two and other Powers in Asia which led to a large extent to the Korean war in 1950,"*

Why have I inserted "to a large extent"? It was in order to take into account the accusations and the counter-accusations. One super-Power says: "No, it did not have to do only with the clash of interests, but because allegedly the North Koreans moved down to the South". And the North Koreans tell us: "Well, it was because of provocations from the South". So I have said, "to a large extent" so that no one can take issue with me that I am taking one side or the other. In fact, how can we take sides? We were not there. Not even the people who represent countries, as we do, can verify the statements. We have to take the word of others, of course, but there were accusations and counter-accusations. Therefore, that paragraph makes a statement of fact.

135. Why should the great Powers have strategic interests? Again, because it is still the way of life. We had thought that the First World War would do away with special arrangements, whether they were bilateral or multilateral. But unfortunately the Covenant of the League of Nations did not transcend such arrangements, nor, I submit, did the Charter of the United Nations transcend regional defence arrangements, bilateral treaties or, for that matter, multilateral treaties. If it did, then we would act according to the book, and by the book I mean the Charter. We rationalize—and in fairness to the big Powers, I must say that even the small Powers rationalize—our policies mostly on grounds of self-defence. However, instead of self-defence we should say economic and political interests. The whole thing revolves around economic and political issues. The economic interests are first, and then political and defence considerations. The latter usually take place when a country is in juxtaposition to another country and feels threatened by that country. But when thousands of miles separate a region from a country, what can we say other than that the motivation was either economic or political. Yes, that is the truth. In this case one super-Power was not very far from Korea and another Power allied to various Powers in the area had economic and political interests, which is natural.

136. The next paragraph of the preamble states:

*"Considering that the partitioning of any territory inhabited by the same people is bound to create internal as well as external power conflicts, as has been manifested in the case of Korea,"*

Who can refute that paragraph? The 38th parallel creates Northern Korean people and Southern Korean people, while, in fact, they are one people. And here I must say I shall always opt for ethnology over ideology. Ideologies come and go. We have had many philosophies. Once they asked me: "What about communism in the Middle East? Is that a new thing, this communist trend?" I said that we witnessed it in the Middle East at the time of the Qaramita—which my colleague from Syria will recall—and the Qaramita were communist even before the Russians. We

have had all kinds of experiments in our area. Ideologies come and go, but what we want is to exist in peace. That is what we want—to exist in peace. Of course, if you read Plato's Republic, you will find a type of communism there. The world did not come to an end with communism. Our communist friends flourish, but do you think they still have the same ideology that existed thirty years ago? Do you think the Americans still have the same capitalist system that existed in 1913, before the income tax was initiated? Good Lord, the capitalists are crying to the high heavens because of the taxes.

137. Ideologies change. We are not made to serve ideologies. They may be necessary at a certain period in the history of a country, or a people or a nation, but the individual and the nation are more important than the ideology. In so far as the Korean question is concerned, I opt for ethnology and not ideology. I do not care about the colour of the North Korean. I think they have the same colour skin, that is, the North Koreans are not red and the South Koreans are not yellow. I think they are all yellow. Yellow is a lovely colour, especially if it deepens into gold, and gold is rare these days.

138. So, you cannot be fooled any more. There are strategic interests. It is a way of life. We rationalize our policies whether we belong to the super Powers or the small Powers on the grounds of self-defence, but in fact it is for serving our political or economic purposes—and I say economic before political.

139. That is the whole story in Korea as well as in any other region where there may be a clash of interests—whether of super Powers, great Powers or lesser Powers.

140. What does the last paragraph of the preamble say?

“*Mindful* of the fact that since the United Nations was first involved in the Korean question its membership has more than doubled”—

of course, it has more than doubled. I remember when we were fifty-three. I think at San Francisco we were fifty-three or fifty-four. We were in the low fifties; we were never in the upper forties. We have more than doubled. I think Mr. Malik mentioned 126; I thought we were 123 the other day; suddenly we are 126.

“... and therefore it is incumbent upon all the Members of this Organization to review the situation with a new constructive approach.”

Not the stereotyped approach of past years, when we thought the unification of Korea should come to pass. Every year we have a stereotyped approach. I am saying we should have a constructive approach, not the stereotyped approach. There are certain words that occur in draft resolutions that have themselves become stereotyped and do not lend themselves to anything but a rigid interpretation, such as the word “unequivocal”. “Vocal”—from the voice. You can put any interpretation on unequivocal. No, this is a statement of fact.

141. We come to the operative paragraphs of my draft resolution. Everybody is talking about his draft resolution but nobody talks about mine. I have to explain it. Are they afraid of leprosy? They are not contaminated here—my

good friends from Africa, they are not afraid of it. Why are you afraid of my draft resolution? Because it states the facts. Why should you be afraid of the truth. The truth hurts? Good medicine hurts too. Iodine hurts on the wound, but it heals. So if it hurts a little, it is with a good intent, with a good purpose. The first operative paragraph states:

“*Appeals* to the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to use their good offices with the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view to removing the obstacles standing in the way of the unification of Korea.”

142. I am told that both Korean people—the North and the South—are sensitive. We cannot expect the Soviet Union to tell North Korea: “Do what I tell you”. After all, they consider themselves a sovereign Power. Likewise, our friends from the Republic of Korea—South Korea—are sovereign. If the United States brings too much pressure, they will tell the United States: “Hands off! This is our country”. We have witnessed what has happened in another country not very far from Korea. When they told them to come to the table to negotiate, they said: “What have you done without consulting us?” which is natural, whether they are right or wrong. That is why I said “their good offices”. We leave it up to their judgement. How? Sometimes with kid gloves, never by force, because a people should be respected. The Republic of South Korea should be respected by the United States, which is a dominant force there. I am sure that the North Korean people will be respected by the Soviet Union which, I must say, should have some influence with the North Koreans. If they did not have any influence, why do they come and defend them here? Why do our friends from the United States come and defend the South Koreans? They should have some sort of influence. We are asking them “to use their good offices”.

