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Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
(Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 73

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5428 and Add.1) (*continued*)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. PAVICEVIC (Yugoslavia) welcomed the improvement in the international climate brought about by the conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, to which Yugoslavia was a party; he paid tribute in that connexion to the efforts of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and especially to the group of non-aligned States represented in that Committee. It was gratifying to note that the preamble proclaimed as the principal aim of the treaty the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, which would put an end to the armaments race and to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons. The treaty, which was the first agreement achieved in the field of disarmament, would help to promote confidence among States and to reduce international tension, and would pave the way to agreement on other disarmament measures and to the settlement of existing political disputes. Its implementation would prevent an increase in radio-active contamination and could do much to minimize the proliferation of nuclear weapons, provided that the nuclear Powers refrained from supplying nuclear arms, or the technical means of producing them, to other countries, and that all nuclear weapon tests were prohibited. The total and universal implementation of the treaty would be a first substantial step towards a slackening in the arms race and one which could and should ultimately lead to the denuclearization of the nuclear Powers themselves. In the meantime, however, all the other ways of continuing the armaments race remained open. The treaty would therefore be fully effective only in so far as it was followed by other agreements providing for disarmament and for the settlement of other international questions.

2. Since the Moscow treaty was incomplete and limited in scope, it was the responsibility of the United Nations, and primarily of the nuclear Powers,

to correct those flaws. The fact that underground tests were not specifically prohibited by the treaty did not mean that they were in keeping with the spirit of the treaty. Moreover, while it made the perfecting of nuclear weapons more difficult, the treaty did not stop the arms race and only hindered, but did not prevent, the proliferation of nuclear weapons; thus there was a danger that the continuance of underground testing might lead to the denunciation of the treaty, under its article IV. The treaty therefore needed to be completed by other agreements as soon as possible.

3. The problem of the cessation of underground testing was essentially not a technical but a political one. The technical difficulties of providing safeguards against the risk of secret underground tests could be solved. Some representatives had referred to the papers read by seismologists at the General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, held at Berkeley, California, in August 1963, concerning new methods of detecting and identifying low-power underground explosions. Furthermore, the discussions on the subject at the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs held at Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, in September 1963 deserved consideration. The nuclear Powers should spare no effort and should display the courage and political realism needed to secure the banning of underground tests.

4. Although more than 100 countries had signed the treaty, several others, some of which were already or potentially nuclear Powers, had felt that it was not in their interest to do so. The abstention of those countries was a threat to the treaty itself and to the international situation. It was therefore to be hoped that all countries would soon see their way clear to signing the treaty, imperfect though it might be. Furthermore, everything possible should be done to ensure that the treaty achieved its utmost political significance and contributed to the positive development of international relations.

5. His delegation was confident that the First Committee would conclude its consideration of the question by adopting a draft resolution clearly reflecting the desires that had been expressed during the debate, which were: that the treaty should be completed by the banning of underground tests, that an appeal should be made to all States to become parties to the treaty, and that all States should continue the work now initiated by concluding other agreements both in the field of disarmament and in that of international relations in general.

6. Mr. OWONO (Cameroon) said that the partial test ban treaty was the first decisive step toward international peace, but must be completed by the banning of underground tests. The same process should be followed as in the case of tests in other environments: the parties should display their goodwill by seeking a compromise permitting progress towards the desired result. Since on the one hand the Soviet Union—which

had accepted the principle of international control—now asserted that scientific means for the long-range detection of underground explosions were available, and on the other hand the Western Powers considered that such explosions could not be identified with sufficient accuracy by present methods, it was urgently necessary for the Committee to recommend that the Powers concerned should work out a compromise formula taking into account their respective offers. Such a solution might, for example, provide for the simultaneous use of on-site inspection and detection with scientific instruments, with a clause allowing the number of inspections to be increased or decreased after an agreed period, depending on the practical difficulties encountered in carrying out inspections and on the degree of reliability achieved in scientific detection methods. That formula could be completed by a declaration offering assurances with regard to the fears of espionage voiced by the Soviet Union. That suggestion might possibly serve as a basis for discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In any event, an appeal should be made to the nuclear Powers to complete the task now begun by reaching a speedy agreement on the banning of underground tests. His delegation would vote in favour of any draft resolution drafted on those lines.

7. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) said that the partial test ban treaty signed at Moscow was an achievement of historic importance because it would not only put an end to the contamination of the atmosphere but also help to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to reduce the tempo of the arms race. That was why Iran had been one of the first countries to sign the treaty, the ratification of which was soon to be considered by the Iranian Parliament.

