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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 106

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (continued) (A/
5976, A/5986-DC/227)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. NABWERA (Kenya) expressed appreciation of the efforts which were reflected in the draft texts on the subject of non-proliferation submitted by various Governments. Kenya believed that the draft treaties presented by the USSR and the United States were not irreconcilable; the main difference between them seemed to lie in their varying attitudes towards Central Europe. One of the main goals of the USSR draft (A/5976) was to prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons or sharing nuclear power with its military allies. The fears underlying that attitude could be easily appreciated. Central Europe was an area of tension, and everything possible should be done to ensure that it did not become the theatre of another war which would inflict untold suffering on mankind. Perhaps because of political and military considerations, the United States draft treaty^{1/} did not place sufficient emphasis on that aspect of the problem; Kenya believed that a NATO multilateral nuclear force would hamper measures to curb the spread of nuclear weapons in Central Europe.

2. The United States draft wisely proposed a periodic review of the operation of the treaty; such a review was necessary, for what was needed was a flexible treaty which could be adapted to changing international conditions. The link between the treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency provided for in the United States text was also a useful idea.

3. Article V of the United States draft mentioned only three nuclear Powers, omitting France and the People's Republic of China. That was unrealistic; any international agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should recognize the existence of five nuclear Powers. In addition, a distinction

should perhaps be drawn between non-nuclear States such as Kenya, which had no nuclear ambitions, and non-nuclear States which were capable of becoming nuclear Powers; it might be useful to include in the treaty a provision calling on potential nuclear Powers to abandon their nuclear ambitions. He welcomed the statements of the Canadian and Indian delegations that although Canada and India were capable of producing nuclear weapons, they had seen fit to refrain from doing so. Other nations in a similar situation should be invited to make corresponding declarations.

4. His delegation did not believe that the security of the non-nuclear countries lay in guarantees from the nuclear Powers. No formal guarantees existed at the present time, and none should be needed after the signature of a non-proliferation treaty; such arrangements would turn the non-nuclear countries into satellites of the protecting nuclear Powers and Kenya would be entirely opposed to them, just as it was opposed to military alliances in general. The Kenyan delegation would welcome any move to prevent the sale of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Powers, and believed that there should also be a guarantee that nuclear equipment, such as atomic reactors, acquired for peaceful purposes would not be converted to military use.

5. The Kenyan Government was opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the racist Government of South Africa, whose technology, vast resources and international connexions made it a potential nuclear Power. The events at Sharpeville in 1960 had shown that the South African Government could resort to any means to wipe out an African population. The Kenyan delegation would explain its views on that subject in further detail when the Committee took up its agenda item relating to the denuclearization of Africa.

6. The problem of the dissemination of nuclear weapons was inseparable from the wider problem of the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. If the non-nuclear nations were to undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers should also undertake to abolish their monopoly of nuclear weapons altogether; in that respect, Kenya shared the view expressed in the joint memorandum^{2/} submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the eight non-aligned participants. The fullest co-operation between the great Powers was needed in disarmament negotiations; their final decision could mean the salvation or destruction of mankind.

7. The Kenyan delegation proposed, firstly, that the two draft treaties should be considered as the basis

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. A.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, sect. E.

for the final treaty on non-proliferation; secondly, that France should be requested to take part in the Eighteen-Nation Committee when the question of non-proliferation was taken up again, and that the People's Republic of China should also be invited to participate; and thirdly, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should take into account the views expressed, and any resolution that might be adopted, at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, and should try to prepare a final draft treaty for submission to the world disarmament conference or to the General Assembly.

8. Mr. NIELSEN (Norway) said it was a cause of increasing concern in his country that the membership of the nuclear club had expanded, whereas no real progress had been made in establishing a bulwark against further proliferation. To prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons was the most urgent and vital task facing mankind.

9. The submission of draft treaties by the two major nuclear Powers was a most important positive element, since it signified their readiness to participate in serious and *bona fide* negotiations. It was to be hoped that the differences between the two drafts would not prove irreconcilable. A satisfactory solution could be achieved only if the main problems relating to nuclear strategy were taken into consideration. Although naturally the major nuclear Powers would protect their legitimate interests, it was to be hoped that they would not adopt rigid positions that would unduly complicate or hinder the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. Norway attached great importance to the United States representative's statement at the 1355th meeting that his country's draft had been offered as a basis for discussion and negotiation; presumably the USSR draft treaty had been submitted in the same spirit. It was encouraging too that the statements made in the First Committee by representatives of non-nuclear States had also reflected a strong desire for the conclusion of an appropriate treaty on non-proliferation.

10. The Norwegian Government attached great importance to the conclusion of such a treaty and to the achievement of a total ban on all nuclear tests. The first step should be for all non-nuclear countries to assume clear and firm treaty commitments not to produce or otherwise acquire national control of nuclear weapons, and for the nuclear Powers to accept treaty commitments not to relinquish control over their weapons or transmit information that would enable non-nuclear States to manufacture nuclear weapons. The First Committee was hardly the most appropriate forum for actual negotiations on the text of a treaty. However, Norway shared the view expressed by the United Kingdom representative that advantage should be taken of the current propitious circumstances, and that informal contacts should be established between the major interested Powers as soon as possible. The machinery of the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be used for the purpose; the members of that Committee could meet either at Geneva or in New York during the current session of the Assembly.

