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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Fahmy (United Arab Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

Expression of sympathy

1. The CHAIRMAN expressed the Committee's sympathy for the people of Florence on the occasion of the recent floods, which had caused severe damage to the city and its art treasures.
2. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) thanked the Chairman and said he would communicate the Committee's sentiments to his Government.

AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1, A/C.1/L.374, A/C.1/L.377)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

3. Mr. BELOKOLOS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that since the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had made no progress on any of the subjects before it, owing to the unwillingness of the Western Powers participating in its work, particularly the United States, to adopt concrete measures of disarmament. The United States was spending more money for military purposes in the current year than in any year since the end of the Second World War. It gave priority to military plans and nuclear strategy and to its aggressive war in Viet-Nam rather than to the cause of disarmament, thereby reducing the possibility of progress in the Eighteen-Nation Committee to a minimum.
4. The United States position in the Geneva negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was based on the concept of "limited dissemination" of such weapons within military alliances, in evident

contradiction of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). The Soviet Union's draft treaty on non-proliferation,^{1/} on the other hand, was aimed at closing all loop-holes that would permit direct or indirect dissemination of such weapons.

5. The non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had made valuable suggestions. The Mexican proposal that nothing in the treaty on non-proliferation should prevent States from concluding agreements to keep their territory free from nuclear weapons was a most useful one. There was, however, a lack of willingness to conclude an agreement on cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests on the realistic and practical basis of using national means to supervise the observance of the agreement.

6. Likewise, the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been unable to take any steps towards prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, in spite of the declaration in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) that such use was a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The Soviet Union and the other socialist States had indicated their readiness to sign a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, but a solution of the problem had been prevented by the attitude of certain militaristic forces which wanted to retain their ability to use nuclear weapons as a threat against peace-loving States and peoples. His delegation welcomed the Ethiopian proposal^{2/} to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against denuclearized territories or regions.

7. It was evident from the Eighteen-Nation Committee's report that the Western Powers members of that Committee were still preventing the establishment of denuclearized zones in the most dangerous regions of the world. In particular, the United States and the other members of NATO had not given a favourable response to the proposal, made by the Polish People's Republic and supported by the other socialist States, for creating in Central Europe, where large concentrations of armed forces were confronting each other, a nuclear-free zone and a zone in which nuclear weapons were frozen. It should also be recalled that in a special message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee^{3/} the German Democratic Republic had requested the

^{1/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/5976.

^{2/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. R.

^{3/} Letter dated 7 February 1966 from the representative of the USSR to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, transmitting a letter dated 7 February from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic together with a statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic (document ENDC/168).

nuclear Powers to denuclearize German territory and keep it denuclearized.

8. The difficulties in the way of agreement in the Eighteen-Nation Committee were not technical but political and arose out of an unwillingness on the part of one side to each agreement on important questions. All States must renew their efforts to end the deadlock. It was in that spirit that Poland and the Ukrainian SSR had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.377) concerning the cessation of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction beyond national frontiers. The mere existence of such weapons posed a constant threat to world peace and security, but when they were carried on board aircraft the danger of their accidental use became far greater. Everyone knew of the numerous air disasters involving aircraft which carried nuclear weapons, most recently near the Spanish village of Palomares in January 1966; the question of the dangerous consequences of such incidents had been raised in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Similarly, the question of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear devices had been taken up several years earlier in the Security Council because an error in the functioning of a radar system had led one nuclear great Power to send such aircraft in the direction of another such Power's territory.

9. Further evidence that the flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons constituted a real and pressing danger could be found in the fact that certain States, notably Switzerland and Ceylon, had taken steps to restrict or limit such flights over their territory. The time had come for all States to take an appropriate decision on the cessation of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.377 would help to ease international tension and to create favourable conditions for the Eighteen-Nation Committee's work.

10. His delegation also supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1, originally by Poland and later by a number of other countries, on various aspects of the nuclear weapons problem, as well as the Hungarian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374) on strict compliance by all States with the Protocol for the prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature at Geneva on 17 June 1925.^{4/}

11. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that the problem of nuclear deterrence involved not only nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and the systems used for defence against them, but also the psychological situation—what one nuclear Power thought about the intentions of another. A study of nuclear deterrence, such as the representative of the United Arab Republic had suggested at the 271st meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 7 July 1966, should be aimed at determining the minimum to which the great nuclear Powers could reduce the number of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in their possession in the later stages of disarmament while maintaining the existing balance of deterrence.