8. The fact that the treaty was incomplete meant that the Eighteen-Nation Committee must continue its endeavours to secure the banning of underground tests, a step which would facilitate a solution of the complex issues of total disarmament. Moreover, the effectiveness of the treaty was conditional on its universality. The United Nations should therefore do everything possible to persuade all countries, especially all nuclear or potential nuclear Powers, to sign the treaty.

9. The conclusion of the treaty proved that the issues separating East and West were not insoluble; and advantage should be taken of the present improvement in the international atmosphere in order not only to extend the treaty to underground tests, but also to conclude agreements on collateral issues such as measures to prevent surprise attack, the limitation of certain types of armaments and so on. In that way, the kind of climate which was a *sine qua non* for any agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament could be engendered.

10. Mr. KHOSBAYAR (Mongolia) said that the political climate had clearly improved since the signing of the partial test ban treaty. The fact that the overwhelming majority of States had acceded to the treaty demonstrated the vitality of the principle of peaceful coexistence between States having different political and social systems. The adoption of General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII), which was intended to prevent the nuclear arms race from extending into outer space, constituted a new advance for the cause of peace.

11. The continuation of underground tests presented a great danger and intensified the arms race; it was important to suspend those tests as soon as possible.

The main obstacle to an agreement on that subject was the stubbornness with which the Western Powers were continuing to insist on the institution of an international system of inspection, when scientists of a number of countries, including some United States scientists, had recognized that national detection devices were adequate.

12. It was regrettable that certain States had refused to accede to the treaty for reasons stemming from narrow nationalistic considerations. France, in particular, had not only refused to accede to the treaty but was actively preparing for new nuclear tests. In his view, such actions should be condemned, from whatever quarter they might arise and regardless of the pretexts used to justify them. If the parties concerned displayed goodwill, controversial international problems could be settled peacefully through negotiation.

13. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Committee would adopt a draft resolution reflecting the desire of all peoples to put an end to all nuclear tests.

14. Mr. QUAISON-SACKKEY (Ghana) said that items relating to the question of disarmament continued to loom large in the Committee's agenda. No progress could be achieved in the direction of disarmament without the agreement of the great Powers, but the smaller nations had the duty to express the yearning of all mankind for peace. Today a shaft of light had penetrated the darkness that only recently had hung over the world; the partial test ban treaty was a significant milestone in the quest for peace. The nuclear armaments build-up seemed to have brought home to all mankind that it was rushing toward its own destruction; the mounting costs of nuclear weapon tests and armaments were reaching a level beyond the financial capacity of the countries concerned; there was reason to hope that that would lead to a more comprehensive test ban treaty and the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament.

15. Even the most sceptical would concede that the treaty could be a first step in that direction and could put a stop to the spread of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear Powers. One must, however, be realistic enough to admit that it did not solve all problems, that it did not eliminate the dangers arising from suspicion, oppression and blind nationalism, and that atomic weapons continued to exist. Critics had rightly pointed out that the treaty was conditional and could easily be abrogated; they had added that the future might perhaps show that the present optimism had been illusory. In that connexion, it was regrettable that France and the People's Republic of China had not become signatories. What was more, France was contemplating further tests in the atmosphere in the South Pacific, despite the protests against those projected tests. His delegation appealed to France to heed the voice of world opinion. Any draft resolution adopted by the Committee should contain a provision calling upon all States, both great and small, to sign the partial test ban treaty, thus preparing the way for a more comprehensive agreement banning nuclear tests in all environments.

16. It had already been said that the partial test ban was only the first move. No one, therefore, could remain indifferent to the continuation of underground testing, since, according to the scientists themselves, health hazards from such testing could not be completely eliminated. To be sure, there were still ob-

stacles on the road to agreement; for example, the parties concerned held different views regarding a system of inspection. Negotiations should therefore continue in a spirit of give and take, so that a satisfactory solution might be found; that solution would be greatly accelerated by the rapid improvement in the scientific methods of detection. In view of the intensive programme undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union in that field, his delegation proposed that the nuclear Powers should agree to suspend underground testing for two years while negotiations continued on control, inspection and detection; such a moratorium would help to improve the favourable atmosphere created by the agreements already reached and open the way for new agreements.

