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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 96

Status of the implementation of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (continued) (A/6397, A/C.1/938-940, A/C.1/L.367, A/C.1/L.388/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Corr.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru), introducing the revised text of the Latin American amendments (A/C.1/L.388/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Corr.1) to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367), said that the Latin American delegations had consulted the leaders of the Afro-Asian group and had embodied their suggestions in the revised version of the amendments.

2. The first amendment had been revised to include a direct quotation from General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX).

3. With regard to the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, it had been suggested that it should not merely reaffirm resolution 2131 (XX) in general and abstract terms but should also emphasize some of its principles. However, the sponsors had felt that no distinction should be made among the principles and rules embodied in the Declaration, and they had therefore, in the second amendment, made a general reference to all. In their view, resolution 2131 (XX) was not purely political in nature, since it contained a set of juridical rules and principles based on the United Nations Charter, on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That amendment placed equal emphasis on all the rules and principles of the Declaration, which were binding, not only because they were included in a recommendation of the General Assembly, but also because they embodied universal legal principles.

4. The third amendment was consistent with the preamble of the draft resolution and emphasized the urgency of putting an end to all forms of intervention.

5. The fourth amendment, under which sub-paragraph (c) would become sub-paragraph (b), included the words "or external" in order to place emphasis on the two forms of intervention.

6. Lastly, the fifth amendment would combine sub-paragraphs (b) and (d) of the operative paragraph of the draft resolution in a single sub-paragraph (c), in which the words "To warn those States" in the previous version and in the Soviet draft resolution would be replaced by the words "To call upon all States" which, although less emphatic, were no less important because of the moral obligation they connoted. In that sub-paragraph, the General Assembly would not only recommend an act, but would also insist that an obligation must be fulfilled. The words "and to urge them to refrain from armed intervention or the promotion or organization of subversion, terrorism or other indirect forms of intervention" had for the most part been taken from the original amendments, and the words "for the purpose of changing by violence the existing system in another State or interfering in civil strife in another State" had been taken from resolution 2131 (XX).

7. On behalf of the sponsors, he thanked the representatives who had expressed support for the amendments during the debate and the Afro-Asian delegations for their suggestions, which had helped to improve the drafting of the amendments and to make them more complete.

8. With the help the sponsors had received in re-drafting their amendments, and with the better international atmosphere created by the recent agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the text of a treaty on outer space, and the greater degree of peaceful coexistence shown on the continent of Europe—which he hoped would be extended to include Africa, Asia and Oceania—he trusted that the draft resolution and the amendments thereto might be adopted unanimously.

9. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that the adoption of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty had been the culmination of efforts by the United Nations to affirm one of the fundamental principles of international law, the strict observance of which would lay the political and juridical basis for inter-State relations founded on sovereign equality and mutual respect for each other's independence. The adoption of the Declaration had, however, been more than a mere attempt at codification or at the expression of very general political intentions. It had also been a kind of reaction by the United Nations to international tension and to the acute conflicts precipitated by the policy of inter-

ference and military aggression practised by some States, in particular by the United States. The Declaration was not merely a general reaffirmation of the principles of the Charter, but also a political instrument directed against such policies, which constituted a direct threat to international peace and which had been categorically condemned in paragraph 1.

10. It was all the more necessary to consider how that important document was being implemented because of the recent increase in tension caused by the escalation of the aggression in South-East Asia and by further interference, including armed intervention, in the domestic affairs of a number of States. In 1966, as in 1965, United States aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and its armed intervention against the people of South Viet-Nam had constituted the most flagrant violation of the principle of non-intervention and created the most dangerous hotbed of international tension. United States policy, which had violated that principle in ways ranging from indirect and disguised acts of interference to the overt and brutal use of armed aggression, posed a real threat to the freedom and independence of the peoples, and its policy in Viet-Nam constituted one of the clearest proofs of the deleterious effect of such a policy on peace.

11. The United States representative had contended at the current session, as he had at the twentieth session, that the problem of non-intervention had been exploited for the purpose of attacking his country. However, a discussion of the principle of non-intervention and the Declaration proclaiming it would be pointless if it remained academic and did not refer specifically to those who were violating the principle. It was easy to understand why the United States wished to keep the discussion on the abstract level: any consideration of concrete cases of interference and military intervention would inescapably lead to the conclusion that they had been perpetrated exclusively by the United States and some of its allies. The United States had sent an armed force of more than 350,000 men to intervene in the domestic affairs of another country, Viet-Nam, to carry out a savage bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and to decimate daily and without the least hesitation the population of South Viet-Nam. Could the United States policy in Viet-Nam be called a policy of peace and international legality? If the United States wished to show that it really respected the principle of non-intervention and the self-determination of peoples it should put an end to its aggressive actions, withdraw its troops and allow the Viet-Nameese people to settle its own affairs and solve the problem of the restoration of its national unity. If the United States really desired a settlement of the Viet-Nameese problem, it would not resort to armed aggression but would leave the Viet-Nameese people alone. Peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nameese problem required the cessation of aggressive actions against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and of armed intervention in South Viet-Nam.

12. The attempts to divert the General Assembly's attention from the most dangerous manifestations of the policy of interference followed by aggressive imperialist forces could not prevent anyone from

seeing who were those who were really violating the Declaration.