143. The next operative paragraph is one that frightens some people, especially those who subscribe to the Australian *et al* draft resolution. Baroody is asking the North Koreans to come to the table in this paragraph—which is not a fact. It states:

“*Requests* the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to prevail”—I should say “if possible”.

Kindly add “if possible”—“prevail, if possible”, because I do not want to say “prevail” as being mandatory.

“... , if possible, upon the Governments of the Republic of Korea and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not to set prior conditions to the appearance of their respective representatives before the United Nations.”

Both sides, if they see fit.

144. In fact, I do not see that there is a dialogue so far between the North Koreans and the South Koreans. I do not have to quote chapter and verse from the documents before us—only a stray quotation. I will start with an early document which was submitted by none other than the North Koreans. It is printed as a memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,



circulated by our good friend Mr. Malik on 16 October 1968 [A/C.1/971]. But if we look at the date, we find that that document was published in Pyongyang on 18 July 1968.

145. I will quote a few lines from it presently. Why should we go to the documents of our good friends from the Republic of South Korea? I will take the Australian draft resolution and show you that both set rigid conditions before agreeing to co-operate. Do you want them to come here just for the sake of their appearance and try and throw propaganda at one another and us to all be false witnesses to what they say? What for? The differences are still rigid.

146. In the memorandum of North Korea I have noted here that near the beginning it states:

“Especially, the frantic manoeuvrings which the U.S. imperialists and their stooges. . .”

Now, if I were from South Korea I would not want to be called a “stooge”—and I think they are sitting there as I saw some of them outside. The South Koreans have the dignity of their person and the dignity of their Government so why should they be called “stooges”. If there is goodwill you do not call the other person a stooge. That is a rubric, a sort of rubber stamp. I call it adjectives by rubber stamps—stereotyped rubric, *cliché*—choose any word.

147. To give you an example: if you have goodwill in order to unify a country you do not start beforehand calling names. People like us should say “Now come on, forget your past grievances and if you want to forgive you should forget. Forgive one another.”

148. We talk of the high principles and lofty ideals of the Charter and this and that and sometimes we encourage one another to be inflexible and unforgiving. Here I think that the major religions, whether they are the monotheistic or the other religions of Asia are predicated on tolerance, on love, on forgiveness and not on vengeance and name-calling. But leaving aside religions, ethically speaking you cannot bring two together unless they forget their grievances for a little while, especially when they are the same people. If they are two different people it is understandable. If there is somebody an aggressor from outside it is understandable but these are the same people, the Korean people and they are of the same colour. Ethnology is more important than ideology.

149. Here is another sentence: “. . . ‘Republic of Korea government’, as a puppet régime rigged up by the U.S. imperialists. . .” They have their dignity. Why should they be called a “puppet”? It serves their purpose to have forces from the United States. That is their business. Tomorrow, it may suit their purpose—if there is some new alignment which I will not mention—to have some forces from another country. That is their business. People help one another. So, you should respect the dignity of one another especially when belonging to the same people.

150. I gave those as an illustration but do you think they are solely to blame? I now go to the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.423]. If I were to be a co-sponsor I would say “Do not be so puritanical and so decisive in the phraseology”. I mention that again: “unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Nations”.

151. We then find here, by a clever way, an allusion to the fact that the North Koreans were bad boys, they were mischievous, and if they behave and promise to behave then they can come to the table and testify. I do not know whether you, sir, are a father but any father who treats his child so rigidly and says “Look, you’re going to appear at such-and-such an hour and do what I tell you or I will brandish a stick”, you know what will happen. He will tell you he renounces you or me as his father. You should be psychological with your own son. How much more so with people who consider themselves sovereign. We should deal psychologically with the north and the south and not treat them as if they were children. Children do not allow that. For heaven’s sake, where is our sense of proportion, our sense of equity and of decency if we use “stooges” on the one part and call them “bad children” on the other—I am paraphrasing of course—“and you should behave and respect the principles of the Charter”.

152. How many times are the principles of the Charter trodden under foot by Member States of the United Nations and nobody says anything? Why then do we take issue with people who are not under the roof of the United Nations? If we are going to take exception to infringement of the principles of the Charter we find that almost every week they are being infringed by Member States of the United Nations. “Joha can only take advantage of his own cousin.”<sup>1</sup> Joha was a legendary character among the Arabs. He could only make headway with his maternal cousin. He could tell him, “Shut up, you are my cousin”. He could tell him anything. Why do we say this ourselves? We can say it here and fold the whole matter up but we are trying to make a deeper rift between the North and South Korean peoples.

153. So, in this draft resolution [A/C.1/L.424] of mine, we say, in operative paragraph 2, please try and prevail, if possible, upon the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea not to set prior conditions to the appearance of their respective representatives before the United Nations. That depends on the provisions of the preceding operative paragraph for removing obstacles. It is contingent upon the removal of obstacles between both peoples through the good offices of the Soviet Union, on the one hand and the United States on the other. If they do not succeed, by using their good offices, to remove the obstacles between these peoples then it is no use having a second operative paragraph. It is contingent on the first operative paragraph.