12. The United States Secretary of Defense had recently stated that the Soviet Union had been developing an anti-ballistic-missile system and that similar action might have to be taken by the United States. He had also suggested that the development of defensive systems might lead to a development of offensive armaments in order to maintain the "credibility of deterrence". The Prime Minister of Canada, speaking in Scarborough, Ontario, on 25 June 1966, had said that the deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system would be an enormously costly undertaking which would probably lead, as the ballistic missile race had done, to ever-mounting defence budgets without any permanent increase in national security or international stability. He had gone on to say that if the United States and the Soviet Union could reach a tacit understanding to refrain from the production and deployment of anti-ballistic-missile systems, they would prevent a new escalation of the arms race and reduce international tension. It would then be easier to examine the vital political issues on which the reduction of armaments largely depended. Moreover, a halt in the development of anti-ballistic-missile systems would remove a major reason for the continuation of underground testing.

13. Vast economic resources were being wasted not only in the arms race between the great Powers, but also in local arms races between smaller and less developed countries whose economies might thereby be greatly harmed. The Vice-President of the United States had drawn attention to the problem in connexion with Latin America, and the same question could be raised in regard to many other regions.

14. He was grateful to the Polish delegation for co-operating with the Norwegian and Canadian delegations to produce a revised draft resolution (A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1); the scope of the study there proposed was broader than that in the original Polish proposal (A/C.1/L.370), and he believed that its terms would be acceptable to all delegations. His delegation was greatly interested in the type of study suggested by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report for 1965-1966 (A/6301/Add.1). It had proposed a more limited study for the present only because it believed that it would not be possible to deal effectively with all the topics the Secretary-General had mentioned before the twenty-second session. A further study of the other topics might be undertaken later.

15. In operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 the question of the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons was listed first, since that was a matter of particular concern to the Polish delegation. However, in the Canadian delegation's view—and, he believed, in the view of most others—all the subjects mentioned in operative paragraph 1 were of equal importance and must be given balanced treatment in the proposed study and the report to be submitted to the Assembly at its twenty-second session.

16. The term "accessible material" in operative paragraph 2 meant material which was available or could be made available from various sources at the request of the Secretariat and its consultants. Because the report was to reflect their combined views

^{4/} League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

rather than the views of national Governments, the consultants must be persons with real experience and authority in the scientific, technological and other aspects of the problems being dealt with. They would, from time to time, require additional data from Governments, but no Government would, of course, be expected to provide classified information or material which it considered sensitive from the viewpoint of national security.

17. Lastly, operative paragraph 1 called for a "concise" report in order that the report could be prepared in time and that a large number of people might find it readable. The word "concise" should not, however, be interpreted to mean that the project should be superficial or concentrate on only one of the topics selected for study.

18. The report as proposed in the revised draft resolution, which he hoped would be adopted unanimously, could make a real and lasting contribution to understanding of the problems created by the advent of nuclear weapons.

19. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to express his delegation's views on three items—the question of general and complete disarmament, the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (agenda item 28), and the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons (agenda item 29).

20. General and complete disarmament was one of the most important of all international problems, but the results of the Eighteen-Nation Committee's discussions on the subject during the past year had not been satisfactory, largely owing to the negative position of the United States and other Western Powers, which had made no effort to seek agreement and had tried to avoid discussing general disarmament problems.

21. The United States had adopted that attitude because, with some of its military allies, it was engaged in aggression in Viet-Nam and was accelerating the arms race. The continued escalation of the United States aggression in Viet-Nam was reflected in the United States military budget estimates which amounted to \$60,500 million—or 53.6 per cent of the total budget—for 1966-1967, compared with \$50,200 million in 1964-1965. Conscription in the United States had reached the highest level since the Second World War. Plans had recently been announced for replacing the Polaris missile with the more powerful Poseidon missiles. Additional armaments were also being sought by some of the United States' military partners. West Germany, for instance, already had half a million men under arms and was planning to increase the size of the Bundeswehr to 750,000. West German revanchists were still anxious to acquire nuclear weapons.