13. Oddly enough, faced with so many facts proving interference in the domestic affairs of States and armed intervention, some speakers had tried unrealistically to attack the work of certain national or international organizations such as the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, known as the Tricontinental Conference, held at Havana in January 1966, whose purpose had been to consider problems connected with the struggle of peoples against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. To attack the struggle for liberation from the colonialist and neo-colonialist yoke was not only tilting at windmills but also combating people who were struggling for their liberation. That was only a method of diverting attention from those who were truly responsible for the violation of the fundamental principle of non-interference. For example, the accusations made by some speakers that revolutionary Cuba posed a threat to the countries and peoples of the Western hemisphere were designed merely to divert attention from the culpability of United States imperialist circles, since it was hard to see how a small country like Cuba could endanger an entire hemisphere. Instead of denouncing the fact that Cuba and its valiant people were continually subject to intervention and attack by a neighbouring Power, which refused to surrender its hold over a part of Cuba territory, some Latin American representatives had invented a non-existent intervention by Cuba in their internal affairs. Even if they wished, by so doing, to find a way of indirectly denouncing intervention by the United States secret, and not-so-secret, services in their internal affairs, they were not blaming those who were directly responsible for their domestic difficulties.

14. The struggle of the peoples for a better life was both inevitable and invincible. To attempt to still the voice of the people's representatives by an erroneous interpretation of the Declaration was to attempt by improper means to conceal the identity of those who were truly responsible and to abet them in their sinister designs. Such attempts could have only one purpose: to conceal the facts and to disguise the responsibility of the United States and its allies for the aggression in Viet-Nam, the intervention against the Dominican Republic, the military provocations against Cuba, and many cases of interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

15. The General Assembly should once again call upon States immediately to cease military intervention or interference in whatever form and strictly to observe the United Nations Charter and the Declaration. Since those principles were contained in the USSR draft resolution, his delegation would support it.

16. Mr. ALARCON DE QUESADA (Cuba) said that some representatives had tried to confuse the debate by falsifying the one possible interpretation of the immutable rule of law, non-intervention. Although they had failed in their endeavour, he felt it his duty to refute the theory they had attempted to expound.

17. The delegations concerned were trying to advance a new version of the problem of intervention and on its basis a new version of the principle of law which

prohibited intervention. They had tried to show that interference in the internal and external affairs of States had gone through two distinct historical phases: the first, already passed, a period of armed intervention, the most serious form of direct intervention; and the second and current phase, a period of indirect intervention, supposedly insidious and entirely new. Some even suggested that the latter type of intervention had been born at the recent Tricontinental Conference.

18. Of course, direct intervention was not a thing of the past, and indirect intervention was not an invention of the present. He would give facts to prove that point, but it was worth while inquiring into the motives behind a theory so much at variance with reality. The aim was to sweeten the image of imperialism for the small nations, while at the same time pretending that there was a new form of intervention which could be practised by a small nation of limited military strength against a great imperialist Power. Since an open attack by Cuban marines on the United States was entirely beyond belief, the innovators of international law had invented the myth of indirect action by Cuban elements against the United States Government and the rest of the hemisphere which would culminate in the destruction of all those Governments and in an empire of unprecedented cruelty. Imperialism and its allies, to protect themselves from such intervention, were establishing a permanent supra-national force to ward off aggression, whether detectable or not; the action of that permanent force would not be intervention, but "counter-intervention". Thus a workers' strike in one country could be considered the result of intervention by another country requiring the friendly landing of troops from still other countries in order to safeguard the principle of non-intervention. That was counter-intervention, the new contribution of Pan-Americanism to contemporary international law.

19. The truth of the matter was, of course, that the history of intervention was a history of interference by the big imperialist Powers in the affairs of small nations. The international policy of imperialism was by definition interventionist. An imperialist Power was a country with capital investments abroad, a country needing raw materials for its industries and markets for its manufactures. Those factors were peculiar to the imperialist countries and were at the root of intervention in small countries, of the development of colonialism, of the world's division into spheres of influence and of the wars for the redistribution of the subject countries.

20. It was because Latin America's history was richest in United States aggression and interference that Latin American had originated the principle of non-intervention. That principle had arisen as a means of defence against United States interference, and Latin American jurists had struggled to have the principle prevail over United States imperialist philosophy. Latin America had suffered immeasurably at the hands of United States imperialism, which had employed every form of intervention, armed, diplomatic, economic and propagandistic and including all the means of sabotage, subversion and terrorism. Indeed, with technical advances, imperialism was

constantly modernizing its interventionist and subversive activities.

21. There could be no anti-interventionism without anti-imperialism. Any true defence of the principle of non-intervention must be founded on true adherence to the anti-imperialist cause and complete support for the emancipation movements of exploited peoples.

22. That was the background against which his delegation had judged and endorsed General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) at the previous session. All the forms of intervention described in that resolution had been perpetrated by United States imperialism against the peoples of Latin America and particularly against the peoples of the Caribbean. All of them had been used against Cuba since January 1959. His delegation considered any other interpretation of the resolution unacceptable, since that would vitiate the Declaration and place it at the service of purposes alien to those it had been meant to serve.

23. Since the adoption of the resolution, the United States imperialists, flouting the principles of international law, the United Nations Charter and the resolution itself, had continued their interference in the domestic affairs of the Viet-Nameese people, escalated their bombings of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, extended the use of poison gases and chemical and bacteriological substances, sent fresh military contingents and pressured their allies and puppets into intervening more actively. The peoples of Cambodia and Laos continued to suffer the consequences of the constantly escalating aggression.

24. Cuba fully supported and co-operated with the Viet-Nameese people, marvelled at their heroism and considered their fight against imperialism to be a fight for peace.