154. The climax of the whole draft resolution comes in operative paragraph 3:

“Calls upon the other Member States directly involved in the Korean question to co-operate with the two major Powers and other Powers in the area with a view to promoting conciliations and creating an atmosphere conducive to the ultimate unification of Korea.”

After all, some people went and fought in Korea. There were sixteen Powers—fifteen besides the United States if my memory does not deceive me—who fought in the so-called “Korean war”; so they should not be neglected. Who are the “other Powers”? We know that one of the

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Arabic by the speaker.

“other Powers” is China; China had volunteers in North Korea at one time, as you all remember, those of you who are old enough. You cannot neglect China; if we neglect China, then China will neglect us. There were other Powers in the area who need not have contributed forces, but they are members of the Asian community who should also be concerned about this question.

155. If there is teamwork, if the coexistence between the super Powers is to remain valid, if there is going to be a fraternity in the interests of world peace, only then will the unification of Korea be made possible. In other words, if one scrutinizes every word of my draft resolution, he will find that the time is not yet ripe for the unification of Korea, unfortunately for the Korean people and for us, too, because we should like to see one people united regardless of their ideology or their political philosophies.

156. I submit that the two draft resolutions preceding mine will be voted on. If North Korea is invited in accordance with resolution A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, we do not know whether they will come. If they do come, the problem will still be in front of us because there is still no dialogue. As we say in Arabic, each of them sings in one valley with a towering mountain in between; he hears the echo of his voice and does not know what the song in the other valley is. On the other hand, if the Australian resolution [A/C.1/L.423] passes, there will still be no dialogue. Therefore, what is the practical result of such efforts during this session? Nil, as it was in the previous session, and this is why I came with my humble resolution to put the whole question in its own perspective, not beating about the bush and, as I said the other day, not calling a spade a silver spoon.

157. That is my whole intent and purpose, as someone, like you all, who is dedicated to the United Nations. I am not interested in widening the rift or fossilizing the differences. I submit that nothing will come out of this session in so far as progress in the Korean question is concerned. In order to serve the purpose, I appeal—and I know my appeal will not be heeded but I put it on record—to the two major Powers to prevail on their co-sponsors—not very difficult to do—to suspend their draft resolutions and not to take any sort of sham victory by votes. If they insist—and I think they probably will insist because I am not encouraged, judging by past experience—I want to show them a good example. I want this resolution to be put forward word for word in the verbatim record as an integral resolution—and I am asking our efficient secretary to see to it—aside from the explanations I have given and without sandwiching in my interpretation between one paragraph and another, so that it may stand as a witness for next year. I hope that a new approach will be tried in dealing constructively with this question and I hope that my good friends from the Soviet Union and the United States will not say that this emanates from a small Power, but from a Power whose representative is dedicated to the United Nations. I ask them to see what it is worth and have the illustrious Senator from the United States—who is a legislator—study it. After all, the legislators to a large extent influence the policy-makers; in fact, they should be the policy-makers.

158. I appeal to my good friend, Mr. Malik, because he has a creative approach to things although, of course, like every

one of us he is bound by the instructions of his Government, to see to it whether next year we cannot have a better approach to solve this question rather than going in circles and coming next year with the same stereotyped phrases, the same *clichés*, the same rubber-stamp resolutions—with all due respect to their sponsors.

159. This is my humble contribution this year. I appeal to my friends to heed my remarks. To you who are sitting around this table and more particularly to you, Sir, I apologize for the long time I have taken to explain myself. I think we should all realize that if we do not have a new approach to this question next year we will become dizzier, spinning in the same circle without achieving any fruitful results.

160. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I have to inform the Committee that it is nearly 6 p.m. and there are still six speakers on my list. The Secretariat has been in consultation to ascertain how long it will take us to hear them, and it estimates that the six statements will take between an hour and an hour and a quarter.

161. If the Committee agrees, we might carry on and hear the six speakers, in which case we would cancel the night meeting. The Secretariat needs to have a prompt decision as to whether or not there will be a night meeting.

162. I take it that it is agreed that we shall cancel the night meeting, and that the Committee will continue to sit until we have heard the six speakers on the list.

*It was thus decided.*

163. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): So then, the night meeting is cancelled, and the debate continues.

164. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): Even at this very late hour of the Committee's proceedings, my delegation would like to extend to the Chairman our sincere felicitations on his unanimous election to the highest office of this very important Committee of the General Assembly. I should also like to convey our congratulations to the Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur.

165. With regard to the question under consideration, that is, the procedural aspect of the Korean question, my delegation would like to make known its position very briefly.

166. At the outset, my delegation is gratified to note that the question of invitation is discussed this time separately from the substantive aspects of the problem. We are also satisfied to note that some time is allowed between our discussion of the procedural aspect and our discussion of the substantive aspect of the question.

167. That is how it should be, although my delegation would have preferred a longer time to have elapsed between the discussions of the two aspects. To be more specific, my delegation would have liked the Committee to discuss the question of invitation at the very beginning of the Committee's deliberations.

168. It has been consistently the position of my Government that the question of the reunification of the Korean

nation is an internal affair of the Korean people, and that they and they alone are capable of deciding their own destiny. But if the United Nations wishes to discuss the matter with the objective of assisting the Korean people in their search for national reunification, it must do so with objectivity and impartiality. Unfortunately, the record of this Organization with respect to the handling of the problem over the past twenty years leaves much to be desired. In all the years that this Committee has deliberated on this problem, it has taken a one-sided and unrealistic approach. For, year after year, this Committee has discussed the question of Korea without the participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Year after year we have been subjected to the anomaly of listening to one-sided statements from the representative of South Korea. The obstructionist tactics adopted by certain delegations in order to deprive the authentic voice of the Korean people from being heard in this Committee have been monotonously repeated. Yet we are told that the aim of those who use these tactics is to achieve the unification of Korea. What a mockery. How ironical it is to note that those leading the obstructionist manoeuvres are none other than the loud advocates of the principle of freedom of expression. One cannot help but wonder why these delegations continue to employ all sorts of tactics in order to deny the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea freedom of expression in this Committee.