22. Though the policies of the United States tended to intensify the arms race and increase international tension, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had made every effort to seek a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament

in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2031 (XX), paragraph 1. The Soviet Union's approach to the question of general and complete disarmament was based on the fundamental premise that the primary objective of disarmament negotiations must be agreement on measures which from the very beginning of the disarmament process would at least radically reduce the possibility of a nuclear missile war, if they did not rule out such a possibility altogether. Accordingly, measures for eliminating the nuclear arsenals of States were the very corner-stone of the Soviet disarmament plan. The Soviet Union had often said that it was prepared to consider any constructive proposal designed to bring new life into the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. The assertion that the world was incapable of dealing with the armaments race was acceptable only to those who were anxious to conceal their desire to produce more armaments. If all States realized their responsibility for the maintenance of peace, the problem of general disarmament could be solved. The United Nations could and should find the strength to give new impetus to disarmament negotiations.

23. As a first step in the direction of general disarmament, the Soviet Union advocated the earliest possible adoption of partial measures, and particularly measures to limit nuclear armaments. The General Assembly, in adopting resolution 2149 (XXI), had already shown that it attached the highest importance to the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Agreement on a comprehensive test ban, which would apply to underground nuclear weapon tests as well as to tests in the other three environments, was equally important. The Soviet Union had constantly advocated prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests. As national means of detection were now adequate to ensure observance of a ban on underground nuclear tests, the Soviet Government was ready at any time to agree to extend the scope of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, to cover underground nuclear explosions. At the same time, in order to expedite the solution of the problem, it had declared its readiness to accept the compromise proposal made by the United Arab Republic at the 224th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, on 17 August 1965, for a ban on underground nuclear tests above a certain seismic magnitude and for a moratorium on all other tests until agreement had been reached on a comprehensive test ban. The Swedish proposal for a "detection club"^{5/} also deserved attention, if it would contribute to the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests without any kind of inspection. States should not, by reason of their membership of the "detection club", be obliged to agree to international inspections and control on their territory. The submission of seismological data should be voluntary, and the data collected should be evaluated not by any international body, but by each State for itself. The problem of prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests could be solved only by adopting a political approach, such as that

^{5/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. B.

which had led to the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty in 1963. If the United States genuinely wanted agreement on an underground nuclear test ban, it should adopt a realistic political approach and should not persist in its unjustified demands for international inspection and control.

24. The threat of nuclear war could also be reduced by prohibiting the flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond the frontiers of their country of origin. Such flights were extremely dangerous, as the Soviet Government had repeatedly pointed out. They might, as politicians in the United States and other Western countries had admitted, lead through some accident or miscalculation to the outbreak of a nuclear war. The prohibition of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond national frontiers would greatly reduce that risk, and would help to protect the territories of States, and the sea as well, from contamination by radio-active elements. He was thinking particularly of the United States bomber carrying nuclear weapons which had crashed off the coast of Spain in January 1966. His delegation fully supported the draft resolution on the subject submitted by Poland and the Ukrainian SSR (A/C.1/L.377).

25. The question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons had first been raised in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), in which the Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of Member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening such a conference. The fact that the conference had not yet been convened was due to the negative position of the United States and other Western Powers, which were opposed to the conclusion of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons, although they could not produce any convincing arguments to support their attitude. Their assertion that the convention would amount merely to a declaration, which could easily be violated, was untenable. If one were to believe such an assertion, no international agreements could be signed at all. In fact, the will and the determination of States to respect the obligations which they assumed under international agreements were the best guarantee that the agreements would be observed.

26. The Soviet Union quite definitely advocated the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and, furthermore, the destruction of nuclear weapons. A convention banning the use of nuclear weapons would be particularly valuable at the present time in view of the increased danger of nuclear war caused by United States aggression in Viet-Nam. The General Assembly should arrange to convene a conference to conclude the convention and, until it was concluded, States possessing nuclear weapons should, individually or jointly, undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons was to some extent linked with the proposal in draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 for a concise report on the effects of the use of nuclear weapons. His delegation thought that the report would be useful and supported the draft resolution.

27. Decisive steps were also required to prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Protocol for the Pro-

hibition of the use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, had been observed throughout the Second World War. But the General Assembly could not remain indifferent to the fact that chemical weapons were being used by the United States forces in Viet-Nam. The Soviet delegation fully supported the Hungarian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374), which was based on generally accepted principles of international law. The use of chemical and bacteriological weapons had been condemned by scientists from many countries at the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and recently by a large group of scientists in the United States itself.

