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AGENDA ITEM 96

Status of the implementation of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (*continued*) (A/6397, A/C.1/L.367, A/C.1/L.388)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. RUDA (Argentina) said that the principle of non-intervention was one of the foundations of any international structure for the maintenance of peace and security. It had been stated in embryonic form in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibited intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, and in complete form in the historic Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty contained in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX). It had, however, been interpreted in very varied ways by different States, depending on their size, their national interests abroad, their stage of economic and social development and their historical experience and political philosophy.

2. The traditional idea that only the threat or use of armed force constituted intervention was too restrictive for the present age. It overlooked other types of interference expertly practised by some States in recent decades: first, economic pressure; secondly, diplomatic proposals accompanied by political threats; thirdly, subversive activities and incitement to rebellion; fourthly, allowing traffic in weapons and military equipment in order to assist a rebel band in another State; fifthly, supplying government-made or government-owned weapons for the same purpose; and, sixthly, allowing persons within the jurisdiction of the interfering State to take part in the preparation, organization and execution of a military enterprise designed to initiate, promote or assist rebellion or sedition within another State. The basic criterion for determining whether there was intervention in a particular case was whether there was any open or

disguised coercion to make a State do something contrary to its desires and interests or to prevent it from doing something which it could legitimately do otherwise.

3. The USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367) spoke of deep concern "at the evidence of unceasing armed intervention by certain States in the domestic affairs of other States". Argentina and the other Latin American States, however, were concerned not only about armed intervention but about other forms of interference in the domestic or external affairs of States in violation of the legitimate right of every State to establish its own political personality. For that reason, they had sponsored the amendments in document A/C.1/L.388, which were based not only on theoretical considerations but also, and in particular, on the experience of Member States during 1966.

4. In a letter to the President of the Security Council on 7 February 1966,^{1/} the representatives of eighteen Latin American countries had denounced the flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX) by the resolutions adopted at the so-called First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, which had been held at Havana in January 1966 with the participation of the representatives of the communist parties of many countries and of outstanding persons in the Governments of States Members of the United Nations. The letter had stated that the objective of that Conference had been to stimulate and promote the violent change of governments and fundamental political institutions in various countries, thus striking against the sovereignty and the political stability of Member States. Moreover, the Conference had proclaimed the necessity of the use of armed force as one means of achieving those subversive ends and had adopted a number of recommendations aimed at improving methods of infiltration and subversion in order to facilitate the violent overthrow of existing political régimes in many Latin American countries. The flagrantly interventionist nature of the resolutions adopted at the Conference constituted a clear violation of the Declaration in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX).

5. The United Nations itself had recognized the fact that intervention could consist of acts other than the threat or use of armed force. On 14 October 1966, the Security Council had adopted a resolution (resolution 226 (1966)) urging the Government of Portugal, "in view of its own statement, not to allow foreign

^{1/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966, document S/7123.

mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo" and calling upon all States "to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo".

6. It was clear, therefore, that the Soviet draft resolution would more accurately reflect the status of implementation of the Declaration if it was amended in accordance with document A/C.1/L.388. The amendments were designed not only to reflect the events of 1966, but also to constitute a warning to countries which were now carrying on the most varied forms of interventionist activity.

7. In the 1966 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, some delegations had said that the Declaration in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) did not constitute a juridical document and was not an adequate formulation of the principle of non-intervention. At the 16th meeting of that Committee, on 18 March 1966, his delegation had clearly stated its position, which he wished to reaffirm today. Argentina believed that the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty constituted the best possible statement on the principle of non-intervention. It could not accept any change in the substance of that Declaration, although it might give favourable consideration to suitable improvements in its form or additions to it. It was firmly convinced that the Declaration was a peremptory norm of law and that all States must adapt their conduct to its provisions.

8. Mr. PRADITH (Laos) said that the world situation appeared to have improved in a number of respects since 1964, largely because the Soviet Union and the United States had been able to reach an understanding. Among the developments that gave reason for optimism were the settlement of the Cuban, Dominican and Berlin crises, the amicable settlement of the India-Pakistan conflict and the easing of tension between Indonesia and Malaysia.