169. More significantly, we ask ourselves the following pertinent questions. For how long would this Committee and this Organization continue to arrogate to itself the right to pronounce judgement on the destiny of a people without even consulting the people concerned? Any realistically minded person cannot fail to understand that, in order to have any meaningful discussion on this item, we must hear the points of view of both sides to the problem. Therefore, it is not only right but imperative that the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should be invited to take part in the discussion of this item. At the same time, the representatives of South Korea would be present to explain their position, as indeed they have done in previous years.

170. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an independent sovereign State and must be recognized as such. Hence, in extending this invitation, we should not lose sight of this fact. In proposing a conditional invitation, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.423 know perfectly well that such conditions would not be accepted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and hence this would be only another futile session of the Committee in its deliberations on this item.

171. My delegation will therefore vote against this draft resolution. On the other hand, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, sponsored by a great number of non-aligned and socialist countries, simply seeks to give both parties to the problem an opportunity to state their respective positions before the Committee. This is an objective and clear-cut resolution which, if adopted, would enable us to get out of our present impasse.

172. My delegation is therefore happy to announce not only that we shall support that draft resolution but that we have decided to become one of its sponsors.

173. Mr. NASSER-ZIAYEE (Afghanistan): Saying that "the question of Korea is once again before this Political Committee" is reiterating that for many years this question has plagued international relations and has poisoned the atmosphere in the world Organization.

174. The delegation of Afghanistan has repeatedly expressed its views and has maintained its objective position on this problem. This position has not changed, and therefore it is not necessary for me to go into any details on the matter except to emphasize and reaffirm the views we have expressed in the past. We have always stressed that it is essential, in the interest of friendly relations between nations and the maintenance of peace and security in the world, to remedy the regrettable situations existing as a result of the divisions of some nations of the world. These situations not only are deplorable for these nations themselves, whose people naturally aspire to their unity, but also have created the most thorny problems and the most undesirable tensions between other countries.

175. The experience of the world Organization shows that what is becoming increasingly essential is to seek and apply a new approach to these problems. The problem of Korea could be placed on the top of any list for such search and action. The delegation of Afghanistan regrets that so far certain countries have not found it possible to accept the principle of a new approach.

176. The new approach should begin with the solution of the question of participation. In the opinion of my delegation, the representatives of both Koreas should participate in the United Nations debate. Whatever the chances of success might be, an invitation to both Koreas would in no way bring any harm to anyone. It is only fair that in any matter all parties directly concerned should participate in the discussion. Afghanistan has always supported this principle and will continue to support it. Any decision which might be taken as a result of "unilateral discussion" would be ineffective since it would be rejected by one of the parties concerned.

177. The delegation of Afghanistan will therefore vote for the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3. This draft resolution opens up new possibilities.

178. Mr. ALARCON QUESADA (Cuba) (*translated from Spanish*): First of all, I apologize for intervening again in the debate, but my delegation wishes to clarify one or two points in the light of what has been said in the last few meetings by the representative of the United States and by other delegations which adopt the same attitude towards this problem. These delegations still persist in presenting the facts relating to the Korean problem in a distorted manner in this Committee. I should therefore like to speak of the version they themselves give of the same facts outside this Committee, citing American sources or those of some of their allies.

179. In the first place, reference has been made to the original treatment of the so-called Korean question in 1947 in the United Nations, as a result of which the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was established [*General Assembly resolution 112 (II)*]. At the time,

spokesmen for American imperialism did not conceal the purpose they had in mind in raising the matter in the United Nations. For example, the New York newspaper *Journal American* on 17 September 1947 described the objective sought by the American delegation and the United States Government in bringing up the so-called "Korean question" in the United Nations as that of establishing a South Korean Government enjoying the support of the United States Government in its attempt to gain possession as quickly as possible of the half of Korea north of the 38th parallel.

180. Mention has also been made in these debates of the so-called elections held in the southern part of Korea under American occupation on 10 May 1948. According to the American delegation and its henchmen, those elections were a model of applied democratic principles, and as a result of them a representative régime had been set up in South Korea. Let us see how the American news agency United Press analysed those elections on 12 May 1948. It described how American reconnaissance planes were flying overhead and how the electoral colleges were strictly controlled by *hyangobodan* armed with baseball bats. In Seoul thousands of police and civilians specially picked and backed by United States troops set up barricades at the main points and intersections, and guards were stationed at the entrance to all the alleys. The civil guards were armed with axe-handles, baseball bats and cudgels, and the Korean guards had American rifles. The atmosphere, it said, was like that of a city under martial law.

181. That is how the correspondent of the American United Press agency in Seoul described on the spot the way in which the famous elections in the south of the country were conducted.

182. According to other press reports about the same date, between 7 and 10 May 1948 alone, 50,425 inhabitants of South Korea were arrested and thrown into prison; and according to the United Nations Temporary Commission itself, in its report to the Organization on the elections, 416 persons were killed and 858 were wounded during the period of the elections.

183. With regard to American aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1950, they go on insisting that this was a United Nations action to maintain peace in the region. It might be worth while recalling the peculiar way in which the Security Council took the decision to endorse the American aggression and declare the Democratic People's Republic of Korea an aggressor country.

