

United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1457th
MEETING

Thursday, 17 November 1966,
at 11 a.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Agenda item 27:

*Question of general and complete disarmament:
report of the Conference of the Eighteen-
Nation Committee on Disarmament (con-
tinued)*

Consideration of draft resolutions 183

Agenda item 28:

*Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and
thermonuclear tests: report of the Con-
ference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee
on Disarmament*

General debate 187

Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 27

*Question of general and complete disarmament: re-
port of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Com-
mittee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228,
A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and
Rev.1/Add.2-4, A/C.1/L.374, A/C.1/L.377-379,
A/C.1/L.381)*

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.1/
L.370/REV.1 AND REV.1/ADD.1/CORR.1 AND
REV.1/ADD.2-4, A/C.1/L.374, A/C.1/L.377-379,
A/C.1/L.381)

1. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary), speaking on a point of order, said that he had been surprised to read in the *Journal* of the United Nations that the Committee had so many items before it at the same time—agenda items 27, 28, 29 and 98. The normal practice was to take up the various items one by one and, when consideration of one item had been concluded or deferred, to go on to the next item. At the beginning of the session the Committee had indeed agreed that in the general debates, delegations might refer to any of the other six disarmament items as well as the one under discussion. His delegation was certainly not opposed to that, but felt that to have four different items before it at the same time might complicate the consideration of each separate item.

2. Furthermore, no verbatim or summary records had yet been distributed for the Committee's last two meetings. That increased the difficulties of delegations which were not large enough to send representatives to all bodies convened simultaneously. He therefore requested that steps be taken to ensure that the records were distributed at the proper time.

3. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee was at present considering only agenda item 27. At the last meeting he had announced that when the discussion on item 27 had been concluded, the Committee would take up item 28. Thus, the agreed order of priority would be strictly observed. The fact that other items were mentioned in the *Journal* had no special significance.

4. Mr. VELLODI (Secretary of the Committee) said that 16 November had been an unusually difficult day for the Secretariat, as the Security Council, the General Assembly itself and the First Committee had all been meeting at the same time. Since there were not enough verbatim reporters to produce records for all three bodies at once, the Secretariat would normally have had to cancel the two meetings of the First Committee. It had preferred to adhere to the original arrangements for two meetings of the Committee, on the understanding that the verbatim records would be prepared from the sound recordings. But, since transcription of the sound recordings took time, it had not been possible to observe the usual time-limits for distribution of the verbatim records. The Secretariat would do its best to distribute verbatim and summary records as soon as possible.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would now consider the draft resolutions and amendments submitted on agenda item 27.

6. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania) shared the views expressed by the Iranian and Kenyan representatives at the 1456th meeting. He therefore wished merely to deal with certain aspects of the question which other speakers had not yet discussed.

7. A solution of the disarmament problem was complicated by three negative influences which threatened to frustrate the most sincere and persistent efforts—fear, ignorance and disrespect for the principles of international law.

8. It was now clear that many countries were again beset by feelings of mistrust and uncertainty and were desperately looking for reassurance. Some of them had revised their defence plans in the past twelve months. Instead of reducing their defence expenditure and cutting down the size of their armed forces, they were planning to increase the number of men under arms by as much as 20 per cent. In one case, defence expenditure was more than 34 per cent higher than in the previous year and amounted to about one-sixth of the total national budget. The countries concerned were major or medium-sized Powers, but the psychosis was affecting smaller countries as well. At the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and elsewhere, the non-nuclear countries had stepped up their demands and were now asking for guarantees

against attack by nuclear States. That was undoubtedly the main reason for the wide support given to the Pakistan proposal for a conference of non-nuclear States.

9. Fear bred on ignorance. As vast numbers of men were illiterate, they could not appreciate the unity of mankind or enjoy the miracle of communication with fellow beings who were, perhaps, separated from them by space and time or colour and nationality, but who were linked with them by knowledge. Even in countries where illiteracy was an unknown or minor phenomenon, knowledge of other peoples and of the United Nations and its objectives was often superficial. Education placed too little emphasis on the possibilities of peace and international co-operation and too much emphasis on national self-interest and belligerence. People were not being taught to accept the ethical and moral principles which defined the mutual responsibilities and obligations of the international society or to appreciate the reciprocal advantages of cultural exchanges and trade and aid.