9. Peace or war depended on the super-Powers alone, and therefore the small nations of the world were always glad to see them reach agreement. Although the small States in the United Nations could not exert any material pressure on the super-Powers, they could have an important moral influence on them.

10. It was relatively easy to write a Charter for the United Nations, but it was difficult to implement its provisions honestly and with no ulterior motive. States frequently said something one day and denied it the next; that attitude existed not only in the United Nations and between the super-Powers, but also in other parts of the world, such as Viet-Nam and Laos. In 1962 Laos had been caught between the communist countries to the north and the SEATO countries to the south, and foreign intervention had almost precipitated a third world war. Fortunately, the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies had agreed to silence the guns and join with other nations in seeking peace; once again, agreement between the super-Powers had brought peace, the paramount desire of all the small nations of the world.

11. Laos was a devoutly Buddhist country and had always abhorred violence, condemned injustice and preached tolerance, hospitality and love between peoples. But the Laotian people were again being subjected to aggression, subversion, sabotage and terrorism from the north and east, from a source which was neither Buddhist nor Laotian. His delegation appealed, as it had done in previous years, to those responsible for the implementation of the Geneva Agreements on Laos to secure the unconditional withdrawal of the aggressors from Laotian soil. The Soviet leaders should no longer overlook Hanoi's interference in the internal affairs of Laos, while the Polish officers of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos should take an active part in investigating cases of North Viet-Nameese aggression and in interrogating captured North Viet-Nameese soldiers. The criminal actions of the communist North Viet-Nameese had been amply described in many world capitals by the Prime Minister of Laos, who had asked the signers of the Geneva Agreements to take note and to condemn the North Viet-Nameese aggressors. Today his delegation appealed once more to the conscience of the world to end the situation which menaced his country and threatened to set other parts of South-East Asia aflame.

12. A discussion of non-intervention invariably elicited the views of the Member States on Viet-Nam. Some spoke of aggression by the United States and its allies, while others spoke of North Viet-Nameese aggression against South Viet-Nam and Laos. But a solution of the problem remained beyond the reach of the Pope, the Secretary-General, President Johnson, Chairman Kosygin, and the representatives of non-aligned countries who had tried to bring peace to Viet-Nam. The solution lay in the hands of the Peking and Hanoi leaders, who, although they had signed the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962, were nevertheless pursuing a long-term programme of conquest in South-East Asia. Their plan of conquest was not only ideological, but economic and demographic as well, and was aimed at seizing control of Laos, north-eastern Thailand, the Mekong valley and delta, and Malaysia, which were relatively under-populated but rich in rice, tin, rubber and other natural resources. The North Viet-Nameese, who had been granted the colonial privilege of establishing themselves in Laos before 1945, now were determined to return there, by force if need be, this time carrying a "virus" that was unacceptable to the peaceful Buddhist people of Laos.

13. The Viet-Nameese war could not be allowed to continue. The warring sides must come to the negotiating table and seek a solution which would bring peace to the countries of South-East Asia, including countries such as Laos, whose neutrality had been formally recognized and guaranteed but which was still suffering the unjust consequences of a war in which it was not directly involved. The two co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference,^{2/} the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, must now give serious consideration to the circumstances in which another conference could be convened, since the United States and many allied States had not signed the 1954

^{2/} Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, held from 16 June to 21 July 1954.

Agreement and since the Viet Cong, or National Liberation Front, had not existed in 1954.

14. If the joint efforts to solve the Viet-Nameese problem did not succeed, it would be useless for the Committee to consider the item on non-intervention again in 1967, for it would only cause further division among Member States.

15. It had been suggested that all of South-East Asia, from Indonesia to India, should be neutralized. His country would gladly join in implementing such an idea, but only if it included the neutralization of the extreme right and extreme left forces in the region.