184. The Security Council had before it only two pieces of evidence, namely two telegrams, one from the United States Ambassador at Seoul, and the other from the so-called United Nations Commission on Korea. The Council did not carry out any subsequent investigations; it did not hear the parties involved in the conflict; it did not apply any of the machinery which logically it was essential to have used to determine objectively the origin of the aggression.

185. It is interesting to underline what was stated by the actual chief of the so-called United Nations Command in

Korea, General MacArthur, at a meeting of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, namely that the American Army was in action twelve hours before the United Nations decision was taken.

186. It is also interesting to point out what the then American Assistant Secretary of State in charge of United Nations affairs, John Hickerson, said in a United States Senate hearing in 1952; he admitted that the United States delegation was already briefed before the war broke out in Korea to deal with the question in the United Nations, and that it actually had a draft resolution on the subject all prepared. Mr. Hickerson stated that they knew in general what they were going to say, and had drafted the main points of the resolution.

187. The quotation can be found on page 1086 of the Hearings of the United States Senate Appropriations Committee, 1952.

188. Consistently, too, in this debate, the troops which took part in the aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and those still in South Korea have been described as United Nations troops. What could be more logical than to contrast the version presented here by certain representatives with the version quite definitely given by those best qualified to say whose troops they are—the chiefs of the so-called United Nations Command.

189. Let us consider General MacArthur's opinion of his work in the Korean Peninsula, as he expressed it some time after the war began, saying that his relations with the United Nations were decidedly nominal. Everything he did was controlled entirely by the Joint Command. Even his routine reports had to be censored by the United States Defense Department. In short he had nothing to do with the United Nations in any way. All his correspondence went through the United States High Command in Washington.

190. As is well known, after General MacArthur there were other American officers who continued to usurp the insignia of the United Nations. Let us see what their opinions were on the task they had to perform in Korea.

191. General Clark stated that the United Nations was not in a position to carry out any large-scale decision it adopted. He had been in charge of the United Nations forces in Korea and he said he did not remember receiving orders of any kind from the United Nations throughout the entire war. He said he would not have relied on the United Nations for anything.

192. More recently still, Mr. William Powell, the spokesman of the United Nations Command, stated on 4 November 1966 that it was not correct to call the American troops in South Korea "United Nations forces", or to call the headquarters of the troops stationed in South Korea a "United Nations Command".

193. This statement was made more or less at the same time as the United States delegation and its allies were insisting here that the troops were United Nations troops.

194. With some justification, the British news agency Reuters reported in a dispatch from United Nations Headquarters in New York, dated 11 May 1967, that what the United States and South Korea generally called the United Nations Command was in actual fact an organization under the control of the United States, with an American general and staff.

195. I ask myself, is this what the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is expected to accept and justify? Is this what the representatives of the Member States likewise are expected to accept and justify?

196. Did the United States military chiefs, and do they now, respect the competence and authority of the United Nations? The fact is that United States imperialism has been grossly abusing this Organization in the interests of its policy of interference in Korea, and making a fool of it. They come here and talk about the authority and competence of the United Nations. In the Senate they dispense with euphemisms and admit frankly that they act without reference to the United Nations, that what are described as United Nations troops are their own troops and receive their orders not from the United Nations but from the Pentagon.

197. Mr. FONSECA (Colombia) (*translated from Spanish*): The Foreign Minister of Colombia, Mr. López Michelsen, in a statement he made at the 1692nd plenary meeting on 11 October last, referred particularly to the vicious circle in which the United Nations is caught up today, primarily as a result of unilateral positions taken by the great Powers. He said that the delegation of Colombia would regard it as a good omen for the world Organization if from the twenty-third regular session onwards it proved possible to modify certain entrenched attitudes with a view to instituting a constructive dialogue which would take the place of the exhausting and futile duel of words, so that the machinery of collective security could become fully effective as the one means of securing the lasting peace for which mankind so yearns.

198. Agenda item 25 on the so-called Korean question, and in particular the invitation aspect under discussion today in the First Committee to allow representatives of both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in this debate, without the right to vote, represents a frustrating example of the vicious circle referred to above.

199. From any angle it is disappointing to find that during the long span of over twenty years since the United Nations first placed the Korean question on its agenda no progress has been made towards the achievement of a just and peaceful solution.

200. Time and time again my country has voiced its views and recorded its vote on this chronic problem; and on this occasion, in a further attempt to be of service, Colombia once again urges the necessity for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to recognize the authority of the United Nations as a prerequisite for being given a hearing in this forum.

201. The position of the Colombian delegation is crystal clear, strictly in accordance with the provisions of the

Charter, and also consistent with the true historical background of the problem. Colombia is a co-sponsor along with eleven other countries of draft resolution A/C.1/L.423, operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of which invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate in the debate without the right to vote, and likewise a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, provided that State accepts the competence of the United Nations, as the Republic of Korea has already done.

202. As my delegation sees it, this is the minimum condition to be required of any State wishing to be given a hearing in the United Nations. There is no foundation or logic whatever in the argument that recognition of the authority of the United Nations would be an affront to the dignity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

203. But this is not in any sense the scope of the draft resolution which my country is co-sponsoring. Quite simply, we confine ourselves to asking North Korea not to engage in a confrontation with the Organization, not to flout its authority, not to try to establish a special status for its case which would manifestly weaken the prestige of the Organization founded at San Francisco.

204. With reference to this very point, the Colombian delegation made the following statement last year through its Permanent Representative, Mr. Turbay Ayala:

"Why do the members of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea want us to invite them? Is it to legitimize a discussion they consider illegal, or to participate in the illegality? That is the dilemma. If it is the former, why should they consider themselves as possessed of a special gift of expurgation?" [1512th meeting, para. 101.]