28. In view of the present standstill in disarmament negotiations, the idea of giving a new impetus to the negotiations by convening a world disarmament conference with the participation of all States was more opportune than ever. The non-aligned countries, particularly those taking part in the Eighteen-Nation Committee's work, deserved credit for the valuable contribution they had made to the negotiations. The Soviet Union, for its part, was determined to make every effort to achieve general and complete disarmament and, in the meantime, to encourage the adoption of partial disarmament measures.

29. Mr. Endalkachew MAKONNEN (Ethiopia) observed that, twenty-one years after the establishment of the United Nations, the goal of disarmament seemed to be further away than it had been when the Charter had been drafted. During the disarmament negotiations, the armaments race had reached its highest pitch.

30. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had not made appreciable progress in carrying out its mandate under General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), although it had provided a better understanding of the complexity and magnitude of the problem. At the moment, the main problem was how to break the deadlock in negotiations which had developed over the United States and Soviet draft treaties on disarmament. As the deadlock was due largely to differences of opinion on what should be achieved at each stage of the disarmament process, the best course was to isolate specific disarmament issues and to work out mutually acceptable remedial measures for each of them. Such measures included a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which had already been given the highest priority in the First Committee and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and an extension of the partial test ban treaty of 1963 to cover underground tests.

31. A treaty on non-proliferation must be based on the principles embodied in resolution 2028 (XX). The nuclear-weapon Powers should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States; not to transfer, directly or indirectly in any manner, nuclear weapons to States not possessing such weapons today; and to halt the production of nuclear weapons and proceed to a substantial reduction of existing stockpiles immediately upon the entry into force of the proposed agreement with a view eventually to eliminating all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, should undertake not to seek or receive nuclear weapons or any technical or other information concerning their manufacture

from any nuclear-weapon Power; to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons with or without outside help; and not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons in their territories. It should be constantly remembered that an agreement on non-proliferation was not an end in itself but only a step towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.

32. The discussions on a comprehensive test ban agreement in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had greatly helped to clarify the issues, especially in regard to on-site inspection. Various Governments and non-governmental organizations had contributed important data on seismic detection, thereby narrowing the gap between the United States and Soviet positions on the issue of on-site inspection. He particularly welcomed the Swedish contribution to the discussion. The proposals made by the Swedish representative at the 247th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, on 10 March 1966, contained complete guidelines for a comprehensive test ban agreement. In particular, the recommended procedures for dealing with "suspicious events" would reduce the need for on-site inspection. If through further scientific research the divergencies over the issue of on-site inspection could be resolved, faster progress on a comprehensive test ban agreement would become possible.

33. The conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation and a comprehensive test ban treaty were essential steps towards the goal of general and complete disarmament but his Government attached considerable importance also to the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. He was grateful for the Ukrainian representative's reference to Ethiopian initiatives in the matter. The idea of prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermonuclear devices for war purposes had been first raised by the Ethiopian delegation at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly and it had been subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI), sponsored by the Ethiopian delegation. That resolution constituted the first United Nations declaration of principles on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Since then, the Ethiopian delegation had continued to urge the convening of a conference for the purpose of signing an international convention on prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. If the nuclear-weapon Powers had been willing to conclude such a convention, the United Nations might not be faced today with the more difficult problem of an agreement on non-proliferation. Nevertheless, despite the present complexity of disarmament problems, principally as a result of the acceleration of the nuclear arms race since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), the proposed convention would have the twofold merit of affording relief from the immediate threat of nuclear destruction and helping to remove one of the greatest difficulties in the disarmament negotiations, that is, the retention of nuclear deterrents until the last stage of disarmament. He appealed therefore to members of the First Committee to give the question their urgent and careful attention.

34. An encouraging development in the last few years was the proposed denuclearization of various regions. If Latin America and Africa were declared nuclear-free zones to be respected by all the nuclear-weapon Powers, denuclearization could be gradually extended to other regions where the interests of the big Powers were in conflict. The denuclearization of continents and regions would help to keep nuclear weapons within their present territorial limits until their final elimination. Although it was not a disarmament measure, it would have a salutary effect upon the psychology of the arms race.

