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*Chairman:* Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN  
(Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 73

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5428 and Add.1) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) said that during the ten years in which the question of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests had been before the General Assembly, most of the non-nuclear Powers had condemned such tests and had tried to bring about an agreement to end them. They had done so because of their conviction that such an agreement would provide a more rational basis for serious disarmament negotiations, would limit the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and would prevent further contamination of the atmosphere by radio-active fall-out. In that connexion he paid tribute to all the countries taking part in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, particularly the eight non-aligned members, who, by their constant efforts and insistent pressure on the major nuclear Powers, had paved the way for the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963.

2. Though that treaty, which the Iraqi Government had been among the first to sign, had already helped to eliminate the worst manifestations of the cold war, it was disappointing that it did not also provide for a total ban on underground tests. For if underground testing were permitted to continue, many of the gains to be expected from the treaty would be largely nullified. The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be revived, the arms race would be stimulated and even the threat of contamination would not be entirely eliminated; and all that might well upset the delicate balance which had been established and even lead to the denunciation of the treaty and the resumption of tests in other environments. The banning of underground tests was therefore an urgent necessity, and the Eighteen-Nation Committee must strive hard to overcome the few obstacles that still stood in the path of agreement. The positions of the Western Powers, which believed that on-site inspection of underground seismic events was necessary, and of the socialist countries, which believed such inspection

to be unnecessary, were not really far apart, and there were grounds for hoping that agreement could be achieved before long.

3. Closely related to the imperative need for a ban on underground testing was the necessity for all States to adhere to the partial test ban treaty, particularly those which possessed the actual or potential capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The Iraqi delegation endorsed the many appeals already made to those Powers to accede to the treaty without delay. In that connexion it also wished to pay tribute to States which, though possessing the scientific, technological and economic capacity to produce nuclear weapons, had refrained from doing so, thereby helping to reduce the dangers to peace and human health.

4. At its current session the General Assembly could do no more than renew its appeals for a comprehensive test ban, expressing the hope that methods of detection and verification would be so improved as to bring about an early agreement on the banning of underground tests, and appeal emphatically to all States to adhere to the partial test ban treaty as quickly as possible. Any draft resolution which embodied those ideas would receive the support of the Iraqi delegation.

5. Mr. KANE (Senegal) said that the participation of the non-aligned countries in the debate was motivated solely by their obstinate desire for peace. As the Head of an African State had told the General Assembly a few days earlier, the three imperatives by which men were guided were liberty, development and peace; and that was particularly true for the young nations, which knew that without peace they could not win their battle against hunger, misery, disease and ignorance.

6. The position of the African nations on the question of general and complete disarmament had been made quite clear in a resolution adopted by the Heads of African States at the Summit Conference of Independent African States, held at Addis Ababa in May 1963, and had been confirmed by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its meeting held at Dakar in August. A resolution adopted by the latter body had invited the representatives of the African countries at the United Nations to concert their efforts to achieve the objectives of the Addis Ababa resolution declaring Africa a denuclearized zone; it had welcomed the Moscow treaty and had suggested that States members of the Organization of African Unity should accede to it; and it had urged the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to pursue its efforts to bring about the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The rightness of that attitude had been confirmed by recent international events, which gave grounds for hoping that what had been only a dream a few months ago might soon become a reality.

7. The non-aligned countries, through their work in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, had done much to make the partial test ban treaty possible. Although they had not been present at Moscow for the final negotiations, the drafters of the treaty had undoubtedly taken account of the views they had expressed at Geneva. His delegation accordingly wished to pay tribute to the work accomplished by the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

8. It was true that the treaty was deficient in a number of respects. It did not prohibit underground testing, it contained no provisions for restricting the production or refinement of nuclear weapons or for reducing stockpiles of such weapons, and it did not eliminate the threat of war. Yet, apart from the fact that even a partial agreement was better than no agreement, the treaty did save the world from the danger of radio-active fall-out, and would to some extent help to limit the dissemination of nuclear weapons. In that connexion he paid tribute to countries like Canada which, though they had the means to continue their nuclear weapons development programmes, had decided to halt them. Finally, by reducing world tension and improving relations between the Soviet bloc and the Western Powers, the Treaty would help to limit the arms race. The international atmosphere prevailing since the treaty had been signed gave cause for believing that the way to other agreements was now open. For that reason he hoped that all States which had not yet signed it would now do so.