205. He went on to say that Colombia did not agree that the representatives of North Korea had any magic power to turn evil into good and to legalize actions which, according to them, were in themselves illegitimate, and that as long as North Korea continued to maintain that our actions are illegal we could not continue to invite them to take part in our discussions because that would place the United Nations in an altogether inferior position vis-à-vis its gratuitous and obstinate accuser.

206. It would take too long to try to give a complete outline of the sound, indeed unassailable arguments on which Colombia bases its firm stand on the invitation aspects of the question; and my delegation is anxious to comply with the appeal made by the Chairman of the Committee to keep statements as brief as possible, bearing in mind the time we have left for the other items on our agenda.

207. At this stage of the debate it seems too much to expect that positions will be changed in the light of new arguments. Perhaps the best course would be to take a vote so as to find out which way the scales tip. Obviously my delegation will fall in with the results and trusts that the draft resolution which my country has co-sponsored [A/C.1/L.423] will receive the support of the majority. We also hope that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will decide to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations, in accordance with the provisions of the



Charter, so that it can take part together with a representative of South Korea, without the right to vote, in the deliberations on the problem facing us.

208. My delegation would certainly be gratified if, in such circumstances, representatives of the Republic of Korea and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could both be heard. We are not trying to favour either side, since we are imposing the same conditions on both.

209. Mr. GALLIN-DOUATHE (Central African Republic) (*translated from French*): Speaking as I do for the first time since our Committee began its work, I should like to discharge the pleasant duty of expressing to you, Mr. Chairman, and to your distinguished fellow-officers my delegation's satisfaction at your brilliant election and of asking you, at this advanced stage of our debate, to accept its warmest congratulations. Aware of the complexity of your duties, my delegation assures you of its modest co-operation and is convinced that under your guidance our Committee will successfully contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of world co-operation.

210. Justice and fairness both require that the parties to a dispute shall be brought face to face and heard. It is certainly in this praiseworthy spirit that our Committee, in beginning its work on the Korean question, wishes to invite simultaneously a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a representative of the Republic of Korea, the two interested parties, to participate without the right to vote in the consideration of the questions that are once again before us.

211. This simultaneous invitation is dealt with in the two draft resolutions A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3 and A/C.1/L.423, each submitted by a number of countries, each born of the disagreement on the conditions to be set to the parties to the dispute and reflecting the desire of each group of countries for an equitable and efficacious examination of the Korean case which has once again been referred to the Committee.

212. In its general policy statement before the Assembly, my delegation said:

"... We believe that when two countries divided as a result of war are engaged in a conflict whose evolution may threaten the peace and security of the world community, only that of the parties which recognizes in advance the authority and competence of the United Nations to examine and settle the said conflict should appear before the United Nations to state its grievances." [*1707th plenary meeting, paragraph 135.*]

213. It will be seen that the position which my country has taken—and which I strongly reaffirm—is based on the provisions of Article 35, paragraph 2 of the Charter, which reads:

"A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter."

214. It will be remembered that, under Article 11, paragraph 2, the action taken by the General Assembly on the matters brought to its attention must relate "to the maintenance of international peace and security", those having always been the fundamental purposes of the United Nations.

215. The people of the country called Korea continues to bear the hardships inflicted on it by a division resulting from the Second World War and, with patience and perseverance, to seek the re-establishment of its territorial integrity and national unity by peaceful means.

216. The obvious goodwill of Korea—I mean the Republic of Korea—has encountered constant obstruction on the part of the Communist régime whose armed resistance cannot but dangerously worsen an already harrowing situation.

217. South Korea, which has become a legitimate republic, and North Korea, which has also been promoted to the rank of a republic but whose legitimacy seems to be in some doubt, have indeed been engaged in a continuing conflict which threatens the already precarious peace and security in that region and which endangers the great peace—that of the world family of nations, desirous of a more fruitful international co-operation based on mutual understanding and human brotherhood.

218. The United Nations, that instrument *par excellence* for world peace and co-operation, is in duty bound to do everything in its power to ensure the survival of mankind, it being understood that parties to a conflict which are not its Members must accept expressly and in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter. In other words, it is necessary—as it is sufficient—that non-member States parties to a dispute should recognize the competence and authority of the United Nations for the purposes of settling that dispute.

219. The Central African Republic is therefore happy to note that the Republic of Korea has stated unequivocally, in document A/C.1/968 and Corr.2 dated 14 October 1968, that it "continues to accept unequivocally the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean Question". Moreover, in the same document, the Republic of Korea has reaffirmed its full adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It follows that its good faith has been established formally and beyond all doubt.

220. My delegation deplores that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in document A/C.1/966 dated 10 October 1968, should, on the contrary, in the clearest terms and in violent language have challenged the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question within the terms of the Charter. According to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in fact, the Korean question is not one which lends itself to discussion by the United Nations, for the latter adopts "illegal resolutions". Not only does the Democratic People's Republic of Korea term these resolutions "illegal", but it has "reduced" the United Nations to the rank of a "belligerent". Worse still, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea claims that the Commission for the Unification

and Rehabilitation of Korea is "a mockery of the United Nations" and demands that it should be dissolved.

221. Lastly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea regards the United Nations forces stationed in South Korea to maintain peace and security in the region as foreign occupation troops, and therefore demands their withdrawal.

222. To sum up, I note with disappointment that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, by taking an attitude compounded of arrogance, unreasonableness and provocation against the United Nations, has once again given proof of its manifest intention not to co-operate effectively with our Organization by claiming that it is "the sole legal power in Korea" and thereby challenging the legitimacy of the Seoul authorities.