10. It was little wonder, then, that fear and ignorance together engendered disrespect for the interests and rights of other peoples. That could lead to the outbreak of unnecessary wars and violations of the generally accepted standards of civilized society. Resort to force in relations between nations was always a retrograde step. If the rules of international law and the standards of civilized conduct were to be sacrificed to the supreme objective—the imposition of the will of stronger nations on their weaker brethren—the direct combatants, and international society as a whole, might relapse into pristine savagery. Accordingly, attempts had always been made to outlaw the use of particular weapons of destruction which outraged the conscience of humanity. One result of those efforts had been the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature at Geneva on 17 June 1925. The principles laid down in the Protocol had been observed because countries had nearly always been afraid of retaliation. But in the Ethiopian war the Italians had been safe from any possibility of retaliation and had used gas with devastating effects.

11. If destruction could not be avoided in conventional wars, what would become of the rules and norms of international law in the event of a nuclear war? Respect for the rules and principles of international law should be guaranteed primarily by countries which, in view of their size and military power, had been given special responsibilities for the maintenance of peace. It was, in fact, the responsibility of all nations.

12. Chemical weapons had been used as long ago as the fifth century B.C. Through the ages, constant efforts had been made to prohibit their use. Chemical warfare had been discussed at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and at the Conference on Limitation of Armament at Washington 1922. It was therefore quite appropriate for the Hungarian delegation to submit a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374) condemning a form of warfare which was abhorrent to civilized human beings. Furthermore, everyone had heard reports that gases and incendiary weapons were cur-

rently being used against undefended villages and areas. In defence of the use of incapacitating gases it had been argued that it was actually humane to use gas rather than weapons which could wound or kill.

13. That argument was quite unconvincing, particularly since weapons of mass destruction were more often than not used by the Western community against oriental or African countries and peoples. There was still, it seemed, an unacknowledged and perhaps unconscious belief that the rules of war need not, under international law, be applied to peoples with a different civilization. In 1906 an English writer had drawn attention to "that peculiarly barbarous type of warfare which civilized Powers wage against tribes of inferior civilization".^{1/} In an article entitled "How to fight savage tribes", published in 1927,^{2/} a United States Army officer, Captain Elbridge Colby, had argued that different principles should be adopted in dealing with uncivilized peoples who did not know or observe international law and would take advantage of anyone who did. By dropping a bomb on a sacred temple or a reputedly inaccessible village, the well-equipped civilized foe was—it was alleged—demonstrating his relentless energy and superior technical skill. A few non-combatants might be killed, but the loss of life would probably be far less than that resulting from prolonged operations of a more polite character. The inhuman act thus became actually humane, he had concluded, as it shortened the conflict and prevented excessive bloodshed.

14. Arguments similar to those had been put forward to justify use of the atomic bomb in the war against Japan, and were being heard again today.

15. Those with faith in the ultimate victory of good over evil were not discouraged by the fact that, in spite of the Eighteen-Nation Committee's efforts, progress towards general and complete disarmament seemed slow if measured by present standards of time. The human race might vanish very soon or might exist for millions of years to come and it was quite possible that future generations, living in a world of peace and security, would not distinguish between the man of today and primitive man.

16. His delegation would support draft resolution A/C.1/L.378, draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-4, and draft resolution A/C.1/L.379, of which it was a sponsor.

17. In connexion with draft resolution A/C.1/L.379, the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964, had appealed to the great Powers to take the lead in giving effect to measures which would make substantial reductions in their military budgets possible. It had also declared itself in favour of any proposal for diverting resources now employed on armaments to the development of underdeveloped parts of the world.

18. His delegation, together with those of Kenya and Uganda, had submitted amendments (A/C.1/L.381) to the Hungarian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374) which

^{1/} F. W. Hirst, *The Arbitrator in Council* (London, Macmillan and Co., 1906), p. 230.