25. In recent weeks, the United States troops occupying the south of the Korean peninsula had carried out a number of armed provocations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In the First Committee, the United States delegation had been manoeuvring to prevent the General Assembly from inviting the legitimate Korean authorities to take part in the discussion of matters which they alone could resolve. Those facts, together with the illegal military occupation of South Korea, were evidence of the continuing United States intervention in the domestic affairs of the Korean people.

26. During the current year the United States had also intensified its policies of aggression, interference, pillage and subversion in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, resorting to direct armed aggression, the overthrow of Governments, sabotage, diplomatic and economic coercion and defamation. In Latin America, the United States Government, with the support of the Brazilian fascists and other military régimes controlled by Washington, was trying to impose the creation of the so-called inter-American peace force. Its establishment, intended to legalize future armed intervention by the United States, would make a mockery of the principles of the Charter of the Organization of American States and obliterate the principle of non-intervention in America.

27. In the course of the year, however, one encouraging event related to the defence of the principle of non-intervention and the protection of the independence and sovereignty of States had occurred: the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America. That Conference had opened up new prospects for the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. For the first time, authentic representatives of exploited and downtrodden peoples had met to exchange views and adopt agreements in support of the cause of universal emancipation. Nothing agreed to at the Conference benefited imperialism, colonialism or racism. None of its decisions was calculated to maintain the inequalities which for centuries had divided the international community into an affluent minority and an impoverished majority. It was logical, therefore, that the Conference should have earned the hatred of the United States imperialists and their racist and colonialist allies, and that imperialism should have ordered its puppets to denounce it. That explained certain statements in the present debate and the circulation of a certain OAS document. If the debate had shown nothing else, it had demonstrated to the world the servile and ludicrous nature of Pan-Americanism. For the representatives of other regions, who spoke on behalf of independent and principled States, the spectacle must have been lamentable indeed.

28. Supporters of the Organization of American States had asked the Assembly to condemn the Tricontinental Conference. They had invoked the principle of non-intervention in order to wield it against the victims of imperialist intervention and against a gathering which in a fortnight had done more to combat the intervention, aggression and exploitation of imperialism than their own Governments had done in a century and a half of pseudo-independent existence. Not one of those representatives had had the courage to mention a single problem of current international concern upon which other representatives had commented. They had asserted that the principle of non-intervention had profound roots in Latin America, but not one of them had dared to cite a single situation conferring such importance on the principle.

29. Prime Minister Fidel Castro, in his letter of 10 February 1966 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,^{1/} had been quite specific in that regard, mentioning United States imperialist interventions against Panama in 1903, Cuba in 1906, Mexico in 1914 and 1917, Haiti in 1915, the Dominican Republic in 1915, Nicaragua in 1910 and 1925 and Guatemala, Cuba and the Dominican Republic in recent years. He had pointed out that the revolutionary solidarity of the peoples of Latin America had assumed a very active form at the time of the struggle carried on by Bolívar, San Martín and Sucre, and that no one would think of describing the Latin American liberation movement of the nineteenth century as an act of intervention. He had recalled the Panama Conference of 1826 summoned by Simón Bolívar, which by present-day United States standards would be regarded as interventionist.

30. Those Latin Americans who defended the position of the Organization of American States did not repre-

sent the interests of their peoples, but oligarchic minorities in the service of United States imperialism. Behind their attacks on the Tricontinental Conference lay fear at the development of solidarity among the peoples of the three continents and a wish to check that solidarity. It was no coincidence that their attack on the Conference coincided with the world-wide intensification of imperialist aggression, the increasing belligerence of the promoters of apartheid and the escalation of the war against the peoples of South-East Asia.

31. The attempt to convert the United Nations into a tribunal to judge national liberation movements constituted a serious threat. A successful attack on the Tricontinental Conference could lead to a successful attack on the Declaration in General Assembly resolution 1515 (XV) and on other United Nations resolutions supporting colonial and dependent peoples and recognizing the right of nations to dispose of their natural wealth. That would be the consummation of the imperialists' dream, to turn the United Nations into one large Organization of American States, to pan-Americanize the world.

32. The agreements reached at the Tricontinental Conference were understandably displeasing to OAS supporters because they condemned the imperialist aggressions in Viet-Nam, the Suez Canal, Santo Domingo, Panama, Korea, China, Guatemala and Cuba; exposed the aggressive role of the imperialists' military bases; expressed support for the African peoples subjected to racism and apartheid; and called for the immediate independence of the people of South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The Governments represented by the supporters of OAS were the same Governments that had supported the invasion of Guatemala in 1954 and had watched in silence the murder of dozens of young Panamanians by United States troops in January 1964. They had countenanced United States military intervention in Santo Domingo and the aggression and intervention against Cuba.

33. Since January 1959, the United States had fomented subversion against Cuba by giving refuge to and financially supporting Cuban war criminals and fugitives from Cuban justice. It had organized systematic propaganda against Cuba, insulting its leaders and people and encouraging ideas of the Cuban Government's overthrow. It had officially endorsed the overturning of the Government and promoted such aggressive acts as the bombing of civilian populations by aircraft coming from Florida. It had fomented subversion in Cuba through acts of sabotage with explosives supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency. It had tried to destroy the Cuban economy by bombing Cuba's sugar-cane fields, supplied mercenary groups with weapons and explosives and plotted against the lives of Cuban leaders. It had organized training camps for mercenaries in the United States, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica and elsewhere in the Caribbean region, camps like those used for the Playa Girón invasion. It had violated Cuban air space and carried out piratical attacks against Cuba's coasts. It maintained the naval base at Guantánamo against the wishes of the Cuban people and Government and from that base committed countless acts of aggression, provocation and subversion. It had committed a series of economic

^{1/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966, document S/7134.

aggressions against Cuba, in flagrant violation of international law and the principle of non-intervention set out in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX). It had cut off oil supplies, abolished Cuba's sugar quota on the United States market, prohibited the export and import of numerous products and finally decreed a total embargo on all trade between the two countries. It had blacklisted ships not joining the blockade, frozen all Cuban assets in the United States, prohibited all direct or indirect dollar transactions and exerted heavy pressure on many countries to take part in the blockade. The Central Intelligence Agency had organized acts of sabotage against foreign ships engaged in trade with Cuba and had even attempted to destroy ships being built for Cuba in other countries.