223. This is the sad story of the relations between North Korea and the United Nations on the one hand and between North Korea and the Republic of Korea on the other.

224. That being so, is it realistic on our part to hope that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would agree, at the same time as the Republic of Korea, to participate in our work? Can we really think for a moment that its participation, if it should by some miracle be enlisted, would have the advantage of making a constructive contribution to our work, since we are convinced that its attitude towards the United Nations is one of defiance?

225. Certainly, since it is an instrument for international peace and co-operation, the United Nations must act as an arbitrator between the interested parties in order to bring about a peaceful settlement of their dispute. But it seems logical that, if the United Nations is to exercise the weight of its moral authority, its competence and authority must be explicitly recognized and accepted by all the parties to the dispute. That is not the case for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, one of the interested parties, which as we all know has been constantly showing disdain and hostility towards the United Nations. That being so, one is entitled to ask how an arbitrator worthy of the name should act when one of the parties to the dispute arrogantly and insultingly challenges his competence and authority.

226. The moral authority and prestige of the United Nations should be religiously guarded by all Member States and, for that matter, by States which are not Members. The Central African Republic is doing what it can to that end by co-sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.423.

227. Mr. PANYARACHUN (Thailand): The delegation of Thailand has followed with keen interest the discussions of the Korean question that have so far taken place in the First Committee. The political content of the question was barely concealed when some representatives, during the first days of the present session of the Committee, made every attempt and employed every manoeuvre to slip in the question of invitation to Korean representatives under the "Organization of work" item. Their tactic came to no avail and was fully exposed under the glaring lights of their own substantive speeches, and subsequently by their sabre-rattling statements. It then became obvious even to the

newest representatives that all the different aspects of the Korean question were closely interrelated, or, one may even say, interdependent.

228. It was most disturbing to my delegation that during those few meetings in which the invitation aspect was discussed, those delegations which for understandable reasons do not want to appear before the eyes of the world as accomplices to the whole series of aggressive designs in Korea, made the supreme effort to rewrite the history of the United Nations involvement in the Korean question. Such a rewriting of history would have been welcomed if the authors had merely been trying to revise the text on the basis of a new set of facts and circumstances. Unfortunately, the authors were not so motivated. All they wanted to accomplish was to write their distorted version of history unsubstantiated by facts and actual events which took place nearly twenty years ago.

229. In order to appreciate the true situation which brought the United Nations into a close and historic association with Korea, my delegation will attempt to relate the circumstances which made such association inevitable and which, in its view, make the present relationship a continuing necessity.

230. When the Second World War came to an end, Korea, on whose territory many battles had been fought, found itself a war-torn country with the presence of so many foreign troops on its soil. All efforts to achieve a unified, democratic and independent Korea were frustrated because the Soviet Union decided to maintain—and intended to implement its decision to maintain—its military presence in the northern half of Korea by installing a régime which would respond to the tune called by the alien master.

231. Under these circumstances and only after the failure of those efforts was the question of Korea brought to the United Nations. On 14 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted a set of measures [*resolution 112 (II)*] which would pave the way for the unification of the two sectors of Korea as well as for the withdrawal of foreign forces from all of Korea.

232. In accordance with the General Assembly's resolution adopted in 1947, elections were held in South Korea under the close and impartial scrutiny of the United Nations Commission established by the General Assembly. It is a matter of genuine regret that the authorities of North Korea chose not to take advantage of such a democratic and just procedure. Instead, as if they wanted to hide something from the public gaze, the authorities of North Korea barred the Commission from entering the territory under their control.

233. In 1948, the General Assembly, having been apprised of the results of the general elections in South Korea during which the Commission representatives were able to travel and observe freely, declared in resolution 195 (III), para. 2, that:

"... this Government [*of the Republic of Korea*] is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea".

234. The General Assembly resolution made explicit the United Nations recognition of the legitimacy of the Government of the Republic of Korea. In defiance of that resolution, the Soviet Union decided and took steps to install a communist régime in North Korea. A successor United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) concluded that that régime was “the creature of a military occupant and rules by right of a mere transfer of power” from the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

235. On the fateful day of 25 June 1950, the North Korean authorities unmasked their face and launched the unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea. The attempts of the Security Council to arrange a cessation of hostilities and North Korean withdrawal did not produce the desired results. Left with no other alternative, the Security Council in resolution 83 (1950) dutifully called on all Member States to furnish troops to repel the blatant aggression of North Korea and to give whatever assistance they could to the Republic of Korea—the victim of such naked use of force. Sixteen members of the Organization including my own country, representing all continents joined the international force for collective defence action against the North Korean invaders. Many others, including Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden provided medical and similar assistance.

236. The Chinese communists intervened in massive scale in October 1950, and the General Assembly accordingly condemned Communist China as another aggressor [*resolution 498 (V)*].

237. The tide of communist aggression was stemmed but not without sacrifice and hardship on the part of the defenders of liberty and independence. Thailand is proud to have contributed its share in this common endeavour and to this day there remains a token unit of Thai soldiers serving under the United Nations Command in Korea.

238. This brief historical outline, I hope, will serve to remind all of us here of the events which led to the United Nations association with the Korean question.

239. Now let us look at the current picture of the Korean scene and try to ascertain whether the factors which brought the United Nations into such relationship with Korea have disappeared. The answer is unfortunately and emphatically “No”. The North Korean authorities have not abandoned their fundamental objective to annex the Republic of Korea by force. A cursory look at some of their past statements confirms our conviction of their determination to carry out their plan of conquest.

