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**Chairman:** Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Fahmy (United Arab Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

## AGENDA ITEMS 31 AND 93

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (continued) (A/6312, A/6370, A/6375, A/6416, A/6417, A/C.1/934-937, A/C.1/L.383/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 and 2, A/C.1/L.391 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.392)

Withdrawal of all United States and other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations and dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (continued) (A/6394, A/C.1/935-937, A/C.1/L.383/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 and 2, A/C.1/L.389, A/C.1/L.391 and Add.1)

1. Mr. SHAW (Australia) said that his delegation had been ready to give higher priority to the Korean question. However, the Committee had decided to consider first the question of non-intervention, which the Soviet Union had requested should be inscribed on the agenda as an urgent and important item. Furthermore, the debate on the Korean question had been held up by a premature discussion concerning a draft resolution which had been submitted as a procedural one, although it actually touched on the very substance of the issue.

2. The question of Korea was, of course, of concern to all States Members of the United Nations. But it was of more vital concern to the countries of the Asian region and the countries which had helped the Korean people to resist aggression and to rehabilitate their country. Australia belonged to both categories.

3. In order to come to a properly considered decision on the question of extending invitations, the Committee must see the Korean question in perspective and

understand the reasons why there was now a North Korea and a South Korea separated by a demarcation line. Although Korea had for a long time been insulated from contact with the outside world, it had had a long history of independence before reappearing on the international scene at the end of the Second World War. At that time, as a result of the fortunes of war, the northern part of the country had been occupied by Soviet forces and the southern part by United States forces. The occupying Powers had set up a joint commission to establish a provisional Korean government. However, differences had arisen between them and the question of the unification of Korea had been brought before the United Nations in September 1947. At the second session of the General Assembly, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, consisting of nine Member States, had been set up to provide for the establishment of a national government made up of duly elected representatives of the Korean people. The Temporary Commission had had a mandate to enter North Korea, as well as South Korea, in order to try to bring about conditions under which free elections could be held. It had been refused permission to enter North Korea, and it had therefore been directed to implement the Assembly's programme in such parts of Korea as were accessible to it, and in May 1948 it had observed elections in South Korea. In resolution 195 (III), the General Assembly, had declared that there had been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission had been able to observe and consult; that that Government was based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea; and that it was the only such Government in Korea. In the same resolution, the United Nations had established a Commission on Korea with the object of trying to bring about the unification of the country.

4. Having served as a member and as Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Korea, he could testify personally to the efforts that had been made to make contact with North Korea. Those efforts and subsequent efforts by United Nations bodies had failed because of the complete denial by the North Korean authorities of any United Nations interest in or responsibility for the unification of Korea.

5. In June 1950 North Korean armed forces had invaded South Korea. The invasion, which had been verified by United Nations military observers located just south of the 38th parallel, had caused great devastation and suffering to the people of Korea, who had fought heroically to resist the imposition of an unpopular régime and ideology. The Security Council had called on all Members of the United Nations to

assist the Government and people of South Korea to resist armed attack. Sixteen Member States, representing all the regions of the world—and including Australia and New Zealand—had responded to the call. The aggressors and their Chinese allies had been beaten back, but the armistice which had then been signed had left Korea still divided.

6. Because of the attack the people of South Korea had suffered, it was not able to put much confidence in the good faith and integrity of its neighbours to the north without some concrete evidence that they accepted policies of peaceful co-operation. However, within the last few weeks incidents had occurred along the demarcation line, including assassinations carried out by the armed forces of North Korea. The twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.383/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 and 2) should be considered against that background.

7. As early as 1947, the Government of the Republic of Korea had bowed to the will of the people and organized free elections in the territory it controlled. It had recognized the competence of the United Nations, and it maintained, or had agreed to establish, diplomatic relations with seventy-five States, seventy-one of which were Members of the United Nations. On the other hand, the North Korean authorities had fought a long war of aggression against forces fighting under the flag of the United Nations. They had disregarded and rejected the resolutions of the General Assembly and had refused to co-operate with the three subsidiary organs the General Assembly had set up with a view to the unification of Korea. They had denied the legal competence of the United Nations even to discuss the Korean question.

8. It was for those reasons that the sponsors of the nine-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.391 and Add.1) wished to make acceptance of the competence of the General Assembly to discuss the Korean question a prior condition for any delegations desiring a hearing. Any delegation that was not prepared to fulfil such a condition could not have any claim to appear before the Committee.