34. Through its gross intervention, the United States was denying to the Cuban people the exercise of an inalienable right of peoples—to choose the social, political and economic system most in keeping with their interests.

35. The OAS had done nothing to counteract the aggression against Cuba. It had not condemned the aggressor under articles 15 and 16 of the OAS Charter. Instead, it had punished the victim. Since the Punta del Este Conference in January 1962^{2/} it had become an outright accomplice in United States aggression against Cuba. The participation of most member countries of OAS in the economic and trade blockade against Cuba—which like any blockade constituted an act of war—was a cynical violation of the OAS Charter, the principle of non-intervention and the United Nations Charter. Other violations were the illegal expulsion of Cuba from the inter-American system, the imposition of economic sanctions and the severance of relations with Cuba by almost all Latin American countries. All of their actions in respect of Cuba were expressly condemned by resolution 2131 (XX), by the Soviet draft resolution under consideration (A/C.1/L.367) and by all the amendments which those countries, with unparalleled cynicism, had proposed.

36. Indeed, the document containing the report of the OAS Special Committee concerned with the Tricontinental Conference had had been circulated to the Members of the United Nations^{3/} had conveniently omitted the Special Committee's recommendation that the members of OAS should renew their efforts to ensure the co-operation of friendly non-member States in the suspension of all trade and all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba, under resolution I of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation.^{4/} Thus, the representatives of countries members of OAS had revealed their own interventionist position, even while denouncing an alleged violation of the principle of non-intervention.

^{2/} Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on 22-31 January 1962.

^{3/} Council of the Organization of American States, Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., document OEA/Ser.G/IV, C-I-769-A Rev., vols. I and II, 28 November 1966.

^{4/} Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, held at Washington, D.C., on 21-26 July 1964.

37. He was bound to note the entirely different policy adopted by one member country of the Organization of American States. Mexico alone had remained faithful to its internationalist tradition and to the rules of international law and the principle of non-intervention. Cuba's relations with that sister nation were proof that States with different political and social structures could coexist in fruitful harmony, on the basis of mutual respect.

38. In his letter of 10 February 1966 to the Secretary-General,^{5/} Prime Minister Castro had affirmed Cuba's adherence to the decisions of the Tricontinental Conference, condemned its critics in America and warned that Cuba would mightily resist any attack by the United States and its accomplices.

39. Mr. MISHRA (India) said that the provisions of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty made explicit what was already implicit in international law. In certain quarters it had been argued that the Declaration was primarily a political document. But his delegation was convinced that compliance with the Declaration was not merely a matter of political desirability or necessity. Effective compliance with the Declaration was incumbent on all States, not only as a matter of good faith but also as a consequence of the modern dimensions of international law.

40. International law was not and could not be static. As the distinguished jurist Roscoe Pound had stated, it should reflect the realities of modern international relations. To that end, it should be constantly developed. In many cases, unfortunately, no such development had occurred. The basic norms of international law could only spring from a consensus of States, and during the past two decades the number of independent States had increased considerably. If legal doctrines and principles were not commensurate with the real needs and aspirations of modern times, then conditions would not be ripe for the development and maintenance of a world public order.

41. In the past forty years various developments in Latin America, Asia and Africa had already added to the specific content of the principle of non-intervention, which had been crystallized in the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX). The Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, adopted at Havana in 1928, the Declaration of American Principles, adopted at Lima in 1938, the Charter of the Organization of American States, adopted at Bogotá in 1948, the declaration adopted by the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in 1955, the declarations of the First and Second Conferences of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1961 and Cairo in 1964, and article 3 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity constituted some of the positive legal and juridical bases of the Declaration.

42. The principle of non-intervention was an established norm of international law. It was a direct corollary of the basic principles of respect for territorial integrity and the political independence of

^{5/} See foot-note 1.

States. Intervention by one State in the internal affairs of another tended to increase international tension and threatened the peace and security of the world. It was those considerations which had led the participants in the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries to declare that every State must abstain from interfering in the affairs of other States, whether openly or insidiously.

43. His delegation regretted that the provisions of the Declaration had not been complied with in certain parts of the world. But there were difficulties to be overcome before the Declaration could be applied universally. First, it was difficult to judge in specific cases what actually constituted intervention. Secondly, there was no effective machinery for ensuring compliance with the norms of international law, except in the remote contingency of unanimity among the great Powers.

44. That being the case, the General Assembly should exert its considerable moral and political authority by examining from time to time the current trends in international relations against the background of certain basic principles of international relations, including those contained in the Declaration. By so doing it might, at least indirectly, induce States to re-examine their policies and to consider whether or not their actions were compatible with the basic principle of non-intervention.

45. In the preceding discussion, references had been made to systematic policies of intervention pursued by major Powers. Such policies did indeed deserve to be condemned. But the developing countries, too, should refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of other developing countries. The balance of terror had made it impossible for the major Powers to intervene directly in each other's affairs. But in all regions of the world there were examples of developing countries yielding to the influence of major Powers and acting as instruments of indirect intervention.