35. While every effort should be urgently directed in the first instance, to halting and reversing the nuclear arms race, the world community could not afford to disregard the conventional arms race, which continued virtually unchecked. Attention should be focused on two aspects of the problem. First, the general view of the question of nuclear deterrents seemed to compel the major nuclear-weapon Powers to continue to seek preponderance over each other in conventional weapons. Inasmuch as the battles of today were still being fought with conventional weapons it would be almost impossible to halt the race and achieve a reduction of conventional weapons to agreed proportionate levels. If, however, success was achieved in regard to the reduction and possible elimination of nuclear weapons, the chances of making considerable progress in the reduction of conventional weapons would be greatly enhanced.

36. Whatever interim measures were adopted or specific agreements concluded, the ultimate goal towards which all must strive was general and complete disarmament under effective international control. As the Ethiopian Foreign Minister had pointed out in the Assembly's general debate (1423rd plenary meeting), any disarmament measure to which not all the nuclear Powers were parties would remain ineffectual and illusory. It was regrettable that one of the nuclear Powers was excluded from the deliberations on disarmament, while another, by its own choice, remained absent from the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. His delegation attached the greatest importance to the universal character of those negotiations and hoped that all the Powers would find ways of participating in the common search for peace when the world disarmament conference was convened.

37. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America) said that two of the draft resolutions before the Committee appeared to have nothing to do with general and complete disarmament. Draft resolutions A/C.1/L.374 on chemical and bacteriological weapons and A/C.1/L.377 on flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons were motivated by purely propagandistic ends and their sponsors had not troubled to make even a passing reference in them to the question before the Committee. Everyone remembered the sterile propaganda exchanges which, at the height of the cold war, had marred East-West relations and obstructed useful discussions in the Committee. As he had already stated (1451st meeting), those who persisted in that course with misguided concern only for making propaganda must bear full responsibility for any recriminations which could have adverse effect on both public and official opinion and lead to a deterioration of an

atmosphere conducive to constructive discussion both in the First Committee and elsewhere.

38. The Hungarian representative, in introducing draft resolution A/C.1/L.374, had sought to establish as contrary to accepted international law the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases "and all analogous liquids, materials or devices" as well as bacteriological methods of warfare. By his references to the use of toxic gas by Fascist Italy against Ethiopia and the use of gas for genocide by Nazi Germany, the Hungarian representative had insinuated that the United States was engaged in similar acts in Viet-Nam. Such an innuendo was both offensive and inexcusable. With reference to the use by the United States of herbicides for defoliating trees in Viet-Nam, the Hungarian representative had urged that the norms of international law prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons should be confirmed. In connexion with the use of riot-control gases, he had made a clear distinction between the use of tear gas within the sovereign jurisdiction of a country and its use in the conduct of warfare. Those arguments could not stand up under analysis.

39. The Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which the United States was not a party, had been intended to prohibit the use in war of deadly gases such as mustard gas and phosgene. It did not apply to all gases and certainly did not prohibit the use of simple tear gas where necessary to avoid injury to innocent persons. It was therefore unreasonable to contend that any rule of international law prohibited the use, in military combat against an enemy, of non-toxic chemical agents which were used by Governments for riot control purposes. The United States had not engaged in gas warfare since the First World War, when it had been unfortunately necessary to use gas in retaliation. The United States Secretary of State had said on 25 March 1965 that the United States was not engaged in gas warfare in Viet-Nam, as that would be contrary to United States policy. The United States had played a crucial role in preventing the horrors of gas warfare during the Second World War. President Roosevelt had threatened the Axis Powers with severe retaliation if they resorted to gas warfare and he had stated categorically that under no circumstances would the United States use weapons of gas warfare unless they were first used by its enemies. That fundamental line of United States policy had been continued by President Eisenhower and was still followed today by President Johnson. Tear gas was occasionally used in Viet-Nam by the United States forces and those of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Tear gas was commonly available and used for riot control purposes by police forces throughout the world. Evidence for recent years revealed that more than fifty countries had so used it. It was ridiculous to contend that national authorities had thus committed acts which, while within their jurisdiction, were contrary to accepted norms of behaviour. Tear gas was often more humane than force, whether it was a question of civil action to quell unruly rioters or military action to dislodge the Viet Cong hiding in villages and using innocent civilians and prisoners as shields. The representative of Hungary, in making a distinction between riot control and warfare, would appear to admit as permissible the use of tear gas by national authorities for riot control purposes against their own

nationals. Was he thus prepared to condone the dreadful effects he had attributed to tear gas for riot control by national authorities? Of course not, for he well knew that tear gas did not have the effects he had described. Nor did the United States delegation believe that the use of tear gas by almost half the countries represented in the Committee bore out the contention that use of the same gas in Viet-Nam for humanitarian purposes—for saving instead of destroying life—was contrary to any norm of international conduct and law. The herbicides used in Viet-Nam involved the same chemicals and had the same effect as those commonly used in the United States and many other countries to clear weeds and control vegetation. They were not bacteriological weapons, nor was their use contrary to international law.