^{2/} See *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 21, 1927, p. 287.

were designed to improve the text. The sponsors of the amendments had wished to emphasize their conviction that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons was incompatible with accepted norms of civilization, and had also felt that all States should be invited to adhere to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

19. His delegation had no difficulty in supporting the draft resolution submitted by Poland and the Ukrainian SSR (A/C.1/L.377) as it stood. It might, however, be so amended as to make it more accurately reflect actual juridical and political realities. While not wishing to make a formal proposal, he thought that the sponsors might be willing to consider the following text, which, incidentally, was partly based on a form of words used by the Polish representative at the 1455th meeting:

"The General Assembly,

"Reaffirming that the chief purpose of the United Nations is the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of international security,

"Noting the risks inherent in the flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,

"Considering that such flights over the territory of foreign States may increase tension and affect relations between nations,

"Calls upon all States to refrain from sending aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction over the territory of foreign States without the explicit consent of those States."

20. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) thought that the Committee was considering the question of general and complete disarmament in an atmosphere of increased awareness of the terrifying danger the nuclear threat represented for humanity. The signs of progress noted during discussion of the two previous agenda items showed that the States Members of the United Nations were willing to make every effort to eliminate the danger. It must, however, be admitted that the will of States to go resolutely forward on the road to general and complete disarmament had so far been frustrated. Despite the many technical difficulties, the problem, though complex, was not insurmountable and his delegation welcomed the interest the non-nuclear Powers had shown in it.

21. Ever since the signing of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in Moscow on 5 August 1963, the next practical possibility had been the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would slowly but surely set in motion the process of general and complete disarmament.

22. The problem of general and complete disarmament remained a constant concern of all States. They must strive unceasingly to solve it while at the same time working on collateral measures. Their joint efforts must be directed towards removing both the symptoms of danger and their causes. In other words, not only must the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, be halted and reversed, but the international situation responsible for it must be changed. The present situation must therefore be assessed. As it

was marked not only by profoundly disturbing signs of deterioration—increased tension, localized conflicts, problems inherited from colonialism—but also by signs of improvement, of which the most important was the thaw in the cold war, the various aspects of disarmament could be tackled effectively only by both reducing the causes of tension and consolidating the new understanding between the super-Powers through increased co-operation between them and the other nations. Such co-operation would make it possible, by abolishing war, to undertake the exciting task of organizing the world in a permanent climate of peace. But not all Powers were willing to co-operate towards the desired end. There were several reasons for that. They included inequality in technical and military development, which gave rise to a stubborn mistrust that could be allayed only by a system of genuine and effective measures and guarantees binding upon all nations, whether Members of the United Nations or not.

23. It was hard to see how the process of progressive reduction and controlled elimination of armaments could be initiated unless the problem of confidence, fundamental to any negotiation, were solved at the same time. However, before tackling, one by one, the collateral measures of disarmament on which an agreement was possible, what the Italian representative had described at the 1451st meeting as "a complex subject related to the final stages of a very long process of world disarmament" should be considered. Only when the problem of disarmament had been placed in long-term perspective and the goal of collective security had been set, would it be possible to examine, discuss and negotiate agreements on partial or collateral measures of disarmament. After the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, the most urgent of those measures were reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban, including a ban on underground tests, and a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. Thanks to the various compromise formulas certain countries, especially Sweden, had proposed for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions, it was to be hoped that the United States and the Soviet Union would be able to break the present deadlock. Furthermore, progress on the denuclearization of Latin America should be followed by similar efforts to secure the denuclearization of Africa and other regions. Nor should the danger inherent in continuation of the conventional arms race be underestimated. Only by an uninterrupted series of negotiations on specific draft treaties would it be possible to sort out the difficulties and set out on the path to general and complete disarmament, which was still the ultimate aim. In that matter, he hoped that the plan for a world disarmament conference would be realized. In the interest of disarmament, it might be desirable to adopt a system of rotation of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee so as to ensure effective participation of all States in the important negotiations under way.

24. His delegation had warmly supported the Secretary-General's suggestion in the introduction to his annual report for 1965-1966 (A/6301/Add.1) for a study of "the impact and implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons" and wished to associate itself

with the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-4. The study would help to limit and control the production of nuclear weapons by giving Governments and the public a better understanding of the nature of the nuclear threat. The draft resolution should be adopted unanimously. His delegation reserved the right to express its view on the other draft resolutions before the Committee at a later stage.

25. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) expressed the hope that the Committee's debates on disarmament questions would end in unanimous votes, for only resolutions adopted unanimously could be truly effective. His delegation would give its unreserved support to draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-4 and to draft resolution A/C.1/L.378, which it believed would receive unanimous endorsement.

26. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.377 seemed to have relapsed into a habit dear to the Eastern delegations which some might think outmoded—that of making extravagant proposals, knowing full well that they would be rejected, for the sole purpose of obstructing the Committee's work. It was of course desirable that disarmament should lead finally to the abolition of alliances, but in the absence of agreements to that effect each country retained its sovereign freedom to organize its security as it thought best. That principle applied both to military bases and to flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. The Western countries believed in an integrated system of defence based on close co-operation between allies and extending beyond national geographical frontiers; thus within the framework of alliances, the aircraft movements, like troop movements, were quite in order. The argument invoked in support of draft resolution A/C.1/L.377 was the need to remove the danger of atmospheric pollution. But there was already in existence a ban having that end in view—the partial test ban treaty. It had taken the Warsaw Treaty countries over a year to accept the Western countries' proposal for a test ban. The Polish and Ukrainian representatives had suddenly become concerned about the contamination of the atmosphere, and he found that rather strange. There had recently been reports of underground tests carried out by the great Powers, and it was not known to what extent they had contaminated the atmosphere, perhaps in violation of the partial test ban treaty. If the Polish and Ukrainian delegations were genuinely concerned about the danger of pollution, why did they seek to eliminate only risks of hypothetical accidents, when there were other more real dangers that should be averted? The Polish and Ukrainian delegations, supported by other delegations, had asserted that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had already given the matter serious consideration. The truth was that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had patiently listened to the polemical remarks of the five delegations from the Eastern countries, but no other country represented in the Committee had associated itself with them. The result had been a great waste of the Eighteen-Nation Committee's time, and draft resolution A/C.1/L.377 would have the same effect on the First Committee's work.

27. His delegation had always upheld the principle that the resources released by disarmament should be

utilized for the economic and social development of all peoples, and particularly of the under-developed countries, and had indeed made concrete proposals in the Disarmament Commission in 1965 for the implementation of that principle. Its basic attitude towards the idea behind draft resolution A/C.1/L.379 could therefore not be called in question. That draft resolution, however, dealt with a subject which lay within the competence of other committees and necessitated study in depth. Furthermore, operative paragraph 3 dealt with a very complex question on which the Eighteen-Nation Committee had not yet been able to pronounce for lack of technical studies on the comparability of budgets of different countries. A decision on that subject could be taken only by the Eighteen-Nation Committee after a very thorough study. As the consideration of that question had already been entrusted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee under the Disarmament Commission's resolution of 15 June 1965,^{3/} draft resolution A/C.1/L.379 could be simply referred to that Committee without being voted upon.

28. Sir Harold BEELEY (United Kingdom) commended to the Committee the amendments to draft resolution A/C.1/L.374 contained in document A/C.1/L.382, of which his delegation was a sponsor. Those amendments fell into three parts. First, the sponsors proposed the deletion of the word "contemporary" from the first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution; it was not clear which elements of international law were not "contemporary" or how that word might be interpreted in the future. Secondly, they proposed the addition of a preambular paragraph recalling the fact that the subjects discussed in the draft resolution were already on the agenda of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Thirdly, they proposed a single operative paragraph as better suited than the three paragraphs in the original resolution to the common purpose of strengthening the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. He hoped that Governments which had ratified the Protocol on a basis of reciprocity, as had the United Kingdom, would not find that that constituted any obstacle to voting in favour of a draft resolution on the question and, specifically, in favour of the amendments in document A/C.1/L.382.

29. Mr. LIATIS (Greece) said his delegation believed that the solution of the problems of disarmament, security and peace depended mainly on the political will of the great Powers. He had accordingly refrained up to the present from intervening in the First Committee's debates, in the hope that more rapid progress might be achieved in the current negotiations between the two major Powers. He wished, however, to state his delegation's position on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

30. His delegation whole-heartedly supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-4, as it was convinced that a better informed world public opinion would understand better the attitudes of Governments toward nuclear weapons and would be in a position to exert influence in the right direction. His delegation would also support draft resolution A/C.1/L.378 since the

^{3/} See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/225.

work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had amply proved its usefulness, although it had not progressed as rapidly as might be desired.