46. His delegation had joined the sponsors of the revised amendments (A/C.1/L.388/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Corr.1)^{6/} to the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367). He hoped that the amendments would be widely supported by other delegations, and that the draft resolution as amended would be adopted unanimously.

47. Mr. MENA SOLORIZANO (Nicaragua) said that the accusations and insults exchanged between earlier speakers in the discussion on non-intervention were damaging to the prestige of the United Nations. The repeated attacks on the policies of the United States Government, and the references to so-called United States imperialism, were particularly objectionable.

48. At the time of the First World War, when the Kaiser's armies had invaded other countries in Europe, the United States had had no knowledge of international war. But it had hastened to defend European democracy. It had sent 2 million of its citizens to Europe, and many of them had died in battle. It had spent billions and billions of dollars in defence of a noble cause. But, after the War, it

had not appropriated a single square inch of territory, and had not sought or obtained any other advantage.

49. In the Second World War, Stalin had begged the United States to open a second front because the Soviet Union could not resist the assault of the Nazi armies. Once again the United States people had responded with Christian generosity to that appeal. It had made immense sacrifices to liberate the victims of Nazism. Many nationals of Nicaragua, too, had donned the uniform of the United States, French or United Kingdom armies and had fought for the defence of freedom. When the War had been won, the United States had not sought to obtain any territorial advantages in return for all the sacrifices it had made. How, then, was it possible to speak of "United States imperialism"? Countries in Latin America had obvious proof of the generosity of the United States, which offered economic aid, technical assistance and food-stuffs whenever they were needed. The Alliance for Progress was an outstanding example of the United States' moral and material generosity.

50. On the subject of the Tricontinental Conference, he recalled that his own country owed its independence to the sacrifices of its own people and not to the assistance of any foreign Power. As a freedom-loving people, the Nicaraguans had watched with profound sympathy the efforts of Fidel Castro to overthrow the Batista dictatorship. That sympathy had been shared by all free men of the Americas, who had provided Castro with weapons and financial support. After the Batista régime had been overthrown, Fidel Castro had openly announced his support for communism. At first, the Nicaraguans had been indifferent to the character of the new régime. It was for the Cubans, and for them alone, to decide between free government and dictatorship in Cuba.

51. Recently, however, Cuba had been trying to assume a monopoly of wisdom. In order to set up governments which would destroy the traditions, religion and economy of the region, it was encouraging assassination and the destruction of private and national property. The people of Nicaragua did not wish to be "liberated" by Castro. The rich could defend themselves quite satisfactorily, and the poor were amply protected by the social laws. The people in all walks of life were protected by the State.

52. The Nicaraguan Government was elected, maintained and supported by Nicaraguans. According to the circumstances of the moment, it might be a military or a civilian government. But the Nicaraguan people did not need any person or any country to tell it what type of government it should have. It had the knowledge and the maturity to elect the government it wished. Since the Civil War of 1926, elections in Nicaragua had been free. Any country or group planning to invade Nicaragua to impose some nefarious ideology would receive the punishment it deserved.

53. Lastly, he wished to point out that Nicaragua had never been a defector from continental solidarity.

54. Mr. AL-RASHID (Kuwait) said that the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) was a solemn affirmation of certain fundamental

^{6/} Document A/C.1/L.388/Rev.1/Add.1 indicated the addition of India to the list of sponsors of the revised amendments.

principles of contemporary international law. It embodied principles contained in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It recognized that intervention could pose a particularly serious threat to the newly independent countries. It emphasized the imperative need to create conditions which would enable the developing countries to choose freely their own political, economic and social institutions. In short, it was primarily directed against colonialism, which was still the most outrageous violation of human rights. The former colonialists had flouted the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination. Neo-colonialism was using more subtle methods of intervention to prevent peoples from exercising their sovereign rights.

55. Intervention could be either permanent or temporary. In the Middle East, unfortunately, it had assumed a permanent character. The artificial State of Israel had been created to promote the selfish interests of colonialism and to retard the whole economic and social progress of the region. In all Middle Eastern States, resources badly needed for social and economic development had to be used for self-defence against endless aggression. According to paragraph 3 of the Declaration contained in resolution 2131 (XX), the use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constituted a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention. But the people of Palestine had been uprooted from its soil by force and violence to make way for hordes of aliens transplanted from foreign lands.

56. For the people of the Middle East, intervention was synonymous with colonialism. The decolonization activities of the United Nations, in accordance with resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2105 (XX), had done much to confound the traditional interventionists who were disregarding the wishes of the international community. It was significant to note that, in paragraph 10 of resolution 2105 (XX), all States were invited to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial Territories. The eradication of the last remaining vestiges of colonialism throughout the world was a necessary prerequisite to the development of friendly relations among nations on the basis of equality and the right of peoples to self-determination.

57. As his country's Foreign Minister had stated in the Assembly's general debate (1421st plenary meeting), Viet-Nam had become a battlefield for the political struggle between the great Powers, and the ideological conflict was being pursued at the sacrifice of the brave Viet-Nameese people. Peace and stability could not be imposed by force. The question of Viet-Nam was primarily political and required a political solution in which the rights of the peoples of Viet-Nam must prevail over any other consideration.