16. Mr. HOPE (United Kingdom) said that his delegation fully and unreservedly supported the principle of the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States. At the last session, it had abstained in the vote on the Declaration in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), not because it had any reservations on the principle but because it believed that such a fundamental issue deserved a more thorough and more expert study than the Committee had been able to give it at the time. A declaration on non-intervention should be complete, watertight and positive in its effects. The Declaration adopted in 1965 had not entirely satisfied those criteria.

17. The Soviet delegation, it seemed, had also found that the Declaration was not wholly satisfactory. But its purpose in proposing the inclusion in the agenda of the item under discussion was not to remedy past defects or errors. As was clear from the Soviet Foreign Minister's statement in the general debate in the General Assembly (1413th plenary meeting), the Soviet delegation intended to use the discussion of item 96 as an opportunity for "unmasking the violators of the Declaration", for accusations and threats.

18. But who were the violators of the Declaration, and where were the violations taking place? The Soviet representative had spoken at length about events in Viet-Nam. But the United Kingdom delegation had not found any constructive proposals in his statement. It did not believe that the grave and terrifying problems of Viet-Nam could be settled merely by reaffirming the principles of the United Nations Charter or, even less, by making propaganda statements. They could only be solved by practical action. During the general debate in the Assembly, many delegations had put forward sincere and carefully weighed proposals for ending the conflict in Viet-Nam. The United States representative had made a firm constructive offer which had since been repeated many times. The United Kingdom Foreign Secretary had spoken in detail of the steps his Government would wish to see taken. All those proposals should be given the profound and unprejudiced consideration which they deserved.

19. From the text of the new Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367), it was doubly clear that the Soviet delegation was not genuinely anxious to remedy the defects of the 1965 Declaration. Like the original Soviet draft resolution submitted at the twentieth session,^{3/} the new text concentrated on "armed

intervention", and no mention was made of certain other forms of intervention such as subversion. At the twentieth session his delegation had drawn the Committee's attention (1398th meeting) to that omission, as had many others, and the original draft declaration had been radically amended to take account of their views. Paragraph 2, for instance, contained a solemn condemnation of the use of economic, political and other types of coercion and of subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the régime of another State.

20. All those provisions of the original declaration had been ignored in the new Soviet draft resolution. Did the Soviet delegation attach no importance to the parts of the Declaration which had not appeared in its original draft, or did it believe that satisfactory progress had now been made towards the eradication of subversion? In the past year there had been a number of cases in which subversion had been brought to light and stamped out. In one case, no fewer than a thousand so-called experts had been expelled from a country. Terrorist training camps had been discovered, and revelations had been made of payments of large sums of money by foreign Powers to political groups in other countries. But those activities were but the tip of the iceberg which showed above the surface. There was a great deal more below.

21. The mainspring of subversion and intervention of similar kinds was a particular political philosophy in which the spread of world-wide revolution was a major article of faith. In his statement in the Assembly's general debate (1416th plenary meeting), the Colombian Foreign Minister had made some highly relevant observations about the convening of inter-continental conferences whose openly expressed objective was to give moral and material support to seditious movements in various parts of the world, particularly in Latin America. A number of speakers in the First Committee's current debate had referred to the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America—known as the Tri-continental Conference—held at Havana in January 1966, and his own delegation had studied with interest the report on that Conference prepared by a Special Committee of the Organization of American States.^{4/} It was clear that some countries were at one moment supporting and voting for decisions of the Assembly and at the next moment calling for action in contravention of those decisions. There could hardly be a more striking example of the contempt which they seemed to have for United Nations declarations. Some time previously, the world had been told that one great continent was ripe for revolution. Even after the adoption of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, revolution was now being planned in another continent. For some, almost any kind of crime or barbarity

^{3/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 107, document A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1.

^{4/} "Report of the Special Committee to study resolutions 11.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference and its Projections ('Tricontinental Conference of Havana'), Council of the Organization of American States, Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., document OEA/Ser.G/IV, C-i-769-A Rev., vols. I and II, 28 November 1966.

could be excused in the name of "national liberation" or "people's revolution". But the Committee was considering subversion not in colonial territories but against the legally constituted Governments of sovereign independent States.