11. Norway believed that the assumption of treaty commitments need not necessarily await the establish-

ment of a final and comprehensive control system; the International Atomic Energy Agency might have a useful contribution to make in that connexion. A treaty on non-dissemination would be of the greatest importance to nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike. Ways should be sought to allay the understandable fears of non-nuclear countries that nuclear weapons might be used against them. However, matters should not be complicated by linking the issue of non-proliferation to other disarmament questions.

12. One of the collateral measures closely linked with non-proliferation was the halting of underground nuclear weapon tests. The Norwegian Government had declared its willingness to explore the possibility of participating in the "detection club" proposed by Sweden in a memorandum submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.^{3/}

13. If the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament was to be reached, progress would have to be made step by step. Norway believed that the best approach at the present stage was to pursue with vigour the collateral measures already singled out by the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water had been a significant step forward. A universal treaty on non-dissemination would be a most important further step which might lead to progress in other aspects of disarmament.

14. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) welcomed the submission of the United States and USSR draft treaties, and expressed confidence that they would result in an agreement which would ultimately be adopted by all the nuclear Powers and which would be gratefully welcomed by all other nations. The Irish delegation heartily endorsed the decision to discuss the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a single issue; it was convinced that the key to stable peace and the co-operative development of the world's resources for the benefit of mankind was to be found in halting the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons.

15. In the light of the warning uttered by the Secretary-General (1355th meeting), it was encouraging that the three nuclear Powers whose representatives had spoken in the First Committee had all emphasized the importance of giving absolute priority to the question of non-dissemination and negotiating a treaty on the subject as quickly as possible. In addition, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the fourth nuclear Member of the United Nations, France, had indicated to the General Assembly (1341st plenary meeting) that it was opposed to nuclear dissemination. A point had therefore been reached at which three of the nuclear Members of the Organization, at least, were anxious to negotiate and sign an agreement on non-dissemination and the fourth nuclear Member was in any event firmly determined not to embark upon nuclear dissemination.

16. Because of the delay in implementing General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, a second circle of States was amassing the skills and resources necessary for the production of nuclear weapons, and demanding that the door of the nuclear club should

^{3/} Ibid., sect. B.

not be closed except on a growing list of conditions which were politically and militarily unattainable. If another State entered the nuclear club, the others in the circle would try to follow as quickly as they could. Another wider circle of States was beginning to argue about the right of every nation to its bomb. The objective sought by a nuclear Power which would not bind itself by a non-proliferation treaty or by a non-nuclear State which wished to acquire nuclear weapons was the attainment of national security—through individual strength, through the strength of alliances or by causing confusion in an opposing alliance. In the case of the non-nuclear aspirants, the desire for technical by-products and national prestige could not be ignored, but it was secondary to the primary aim of national security.

17. The amassing of weapons of total destruction and means of delivering them had been a valid method for one great Power to seek its national security, but it ceased to be valid as other Powers became similarly equipped. In a world supersaturated with the means of instant and total destruction, individual national security was no longer to be found in national armaments or limited military alliances; it could be found only in collective peace-keeping measures adopted through the efforts of the United Nations. Limited military alliances were improvised to meet a particular threat and therefore lacked stability in an ever-changing world; but the United Nations, if it grasped the opportunity while there was yet time, could become a solid and unchangeable universal peace alliance capable of protecting all nations individually and collectively against the nuclear danger.

18. If the present and succeeding generations were to beat their swords into ploughshares in order to win a better life for all in brotherly co-operation, the United Nations must act to maintain international discipline and to dissuade States from taking individual action which added to international tension and endangered their neighbours. For example, all measures open to United Nations organs under the Charter should be taken to dissuade any signatory to the partial test ban treaty from testing nuclear weapons in the prohibited environments.

19. Four of the five present nuclear Powers were permanent members of the Security Council, and he hoped that an agreement would soon be negotiated to enable an independent Taiwan to take its place in the Assembly, with the five nuclear Powers filling the seats of the five permanent members of the Security Council. If the world was not to end in nuclear chaos, a line of demarcation must be drawn between nuclear and non-nuclear States until such time as there no longer existed any individual ownership of nuclear weapons; and a natural and stable line would be that between the permanent members of the Security Council and other States. An attempt by a non-nuclear State to breach it not only would endanger world peace but would blaze the trail to world anarchy. The nuclear Powers, and particularly the super-Powers, bore the responsibility for stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. Although there was no likelihood that any of them would decide to surrender their monopoly of nuclear weapons, it was urgent that they should produce an agreed text of a treaty on

non-dissemination, for the signatures of the majority, if not all, of the nuclear Powers were necessary before the non-nuclear States could be asked to sign.