9. The memorandum of 21 July 1966 from the North Korean authorities, which had been circulated at the request of the Soviet delegation (A/6370), stated the views of the North Koreans on the question.

10. The first paragraph of the memorandum claimed that the United States was again trying to "illegally bring the 'Korean question' before the United Nations General Assembly". As the Committee knew, the Korean question had been inscribed on the agenda not at the request of any one delegation, but because the General Assembly had instructed the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) to continue its efforts and to report on the results achieved. Moreover, so long as the North Korean authorities continued to assert that the General Assembly's discussion of the Korean question was illegal, it was not logically possible to invite their representatives to take part in it.

11. It was further stated in the North Korean memorandum that the Korean question was "a question of restoring the unity of the temporarily divided territory". That was accurate enough. But the memorandum

then asserted that it was accordingly, "an internal affair which should be solved by the Korean people themselves". It should not be forgotten, however, that the armed attack from the North had created a grave threat to international peace and security. The United Nations had taken action to remove that threat and then to establish peace and stability, and it was thus that the United Nations had become involved in the Korean question. Although the settlement of the Korean question was a matter for the Korean people themselves, the restoration and maintenance of normal conditions in Korea was also a matter for the United Nations.

12. The North Korean authorities then claimed that they had "made all possible efforts to realize the unification of the country" and had "consistently maintained that the peaceful unification of Korea should be realized by way of establishing a unified all-Korea government ... through free and democratic North-South general elections". It should not be forgotten that it was precisely because those authorities had resorted to force and had never agreed to the observation of free elections in North Korea that progress on unification had been impossible.

13. In the final part of the memorandum the North Korean authorities stated that "the United Nations should desist from the illegal discussion of the 'Korean question'", that "the United Nations was not entitled from the outset to deal with the Korean question" and that "having been reduced into a belligerent in the Korean war by the United States, the United Nations has even lost the moral authority to concern itself in the Korean question"

14. That statement proved clearly that the North Korean authorities had not in any way abandoned their defiant attitude towards the United Nations. Nor was there anything in their statement of 4 December (A/C.1/937) which indicated any change in their attitude. It would, therefore, be inadvisable to invite their representatives. Consequently, his delegation would vote in favour of the nine-Power draft resolution, which prescribed the conditions under which representatives from both parts of Korea might be allowed to take part in the Committee's debate, and would vote against the twelve-Power draft resolution, which did not give the Committee any assurance that the representatives invited would take a constructive attitude.

15. Mr. BUSNIAK (Czechoslovakia) stated that the discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations had achieved nothing so far owing to the fact that the United States, contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter, had committed an act of unilateral intervention in Korea. The Korean question had always been discussed in the United Nations in unequal and discriminatory circumstances, since the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had never been able to take part in the discussions. At the current session the United States had resorted to intrigue on a point of procedure. It had refused to recognize a decision taken by the Committee and had used totally unfounded arguments to prevent the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from taking part in discussion of the question. His delegation condemned those obstructive acts. The discrimination against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

was a violation of the United Nations Charter and was detrimental to the prestige of the Organization. The presence of all the parties concerned was not only reasonable, but even essential, if all aspects of a question were to be examined. All countries recognized that principle, of course, but some wished to impose conditions. Objectivity and fairness required that all the parties concerned should be invited without discrimination, without pressure and without conditions.

16. For those reasons his delegation supported the twelve-Power draft resolution and would vote for it. It was convinced that most members of the Committee would take the same attitude. On the other hand, his delegation would vote against the nine-Power draft resolution, which discriminated against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

17. Mr. TAUSHANI (Albania) stated that the unification of Korea was a matter exclusively within that country's national competence and should be settled only by the Korean people themselves. Discussion of the question was illegal and contrary to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. His delegation was resolutely opposed to discussion of the item relating to the report of UNCURK. That item had been placed on the agenda under the direct influence of the United States, which for the past twenty years had been using South Korea as a military base for aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and other peaceful Asian countries.

18. His delegation felt that no positive results could be achieved on the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces occupying South Korea and the dissolution of UNCURK without the participation of the representatives of the two parties concerned. That was why it supported the twelve-Power draft resolution and categorically rejected all attempts, especially those of the United States, to invite the representatives of the South Korean Government and to prevent the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from taking part in the discussion of the item by laying down conditions which were unacceptable to a sovereign State. Consequently, his delegation would vote in favour of the twelve-Power draft resolution and against the nine-Power draft resolution.