22. It was not enough merely to condemn intervention wherever and in whatever form it occurred. Efforts should rather be made to eradicate the causes of international conflict and friction, of which intervention was merely a symptom. The United Nations Charter enjoined Member States to practise tolerance and to live together in peace with one another. Good neighbourliness meant much more than refraining from intervention. As the Secretary-General had pointed out in the introduction to his annual report for 1965-1966 (A/6301/Add.1), Governments which had subscribed to the principles and ideals of the Charter had to recognize that one of the basic purposes of the United Nations was to be "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations" in the attainment of the common ends for which the Organization had been established.

23. His delegation saw no merit in the Soviet proposal and regarded it merely as a propaganda instrument. Some of the nineteen-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.388) dealt with forms of intervention which were of immediate and practical concern to all States. If adopted, they would improve the text of the Soviet draft resolution considerably. His delegation would give close attention to the amendments and to any other proposals which might be made during the discussion.

24. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) said that the drafting and adoption of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty had been a historical necessity for two reasons. First, the Declaration had contributed to the recognition and appreciation of the conditions necessary for the maintenance of peace and international security, the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war and the development of friendly relations between countries. Secondly, it had made the principle of non-intervention binding on all States. The principle of non-intervention had been expressed for the first time as a principle of law in article 119 of the Jacobin Constitution of 24 June 1793. Since then, it had been invoked by States born of revolutions to protect themselves against intervention by "holy alliances" of all kinds. Thus the Soviet Union, which had proposed the Declaration in the first instance, and the delegations which had supported it at the last session, had satisfied a historical need which had existed for more than 170 years.

25. He had no illusions as to the practical effect of resolutions and solemn declarations in the turmoil of international life. He had no exaggerated hopes regarding the implementation of the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX). He was not surprised that the imperialist Powers, after voting for the Declaration merely because they could not prevent its adoption, were still trying to evade its provisions. But he did hope that, as a result of the discussion on item 96, the Committee would condemn those who were still violating the Declaration and would reaffirm the need to observe it.

26. A further condemnation of States violating the Declaration was urgently necessary in view of the existing situation. The march of progress throughout the world was irresistible. But, on the pretext of containing communism and socialism, the United States Government was interfering in the domestic affairs of other States in the pursuit of its own national interests and had elevated intervention to the status of an official doctrine. Its intervention took many forms, including diplomatic pressure, economic blackmail, coup d'état and often overt military intervention. But its policies were always designed to arrest progress and maintain reactionary régimes in power.

27. Notwithstanding the adoption of the Declaration, the United States Government was defying the entire world by continuing and extending its armed intervention in Viet-Nam. It had intensified its armed and unarmed intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries in Indo-China. Its air force had committed further provocative acts against the frontiers of the People's Republic of China. It had redoubled its efforts to legalize armed intervention in Latin America by establishing a so-called "Inter-American Force". In the past year, the militarily and economically weaker countries of three continents had been the victims of various forms of economic or political blackmail, or overt or covert intervention. Since 1965, international tension had been increased by the escalation of United States aggression in Viet-Nam. The colonial war which the United States was waging thousands of miles from its own frontiers should not be allowed to drag the world into the abyss of a thermonuclear confrontation. Responsible statesmen in all countries—not only in the socialist countries—should make every effort to avoid such a disaster. By studying the attitudes of Governments towards democratic Viet-Nam and the heroic struggle of the Viet-Nameese people, it was easy to see who was for war and intervention and who was for peace, progress and human dignity.