240. At the 14th Plenary meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the North Korean Worker's Party held in October 1966, Prime Minister Kim Il Sung of North Korea stated in part that:

“The Revolutionary Movement in South Korea must be developed properly, combining diverse forms and ways of struggles, political and economic struggles, violent and non-violent struggles, legal and illegal struggles . . .”

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Supplement No. 9*, chap. IV, para. 27.

He also declared that:

“Our revolution will not be achieved without liberating South Korea,” and that “a war of revolution may come at any minute.”

Kim Il Sung, incidentally, is reported to have set a target date of 1970 for the take-over of the Republic of Korea.

241. And again his statement at the first session of the Fourth Supreme People's Assembly on 16 December 1967, stated:

“... The entire people in the northern half of the Republic bear the heavy responsibility for carrying the South Korean revolution to completion, keeping pace with the exalted fighting spirit of the South Korean people and rendering active support to their struggle.”  
[A/7212, para. 12.]

Those statements are clear manifestations of the aggressive designs on the part of the North Korean communists against the Republic of Korea and the United Nations forces.

242. Those words are not mere empty threats, but have actually been carried out with such consistency and daring. Indeed, the North Korean régime has made sure that there is no credibility gap between the words of its leader and its activities.

243. The incident of 21 January of this year has indeed transformed the words of the Prime Minister of North Korea into deeds, when a thirty-one man North Korean commando unit was sent into the Republic of Korea with the clear mission of assassinating the President of the Republic, the Chief of State of a country with which some sixty States Members of the United Nations maintain diplomatic relations.

244. For the last few years, as confirmed by the reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, as well as the reports of the United Nations Command, the North Korean régime's violations of the 1953 Armistice Agreement not only have remained unabated but have increased to such a level that it is a source of major concern to all peace-loving countries in Asia and the Pacific.

245. Only two days ago, *The New York Times* of 24 November 1968 reported on page 10:

“Two captured North Korean Army officers said today their country was training several thousand soldiers for guerilla war and commando raids in South Korea.

“The 60-man commando group that was put ashore by high-speed boats on the east coast of South Korea on Oct. 30 was sent on a 30-day mission primarily to set up guerrilla and intelligence bases in mountain villages, they said.”

The article goes on to state:

“The captured officers are First Lieut. Ko Deung Un and Second Lieut. Chung Dong Choon, both from the 124th Unit of the North Korean Army, which sent a commando team to the heart of Seoul last January in an attempt to kill President Chung Hee Park.”

246. These aggressive activities bear a testimony to North Korea's determination “to accomplish the revolutionary

cause of unification at all costs". Those were the words used by Kim Il Sung at the Fourth Supreme People's Council on 16 December 1967.

247. It is all very clear that the North Korean régime has no interest in the United Nations efforts to unify the country by peaceful means. On the contrary, it seeks to use every possible means to impose its rule over the Republic of Korea by force, violence and terrorist measures.

248. Furthermore, unlike the Government of the Republic of Korea, which has always adhered to the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and has willingly accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action in the Korean question, the North Korean régime has contemptuously rejected the United Nations association with the Korean question. North Korea, which was organized in defiance of the United Nations resolutions, refused to allow the United Nations to supervise elections in the north in 1948 and has continued to reject the competence and authority of the United Nations to concern itself with the Korean question.

249. On the basis of the long history of the Korean question and in face of North Korea's policies of aggression and expansionism and its current hostile activities directed at the Republic of Korea, it cannot be denied that the United Nations continues to exercise some responsibility in regard to Korea. This United Nations responsibility, further strengthened by the collective decision to repel the invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea by the armed forces of the North Korean authorities on 25 June 1950, continues to remain as necessary and valid today as it was necessary and valid when the Korean question was first discussed by the General Assembly. It follows that the exercise of such responsibility by the United Nations can never be regarded as an interference in the internal affairs of Korea.

250. Given this past history of the question and the special circumstances surrounding Korea, my delegation continues to believe that the equitable and just approach to this problem is to invite the representatives of both the Republic of Korea and North Korea to take part in the discussion of the Korean question under the same terms. Those terms are that they first unequivocally accept the competence and authority of the United Nations, within

the terms of the Charter, to take action on the Korean question. Moved by this conviction, Thailand joined with eleven other delegations in tabling draft resolution A/C.1/L.423.

251. The procedure laid down in this draft resolution does not set a double standard, nor is it discriminatory. Identical terms governing the participation of the representatives of Korea apply to both the Republic of Korea and North Korea. Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, furthermore, leaves an option to the North Korean authorities to participate in the deliberations of the Korean question. If they should, however, decide not to exercise that option, the responsibility is theirs and not that of the United Nations.

252. It is really North Korea which attempts to set unilateral conditions prior to the discussion of the question. It demands, in its statement issued on 21 September 1968, that the United Nations

"... must not discuss the 'Korean question' any more but withdraw without delay all measures taken by the illegal 'resolutions' on the 'Korean question'..." [See A/C.1/966.]

Such an intransigent and belligerent attitude can hardly be interpreted as a sincere desire on the part of the North Koreans to contribute to the fruitful and positive deliberations of the Korean question. It is the North Korean authorities themselves who block the door to peaceful and constructive co-operation with the Republic of Korea and the United Nations.

253. For the reasons I have outlined, my delegation expresses its hope that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.423 will be adopted as in previous years and that the Bulgarian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3/ will be rejected accordingly.

254. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): The statement by the representative of Thailand completes the list of those scheduled to speak on the item under consideration. Unless any representative wishes to speak, we shall adjourn the meeting and meet again tomorrow to hear explanations of vote and to take a vote.

*The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.*