9. The true value of the treaty was as a spring-board to other agreements, such as that reached recently by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom concerning the prohibition of the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction. It was to be hoped that those Powers would soon reach agreement to ban all nuclear testing, including underground tests, so aiding the world to achieve general and complete disarmament.

10. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty testified to the growing strength of the forces of peace and was a triumph for the policy of co-existence. It proved that all international problems could be solved through negotiation and that further steps could be taken to strengthen confidence between States, expand co-operation and safeguard the security of all. The treaty was a practical step towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under strict international control. In that connexion, he wished to commend the United States and the United Kingdom for their willingness to accept the proposal for a partial test ban put forward by the Soviet Union.

11. Although the treaty had not halted the arms race, it would restrict it to some extent if its provisions were faithfully carried out. Its chief significance, however, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had pointed out in replying to questions by newspaper correspondents on 27 July 1963,<sup>1/</sup> was that it had helped to create a more favourable atmosphere for the solution of other important international problems. The unanimous adoption of General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon all States to refrain from placing nuclear weapons

in orbit in outer space, was further proof of the need for continued efforts and of the responsibility resting with the great Powers. He wished to emphasize, at the same time, the important part which the small and medium-sized Powers had to play in the struggle for peace. It was only with the participation of all nations that a lasting and effective solution could be found for major international problems, and the smaller Powers must constantly aid the great Powers in strengthening the policy of peaceful coexistence.

12. There were still some reactionary proponents of cold war, few in number but influential, who did not find the Moscow treaty to their liking and who clung to the bankrupt policy of "positions of strength". Their efforts must be resisted, so that the "spirit of Moscow" should not prove as short-lived as the earlier "spirit of Geneva" and "spirit of Camp David". The French Government, which insisted that France could not be great unless it possessed nuclear weapons, was pursuing a dangerous policy which seriously threatened the prospects for a further improvement of the international atmosphere. Another threat to peace was the plan to create a "multilateral" nuclear force of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. No one would be deceived by the argument that the "multilateral" force was designed to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons resulting from the establishment of individual nuclear forces by the various members of NATO. Those activities on the part of the Western countries had unquestionably had an adverse effect on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

13. The Western Powers' insistence on international inspection as essential to a ban on underground testing was unrealistic and served only to widen the differences between the parties concerned. As the Soviet representative had recently pointed out once again, underground nuclear tests could be identified by means of national detection systems. The Byelorussian delegation was certain that given the proper political attitude that problem would be solved at the technical level, as had the problem of detecting other types of nuclear tests by national means. He recalled in that connexion the Indian representative's statement (1310th meeting) calling for an unremitting effort to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty lest continued underground testing should lead to a deterioration of the international atmosphere and the ultimate resumption of testing in other environments.

14. A constant effort must be maintained to achieve further advances wherever possible, taking advantage of the favourable atmosphere created by the partial test ban treaty.

15. Mr. COULIBALY (Mali) said that while his Government had welcomed the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty, it should not be forgotten that that treaty was only one step on the way to a complete solution of the problem. It did not prohibit underground testing; moreover, two major Powers—France, which was already a nuclear Power, and the People's Republic of China, which was on the way to becoming one—had not yet acceded to it. The Government of Mali considered that everything possible should be done to associate all nations in a total nuclear test ban.