28. Some representatives would undoubtedly accuse his delegation once again of making propaganda. But his delegation had no wish to make propaganda at the expense of the sufferings of the Viet-Nameese or any other people. Hungary wanted a just peace in Viet-Nam based on the interests of the Viet-Nameese people. It was doing everything in its power to bring the conflict to an end, not only because the continuation and escalation of the United States intervention in Viet-Nam might be disastrous for the world as a whole but because the Hungarian people were convinced that justice was exclusively on the side of the Viet-Nameese people and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

29. The United States alleged that the tragedy in Viet-Nam had been caused by a "communist attempt to seize power". In fact, the United States had itself intervened by force in a revolution supported by all sections of the South Viet-Nameese people. In the October 1966 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Bernard B. Fall had observed, in an article entitled "Viet-Nam in the Balance", that Diem had begun to become oppressive as early as January 1956, when a concentration camp ordinance had given the régime almost unchecked powers to deal with the opposition,

and that the non-communist opposition had been hit the hardest. The same commentator had remarked that the communists could hardly be held responsible for the incredible stupidity of the Diem régime, and that there had been plenty of motivation inside South-Viet-Nam, on the left as well as on the right, for a revolutionary explosion. The aggression could not be justified, either, by a reference to "containment" of the People's Republic of China.

30. At the 1473rd meeting, the United States representative had complained that other countries were not helping the United States to find a peaceful solution to the Viet-Nam problem. But, as the First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party had pointed out in a speech on 28 November 1966, certain conditions would have to be satisfied in order to prove that the United States was genuinely anxious for peace. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 would have to be strictly observed. Bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would have to be stopped unconditionally. United States armed forces would have to be withdrawn from Viet-Nam, and the right of the South Viet-Nameese people to decide its own future would have to be guaranteed.

31. Intervention by the imperialist States took many other forms, apart from overt armed intervention. In his statement in the Assembly's general debate (1424th plenary meeting), the Burmese Minister for Foreign Affairs had quite rightly pointed out that newly independent States were frequently subject to economic pressure and threats of force by other States. His own delegation had often drawn attention to the dangers arising from the operations of national and international monopolies in newly independent States and from economic, political and ideological intervention by neo-colonialists. The provisions of the Declaration prohibited the more subtle kinds of intervention, as well as overt armed intervention.

32. Like the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, Hungary believed that it was an international crime to label popular movements against reactionary régimes as "communist subversion", and to intervene in countries to protect the interests of reactionary groups against the wishes of the peoples. The "holy alliances" of the present day were doing everything in their power to protect the relics of obsolete societies. By comparison with them, Metternich and Bismarck seemed to be liberals indeed. The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty could be regarded as a development of international law relating to non-intervention. In the first place, it recognized that armed intervention was synonymous with aggression and could pose a serious threat to the maintenance of peace. Secondly, in addition to stating that the principle of non-intervention was inviolable in relations between States, it also prohibited countries from intervening against peoples struggling for their independence. In paragraph 3, in particular, it was stated that the use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constituted a violation of the principle of non-intervention.

33. Hardly a year after the adoption of the Declaration, attempts were being made in another United

Nations body to weaken its effects. His delegation was of course opposed to those attempts. In particular, it objected to the argument that the Declaration was a mere political manifesto and could not be regarded as a declaration of law. In fact, the Declaration was a legal and political expression of the principle of non-intervention. Concepts foreign or contrary to the provisions of the Declaration should not be introduced into other General Assembly resolutions. The representatives of certain Western countries had argued that what they called a generally recognized freedom, compatible with international law and established international practice, permitted States to exert an influence on the policy and actions of other States. But there was no such generally recognized freedom.

34. States which had a habit of intervening in the domestic affairs of other countries should now respect the provisions of the Declaration. One way of forcing them to do so was to expose the acts of intervention they had committed. Words might not achieve much in themselves, but the condemnation of acts and attitudes contrary to international law would at least have some effect. Consequently, his delegation supported the Soviet draft resolution, which called for a reaffirmation of the Declaration in the interests of peace and friendship between nations.