17. He welcomed the results already achieved and the role played by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, especially by the non-aligned countries taking part in it. Every proposal made to seek a new solution should be seriously examined and not dismissed as a mere propaganda exercise. He therefore recommended for serious consideration the Soviet proposal for a summit conference of the States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, since that Committee had proved itself capable of making a worthy contribution towards the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement.

18. Moreover, his delegation would continue to support the idea of denuclearized zones, which had gained much support since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI), entitled "Consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone". He deplored the fact that, in the absence of an agreement to stop all nuclear tests, the nuclear Powers had not given immediate practical support to that excellent idea. The signing of the Moscow treaty did not, however, impair the validity of that proposal, in spite of the complexities of the problem.

19. In any case, the treaty had demonstrated what could be achieved in a spirit of mutual trust. Mankind yearned to be free from the dread of a nuclear holocaust, and that goal no longer appeared unattainable. That craving would be fully satisfied with the successful conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, which could be regarded as the prelude to general and complete disarmament. His delegation would support any draft resolution which reflected the considerations he had outlined.

20. Mr. TARAZI (Syria) was happy to see that the discussion on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests was taking place in a calm atmosphere. There was, therefore, reason to hope that the atom could, after all, be placed at the service of humanity and not used, as might have been feared at first, solely for purposes of destruction. The partial test ban treaty represented an essential step in that direction, and the States that had not yet signed that agreement should be urged to do so as soon as possible. Nevertheless, that first step would remain incomplete until underground tests had been banned. Efforts must therefore be made to attain that goal, and his delegation, for its part, would support any initiative which would help to preserve civilization from the atomic danger for ever.

21. Mr. JAYARATNE (Ceylon) also urged the great Powers to surmount the final obstacle to a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Although the partial test ban treaty was still a fragile instrument, he never-

theless congratulated the three major nuclear Powers and the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, whose constructive role had helped to bring about the present understanding. His delegation was happy to note certain encouraging trends toward an agreement on underground tests. Such an accord, of course, could come only when the Powers concerned were satisfied that they would not be jeopardizing their vital security interests, but there seemed to be a sincere desire on their part to reach agreement. The positions they had adopted with regard to on-site inspections left the door open for further negotiations, and it was to be hoped that every effort would be made to fulfil the promise contained in the preamble to the Moscow treaty.

22. There must be no room left for anyone to make the charge that the treaty had merely made a virtue of necessity in banning tests in the environments where they were no longer necessary and leaving the way open for a new arms race through underground tests. Those tests themselves might contribute further to the contamination of the atmosphere and thus add to the inescapable consequences which that contamination already implied for future generations. Moreover, the continuation of underground tests provided a convenient pretext for those who might wish to resume tests in the three environments where they were already banned. So much was at stake that the work must not be left unfinished, for fear of imperilling the gains already made. In that connexion, his delegation hoped that the nuclear Powers would study carefully the various suggestions which had been made by the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and of which a synopsis had been prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Swedish delegation.^{1/} He urged the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to continue to use their good offices to bring about an understanding among the nuclear Powers to ban underground testing, and he called upon the nuclear Powers to acknowledge the futility of continued underground tests when they were already equipped with nuclear weapons which were sufficient to destroy the entire planet but which nevertheless had brought them no feeling of security.

23. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that his Government had always supported all constructive measures and proposals aimed at achieving a genuine solution of the problem of achieving the total prohibition of the production and testing of nuclear weapons and the complete and final elimination of nuclear weapons, as an integral part of the problem of general and complete disarmament. It had stated, however, that the partial ban on nuclear weapon tests only partly met the peoples' wishes as being a measure to safeguard health, and that the Moscow treaty was essentially a deception which could have serious consequences.

24. The Moscow treaty did not in any sense solve the basic problem which affected all peoples; that of achieving the complete, permanent prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. It made no provision for reducing existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and left the nuclear Powers completely free to accumulate those weapons and even to use them in the event of war. It had the effect of legalizing underground tests, so that nuclear weapons could be perfected further; proof of that was the underground tests which

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1963, document DC/208, annex 1, sect. B (ENDC/96).

the United States had carried out immediately after the conclusion of the treaty and was still carrying out. Finally, the treaty left the parties completely free to resume testing whenever they saw fit. Thus, it was not a step towards disarmament but, on the contrary, a measure which served to promote the arms race and to guarantee certain Powers a monopoly of nuclear weapons at the expense of the peace-loving countries which were threatened by imperialist aggression. At the same time, it fostered dangerous illusions which could lull the peoples' vigilance.