16. The problem of nuclear testing, however, should not be isolated from that of general and complete disarmament. His delegation would refrain from taking sides in the controversy on on-site inspection,

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1963, document DC/208, annex 1, sect. P (ENDC/103).

which was due to the continued lack of confidence among the major nuclear Powers, but hoped that it would soon be settled; in that connexion, the new proposals made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR should be explored. It was to be hoped that France would decide to participate in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, whose untiring labours had made possible the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty. In addition, his delegation agreed with most other delegations that the question of a nuclear test ban and of general disarmament could not be finally solved in the absence of the People's Republic of China.

17. The continuation of nuclear testing and the manufacture and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction not only confronted mankind with a ghastly peril but entailed a colossal expenditure of funds which would be better devoted to assisting the developing countries. The great Powers should make the relatively small sacrifices of prestige required if the problem was to be solved.

18. His delegation felt that on the basis of existing proposals, the Eighteen-Nation Committee could prepare recommendations for consideration at a summit conference, at which all countries without any exception should be represented. Finally, it wished to repeat the appeal and addressed to all nuclear Powers by the Heads of African States at Addis Ababa, in the hope that mankind might be freed from the fear of total annihilation and that scientific progress might be used solely for man's welfare.

19. Mr. DE BEUS (Netherlands) said that no one could fail to be impressed with the striking degree of unanimity which had been shown in the statements of nearly all representatives on the issues under discussion. In particular, there had been very substantial agreement on a number of mainpoints. Firstly, the conclusion of a partial test ban treaty had been hailed with general satisfaction. The Netherlands, which was the most densely populated country in the world and, being located in the heart of industrial Europe, was particularly vulnerable to the dangers of atomic radiation, felt particular pleasure at that achievement; he wished to express his country's appreciation of the selfless and far-sighted statesmanship displayed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in concluding the treaty, and of the untiring efforts of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, particularly the eight non-aligned nations, in helping to pave the way for it.

20. Secondly, all had agreed that the treaty should be followed up with further steps, since it was of vital importance not to lose the impetus gained.

21. A third point of general agreement was that a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests should be achieved, by banning underground tests also. However, the question of the detection and identification of such tests still remained a stumbling-block. His delegation considered that on-site inspections remained necessary for explosions that could not be identified by other means. Fortunately, scientific advances had considerably narrowed down that category of explosions, and it was to be hoped that co-operation between the parties would help to reduce it further still, and that the Soviet Union would either make available the methods of detection in its possession or again consent to a limited number of on-site inspections, as it had previously agreed to do, since otherwise the achievement of a comprehensive test ban would be

impossible. The United States representative had already told the Committee that his country was prepared to accept certain restrictions and safeguards regarding on-site inspections.

22. Fourthly, there was a general hope, which the Netherlands shared, that all nations that had not yet signed the partial test ban treaty would do so, giving it universal effect; in that connexion, he drew attention to the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the treaty, which was evidence of that country's intention not to develop its own nuclear weapons.

23. Finally, there was agreement that negotiations with a view to general and complete disarmament should be continued, and that the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which had the full backing of the General Assembly, was the best possible forum for that purpose. His delegation fully shared that view; on the other hand, it felt that the Soviet proposal for a meeting of that Committee early in 1964 at the level of Heads of Government was premature, and that further preparatory work was required before such a summit conference could be held.

24. His delegation would whole-heartedly support any draft resolution in which those five points were embodied; he understood that such a draft resolution would shortly be submitted to the Committee.

25. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) said that the first appeal to the nuclear Powers to suspend nuclear weapon tests had been made by the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in April 1955. Since then it had been repeated more and more insistently, especially by the non-nuclear countries, and had been the subject of many General Assembly resolutions. Finally, it had been reiterated in May 1963 by the Heads of State or Government of thirty African countries at Addis Ababa. It was that increasing pressure, coupled with improvements in detection techniques, which had finally led to the conclusion at Moscow of a treaty providing for a partial nuclear test ban. For it should never be forgotten that the great Powers, as the Mexican representative had said in the General Assembly (1239th plenary meeting), concluded agreements only when it was in their interest to do so and when they felt that lack of agreement was prejudicial to their security.