35. Sir James PLIMSOLL (Australia) said that it was clear from the terms of the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367) and from the introductory statement of the Soviet representative that the item under discussion had not been brought to the General Assembly with the serious intention of producing any constructive progress. It afforded certain delegations an opportunity for an exercise in propaganda and in the cold war tactics of attacking the United States and the countries associated with it. The item was much broader in scope than the sponsors suggested and a constructive discussion would have to range much more widely. It was not related solely to the ideological clashes between the communist and the non-communist world. Various forms of intervention related to other quarrels, such as conflicting national aspirations, attempts to subvert minorities or to annex territory. However, a general discussion on non-intervention was not likely to have any practical purpose. The specific relevant problems could best be dealt with bilaterally or in other ways.

36. The Soviet representative and others had made statements that needed some reply. He would not refer to Latin America, which had been covered very adequately by several Latin American representatives. He would deal with some Asian situations and particularly Viet-Nam, which was an area where Australia was more intimately concerned and had some direct knowledge.

37. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 divided Viet-Nam into two de facto separate States. It had proved impossible to hold genuinely free elections in both parts of Viet-Nam and thus achieve unification by election in the time envisaged in the Agreements. The only hope for eventual stability in the area then lay in the peaceful coexistence of the two de facto States to the north and south of the seventeenth parallel, perhaps over a rather long period, until they could unite peacefully. There was nothing to be gained by a

resort to force by either side in an attempt to achieve unification. In North Viet-Nam, an authoritarian and rigidly controlled one-party State had developed, with a substantially communist philosophy. In the south, a non-communist régime of greater diversity had come to power and for a period of years had devoted its efforts to the economic reconstruction and development of the country. During that initial period of the Republic of Viet-Nam, many persons in North Viet-Nam were being trained in subversion and violence, and from 1959 onwards trained cadres had been gradually infiltrated into the south. The infiltrators had established themselves in the countryside, built a political apparatus and lines of communication and amassed arms and supplies for use in revolution. With time, they had strengthened their position and built the infrastructure for an uprising. Their objective was to destroy the fabric of government in South Viet-Nam. They singled out for terrorist attacks the most prominent persons in the villages with the dual aim of curbing the power of persons who might be the focus for national strength and revival and influencing the South Viet-Nameese to withhold co-operation from the authorities. That strategy was still being employed: The New York Times of 7 December 1966 reported that one of the leading politicians of the Republic of Viet-Nam had been murdered by a member of the Viet-Cong, who had been ordered to kill a prominent person, no matter who. The purpose was to intimidate others and remove a potential national leader.

38. At the same time the Viet Cong, armed and supplied by North Viet-Nam, had pursued a systematic campaign of economic sabotage in the South in the hope of causing a breakdown of government. The logic of the campaign was that under the threat of constant terrorist attacks the people would be unable to work and the South Viet-Nameese Government would be forced to take unpopular measures to maintain law and order. It was a carefully-thought-out plan and men had been trained over the years to carry it out effectively. Only after subversion and sabotage directed and organized by North Viet-Nam had assumed gigantic proportions had the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam felt compelled to seek outside assistance in exercise of its sovereign right. That assistance had ultimately taken the form of armed assistance from the United States, Australia and a number of other countries. But that aid had been provided only after a long period of intervention from North Viet-Nam, backed by Peking.

39. Before that many countries, including non-committed States, had been providing economic aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam. Under the Colombo Plan, Australia, for example, had established a dairy farm to improve the herds and raise the level of nutrition and food resources in South Viet-Nam. But the Viet Cong, including North-Viet-Nameese, had attacked the farm, killed the cattle and destroyed the installations. They were clearly not interested in improving the economic conditions of the people. Their sole aim was to create a revolutionary situation and disrupt the economy in order to plunge the population into deeper misery and thus incite it to revolt. The first point he would stress therefore was that armed assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam had come only after it had been subjected for several years to

outside intervention, banditry and terrorism. The second was that throughout this period North Viet-Nam had been left in complete immunity.

40. The bombing of North Viet-Nam had started only when the Republic of Viet-Nam, and those with them, had concluded that the North could no longer be permitted to enjoy immunity from attack while it continued to send infiltrators and regular forces into the south to terrorize the population. Indeed, the terrible war in which the country was trapped would never have come about if South Viet-Nam had not been the victim of such attacks.