19. Mr. CHURCH (United States of America) pointed out that the nine-Power draft resolution and the twelve-Power draft resolution had only superficial similarities. In itself, extending an invitation was a simple procedural act, but in fact it involved questions of fundamental importance. Did the United Nations have the competence and authority under the Charter to deal with the Korean problem? If it did, was it not then proper and necessary to ask those taking part in the discussions to accept that competence and authority without reservations? For nearly two decades the United Nations had not ceased to assert its right to be concerned with the Korean problem.

20. After the Second World War the Korean people had soon realized that their independence and their unity were threatened by the evident determination of the Soviet Union to transform a line created solely as a result of the surrender of the Japanese forces into a permanent and artificial division of the country.

The Korean people had seen established in the north—under the protection of alien troops—a political and social structure foreign to Korea and a régime which offered no opportunity for freedom or national self-determination. It was against that background that the question of Korea had been brought before the General Assembly in 1947. The Assembly had formulated a programme to bring the Korean people independence, unity and a national government responsive to the popular will. The programme had involved the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the holding of free elections subject to observation by a United Nations commission. The Soviet Union and the authorities it had installed in North Korea had then insisted that the United Nations had no right to concern itself with the unity and independence of Korea. The General Assembly's programme had accordingly been carried out only in the part of Korea not subject to Soviet control. It was through that programme that the Republic of Korea had come into being in 1948 and had been recognized by the Assembly as the only lawful government in Korea based upon elections which had been an expression of the free will of the people. Through the programme also foreign forces had been withdrawn from the Republic of Korea in 1949; as in the case of the elections, no observation or verification by the United Nations of the withdrawal of foreign forces from North Korea had been possible, for the Soviet Union had continued to insist that the Korean problem was of no concern to the United Nations.

21. Then, in 1950, North Korea had attempted to conquer and destroy the Republic of Korea by means of armed invasion, and the United Nations had taken collective action to turn back the invasion. Even in the midst of the fighting, the Assembly had again reasserted its responsibility for certain basic objectives in Korea: to end the division of the country through peaceful means and to restore international peace and security in the area. The objectives had not been achieved, but that did not detract from their merit. Nor did it reduce United Nations responsibility for the problem.

22. North Korea, for its part, would like the Assembly to shed that responsibility and the United Nations to decide that it should no longer be concerned with the division of Korea or with the international tensions the division caused. That had been demonstrated again in the North Korean memorandum of 21 July 1966 (A/6370), which stated that the United Nations had lost the moral authority to concern itself with the Korean question and that the question of the country's unification was a purely internal affair. The same memorandum said, moreover, that the question of Korea's unification remained unsolved and that the division of the country constituted a grave menace to peace in the Far East and the world. It was thus clear that the United Nations was not to be concerned about a grave menace to peace for the simple reason that North Korea did not want it to be concerned.

23. Many of the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution shared that view; some of them had submitted at the twentieth session of the Assembly a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.360)<sup>1/</sup> stating that the establish-

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 32, document A/6221, para. 5 (c).

ment of a unified and independent Korea was essentially a domestic matter of the Korean people. That assertion was only one step from the claim that the United Nations had no right, authority or competence to deal with the problem created by the division of Korea. That step, moreover, had been taken at the preceding session by two of the sponsors—Hungary and Mongolia.

24. Precisely the same approach was urged at present by the communist countries which had requested the inclusion in the agenda of item 93: renunciation of any international responsibility for seeking a solution to the question of Korea. The explanatory memorandum attached to the request for the inclusion of the item in the agenda, (A/6394) and the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.389) did not envisage any role for the United Nations. The draft resolution even envisaged that "the 'Korean question' should not in future be discussed in the United Nations".

25. It was open to the Assembly to shed its responsibilities because they were difficult, and to close its eyes to a problem which affected peace and security in Asia because the solution was not yet in view. His delegation, however, like—he was confident—the overwhelming majority of the Members of the Assembly, would strongly oppose such an abdication of responsibility.