58. His delegation was anxious to ensure that the Declaration should not be relegated to oblivion in the United Nations archives but should be used as a guideline for international conduct. It welcomed any move to provide the Assembly with reports on progress, or regress, in the implementation of the Declaration. In

that spirit, it had decided to join the sponsors of the revised amendments to the Soviet draft resolution.^{Z/}

59. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the great number of countries which had taken part in the debate on an item included in the agenda at his delegation's request (A/6397) showed not only that the item was important and timely but also that the most blatant violation of the Declaration was the increasing armed intervention by the United States in Viet-Nam. The United States representative in the Committee had tried to justify United States aggression in Viet-Nam by denying it, but such statements were obviously at variance with the facts, which incontrovertibly showed that the ruling circles in Washington were waging aggressive war in Viet-Nam and were attempting to crush the national liberation movement of the Viet-Nameese people and to prevent them from settling their own affairs. The allegations in United States propaganda about so-called aggression from the north were as groundless as they were false and overlooked one simple truth: that Viet-Nam was a single country temporarily divided into two zones and that the Viet-Nameese were a single people which unanimously wished to expel the foreign invaders who had come from another continent to attack them. There were no foreign troops in Viet-Nam other than those of the United States and its allies.

60. The United States representative had alleged that the United States was defending freedom and democracy in Viet-Nam and had sent its army there in compliance with some kind of treaty obligations. But it was enough to ask what kind of freedom and democracy the United States was defending in South Viet-Nam, and what obligations it had there, to show the groundlessness of such assertions. The succession of puppets in power in South Viet-Nam had been placed there by the Pentagon and not by the people of that part of Viet-Nam. If the United States had any obligations, its obligations were to itself because the Saigon régime and the part of the country occupied by the United States interventionists was not Viet-Nam, and there was no government in Saigon but only a clique of venal generals changed at will by the United States interventionists.

61. What could be the value of Washington's many statements about its desire for peace in Viet-Nam when its deeds attested to the Pentagon's obstinate wish to escalate the aggression and impose its demands on Viet-Nam by force? According to United States Senator Milton R. Young, one-third of the United States military capacity, one-half of its air forces and one-third of its naval forces, had been committed to a civil war in a small country of 14 million people. The military budget for the aggression in Viet-Nam was already being increased by some \$9,000-\$10,000 million. Yet the United States representative had said that a system of government must commend itself, not by force of arms, but by force of ideas. Viet-Nam today and the Dominican Republic yesterday provided eloquent proof of the attempts of the United States armed forces to fight ideas with weapons. That was why the United States representatives, among others, had attacked the national libera-

^{Z/} Document A/C.1/L.388/Rev.1/Add.1 indicated the addition of Kuwait to the list of sponsors of the revised amendments.

tion movement and the revolutionary struggles of the peoples, calling them a new form of aggression. The fact that Washington proclaimed any liberation or patriotic movement to be a subversive or terrorist activity revealed its ambitions to arrogate to itself the power to judge the fate of peoples and to decide what system of government the people of another country must adopt.

62. When he had quoted (1479th meeting) the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the United States representative had glossed over the fundamental provisions of those agreements. Article 4 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China prohibited the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel; article 5 prohibited the establishment of military bases in Viet-Nam and the participation of any part of the country in military alliances. Who then, had, violated those articles? Whose foreign troops had invaded Viet-Nam? Who had set up military bases in South Viet-Nam? Who had drawn the puppet régime of Saigon into military adventures? Did not responsibility for all that rest fully and solely with Washington, which had initially dispatched its interventionists to South Viet-Nam in secret in the guise of military advisers and then openly, throwing down a challenge to the whole world, had dispatched an army of almost half a million men which was occupying that part of the country? There was a whole network of United States military bases in South Viet-Nam and it was from South Viet-Nam that the American interventionists and their lackeys in Saigon undertook armed attacks, not only against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, but also against Cambodia and Laos, whose sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity the United States was also duty bound to respect under the Geneva Agreements. Moreover, under the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, South Viet-Nam, again in violation of the Geneva Agreements, had been included in the Treaty area. Lastly, article 7 of the Final Declaration provided for the holding of general elections in Viet-Nam in July 1956 and for the settlement of political problems on the basis of respect for the independence, unity and territorial integrity of the country. The United States and its puppets had thwarted the holding of the general elections scheduled for July 1956 and had thus deprived the Viet-Nameese people of the possibility of unifying their country within the time-limit provided for by the Geneva Agreements. All that had been done long before the creation of the National Liberation Front in South Viet-Nam and long before United States propaganda had begun to shout about the so-called aggression from the north. Washington had sabotaged the holding of general elections in Viet-Nam because, had such elections been held, the puppet régime in Saigon would have been thrown on the garbage heap of history.

63. Obviously no new developments could be expected in Viet-Nam until Washington renounced its policy of aggression and terminated its armed interference in the internal affairs of the Viet-Nameese people. The question of Viet-Nam could be settled in accordance with the programme put forward by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, which his country supported and considered fully con-

sistent with the interests of the Viet-Nameese people and with the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

64. Some representatives had claimed that the principal form of intervention at present was indirect and that it was wrong to concentrate on armed intervention; however, that was nothing but a clumsy attempt to divert attention from the essence of the problem. There could be no doubt that armed intervention in the internal affairs of States constituted the greatest threat to the independence and freedom of peoples and to the cause of international peace, and that such intervention caused thousands of deaths and the destruction of enormous resources. The casualty figures of the war in Viet-Nam which appeared every day in the United States Press clearly showed the results of foreign intervention.

65. The Honduran representative, obviously suffering from a lapse of memory, had not uttered a single word about the armed intervention by United States troops in the Dominican Republic, or the bloody repression carried out in Santo Domingo, or the monstrous aggression against the Viet-Nameese people.