20. The question of control of nuclear weapons within mixed alliances of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers should not prove an insurmountable obstacle to agreement if there was clear understanding of what was natural and permissible—and indeed inevitable—within such alliances. For example, until the United Nations could organize and develop a universal and completely stable system of collective defence, it was in the vital interest of all States that group military alliances should remain sufficiently stable to prevent any sudden change in the strategic balance between the super-Powers. Again, all members of a mixed alliance should be conceded the right, when a treaty on non-dissemination was drafted, to unrestricted political and military consultations—first, so as to ensure adequate planning of the action to be taken by members and their military units in the event of a conventional or nuclear attack on the alliance; secondly, so as to ensure that no member would launch a nuclear or conventional attack except upon clearly defined conditions which all members would have a voice in determining; and, thirdly, so that there could be discussion of the conditions, including inspection and control, upon which the nuclear members of a mixed alliance might negotiate with other nuclear States for the reciprocal withdrawal of various types of nuclear weapons and delivery systems from specific areas. Apart from the question of a treaty on non-dissemination, the groups in mixed military alliances might also agree that a unilateral attack by one member would automatically terminate the alliance.

21. In order to dispel the suspicions and fears surrounding the question of the control of nuclear weapons within mixed alliances, it was essential for the nuclear Powers participating in such alliances to commit themselves firmly now to the obligation not to give any non-nuclear States control over nuclear weapons or the means of acquiring them; he had no doubt that such commitments would be observed faithfully.

22. There could be no hope of reasonable stability in the world if the Members of the United Nations did not discourage or, if necessary, take steps to dissuade all non-nuclear States or groups of non-nuclear States from having the means or developing the capacity to detonate, or cause a nuclear Power to detonate, a nuclear weapon. Moreover, the internal stability of some non-nuclear States would be gravely endangered if they had nuclear weapons in armouries liable to seizure and use by a power-crazy revolutionary group. It was no disservice and no injustice to non-nuclear States to seek to prevent them from obtaining possession or control of nuclear weapons, for a non-nuclear State, inside or outside an alliance with a nuclear Power, had no more legal or moral right to such weapons than a man had to carry a bomb through the streets of a crowded city. Similarly, it was no disservice and no injustice to nuclear Powers to ask them to ensure that nuclear weapons would not be used except by their own national forces for self-defence or in defence of their allies.

23. Experts of the nuclear Powers should meet in New York or elsewhere to draft a treaty on non-dissemination at once, and it should be opened for signature as soon as possible in the capitals of the nuclear Powers. Even if one or more nuclear or non-nuclear States failed to sign such a treaty immediately, as had happened in the case of the partial test ban treaty, there was reason to hope that ultimately, and perhaps soon, all would be persuaded to sign, thus providing a firm foundation upon which to build a brighter future for all peoples.

24. Mr. PAZHWAK (Afghanistan) said that if the discussion of an agreement on halting the spread of nuclear weapons was to be fruitful, political sacrifices would be needed. The importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons had been recognized in statements made in the First Committee by representatives of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom; similar declarations had been made by the United Nations as a whole; yet no practical steps had been taken, and the number of nuclear Powers had in fact increased. Nothing had been done to give the force of legality to General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), which declared that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons was a crime against mankind; and the test ban treaty still failed to cover tests in all environments and had not been signed by all the nuclear Powers.

25. In his delegation's view, the United Nations alone had the responsibility to translate expressions of good will into legal agreements and treaties. The General Assembly's role should not be confined to transmitting proposals to other organs; it should establish certain principles in the form of concrete directives for detailed study by organs set up for that purpose.

26. The Afghan delegation shared the view expressed by the representative of the United Arab Republic (1359th meeting) that any international agreement should take into account not only the interests of the nuclear Powers but also their relationship with and

obligations towards the non-nuclear States, and that such an agreement should be regarded as a permanent international obligation and should contain no vague or controversial provisions which could be used by the signatories as a pretext for action to defeat its purposes.

27. The possible methods by which a non-nuclear State could directly or indirectly acquire nuclear weapons, or assistance or information which would increase its nuclear capability, should be determined by the General Assembly before they were considered by any other body engaged in a detailed examination of draft treaties. The Assembly should consider not only the proposals of nuclear Powers but those of all Powers, and should determine the general lines of the obligations to be undertaken by nuclear and by non-nuclear Powers. It should also endeavour to create the balance essential for mutual confidence among all countries, so as to induce all nuclear Powers, including Powers which were not at present Members of the United Nations or were not participating in deliberations on certain aspects of disarmament, to participate in common measures in the field of nuclear weapons and disarmament.

28. His delegation agreed with the statement made by the representative of Liberia (1359th meeting) that it was morally untenable that certain Powers should be allowed to possess nuclear weapons in perpetuity while others were denied their use, and associated itself with his support of the Nigerian representative's call for an unconditional undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers.

29. If the disarmament negotiations were to be successful, a new approach aimed at a comprehensive solution of disarmament problems would be needed. It was because of the urgent need for such an approach that Afghanistan supported the idea of a world disarmament conference.

The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.