26. At the current session, as in the past, it had been argued that the invitation extended to representatives of Korea must be compatible with the dignity of those invited and should make no discriminatory or unreasonable demands upon them. The nine-Power draft resolution, of which the United States was a sponsor, did not ask that the Republic of Korea or North Korea should do anything incompatible with their dignity or that they should be treated in an unequal or discriminatory manner. On the contrary, the draft resolution asked that the Republic of Korea and North Korea should honour the dignity of the United Nations by accepting its competence and authority within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question. To propose that North Korea should be invited without accepting the competence and authority of the United Nations would be to urge unequal treatment in the name of equality and discrimination in the name of non-discrimination.

27. It had also been argued that it was unprofitable for the Committee to discuss a question unless the parties directly concerned were present or at least were invited to present their views. The argument ignored the following consideration: if the United Nations intended to continue to exercise its competence and authority with respect to the problem of Korea, it was reasonable, and indeed necessary, to ask that those who would participate in the search for a solution should accept the competence and authority of the Organization which was itself seeking that solution. To invite those representatives without such assurances would be to invite them to use the Committee to attack not only the manner in which the United Nations had exercised its responsibilities in Korea, but also the very right of the United Nations to concern itself with the Korean question.

28. Surely the Committee should hear statements and different views about any problem not solely for the sake of debate, but in order to find a solution. Con-

sequently, the Committee should first satisfy itself that both parties would co-operate in its efforts, that they would consider its recommendations in good faith and that they would accept the right of the Committee and the General Assembly to seek a solution to a problem which affected international peace and security in Asia.

29. His delegation considered that the formula used to invite representatives of Korea should be even-handed and should make no unreasonable demands on the Republic of Korea or on North Korea. At the same time, the formula must recognize the facts as they were, namely, that the Republic of Korea had unequivocally accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean problem, whereas North Korea continued to assert that the United Nations had no right to concern itself with that problem. The formula to be adopted must uphold the authority and competence of the United Nations and must in no way imply that the United Nations was abdicating its role in Korea or acquiescing in the view that it had no right to be concerned with the problems and tensions arising from the division of the country.

30. His delegation urged the Committee to adopt the nine-Power draft resolution because it was the only formula which took into account the legitimate interests of the Republic of Korea, North Korea and the United Nations itself.

31. U SOE TIN (Burma) said that the twelve-Power draft resolution was simple and straightforward. It presupposed no supra-national role for the United Nations. It did not impose any condition precedent. It was motivated, as the sponsors had stated, by a genuine desire to consider the items relating to Korea with all the seriousness they deserved. If the Committee wished to engage in a meaningful and realistic consideration of the items before it and to make every possible effort to bring about a rapprochement between the two sides, it was just and fair that the two parties directly concerned should be allowed to take part in the discussion.

32. It was well known that Korea had been artificially divided against the will of its people and that two differently orientated régimes, affiliated with the two opposing power blocs, had been set up. The artificial division imposed on the Korean people was being perpetuated as a result of the conflicting interests of the two blocs. It was an undeniable fact that the régime of the Republic of Korea had effective jurisdiction over the part of Korea south of the 38th parallel and that the régime of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had effective jurisdiction over the part of Korea north of the 38th parallel. It was, therefore, not only just but essential that the Committee should invite both parties to take part in the discussion which concerned the whole of Korea.

33. Burma had always been in favour of the United Nations objectives in Korea, namely, the establishment by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. It did not, however, believe that those objectives could be achieved without

the consent of the peoples concerned. It was time that the United Nations realized the futility of the methods which it had adopted in the past, and that it took a new approach to the question of Korea. For those reasons, his delegation would support the twelve-Power draft resolution and not the nine-Power draft resolution.

34. Mr. DIACONESCU (Romania) said that the question to be decided was whether or not the Committee would profit by inviting the two parties directly concerned with the Korean question. In his opinion, the answer did not require much imagination. Since the Committee found it useful each year to invite one of the parties, there was no reason why the other party's participation should be considered less useful. If the Committee wished to have a complete picture of the present situation, it should redress the injustice which had been done to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for nearly twenty years. That was precisely what was proposed in the twelve-Power draft resolution.

35. Anyone who seriously considered the question of Korea readily understood that the question could be settled only through direct negotiations between the two parties concerned, without external intervention. In its memorandum of 21 July 1966 (A/6370), the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had declared that it was prepared to negotiate with any South Korean personages who really desired national unity. By inviting the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and those of the Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion, the United Nations would help to establish the first contacts between the representatives of the two Governments.