41. Some representatives had criticized the political situation in the Republic of Viet-Nam. It had been part of North Viet-Nam's tactics to produce dissatisfaction with the Government. In addition, conditions were not in all respects perfect, nor were they in any country of the world. But given the terrible travail that Viet-Nam had gone through for so many years, conditions were much better than one might have dared to hope. There was of course dissension in South Viet-Nam, as there was in any healthy political society, and it was nothing to apologize for. There would be signs of hope if there could be dissension freely expressed in North Viet-Nam. He would emphasize that throughout the political turmoil in South Viet-Nam there had been no attempt to surrender to the North by those who had staged coups or who had taken part in political movements, because they knew that they would be deprived of their freedom of expression and dissent if they came under a government controlled by Hanoi or its agents.

42. In addition to Viet-Nam he could talk also of other parts of Asia, such as Laos and Thailand. As representatives of Laos had told the General Assembly, the Pathet Lao and groups associated with them had never tried genuinely to implement the Geneva Agreements. They continued to be directed and supported by North Viet-Nam and Peking in a demonstration of bad faith and of some of the things against which the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty was directed. Representatives of Thailand, too, had spoken of attempts from outside to subvert their Government. Guerrillas were being trained in North Viet-Nam under Chinese instructors and infiltrated back into the country in an attempt to follow the pattern for creating a revolutionary situation. Through terrorism, they were striving to make the Thai Government unpopular and bring about its destruction. All those things were condemned by the Declaration, and specifically in its paragraph 2. The continued use of those methods by Hanoi and Peking constituted the most flagrant violation of the Declaration in the past year.

43. Mr. HSUEH (China) said that the principle of non-intervention had long been recognized as the basic rule of conduct among independent and peace-loving States. The obligation to respect that principle had been made all the more mandatory by the United Nations Charter, in which it was enshrined, and by the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly at the twentieth session (resolution 2131 (XX)).

44. The current discussion provided an opportunity to identify violations and violators of the Declaration and to draw attention to areas where greater vigilance should be exercised. Unfortunately, it was precisely in those areas—Asia, Africa and Latin America—where peace and stability were most urgently needed for internal development that international communism had found its prime targets. States which did not choose to live under communism were castigated as reactionary, neo-colonialist and lackeys of imperialism. They were subjected to communist subversion, infiltration and terrorism, disguised as social reform, people's progress and liberation movements. The purpose of the intervention was to disrupt economic and social development and overthrow non-communist governments. Indeed, Asia, Africa and Latin America were regarded as the "countryside" to be conquered by international communism as a first step before it encircled the "cities" of the world, namely, Western Europe and North America. The blueprint for that world-wide intervention had been published in Peiping in September 1965 in an article by Lin Piao and given more glaring publicity at the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America—the "Tricontinental Conference"—held at Havana in January 1966 and attended by communists from eighty-two countries.

45. Every word uttered and every deed planned at the Tricontinental Conference, held only a few days after the Assembly's adoption of the Declaration on non-intervention, was the antithesis of the Declaration. The Conference had condemned as reactionary the Governments of Senegal, Upper Volta, Cameroon, Niger, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia and branded them as instruments of neo-colonialism. It had called for support of the "armed liberation struggles" in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, Oman and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It had encouraged the former British colonies in the Caribbean and certain former African colonies to fight for national liberation. Yet all those States were Members in good standing of the United Nations pursuing policies of peace and national development. They could hardly be described as reactionary and neo-colonialist. Moreover, the participants in the Conference, including government officials, had openly promoted an armed struggle in certain States at the very moment when other officials of the same Governments were discussing the implementation of the Declaration on non-intervention which they had unequivocally supported. The blatant violation of the Declaration by the Conference participants had been condemned by the Council of the Organization of American States in its resolution of 2 February 1966^{5/} and by the representatives of Latin American States in the United Nations in their letter to the President of the Security Council of 7 February 1966.^{6/}