25. If the United States was really concerned about the health of the peoples, it would not refuse to conclude a far-reaching agreement providing for the complete prohibition of nuclear testing and the total, permanent elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

26. His delegation wished to emphasize the fundamental importance, in the present state of world affairs, of the constructive and specific proposals made by the Government of the People's Republic of China in its statement of 31 July 1963.^{2/} The statement had called for the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and had proposed that a conference of the Heads of Government of all the countries of the world should be convened for that purpose. His Government fully supported that proposal, which testified to the sincere desire of the Government of the People's Republic of China to eliminate the danger of nuclear war to which imperialism was exposing the world.

27. His Government appreciated the efforts which the peace-loving countries represented in the United Nations were making on behalf of international peace and security. It would continue its own efforts to bring about a lasting peace through effective action aimed at permanently eliminating nuclear weapons, achieving general and complete disarmament and defeating all attempts to impose deceptive measures which threatened the peace and freedom of peoples.

28. Mr. JIMENEZ (Philippines) said that he shared the satisfaction which many delegations had expressed over the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty, which his country had been happy to sign. He commended the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union for the high statesmanship they had shown in making the treaty possible. Recognition must also be given to the contribution made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee and to the positive role played by the United Nations as a whole.

29. Despite its limitations, the treaty represented a significant break-through towards disarmament. It had brought about a marked improvement in East-West relations, had reduced radio-active fall-out and would, it was to be hoped, slow the arms race and prevent the further development of weapons of mass destruction. The immediate task was to broaden the treaty's scope to include a ban on underground testing as well. That task had a political and military aspect and a technical and scientific one. The first was of great importance, since the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty would largely depend on the realities of the cold war. However, new developments in warfare had rendered the concept of military victory

obsolete, and the nuclear Powers were aware of that fact. There had already been a substantial narrowing of the gap between the opposing positions on such issues as on-site inspection. The technical aspect of the problem, like the political one, might not be insoluble. The United States representative had stated that his country was giving urgent attention to the problem of identifying and detecting underground tests. The progress now being achieved might eventually make inspection superfluous and thus pave the way for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

30. The non-aligned nations' suggestions concerning the number of inspections and the methods of carrying them out were extremely helpful. His country took the position that until verification techniques were found satisfactory by both sides, control and supervision would have to take the form of on-site inspection. All factors—political, scientific and humanitarian—should be exploited with a view to bringing about a comprehensive test ban treaty, and it was to be hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would give the matter its urgent attention.

31. He would also like to point out that his country had always taken a very great interest in the broader problem of general and complete disarmament. The Philippines had embarked on a programme of economic and social development aimed at raising the people's standard of living through industrialization, land reform and improved education, and the programme could not be properly carried out under the constant threat of a devastating war. That sentiment was shared by other Asian countries, while at Addis Ababa the voice of Africa had also been raised in favour of general and complete disarmament. Even the great Powers had begun to seek means of reducing the crushing burden of military expenditure.

32. He was pleased that agreement had already been reached on certain measures designed to reduce the risk of war through miscalculation, failure of communications or surprise attack. The most important advance along those lines had been the establishment of a communications link between Moscow and Washington. Another was the unanimous adoption of the draft resolution prohibiting the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction (General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII)). Furthermore, the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to be in agreement on the question of exchanging military missions and establishing observation posts. It was to be hoped that such progress on collateral measures would contribute to a solution of the central problems of disarmament.

33. The far-reaching nature of the problems connected with a disarmament treaty would require the establishment of a system of verification, perhaps in the form of the international disarmament organization whose creation under the auspices of the United Nations had been proposed. Verification covering not only the destruction but also the manufacture of weapons was essential to the implementation of a disarmament programme. The existence of an impartial body like the proposed international disarmament organization, with power to supervise the process of disarmament, would help to allay mutual distrust.

34. In conclusion, he wished to emphasize that in a disarming—and ultimately a disarmed—world, the role of the United Nations as a peace-keeping body would be more important than ever. He therefore

^{2/} Transmitted to the Permanent Missions of Member States under cover of a *note verbale* dated 25 September 1963, at the request of the Permanent Representative of Albania to the United Nations.

shared the Canadian representative's view that the United Nations must improve its capacity to deal with threats to world peace. His delegation would support any measure which would help to bring about an agree-

ment on general and complete disarmament accompanied by effective guarantees.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.