26. The general optimism to which the signing of the treaty had given rise had recently been tempered by the doubts expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR regarding the outlook for further negotiations; but there was still room for hope that under the heavy pressure of world opinion the nuclear Powers would come to identify the early solution of cold-war issues with their own national interests.

27. There was almost complete agreement in the Committee that the most urgent next step was the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty covering underground tests. Representatives of the eight non-aligned countries which had been so active at the Geneva Conferences had already put forward several arguments and scientific proposals, which he would not repeat but which his delegation whole-heartedly endorsed, with a view to achieving that goal. On the other hand, while the three major nuclear Powers had sought to avoid controversy, they had also refrained from taking positive stand, which suggested that they did not at the moment want an agreement on underground testing. He hoped that, as the United Kingdom representative had stated, prospects were better for agreement on other collateral

measures than they appeared to be for a comprehensive test ban. The Indonesian delegation felt that collateral disarmament measures and a comprehensive test ban were very closely interrelated, and that progress made in one field would be bound to stimulate progress in the other. The process was essentially a reciprocal one, and if the negotiators bore that fact in mind, simultaneous agreement on both issues could be expected to ensue.

28. Such simultaneous agreement, backed up by all the strength of world opinion, would no doubt compel France and the People's Republic of China to review their present regrettably negative stand towards international disarmament efforts, evidenced by their refusal to sign the partial test ban treaty. It was to be hoped that that refusal would not deter the three nuclear Powers in their efforts to come to agreement on underground testing.

29. President de Gaulle had taken the view that France had no choice but to become a nuclear Power, since the three present nuclear Powers would never renounce their nuclear weapons. If, however, he were to see genuine signs of their intention to do so, he would probably be statesman enough to refrain from obstructing their efforts and to give up his own endeavour to make France a nuclear Power. The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, especially if accompanied by collateral disarmament measures, would certainly provide convincing evidence of such an intention.

30. France's intention to test a hydrogen bomb in the Pacific area had alarmed all the countries signatories to the partial test ban treaty, and had resulted in protests from the countries in closest proximity to the projected test area. Fortunately there was still a breathing-space left in which to negotiate a comprehensive test ban and collateral disarmament measures, since it appeared that France would not be in possession of nuclear weapons until 1967. However, the need for drawing the People's Republic of China into the negotiations had also to be borne in mind; the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, was reported in The New York Times as having stated that in a year or two it would no longer be possible to negotiate a disarmament treaty without the participation of Communist China.

31. It seemed likely that that consideration was at the root of the current discussions on future nuclear co-operation between France and the United States, which co-operation the latter country would doubtless make conditional on France's accession to the partial test ban treaty. However France's accession to that treaty would not prevent it from resorting to underground testing in order to put into practice any theoretical information it obtained from the United States. A comprehensive test ban treaty accompanied by collateral disarmament measures was therefore the only real safeguard against France's desire to establish itself as a nuclear Power.

32. The reasoning that applied to France also held good in the case of the People's Republic of China, with the difference that if the Government of that country was to be brought to the disarmament forum, the problem of China's representation in the United Nations must first be solved. As to the possible attitude of the Government in question, all that could be said was that, like the other major Powers, the People's Republic of China would conclude only agreements which it believed to be in its own interest.

There again, the pressure of public opinion could play an important part in convincing the People's Republic of China that general and complete disarmament was in fact in its interests. Agreements for a comprehensive test ban treaty and for collateral measures signed by the vast majority of nations, including France, could create an appropriate climate for negotiations on general and complete disarmament. But time was short, and immediate action was essential.

33. Mr. BERNARDES (Brazil) commended the three nuclear Powers and the United Nations organs concerned for what they had done to bring about a partial nuclear test ban, which would ultimately reduce the human toll exacted by radio-active fall-out. It was hard to believe that in the name of national interest certain countries could act with such complete disregard of the vital interests of the international community as a whole; surely it could not be argued that nuclear testing had made the world a more secure place to live in.