46. Many countries in Africa and Asia shared the indignation of the Latin American States at the effrontery of the communists in promoting violent changes in the basic political institutions of sovereign States. The representatives of the Ivory Coast, Rwanda

and the Democratic Republic of the Congo had charged in the General Assembly that the communist régime in China had attempted to subvert their countries and stir up rebellion by arming dissidents and preaching revolution. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand, commenting on the nature of the régime which was fomenting revolution in those countries and his own, had observed that what the Chinese communists euphemistically called "the great proletarian cultural revolution" was a display of un-Asian behaviour which concealed fundamental weakness. But the Chinese communists were not the only interventionists in Asia and Africa. A book published by the Government of Ghana entitled Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa had revealed that, in response to Nkrumah's appeal, the communist States had sent their experts to Ghana to prepare and carry out detailed plans for espionage and subversive activities throughout Africa with the ultimate aim of overthrowing Governments which were not inclined towards communism.

47. In Asia, foreign intervention had a long history, but the delegation which had proposed the item on non-intervention for the Assembly's agenda was obviously seeking to direct the discussion to Viet-Nam, and, indeed, Viet-Nam was a typical case of intervention. The line of demarcation between the two parts of Viet-Nam had originally been intended to permit the regrouping of communist and non-communist forces, and millions of people from the north had fled to the south because they chose not to live under a communist régime. However, the Viet Cong—a term which was simply an abbreviation for "Viet-Nameese Communists"—had been trained and equipped by North Viet-Nam and had become an arm of the political organization which controlled that country. Their purpose was to overthrow the non-communist Government in the Republic of Viet-Nam by force and to extend communist rule to the south.

48. He deplored the support given to those interventionists in Viet-Nam by so-called liberals in non-communist countries who chose to ignore the subversion and terrorism to which they had consistently resorted and who insistently considered the Viet Cong terrorists as nationalists seeking reform. Those liberals should know that despite Viet Cong threats and attacks, 80 per cent of the people of the south had gone to the polls to elect their representatives to the Constituent Assembly and thousands of agents of the communists had defected to the Viet-Nameese Government in the south, while no South Viet-Nameese had defected to Hanoi. The assistance provided by the United States and others to the Republic of Viet-Nam was a contribution to the defence of that country against communist intervention in exercise of the right of collective self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the Charter. The bombing of North Viet-Nam was a necessary part of that self-defence and it was illogical for the so-called liberals to demand that it cease without at the same time calling for a cessation of intervention from the north. To demand the one without the other would be to betray the Charter and the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX).

^{5/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966, document S/7133.

^{6/} Ibid., document S/7123.

49. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly his delegation had referred in the First Committee (1398th meeting) to four serious cases of intervention

which, according to the collective judgement of the League of Nations and the United Nations, had been the work of communists. In the year following the adoption of the Declaration, events had demonstrated not only that intervention had come from the same direction but that it had been planned and was being carried out on an unprecedented scale. Events in the past year had also confirmed the view expressed by his delegation at the last session that open or armed intervention had become less likely in the contemporary world than covert or indirect intervention. The modern interventionists had perfected their technique of intervention by filling the target countries with agents whom the communists and so-called liberals described as "revolutionaries", "progressives", members of "liberation fronts" and so forth. Before the meaning of those terms was fully realized, serious fratricidal wars began and non-communist Governments, which were always smeared as reactionary or even fascist, were threatened.

50. Those who promoted intervention of that kind were playing a dangerous game. The day might come when they themselves would fall victim to the very technique of intervention which they had helped to perfect. According to a statement made in February 1966 by the Prime Minister of Cuba, the Chinese communist régime had increased its distribution of propaganda material in Cuba and Chinese communist representatives had tried to contact Cuban officers for the purposes of proselytism as well as to gather information. The Prime Minister of Cuba had himself declared that no sovereign State or Government could possibly tolerate such extraordinary practices. Countries practising covert intervention should remember the proverb: "Do as you would be done by".

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.