66. The Nicaraguan representative, in giving his effusive panegyric on the policies of United States aggression and his eloquent description of the remarkable feats of imperialism, had remained deaf and blind to the recent bloody adventures of the imperialists in Santo Domingo and to the barbarous war of United States imperialism against the Viet-Nameese people. He would like to ask that representative whether he really felt, in the privacy of his own conscience, that the United States aggression sprang from humanitarian and charitable motives.

67. The Declaration itself equated armed intervention with aggression. It was obvious that the first thing to be dealt with was the most dangerous manifestation of intervention, especially since that type of interference had become increasingly common in recent years. That did not mean, of course, that the Soviet Union was opposed to a condemnation of any kind of interference, including indirect interference, in the internal affairs of States. That was implicit in paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367).

68. The Cuban representative had presented many facts unmasking United States policy in Latin America and had drawn attention to the fact that the report of the OAS Special Committee had been silent on the recommendation for an economic blockade against Cuba. He wondered how it was possible for a representative to advocate a prohibition of any kind of direct or indirect intervention and at the same time connive at the preparation and training of counter-revolutionary forces for provocative activities against Cuba and the legalization of economic pressure on Cuba. United States representatives, including agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and diplomats of the highest rank, had played a direct part in the organization of practically every one of the coups d'état in Latin American countries. The "Camelot project" in Chile had been designed to obtain espionage data in that country, and "Operation Simpático" in Colombia had been denounced by members of the Colombian Parliament as a violation of the country's

Constitution and national sovereignty. A resolution adopted by the House of Representatives of the United States Congress on 20 September 1965 asserted that the United States had the right to engage in such interference. Clearly, then, the attempts made in the First Committee to discredit the Tricontinental Conference held at Havana had been intended to whitewash United States diplomacy and to divert attention from Washington's true activities in that part of the world.

69. The Soviet Union's policy toward Latin America, as toward other States, was based on the principle of the equality of rights of all States, large or small, and mutual respect for their sovereignty and independence. His country scrupulously respected the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States and had proved its readiness to establish friendly relations based on those principles with all countries, including the countries of Latin America.

70. Popular organizations naturally had the right to express their attitudes toward the outstanding problems of the day, such as the struggle of the peoples for their national and social freedom from colonialism and neo-colonialism, as the Soviet Union delegation had stated at the Tricontinental Conference. However, even though the just struggle of peoples for their national liberation was fully in conformity with the principles of the Charter and many United Nations resolutions, the activities of the popular organizations mentioned during the debate had nothing to do with the problem and were of no concern to the United Nations.

71. The Soviet draft resolution correctly indicated the steps that must be taken to strengthen international peace and to protect the rights of independent States which were victims of intervention in their domestic affairs. However, his delegation would consider the views of other delegations sympathetically.

72. Mr. SCHUURMANS (Belgium) said that he wished to exercise the right of reply in respect of a statement by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the 1478th meeting. While he was not disputing the facts that representative had given, he merely wished to point out that a State was not responsible for the activities of certain private associations or groups established on its soil which might give other States grounds for complaint. Such activities did not fall within the application of the principle of non-interference, which concerned only relations between sovereign States. The Belgian Government adhered strictly to the course it had followed since the territories for which it had formerly been responsible had become independent; it scrupulously refrained from any interference in their affairs, and its relations with them, particularly in the matter of technical and financial assistance, were based on mutual agreement and on the principle of sovereign equality.

73. The legislation protecting the constitutional liberties enjoyed by private associations defined the extent to which the Government could influence their activities. Consequently, it was primarily by persuasion that the Government might hope to bring them around to its own views and it made every effort to that end. How-

ever, in the last analysis, it was the prerogative of those groups to decide their own course of action and, consequently, it was they and they alone who should answer for it.

74. That observation applied in particular to the Ligue belge des droits de l'homme, which had been expressly referred to by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as having condemned the execution of a high army officer by the Congolese authorities. It was of course regrettable that so grave an accusation had been made on the basis of inaccurate information, without, apparently, the organization in question having made a suitable inquiry into the accuracy of the report. In any case, the Belgian Government could not be held accountable and an explanation must be sought from the organization in question.

75. Mr. SETTE CAMARA (Brazil) wished to reply to certain observations by the Cuban representative.

76. The Cuban representative had been quite right in saying that few people could envisage the possibility of a landing by Cuban marines on United States territory. If such a landing ever occurred, it was hardly likely to give rise to panic in the United States or elsewhere. The experience of the past few years suggested that any Cubans who landed on United States territory would probably wish to remain in the United States and never go back to Cuba.

77. The Cuban representative had said that OAS was involved in organizing an international force to interfere in labour strikes in Cuba. But it was not in the least interested in Cuban labour strikes. In fact, since Fidel Castro had come to power, it had never heard of any labour strikes in Cuba. As long as he remained in power, Cuban workers would probably be denied the right to strike.

78. The Cuban representative had painted a very sinister picture of the Organization of American States. But OAS was the oldest international organization in the world. All its members were very proud to belong to it. For some years Cuba, too, had been proud to belong to it. But in 1962 Cuba had been forcibly expelled.

79. The Cuban representative seemed to think that he could offer other countries lessons in democracy. But the Brazilian delegation did not recall that any election had been held in Cuba to bring the present régime to power. The Cuban people had never been asked to express its views on Mr. Castro's decisions and policies. Mr. Castro himself had never indicated how long he intended to retain his unlimited and despotic powers. The peoples of Latin America hoped that Cuba would keep its own particular type of democracy within its own frontiers, and would not insist on exporting it elsewhere. What, indeed, had Fidel Castro's régime done for the prosperity of Cuba? Statistics showed that Castro's ambitious plans for the development of the Cuban economy had never been realized. Cuba was living on the generosity of its friends who were paying an artificially high price for its only major export, sugar.