34. It was unfortunate that the partial test ban treaty did not cover underground testing, thus leaving the door open for the continuation of the arms race, and that the major nuclear Powers were actively engaged in underground testing and were keeping in readiness the equipment and personnel required for a resumption of testing in all environments. He hoped that the preparations for a resumption of testing were merely precautionary and would be abandoned as international confidence increased.

35. The problem of inspection, which was a major obstacle to a ban on underground testing, was not insoluble. Disagreement centered largely on the question of how many annual inspections should be permitted, with one side contending that two or three were sufficient while the other insisted on a minimum of seven. With regard to the argument that the inspection teams might engage in espionage, it should be pointed out that however many on-site inspections were agreed upon, the same number would apply to both sides. He hoped that the Soviet representative's statement at the 1312th meeting that his Government could not agree to any inspection did not mean that the Soviet Union had withdrawn its previous offer to permit two or three inspections a year.

36. While the question of controls remained unsettled, progress could be made, as the Brazilian Foreign Minister had pointed out recently in the General Assembly (1208th plenary meeting), by extending the application of the test ban treaty to underground tests above a certain yield which could easily be detected with the national monitoring equipment now available. His Government had already made that suggestion at Geneva and intended to bring the matter up again when the Eighteen-Nation Committee reconvened. He hoped that the nuclear Powers would deal with that problem in the pragmatic spirit that had led to the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty.

37. He wished to conclude by urging the nuclear Powers to make full use of the political and technical machinery that had been established by the United Nations with their concurrence. It was surprising that the three original signatories of the Moscow treaty, although members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the sole members of its Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, had preferred to act outside that Committee. Those Powers should avoid giving the im-

pression that they were setting up a kind of nuclear directorate whose decisions the world at large would merely be called upon to ratify.

38. Mr. BOSSAY (Chile), after paying tribute to the delegation of India for the leading role which it had played for so many years in the struggle to end nuclear and thermo-nuclear testing, expressed his delegation's satisfaction at the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty, which his country had been among the first to sign. That treaty had done much to relieve international tension and could mark the beginning of a new era of true peace. Although limited in scope, the treaty had broken a vicious circle and opened up new vistas of a world freed from the atomic terror. It was that feeling which had led the Presidents of Chile and Yugoslavia to issue a joint communiqué on 25 September 1963 welcoming the treaty as a first step on the road to peace and general disarmament and expressing the hope that the great Powers would continue to seek agreements with a view to removing the danger of war and eliminating all nuclear weapons. The two Presidents had also stated their view that the reduction of international tension and the consequent limitation of armaments would benefit the developing countries by releasing resources for economic and technical co-operation; and they had welcomed the declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America issued on 29 April 1963 by the Presidents of Chile and four other Latin American countries (A/5415) as an example of the way in which the small and medium-sized nations could contribute to the reduction of international tension and the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

39. The delegation of Chile would support the draft resolution which the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee proposed to submit, calling on all countries to accede to the Moscow treaty. Chile appealed to all countries which had not yet signed the treaty to do so, and addressed a special appeal to a certain country with which it had long-standing bonds of friendship to give up its announced intention of conducting nuclear tests in the South Pacific, thereby freeing Oceania and the west coast of South America from the danger of radio-active contamination.

40. Yet even if all countries acceded to the treaty, there would still remain the question of underground tests, which had to be resolved as soon as possible. He was convinced that some system could be found either of detecting underground tests at long range or of making espionage impossible in the case of on-site inspection, so satisfying both sides. The Powers concerned had repeatedly expressed their wish to reach agreement on the question, and the delegation of Chile appealed to them to try and find as soon as possible a basis for expanding the Moscow treaty to cover nuclear tests in all environments. Now that they had reached agreement not to contaminate the atmosphere, the sea and outer space and not to place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in orbit, an agreement on underground tests should not be difficult to reach.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.