36. It had often been alleged that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea refused to recognize the validity of United Nations resolutions adopted without its participation. At the same time, it was systematically prevented from taking part in the consideration of the questions which concerned it. It was not customary for the party whose policies agreed with those of certain Member States to be alone invited to state its views. Participation in the discussions was not a reward for adopting certain political positions, nor was it a good conduct medal. In order to prevent the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from stating its views at the United Nations, an attempt was being made to equate its attitude towards resolutions adopted without its participation with its general position with respect to the United Nations. As was well known, that Government had declared more than once that it recognized the principles proclaimed in the United Nations Charter. The fruitful co-operation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with many countries in all corners of the world was proof of its devotion to the fundamental Charter principles. The fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had rejected all attempts to intervene in its internal affairs could not serve as a pretext for preventing its representatives from taking part in the consideration of a question which concerned it directly.

37. Lastly, it had been contended that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not want to co-operate with the United Nations, and that it would not respond to an invitation from the United Nations. In its state-

ment of 4 December 1966 (A/C.1/937), however, it expressed its wish to take part unconditionally in the discussions on the question of Korea. The truth was that the United Nations, because of foreign pressures, had not wished to co-operate with the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, since it had imposed conditions on the invitation which were unacceptable to any independent and sovereign State.

38. The nine-Power draft resolution, of which the United States was a sponsor, proposed that the Committee should follow the discriminatory practice imposed upon it for many years. His delegation would vote against that draft resolution, for it was deeply convinced that it was to the interest of the United Nations to abandon the serious discrimination to which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been subjected for nearly twenty years. The discussions throughout that period showed that recriminations had led nowhere. If the Committee wanted the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respond to the invitation that was issued to it, it must treat that country with dignity and send it an unconditional invitation. For those reasons his delegation would strongly support the twelve-Power draft resolution.

39. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq) considered that the only way to progress in solving the problem of Korea was to issue an unconditional invitation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to the Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion in the First Committee. In the introduction to his annual report for 1965-1966 (A/6301/Add.1), the Secretary-General had recommended that all countries should be encouraged to send observers to the United Nations, in order to make the organization as representative as possible. In any event, whenever the United Nations discussed a question, the countries most directly concerned should be invited to take part in its discussions, as the Charter provided. To impose conditions on an invitation issued to a State was to prevent its acceptance. Iraq was in favour of sending the Governments of both North and South Korea an unqualified invitation to take part in the discussion. The reason why no progress had been made so far was that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been unable to take part in the discussions on a question of direct concern to it.

40. His delegation accordingly would vote for the twelve-Power draft resolution. It could not vote for the nine-Power draft resolution, particularly as it did not see exactly what was meant by "authority of the United Nations". In point of fact, many Member States—Israel for example—had violated the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations.

41. Mr. BEN-HORIN (Israel), speaking on a point of order, said that he was quite prepared to turn the present discussion into a discussion of Israel-Arab relations but, if that was not the Committee's wish, the Iraqi representative should keep to the subject under discussion.

42. The CHAIRMAN pointed out to the representative of Israel that his statement was an exercise of the right of reply and not a point of order.

43. Mr. BEN-HORIN (Israel) said that though he disagreed with the Chairman's ruling, he of course accepted it.

44. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq) did not see how the Committee could require a non-member State to accept the competence and authority of the Organization while allowing Member States which violated the Charter to retain their standing as Members. Furthermore, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would not have time to prove that it unequivocally accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations, as it would be requested to do by operative paragraph 2 of the nine-Power draft resolution, when the General Assembly session was coming to a close. That being so, there was no point in saying that the General Assembly reaffirmed its willingness to invite the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

45. His delegation would state its position in due course on the other draft resolutions on the Korean question before the Committee. He wished, nevertheless, to reaffirm at the present time that Iraq had always been for the evacuation of foreign troops from all countries, that it had always been in favour of the self-determination of peoples, and that it must be noted that UNCURK to date had not done very useful work and had simply issued reports which did not differ from one year to the next.

46. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) regretted that the delaying tactics of some delegations, especially the United States delegation, had prevented the Committee from reaching a decision earlier on the question of sending invitations to both parts of Korea. Indeed, the debate on the Korean question had been marked by discrimination from the beginning, since representatives of the Republic of Korea were already following the discussion as unofficial observers whereas the representatives of the other part of Korea had not even been afforded the possibility of being present at the discussion of their own affairs. That situation was due to the fact that a group of States was trying to impose its will arbitrarily on the General Assembly in the matter of Korea. It was regrettable that the fact that countries had or did not have diplomatic relations with the United States should be a determining factor in questions falling within the competence of the United Nations. That was actually what determined whether a State might send observers to the United Nations and whether it might, as a sovereign State, take part in discussions bearing on any question directly concerning it.