31. His delegation was opposed in principle to the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons but could not support draft resolution A/C.1/L.374, as it had apparently been introduced for propaganda purposes associated with the cold war. He appealed to all the delegations concerned to desist from irrelevant actions which poisoned the atmosphere in the Committee. The amendments in document A/C.1/L.381, though well intentioned, had not fully dispelled his misgivings. On the other hand, the amendments in document A/C.1/L.382 preserved the basic objective of the draft resolution while excluding its propagandistic provisions. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.374 only if the amendments in document A/C.1/L.382 were adopted. It would vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.377 since flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons were one of the means of defence available to countries belonging to defensive alliances which the present international political situation had compelled them to form. The drafting changes just proposed by the Tanzanian representative did not change the purport of the draft resolution.

32. His delegation supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.379 although it believed that the consideration of such matters was premature at the present stage of the disarmament negotiations and that other organs of the United Nations were more competent to deal with them.

33. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) said that as one of the sponsors of the amendments in document A/C.1/L.382, he wished to add a few comments to the explanation given by the United Kingdom representative. Resolutions, to be effective, should be adopted unanimously. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.374, however, could never receive unanimous support, given its tendentious, negative, ambiguous and even aggressive tone. The amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.381 did not remove the draft resolution's negative aspects. The Hungarian draft resolution contained an idea to which, if it were expressed without the tendentious language which accompanied it, there would be no objection: that the international commitment to humanize war and to ban chemical and bacteriological weapons must be reaffirmed. However, unless the wording was changed a number of delegations would be unable to support the draft. For that reason Italy had associated itself with the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States in sponsoring amendments which put the question in its proper context. The commitments which they proposed could be assumed by all countries and the resolution would then be of genuine and universal value. By accepting those amendments, the Hungarian representative would give proof of his sincerity and good faith.

34. Mr. ODHIAMBO (Kenya) said that the amendments to the Hungarian draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.381 had been introduced for several reasons. Weapons of mass destruction were not only a danger to all mankind; they were also incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization. The Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 had been drawn up for that

very reason. Furthermore, the sponsors of the amendments in document A/C.1/L.381 had considered it necessary to emphasize that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons was to be deplored and that all States which had not already done so should be invited to adhere to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

35. As for the amendments to the Hungarian draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.382, the addition of a new preambular paragraph would put the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons back within the framework of general and complete disarmament, whereas they had been removed from the general weaponry of mankind as long ago as 1925. In his delegation's view, the question of the use of those weapons, because of its special gravity, should be treated separately, as in the Geneva Protocol. For those reasons, it would be difficult for his delegation to accept the amendments in document A/C.1/L.382.

36. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said he wished to point out to the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, who had earlier in the meeting quoted a passage from an article written in 1927 by a United States Army captain, that the views expressed by that officer had never been those of the United States Government. No such argument had ever been advanced officially, either during the Second World War or later.

37. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania) welcomed the assurances just given by the United States representative but wished to point out that he had not described the views of the United States captain as an expression of the policy of the United States Government. Moreover, those assurances argued in favour of the adoption of the amendments in document A/C.1/L.381, which did not condemn any Power but simply deplored the use of chemical and biological weapons, weapons which should be banned from the globe, as all delegations seemed to agree. He reserved the right to speak again on the matter.

AGENDA ITEM 28

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.380)

GENERAL DEBATE

38. Mr. ASTROM (Sweden), introducing draft resolution A/C.1/L.380, said that the operative paragraphs of the draft followed logically from the points covered in the preambular paragraphs. The sponsors wished above all to stress the particularly urgent need to ban nuclear weapon tests. The draft resolution had been worked out after extensive consultations, and the eight sponsors hoped that it would meet the preoccupations of Member States and be adopted unanimously.

39. The deliberations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests were being accompanied by an uninterrupted series of such tests. His Government deplored all nuclear experiments, whatever the environment in which they were conducted, and whether or not the countries concerned were bound by a formal test ban treaty. Negotiations on a comprehensive test

ban should form part of the immediate work programme of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. A draft treaty should be worked out as soon as possible, in order to make the negotiations more concrete and more purposeful.