40. He drew the Hungarian representative's attention to an article in The New York Times of 11 November 1966 which had reported the use of tear gas against United States forces in Viet-Nam and the capture of tear-gas grenades from the Viet Cong. It had been officially confirmed that on 10 November 1966 gas grenades had been used against a United States patrol in Viet-Nam, and they had been found to be of Communist Chinese manufacture.

41. During the Korean War the United States had been accused of resorting to germ warfare. History had proven those charges utterly false and would record a similar verdict for the charges now made. Had the Hungarian draft resolution been motivated by genuine concern over the problem of chemical and bacteriological warfare, it would have called for observance of the principles and norms of the Geneva Protocol without employing tendentious language and it would have met with general support. Its purpose, however, was purely propagandistic and his delegation would vote against it.

42. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.377 was similar to a USSR draft resolution^{6/} which the Security Council had rejected at its 817th meeting, on 2 May 1958, by 9 votes to 1, with 1 abstention. The question had been raised again in 1966 in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in connexion with the crash of a United States aircraft carrying unarmed nuclear armament near the Spanish coast. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.377 seemed to suggest that flights of nuclear-armed aircraft outside national boundaries violated the partial test ban treaty of 1963 and the Convention on the High Seas of 1958.^{7/} The idea that such agreements would be violated as a result of accidents whether within or beyond national frontiers had no validity. Furthermore, the accident which had occurred in Spain had not resulted in a nuclear explosion precisely because elaborate precautions had been taken by the United States to avoid such a contingency. The fact that no reference had been made to the other means of transporting nuclear weapons beyond national frontiers clearly revealed the propagandistic intent behind the draft resolution. Furthermore, the draft conveniently ignored geography. Deployment of weapons and forces beyond national frontiers was

^{6/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Thirteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1958, document S/3997.

^{7/} See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, vol. II, Plenary Meetings, p. 135.

essential to the States of NATO and it would be unrealistic to attempt to confine their deployment within national frontiers. He wondered how the sponsors of the draft resolution proposed to verify its application. His delegation intended to vote against it.

43. Certain delegations might feel a need to ventilate their propaganda, but his delegation should not be expected to remain silent when faced with such tactics. Agenda items and draft resolutions introduced for purely propaganda motives were evidence of a regression to the lamentable practices of the cold war.

44. With reference to draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1, the proposed study could serve a most useful purpose. In any study of the implications of nuclear weapons and the threat posed by the nuclear arms race, it was clearly necessary to do far more than assemble information on the horrors of the possible use of nuclear weapons. He was glad that the security and economic implications of the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons were also included for study. The proper perspective for such a study would be found in the introduction to the Secretary-General's annual report for 1965-1966 (A/6301/Add.1). He hoped that "accessible material" did not mean only published information and that Governments would be asked to provide additional appropriate information. His Government would be prepared to consider such a request most sympathetically. It would be vital for the success of the report

that the Secretary-General should be able to call on the assistance of "consultant experts" best qualified to assess the economic, scientific, military and other factors to be studied. Such a report could contribute significantly to a better understanding of the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and thus facilitate progress on the measures necessary to deal with it. His delegation would vote in favour of that draft resolution.

45. Mr. PRANDLER (Hungary), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his delegation, in submitting draft resolution A/C.1/L.374, had been inspired by a genuine desire to promote the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons as an integral part of the efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament. Such a prohibition could represent a very important collateral measure if it was endorsed by the First Committee.

46. The United States representative had asserted that the Hungarian draft resolution had nothing to do with general and complete disarmament and had called it propagandistic. The United States representative's statement might also be described as propagandistic and as confused. The United States delegation was in a precarious position and would do well to argue its case with those American scholars, including several winners of Nobel prizes, who held a different view from its own.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.