47. Both parties concerned should be given a hearing, in accordance with a fundamental legal principle, so that all the members of the Committee could form an objective opinion on the situation. That was the purpose of the twelve-Power draft resolution, in contrast with the nine-Power draft resolution, which set a number of conditions for the invitation, as though a culprit was being summoned to court for indictment. No sovereign State could accept such conditions, not to mention the fact that it was certainly not North Korea that could be held guilty of any wrongdoing in Korea.

48. Moreover, the question of inviting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had to be considered at the

current session in the light of the fact that the Committee had before it not only the report of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea but also another question relating to the restoration of the Korean people's dignity and the exercise of its right to self-determination. From the legal point of view, there could be no obligations without rights. Nevertheless, the sponsors of the nine-Power draft resolution sought to impose obligations on the Korean People's Democratic Republic without granting it any rights in return. If the parties directly concerned could not take part in decisions on questions concerning them, those decisions could have no binding force for them. The sponsors of the nine-Power draft resolution nevertheless wanted the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to accept in advance the decisions of an organization of which it was not a member. Such a practice was a flagrant violation of the right of self-determination and the sovereignty of States, which were established principles both of international law and of the Charter and should therefore be respected by all States, whether they were Members of the United Nations or not. A self-respecting State could not accept such a condition.

49. Furthermore, among States which wanted the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to accept the competence and authority of the organization in advance, there were some who, although full Members, did not respect United Nations decisions; for instance, the United States did not act in accordance with those decisions on many issues, such as colonial questions, apartheid and racial discrimination.

50. There had been many cases of countries appearing before United Nations organs on questions directly concerning them, without any conditions being laid down. Why then should an exception be made in the case of North Korea? The United States representative had said that an alien society had been imposed on North Korea. But had the United States representative been in that country? He himself had been there and could say that the inhabitants were exerting every effort to build an advanced society. A more convincing proof was the fact that many Korean nationals living in Japan, who had been unemployed and had been given the choice of returning to North Korea or South Korea, had of their own free will chosen to return to North Korea, with a few exceptions. Contrary to the United States representative's assertions, the Koreans themselves preferred the way of life in North Korea to that in South Korea, which was today ruled by a military dictatorship, following the mockery of free elections which had been held at the end of the Second World War.

51. The nine-Power draft resolution was grounded on prejudices and could only serve to create tensions without helping to settle the Korean question. If the Committee adopted it, it would be repeating the mistakes of the past. On the other hand, adoption of the twelve-Power draft resolution would not harm the interests of anyone and would enhance the prestige of the United Nations by showing that it was resolved to consider the Korean question objectively and to dispel the "cold war" atmosphere surrounding it.



52. Mr. JIMENEZ (Philippines) said that, though he believed that generally it was desirable to have a dialogue between the parties directly concerned in a dispute, he feared that in the case of the Korean question such a dialogue might not be fruitful, because, for it to be so, both parties would have to come to it with sincere intentions and would have to accept the authority and competence of the United Nations. Unfortunately, such was not the case. North Korea and South Korea could not be considered in the same category. The Republic of Korea had always recognized the competence and authority of the United Nations, whereas the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had always refused to bow to its decisions and had always questioned its competence to deal with the Korean question. The Republic of Korea was the only legitimate Government recognized by the United Nations and ever since its establishment it had always co-operated with the United Nations for the creation of a democratic and unified Korea under an independent Government. On the other hand, North

Korea had declared once more in its memorandum of 21 July 1966 (A/6370) that the United Nations should desist from the illegal discussion of the Korean question and revoke all the unlawful resolutions adopted on it.

53. He questioned whether in such circumstances North Korea should be given the opportunity to come and defy the authority of the United Nations in the First Committee. The Hungarian representative had said that there could not be obligations without rights. His reply to that was that the obligation to recognize the competence of the United Nations brought with it the right to attend the Committee's debates. He hoped that the nine-Power draft resolution would be adopted. As it contained a condition, it should logically be given priority over the twelve-Power draft resolution. However, in order to make the Committee's work easier, the sponsors of the nine-Power draft resolution had decided not to request priority.

*The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.*