40. When considering the prospects for an underground test ban agreement, it should be noted that the progress made was more substantial than had been publicly acknowledged. The chief obstacle to agreement was the fact that some countries believed that seismic shocks could be distinguished from nuclear explosions, while others demanded a certain number of on-site inspections. It was apparently difficult to determine whether minor seismic events fell into the category of earthquakes or explosions. Research in that area had been intensified, however, and the results would seem to forecast a new seismological method which might further improve existing identification techniques. The refinement of seismic detection and identification techniques would further reduce the small number of unknown events. His delegation favoured the continuance of research and hoped that all nations would encourage and facilitate such efforts. In that connexion, the acquisition of seismic data furnished, for example, within the framework of a "detection club", would provide a basis for increased research efforts in many countries. Countries possessing modern equipment and seismologically advantageous regions could play a particularly important role. Although great Powers which already had seismological networks of global range might not necessarily need a "detection club" for themselves, it was to be hoped that they would take part in that important area of scientific research; they would thereby be encouraging general co-operation for the purpose of test ban control.

41. The question of the future peaceful use of nuclear explosions needed further urgent international consideration. Rules would have to be worked out to regulate the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. That would necessitate careful consideration of the possible implications of the partial test ban treaty and of the implications of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive test ban treaty. The possible role of an international body, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, would also have to be explored. The right forum for such a study was the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and his delegation proposed that the matter should be considered immediately within the terms of reference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, with a view to drawing up international rules to which all States—nuclear and non-nuclear alike—would adhere.

42. The uncertainties still attaching to a ban on underground nuclear tests were insignificant in comparison with the risks inherent in the uncontrolled and unlimited continuation of such tests. The Eighteen-Nation Committee must reach an agreement on the matter without delay; political decisions were now needed. Twelve years had passed since the late Jawaharlal Nehru had first called upon the world to ban all nuclear tests, and the results of United Nations deliberations to that end were long overdue.

43. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy), referring to the negotiations on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, stressed the particular importance of two proposals made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the non-aligned countries, relating respectively to a ban on underground tests above a certain threshold and to inspection by invitation, or "verification by challenge". Those two proposals had in common the fact that they both recognized, either directly or indirectly, the principle of the need for inspection. The "threshold" idea, by suggesting that a test ban agreement should be limited for the time being to large-scale explosions, indirectly confirmed that it was impossible to identify all underground explosions by means of national devices. To ensure security in regard to any secret explosion, therefore, inspections were necessary. Under the system of inspection by invitation, a country's rejection of a request for inspection would entitle the other party to take extreme steps, namely, to denounce the test ban treaty. The two proposals thus confirmed the principle of the need for appropriate verification.

44. Again, the Soviet Union's position on the question of control had undergone some modification. After first stating that no inspection would be necessary, the Soviet Union had proposed the conclusion of a treaty providing for three inspections a year. In response to that proposal the United States had reduced its demand from eight to seven inspections a year. The Soviet Union had then reversed its decision and had again rejected any idea of inspection. It had also refused at Geneva to examine the technical data underlying the problem of verification, or possible procedures for inspection. At present, the Soviet attitude was again developing along positive lines; he referred in particular to the Soviet approval of the Swedish proposal for international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data.^{4/} The Soviet Union was also less hostile than in the past to the application of controls, and had expressed its support of International Atomic Energy Agency control under an agreement on non-proliferation. Of course, that was a different context from that of a test ban, and the Soviet delegation had recently again expressed opposition to inspection in connexion with a ban on underground nuclear tests. Nevertheless, some improvement in the Soviet attitude was discernible, particularly with regard to IAEA controls. That might be a subject worth exploring in the context of a test ban agreement. It might be useful to take up the question of controls again at Geneva, giving special consideration to the two points just mentioned.

45. Agreement on a comprehensive test ban would help to improve the international situation and would bring the world closer to general and complete disarmament. The Italian delegation was convinced that progress would be achieved. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.380 would greatly facilitate the Committee's efforts in that area, and his delegation would vote for it.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, document DC/227, annex I, sect. B.