80. Mr. BANCROFT (United States of America), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that

the Soviet representative's statement showed beyond doubt that the Soviet Union was using every opportunity and every available forum to heap criticism and invective on the United States Government and to divert the Committee's attention from all the charges which had been made against the Soviet Government and other communist States during the discussion.

81. The Soviet representative had implied that strict observance of the principles of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 meant only the withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of United States and other forces aiding the Republic of Viet-Nam. That representative had sought to create the false impression that North Viet-Nam, for its part, had assumed no obligations whatsoever when it had signed the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam of 20 July 1954, when it had acceded to the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China on 21 July 1954, and when it had acceded to the agreements reached at the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question in July 1962. In fact, those three international instruments, accepted voluntarily by North Viet-Nam, imposed both obligations and restrictions on North Viet-Nam. There was the obligation, contained in article 1 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, to regroup all North Viet-Namese armed forces north of the demarcation line. There was the obligation contained in article 12, to ensure that the area north of the demarcation line was not used for the resumption of hostilities. There was the obligation under article 5 of the same agreement to withdraw all military forces, military supplies and military equipment from the demilitarized zone established on either side of the demarcation line. There was the far-reaching obligation under article 6 to permit no person, military or civilian, to cross the demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission. Finally, there was the obligation, in the 1954 and 1962 Agreements, to remove North Viet-Namese forces from Laos and to respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Laos.

82. Those obligations had been accepted voluntarily by the Government of North Viet-Nam, and they were not onerous. They were in essence based on the principles of the United Nations Charter. They could be regarded, in fact, as an earlier formulation of the principle expressed in paragraph 2 of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), which had now been reaffirmed in the amendments (A/C.1/L.388/Rev.1) to the Soviet draft resolution. But, in spite of its adherence to the Geneva Agreements, North Viet-Nam had refused to fulfil those obligations and restraints, and had violated them with increasing frequency and intensity since 1954.

83. If the Soviet Union at any time wished to seek a real solution to the Viet-Nam problem, it could use its power and influence to arrange serious negotiations on mutual steps to reduce the intensity of the hostilities in Viet-Nam.

84. As the United States representative had declared in the General Assembly on 22 September (1412th

plenary meeting), the United States Government's aim in responding to South Viet-Nam's appeals for military assistance was strictly limited. The United States was not seeking to impose a policy of alignment on South Viet-Nam. It was not seeking to overthrow the Government of North Viet-Nam. It was not seeking to do any injury to mainland China. It was not asking North Viet-Nam to surrender unconditionally, or indeed to surrender anything which belonged to North Viet-Nam.

85. Mr. LOPEZ VILLAMIL (Honduras), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it would always be absurd to argue that States could, for ideological or other reasons, arrogate to themselves rights which were expressly prohibited by the United Nations.

86. It was quite true—as a number of delegations had recalled—that the principle of non-intervention had first been invoked in Latin America as a defence against United States imperialism. For that reason, all Latin American States condemned intervention from any source. As the representative of the Dominican Republic had said, any type of life which was imposed on a people was intolerable. The most effective weapon for combating hunger, disease and misery in the world was constructive international assistance and peaceful coexistence, of which earlier speakers had mentioned many practical examples.

87. One representative had alleged that, at the Tri-continental Conference, a group of patriots had met to rise up against Governments which had usurped the will of the people. Those "patriots" were terrorists, bandits and guerrillas working in collusion with the communist countries which had organized the Conference. Genuine patriotism implied loyalty, above all, to one's own country. No genuine patriot could become the accomplice of a foreign Power which wished to impose an alien political system on his country.

88. In his earlier statement, he had condemned all forms of intervention and had referred to specific acts of intervention in the past. His statement had since been criticized by other delegations. But, in all seriousness, he wished to ask what the Soviet Union had done with the Baltic countries which had existed before the Second World War. Which was the only country that had signed a treaty with the Nazis, betraying Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania? Which country had annexed territory from Poland and Finland? Which country had, in 1956, butchered the defenceless people of an Eastern European country?

89. At the current session of the General Assembly, the Minister for External Relations of Cuba had referred to the Governments of certain Latin American countries as "lackeys", "weak-kneed reactionaries" and "so-called defenders of Latin American sovereignty". The same man, in a book entitled *En pie*, had referred to the present rulers of Hungary as Moscow's "lackeys" and "performing seals". What could one say of the integrity or patriotism of those who applied the term "lackeys" to communists and to democrats alike?

90. Events in Cuba since Fidel Castro's advent to power were a warning to the peoples of Latin America

and the entire world. More than 400,000 Cubans had left Cuba. In the words of Fidel Castro's own sister, the Cuban workers had lost many of the social rights they had gained in earlier years, including the right to strike. Men and women of the communist belief had been sent to Cuba from all Latin American countries to learn subversion, terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Fidel Castro was intending to promote insurrection in Argentina, Brazil and Central America.

91. He might be told that Juana Castro was a "lackey" or a "puppet". But he was sure that her comments on Cuban policies were perfectly accurate.

Order of discussion of agenda items (continued)*

92. The CHAIRMAN announced that, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 1430th meeting, he had consulted most of the delegations on the order in which the remaining agenda items were to be discussed and believed that there was agreement that agenda items 31 and 93 should be taken up after the Committee had concluded its consideration of agenda item 96.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 2.20 p.m.

*Resumed from the 1430th meeting.